text:
    (No. 74-CC-147
    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 17, 1973.

    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 74-CC-148
    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 17, 1973.

    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-154
    Laurel Haven School, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed, December 17, 1973.

    Laurel Haven School, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-180
    Office Equipment Co. of Chicago, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 17, 1973.

    Office Equipment Co. of Chicago, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-187
    Century Machine Shop, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 17, 1973.

    Century Machine Shop, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6988
    Kankakee Industrial Supply Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 17, 1973.

    Kankakee Industrial Supply Company, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This Court Finds that the purpose of this expenditure by the Department of Mental Health is the reimbursement to the vendor in accordance with the contract between the vendor and the Department of Mental Health for five gallon returnable bleach drums that were not returned. In accordance with the contract the department is to pay a price of $9.00 to the vendor for each drum not returned. The claim was filed for an amount of $927.00, but an audit conducted by the claimant and Mr. Gerald C. Anderson, Business Administrator for the Kankakee State Hospital, has concluded that as of November 6, 1972, the date of the filing of this complaint, there were only 28 drums outstanding and not returned which would amount to $252 due and owing for drums on the date of the filing of the claim. It would appear from the audit that the supplying and return of drums is a continuing purpose and that it would be virtually impossible at any time to determine if the claimant had supplied drums that would never be returned. However, the inventory of the Kanakee State Hospital indicated that there were drums missing and that the number missing would not be greater than 81. However, this report of the inventory was a current figure as of October 2, 1973, and can not be relied upon by the claimant in their claim for nonreturned drums as of the date of filing the complaint in question.

In view of the fact that there are apparently drums missing which can not be returned and the number of drums missing which can not be returned as of the date of the filing of the complaint appears from the inventory to be 28, it is hereby ordered by this Court that the claimant be awarded the amount of $252 which is payment for 28 drums at $9 apiece.

It Is, Hereby Ordered that the sum of $252 (Two Hundred Fifty Two Dollars) be awarded claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above-captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 7035
    Burroughs Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 17, 1973.

    Burroughs Corporation, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 6826
    James Eickmeyer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Petition of Respondent for rehearing allowed, award order stayed, case dismissed December 21, 1973 on Claimants motion.
    James Eickmeyer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

Claimant, representing himself, presents this comparatively small claim for back pay in the amount of $350 which he contends is owed to him by the Department of Labor’s Division of Unemployment Compensation.

Claimant avers that, during certain periods stated in the stipulation below, he performed the duties of Office Manager II at the Quincy Office of the above named division, while being paid at the salary and in the title of Unemployment Claims Deputy I.

There was a paucity of evidence presented by the claimant and none offered by the respondent since it did not elect to answer. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on technical and legal grounds. The court requested the respondent to make an investigation in the Department of Labor and submit a statement of facts which might obviate the necessity and expense of a formal hearing and the employment of legal counsel for the claimant. We are in receipt of the following stipulation filed on March 1, 1973:

JOINT STIPULATION AS TO THE FACTS
Now comes the claimant, James Eickmeyer, and the respondent, State of Illinois, by William J. Scott, Illinois Attorney General, and jointly stipulate to the following facts for the purpose of presenting to the Court in a concise chronological order of the events as they occurred. The purpose of presenting it at this time is to aid the Court in its determination of the questions involved in respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and the claimant’s Objections to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. In furtherance of this purpose, the parties stipulate as follows:
1. On or about December 1, 1968, the manager of the Quincy office of the Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Compensation, Mr. Leroy Cramer, was transferred to the Rockford Office.
2. On or about June 16, 1969, Mr. John Robinson was appointed as manager to the Quincy office.
3. Mr. Robinson did not assume the managerial duties at Quincy until July 1, 1969.
4. During the period from on or about December 1, 1968 through on or about June 30, 1969, the claimant performed duties of Unemployment Compensation Office Manager II at the Quincy office while being paid at the salary of and in the title of Unemployment Claims Deputy I.
5. During January of 1969, the salary for the higher position would have been $726.00 whereas the claimant was paid at the lower salary of $715.00
6. For the months of February, March, April, May and June of 1969, the payment for the higher title would have been $742.00 per month, whereas the claimant was paid at the salary of $720.00 per month.
7. That during the period of time in question the total salary for the higher title would have been $4,436, whereas the claimant was paid $4,315, or $121 less than he would have been paid at the higher salary.
8. That the complaint alleges salary due of $315, this being based on an additional period of time for the period August 1, 1970 to October 1, 1970, but that during this time, the claimant had only limited additional responsibilities, not the full responsibility of a managerial position.
9. The Illinois Bureau of Employment Security, the office in question in this claim, is fully operated through federal grant-in-aid funds.
10. It has been agreed between the parties that should this court determine that the claimant is entitled to compensation, the amount of $121 would be the proper amount for an award.
11. This stipulation is not designed to supersede the motion or objections previously filed, but is supplemental for the Court’s benefit in its determination of a proper course of action with regard to said motion and objection.

Based on the above stipulation, and without passing on the merits of respondent’s technical legal arguments in its earlier motion to dismiss, we find that claimant is equitably entitled to back pay for services rendered in the amount of $121 under an implied contract with the respondent.

Claimant, James Eickmeyer, is hereby awarded back pay in the amount of $121.00.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-124
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 26, 1973.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-16
    Dean Evans Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 26, 1973.

      Dean Evans Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-191
    Grace Carpeting, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 26, 1973.

    Grace Carpeting, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-207
    Susan G. Pierson, Special Assistant Attorney General, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Attorney General’s Office, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 26, 1973.

    Susan G. Pierson, Special Assistant Attorney General, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-146
    J. C. Penney Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    J. C. Penney Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-156
    Parkview Orthopaedic Group, S.C., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Parkview Orthopaedic Group, S.C., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-160
    Jersey County Educational Service Region, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Jersey County Educational Service Region, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-164
    Grand Spaulding Dodge, Inc. Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Grand Spaulding Dodge, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-166
    Aid to Retarded Children, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Aid to Retarded Children, Inc., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-117
    Frank J. Corbett Recruitment Advertising, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Frank J. Corbett Recruitment Advertising, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-183
    Myrna Faye Mc Quade, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Myrna Faye Mc Quade, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-195
    American Petrofina Company of Texas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    American Petrofina Company of Texas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-196
    American Petrofina Company of Texas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    American Petrofina Company of Texas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-199
    Joshua H. Weiner, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

      Joshua H. Weiner, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-201
    Mr. Michael R. Cannon, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Mr. Michael R. Cannon, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-205
    Robert O. Sloan, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Robert O. Sloan, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-206
    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-225
    Darlene Harold, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Darlene Harold, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-227
    Carol A. Moses, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Carol A. Moses, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-231
    P. N. Hirsch & Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    P. N. Hirsch & Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-188
    Wright Building Center, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 18, 1974.

    Wright Building Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-190
    R. D. Lawrence Construction Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 18, 1974.

    R. D. Lawrence Construction Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-214
    Crc Press, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 18, 1974.

    Crc Press, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-385
    Emulsified Asphalts, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 18, 1974.

    Emulsified Asphalts, Inc., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-133
    Hubert Dunlap, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Hubert Dunlap, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This court finds that the purpose of this expenditure by the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation was for travel expenses for an employee for the months of March, April, May and June of 1973 for a total cost of $298.75. These services were properly authorized and properly performed. The charges are in compliance with existing travel regulations. Money was appropriated for this expenses in Fund No. 081-4415, a federal trust fund which carried a balance of $136,969.43 on June 30, 1973. Since this appropriation is a federal trust fund, no amount was returned to the State Treasury; however by agreement of William T. Coleman, Deputy Director, Fiscal and Administrative Services, Board of Vocational Education and Rehabilitation, upon the payment of this claim, the amount of $298.75 will be reimbursed to the State Treasury from existing federal funds.

It is, therefore, ordered that the sum of $298.75 (Two Hundred Ninety-Eight Dollars and Seventy-Five Cents) be awarded claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above-captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-151
    Continental Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Continental Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-174
    Montanari Clinical School, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Montanari Residential Treatment Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-178
    Frank J. Corbett Recruitment Advertising, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Frank J. Corbett Recruitment Adverstising, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-181
    Albert Powers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Albert Powers, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This court finds that the purpose of this expenditure by the Department of Mental Health was for the payment of a retroactive pay increase which was not paid along with the other employees so entitled, due to an error on the part of the department. According to the departmental report there was a retroactive pay increase from $5.09 to $5,535 per hour for employees classified as Trades Tenders under the Illinois Personnel Code. Claimant was so classified when he terminated his employment with the Department of Mental Health on March 15, 1973. On August 30, 1973, the Department of Mental Health was informed by the Department of Personnel, Labor Relations Division, that pursuant to a new collective bargaining agreement pay was to be paid retroactively to April 1, 1973. Therefore, it appeared to the department that the claimant was not entitled to the increase inasmuch as the claimant was not employed on April 1,1973. However, there was an error in communication between the Department of Personnel and the Department of Mental Health as to the initial date of retroactivity. The pay increase was to have been retroactive to January 1, 1973, and not April 1, 1973. Therefore, the claimant has back pay due and owing for a period from January 1, 1973, to March 15, 1973. In addition, the departmental reports points out that the appropriation for Fiscal 1973 did not include this increase under appropriation No. [ XXX-XX-XXXX ] and the appropriation was expended and no money was returned to the State Treasury.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Fergus v. Brady, 277 Ill. 273 (1917) in determining whether payment in excess of authorized appropriation would be valid, stated:

. . ."claims under any agreement or contact made by express authority of law are accepted, and if there is some particular and specific thing which an officer, board or agency of the State is required to do, the performance of the duty is expressly authorized by law. That authority is expressed which confers power to do a particular, identical thing set forth and declared exactly, plainly and directly with well defined limits, and the only exception under which a contract exceeding the amount appropriated for the purpose may be valid is where it is so expressly authorized by law.” Id. at 279.

This Court has followed this rule where express authority is shown, City of Jacksonville v. State of Illinois (1946), 15 C.C.R. 62, Illinois-Iowa Power Company v. State of Illinois (1942), 12 C.C.R. 308.

Express authority to pay retroactive pay increases, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is found in Ch. 127, Sec. 145, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, where the legislature stated:

"Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State, either temporary or regular, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates as specified in the payroll or other voucher and no additional sums shall be paid to such officer or employee from any lump sum appropriation, appropriation for extra help or other purpose or any accumulated balances in specific appropriations, which payments would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement the state or state agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.” (Emphasis added)

In light of this Court’s decisions in City of Jacksonville v. State of Illinois, (supra) and Illinois-Iowa Power Co. v. State of Illinois, (supra) and the legislative intent embodied in the Ch. 127, Sec. 145, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, it is our opinion that the claimant should be paid.

The reason that this claim was not paid is due to the fact that claimant was no longer an employee of respondent at the time authorization was received for retroactive pay increases. Therefore, the claimant was not included in the short payroll at the end of fiscal 1973, the same having been confirmed by the departmental report of the Department of Mental Health, a copy of said report being attached to the Joint Stipulation of the parties.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of Two Hundred Thirty and 96/100 Dollars ($230.96) be awarded claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-197
    Malcom E. Zenge, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Malcom E. Zenge, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This court finds that the purpose of this expenditure by the Department of Mental Health was for the payment of a retroactive pay increase which was not paid along with the other employees so entitled, due to an error on the part of the department. According to the departmental report there was a retroactive pay increase from $5.09 to $5.33% per hour for employees classified as Trades Tenders under the Illinois Personnel Code. Claimant was so classified when he terminated his employment with the Department of Mental Health on March 15, 1973. On August 30, 1973, the Department of Mental Health was informed by the Department of Personnel, Labor Relations Division, that pursuant to a new collective bargaining agreement pay was to be paid retroactively to April 1, 1973. Therefore, it appeared to the department that the claimant was not entitled to the increase inasmuch as the claimant was not employed on April 1, 1973. However, there was an error in communication between the Department of Personnel and the Department of Mental Health as to the initial date of retroactivity. The pay increase was to have been retroactive to January 1, 1973, and not April 1, 1973. Therefore, the claimant has back pay due and owing for a period from January 1, 1973, to March 15, 1973. In addition, the departmental report points out that the appropriation for Fiscal 1973 did not include this increase under appropriation No. [ XXX-XX-XXXX ] and the approprialion was expended and no money was returned to the State Treasury.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Fergus v. Brady, 277 Ill. 273 (1917) in determining whether payment in excess of authorized appropriation would be valid, stated:

. . . "claims under any agreement or contract made by express authority of law are accepted, and if there is some particular and specific thing which an officer, board or agency of the State is required to do, the performance of the duty is expressly authorized by law. That authority is expressed which confers power to do a particular, identical thing set forth and declared exactly, plainly and directly with well defined limits, and the only exception under which a contract exceeding the amount appropriated for the purpose may be valid is where it is so expressly authorized by law.” Id. at 279.

This Court has followed this rule where express authority is shown, City of Jacksonville v. State of Illinois (1946), 15 C.C.R. 62, Illinois-Iowa Power Company v. State of Illinois (1942), 12 C.C.R. 308.

Express authority to pay retroactive pay increases, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is found in Ch. 127, Sec. 145, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, where the legislature stated:

"Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State, either temporary or regular, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates as specified in the payroll or other voucher and no additional sums shall be paid to such officer or employee from any lump sum appropriation, appropriation for extra help or other purpose or any accumulated balances in specific appropriations, which payments would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement the state or state agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.” (Emphasis added)

In light of this Court’s decision in City of Jacksonville v. State of Illinois, (supra) and Illinois-Iowa Power Co. v. State of Illinois, (supra) and the legislative intent embodied in the Ch. 127, Sec. 145, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, it is our opinion that the claimant should be paid.

The reason that this claim was not paid is due to the fact that claimant was no longer an employee of respondent at the time authorization was received for retroactive pay increases. Therefore, the claimant was not included in the short payroll at the end of fiscal 1973, the same having been confirmed by the departmental report of the Department of Mental Health, a copy of said report being attached to the Joint Stipulation of the parties.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of Two Hundred Fourteen and 94/100 Dollars ($214.94) be awarded claimant in full satiisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-203
    Mrs. Yvonne Rice, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Mrs. Yvonne Rice, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-233
    John W. Castle, Special Assistant Attorney General, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    John W. Castle, Special Assistant Attorney General, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-234
    Cesar M. Secoquian, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Cesar M. Secoquian, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-242
    James T. Jones, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    James T. Jones, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-277
    Commonwealth Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of state, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    George O. Shaffner and Joseph C. Sibley, Jr., Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-279
    Edwin L. Esser, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Edwin L. Esser, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

A claim in this matter was filed in the Court of Claims on April 16, 1973, alleging that claimant’s car, while parked at the Illinois Department of Mental Health, Chicago Reed Health Center, was damaged by a projectile thrown from a lawn mower operated by James R. Harris, an employee of the Department of Mental Health.

From the testimony of claimant, it appears that Edwin L. Esser, an electrician employed by the State of Illinois, for a period of over thirty years, parked his automobile in the parking lot of the Reed Zone Medical Center, 6500 West Irving Park Road, Chicago, Illinois, where he was employed. From the police report of the Chicago Police Department, a statement from Peter Bertuccio, the Building and Grounds Supervisor of the Chicago Reed Mental Health Center, and from various other statements submitted at the hearing, it appears that an employee of respondent, James R. Harris, was driving a tractor with an attached law mower and while Harris was cutting the grass in the area north of the Power House with his rotary blade tractor, the blade threw an eighteen-inch length, two-by-four board, into the left fender of the claimant’s 1971 Lincoln automobile, denting the fender. Claimant had the automobile repaired and submitted a paid bill in the amount of $142.00.

From the evidence introduced at this hearing, the Court finds respondent was negligent, which negligence caused property damage to the claimant in the amount of $142.00.

An award is, therefore, made to claimant in the sum of $142.00.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-279
    Commonwealth Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    George O. Shaffner and Joseph C. Sibley, Jr., Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-404
    Tribune Publications, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Tribune Publications, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 3025
    Elva Jennings Penwell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 22, 1974.

    Gosnell, Benecki and Quindry, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

Claimant filed her Petition for reimbursement for moneys expended for nursing care and help, medical services, and expenses from January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1972, praying for an award in the sum of $9,078.58.

Claimant was seriously injured in an accident on the second day of February, 1936, while employed as a Supervisor at the Illinois Soldier’s and Sailor’s Children’s School at Normal, Illinois. The complete details of this injury can be found in the original cause of action, Penwell vs. State of Illinois, 11 C.C.R. 365, in which an initial award was made, and at which time jurisdiction was retained to make successive awards in the future, and this Court has periodically made supplemental awards to Claimant to cover expenses incurred by her, the last award covering the time period from January 1, 1971 to December 31, 1971.

A joint motion of Claimant and Respondent was filed herein requesting leave to waive the filing of briefs and arguments. In addition, Claimant filed a corrected Exhibit "1”. The corrected Exhibit "1” sets out those items upon which agreement has been had with Claimant and Respondent in the above cause. This motion was granted, and no further pleadings have been filed herein.

The Attorney General does not contest the veracity nor the propriety of the items and amounts set forth in Claimant’s corrected Exhibit "1”.

The Court, therefore, enters an award in favor of the Claimant in the sum of Five Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Three and 92/100 Dollars ($5,933.92. The matter of Claimant’s need for additional care is reserved by this Court for future determination.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-76
    Jose A. Gonzalez, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1974.

    Jose A. Gonzalez, M.D., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-158
    Edward F. Casey, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Aeronautics, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1974.

    Casey and Casey, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-175
    Scientific Products Division of American Hospital Supply Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1974.

    Scientific Products Division of American Hospital Supply Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-255
    American Petrofina Co. of Texas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1974.

    American Petrofina Co. of Texas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-262
    Charles Kline, James Christison, and Russell Flynn, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1974.

    Charles Kline, James Christison, and Russell Flynn, Claimants, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-271
    Science Kit, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1974.

    Science Kit, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-408
    William K. Jenkins, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1974.

    William K. Jenkins, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 5930
    William Karp, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Commission on Technological Progress, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1974.

    Leon M. Despres and Albert Schwartz, Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-120
    Sieg Peoria Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1974.

    Sieg Peoria Company, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-241
    Cities Service Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1974.

    Cities Service Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-246
    Martin Brothers Implement Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1974.

    Martin Brothers Implement Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-249
    Amber Ridge School, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1974.

    Amber Ridge School, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-274
    Enloe’s Lincoln Square Drug Store, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1974.

    Enloe’s Lincoln Square Drug Store, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-281
    Edward Don & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1974.

    Edward Don & Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-430
    Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Chicago, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1974.

    Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Chu cago, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-444
    Aero Mayflower Transit Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1974.

    Aero Mayflower Transit Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6475
    Ingersoll-Rand Company, Tool and Hoist Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1974.

    Ingersoll-Rand Company, Tool and Hoist Division, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6769
    Sun Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1974.

    Sun Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Perlin, C. J.

text:
    (No. 74-CC-26
    Koeber’s Artificial Limb Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Koeber’s Artificial Limb Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 73-CC-90
    Buecker Plumbing, Heating and Air Conditioning Co., A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Drach, Terrell and Deffenbaugh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court on a Joint Stipulation as to Facts submitted by the claimant and respondent.

Pursuant to a public bid and letting, claimant entered into two certain contracts with respondent with respect to a project pertaining to work to be performed on a certain building owned or occupied by the respondent at 11th and Ash Streets, Springfield, Illinois. These contracts were entered into and approved by and through the Department of General Services on or about June 8, 1971, and June 30, 1971.

Phase I involved primarily work to be done below ground level, while Phase II involved primarily work to be done above ground level.

After the work called for in the contract referred to as Phase I had been commenced, the respondent revised the plans concerning the work to be performed under said Phase I, and requested the claimant to complete the work called for in Phase I in accordance with said revisions, which revisions were set forth in a series of change orders prepared by the claimant and approved by the Department.

Change Order No. 1, dated August 31, 1971, called for an additional expenditure of $7,458.08.

Respondent later determined it would be necessary to eliminate the above ground roof drainage system, as called for in the plans for Phase II, with a below ground drainage system not originally called for in the Phase I plans.

Plan changes were made by the claimant and claimant proceeded to construct the project in accordance with the revised plans.

This work was completed without the issuance of a proper Change Order.

When payment was requested for this particular work, it was denied on recommendation by the Consulting Architect on behalf of the Department of General Services on the grounds that the work for which payment was requested had been previously paid under Change Order No. 1 of Phase I, dated August 31, 1971.

As a result of this, claimant refused to sign a "Substantial Completion Form” and the Department of General Services therefore withheld the required retainage of $1,029.51.

A joint detailed study of the construction records and plans was then made by the claimant and representatives of the respondent, and as a result of this study, respondent has concluded that the claimant had performed work under the contract for which he had not been reimbursed in the amount of $10,972.45, and the claimant has concluded that the work for which he had not been reimbursed was $10,958.94.

The claimant has agreed to revise their claim from $13,011.94, plus retainage of $1,978.10, to the present claim of $10,958.94, plus retainage of $1,029.51, for a total claim of $11,988.45.

It is the opinion of the Court that the claimant is entitled to the sum of $11,988.45, and an award is hereby entered for the payment of said amount.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-146
    The Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

      The Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This court finds that the claimant filed a Complaint against the State of Illinois alleging that they made an overpayment of privilege tax payments.

A Stipulation has been entered into by and between the claimant and the State of Illinois stating that, based upon Departmental Reports filed in said cause, there has been an overpayment of $56,241.72. The evidence indicates that said overpayment of privilege tax payments was deposited with the office of the Director, Department of Insurance, and was then transferred to the General Revenue Fund by the State of Illinois.

Evidence also discloses that claimant made a demand for said refund, which demand was refused.

It appears from the evidence and from the Stipulation that the claimant is entitled to said sum of $56,241.72 and it is hereby ordered that the sum of $56,241.72 be awarded to claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-213
    Atlantic Richfield, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Atlantic Richfield, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-123
    Abraham Lincoln Medical Group, S.C., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Abraham Lincoln Medical Group, S.C., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-131
    John F. Truty, Claimant, vs. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Tuohy and Martin, Attorneys for Claimant.

      John W. Purvey, Attorney for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant filed his Complaint on October 9, 1973, in which he alleges that on October 8, 1971, he was the owner of a certain Buick automobile, and that on said date, the University of Illinois was the owner and operator of a certain parking lot designated as Number 40, located at Harrison Street east of Racine, in Chicago, Illinois.

Claimant further alleges that while he was operating his vehicle on said parking lot, he collided with a certain cable belonging to respondent which was strung in a non-lighted area of the respondent’s premises. It is from this action that he alleges the damage occurred from which he seeks to recover.

The suit names the University of Illinois as the respondent.

On November 29, 1973, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss and Strike the Complaint.

As the basis for said Motion, the respondent states that the Complaint was filed too late, setting forth the fact that the accident happened on October 8, 1971, and the Complaint was not filed until October 9, 1973, one day beyond the time allowed by law.

Respondent, as a second ground for dismissal, sets forth the fact that claimant named the University of Illinois as respondent while, in fact, the proper respondent should have been the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

Respondent alleges that proper notice was not given and calls attention to the fact that claimant’s notice was directed to the Board of Governors of the State Colleges and Universities, which is an organization that does not have any connection with the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.

Respondent further alleges that this notice should have been given within six months from the time the claim accrued and that it was not filed within that time. The record indicates it was received by the Attorney General’s office on May 3, 1973, which the respondent alleges is thirteen months beyond the last day that claimant could file his notice.

Respondent, as further grounds for dismissal, states that the Complaint failed to comply with Rule 5A1 of the Rules of the Court of Claims in that it failed to state the nature of the claim and the section of the Court of Claims Act under which recovery is sought and that it further failed to comply with Rules 5A3, 5A3(a), and 5A3(b) in that it failed to state whether the claim had been previously presented to any State Department or Office thereof, and the result of such presentment, if any.

Respondent further states that the Complaint failed to comply with Rule 5A6 of the Rules of the Court of Claims in that it failed to state whether claimant is justly entitled to the amount therein claimed from the University of Illinois.

Respondent further states that the Complaint failed to comply with Rule 5A7 of the Rules of the Court of Claims in that the claimant had failed to state whether said claimant believes that the facts stated in the Complaint are true.

The next objection was that the Complaint failed to comply with Rules 5A8 and 5A8(a) of the Rules of the Court of Claims and that the claim did not state whether it had previously been presented to any person, corporation or tribunal, other than the State of Illinois, or the University of Illinois, and the results of such action.

The next objection by the respondent was that the Complaint violated Rule 5A9 of the Rules of the Court of Claims because there was not any Bill of Particulars attached to the Complaint.

The last objection by the respondent was that the Complaint failed to comply with Rule 5B1 of the Rules of the Court of Claims because no copy of the Notice required to be sent by Chapter 37, Section 439.22-1, Illinois Revised Statutes, was attached to the Complaint as a separate item.

The claimant filed a Reply to Motion to Dismiss and Strike the Complaint and attempted to meet all the objections set forth in the Motion to Dismiss and Strike the Complaint. It called attention to the fact that as to the first objection, which was that the Complaint was not filed in time, the date of October 8, 1973, which is two years from the time of the accident, was a legal holiday, and that the filing October 9, 1973, was to be considered timely filed.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that Chapter 98, Section 20C is as follows:

“The second Monday in October of each year shall be a holiday, to be known as “Christopher Columbus Day” and which shall be observed throughout the State as a day on which to hold appropriate ceremonies and exercises in commemoration of the discoveror of the New World and his discovery of October 12, 1492.”

The word "holiday” is used by the legislature in this particular section of the statute; whereas, in Section 20A, it refers to Lincoln’s Birthday and in Section 20B it refers to Good Friday as a "legal holiday.” Section 20C which deals with Christopher Columbus Day, and also Section 19 dealing with Veterans Day, refers only to those days as "holidays.” I believe, however, the fact that the notice was not filed at that time is not sufficiently supported by the authorities to warrant dismissal on that ground.

As to the objection that improper notice was served, we call attention to the case of Munch vs. State of Illinois, 25 Ill. Court of Claims, 313, which says, in effect, that there is no statutory notice requirement with regard to property damage cases such as the present one.

The Court believes that the Complaint was defective in that it did not comply with 3a under Rule 5, 5a under Rule 5 and Sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 of Rule 5.

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and Strike the Complaint is hereby granted and said cause is dismissed.


author: Perlin, C. J.05.

text:
    (No. 74-CC-150
    Wilma J. Thomas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Wilma J. Thomas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.05.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-189
    Emmy Andri, M.D. & Associates, S.C., Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Emmy Andri, M.D. & Associates, S.C., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-210
    Paul Karl Riemer, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Paul Karl Riemer, Jr., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-253
    Arthur Dozier, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Arthur Dozier, Jr., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-261
    Kankakee Industrial Supply Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Kankakee Industrial Supply Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-264
    Kerr-Mc Gee Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Kerr-Mc Gee Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-266
    St. Elizabeth Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    St. Elizabeth Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-302
    IBM Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Departments of Finance and Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    IBM Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-305
    Clock Tower Inn, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    Clock Tower Inn, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S.

      Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 5170
    Richard Hendrix, a minor, by F. G. Hendrix, his father and next friend, F. G. Hendrix and Betty Sue Hendrix, Claimant, vs. The Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University and The State of Illinois, Respondents.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1974.

    R. W. Harris, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This action was brought on behalf of Richard Hendrix who was a minor, 14 years of age, at the time he sustained personal injuries, allegedly caused by respondents’ negligence, giving rise to this claim for damages in the amount of $25,000.

Claimant’s injuries occurred when he fell off a high cliff at the edge of a picnic area in Giant City State Park, a park known for its giant rock formations and numerous high bluffs and cliffs.

Claimant had gone to the park on an overnight camping trip as a member of a group of boys and girls between the ages of 11 and 14 who attended a summer camp sponsored and operated by Southern Illinois University. The S.I.U. summer camp was located at Little Grassy Lake in the immediate vicinity of an in close proximity to Giant City State Park where claimant was injured.

The campers were divided into units of about 8 boys and 8 girls in each unit. Two senior counselors and two junior counselors were assigned to each unit. There were about 7 boy units and 7 girl units in the whole camp, and most of the units were taken on the overnight camping trip to the nearby state park on the date claimant was injured. All of the campers were under the direct supervision and guidance of the counselors assigned to each unit by Southern Illinois University. In claimant’s unit the senior counselors were Robert Lee Miller and Charles Fredrick; the junior counselors were Dale Miller and Otis Callis.

The group, including claimant’s unit, arrived at the park before noon; set up camp at a site by the baseball diamond; and then had lunch at the lodge. Shortly after lunch, the S.I.U. counselors told the group to move their camp across the road to a picnic area, because the site they originally selected was too crowded with other campers.

There was a shelter building in the picnic area where the group established their new camp site about 1:30 p.m., some 7 or 8 hours before claimant’s accident which occurred at about 9:30 p.m. Tents were pitched in an open play area about 100 feet from the point where claimant fell off a bluff. Claimant remembers that one of the counselors had told the group that there were cliffs in the vicinity and to be careful. During some 5 or 6 hours of daylight, claimant played on the swings and ran around the area. He also played on the bluffs but not at the location where he was injured. As claimant said, the bluffs make a curve like a horseshoe around the area. The cliffs run about a quarter of a mile to the lodge and about a mile in the other direction. Claimant had seen the cliffs on the opposite side of this circular formation, but had not seen the cliff where he fell.

About nightfall, Park Ranger William Yates came by and said that this was a picnic area and not a camping area. Yates then went to the park manager, Jack Porschbacker; told him that all of the normal camping areas were full, and the manager gave permission for the campers to stay in this picnic area all night.

After supper all of the counselors except two, one male and one female counselor, went up to the lodge to dance. The two remaining counselors stayed in the open shelter building studying.

After dark, claimant and some other boys, sitting in a group near the tents, decided to play hide-and-seek. One of the boys was sent up to one of the counselors to get permission to play the game and obtain a light. After getting permission and obtaining a kerosene light, the boys went into the woods nearby to play. After a while, the boy with the light who was "It” caught all the other boys, and they were standing in the woods together when the kerosene light went out. It was the only light they had. Claimant said it was completely dark in the woods; that they could not see the lights of the shelter from where they were; and that he, being the oldest boy in the group, was selected to go get another light from the shelter. Claimant started back "running as fast as he could” on what looked like flat ground or a footpath when he fell and tumbled over the edge of the bluff. Claimant sustained some serious injuries.

The above summary of the facts will be enlarged upon and supplemented from the record as we comment on the following allegations upon which claimant bases this action for damages:

[1] That the Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, failed to exercise reasonable care in supervising the campers, including the claimant, under its custody and control; in failing to warn the claimant of the perils of the cliff near the camp site; in failing to station a counselor at the cliff to warn the claimant and light the area of the cliff; and in permitting the campers to lodge for the night in a picnic area normally prohibited for camping.

[2] That the State of Illinois failed to exercise reasonable care in establishing, maintaining and supervising its parks; in failing to warn the campers of the perils of the cliffs near their camp site; in failing to maintain a guardrail at this particular cliff; in failing to light the area near the cliff; and in allowing claimant’s group to camp overnight in a picnic area not designed for camping;

[3] That claimant was entirely free from any contributory negligence.

Able briefs and arguments have been presented on both sides of the above issues, obviously the result of commendable energy and research. We will deal with these three issues in their numerical order as listed above.

[1] We believe the evidence supports a finding that the counselors, employed by Southern Illinois University to supervise claimant and the other youths on the overnight camp out, neglected their duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of the claimant. We hold that the negligence of the counselors, as agents and servants of S.I.U., is imputed to the Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University under the doctrine of respondeat superior, since the University, like the State itself, can only act through its officers, employees and agents. We would have no difficulty in holding that the negligence of S.I.U., through the acts of its counselors, was the proximate cause of claimant’s injuries, were it not for claimant’s contributory negligence discussed in [3] below.

In any event, the legal liability of the Trustees of S.I.U., if any, was extinguished by claimant’s "covenant not to sue” which he gave the Trustees in return for the payment of $8,900.00 to the claimant from the University through its insurer. After claimant executed the covenant not to sue the Board of Trustees of S.I.U., a separate suit then pending in the Circuit Court of Jackson County [No. 64-L-94] was dismissed, and the Board of Trustees of S.I.U. was dismissed as a respondent in this cause now before us, leaving the State as the sole respondent in this claim.

Claimant argues in his brief that the State is equally liable for the negligence of the S.I.U. counselors and should pay damages to supplement the payment of $8,900.00 which claimant received from S.I.U. in return for his convenant not to sue. Claimant’s theory is that the S.I.U. counselors were "agents” of the State.

While it is technically true that all employees of the University are employees of the State, since they are paid by state funds, their selection, employment, amount of salary, supervision, tenure and control are powers committed solely to the Board of Trustees of the University. Ch. 144, Sec. 658, Ill.Rev.Stat. These powers establish the Board of Trustees as the principal and the S.I.U. counselors, employed by the Board, as its agents and not agents of the State. "The principal is the source of power in an agency.” Fredrick v. Wolf 383 Ill. 638.

At the time of claimant’s injuries, the S.I.U. counselors were acting solely under the authority and control of the Board of Trustees of the University, as the counselors testified at the hearing.

Both parties acknowledge that the Board of Trustees of S.I.U. is declared by statute [Ch. 144, Ill.Rev.Stat.] to be a "body politic and corporate” [§651] with power, inter alia, "to sue and be sued” [§657], including power to compromise and settle suits against the Board, the corporate body of the University, and even employ its own legal counsel in court actions involving the University. People v. Barrett, 382 Ill. 344.

The Court of Claims Act in §8d specifically recognizes the Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University as a separate state agency which is liable for the negligence of its officers, agents and employees in the course of their employment. This applies to the counselors in the case at bar.

It was in its capacity as "a body politic and corporate” that the Board of Trustees paid to the claimant the sum of $8,900.00 in return for a covenant not to sue and thereby releasing S.I.U. and its Board from any liability arising out of claimant’s injuries and for the negligence of its agents, the counselors.

We therefore conclude that, even if there were no evidence of contributory negligence, any liability based on the negligence of the S.I.U. counselors in this cause was released and extinguished, to the State as well as the University, by claimant’s covenant not to sue.

This conclusion is not altered by the provisions in claimant’s covenant purporting to reserve claimant’s right to proceed against or sue the State. The only conceivable basis for any such further action against the State would be under the doctrine of respondeat superior and based on the proposition that the Board of Trustees of S.I.U. is an agency of the State. See I.L.P. Schools §332 and People v. Barrett (Supra). If we accept that proposition, we must agree with respondent’s contention that the rule in Holcomb v. Flavin, 34 Ill.2d 552 would apply.

The Holcomb case held that a "covenant not to sue” an agent, regardless of the language of the covenant, is indistinguishable from a "release” to the principal where the liability of the principal, if any, is solely derivative and arising only through the doctrine of respondeat superior.

The Holcomb decision was reaffirmed, fortified, and extended in the more recent case of Gramm v. Armour & Co. (1971) 271 N.E.2d 52.

As claimant points out, the facts are different in the case at bar, but we find the rule in Holcomb and Gramm applicable in all cases where the liability of a principal is derivative under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

In answering respondent’s supplementary brief, claimant contends that there is no respondeat superior theory at all involved between the two respondents in this case; that they were each sued on a separate theory of negligence: [1] Board of Trustees of S.I.U. was sued for the negligence of their counselors at the camp. [2] The State of Illinois was sued for its negligence in the maintenance of its park. This argument contained in an amendment to claimant’s brief, filed May 5, 1972, was not answered by the respondent. However, as the court interprets claimant’s position, claimant regards the Board of Trustees and the State as joint tort feasors, or independent concurring tort feasors, whose tortious acts concurred in causing claimant’s injuries. If so, since the Board of Trustees was released by the claimant, it would appear that the State was also released under the following rule in Anderson v. Martzke (1970) 266 N.E. 2d 137. At page 140 the Court said:

"There can be but one satisfaction for a single indivisible injury, and if the injured party makes a settlement with one tort feasor and releases him, that also operates as a release of the other tort feasors, whose tortious acts concurred in the same single, indivisible injury, whether all of the tort feasors engaged or did not engage in concerted action, when their acts produced the same single, indivisible injury, be they strictly joint tort feasors or independent concurring tort feasors. There cannot be a double recovery for a single injury, and one release is a bar to further claims for the same tort. Tidwell v. Smity, 27 Ill.App.2d 63, 169 N.E. 2d 157 (1960); Manthei v. Heimerdinger, 332 Ill.App. 335, 75 N.E. 2d 132 (1947).”

[2] Notwithstanding the above rule in Anderson which would appear to release the State completely, we will comment briefly on claimant’s contention that his injuries were caused by the State’s alleged negligence in its maintenance of Giant City State Park.

Both sides have submitted a comprehensive review of numerous cases decided by this court involving injuries sustained by visitors to Illinois’ vast system of state parks. Many of the cases cited here were discussed in our recent decision in Mooneyham v. State (filed November 19, 1973) denying liability for the death of a 12 year old boy who fell from a cliff in Starved Rock State Park and drowned in the Illinois River.

However, no case has come to our attention in which the claimant charged or conceded that the negligence of a separate state agency (here the S.I.U. counselors), in addition to the State’s alleged negligence in maintaining its park, were both responsible for claimant’s injuries.

Claimant here apparently takes the position that, in spite of the negligence of his counselors, he would not have fallen over the cliff if the State had erected a guard rail at that location which he says was at the end of a footpath; or had lighted this wooded area at night; or had posted danger signs or given claimant warning of the perils of the cliffs; or had refused to allow the group to camp overnight in a picnic area which was not intended to be used for camping.

Considering each of these points, in reverse order, we find that the evidence of negligence points primarily to the counselors. It was they who selected the camp site. After first pitching camp that morning in an authorized camping area, the counselors directed that the camp be moved after lunch to the picnic area which was designed and intended to be used only for daytime activities and not for overnight camping. It was nearly dark when the park ranger discovered that the group was camped in an unauthorized area. The ranger explained this to the counselors. But, since all regular camping areas were full by that time, the ranger obtained permission from the park manager to allow the group to stay for the night.

The record is silent as to whether the park ranger warned the counselors or the youth groups as to the proximity and perils of the cliffs. Such a warning would seem to be a statement of the obvious if given to this group which had spent more than 6 hours playing and exploring in and around their camp site. The record does indicate that the counselors had knowledge of the cliffs since one of them told the claimant there were cliffs in the area and that he should be careful. The ranger did know that the group was under the supervision and control of counselors employed by Southern Illinois University. The record shows that there were 4 counselors for each unit of 8 boys, a ratio of 1 counselor for every 2 boys. This would appear to be reasonable grounds for the park ranger and the manager to assume that the youth groups would be carefully supervised by their counselors, and that this would justify granting permission for the group to stay overnight in the picnic area.

The park manager could not reasonably be expected to anticipate the paucity of supervision that the campers would be given by the counselors; that most of them would leave the camp after dark and go off to dance at the lodge; that the counselors who remained at the camp would stay in the shelter building to study their lessons for summer school; or that any counselor would give permission for the boys to play hide-and-seek in a totally dark woods close to the cliffs.

These acts establish a pattern of negligence on the part of the counselors, but negligence for which the State has been exonerated as stated in [1] above.

We turn then to the remaining question as to whether the State exercised reasonable care in maintaining its park, a duty which this court has fully recognized. Murray v. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 339; Hansen v. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 102; Stedman v. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 446; Kamin v. State of Illinois, 21 C.C.R. 467; Finn v. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 177; Pulizzano v. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 234 (1946); Mooneyham v. State of Illinois (Supra) No. 6412.

All of the above cases involve claimants who were injured in a state park by falling from a cliff or into a hole or a canyon. Most of the cases, like the case at bar, charge the State with negligence in failing to maintain guard rails or warning signs along a trail or foot path at points of potential danger. Our decisions recognize such a duty on paths and trials that have been established, controlled and maintained by the park and shown on its maps, as in the case of Murray and Hansen (Supra). We have felt that it would be an unreasonable hardship to impose such a duty to so maintain every foot path created by public usage, like the path on which the claimant here was running when he fell. In the Hansen case, the trail was originally established by public usage but the park had assumed control of the path by showing it on a map furnished to hikers and by posting a sign on the trail warning, "Dangerous-loose rocks”.

Although the park ranger knew of the existence of the path on which claimant was running, the park had never recognized it as an established trail on which public safety would require handrails, warning signs or artificial light. It must be remembered that the area was intended to be used in daytime and not at night.

Giant City State Park contains miles of cliffs and bluffs in its area of over 2,000 acres. The legislature intended that such nature preserve parks be maintained in their rugged natural state so that the public could view the natural beauty of the area. Ch. 105, Sec. 465 et.seq., Ill.Rev.Stat. To require the park to place guard rails or warning signs at the end of every foot path which the public may beat to the edge of a cliff would not only impose unreasonable burden on the Department of Conservation, but would be contrary to the legislature’s intent.

As we said in the above cited cases of Finn, Stedman and Kamin, the State is not an insurer of patrons using its park facilities. The invitation to use a state park is in no sense an absolute one. It is rather an invitation to use the particular facilities in the manner in which and for the purposes of which they were designed and intended. The state is not required to maintain its parks in such condition that patrons may wander at will over each and every portion thereof.

In Kamin (Supra), we announced the rule that a determination of what constituted reasonable care in the maintenance of a trail or pathway in a state park depended upon the location, character and extent of the use to which the particular trail was put. We also held that the state was under no duty to maintain guardrails along the side of the trail at the point where the adjoining canyon was readily visible to users of the trail. In the instant case, although it was dark, claimant and all of his companions knew that a canyon was in the vicinity.

[3] Finally, this court is bound by the well established rule of law in Illinois that a claimant must be free from contributory negligence in order to recover damages. This rule was carefully re-examined and upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in Maki v. Frelk (1968) 40 Ill.2d 193 reversing the Appellate Court which had attempted to change the contributory negligence rule and adopt the comparative negligence doctrine. [85 Ill.App.2d 439] The law remains unchanged.

We are mindful of the fact that claimant was 14 years old at the time of his unforunate accident, and will apply the test of negligence correctly stated in claimant’s brief as follows:

"Although a child of 14 may be held to the same standard of care for his own safety as an adult, still his age, intelligence and experience shall be considered. Seaburg v. Williams 16 Ill.App.2d 295, 300 (1958); Mascalinnas v. Chicago and W.I.R. Company, 318 Illinois at 142.”

The record indicates that the claimant was an alert young man of normal intelligence. Although he was not an experienced camper, he must have gained some knowledge of the area during the 6 or 7 daylight hours he spent playing in the vicinity of the camp site and on the bluffs to the southeast of where he fell. He remembers being warned by a counselor that "there were bluffs in the vicinity” and admonished "to be careful”. Under these circumstances claimant would be contributorily negligent if he failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. Ordinary care is stated to be that care and foresight to avoid danger which a person of ordinary prudence, caution and intelligence would usually exercise under the same or similar circumstances. I.L.P. Negligence § 123.

Claimant testified that he was standing on a footpath in the woods when the kerosene lantern went out. It was so dark that he could not see the lights from the shelter building. The boys had no light of any kind. Being the oldest boy, claimant was selected to go back to the shelter and get another lantern. Claimant thought that the path led back to the shelter. He could not see far ahead. Nevertheless, being in a hurry to get back, he started running as fast as he could, and suddenly he fell over the cliff. We believe a reasonably cautious person, even if oblivious to the cliffs, would foresee the danger of running through an unfamiliar woods in the darkness as claimant described it. He could have struck a tree limb or log or other unknown hazards.

We believe that by running in the dark of night through the woods, being unfamiliar with the area, but having been warned that there were cliffs in the vicinity, claimant displayed a reckless disregard for his own safety. At least he did not exercise the degree of care required by the above rule to establish freedom from any contributory negligence.

For the reasons stated above, we must deny this claim. It is, therefore, unnecessary to comment on the seriousness or extent of the injuries claimant sustained in this unfortunate and regrettable accident. The claim is denied.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-38
    Wright’s Moving, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Wright’s Moving, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-40
    Desaulniers and Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Public Employees Pension Laws Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Desaulniers and Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-43
    Dean Business Equipment Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Dean Business Equipment Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-82
    Henry Hanselman d/b/a Central Chemical Co., Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Howarth & Howarth, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-202
    Marshall Bautz, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Marshall Bautz, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-209
    Kenneth Eugene Laird, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Kenneth Laird, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-218
    Dorothy P. Beard, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Dorothy P. Beard, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-248
    West Publishing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Finance, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Wes Publishing Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-250
    R. Herschel Manufacturing Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    R. Herschel Mfg. Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-294
    Northwest Dodge, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Northwest Dodge, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S.

      Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-295
    Cinema Processors, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Cinema Processors, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-304
    Clock Tower Inn, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Business and Economic Development, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Clock Tower Inn, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-306
    IBM Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    IBM Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-325
    West Publishing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Comptroller, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    West Publishing Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-330
    Illinois State University, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Office of the Bursar, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-338
    IBM Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Comptroller, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    IBM Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-358
    IBM Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    IBM Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-386
    John W. Anderson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    John W. Anderson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-402
    Hubert S. Cobb, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Hubert S. Cobb, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-424
    Weber, Hilmer & Johnson, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Weber, Hilmer & Johnson, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S.

      Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6159
    Ida Rosenthal, Claimant, vs. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1974.

    Root & Root, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Frank Glazer and John Purney, Attorneys for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

Claimant Ida Rosenthal has filed suit against the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, claiming damages in the amount of $8,650 for injuries received on June 20,1970, on the premises of the assembly hall of the University of Illinois in Champaign, Illinois. On that date, Claimant was visiting the University to attend the graduation of her grandaughter. She entered the assembly hall building at approximately 9:30 a.m., accompanied by her husband, daughter, son-in-law and two grandchildren. She wore closed toe shoes with leather soles, and heels approximately one inch high. The lighting was good, the Claimant was wearing her glasses.

Claimant testified that she noticed that the corridor leading to the auditorium was highly waxed and polished. As she and her party approached a door leading from the corridor into the auditorium, her right foot slipped, and the toe of her left shoe caught in a depression in the floor. Claimant fell forward, striking her face, mouth and nose on the concrete floor.

After her fall, Claimant noticed that the area where she fell did not appear to have been polished as was the rest of the corridor. She described the floor as "splotchy”, and said there were several grooves in the floor at the point where she fell. She described the indentation in which she caught her toe as being about two inches in diameter and from ¼ to ½ inches deep. She said that this indentation was filled with a spongy material that appeared to be unbuffed wax, and that after her fall her clothes, hands and purse were marked with a dark, waxy-like material.

Claimant’s son-in-law, who witnessed the incident, testified that there were depressions in the floor where Claimant fell, and that the depressions were filled with a yellowish, slippery substance. He said that the area was slippery as compared with the rest of the corridor, and appeared not to have been buffed.

Claimant’s grandson, who also witnessed her fall, also stated that the area was marked by depressions filled with wax.

The superintendent in charge of the assembly hall building on the date of the incident said that no wax had been used on the corridor, but that the corridor floor was treated with a sealer sometime prior to the graduation exercise. He said that the sealer, a white, milky liquid, was applied to the floor with a mop, and then buffed with a machine to a dry, glossy finish.

As a result of her fall, Claimant’s mouth, gums and lip were cut. Two of her natural teeth were fractured and had to be surgically removed. A three tooth bridge which she was wearing at the time of the accident was broken, and had to be replaced. In all, Claimant incurred dental expenses totalling $1150.00.

At the onset, the instant situation must be distinguished from those cases holding that there can be no recovery for falling on a waxed floor merely because it is polished to a slippery gloss. Claimant’s theory is that the Respondent’s agents negligently and improperly applied a sealing substance to the floor, which resulted in Claimant’s fall. This Claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

The record establishes that at the point where Claimant fell, the corridor floor was marked by indentations which were filled with a spongy, slippery, yellowish substance. This record further establishes that this portion of the corridor was slippery, and that the floor apparently had not been buffed. As Claimant slipped on the floor her left toe caught in one of the indentations, causing her to fall forward and to sustain injuries.

In Dixon v. Hart, 344 Ill. App. 132, 101 N.E. 2d 282, at 284, the Court said.

"We have concluded for an examination of the law in Illinois as well as in other jurisdictions that as a general proposition the mere treating of a floor with a subtance that gives it a polished surface is not negligence per se . . . The cases establish that some positive act of negligence must be shown before recovery can be had, such as: that an excessive quantity of polish must be used, that it was applied unevenly, that the floor had been freshly polished, and no warning given, that one section of the floor was waxed or oiled while the remainder was untreated, or that a floor was polished were people would step on it unexpectedly, . . .”

Claimant has succeeded in proving affirmative acts of negligence on the part of the agents of Respondents, namely their permitting an accumulation of sealer to collect in depresuions in the corridor floor, and their failure to properly buff the area.

Respondents urge that the substance upon which Mrs. Rosenthal slipped has not been identified, and that there is therefore no evidence that it was placed on the floor by an agent of the Respondent. Respondents assert that Claimant must prove actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of the substance on the part of Respondents before they may be held liable. This argument is unsupported by the record, however, as the material upon which Claimant slipped was identified as floor sealer which could only have been put there by Respondent’s agents. The superintendent of the assembly hall building testified that the corridor was regularly treated with a liquid sealer, which if properly buffed left a dry, glossy shine. The spot where Claimant fell had allegedly not been buffed, and although Claimant and her witnesses erroneously identified the substance as wax, the conclusion is compelling that sealer was allowed to accumulate in depressions in the floor, causing Claimant’s accident.

Respondents also contend that Claimant was not free from contributory negligence. There is no evidence however, that Claimant was walking with undue haste. She was walking in a normal fashion, looking ahead, and she had a right to assume that the floor was reasonably safe and that she would be given warning of any hazardous condition. Johnson v. Central Tile & Terrazzox Co., 59 Ill. App. 2d 262 (1965).

The Court has fully considered the extent of damage alleged by Claimant and the testimony of the two dentists who treated Mrs. Rosenthal.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $3500.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-47
    Dean Business Equipment Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Dean Business Equipment Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-73
    Gelman Instrument Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Natural History Survey, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Gelman Instrument Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-219
    William O. Stewart, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    William O. Stewart, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-220
    Marea C. Rivers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Marea C. Rivers, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-247
    Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-251
    Able Ambulance Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Able Ambulance Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-256
    Corine Proctor, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Corine Proctor, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-257
    American Petrofina Co. of Texas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

      American Petrofina Co. of Texas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-278
    Commonwealth Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    George O. Shaffner and Joseph C. Sibley, Jr., Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-297
    Micro Design, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Micro Design, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-387
    Eugene Short, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Eugene Short, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-391
    Calvin Minor, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Calvin Minor, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-396
    A*A*A* Saw & Tool Serv. & Supply Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    A*A*A* Saw & Tool Serv. & Supply Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-398
    Max Hirschfelder, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Max Hirschfelder, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-405
    Cord Moving and Storage, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

      Cord Moving and Storage, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-410
    Arthur Thomas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    Arthur Thomas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Pee Curiam.

text:
    (No. 6973
    International Salt Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    International Salt Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pee Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6889
    International Salt Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    International Salt Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6890
    International Salt Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1974.

    International Salt Company, Claimant, pro se.

    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.