text:
    James F. Green v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 21, 1898.

    Military Service—injury to soldier through defective fire arm. Where claimant is injured in the performance of his duty, as a member of the National Guard, acting under command of his superior officer in camp, is guilty of no carelessness or negligence whatever on his part contributing to said injury and said injury is caused by an old defective rifle, unfit for use and furnished him by the State, said rifle exploding accidentally, causing laceration of his thumb and left hand and rendering claimant permanently injured, claimant can recover.
   The petition in this case alleges that James F. Green enlisted as a member of company “I” of the Fifth Regiment of the Illinois National Guards on the 28th day of June, A. D. 1897; that on the 31st day of August, 1897, company “I” of which the claimant was a member, was in camp at Camp Lincoln in the State of Illinois by order of the proper authorities of said State for the purpose of duty; that on said day the claimant was ordered by his superior officer to engage in target practice; that in obedience to said order, he engaged in target practice and while so engaged in target practice and while in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety and without any negligence on his part, the rifle which he was using exploded and greatly lacerated and wounded his hand, nearly tearing off his thumb by which the claimant was permanently deprived of the perfect use of his left hand; that he suffered great pain and anguish and for the space of three months he was wholly disqualified from performing any labor or earning a livelihood; and that he has been permanently injured so that his ability to earn a livelihood is materially decreased; that the rifle he was using at the time was one furnished him by the State; and was an old and defective rifle and unfit for the use for which it was required.

The claimant introduced in support of his claim, the evidence of Col. James S. Culver, who was in command of the regiment at the time of the injury; the evidence of Captain E. S. Vickery who was in the immediate command of the company at the time; and the evidence of James L. Evans who was surgeon in charge of the Fifth Infantry at the time of the accident and who took charge of Mr. Green immediately after his injury; and the evidence of Dr. E. W. Ames, who was a physician on the field near Mr. Green at the time of the accident; and, also, the evidence of Oliver P. White, who was inspector of rifle range and Only a few feet from the petitioner at the time of the injury.

These witnesses fully establish the claim of the petitioner and show conclusively that Mr. Green was injured in the line of his duty, acting under the command of his superior officers during the encampment at Camp Lincoln in August, 1897; and that he was guilty of no carelessness or negligence whatever on his part contributing to said injury; that the rifle exploded accidentally causing the laceration of the thumb of the left hand of Mr. Green and rendering him permanently injured. The nature of the injury is substantially that of the entire left thumb reaching to the middle line of the palm of the hand to the wrist; that the thumb was^ blown back on the hand and was hanging by only about three-fourths of ah inch of the skin and a little flesh; the bones were badly shattered and the evidence shows about twenty pieces of the bone were taken out of the wound.

Considering the nature and extent of the injury as shown by the evidence in this case and that the claimant’s thumb is shriveled and stiffened at the joint and that the injury is a permanent one, we are of the opinion that the claimant is entitled to an award of seven hundred and fifty dollars; and that amount is fixed upon by the Commission as a just and proper allowance. Seven hundred and fifty dollars is therefore awarded to claimant.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Lincoln H. Ross v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 21, 1898.

    Respondeat Superior—State not liable for torts of its officers. The State is not liable for the torts arid negligent acts of its officers.
   While the accident to the claimant in this case is to be deplored, and while the petition shows the injury is permanent, in the opinion of the Commission we have no power to bind the State.

The petition shows the claimant was acting under the direction of a foreman of the State’s prison, and while obeying his orders fell from a derrick and was badly disabled. It also alleges that the surgeon in charge failed to perform his duty and by neglect and unskillfulness the result of his treatment was unsatisfactory to the claimant, rendering him a cripple for life.

To the petition, a demurrer was filed by the State. Admitting the truth of the allegations of the petition,. we are of the opinion that the State is not liable for the torts and negligent acts of its officers. This view is fully sustained by the following line of authorities, viz: Story on Agency, Sec. 319; The State Bank, Admr., etc. v. The State, decided by the Commission at its August session, 1897,and authorities there cited: Jacob Schmidt v. The State of Illinois, decided by the Commission at the August session, 1890, and authorities there cited.

Viewing this case as we do and believing ultimately that there can be no allowance made by this Commission it would be useless expense incurred if the Commission should overrule the demurrer in this case and permit the claimant to introduce evidence which would only involve the expenditure of money and ultimately result in no good.

If there is any liability in this case, it is not against the State, but against the officers personally; that the State cannot be held liable for the acts of its officers, however negligent, is a rule too well established to admit of controversy. Nor do we believe the Commission is authorized by any statute to change the rule of the common law so well established, even though such a rule of necessity frequently works a great hardship.

Believing, therefore, as we do that the demurrer to the petition is well taken, we feel disposed to sustain it, and therefore dismiss the petition.


text:
    John J. Claucy, August Buchbolz, Michael Killeen and John Bunes v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 30, 1898.

      Practice—rules of procedure of Commission must be followed. Failure to comply with the rules of Commission providing for filing of claim will support motion to dismiss.
   The claimants in this case have failed to file a claim as required by Sec. 4 of the act creating this Commission and prescribing its powers and duties.

The Attorney General on the 2d day of August, A. D. 1898, filed his motion in the office of the Auditor to dis-, miss the same, there being nothing but a copy of a bill introduced in the House of the 40th General Assembly.

It is therefore ordered by the Commission that said bill be stricken from the files and that this claim be dismissed.


text:
    John H. Hamline v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 30, 1898.

      Services—rendered by appointment with Attorney General. When, an appointment has been made by the Attorney General and the claim for services is reasonable, claim will be allowed.
   This is a claim filed in the Auditor’s office in due form by the claimant, John H. Hamline, claiming an amount due for services rendered the State of Illinois under an appointment had with the Attorney General.

The evidence is conclusive that the appointment was made and the services were rendered and that a reasonable charge for the services would be $500.00; and that the claimant expended an amount of $31.00 for the printing of briefs and some other sundry matters.

Therefore it is ordered that the claimant be awarded the sum of five hundred thirty-one dollars.


text:
    Arthur D. Martin v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 30, 1898.

      Contracts—when receipts showing settlement of account are conclusive. When claimant has given receipts showing an adjustment of his account they are conclusive in the absence of proof of fraud or mistake.
   This is a claim filed by Arthur D. Martin in due form in the Auditor’s office, on February 25, 1898, for the sum of $34,737.19, of which sum it is alleged to be for a balance of commission due the claimant for sales of chairs sold by claimant under two certain contracts with the Commissioners of the State Penitentiary at Joliet, Illinois, acting in behalf of the State of Illinois, and a balance; of $14,000.00 for damages alleged to have been sustained by said claimant by reason of a breach on the part of the said Commissioners acting in behalf of the State of Illinois of the said two certain contracts.

On the hearing of this cause, claimant, by his attorneys, waived his claim to the $14,000.00; and the only matter in controversy for this Commission to pass upon is the claim of $20,737.19.

The evidence shows that the claimant entered into a contract with the Board of Commissioners of the Illinois Penitentiary at Joliet acting on behalf of the State of Illinois, on the 20th day of June, 1893. The conditions of this contract were that the claimant was to devote his time exclusively to the management of the chair factory at the State prison at Joliet, including the sale of all manufactured products.

His compensation was to be fifteen per cent of the gross sale of said business as. long as the earnings of the men employed amounted to less than sixty cents per man per day; and the additional sum of five per cent, making the total commission twenty per cent, when the business upon its gross products developed an earning of sixty cents per man employed per day after certain charges for interest of the money invested in said plant and costs per power and other items were deducted.

On the first day of September, 1894, another contract was entered into, the conditions of which in relation to the compensation, were substantially the same as the contract of June 20, 1893.

Both contracts contained other provisions which are not necessary to be considered in passing upon the merits of this claim.

The claimant’s testimony is: That he operated under these two contracts and that from October 18, 1893, to February 29,1896, the sales of chairs made by him under these two contracts amounted to $339,442.24, of which amount calculated on a basis of twenty per cent commission, his earnings would amount to $67,888.45; of which amount, he credits the State with having paid him $47,151.26, leaving a balance as he claims to be due him of $20,737.19.

The claimant insists that the major part of this amount which he claims to be due is upon the extra five per cent commission as provided in contracts; that the settlements made with him by the State were upon a basis of fifteen per cent; that the Commissioners and the Warden in mailing these settlements, made it upon a basis of fifteen per cent; and that the earnings of the men were sixty cents per day per man employed and that he is entitled to- the twenty per cent commission on the gross sales as in the two said contracts provided.

The only positive evidence introduced by the claimant upon this point is the evidence of Warden Allen, which was contained in the report of an investigation committee appointed by the Senate of Illinois 39th General Assembly.

This evidence was introduced by the claimant under objections of the Attorney General and was allowed to be introduced and passed upon in the final hearing of this case.

The Commission is of the opinion that this evidence introduced in the form it was, is not competent and therefore is not considered in arriving at a judgment in this case.

The Commission is also of the opinion that there is not sufficient evidence to establish the fact that the earnings of the men amounted to sixty cents per day per man employed.

The State has introduced a number of receipts from the claimant, which, in the opinion of the Commission, are conclusive in the absence of proof of fraud or mistake. Many of the receipts contain a statement of the settlement for a period of time and there seems to have been an adjustment in full of accounts between the parties.

We are of the opinion that there is not sufficient evidence introduced to sustain the claim.

The judgment of the Commission is the claim be denied and the petition dismissed.


text:
    Anton Grajewski v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 30, 1898.

      Practice—procedure prescribed must be followed. Law governing prosecution of claims before the Commission must be followed, otherwise claim will be rejected.
   The claimant in this case had a bill introduced for his relief before the 40th General Assembly but received no aid therefrom, he thereupon filed a copy of said bill before this Commission on the 21st day of May, 1897. Ho evidence was taken nor was there any proper claim filed as required by the statutes governing the filing of claims before the Commission. At the present session of the Commission the Attorney General oh behalf of the State interposed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground that no claim had been filed in accordance with the law. The Commission held as heretofore in the case of Schultz v. The State, that the ground of the motoin was well founded and dismissed the case, holding that claimants desiring relief at the hands of this Commission must follow the law governing the prosecution of claims before the Commission.


author: J. C. McKenzie,

text:
    Isaac R. Hitt, et al v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 30, 1898.

    1. Statute of Limitations—all unliquidated claims must be filed within two years. The statute of limitations of 1847 provides, “that all claims for unliquidated damages against the State must be filed within two years after the right of action accrues or be forever barred.”
    2. Same—act of 1847 still in force. The statute of limitations of 1847 was not repealed by implication upon the passage of the act creating a Commission of Claims.
    3. Fees and Salaries—manner in which State agents may be appointed and paid. The only case in which the State could be held liable for the payment of agents such as are considered in this case, is when the party making the appointment of such agents is duly empowered by an act of the General Assembly authorizing such appointment.
   Separate Opinion by

J. C. McKenzie,

Commissioner.

The amount demanded by claimants in this case, (something over thirty-six thousand ($36,000.00) dollars) as set forth in the petition of the claimants and by the evidence in support of their petition is for services rendered by claimant Hitt and John A. Logan and W. W. Wiltshire, deceased husbands of Mary S. Logan and Catherine Wiltshire respectively; the services being rendered by them in behalf of the State of Illinois, in prosecuting against the United States government, first, the claim for advances made by the State to the government to carry on the war under the Act of July 27, 1861; second, the direct tax claim; and third, the claim of five per ¡cent on all public lands located with military land warrants in the State of Illinois.

The claimants set forth in their petition that claimant Hitt has been laboring for many years on all of the above claims under the authority given him by Ex-Governors Beveridge and Cullom, to act as State agent for the State of Illinois in the prosecution of said claims, and that John A. Logan and W. W. Wiltshire were each commissioned by the Governors of the State of Illinois in their lifetime to prosecute all of said claims and that they rendered valuable service to the State in recovering back from the government large sums of money, and that in the prosecution of said work large sums of money were expended and laid out by said Hitt, Logan and Wiltshire, for which claimants now seek reimbursement from the State.

The claimants sought relief at the hands of the General Assembly and a bill was introduced in the Fortieth General Assembly but failed to pass and was referred to this Commission.

On November 5, 1897, by leave of the Commission, claimants filed their amended petition, to which the State filed four pleas. The third being the five years’ statute of limitations and the fourth being the two years’ statute of limitations. To the said last plea, claimants interposed a demurrer. The State further set up in bar of claimants right to recover section 19 of article 4, of the Constitution of the State.

Claimants offered in evidence in support of their claim the depositions of claimants, Hitt and Logan, Ex-Governor Beveridge of Illinois and Ex-Governor Crawford of Kansas, also certain reports of said Hitt made to the Governor of Illinois while claiming to act as such agent for the State.

The State offered in evidence certified copies of the so-called Commissions relied upon by claimants as a basis for their claim, and many letters and documentary evidence tending to throw light on the controversy.

The case was heard before the full Commission in December, 1898; claimants being ably represented by J. Otis Humphrey and the State by C. A. Hill, Assistant Attorney General for the State, and by agreement of counsel the demurrer was allowed to stand until after the hearing of the evidence and arguments of counsel in order to better determine the force of the same.

We deem it our duty after hearing the contentions of the party to pass upon the demurrer filed by claimants before considering the merits of the case. The two years statute of limitations is found in the Act of 1847 (laws of Illinois) which prescribed the manner of prosecuting claims against the State and specifically set forth that all claims for unliquidated damages against the State must be filed within two years after the right of action accrues or be forever barred. The contention of counsel for claimants is that the statute of 1847 prescribing the manner of prosecuting claims against the State was repealed by implication upon the passage of the later act creating this Commission, and consequently the statute of limitations therein set forth was also repealed notwithstanding the act creating this Commission does not prescribe any limitation whatever to the filing of claims against the State. In view of the fact that the new act does not prescribe any limitations whatever to the filing of claims against the State, we are of the opinion the contention of the able counsel is not sound; that the rule of repeal by implication cannot be applied in this case; and while we do not in this opinion hold that the statute of limitations can be plead as a bar to claimants right to recover in this case, we are still of the opinion (and have so held before) that in all cases where the statute of limitations may be plead at all the two years statute is a complete and perfect defense. In our opinion had the claimants’ demand any legal standing, or in other words there had been a contract made with the State not expressly forbidden by the Constitution we are of the opinion that the statute could not be relied on as a bar in this case, however we are forced to believe that the defense set up by the State, that admitting it to be true that the claimants were armed with such Commissions as claimant Hitt testified to in his deposition, even then they would have no right to recover from the State under section 19, article 4, of the Constitution set up by the State which provides as follows: “The General Assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compensation, fee or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor after service has been rendered or a contract made, nor authorize the payment of any claim, or part thereof, hereafter created under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law; and also such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void.” This provision of the Constitution is too plain to admit of discussion. We hold that the only way in which the State could be held to respond in a matter of this character is where the party making the appointment is duly empowered by an act of the General Assembly authorizing such appointment, and we hold that under the very plain provision of the Constitution we are helpless to aid claimants, and further believe that the Legislature is powerless to act in their behalf and any bill making an appropriation in behalf of these claimants would in our opinion be unconstitutional and void. As to the merits of this case we do not think it necessary to discuss the matter but briefly. There is not a particle of evidence in the record tending to show that either claimant Hitt, John A. Logan or W. W. Wiltshire were ever legally appointed or authorized to act as State agent for the State of Illinois in the prosecution of any claims set forth in the petition of claimants. The evidence shows that the only services rendered by John A. Logan and W. W. Wiltshire were in relation to the five per cent on the military land warrants and that the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the State could not recover; and it is admitted by all the claimants that the parties rendering the services were to receive no compensation from the State unless successful in. the prosecution of the matters they had in charge. So far as the services of John A. Logan and W. W. Wiltshire are concerned they recovered nothing for the State and consequently under their own admissions are not entitled to any compensation from the State. As to claimant Hitt’s right to recover there is no evidence in the record that tends to show that he was legally appointed agent for the State of Illinois to even look after any of the claims, his evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. He boldly testifies that the Commission he received from Ex-Governor Beveridge was broad enough and in fact covered all such matters. He attempts to corroborate his testimony on that point by the deposition of Ex-Governor Beveridge. The Commission as shown by a certified copy in evidence which he received from Beveridge, was simply a Commission appointing him as agent for the State to look after the swamp land located in this State and for which services he was to look to the various counties for his compensation. He is absolutely contradicted in his testimony by documentary evidence that cannot be controverted.

The Commission he received from Ex-Governor Cullom was without authority of law and Ex-Governor Cullom expressly stated as did Ex-Governor Hamilton after-wards, in their communications with Hitt in regard to the same that they had no power to bind the State for compensation for such services. There is no evidence that through the efforts of claimant Hitt any money was ever recovered from the United States government on any of said claims except it be the fifteen hundred and thirty-two dollars which he speaks of as being part of the money advanced by the State to carry on the war and which has since been paid to the State of Illinois. Had claimant Hitt been acting under legal authority as the duly authorized agent of the State of Illinois, he would be entitled to some compensation for such services, but Ave are of the opinion that no such authority was ever given him.

The generosity of claimant Hitt towards Mrs. John A. Logan and Mrs. Catherine Wiltshire in giving to them one-third of the amount claimed in this case when the evidence plainly shows that they are not entitled to a single dollar of compensation, seems very strange indeed in the light of Hitt’s own testimony that he has spent all the better years of his life in the prosecution of these claims while the other gentlemen spent but a few months and that in a fruitless effort to recover on one of said claims.

We are loath to believe that claimant Hitt wilfully falsified his statements concerning this matter, yet we cannot conceive how any sane man, intelligent and well posted on such matters as Mr. Hitt must have been, would follow a will-o’-the-wisp, as he has apparently done. In short we are of the opinion that this claim is absolutely without any foundation, legal, equitable, or moral, and that it would be a fraud upon justice to allow it. Therefore the claim is denied.


author: W. S. Louden,

text:
    Isaac R. Hitt, et al v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 30, 1898.

    Pees and Saiabies—no extra compensation to be granted public officer after service rendered on contract. Under Section 19 of Article 4 of the Constitution of 1870, which provides, “That the General Assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compensation fee or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor after service has been rendered or a contract made; nor authorize the payment of any claim or part thereof hereafter created against the State under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void; provided the General Assembly shall make appropriations for expenditures incurred in suppressing insurrection or repelling invasion,” an agreement made with a party whereby he is to attempt to obtain a settlement of war claims owing the State by the United States Government and look to the legislature for his pay, is void.
   Separate opinion by

W. S. Louden,

Commissioner.

The claimants in this case, Isaac R Hitt, Mary S. Logan, widow of John A. Logan, deceased, and Catherine Wiltshire, widow of W. W. Wiltshire, deceased, claim an amount due from the State of Illinois for alleged services rendered by authority averred by petitioners to have been given Isaac E. Hitt by Governors John L. Beveridge and Shelby M. Cullom to represent the State of Illinois in any and all claims of the State of Illinois against the United States and press them to a settlement.

This alleged authority was granted to Isaac E. Hitt by Governors Beveridge and Cullom with the express understanding that the said Hitt was to look to the Legislature of the State of Illinois for compensation for services.

The petition avers that Hitt employed General John A. Logan and Hon. W. W. Wiltshire to assist him in representing the State in these claims; that the services of General John A. Logan were rendered during the years of 1877, 1878 and 1879 while he was not in the employ of the United States Government; that the understanding between said Hitt, Logan and Wiltshire was that they should share equal in any compensation there should be allowed by the State of Illinois for services rendered; that through the efforts of said Hitt, Logan and Wiltshire, an act of Congress was passed in 1891 refunding to the State of Illinois, the sum of $974,569.63.

At the session of the 39th General Assembly of the State of Illinois, these claimants presented their claim and a bill allowing the claimants the sum of $30,000 was passed by the Senate and a similar bill for like amount was passed by the Senate of the 40th General Assembly. At the 40th General Assembly, a resolution was adopted by the House of Eepresentives referring the bill to this Commission.

At the August session, 1897, of this Commission, these' claimants by leave of this Commission, filed their amended petition.

The State filed four pleas to this claim; the fourth which is known as the two years statute of limitations, to which fourth plea, a demurrer was filed by claimant’s attorneys. The State also set up and relied upon as a complete defense to this claim, section nineteen of article four of the Constitution of 1870.

The opinion of the Commission is, that the two years statute of limitations does not apply in this case; and the demurrer is therefore sustained.

As to the other defense relied upon by the State, section nineteen of article four of the Constitution of 1870, which provides, “That the General Assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compensation or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor after service has been rendered or a contract made; nor authorize the payment of any claim or part thereof hereafter created against the State under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void; provided the General Assembly shall make appropriations for expenditures incurred in suppressing insurrection or repelling invasion.”

In the opinion of the Commission, this is a good and complete defense against the claim; and upon this constitutional provision alone, the claim is, by this Commission, denied.

The testimony of the Governors making the appointment is all to the effect, that they knew that they had no authority to bind the State, nor is there any evidence that they attempted to do so. Hitt in his testimony says, the understanding was that he was to look to the Legislature for payment.

Governor Beveridge in his testimony says, “I requested Hitt to look after any and all claims of the State of Illinois against the United States Government and to press them to a settlement with the understanding that Hitt was to look to the Legislature of the State for compensation of services.” He also says, “I know of no special authority for the appointment of Hitt.”

Cullom in his appointment says, “That this authority is given with the express understanding that no liability will be created under it against the State for costs or expenses of any kind.”

The judgment of the Commission is that this claim be denied and the bill dismissed; but it is also decided by the Commission that each Commissioner should prepare an opinion as to the finding of the facts in the evidence so that if the claimants desire that they may prosecute their claim before the Legislature.

The! first evidence to< be considered is Hitt’s- appointment as State agent as alleged in the claimants’ petition. Taking the testimony first of Governor Beveridge, interrogatory third: “If you at any time during said term employed Isaac B. Hitt to act on behalf of the State of Illinois to prosecute and obtain from the government of the United States, certain war claims due the State and principally the claim known as the direct tax claim, if so, please state the character of said employment and the terms thereof as nearly as you can ?” Answer to the third interrogatory: “In answer in part to the interrogatory I offer a copy of a letter dated June 8, 1895, which letter was written by me, to be attached to this deposition as ‘Exhibit A.’ According to my best recollection as Governor of Illinois, I requested Isaac B. Hitt, who had been appointed agent of the State of Illinois in swamp land matters^ to press to settlement all claims of Illinois against the United States of every kind and nature and gave him written authority therefor, with the understanding that he was to meet his own expenses and look to the Legislature of the State of Illinois for his compensation for money expended in services rendered in this behalf.” The letter referred to. reads as follows:

“Chicago, Illinois, June 8, 1895.
I. B. Hitt, Esq.,
Chicago, Ill.,
Dear Sir:—
In pursuance of a joint resolution of the Illinois Legislature passed during my gubernatorial term, I, as Governor of the State, appointed you State agent to represent the interest of the State and Counties under the swamp land grant.
Hon. H. D. Cook, of McLean county, formerly representing the State at Washington in the settlement of war claims having resigned, I requested you to look after any and all claims of the State of Illinois against the United States Government and to press them to a settlement with the understanding that you were to look to the Legislature of the State for compensation for your services.
Tours truly,
(Signed.) John L. Beveridge.”
Certified copy of commission issued by Governor Cullom was dated July 20, 1880, authorizing Isaac B. Hitt to appear as agent or attorney for the State of Illinois “in any of the departments of the United States government, to secure the allowance and payment of any sums that may be due and owing to the State of Illinois on account of expenses, costs or charges incurred by the State in the war of Rebellion. This authority supercedes that given to R. G. and E. C. Ingersoll, July 2, 1878, and which is now resigned by Hon. R. G. Ingersoll, surviving member of the firm. This authority is given with the express understanding that no liability will be created against the State for costs and expenses of any kind whatsoever.
Very respectfully,
(Signed.) S. M. Cullom, Governor

Hitt in his testimony says, “that the Beveridge and Cullom commission cover the direct tax. And Beveridge also states in a general way, I must depend upon the Legislature. The Cullom commission was, some time in 1880.”

The next question to be considered is, “Was there any money, recovered by the State from the United States government?" The three following receipts were introduced in evidence, viz:

First: Date November 29, 1890,. for the sum of $1,532.92, from Governor Fifer, “From appropriation made by the U. S. government refunding to State expenses incurred in raising volunteers, Act July 27, 1861.”
(Signed.) Charles Becker, State Treasurer.
Second: Date April 23, 1891, for the sum of $956,-750.69, received of Governor Fifer, “Refunding direct tax, levied by general government act of Congress, August 5,1861.”
(Signed.) E. S. Wilson, State Treasurer.
Third: Date March 30, 1893. “Received of John P. Altgeld, Governor of Illinois, seventeen thousand eight hundred seven and 94-100 dollars, being the amount of direct tax levied by the act of August 5, 1861, found due the State of Illinois on settlement with government of United States.”
(Signed.) Rufus N. Ramsay, State Treasurer.

The next question to be considered is, “Was the money recovered through the efforts of Isaac B. Hitt, John A. Logan and W. W. Wiltshire?’ Isaac R. Hitt’s testimony: “The work done by me in the collection of the direct tax was begun in 1877. At that time, I employed Logan and Wiltshire to assist me in this claim. In 1877, Logan, Wiltshire and myself went to the war department and to the treasury department to obtain the data. We consulted at that time and many times afterwards during 1878 with Ex-Governor Samuel J. Crawford of Kansas, who was agent for the State, Prescott and Earl, agents for South Carolina, Wailes, agent for State of Maryland, Mullen, agent for California, Belknap, agent of Iowa, Lowe, of Iowa, and Garland, of Arkansas. We frequently consulted with the Attorney General’s office, also Commissioner Raum of the Internal Revenue department and with the Secretary of the Treasury.

We discussed many methods of proceedure but finally decided that our best claim was through Congress. Nearly every Congress from 1880 until 1888 had a measure before it relating to this claim; but no final action was taken. I was present at every session of Congress from 1876 down to this date. Have done all I could do as agent for the State in urging Congress to adjust this claim. From 1876 to 1882, the agents of the several States worked to this same end and without concerted action.

I think in 1882, several state agents formed an association and from that time to the passage of the act of March 2,1891, the organization was kept up, sent letters to governors of all states and printed circulars, disseminated information by letters and otherwise; obtained resolutions from the State legislators instructing members of Congress to vote for the refunding of the direct tax.

Judge Wiltshire and I attended all meetings of the association, paid our proportion of expense and appeared before committees in Congress from time to time.

General Logan’s connection with this bill was during the years of 1877 and 1878 and early in 1879, prior to his election to the United States Senate.

During the years they worked together neither Logan or Wiltshire were in the service of the United States in any capacity. Both did faithful work; and I promised them that whatever the Legislature of the State of Illinois might give me for services as agent of the State, I would give them each one third of the same. That agreement was verbal, never reduced it to writing.

I know that both Logan and Wiltshire paid out money in connection with their services. Wiltshire assisted me on this claim to the date of his death.

My expenses on account of the direct tax has been over $5,000 between 1876 and 1891 for printing, clerk hire, stenographer, telegraph and postage bill, expenses to the association, traveling expenses and expenses in Washington. I charged one-third of my expense up to the direct tax claim.

I spent the best part of my life working for the State and have never received any benefit from it.

I think the first bill to refund the direct tax was introduced in 1878 or 1880, might have been as late as 1881 or 1883.”

The evidence of Mary S. Logan is: “My husband was attorney for the State of Illinois from March, 1877, to March 4, 1879. He was employed by Mr. Hitt while associated with W. W. Wiltshire in the practice of law in Washington. He and Judge Wiltshire were to receive one-third of whatever compensation the Illinois Legislature should allow, whenever any of the claims should be paid by the government.

The services embraced the prosecution of all claims of the State against the government. I know this by being present on various occasions when the agreement and the nature of the claims were discussed.

General Logan was not connected with any services of the United States in any character whatever between the years of March 4, 1877, and 1878. He was in Washington continuously during the sessions of Congress and appeared before committees of both Houses and before the departments of claims.

He and Judge Wiltshire worked diligently at these claims daily during the period of two years from March, 1877, and March, 1879.

Mr. Logan’s share of expenses in the prosecution of these claims was $714. I know this because as his administratrix, I paid to Mary H. Brady that amount which he had borrowed from her to defray these expenses.

The agreement between Hitt, Logan and Wiltshire related to all claims which Hitt was authorized to prosecute against the government from the State of Illinois.

When my husband re-entered the Senate in 1879, he turned all his legal business to Judge Wiltshire and did not participate in the prosecution of the claims thereafter.”

The evidence of Governor Samuel J. Orawford of Kansas, is: “I am a lawyer, was employed by the State of Kansas, March 6, 1877, to prosecute claims against the United States, which employment continued until the direct tax was paid by the United States.

The services rendered in the direct tax claim consisted in preparing the case first, for presentation to the treasury department and afterwards to Congress.

Frequent meetings were held at which the attorneys of other states were present including the agent and attorneys of the State of Illinois who assisted in every-way.

The attorneys for Illinois were Isaac R. Hitt, John A. Logan and W. W. Wiltshire.

The question of refunding the direct tax to states that had paid their quota was presented to the First Comptroller of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency and the Secretary of the Treasury.

The attorneys, including those representing Illinois, took the position that it was the duty of the government either to collect the tax from the delinquent states or to refund it to those which had paid.

This question was submitted and discussed by them before the officials of the treasury department and the secretary of the treasury in a printed brief.

This work was done mainly by the representatives of South Carolina, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Kansas, Arkansas, Maryland, Iowa and Pennsylvania.

I acted with attorneys for the State of Illinois, Hitt, Logan and Wiltshire from 1877 until the claim was paid.

Logan began in 1877 and retired in 1879. Wiltshire continued until his death.

The foundation for the collection of this direct tax was ready long before 1885.

I know that Logan, Wiltshire and Hitt represented Illinois before the departments of the principal committees in Congress. They did their duty in presenting and prosecuting the refunding tax act and they helped to secure the State of Illinois about nine hundred thousand dollars and they should be paid for their services.”

I am of the opinion that from the evidence, the finding of the facts by this Commission should be:

First: That Isaac R. Hitt labored under the impression that he was the authorized agent under the appointments of Governors Beveridge and Cullom to represent the State of Illinois in securing to the State any claims due it from the general government.

Second. That Hitt employed Logan and Wiltshire to assist him in prosecuting these claims of the State of Illinois against the United States government.

Third. That Hitt, Logan and Wiltshire performed services that were valuable to the State of Illinois in securing the refunding of $956,760.69 and also $17,807.94 levied by the general government against the State of Illinois by the act of Congress, August 5, 1861.


author: W. C. Jones.

text:
    Isaac R. Hitt, et al v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 30, 1898.

    1. Statute of Limitations—act of 1847 still in force. The limitation act of 1847 has not been repealed directly or by implication, but is still in force.
    2. Pees and Salaries—contracts with State agents must be made by express authority of law. In order that a State agent such as is under consideration in this case, may receive compensation for his services, his contract must have been made under express authority of law.
   Separate opinion by

W. C. Jones.

The real claimant, Mr. Isaac R. Hitt, alleges that he was appointed agent of the State of Illinois by Governor Beveridge in the year 1875, for the purpose of collecting all claims due the State from the general government growing out of the war of 1861. In order to ascertain what that appointment was, and the scope of the authority under the same, it may be stated here that the certified copy of the commission issued by Governor John L. Beveridge in 1875, simply appointed Mr. Isaac R. Hitt, State agent to look after the interests of the State growing out of the Swamp Land Act of 1850 and the amendments thereto.

Mr. Hitt in his testimony states that he acted as agent of the State under this authority from the date of his appointment to the present time; that his services began in 1875 and that he had examined at least two wagon loads of records, embracing claims to the amount of $4,000,000.00 paid and unpaid to the State; that he had three personal claims in his charge, viz:

First: Claim for balance due on account of advances made by the State to the United States under the act of Congress approved July 27, 1861; under which act he succeeded in collecting in 1890 items amounting to $1,532.92 which has been paid into the State Treasury.

Second: A claim amounting to $1,146,551.33 which was the direct tax paid by the State of Illinois. The State, however, having received a rebate of 15 per cent the amount actually paid by the State was only $974,-568.03. This amount, $974,568.03, was finally repaid to the State under the act of Congress approved March 22, 1891.

It was for the collection of this direct tax claim, Mr. Hitt says much of his time was given during the years 1877,1878 and 1879 and up to 1891, when the claim was finally paid to the State.

Third: The claim of 5 per cent for public lands lying within the limits of the State upon which land warrant entries were made. This claim is still unpaid and approximates about $1,000,000.00.

It will be perceived that Mr. Hitt claims that he gave most of his time and attention to the direct tax el aim during the years 1877,1878 and 1879 on up to 1891 when the claim finally passed Congress. The evidence in this claim discloses the fact that Mr. Hitt was appointed by Governor Beveridge to look after certain interests belonging to the State of Illinois, during the year 1875. His appointment, however, was simply to look after the interests of the State, growing out of the Swamp Land Act of September 28, 1850, and amendments thereto. During the years 1875, 1876 and 1877 and on up to July 28, 1880, Illinois had other State agents looking after the war claims belonging to the State.

Mr. H. D. Cook of McLean county, Illinois, was appointed State agent to collect war claims in 1867. July 2,1878, Messrs. E. G. and E. C. Ingersoll were appointed, Governor Cullom stating at the time that there was no law authorizing the appointment. The appointment was resigned by the Hon. R. G. Ingersoll, surviving member of the firm; and, on July 28, 1880, a commission was issued by Governor Cullom to Mr. Isaac R. Hitt to appear as agent or attorney of the State of Illinois in any department of the United States government and to secure amounts and payments that might be due or owing from the United States to the State of Illinois on account of expenses, costs and charges incurred by the State in the war of the Rebellion. The commission contained this clause: “This authority is given with the express understanding that no liability will be created under it against the State, for costs and expenses of any kind whatever.” It will thus be seen that Mr. Hitt had no semblance of authority to act for the State until this appointment. The appointment made by Governor Beveridge in 1875 was for no other purpose than looking after the interest of the State growing out of the Swamp Land Act.

Mr. Hitt in his testimony states, “that Gen. Logan, Judge Wiltshire and myself participated time and again during the years 1877 and 1878 and since that time Judge Wiltshire and myself appeared in connection with other agents before committees of Congress” to secure payment of claim belonging to Illinois. He states that the work done by him in connection with the direct tax was done in 1877. “At that time I employed Logan and Wiltshire to assist me in that claim; in 1877, Logan, Wiltshire and myself went to the war department to obtain data for full understanding of the merits of this claim.”

Mr. Hitt evidently supposed at that time he was acting as State agent for Illinois, for the purpose of securing all claims due from the general government to the State, but the records and files introduced in evidence show otherwise, and that he never received any authority to act and never had any appointment until July 28, 1880.

Mr. Hitt in his testimony further says: “During the years they worked together neither Logan nor Wiltshire were in the service of the United States in any capacity. Both did faithful work and I promised them that whatever the Legislature of Illinois might give me for services, as agent of the State, I would give them each one-third of the sum. That contract was verbal. Never reduced it to writing.” In this connection it will be well to see what work Gen. Logan was authorized to do at that time by the State of Illinois. It has already been seen that Mr. Hitt was authorized only to look after the Swamp Land interests of the State. The records of the executive office of 1878 show that on February 28th, the Governor appointed Hon. John A. Logan agent of the State of Illinois to collect and receive any moneys recoverable from the United States on account of military locations of lands in the State of Illinois under an act of Congress. Under that appointment Gen. John A. Logan acted as agent for the State of Illinois until his election to the United States Senate; when Governor Cullom, December 27, 1879, appointed “Judge Wiltshire, of Washington City, D. C., as agent of the State of Illinois, to collect and receive any moneys recoverable from the United States on account of military locations of lands, in the State of Illinois, under an act of Congress, in place of Hon. John A. Logan, who has resigned.” From that time on Gen. John A. Logan was a member of the United States Senate and his former partner, Judge Wiltshire, represented the State as State agent for the purpose for which he was appointed, viz: to collect and receive any moneys recoverable from the United States on account of military locations of lands in the State of Illinois under act of Congress.

The evidence shows that Gen. John A. Logan died on or about the ... day of........ 1886, and that Judge Wiltshire died on or about the ... day of........ 1890. The evidence shows that Logan and Wiltshire prosecuted the claim for which they were agents until they reached a decision which was adverse in the Supreme Court of the United States. With the exception of Mr. Hitt’s testimony there is no direct evidence showing that they ever had any connection with any claims in favor of the State against the United States except the one for which they were appointed agents.

The evidence shows that Mr. Hitt requested Governor John M. Hamilton to appoint him State agent to prosecute any and all claims due the State of Illinois growing out of the war of 1861; and, in reply to the request Governor Hamilton stated to Mr. Hitt, he had no authority given him, either by joint resolution or by an act of the Legislature, authorizing him to make the appointment.

It will be seen then that Governor John M. Hamilton when requested gave it as his opinion that he had no authority to make such an appointment and declined to act, and had there been authority in the first instance to make the appointment it would not have been necessary to have asked for reappointment, for such authority would have held good until the same was revoked.

One more reference to the evidence of Mr. Hitt. The evidence I refer to was introduced by the State and is a letter from Mr. Hitt to Governor Oglesby. This letter was dated February 24, 1886, and is a very important link in the testimony offered by the State. We quote: “The bill 164 provides to- credit or repay each State the direct war tax in toto. The Illinois M. C. are not a unit on this question and some of them have come to no conclusion. Shall I favor or oppose it? The southern members generally are favoring the bill. I should be pleased to- receive any advice or instruction you may give me.”

Judging from the language used by Mr. Hitt at this time he was in doubt as to what course he should take; and, had Governor Oglesby written back to him, “Oppose bill 164,” Mr. Hitt would have lent opposition to the bill; and yet, bill 164 was the first bill introduced in to Congress authorizing the repayment of the “direct tax” to the States. '

During the year 1886 Gen. Logan was a member of the Senate and died during that year. If Mr. Hitt was undecided at that time in regard to his course, it must be conceded his recollection may be a little at fault in regard to transactions which had previously taken place.

There is still another document, A Memorial to the 40th General Assembly, by Mr. Hitt, from which we quote: “I am not desirous personally to have anything further to do with the settlement of this account of the State against the United States, but would like to be paid whatever the Legislature may see proper to pay me for services performed and for the $400.00; and to pay me ten per cent on the $1,532.92 and I will be satisfied.” Mr. Hitt has previously in this memorial complained that he has expended $400.00 in money; and, that the Legislature had made no appropriation to reimburse him for his expenses, nor had that body passed any act appropriating money to pay the per cent which he demanded on the amount he had collected for the State; and, he states in his memorial, if the State will pay him $553.29, he will be satisfied, and will not seek to act further as State agent; but, advises the Legislature there are other claims and the State should look after them.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

The limitation act of 1847 is pleaded in bar of this claim; and, a demurrer is filed to the plea. The demurrer is not well taken. The limitation act of 1847 is not repealed directly or by implication, but is still in force. But there is an objection to the allowance of any item in this case which seems insurmountable. A constitutional barrier. Section 19 of article 4, of the Constitution of Illinois, adopted 1870, provides, that “The General Assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compensation, fee or allowance, to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor, after service has been rendered, or a contract made, nor authorize the payment of any claim, or part thereof, hereafter created against the State, under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void; provided, the General Assembly may make appropriations for expenditures incurred in suppressing insurrections or repelling invasions.” No contract was ever made with Mr. Hitt or with Messrs. Logan and Wiltshire, nor could any legal contract have been made, for the reason there is nothing in all the evidence introduced showing that the General Assembly of Illinois, at any of its sessions, had ever passed a joint resolution or an act authorizing the appointment of any State agent for the purpose of collecting any of the claims for which Mr. Hitt now claims payment for services. • That there was no law authorizing these appointments seems to have been well understood by the Governors appointing for the appointments all expressly state, that the State of Illinois shall not be held liable for any costs or expenses incurred of any kind whatever.

Claim denied.


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    John Schultz v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 30, 1898.

      Practice—rules of procedure must be followed. Claim must be Sled in accordance with provision of law governing presentation and prosecution of claims before Commission. Failure to comply with law governing practice before Commission is ground for dismissal of claim.
   The claimant in this case had a bill introduced for his relief in the 40th General Assembly but received no aid therefrom; he then filed a copy of said bill with the Auditor on the 21st day of May, 1897, for the purpose of seeking relief at the hands of this Commission.

3SR> formal claim was filed and no evidence in support «of his claim was submitted. At the present session of the Commission the Attorney General in behalf of the State interposed a motion asking that the claim be dismissed on the ground that there was no claim filed in the case as required by the law governing the presentation and prosecution of claims before the Commission.

We are of the opinion that the grounds of the motion are well founded, and while the claimant may have a meritorious case, he like all other claimants is bound to follow the law governing the practice before this Commission which is no hardship as the law is very plain and explicit.

The claim for the above reasons is dismissed and stricken from the docket.


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    W. L. Mulford v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 22, 1899.

      Practice—rules of procedure must be strictly adhered to. This Commission is a Court governed by the statute and the rules of procedure heretofore adopted for the trial of cases before the Commission. It is necessary that claimant comply strictly with the law and rules of the Commission. For failure to comply with the law and rules of Commission as to taking and filing proofs in support of claim and filing abstracts and arguments, claim will be rejected.
   This is a claim filed by the claimant, W. L. Mulford, against the State of Illinois for a balance of seventy-two dollars and twenty-two cents alleged to be due him for labor performed on the Illinois and Michigan canal by order of the superintendent of said canal. The time when the services were performed does not appear from the claim.

The claim was filed May 24,1898, but no proofs or evidence other than the sworn claim of the party has been filed.

On September 16, 1898, the State by E. C. Akin filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: First, that the claim was not filed three months prior to the meeting of the Commission in August as required by the statute; and, second, because said claimant does not set forth when said claim accrued as required by the rules of the Commission.

The Commission, however, thought best not to dismiss but allowed the claim to stand on the docket until the present session, believing it to be no more than just that claimant have an opportunity to file proofs, and amend his claim, if desired; claimant, however, wholly neglected to do the same, and on November 28, 1899, the State by E. C. Akin, Attorney General, filed another motion to dismiss on the following grounds, viz:

First: The claimant has failed and neglected to take and file proofs in support of his claim, etc.
Second: Claimant has failed and neglected to make and file abstracts and arguments as required by Rules 11 and 12 of this Commission.
Third: Upon the grounds stated in the former motion filed September 16,1898.

This Commission is as we have said before a court governed by the statute and the rules of proceedure adopted heretofore for the trial of cases before the same; it is essential and necessary that any one desiring an adjudication of his claim by the Commission, that he comply strictly with the law and the rules of the Commission; and as the claimant in this case has wholly neglected to do so we are compelled to dismiss his claim without inquiry into the merits of the same. For the reasons above stated the Commission unanimously agree to dismiss the claim.


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    Continental Investment and Loan Society v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 22, 1899.

      Practice—Court rules must be observed. Failure to file proper declaration meeting requirements of the statute and rules of the Commission; failure to take evidence in support of claim and failure to file abstracts and briefs as provided by rules 4, 7, 11 and 12, will support a motion by the State to dismiss the claim.
   This is a claim filed May 16, 1898, in the Auditor’s office, sworn to by Graham H. Harris, averring an indebtedness against the State of Illinois for fees and expenses paid out and accrued in the case of The People v. Continental Investment and Loan Society on relation to the Auditor of Public Accounts of the State of Illinois, which the claimant avers were paid out in defending said litigation. The claimant avers they were all necessary expenses paid out by order of the Board of Directors of the Continental Investment and Loan Society and the amounts were itemized and aggregate the total sum of fifteen hundred and thirty-two dollars and ninety-five cents.

Buie 4 of the printed rules of the Commission, requires every claimant to file a written or printed declaration with the Auditor containing a statement of his or her claim, which delcaration is required after giving the title of the court and term, and the venue, and the commencement, to state concisely the facts constituting the claim, the time when and the place where the claim arose, the amount claimed; and all facts necessary to a full understanding of such claim; and if such claim accrued by virtue of a contract, a copy of such contract to be filed with the declaration, together with the name and present residence, if known, of the officer or agent with whom the contract was made.

A bill of particulars stating in detail each item claimed and the amount shall be attached to and made a part of the declaration.

The claimant is also required to state his or her claim has never been assigned or if assigned, to whom and when such assignment was made and the names of all persons interested in the claim. He is also required to state that his or her claim has never before been presented to any department or officer of the State; or, if it has been, shall state when and to what department or officer, and what action has been had thereon.

The claimant should verify his claim and unless verified under oath by claimant it shall not be filed by the clerk. The declaration filed in this case falls short of these requirements and a motion was filed by the State asking that the cause be dismissed, assigning the following grounds:

First: That said claim does not state the result of the suit against the Continental Investment and Loan Society, or what judgment, if any, was entered therein.
Second: That said claim does not show how or in what way the State of Illinois is or should be held liable for the expenses accrued by the Continental Investment and Loan Society in defending litigation in said claim mentioned.
Fourth: That said claim does not state when and to-what department or officer the same was presented and with what results, or. that it has never been presented to-any department or officer.

This motion was filed August 2,1898; but was not considered at the August term, 1898. On November 28, 1899, another motion was filed by the Attorney General for and on behalf of the State urging a dismissal of said claim, upon the grounds assigned in the first motion; and, upon the following additional grounds:

First: The claimant has failed to take and file proofs in support of his claim as required by section 4 of the statute governing proceedings in the Commission of Claims and of rule 7 of this Commission.
Second: Claimant has failed and neglected to make and file abstracts and argument as required by rules 11 and 12 of this Commission.

The objections urged by the State seem to be tenable. In other words, the files fail to show a proper declaration to have been filed meeting the requirements of the statute and the rules of this Commission; nor, does it appear any evidence has ever been taken in support of the claim; nor does it appear any abstract or briefs have been filed. It is not the disposition of this Commission to dismiss claims without a hearing upon the merits, but sufficient time has elapsed since the filing of this Ha.im to have filed a proper declaration, to have taken the testimony necessary to support it, and to have filed the necessary arguments and briefs as required by rules 7, 11 and 12.

The Commission deeming the motions filed in this cause by the State and the grounds assigned well taken can do nothing else than enter an order dismissing the claim.

Claim dismissed.


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    Sidney N. Johnson v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 23, 1899.

    1. Respondeat Superior—State not liable for wrongful acts of subordinate officers. The State is not liable for the wrongful acts or negligent conduct of its subordinate officers or agents.
    2. Commission op Claims—no new liability against State created by act. The law creating the Commission, does not create any new liabilities against the State but simply provides a method by which claims may be allowed or rejected.
    3. Practice—evidence may be filed where demurrer is sustained. Upon claim being rejected on demurrer claimant can file evidence in order that claim can be submitted to the legislature.
   The claim in this case was filed in the Auditor’s office on the 31st day of August, 1899, and is based upon a personal injury received on the 17th day of September, 1897, under circumstances averred to' be as follows, to-wit: That on that day about four o’clock, P. M., the claimant was riding a bicycle south on Albany avenue in the city of Chicago towards the intersection of Jackson boulevard and Albany avenue; that on reaching said Jackson boulevard the claimant turned westward and continued to ride said bicycle westward on Jackson boulevard to a point about seventy five (75) feet west of said Albany avenue; that at that point one, Ceitlan, an employe and servant of the Board of Park Commissioners of the town of West Chicago was engaged in the line of his duty and occupied with a certain hose reel watering the grass on the north side of said boulevard and was commencing to wheel said hose reel across said boulevard standing about five and one-half (5%) feet south of the north curb of Jackson boulevard and in the way of passing vehicles and was occupied in wheeling said hose reel south across said Jackson boulevard; that two ladies also were riding bicycles at that time and shouted to the said Ceitlan warning him not to proceed until they had passed, whereupon said Ceitlan without looking to see if there was any danger of any collision or accident in the rear of the place where he was standing and without paying any attention to the persons or other vehicles on said boulevard, except said bicycles ridden by said ladies, suddenly and without warning ran backward with said reel and directly in the path of said claimant and in such a manner as the claimant was suddenly and violently thrown from his bicycle on to the asphalt pavement and sustained many permanent and serious injuries, to-wit: being a fracture of the left leg and a fracture of his left knee cap; and, from thence hitherto has been and still is unable to follow his usual occupation and business and unable to walk without use of cane and then only with great difficulty.

Claimant avers he was riding said bicycle at a slow rate of speed and was at and before said accident using all due care for his own safety. Claimant avers that at time of said accident he was engaged in soliciting fire insurance from which occupation he derived large sums of money and profits and since said accident claimant has not been able to and has not earned any money whatsoever and has been obliged to pay out and expend large sums of money for physicians’ services in endeavoring to be healed of his said injuries.

The damages claimed for the injuries aforesaid are laid at ten thousand ($10,000) dollars.

To the declaration aforesaid the Attorney General on the 12th day of September, 1899, filed a general demurrer and the case comes before us at this time for disposition on the demurrer.

The demurrer raises the question whether the State of Illinois is responsible to the claimant for the wrongful or negligent acts of its subordinate officers. This question has been so frequently decided and the authorities are so numerous that we deem it only necessary to cite them. The question was before this Commission in the case of Jacob. Schmidt v. The State, decided at the August session, A. D. 1890; it was again before the Commission and decided at the August session 189.. in the case of.........v. The State, and also before the Commission for decision and decided at the August session, 1898, in the casé of Lincoln H. Boss v. The State. In these cases the Commission held the rule to be well settled that a State could not be held liable for the wrongful or negligent conduct of its officers. The principle is so well established by authority as to admit of no doubt:

Story on Agency, Sec. 319-322;
Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass., 344;
Gibbons v. U. S., 8 Wall, 269;
U. S. v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheaton, 720;
Lewis v. State of New York, 96 New York, 71;
Sipple v. State, 99 N. Y., 284;
Clodfelter v. The State, 86 N. C., 51;
The State v. Hill, 54 Ala., 67.

The law creating the Commission does not create a new liability against the State, it simply provides a method by which a claim may be allowed or rejected against the State on a hearing before the Commission. In caes of an award the same is paid by money appropriated for that purpose by an act of the General Assembly. There being no provision for an appeal from the decision of the Commission, the Commission feels that it is but just that parties coming before the Commission desiring to take evidence in support of their claim may do so, even though the Commission’s decision may be adverse, as the matter can then be presented directly before the Legislature if parties deem they have a cause of sufficient merit. In this case therefore, while the Commission must sustain the demurrer and dismiss the claim on the ground of no liability against the State, the Commission will permit party to file evidence if they desire to do so during the present session.

The demurrer filed is sustained and the case dismissed.


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    J. G. Fogarty v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 28, 1899.

      Practice—rules of Commission must be followed. Rules of Commission and provisions of statute governing practice before the Commission are not unreasonable or technical and must be followed by persons seeking relief at the hands of the Commission.
   The claimant, J. G. Fogarty, alleges in his claim filed May 5, 1899, that he is the lessee of certain property in the city of Springfield and that he sublet a portion of the building to company “C,” Fifth Regiment, Illinois National Guard, and that there is due him a balance of ninety dollars rent for the months of July and August, 1895, also for rent of fixtures, forty dollars and interest on said sum amounting to twenty-nine dollars and eighteen cents making a total of one hundred and fifty-nine dollars and eighteen cents due and unpaid according to his statements in said claim. Claimant has filed no proofs, abstracts or arguments as required by the statute and the rules of the Commission but simply rested his case on the verified claim or declaration.

The State by E. C. Akin, Attorney General, very aptly filed a motion to dismiss for want of proof and due compliance with the statute and the rules of the Commission by claimant in prosecuting his claim.

The Commission in accord with its decisions rendered heretofore in similar cases are bound to sustain the motion of the state and dismiss the claim, without considering the merits of the claim at all, as we do not consider the rules of the Commission nor the provisions of the statutes governing the practice before the Commission unreasonable or technical, and it is no hardship on anyone to follow them strictly when seeking relief at the hands of the Commission, and any person unable to prosecute his own claim should employ competent counsel to assist him and not expect the Commission to do business in “Town Meeting” style.

Claim dismissed.


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    William Rhodes, et al v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 28, 1899.

      StatutesChap. 129, Art. 9, Sec. 1, construed. Where the order of the Commander in Chief of State militia calling it into service contains no language showing that the company was called into actual service “for the suppression of riot and the enforcement of the laws,” and does not show that they were called to perform any duty “under orders of the Commander in Chief,” its members are entitled to no more pay than is provided by law for officers of the United States army and navy of like grade.
   This is a claim filed by William Rhodes and eight others who are members of company “M,” Fourth Infantry of Illinois National Guard. These claimants claim that in compliance with an order from the Governor of Illinois, they, with other members of their company, left their homes on the 27th day of April, A. D. 1898, and performed military duty at the Fair Grounds at Springfield until after their rejection for services in the United States Volunteer Army.

These claimants admit to having received, by Audit- or’s warrants drawn on the Treasurer of the State of Illinois, sums of money based on a like grade of soldier’s pay in the United States Army for the number of days in service, but claim they are entitled to two dollars per day for each days’ service rendered, and that there is now due them the difference between the amount claimed by each, being forty-eight dollars and the thirteen dollars, amount received by each.

Chapter one hundred and twenty-nine (129), article nine (9), section one (1), seems to be the authority upon which these claimants base their claims.

This section reads as follows: “When in actual service for the suppression of riots and enforcement of the laws and when on duty under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and it is so specified in such order, officers of the Illinois National Guard and of the naval force of Illinois, shall receive the same pay as provided by law for officers of the United States Army and Navy of like grade, and the enlisted men of the Illinois National Guard and of the naval force of Illinois, shall receive two dollars per day for each day service is actually so performed, said payment to be made on rolls prescribed by the Adjutant General.”

The order of the Governor through the Adjutant General reads as follows:

“Springfield, Illinois, April 25,1899. Commanding Officer Company “M,” Fourth Inft., Champaign, Illinois.

You will report your company for services in war, to your regiment commander at State Fair Grounds, Springfield, not later than noon, Wednesday. Acknowledge receipt of this order by wire.

(Signed.) J. N. Reece, Adjutant General”

This order, in our opinion, contains no language showing that the company was called into actual service “for the suppression of riot and the enforcement of the laws.” Nor do we interpret the order to show that they were called to perform any duty “under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief” which duty was specified in said order. Nor is there any evidence submitted showing that any services were performed by order of the Commander-in-Chief for the State of Illinois. Nor is there any evidence that any services were performed.

In the absence of these elements, we cannot see how this section applies, nor can we, from a careful reading of the military code of Illinois, find any law that will enable these claimants to receive more than they admit they have received, which pay is certainly, in our opinion correctly based upon section one (1) of article nine (9), which provides: “The militia when called into actual service, shall receive the same pay and allowance provided for like troops in service of the United States.” This section, from the reading of the proof submitted, is what we interpret the order was issued under.

The claimants’ bill is dismissed and judgment denied.


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    Oscar B. Alexander v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 28, 1899.

    Respondeat Superior—State not liable for torts of officers. The :State is not liable for the torts or negligent acts of its officers.
   This is a claim filed by Oscar B. Alexander who was an inmate of the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet, and at work in the chair department of said penitentiary in the employ of agents of the State of Illinois. He was injured while working at a certain saw.

To the claimant’s declaration, the State by its Attorney General, filed a demurrer setting up the following grounds:

First: That the facts stated in the claim do not entitle the claimant to have and maintain the same against the State of Illinois. Second: That the State of Illinois is not responsible to the claimant for the wrongful conduct and neglect of its subordinate officers. Third: That the State of Illinois is not responsible to the claimant for the wrongful and negligent conduct of the foreman in said claim referred to. Fourth: That the said State of Illinois is not responsible to the claimant for the wrongful or negligent conduct of the subordinate officers or foreman of the penitentiary at Joliet.

This Commission filed an opinion December 31, 1898, in the matter of Lincoln H. Boss v. The State of Illinois, holding that the State of Illinois is not liable for the torts or negligent acts of its officers.

The demurrer is sustained and claimant’s bill is dismissed.

However, if this claimant desires to present the evidence to this Commission, we will make, a finding upon the facts and if he desires to take an appeal to the Legislature, we will put the record in shape; but from a legal standpoint, we are of the opinion that the State is not liable.


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    Jennie Brewster v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 28, 1899.

    Respondeat Superior—State not responsible for negligence or misconduct of its officers. The State cannot be held responsible for the negligence or misconduct of its officers or subordinate agents. The State is not liable for acts of employes of Park Commissioners in operating a steam roller resulting in frightening of claimant’s horse, causing horse to run away and. injure claimant.
   This is a claim filed against the State by claimant, for ten thousand dollars damages, for injuries received by claimant in a runaway which occurred in Humboldt Park in the city of Chicago on the 12th day of May, 1897.

Claimant alleges in her declaration that she was driving in said park on said day, and had stopped to water her horse at a fountain in said park when her horse became frightened at a steam roller which the employes of the Park Commissioners of said park were operating in the park at the time, and being so frightened became unmanageable and ran away causing the buggy in which the claimant ivas riding to collide with another vehicle lawfully in said park and from the force of said collision the claimant was thrown violently from her buggy against the wheel of the other vehicle and thence to the ground thereby receiving serious and permanent injuries to her person for which she asks to be reimbursed from the State claiming that the State is liable on the ground that it was through the negligence of the Park Commissioners who are agents or servants of the State that she was so injured.

To the claim or declaration of the claimant, the State by E. C. Akin, Attorney General, filed a demurrer the specific allegations of which are as follows:

First: That the State of Illinois is not and cannot be made responsible for the negligence or misconduct of the servants or agents of the West Chicago Park Commissioners.
Second: That the State of Illinois is not responsible for the negligence or misconduct of its subordinate officers or agents.
Third: It is not alleged and it does not appear that the injury to the said Jennie Brewster was due and owing to the negligence or misconduct of the West Chicago Park Commissioners or of their servant or servants.

The State also by E. C. Akin, Attorney General, also filed a motion to dismiss the claim on the ground that claimant did not comply with the law and rules of the Commission by filing abstracts and arguments with the evidence in the case.

The Commission heretofore held in the decision of the case of Lincoln H. Boss v. The State that the State could not be held responsible for the negligence or misconduct of its subordinate officers or servants, to do so would be against public policy and in the face of a long line of able decisions of our higher courts. This Commission having so held in the above case cited at its 1898 session can see no just reason for reversing the opinion given out at that time, therefore sustains the demurrer filed by the State, being fully satisfied that there is no liability existing against the State in this class of claims.

Demurrer sustained.


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    Hiero B. Herr and Richard S. Walsh v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 28, 1899.

      Practice—Court procedure must be observed. Failure to take and file proofs in support of claim and to file abstracts and briefs is sufficient cause for dismissal of same.
   The claim in this case was filed April 29, 1899, and is for an alleged balance due on a contract made between the claimants and the first battalion of the Illinois Naval Militia, by B. M. Shaffner, their commander; that the contract provides for the building of a foundation for the structure known as the model battle ship, Illinois; that the price to be paid for the work was twenty-four hundred thirty-eight and 34-100 dollars upon which fourteen hundred and fifty dollars was paid, leaving a balance due on the contract of nine hundred eighty-eight and 34-100 dollars, which the claimants aver has not yet been paid.

A copy of the contract duly signed was filed with the declaration as required by the rules of the Commission. To this declaration a plea of general issue was filed on the 29th day of May, 1899, and no other steps seem to have been taken until the 28th day of November, 1899, when the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss claim for want of prosecution.

An examination of the files fails to show that the claimants have ever taken or filed any proofs in support of their claim, as required by section 4 of the statute governing proceedings in the Commission of Claims and of rule 7 of this Commission; and that the claimants have also failed and neglected to take and file abstracts and briefs as required by rules 11 and 12 of the Commission.

It is not the disposition of the Commission to dismiss claims without giving claimants an opportunity to take their evidence and an opportunity to be heard on the merits, but in this case there seems to be no effort to prosecute the claim as required by the rules of the Commission and for such failure we have entered an order dismissing the claim.

Claim dismissed.


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    David Oliver v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1900.

      Practice—where no foundation in law exists for allowance of claim. Where the record discloses no foundation in law for the allowance of claim, it is rejected.
   The claimant in this case seeks recovery of one thousand dollars, rental for water power, paid in pursuance of the terms of a lease executed in April, 1900, between the State Canal Commissioners, as lessors, and the claimant as lessee; the basis or plea on which the claimant here seeks recovery being the unfortunate circumstance that the claimant’s mill in which he expected to use the water power rented from the Canal Commissioners was destroyed by fire, and the water power, as a result of such fire, could not be used during the period for which one thousand dollars rent accrued. Neither in the evidence no.r in the argument of claimant’s attorneys is there disclosed any legal ground for recovery, nor any claim made that the sum paid (recovery of which .is herein sought) was not due in accordance with the terms of the lease; nor is there any intimation that the claimant would have had a legal defense had he withheld the rent, in a suit for rent by the Canal Commissioners. It is in fact explicitly admitted in the written argument of claimant’s counsel that “he was obliged to pay one thousand dollars to save his lease.”

The inference may naturally be drawn that this claim is filed on the presumption that the Commissioners of Claims may, out of the generosity of their own hearts and other peoples’ money (from State funds to be appropriated by an equally generous and complacent Legislature) donate to the claimant a sum of money equal to that legally and rightfully paid to the State Canal Commissioners, in accordance with the terms of a lease voluntarily executed by the claimant.

From the fact that no legal ground of recovery is disclosed by the record, and from the language used in their argument by the claimant’s attorneys, we infer that there is a misapprehension on their part, as to the scope and authority vested in this Commission by the act of the Legislature creating it.

Claimant’s counsel urge that “It was not the fault of the (canal) Commissioners nor his (claimant’s), and yet it is a misfortune to be felt more by him, if he has to lose than it would be by the State * * *

It should not be necessary to do more than call attention to this line of reasoning. What claim would ever be rejected if the assets of claimant are to be taken into account as against the resources of the State? In what court of law would it occur to an attorney, unless for unfair and unworthy appeal to prejudice, to suggest a comparison of the resources of litigants as an aid in determining legal liability? All such considerations are equally irrelevant and without weight, before this Commission which was not created to give to claimants remedies against the State which could not be maintained against individuals. The Commission of Claims is not a bureau of charities, but a court, and under the law creating it must determine all claims in accordance with legal principles.

As the record disclosed no foundation in law for the allowance of this claim, it is rejected.


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    Cyrus A. Jones v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1900.

      Militia—claim for additional compensation for services rendered. The Commission sustains a demurrer to claimant’s petition upon the authority of Rhodes v. the State ante p. 212.

   In the above entitled cause the State filed a demurrer, based on two grounds:

First: That there is no liability under the law existing against the State.
Second: That the claimant has failed to comply with the rules of the Commission concerning the filing of proofs.

The first point in the demurrer is based on the decision of the Commission in the case of Wm. Rhodes, et al, decided at the August-term, 1899, in which the Commission held that in such cases the State was not liable. The reasons being fully set forth in the opinion written by Judge W. S. Louden we do not deem it necessary to go into any argument of the matter, the Commission having decided to sustain the demurrer and dismiss the case.

Case dismissed.


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    Charles Hatfield v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1900.

      Militia—personal injury to member while doing duty at annual encampment. Claimant while on duty as member of a troop of cavalry in their annual encampment received an injury by his horse falling on him while making a charge on the parade ground, which resulted in his right arm and shoulder being broken. The captain gave the command to charge the batteries. As they went by, the cannon were fired and the balloon on the parade ground ascended and the horses were frightened and became tangled up together, resulting in the injury. Held that the claimant exercising due care and caution and being in the line of his duty at the time he received the injury, is entitled to recover.
   Charles Hatfield, the claimant in this case, was a member of troop “B,” First Cavalry, Illinois National Guard. In March, 1898, he enlisted in said organization, and on the 31st day of August, A. D. 1899, and while the troop was in Camp Lincoln, near Springfield, Illinois, in their annual encampment while on duty as a member of said troop he received an injury by his horse falling on him while making a charge on the parade ground which resulted in his right arm and shoulder being-broken. Colonel Young was in command of the regiment at the time, and Lieutenant Douglass was in command of troop “B.”

Captain Bornique gave the command to charge the batteries. As they went by, the cannon were fired and the balloon on the parade ground ascended and the horses were frightened and became tangled up together and the horse of claimant collided with another horse and fell about midway of the parade ground. The horse in falling struck him on the head and knocked him down on his shoulder and arm, fracturing both, the saddle striking him and the horse rolling over him.

At the time of the injury the claimant was a carpenter and earning fifty dollars per month. He was treated by Dr. Robertson. from the third day of August, 1899, the day of the injury, to September 2, 1899, when he returned to Bloomington, Illinois, his home. Dr. Fulwiler, of Bloomington, Illinois, attended him from that time to December, 1899, and has attended him many times since.

The evidence shows that claimant was exercising due care and caution and was in the line of his duty at the time lie received the injury. The evidence also discloses that the injury was serious and painful and may be permanent in character. The evidence shows claimant has incurred a liability of one hundred dollars for services of a physician and has also been unable to earn anything since his injury. The claimant is fully supported in his evidence by the testimony of his superior officers and comrades and by the testimony of his physician showing clearly a right of recovery.

We are therefore of the opinion a claim should be allowed in his favor for one thousand dollars, -the amount-claimed. Claimant is therefore allowed one thousand dollars.


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    William O. Snyder v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1900.

      Militia—claim for services rendered. The Commission sustains a demurrer to claimant’s petition upon the authority of Rhodes v. the State ante p. 212.

   The claimant in this case files a claim to recover from the State of Illinois for services rendered as a member of the State Militia equal to pay when called out for riot or other active duty under the express command of the commander in chief, whereas at the time the services were rendered he was not serving in such capacity but was called for the purpose of entering the service of the United States, not to do service for the State.

To claimant’s petition the State files a- demurrer based on two grounds:

First, that there is no liability on the part of the State, and,

Second, that the claimant has failed to comply with the rules of the commission regarding the filing of proofs.

The Commission is of the opinion that the demurrer is well founded, being in harmony with the decision of this Commission in the case of Wm. Rhodes, et al v. The State and filed at the August term, 1899; therefore the demurrer is sustained and the case is dismissed.


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    Charles Hatfield v. The State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1901.

    1. Respondeat Superior—State not legally liable for negligence of officers. The State can not be held legally liable for either the neglect of duty or the negligent performance of duty by the officers of a troop or regiment while on their annual encampment.
    2. State Liability—founded upon its own consent. The liability of the State for any claim, must be founded on its own consent expressed through some act of the Legislature.
   The claim in this case was filed with the Auditor on the 20th day of December, A. D. 1899, to the August term of the Commission of Claims.

The general issue was interposed by the Attorney General. The case was heard at the August session, and an opinion filed on the 18th day of December, 1900, finding for the claimant and awarding damages in the sum of one thousand dollars.

On the 23d of February, 1901, the Attorney General filed a motion for a rehearing of said cause, assigning the following reasons for same:

“First: The finding in said cause is contrary to the evidence and the facts therein.
Second: The finding is contrary to the law applicable to said case.
Third: As to matter of law, the said Commission of Claims under the facts in the case, had no jurisdiction to award any amount whatever.
Fourth: Admitting the facts to be as urged in said statement of claim as is stated in the finding of this Honorable Commission, still the facts do not furnish any foundation on which to base a liability of the State to the claimant in the amount awarded, nor in any other amount whatever.”

On the hearing of this cause at the August session no evidence was presented or brief filed on behalf of the State. The case being determined entirely upon the evidence and brief of the claimant, a rehearing was considered proper, and granted.

The question now is do the facts presented by claimant’s evidence establish a legal liability on the part of the State of Illinois to respond in damages for the injuries received by the claimant.

From the evidence taken it appears that Charles Hatfield, the claimant in this case, enlisted as a member of troop “B,” First Cavalry, Illinois National Guard, in March, 1898. That in August, 1899, the National Guard was holding its annual encampment at Camp Lincoln, near Springfield. That on the 31st day of August, 1899, the claimant, as a member of his troop was participating in a cavalry charge, which had been properly ordered by the officer in command, and his horse fell. The horse rolled over claimant, and broke his arm and collar bone. The injuries received were serious and painful, requiring the attention of a physician for two months regularly, and for sixty days longer occasionally. We are satisfied that the defendant received an injury while in the line of his duty as a member of his troop, obeying the orders of his officers, which resulted in his losing about six months time, and that he expended about |100 in employing physicians to attend him. We are also satisfied that the facts of the case are sufficient to warrant the legislature in making an appropriation under the head of relief, to compensate claimant for loss of time, expenses incurred, etc., but do the facts constitute a claim or cause of action, against the State, which would justify this Commission in making an award in favor of claimant?

A slight effort is made on the part of the attorneys for the claimant to show negligence on the part of some one of the officers of the troop or regiment, but who was negligent, or in what manner negligent does not appear. The evidence upon the question of negligence is not sufficient to make out a case in favor of the claimant, if the case had been brought in a court of law against a private individual for an injury received under similar circumstances.

But even if negligence had been proven, in view of the uniform holding of our Supreme Court, and also the ruling of this Commission in a number of cases, the State could not be held legally liable for either the neglect of duty or the negligent performance of duty by the officers of said troop or regiment on the occasion of the claimant’s receiving the injury in question.

Story on Agency, Sec. 319;

Dillon on Municipal Corporations, Sec. 975-978;

State Bank, admr. v. The State, decided by the Commission at its August session in 1897;

Jacob Schmidt v. The State, decided by the Commission at its August session, 1890.

Carrying out the above doctrine that the State is not liable for the negligence of its officers or servants, the Supreme Court has also held that counties, towns, road districts, and drainage districts are not responsible for injuries resulting from the negligent performance, or non performance of the duties of its officers or servants.

Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill., 346;

Bussell, Admr. etc. v. Town of Steuben, 57 Ill., 35;

Hollenbeck v. Winnebago Co., 95 Ill., 148;

Elmore v. Drainage Comrs., 135 Ill., 269.

In the above case of Hollenbeck, Admr. v. Winnebago Co., 95 Ill., 148, the court says: “In fact the powers and duties of counties bear such a due analogy to the governmental functions of the State at large that as well might the State be held responsible for the negligent acts of its officers as counties. They stand in many respects upon the same footing. The one as well as the other is organized for political purposes.”

It is also contended that as the National Government makes just and liberal compensation for all injuries received by a soldier in the United States army, while in the line of his duty, the State of Illinois should be held equally liable to a member of the National Guard, who is injured while in the line of his duty, performing service for the State. The liability of the National Government, however, is not by virtue of any common law right of the injured soldier, but in consequence of a United States statute making proper provision for soldiers injured while in the performance of their duties for the government. The State of Illinois however has no such statute, giving a member of the National Guard a legal claim or demand against the State for injuries received while in the line of duty in the State militia

In the case of Murdock Parlor Grate Co. v. Com. (Mass.) 8 L. R. A., 399, the court holds that an action to recover damages for injuries resulting from the negligence of a servant of the Commonwealth in the performance of his duties, is not “a claim,” within the meaning of the Massachusetts Act of 1887, chap, 246, which authorizes the maintenance of a suit against the commonwealth to recover “all claims,” against the State, whether at law or equity.

Also in the case of West & A. R. Co. v. The State, (Ga.) 14 L. R. A., 438, the Court decided that under an act submitting to a commission or court the “legal rights” of the parties, claims alleged to rest upon “equity and good conscience,” but not shown to be recognized by any established doctrine of equity jurisprudence cannot be considered.

The liability of any State for any claim, must be founded on its own consent expressed through some act of the Legislature.

It is the opinion of this Commission that there is clearly no common law or statutory liability in this case against the State of Illinois.

But in view of the fact that the Legislature from time to time by special acts has made appropriations for injuries received under similar circumstances, we do not feel disposed to disturb the finding of the Commission in this case.

The following cited cases are some of those in which appropriations have been made:

Frederick Wagner—Appropriation made in 1873 and 1875 for injuries received by premature discharge of a gun in the hands of another member of his company.

William G. Hill—Appropriation of $2,500, in 1885,. for injuries received by premature discharge of a cannon which belonged to the State at a soldiers reunion at Belleville, Ill.

George McKee—Appropriation of $2,500 in 1885 for injuries received while in the line of his duty firing a salute on the occasion of the death of James A. Garfield, late president of the United States.

W. J. Ralph—Appropriation of $1,500 in 1885 for injuries received in the line of duty participating in the sham battle at Bloomington, Ill.

Mrs. R. A. Purdy-—Appropriation of $2,500 in 1887, whose husband, R. A. Purdy, a private in Co. I. 4th Reg. Ill. Nat. Guards, was injured in a sham battle at Buffalo Rock, near Ottawa, Ill.

John A. Lyle—Appropriation of $3,000 in 1887, who was injured by premature discharge of a cannon belonging to the State, and furnished by proper requisition at a soldiers’ reunion held at Sterling, Ill.

Peter McGee—Appropriation of $1,500 in 1887 who was injured by premature discharge of a cannon belonging to the State at a reunion of the Army of the Tennessee.

Jacob Schmidt—Appropriation, of $2,500 in 1891, who was injured by an attack made upon him by an unruly convict confined in the Southern Illinois Penitentiary while said Schmidt was in the line of his duty as an officer of said institution.

Samuel Warren—Appropriation of $3,000 in 1895.

J. A. Cowley—Appropriation $2,500 in 1895.

Valentine Fitzpatrick?—Appropriation of $1,500 in 1897, for injuries received while in the line of his duty as a member of the Illinois National Guards.

James F. Green—Appropriation of $1,200 in 1899, for injuries received by the explosion of a gun while in the line of his duty as a member of the National Guards.

Ada J. Hunt—Appropriation of $2,000 in 1899, for the death of her son caused by exposure while in the line of his duty as a member of Company M, Ill. National Guards.