text:
    (No. 82-CC-0495
    Arthur J. Allen, Sr., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 28, 1984.

    Harlan Heller, Ltd. (M. John Hefner, Jr., of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This is a claim brought by Arthur J. Allen, Sr., against the State of Illinois whereby Claimant seeks damages for personal injuries he sustained as the result of an accident in which he lost control of his motorcycle on. a patched area of Illinois Route 57 in Coles County, approximately one-half mile south of the Route 45 interchange at Mattoon, Illinois. The accident occurred on May 31, 1981, at 7:30 p.m.

Claimant contends that the patched area in question caused him to lose control of his motorcycle when he encountered it. He claims that the patched area was a defective condition of which the State had notice and that the roadway, therefore, was not in a reasonably safe condition, thereby making the State negligent. Claimant contends further that the State was negligent for failing to post warning signs advising the travelling public of the alleged dangerous condition. The State denied Claimant’s contentions. An evidentiary hearing was held on January 20, 1983.

As the Court has said many times, the State is not an insurer of all persons travelling upon its highways. (Bloom v. State (1957), 22 Ill. Ct. Cl. 582; Jackson v. State (1981), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 63.) For liability to be imposed upon the State, Claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the State breached its duty of reasonable care and the negligence flowing from the breach proximately caused the accident and Claimant’s injuries. Estate of Brockman v. State (1975), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 53; Laine v. State (1977), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 10 (1977).

It is the duty of the State to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance and care of its highways in order that defective and dangerous conditions likely to injure persons lawfully on the highways shall not exist. (Moldenhauer v. State (1978), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 514.) The exercise of reasonable care requires the State to keep its highways reasonably safe. (Schuck v. State (1965), 25 Ill. Ct. Cl. 209.) If the highways are in a dangerously defective condition and therefore not reasonably safe and the State is on notice of such condition, the State is negligent if it does not notify or warn the public of such condition. Clark v. State (1974), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 32; Moldenhauer, supra.

The Court finds that the foregoing principles of law as applied to the facts of this case mandate the conclusion that Claimant has failed to meet its burden of proof. A close examination of the evidence presented at the hearing discloses that Claimant indeed lost control of his motorcycle when he drove onto the patched area of highway. However, the evidence fails to demonstrate that the patched area was in such a defective and dangerous condition that it left the highway unfit for the purpose for which it was intended, or that the highway was not reasonably safe. (Schuck, supra.) The mere happening of this accident, of course, is not enough to impose liability, since as indicated, the State is not an insurer (Bloom, supra). The State is not required to make its highway perfect. See Laine, supra.

The only occurrence witness to testify was the Claimant. He testified that shortly after entering Route 57 southbound from Route 45, he prepared to pass a slow-moving vehicle driving ahead of him. He looked in his rear-view mirror, saw no traffic behind him, drove his motorcycle into the passing lane and proceeded to pass the slow-moving vehicle. He then accelerated to a speed of approximately 60 miles per hour and began to drive his motorcycle back into his original lane of travel and in front of the vehicle that he had just passed. While making this maneuver he was looking in his rear-view mirror and not at the roadway in front of him. It was at that instant that the front wheel of his motorcycle struck what Claimant described as a hole or bump. Claimant’s motorcycle then went into “speed wobble”, a phenomenon whereby the front wheel begins shaking violently. Claimant lost control and the motorcycle fell, resulting in various injuries to Claimant. Claimant was familiar with Highway 57 as he had traversed it on prior occasions and had never noticed the bump previously.

Claimant did not describe the patched area where the “speed wobble” occurred beyond referring to it as a bump or hole. He did identify two photographic exhibits which he stated were accurate portrayals of the accident site and the patch in question. Claimant suggests that his photographic exhibits clearly depict an unreasonably dangerous condition. The Court does not agree. It is difficult to make that conclusion from the photographs since the angle of the photographs and other factors undoubtedly effect the viewer’s perception of what is depicted and those relevant factors were not addressed. This, of course, would have equal application to the photographs introduced by the State which depict patched areas and, which on first glance, appear harmless. Claimant provided no testimony detailing those important factors, such as the shape, height, configuration, and other matters that go to the heart of the ultimate issue in this case, which is of course the question of whether or not the patch was in an unreasonably dangerous condition.

The crucial testimony was provided by Paul Fleming, maintenance field technician for the State. Called as an adverse witness by Claimant, Fleming testified that he was directly responsible for patching on Route 57 and of course the accident vicinity. On a regular basis prior to the accident, Mr. Fleming patrolled Route 57 and caused all necessary patch work to be done by the crews.

Mr. Fleming identified the patch depicted in Claimant’s photographic exhibits as one made by his crews. He indicated that the patch did not meet the requirements of the standard specifications for road and bridge construetion. Those specifications were admitted into evidence and Mr. Fleming explained that they only applied to new highway construction by private contractors and not to State crews doing patch work on existing highways.

Fleming provided lengthy testimony on State maintenance standards regarding highway patching and discussed the feasibility of such things as asphalt and concrete as patch work material. It will serve no purpose to discuss that testimony here. It suffices to say that it was Fleming’s unrebutted testimony that the patch work in question, including that depicted in Claimant’s photographic exhibits, was acceptable within the Staté’s highway maintenance standards. Mr. Fleming’s testimony on this point is unchallenged and we accept it.

Very simply stated, Claimant has failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the patched area of highway, which undoubtedly played a role in the accident, was unreasonably dangerous. This is the only proper conclusion in light of Mr. Fleming’s unrebutted testimony. As the State points out in its brief and as stated previously, the Court has never held that all State roads must be bump free. To hold that they must would be to make the State an insurer.

Claimant must also fail on his allegation that the State was negligent for failing to warn of the alleged dangerous condition. There is no duty to warn unless there is an unreasonably dangerous condition, and as indicated, Claimant’s proof has failed on that issue. In light of the foregoing, it is not necessary to discuss the question of Claimant’s own conduct or the extent of his injuries.

It is therefore ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Roe, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 82-CC-0574
    Dale Goetten and Carolyn Godar Goetten, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 6, 1984.

    Dale Goetten and Carolyn Godar Goetten, pro se, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

The Claimants seek compensation pursuant to an Act Concerning Damages Caused by Escaped Inmates (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 23, par. 4041), for losses incurred due to damage to their automobile and the theft of property contained in the vehicle. These losses were allegedly caused by the negligence of the State in failing to properly supervise two residents of the Illinois Youth Center at Pere Marquette. On June 27, 1981, two young men escaped from the center, stole the Claimants’ automobile and later abandoned it in damaged condition. Certain items of personal property contained in the vehicle when it was stolen were missing when it was found.

Based on the record before us, we find that the Claimants are entitled to recover for the losses they have incurred.

We find that the Claimants’ losses total $500.00, which includes $375.00 for the total loss of their automobile, $75.00 for the personal contents stolen from the vehicle, $25.00 for the costs of towing the vehicle, and $25.00 for the rental by the Claimants of a truck to return the vehicle to their home.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimants be, and hereby are, awarded the sum of $500.00.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 82-CC-0809
    Rosa and Albert Lucht, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 3, 1983.

    Jefferson Lewis and Nolan Lipsky, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant in this cause, Rosa Lucht, was a member of a car pool which brought her and several employees of the Department of Revenue to Springfield, Illinois. Claimant was not an employee of the State of Illinois but she worked in a position approximately four blocks from where the accident occurred. She was employed as a secretary by United Cerebral Palsy.

This car pool had been in existence for some time and it was a well-established routine for them to park in the Department of Revenue parking lot in Springfield. On the day in question, they left their point of origin approximately 15 minutes earlier than usual because it had sleeted during the night and everything was covered with snow and ice, resulting in very slick roads and other places where ice had accumulated.

On the morning in question, Claimant testified to the fact that the roads were icy and the parking lot was both snowy and icy. Claimant, on the day in question, got out of the vehicle and walked approximately 10 feet, at which point she slipped and fell upon an accumulation of ice and snow on the surface of the parking lot. This is an area in which the Claimant was familiar since it was the customary point of discharge for the passengers in the car. Most of the passengers worked for the State of Illinois in the immediate area.

It is Claimant’s contention that the parking lot in question contained rough spots on the pavement because of the potholes thereon. Claimant was wearing snow boots because of weather conditions. She did not request that the driver of the car take her the four blocks to her place of employment, but she got out of the car as usual in an area she was familiar with, knowing that the sleet storm had caused an accumulation of ice and snow.

When Claimant fell, she cracked her left wrist and was unable to return to work for approximately six weeks.

It is Claimant’s contention that the Respondent was negligent in the maintenance of the area in which the accident occurred. It is her further contention that she was an invitee and that the State negligently and carelessly permitted the parking lot to be maintained in a dangerous and unsafe condition without giving warning of these conditions. This was despite the fact that Claimant was familiar with the area and conversant of the fact that this was a sleety, icy and snowy morning.

Claimant relies on the case of Dietz v. Bellville Coop Grain Co. (1933), 273 Ill. App. 164. She contends that by being in the company of Department of Revenue employees at the time of her accident, Claimant acquired invitee status. The Dietz case holds that “it is the duty of persons who invite others upon their premises to keep such premises in a reasonably safe condition so that the invitees will not be injured by reason of any unsafe condition of the premises, yet the law does not make the owners of premises insurers of persons thereon.” (273 Ill. App. 164, 167.) By merely being in the presence of employees of the State of Illinois does not make Claimant an invitee and, in any event, the State of Illinois is not an insurer of persons upon its premises.

In the case of Helton v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University (1965), 25 Ill. Ct. Cl. 238, 241, the Court held that “an invitee is a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land for a purpose of the occupier . . .” Certainly Claimant was not there for any purpose of the occupier in this instance, but as a matter of convenience for herself. The Helton case also held that “where evidence disclosed that Claimant was merely a licensee, he was required to take the premises as he found them, and in order to recover must prove Respondent guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct.” Certainly wilful or wanton misconduct is not shown in the present case, and the State of Illinois cannot be held liable for sleet that accumulated the night before.

Even if Mrs. Lucht had been an invitee, Claimants must still prove Respondent guilty of ordinary negligence. Claimants base their argument on what they perceive to be the Respondent’s duty to warn Mrs. Lucht of the icy conditions in the parking lot. The Court finds this argument unpersuasive for the following reasons. First, the Illinois appellate court has ruled that a property owner is not liable for a business invitee’s fall and consequent injury in an icy parking lot maintained by the property owner for the use of its customers, where the condition is a natural one and not caused or aggravated by the property owner. (Anderson v. David Development Corp. (1968), 99 Ill. App. 2d 55, 241 N.E.2d 222.) The Court does not mention a duty to warn as a basis for liability under these circumstances.

In Lansing v. County of McLean (1978), 69 Ill. 2d 562, 372 N.E.2d 822), the Illinois Supreme Court stated that notice by the defendant of the icy condition was necessary to establish a duty to warn. In Lansing, the period of time between the plaintiff’s accident and the snowfall was three days. The Court stated that this brief period of time was not sufficient to establish a presumption of notice. In the case at bar, the period of time that had elapsed between the ice storm and Mrs. Lucht’s accident was even shorter.

Second, Mrs. Lucht testified that she noticed while riding to work that the roads were slick. Mrs. Lucht and her companions had left for work approximately 15 minutes early due to these weather conditions. It is obvious from this testimony that Mrs. Lucht had knowledge of the icy conditions. Considering this, a warning by Respondent would have served no purpose. Mrs. Lucht requested to be let out at the Department of Revenue’s parking lot although she was not an employee of the Department. Her place of employment was approximately four blocks away. Given her knowledge of the icy conditions, it would seem that Mrs. Lucht had assumed the risk involved in walking from the parking lot to her place of employment rather than requesting to be dropped at her office.

To require the State to remove the snow and ice that had accumulated a few hours before the accident would put the State in the position of being an insurer. This Court has repeatedly held that the State of Illinois is not an insurer of persons who use its facilities. In Levy v. State of Illinois (1958), 22 Ill. Ct. Cl. 694, 699, the Court held that “Respondent is not liable for injuries resulting from the natural accumulation of snow and ice, and would be under no obligation to clear the walks in the first instance. By clearing them, Respondent was performing a gratuitous service, and, hence, would not be liable unless a dangerous condition was evidence of gross negligence.”

The record shows Claimant was familiar with the area in question and, instead of asking to be dropped off at her place of employment approximately four blocks away, she voluntarily got out of the car at the parking lot knowing of the icy and snowy conditions. She had full knowledge of the weather conditions and no notice by the Respondent could have emphasized the condition of the parking lot any more than the knowledge she already had.

Claimants having failed in their duty to establish their cause by a preponderance of the evidence, award is denied and this claim is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 82-CC-0978
    Charles Ray Folden, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 22, 1983.

    Peek & Gandy, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This cause having come for consideration on the joint stipulation of the Claimant and Respondent and the Court being duly advised in the premises:

Finds, that on June 29, 1981, the Respondent, acting through the Department of Transportation, was repairing Illinois Route 54 with the job site situated approximately three miles east of the City of Pinckneyville, Illinois, in the westbound lane. At the end of the regular work day, being 4:00 p.m., the Respondent had excavated an opening in the westbound lane of said highway, and by way of warning those persons rightfully on that highway, both then and after dark, had erected wooden barriers adjacent to the east and west edges of the excavation with some flashing lights atop the barriers. Furthermore, Respondent caused warning signs to be placed about a mile in either direction of the job site where the excavation was located in the highway.

At or about the hour of 10:00 p.m. on said date, the Claimant was westbound on said highway on his 1975 Yamaha motorcycle which was equipped with a headlight, then in operation. Simultaneously, as Claimant approached Respondent’s job site three miles east of Pinckneyville, there was vehicular traffic approaching him from the west going east with headlights on. As the Claimant approached the job site, he was unable to see • the warning lights because those lights were very dim and he was blinded by the oncoming vehicular traffic lights. As a result, Claimant was unaware of the precise location of the excavation and had slowed his speed; but, nevertheless, before the Claimant could stop his motorcycle, he drove off into the excavation.

As a result of the Claimant driving off into the excavation, his 1975 motorcycle was completely damaged beyond repair, and he suffered cuts, bruises and abrasions, became sore, lame and unable to work at his usual occupation for several days, during which time he lost days of employment, incurred medical bills, and suffered pain and disfigurement from cuts to his face and body.

The Claimant’s damages for personal injury, pain, suffering and disfigurement, his lost wages and property damage are stipulated to be the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00). However, it is further stipulated that although the Respondent, acting through the Department of Transportation, was guilty of negligence, Claimant was nevertheless also negligent to the extent of 45%; and therefore, the Claimant’s recovery should be limited to the sum of two thousand seven hundred fifty dollars ($2,750.00). Both parties agree that this award will constitute full and final satisfaction of the claim herein or any other claim arising out the same occurrence.

While this Court is not necessarily bound by a stipulation such as this, it has no desire to interpose a controversy where none appears to exist. The stipulation submitted by Claimant and Respondent appears to have been entered into freely and fairly, and its contents appear to be reasonable. The Court, therefore, finds no reason not to accept it and follow its recommendations for an award of $2,750.00.

Claimant is hereby awarded the amount of $2,750.00 in full and final satisfaction of the instant claim.


author: Montana, J.

text:
    (No. 82-CC-1876
    Leona Peters, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 4,1984.

    Onesto, Giglio & Associates, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (James A. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, J.

This is a claim of Leona Peters against the Respondent, the State of Illinois, for personal injuries sustained when Ms. Peters fell in the offices of the Unemployment Compensation Board in Chicago, Illinois, on August 7, 1981. Ms. Peters was at the Unemployment Compensation Board to conduct some business at the Board’s office.

The testimony showed that Ms. Peters, 57 years old, had been at the offices of the Unemployment Compensation Board a number of times before August 7, 1981. Claimant was wearing flat-soled shoes and carrying a small purse. She had been at the Unemployment Compensation Board for approximately three hours and was exiting through the front, public entrance when she was injured.

As Claimant exited, she placed her left foot upon a heavy duty rubber mat which Respondent had caused to be placed in their offices, directly in front of the first set of two double action metal and plate glass doors leading to the outside. After Claimant placed her left foot on the mat, she felt the toe of the right foot catch an edge of the mat as she was lifting her right foot off the floor. As a result, Ms. Peters fell forward against the right side of the first double set of doors which was locked. She struck the door and fell back onto the mat. Ms. Peters sustained a fracture of the left shoulder as a result of her fall, and was hospitalized for approximately one week.

Testimony revealed that the rubber mat upon which Claimant tripped was constructed of rubber fastened together with metal wire. The mat was approximately one-half inch in height and four feet by 11 feet in length. As a result of its construction, the mat did not lay uniformly flat on the floor, but was raised in certain spots, particularly around the right front edge. Ms. Peters testified that after she fell, she was sitting upon the mat and observed that one section of the mat was turned upward towards the door and that metal wires were protruding from it. Ms. Peters introduced several photographs of the mat into evidence, which had been taken by investigators for the State. Mr. William Simmons, office manager of the Bureau of Employment Security, confirmed that these photographs truly and accurately depicted the condition of the mat on the day of the incident.

One who occupies or is in charge of property, such as the State in this case, is bound to use reasonable or ordinary care and prudence to keep the property reasonably safe for the benefit of those who come upon it as invitees. (Joyner v. State (1955), 22 Ill. Ct. Cl. 213; Dable v. State (1967), 26 Ill. Ct. Cl. 89.) In this case, Leona Peters was an invitee as she came upon the premises of the Unemployment Compensation Board in connection with its activities. (Hiller v. Harsh (1981), 100 Ill. App. 3d 332, 426 N.E.2d 960.) There was no evidence adduced by either party showing that the other party had notice that the mat was in an unreasonably dangerous condition.

This Court finds, however, that the State is liable in this case because it could have and should have discovered the condition of the mat through the exercise of ordinary care. (Maytnier v. Rush (1967), 80 Ill. App. 2d 336, 225 N.E.2d 83.) As the occupier of the premises, the State is expected to have superior knowledge of the premises’ condition, and is held to a higher standard of knowledge, both presumed and actual, of defects in the premises, than is Ms. Peters, an invitee. Hence, the State here had a duty to remedy or warn of the defective condition of the mat, notwithstanding the fact that it had no actual notice of its condition, because in fact in the exercise of reasonable care it should have known of the mat’s condition. Beccue v. Rockford Park District (1968), 94 Ill. App. 2d 179, 236 N.E.2d 105.

This Court also finds that Claimant was not contributorily negligent. The evidence showed that Ms. Peters was reasonably dressed on the day of the incident, and was wearing flat-soled shoes. She was not leaving the premises in a hasty manner but was walking normally as she left. An invitee may assume that others have done their duty to give proper warning of hidden dangers, and apart from obvious dangers, can assume the premises are reasonably safe. (Allgauer v. LeBastille, Inc. (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 978, 428 N.E.2d 1146.) Put another way, where a person has no reason to suspect danger, he is not required to look for it. Prater v. Veach (1962), 35 Ill. App. 61, 181 N.E.2d 739.

In the instant case, since a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would not have suspected that stepping upon and walking across a door mat would cause a fall because of its defective condition, this Court finds that Leona Peters was in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care for her own safety as she exited the offices of the Unemployment Compensation Board in Chicago on August 7, 1981.

We now turn to the appropriate damages to award Claimant. As a result of the fall, Claimant received a fractured left shoulder. It appears from the record that Claimant expended $1,312.31 for unreimbursed medical bills with respect to this injury. The Claimant testified that as a result of the accident she was unable to work from the date of the occurrence through April 1982 and that she suffered continuing discomfort during all that period.

We believe an award of $1,312.31 for medical bills, $4,522.00 for lost earning ability and $4,200.00 for pain and suffering is a fair and just award in this case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of ten thousand thirty-four dollars and thirty-one cents ($10,034.31).


author: POCH, J.

text:
    (No. 82-CC-2304
    Angela Weyhaupt, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1983.

    Deborah Spector, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties hereto, the Court being fully advised in the premises, finds:

That this is a personal injury action brought pursuant to section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 439.8(d)).

At the time of the incident, the Bur Oak library System had a contract with the Illinois Department of Corrections to provide library services in certain of the Department’s facilities. On July 7, 1980, Claimant was employed by Bur Oak as a correctional librarian and was assigned to Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois.

On July 7, 1980, Claimant was assaulted while she was working as a library assistant at Stateville.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant, Angela Weyhaupt, be and hereby is awarded the sum of seven thousand five hundred dollars and no cents ($7,500.00), in full satisfaction of this claim.


text:
    (No. 82-CC-2350
    L. K. Comstock & Company, Inc., a New York corporation, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 26, 1984.

      Amended opinion filed June 28,1984.

    O’Halloran, Lively & Walker (Paul T. Lively, of counsel), for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Erin O’Connell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, J.

This matter coming to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties hereto, due notice having been given and the Court being fully advised;

Finds that this claim for construction services was performed by the Claimant for the Capital Development Board. The services were properly authorized and performed to the specifications and satisfaction of the Capital Development Board. This Claim arises because project funds were exhausted prior to payment of the Claimant for the services herein claimed. Furthermore, $60,000.00 held in retainage under a Retention Trust agreement shall be promptly released to the Claimant.

Section 30 of An Act in relation to State finance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 166) prohibits obligating the State to any indebtedness in excess of the money appropriated. Therefore, the Court has no authority to grant an award on this claim because to do so would be to add money to the project account which was not appropriated by the General Assembly. It is hereby ordered that the claims herein be dismissed without prejudice.

AMENDED OPINION

Roe, C.J.

This is a claim by a prime contractor on a Capital Development Board project for breach of contract. The case is before the Court on a joint stipulation.

The facts as alleged in the complaint are briefly as follows. On or about May 5, 1977, the Respondent awarded the Claimant a contract for the provision of certain electrical work for the University of Illinois Replacement Hospital Project located in Chicago, Illinois, and known as CDB Project No. 830-030-007. Pursuant to the terms of the contract the Claimant was to be paid a base contract price, including alternates, of $6,201,892.00 plus change orders and less deletions to the base. During the course of Claimant’s performance of the contract the base was increased to $6,631,764.14 due to various change orders agreed upon by the parties. To date the Respondent has paid the Claimant on performance of the contract the sum of $6,333,556.80 leaving a balance due and owing of $299,207.34. The Claimant alleges breach of contract for the Respondent’s wrongful refusal to pay. Prior to the filing of the claim Respondent took no action except to attempt to backcharge $266,162.00 to the Claimant’s contract, which backcharge Claimant contests.

In order to settle and compromise this claim the parties stipulated and agreed to the reduction of a change order (No. 31 — EL—19) from $161,977.00 to $138,240.71, thereby reducing the balance due to $295,471.05 and adjusting the Claimant’s prayer for relief accordingly. Respondent then consented to entry of judgment in favor of the Claimant and against the Respondent in the amount of $275,471.05. It was understood and agreed that in partial satisfaction of the judgment the amount of $60,000.00 will be promptly released and paid to the Claimant from the Retention Trust Account arrangements established under the Retention Trust Agreement with the Claimant and the Harris Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago for the construction project. Said payment will be made plus interest under the terms of the Retention Trust Agreement.

The remaining balance of $215,471.05 represents the amounts not paid by the Respondent for change order No. 31 — EL—18 in the amount of $77,230.34 and change order No. 31 — EL—19 in the amount of $138,240.71 both of which the Respondent acknowledged are properly payable as change orders to the owner-contractor agreement. The Respondent acknowledged that the Claimant performed the work required by these two change orders at the direction of the Respondent acting by and through the Capital Development Board, that the Claimant has fully and properly completed all work required thereunder, and that the change orders are otherwise due and payable. Respondent affirmed that the sole reason the two change orders have not been paid is because the Respondent has heretofore not appropriated money for their payment.

The Respondent further acknowledged that it does not now have and agrees not to assert any claim or demand against the Claimant arising out of or in any way related to the construction of CDB project No. 830-030-007 for purported delays in the completion of construction, although it did reserve all claims, demands, causes of action, or suits which it has or may have against any other person or entity arising out of or in any way related to the subject matter of the project.

Lastly, it was agreed that funds for change order Nos. 31 — EL—18 and 31 — EL—19 should be appropriated as there is no dispute that the work required by those change orders was requested by the Respondent through the Capital Development Board and was completed by the Claimant.

Although this Court is not bound by such stipulations, we do not -seek to interpose controversy where none appears to exist. This stipulation appears to have been entered into fairly and at arms length and, based solely on the record before us, we concur with the parties with the exceptions noted hereinafter.

Because no funds were appropriated for the change orders which are the subject of this lawsuit we cannot concur in entering judgment for the Claimant and against the Respondent. It is a basic rule in the Court of Claims that where an insufficient amount of appropriations have lapsed or where no appropriation was made to pay an obligation, this Court will not make an award. (J. T. Blankenship and Associates v. State (1975), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 116.) Appropriating funds for public use is constitutionally solely the power of the legislature and were we to make an award herein we would in effect be usurping the legislative prerogative. For that reason we make no comment as to the parties’ stipulation that such funds should be appropriated. In addition, issuance of or agreement to the change orders by the Capital Development Board was prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 166 which provides “No officer, institution, department, board or commission shall contract any indebtedness on behalf of the State, nor assume to bind the State in amount in excess of the money appropriated, unless expressly by law.”

It does appear however that the $60,000.00 remaining in the Retention Trust Account was appropriated for this project and can be paid to the Claimant without any action or opinion by this Court.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied.


text:
    (No. 82-CC-2554
    National Railroad Passenger Corporation, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order, filed September 22, 1982.

      Order on denial of rehearing filed December 27, 1983.

    Lord, Bissell & Brook, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Lynn W. Schock, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This case is before this Court on a motion to dismiss filed by Respondent. The claim arises out of a contract between Amtrak and the State dated August 1,1975, and amended September 1,1975. Under the contract Amtrak agreed to furnish certain rail services. Amtrak furnished services for fiscal years 1975 and 1976. The State paid Amtrak $333,132 less than the amount billed and refused to pay the balance.

The contract contained a provision for arbitration of any dispute in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.

On October 15,1981, Amtrak demanded arbitration and subsequent thereto the arbitrator allowed Claimant’s claim in the sum of $98,647.00 plus $668.23 as a share of fees. The complaint before this Court was for $99,315.23 and was filed in May 1982 based on the arbitrator’s award.

The Respondent contends the arbitration clause is invalid and that more than five years expired before the claim was filed in this Court.

The Claimant contends the arbitration clause is, or ought to be, found valid and that no cause of action accrued until the arbitrator made his award based on the hearing before it.

A study of past cases will reveal that this Court has limitations which are applicable here.

The Court of Claims is not a court of general jurisdiction. Cases show that we have no authority to allow claims based on quantum meruit; that estoppel is no defense; that we are not a court of equity and cannot allow claims based thereon. We are referred to often times as a “quasi-court”.

The legislature has granted this Court authority to decide cases only in specific cases, and we must adhere to the limits imposed on us. This a concession to the rule that the State, as a sovereign, cannot be sued.

In deciding our cases, we must decide them within the authority granted to us regardless of any harshness involved.

Were we authorized to consider equities, our holdings might be different in many cases, but we deem it beyond our authority to do so. The legislature has limited us in this regard.

In the case before us we are compelled to decide solely whether the statute of limitations has run since the accrual of the cause of action arose; we can give no credence to harshness nor to estoppel.

Based on the record before us, we find that the cause of action, if any, arose over five years before any claim was filed here. We further find that the State cannot be held to be estopped from raising such a defense based on any efforts to arbitrate under terms of the contract entered into.

The Claimant could have protected itself by filing a claim here and indicating that it was pursuing the separate remedy of arbitration. This would have prevented the application of the statute of limitations being invoked. At that time, we could have considered whether arbitration was available and had we decided it was not, Claimant could then proceed before this Court. This position is supported by our recent case of Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 841.

W e hold that arbitration under the contract did not toll the statute of limitations from running.

While we aren’t compelled to decide whether arbitration under the contract was valid, we do say that in the opinion of this Court the procedure was invalid. Under the statute this Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear contract claims against the State. Arbitration is not available as a substitute. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.8.

Motion to dismiss is allowed.

ORDER ON DENIAL OF REHEARING

Holderman, J.

Claimant has filed a petition for rehearing of our order dismissing its complaint. Our order was entered on September 22, 1982. Oral arguments were made on its motion. We mention here that this case was very ably argued, both orally and by briefs, by both the Claimant and the State.

The case was dismissed originally on the grounds that the five-year statute of limitations had run before the claim was filed before this Court. It is Claimant’s position the statute had not run because of the arbitration clause in the contract sued upon.

Claimant’s basic argument is that “arbitration was a prerequisite to the accrual of its claim against the State and therefore, the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run until completion of the proceedings”.

While this could be true if the arbitration clause were an acceptable procedure, we fail to see how the same effect can be given to it when it is determined that the clause on arbitration is an invalid clause. If it is void, it is void for all purposes. To recognize partial validity, is not, in our judgment, a sound position for this Court to take. To hold that the arbitration clause was valid for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations would require a party to pursue a useless act before bringing his action before this Court. We are not constrained to require such a futile action.

While it isn’t a determining factor, we do point out that on November 13, 1981, the Claimant was apprised by letter that the State insisted that any action had to be brought in the Court of Claims, which had sole jurisdiction, and that arbitration was not an acceptable procedure. By our holding, we are confirming that the writer of the letter was correct — arbitration is contrary to law and therefore should be given no effect whatsoever.

Petition for rehearing denied.


text:
    (No. 82-CC-2578
    Lester Oetgen, Claimant, v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 6, 1984.

    Rammelkamp, Bradney, Hall, Dahman & Kuster, for Claimant.
    Warren H. Glockner, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant’s complaint sets forth that he was injured while an employee of Respondent on July 19, 1967. He was compensated for medical benefits and other benefits due him under the Workers’ Compensation Act, for temporary disability, for loss of 28% use of lower extremity and for a number of weeks for total disability.

However, he alleges that additional benefits were due him for the years 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980 in the total amount of $2,017.99, under provisions of an Act adopted in 1975 allowing rate adjustments for each of those years. He further stated that Respondent on September 6,1973, tendered him a settlement sheet which he signed but which neglected to include provisions for any rate adjustments.

It appeared at the hearing that Claimant was compensated for the year 1980, and therefore his claim was reduced to $1,304.83 for 1977,1978, and 1979.

Claimant’s position is that the Respondent acted fraudulently in submitting the settlement sheet without such a provision, and that he signed it believing that all his workers’ compensation entitlements were included therein.

He alleges that the settlement sheet was made “with intent to induce him into signing”, and that “Respondent had secured for him all benefits” under the Act to which he was entitled.

In paragraph 10 of his complaint he alleges:

“Respondent knew such representation was false; that in fact unless an award was given or settlement contract approved, Claimant could not receive full benefits.”

In paragraph 11.4 he states that Respondent “represented to Claimant that there had been a change in the law and that once certain forms were signed, Claimant would be receiving his rate adjustment.” And in 11.5 that “Claimant signed the forms in reliance as to the representations made by Respondent.”

Claimant first sought on November 12,1979, to have this claim for rate adjustment compensation adjudicated before the Industrial Commission, but his claim was denied on the ground that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to allow rate adjustments Claimant would have received had he filed before July 1, 1975. The Commission lacked jurisdiction to allow rate adjustments Claimant would have received had he filed before July 1, 1975. The Commission did decide, on a separate request, that Claimant was entitled to a rate adjustment compensation under section 8(g) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, 138.8(g)), and was granted an award which resulted in him receiving the rate adjustment, but not including the years 1977, 1978, and 1979.

An evidentiary hearing was held July 7, 1983, to determine if the facts showed Respondent had indeed practiced fraud on the Complainant.

In his brief Claimant states:

“The basis of Claimant’s argument is that the Respondent entered into a 1973 ‘green sheet settlement’ in violation of Section 23 of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act and fraudulently represented to Claimant that he would receive the full benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. An Application for Adjustment of Claim was not filed until 1979 and a Decision of the Arbitrator was not entered until February 27, 1979, awarding Petitioner a pension for life. This delay resulted in Claimant being denied rate adjustments for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979, as provided by Section 8(g) of the Workers’ Compensation Act.”

Statutory provisions applicable are the following found in section 8 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138).

Section 8(g), provides in part:

“Every award for permanent total disability entered by the Commission on or after July 1, 1965, under which compensation payments shall become due and payable after the effective date of this mandatory Act and every award for death benefits for permanent total disability entered by the Commission on or after the effective date of the amendatory Act shall be subject to annual adjustments as to the amount of the compensation rate therein provided. Such adjustments shall first be made on July 15,1977 and all awards made and entered prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act and on July 15 of each year thereafter. In all other cases such adjustments shall be made on July 15 of the second year next following the date of the entry of the award and shall further be made on July 15 annually thereafter. . .”

Section 7(f) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.7(f)) provides in part:

“On July 15, 1976 and on January 15, 1977, and on each year thereafter the employer shall further pay a sum equal to one-half of one percent of all compensation payments made by him after the effective date of this Amendatory Act of 1975, either under this Act or under the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act, whether by lump sum settlement or weekly compensation payments, made during the first six months and during the second six months respectively of the fiscal year next preceding the date of the payments. . .”

Section 23 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.23) provides in pertinent part:

“No employee, personal representative, or beneficiary shall have power to waive any of the provisions of this Act in regard to the amount the compensation which may be payable to such employee, personal representative or beneficiary hereunder except after approval by the Commission and any employer, individually or by his agent, service company or insurance carrier who shall enter into any payment purporting to compromise or settle the compensation rights of an employee, personal representative or beneficiary without first obtaining the approval of the Industrial Commission as aforesaid shall be barred from raising the defense of limitation in any proceedings subsequently brought by such employee, personal representative or beneficiary.”

It appears from the testimony that Max N. Pike was employed by the University of Illinois from 1956 to 1979 as a supervisor of accident compensation, handling contacts with various claimants who had suffered an injury. He testified that his function was managing claims so that “Mr. Oetgen would receive benefits from the University under the Act.” In connection with his claim, Claimant contacted Mr. Pike on many numerous occasions. On September 6, 1973, a document (green sheet settlement) was signed by Claimant and Max Pike which set forth, in itemized form, the benefits which Claimant would be entitled to for his injury of July 19, 1967.

In 1978, according to Mr. Pike, Claimant contacted him and stated he had been advised of a change in the Workers’ Compensation Act which would entitle him to additional benefits. Pike stated he did not know of the change. The change in the Act provided for certain rate adjustments. This change in the Act was made after the September 6, 1973, memorandum.

At a hearing before the Industrial Commission on October 21, 1980, Mr. Oetgen stated that at the time he signed the memo of September 6, 1973, Mr. Pike represented that the benefits listed would be complete benefits due him. He further testified that Mr. Pike called him in 1978 and said there would be an adjustment in his pension because of a new law that was passed.

Claimant argues that Respondent violated section 23 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.23) by entering into the “agreement” of September 6, 1973, and by representing that he would receive full benefits under the Act, and that in so doing it committed a fraud on Claimant.

It appears that Claimant did place complete confidence in Mr. Pike in the handling of his claim. He complains that Respondent waited three years after the 1975 amendment to advise him on the rate adjustments he could be entitled to. His position is that Respondent prepared the green sheet settlement with the intent that Claimant rely on it and do nothing further and all benefits, even future benefits which were then unknown, would be forthcoming.

Numerous cases were cited by Claimant to support the principle that an employer can’t lull a Claimant into a false sense of security and allow the statute of limitations to expire. In such cases, the employer has been held estopped from invoking the statute of limitations. These cases are sound in their holding but do not control this case based on an alleged false misrepresentation as we find no evidence that there was indeed a false representation on September 6,1973.

In reply the Respondent argues that the case before the Court is one based on fraud; that Claimant has claimed the green sheet settlement sheet was presented to him with a representation that Respondent had secured all benefits for him and that “Respondent knew such representation to be false.”

The essential elements of fraud are a misrepresentation of a material fact, coupled with scienter, deception and injury. Mustain v. Shaver (1981), 96 Ill. App. 3d 86, 420 N.E.2d 1197.

The record fails to contain any evidence of a misrepresentation with intent to defraud made by the Respondent. Even though Claimant relied on Mr. Pike and even assuming that he was told the benefits in the green sheet settlement were full benefits, how can that be construed to be a false statement when the Act providing for rate adjustments was not enacted until July 1, 1975? This was a future event and could not have been anticipated in any representation made in 1973. There was no express statement in the green sheet of September 6, 1973, that constituted a misrepresentation, and the evidence does not establish any verbal representation that would be the basis of fraud.

We find scant evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Pike had a duty to alert himself to future changes in the Workers’ Compensation Act and to notify Claimant of such changes. Nor do we find that Claimant has proved that there was a fraudulent misrepresentation by Respondent when the green sheet settlement was executed.

Basically, the Claimant’s position is that when the Act was amended in 1975, the Respondent should have been aware of it and advised the Claimant what to do. We do not feel the testimony supports this conclusion, and even if it did, Respondent’s failure would not constitute fraud at the time of the signing of the green sheet settlement. At best he presents only an appeal to fairness because Respondent had helped him at the outset of his claim, but certainly he failed to meet his burden of proving fraud by Respondent.

Claimant has failed to meet its burden of proving fraud as alleged in its complaint.

Claim denied.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-0014
    Mark W. Johnson, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 30, 1983.

    Califf, Hooper, Fox & Dieley (Dennis R. Fox, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

Claimant seeks to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of an accident in which Claimant’s pick-up truck collided with a State snowplow.

An evidentiary hearing was conducted by Commissioner Bruno P. Bernabei, on March 18, 1983. The commissioner has duly filed his report, together with the transcript, together with the briefs, now before the Court.

A summary of the facts determined at the hearing before the commissioner is as follows:

The accident occurred at 1:20 p.m. on March 4, 1982, on U. S. Route 6 at its intersection with the Oakwood Country Club Road in Colona Township, Henry County, Illinois.

The collision occurred when Claimant, traveling westbound behind the snowplow, entered the eastbound lane of travel and attempted to pass the snowplow. As Claimant began accelerating to pass, the operator turned the snowplow to the left from the westbound lane into the eastbound lane in an attempt to turn into Oakwood Country Club Road. It was the intent of the operator of the snowplow at that point to turn around and proceed back eastward on Route 6.

Claimant contends that the accident and his injuries were the proximate result of Mr. Parchert’s negligent operation of the snowplow. Respondent denies that Mr. Parchet was negligent and contends that if he was, Claimant’s own negligence should reduce his award proportionally. Claimant denies any negligence.

Claimant testified that weather conditions at the time of the accident were good, except that the highway was wet, apparently from melted snow. Claimant had been traveling west on Route 6 for several miles when he came upon the snowplow which was traveling about 30 m.p.h. and was not engaged in plowing operations. Between the two vehicles was a Cadillac automobile operated by an unknown driver.

Claimant further testified that at the point where Route 6 was, passing was permitted and the Cadillac automobile passed the plow. Claimant then pulled his vehicle into the eastbound lane at a point five car lengths behind the snowplow.

Claimant observed the Cadillac successfully complete its pass, saw that it was clear for him to pass, saw no turn signal actuated on the plow, and began to accelerate. At this time the snowplow turned to the left into the eastbound lane in an attempt to enter the Oakwood Country Club Road. Claimant braked, skidded a short distance, and struck the left rear of the snowplow.

Mr. James Parchert, the snowplow operator, testified that he was traveling westbound on Route 6 for about six miles at a speed of 25 m.p.h., and that for the last two or three miles he was not engaged in plowing operations since there was no snow on the road.

On that two- or three-mile stretch leading to the point of the accident, several westbound vehicles passed the snowplow as he was proceeding west on Route 6. Parchert was attempting to find a side road so that he could turn around and proceed back eastward.

Parchert further testified that he saw the Cadillac automobile pass him a few seconds before he made his turn to the left. He saw Claimant’s vehicle when he glanced in his rear view mirror approximately 250 feet east of the Oakwood Country Club Road. At that point Claimant was several car lengths behind Parchert and still in the westbound lane. Parchert did not remember if he looked for Claimant’s vehicle again prior to the time he made the left turn. He did testify that he did not see Claimant’s vehicle again until the collision. Parchert testified that from the point where he observed Claimant’s vehicle 250 feet east of Oakwood Country Club Road to the time of the collision, he made the decision to turn around on Oakwood Country Club Road and had his left-turn signals on the entire distance.

State trooper Herbert Anderson and Department of Transportation field engineer Harry Faveri both testified that when they arrived at the scene after the accident they found the snowplow’s left-turn signals still operating.

The Court finds from the evidence that the State employee, James Parchert, negligently operated the snowplow. Knowing that the Claimant was traveling behind him and that vehicles were routinely passing his slow-moving snowplow, Parchert travelled some 250 feet and made a left turn across the passing lane without looking back to determine if the turn could be made in a reasonably safe manner. Failure to give an appropriate left turn signal as required by section 11 — 804 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95/2, par. 11 — 804), is a statutory violation and is prima facie evidence of negligence. Old Second National Bank of Aurora v. Bauman (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 315, 408 N.E.2d 224.

The Court further finds that Claimant was not guilty of negligence and therefore his damages will not be reduced pursuant to the theory of comparative negligence. Alvis o. Riber (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886.

Dr. Edward D. Lanigan, Claimant’s treating physician, testified that as a result of the accident, Claimant suffered a concussion which caused him severe headaches for several days. Claimant sustained a four-inch laceration on the right side of his forehead through all of the soft tissues around the skull, and 40 to 50 stitches were required to close the wound which left a permanent scar. Claimant’s medical bills amounted to $972.80.

Based upon the record the Court finds that Claimant has proven his claim by a preponderance of the evidence that the Respondent was negligent.

It is hereby ordered that Claimant be and hereby is awarded the sum of ten thousand ($10,000.00) dollars.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-0081
    Lilian Lee and Donald Tweedy, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 20, 1984.

    Moore, Nelson & Stiff (Gorden R. Stiff, of counsel), Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the Claimant and the Respondent and the Court being fully advised in the premises:

Finds, that during the period of July 1,1978, to June 30, 1981, the Claimants were the owners, as tenants in common, of a certain commercial building and real estate consisting of approximately 1400 square feet and located at R.R.l, North Dixie Highway, Hoopeston, Vermillion County, Illinois.

On July 1, 1978, Claimants entered into á written lease agreement with the State of Illinois, through the office of Alan J. Dixon, Secretary of State (here and after referred to as lessee), for use by lessee and its Driver Services Department of the premises herein described as the drivers license examination facility, for an initial two-year period and for a total consideration of $16,800.00, payable in 24 monthly rental installments of $700.00 each, commencing July 1, 1978. A true copy of the lease agreement was attached to the joint stipulation of the parties as Exhibit A.

On April 4, 1980, pursuant to section III (c) of the lease agreement, lesse exercised its option to renew said lease for an additional two-year period by written letter, dated April 4,1980. A true copy of the renewal letter was attached to the joint stipulation of the Claimant and the Respondent as Exhibit B.

Satisfactory delivery of goods and services was provided by Claimants to lessee pursuant to the lease agreement, and lessee continuously occupied, and continues to occupy the.premises and operates a drivers license examination facility on the premises belonging to the Claimants from July 1, 1978, to the present.

There remains in controversy, and unpaid by the Respondent to the Claimants, a total sum of $8,400.00, which the Claimants maintain they are entitled to receive from the Respondent. This $8,400.00 is for the rent payments for fiscal year 1981. The appropriation from which this claim would have been paid is 1233-011-35010-1200-00-00. This appropriation has lapsed, and sufficient funds remain in it to pay this claim.

This is a matter of lapsed appropriations, and no new issues of law were presented. No other evidence, oral or written, was presented to the Court, and both parties waived briefs.

Both parties agreed that this award of $8,400.00 will constitute full and final satisfaction of the claim herein or any other claim arising out of the same occurrence.

While this Court is not necessarily bound by a stipulation such as this, it has no desire to interpose a controversy where none appears to exist. The stipulation submitted by the parties appears to have been entered into freely and fairly, and its contents appear to be reasonable. The Court, therefore, finds no reason not to accept this stipulation and to follow its recommendation of an award for $8,400.00.

It is hereby ordered, that the Claimants be awarded $8,400.00 in full and final satisfaction of this Claim.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-0157
    Gail Mangle, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 26, 1983.

    Douglas G. Brown, P.C. (Mark S. Rohr, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This cause having come for consideration on the Respondent’s stipulation and the Court being duly advised in the premises:

Finds, that the Claimant in this matter was an independent contractor contracted with the Illinois Department of Public Aid to provide telephone collection services during the period of July 1981 through June 1982. Claimant is now requesting $4,574.24 remaining on her contract. The original ceiling on this contract was $25,000.00. The Illinois Department of Public Aid is unable to determine the quality of the Claimant’s performance because of missing records. However the Department has determined that the Claimant has been paid $20,606.22 on her contract, and the amount remaining is $4,393.78. The account from which this claim would have been paid is a non-appropriated revolving fund, commonly referred to as the 421 Fund, 421-47855-1900-01-99, the public assistance recovery trust fund.

This information was received from a departmental report attached to the Respondent’s stipulation. That departmental report, under Rule 14 of the Rules of the Court of Claims of the State of Illinois, is considered to be prima facie evidence of the facts set forth therein.

The Illinois Department of Public Aid has agreed to liability in this matter in the amount of $4,393.78.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the amount of $4,393.78, from the public assistance recovery trust fund, Fund 421, 421-47855-1900-01-99. This payment shall be in complete accord and satisfaction of this claim. The claim for attorney fees is denied.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-0287
    S. D. Louge and Associates, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 8, 1984.

    Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll & Keller, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This cause having come for consideration on the Respondent’s motion to dismiss and the Court being duly advised in the premises:

Finds, that Claimant is seeking payment for services rendered when it allegedly investigated a workers’ compensation claim. Claimant alleges that he was authorized to do this work on behalf of the State of Illinois by Baroni & Baroni. Claimant has failed to produce a contract between itself and Baroni & Baroni, and has also failed to show any evidence that Baroni & Baroni was an authorized agent of the State of Illinois. The Illinois Department of Central Management Services, State department or agency, issued a departmental report which is considered prima facie evidence of the facts set forth therein pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Court of Claims of the State of Illinois. This departmental report indicates that the agency has no contract on file with either the Claimant or Baroni & Baroni, and has absolutely no knowledge of receiving any services from the Claimant or that the Claimant’s services were retained by anyone having the authority to issue a contract on behalf of the State of Illinois or Central Management Services.

It is axiomatic that this Court will not authorize payment of a claim by a vendor who is unable to prove from the onset that it properly contracted with the State of Illinois.

It is hereby ordered that this case be dismissed.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-0315
    Aetna Casualty & Surety Company of Illinois, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 12, 1984.

    Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. of Illinois, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Respondent’s motion to reopen and reconsider an award which we previously held in abeyance by order of this Court dated January 5,1984;

The court finds:

1. That Claimant, Aetna Casualty & Surety Company of Illinois, as surety, posted a supersedeas bond for the Office of the Attorney General as principal.

2. That the bond was required of the State of Illinois by a Federal district judge when the State appealed a civil contempt citation, Hughes v. Vujovich, No. 80-2729, in which the assistant Attorney General for the State of Illinois was ordered to pay attorney fees of $1,500.00 and expenses of $46.34, plus interest.

3. That that proceeding arose out of a case entitled Hughes v. Gentry, No. 78-C-2523, which was a civil rights case which ended with a consent decree dated April 4,1980, which required the Department of Corrections to pay plaintiff $525.00.

4. That the assistant Attorney General for the State was held in civil contempt when he attempted to set off against this payment an amount owed by the plaintiff to the State as a result of an award of attorney fees in Hughes v. Rowe, No. 77-C-4583.

5. That the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the Federal court in Hughes v. Vujovich, No. 80-2729.

6. That Claimant paid to Shiff, Hardin & Waite, attorneys for Russell B. Hughes, Jr., $1,774.11 on June 23, 1982.

7. That the assistant Attorney General for the State is a State employee with the right of indemnification under “An Act to provide for Representation and Indemnification in certain civil lawsuits.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 1301 et seq.

8. That by posting of the supersedeas bond and making the required payment for attorney fees, expenses and interest, the Claimant here succeeds to the right of indemnification.

9. That the claim at bar was pending in this Court on the date of our decision in Norman v. State (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 895, and, said decision having prospective effect only, is not barred thereby.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of $1,774.11.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-0326
    Nile Marriott, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed December 21, 1982.

      Order on motion to vacate filed September 26,1983.

    Shea, Rogal & Associates, Ltd., for Claimant.
    Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of the Respondent to dismiss, it appearing that due notice has been given, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

Claimant seeks the sum of $55,696.08 for rent unpaid for the balance of the term of a lease entered into between him and the Respondent. The lease in question was signed on May 16,1980, to be effective commencing June 1, 1980, for the 36-month period terminating on June 30, 1983. The tenant, the Environmental Protection Agency, vacated the premises prior to June 30,1981, but paid the rent through said date.

The lease, a copy of which was attached to the complaint, contains a provision as follows:

“Lessor understands and agrees that continuation of this lease and all obligations and convenants hereunder, during the term, or any subsequent renewal or extension of this lease, shall be subject to passage of a suitable appropriation to the Agency by the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, and to lawful availability to the Agency of sufficient funds for the payment of rent. If this lease is terminated as hereinafter provided, the rental of the monthly rate specified shall be payable only to the date of termination.”

The Civil Administrative Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 63b13.2), requires that all leases negotiated by the Department of Administrative Services contain such a clause.

Apparently the legislature in appropriating funds for the Environmental Protection Agency’s ordinary and contingent expenses for fiscal years 1982 and 1983 inserted language to the effect that the line item appropriation for contractual services could not be used to pay the rent on the lease in question here. It would therefore seem the lease agreement was conditional, and with the condition not having been met it cannot be enforced. However, Claimant asserts in his complaint (he filed no responsive pleading to the motion to dismiss; the time for doing so having expired at the time this opinion was being prepared) that the language in the appropriations legislation restricting the agency’s use of the line item is a substantive provision and such provisions are without effect, presumably because they are unconstitutional. In its motion to dismiss, Respondent makes a counterargument in favor of the legislation’s constitutionality.

Although a copy of the legislation was not provided us by either party, we find it unnecessary to review it. We find that this Court’s holding on rehearing in the case of Gossar v. State (1962), 24 Ill. Ct. Cl. 183, 192, is dispositive of the issue. We do not feel authorized to pass on the constitutionality of an act of the legislature. In addition, it should be pointed out that we have no authority to grant the relief sought without going to the legislature and it has already considered the matter.

Accordingly, we find that the lease was conditional, that the condition was not met, and therefore the terms of the lease cannot be enforced. It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, dismissed.

ORDER ON MOTION TO VACATE

Roe, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Claimant’s motion to vacate, due notice having been given, and the Court being fully advised in the premises:

We have reviewed the motion at bar and find that it does not state sufficient cause to vacate our order of dismissal dated December 21,1982. No error was alluded to nor were any facts supposedly overlooked alleged.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, dismissed.


author: Raucci, J.

text:
    (No. 83-CC-0494
    Desiree Groenland and Michael Groenland, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1984.

    Tutt & Kodner, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties hereto, the Court being fully advised in the premises, finds:

That this is a personal injury action brought pursuant to section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 439.8(d).

On December 1, 1981, Respondent had control and responsibility for maintenance of a State highway known as Route 68, at or near its intersection with Quentin Road, in Palatine Township, Illinois. At the time of the accident, the Claimants’ automobile, which was being operated by Desiree Greenland, struck a broken section of the edge of the highway, causing her to lose control of the automobile and travel into a ditch located next to the highway.

It is therefore ordered that the Claimants, Desiree Greenland and Michael Greenland, be and hereby are awarded the sum of seven hundred fifty dollars and no/cents ($750.00), in full satisfaction of this claim.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-0584
    Orest F. Belvedere, Jr., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 1, 1983.

    Orest F. Belvedere, Jr., pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Glen P. Larner, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant in this cause was a resident of Stateville Correctional Center. He has filed suit for loss of personal property that occurred on May 21, 1981, when he was a resident of Pontiac Correctional Center. Claimant was taken from his cell to a hospital in Pontiac, Illinois, for medical attention, at approximately 6 o’clock in the morning. His cell mate was a barber in the institution barber shop and he left the cell about 6:30 a.m. for breakfast and to report to work. The cell was vacant thereafter.

At approximately 11:45 a.m., a fire was discovered in the cell. The State fire marshal, after investigation, concluded that the fire was caused by a cigarette smoldering on a mattress in the cell. Claimant’s property was totally destroyed in the fire.

On May 20, 1981, the day before the fire, Claimant learned he would be going to the hospital the next day and he expressly asked a cell house sergeant and a lieutenant to store his property in a store room. Contrary to departmental regulations, they refused to do so even though his property at that time was stored largely in boxes as a result of having just moved from one cell house to another. Both the sergeant and the lieutenant refused to remove his property, as requested by Claimant, with the result that the property was destroyed in the fire.

Claimant testified at some length as to the loss he had incurred and his claim was further substantiated by resident personal property permits and various other documents that were introduced at the time of the trial.

Claimant’s original claim was for $5,369.00. It appears to the Court that the value of the property lost was at least $3,500.00.

This Court has held that the State has a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard and return an inmate’s property when it takes actual and physical possession of such property. See Scott v. State (1978), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 756.

In the present case, the State did not take actual possession of the property in question, although it is the Court’s opinion that the request made by Claimant that they do so, which request was made the day before the loss incurred and was denied, places the Respondent in the position of having failed to abide by its own rules. It is interesting to note that the Respondent did not introduce any evidence as to the reason for the refusal of the sergeant and lieutenant to take possession as requested by Claimant.

It is also interesting to note that the Claimant’s cell was vacant for several hours before the fire actually occurred which is strong evidence of the fact that someone else was in the cell and left the cigarette which caused the fire.

It is the Court’s opinion that the failure of the sergeant and lieutenant to take possession of the Claimant’s personal property as he requested was the proximate cause of the loss that occurred. Claimant is therefore awarded the sum of three thousand five hundred ($3,500.00) dollars, in full, final and complete settlement of all his claims.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-1268
    Spaeth and Company, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 1, 1983.

    Theodore J. Priester, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

The record in this cause indicates that this is a standard lapsed appropriation claim. The Attorney General and the Claimant have entered into a joint stipulation based upon a report forwarded to the Office of the Attorney General by the Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security.

This Court finds that this was a properly authorized expenditure at prices reasonable, usual and customary in the area where received, of which $7,000.00 remains unpaid. The purpose of the expenditure for which this claim was filed was for rent for October 1982 for 1510 6th Avenue, Moline, Illinois.

Money was appropriated under line item #052-45211-1200-00-00. A sufficient amount lapsed to cover this claim. Claimant’s social security or Federal tax I.D. number is 36-6087509.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be and is hereby awarded, in full satisfaction of this claim, the sum of $7,000.00.


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    (Nos. 83-CC-1488, 83-CC-1489
    Carmody Auto, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 9, 1984.

    Leonard H. Carmody, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This cause having come for consideration on the joint stipulation of the Claimant, Carmody Auto, and the Respondent, State of Illinois, and the Court being duly advised in the premises;

The Court finds that these claims arise from the same lease, concern the same building, during the same time period, and would have been paid from the same appropriation. It appears from the joint stipulation submitted by the parties that the building in question is owned by Carmody Auto, and is located in East St. Louis, Illinois, where it was used continually from September through December 1981 by the State Community College, East St. Louis, Illinois, pursuant to a lease. When the lease was terminated in December of 1981, the weather was such that it was difficult for the State Community College to completely vacate the building, and the building was not completely vacated until February 1982. During this time the State Community College incurred the amount of $1,511.66 in rent at a rate of $755.83 per month. Furthermore, because of the inclement weather, the State Community College was unable to complete cleaning the building and making some repairs in the amount of $840.00. Both of these amounts were stipulated to as being reasonable by the Claimant and the Respondent.

The stipulation of the Claimant and Respondent also establishes that there was no money remaining in the appropriation of the Community College to pay this claim, and the 2% transfer funds were also unavailable. This Court has consistently held in the past that it is unable to expend an appropriation beyond what the legislature has appropriated for that fiscal year. Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Illinois Constitution of 1980 prohibits this Court from appropriating money to pay this claim, as does section 30 of “An Act in relation to State finance” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 127, par. 166). We have consistently held, as in St. Mary’s Hospital v. State (1981), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 440, that to make an award where no unobligated funds lapsed at the end of the fiscal year would be to make a supplemental appropriation and, according to the constitution of this State, this is a power belonging solely to the legislature. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VIII, sec. 2(b).

This Court is not necessarily bound by a stipulation such as was submitted by the Claimant and the Respondent in this matter. However, the Court has no desire to interpose a controversy where none appears to exist. This stipulation submitted by the parties appears to have been entered into freely and fairly and its contents appear to be reasonable. The Court, therefore, finds no reason not to accept this stipulation.

It is hereby ordered that this claim, although it is a fair and proper claim against the State of Illinois, which should have been paid, must be denied by this Court for lack of an adequate appropriation from which it could have been paid.


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    (No. 83-CC-1590
    University of Chicago Hospital, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 17, 1984.

    Hayt, Hayt & Landau, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on Respondent’s motion to dismiss, due notice having been given and the Court being fully advised finds as follows:

The University of Chicago Hospital is here seeking a $2,793.60 vendor payment, as provided in section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 11 — 13), from the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA), for inpatient neonatal services which it rendered to a newborn infant during May and June of 1979. The subject services began with the date on which the infant’s mother, a public aid recipient, was discharged from Claimant’s hospital, and ended with the infant’s discharge eight days later.

As explained by IDPA in its departmental report, hospitals are to bill both the mother’s and the newborn’s care to IDPA on a single invoice, covering services from the mother’s admission for childbirth and including the days during which both mother and newborn were patients. Claimant did so in this case, and was paid in full by IDPA for the services furnished prior to the mother’s discharge. The subsequent neonatal services for this infant are not, however, eligible for payment by the State, since at no time here relevant did the mother apply to IDPA to request recipient status for her newborn daughter. In the absence of such application, IDPA had no authority to determine the infant’s eligibility for State-paid medical assistance.

As IDPA points out, a newborn child does not become a recipient simply as a result of his or her birth to a recipient mother. All persons wishing the benefits of recipient status must timely apply to IDPA for that status. In the case of minor children, the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 11 — 15) provides that a parent, relative or guardian may apply for recipient status on the minor’s behalf. IDPA’s medical assistance program (MAP) Handbook for Hospitals outlines the procedures whereby the Claimant could have aided the mother in applying for MAP coverage for her infant. Since no application was submitted, there was no MAP coverage for the subject services.

Because this infant was not determined eligible for recipient status with respect to the period during which these services were rendered, payment by the State would be contrary to IDPA requirements.

It is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed, the Claimant having failed to demonstrate an entitlement to payment for the subject neonatal services.


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    (No. 83-CC-1706
    Michael H. Robinson, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 2, 1984.

    Michael H. Robinson, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises from personal injuries suffered by Claimant while he was an inmate at Joliet Correctional Center.

The Claimant, Michael H. Robinson, was an inmate at the Joliet Correctional Center on January 10,1983. He and another inmate were assigned to clean a garage on the institution premises. Claimant had pulled away from the wall a six-foot-tall metal storage cabinet so that he could clean behind it. When he pushed the cabinet back towards the wall an automotive bead breaker fell off the cabinet and hit him on the head. As a result of the blow on the head, Claimant suffered a painful injury but with no permanent ill effects.

A bead breaker is a heavy metal stand (26 pounds or more in weight) on which a tire rests while someone breaks the tire away from the rim. It was approximately two feet long, eight inches wide and two and a half feet tall. It was painted yellow. On January 9, 1983, the day before the accident, Claimant was likewise assigned to clean the garage and had taken the bead breaker from the top of the cabinet and put it on a table. Prior to Claimant’s coming to work on January 10,1983, someone had put the bead breaker back on top of the cabinet. A water pipe, suspended by straps fastened to the ceiling, ran the length of the room above the cabinet. At some unspecified time someone had hung a vehicle exhaust pipe from the water pipe. When Claimant pushed the cabinet back up against the wall the bead breaker came in contact with the exhaust pipe hanging from the water pipe, and this caused the bead breaker to tip over and fall off the cabinet.

Claimant was thoroughly familiar with the garage, having been cleaning it on an average of once a week for some time.

The record clearly indicates that the Claimant, in failing to verify the location of the bead breaker before pulling the cabinet away from the wall and pushing it back up against the wall, was not acting with due care for his own safety, and that his lack of care was the proximate cause of the accident.

It is the opinion of this Court that the Claimant has failed to prove the State was negligent and an award is hereby denied.


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    (No. 83-CC-1707
    Lauren L. Liss, Claimant, v. The Board of Regents of the Regency University System, Respondent.

      Order filed August 29, 1983.

    Alexander & Zalewa, for Claimant.
    John W. Countryman, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon stipulation of Respondent. It is the Court’s understanding that the parties hereto have agreed that Claimant is entitled to the sum of $2,000.00 as full, final and complete settlement against the Respondent.

The stipulation, filed by Respondent, states that Claimant and her attorney have agreed to settle this case for said sum.

Award is hereby entered in favor of Claimant in the amount of two thousand ($2,000.00) dollars, and according to a letter from Claimant’s counsel at Northern Illinois University, said check in the above amount should be made payable to Lauren L. Liss and Mark J. Liss.


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    (No. 83-CC-1720
    Mary Bartelme Homes, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 22, 1983.

    McCarthy & Levin, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

The record in this cause indicates that the purpose of the expenditure by the Department of Children and Family Services for which this claim was filed was group home care services provided to children in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services.

The Department of Children and Family Services has submitted a report on this claim which states that there were no funds remaining in the appropriation out of which this claim should have been paid (appropriation and fund No. 001-41817-4400-06-00), but that there were funds in appropriation and fund No. 001-41817-4400-02-00 which could have been transferred into the 06 fund if the Department had requested that a transfer bill be passed by the General Assembly. No transfer bill was passed, so technically these funds were not available to the Department for the payment of this claim.

Section 30 of “An Act in relation to State finance” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 166) prohibits obligating the State to any indebtedness in excess of the money appropriated for a department, unless expressly authorized by law. Therefore, the only way an award on this claim may be made is if this expenditure was expressly authorized by law. Previously, expenditures for food and medical care for prisoners have been recognized to be expressly authorized by law. (Fergus v. Brady (1917), 277 Ill. 272.) Also the Court has considered this problem in connection with the apprehension and return of fugitives. In those cases, the Court has made awards on the basis that payment was expressly authorized by law.

The children for whom Claimant performed the services for which payment is sought were placed in the custody of the Department of Children and Family •Services by order of the Circuit Court of Cook County pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 701 — 1 et seq.) Section 1 — 12 of the Juvenile Court Act imposes upon the legal custodian of a child the duty to provide him with food, shelter, education and ordinary medical care.

The Court has considered the limitations placed on the Department of Children and Family Services by the General Assembly. It is the function of the General Assembly to control the expenditures of public funds by the various agencies of State government. However, this is a situation very close to that of Fergus v. Brady. Here, as in Fergus v. Brady, the State agency had custody by court order and was authorized by law to provide basic necessities for the persons in custody, in this instance children.

The invoice for these services was submitted after the close of the fiscal year, but the Department of Children and Family Services was required to pay that invoice out of funds for that prior fiscal year. This situation leads to unique and difficult forecasting problems for the Department of Children and Family Services. The provider of these services should not be penalized because the Department is unable to accurately forecast specific appropriation fund requirements for each fiscal year. Had the Department been able to properly forecast, sufficient funds would have been available for the payment of this claim.

Because the expenditure here in question was required by law, it is hereby ordered that the Claimant, Mary Bartelme Homes be and is hereby awarded the sum of $7,070.51.


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    (No. 83-CC-2016
    Gem City Vineland Co., Inc., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed November 29, 1983.

    Gem City Vineland Co., Inc., pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This cause comes before this Court on Respondent’s motion to dismiss. The facts of the case are that the Claimant on February 1, 1983, made application for a first-class wine manufacturer’s license and paid the sum of $500.00 in accordance with the statute. The Illinois Liquor Control Commission issued a first-class wine manufacturer’s license to the Claimant on February 24, 1983. Following the issuance of the first-class wine manufacturer’s license, the Claimant, on March 17,1983, applied for a first-class wine maker’s license and again paid the fee as required by statute. Then, before the issuance of the first-class wine maker’s license, the Claimant applied on March 25, 1983, for a wine maker’s retail license and again paid the appropriate fee. On April 4, 1983, both the first-class wine maker’s license and wine maker’s retail license were issued. Upon the issuance of the first-class wine maker and wine maker’s retail licenses the Claimant voluntarily surrendered the first-class wine manufacturer’s license. The Claimant would now like to have a refund for the amount paid for the first-class manufacturer’s license. The Claimant may or may not have understood the legal significance attached to each license, but the Claimant did in fact get what it bargained for. If the Claimant made a mistake as to the legal significance of the license, this constitutes a mistake of law for which there is no recovery under the law. The Court in Southside Petroleum Co. v. State (1947), 16 Ill. Ct. Cl. 284, stated:

“A mistake of law is an erroneous conclusion as to the legal effect of known facts and therefore under the law payments made by Claimants are clearly a mistake of law and are not recoverable.”

Again in the same case, the Court stated that:

“Fees and taxes paid voluntarily and without any compulsion or duress, cannot be recovered in the absence of a statute authorizing such recovery." (16 Ill. Ct. Cl. 284, 286.)

This Court is unaware of any statute authorizing the recovery for taxes paid voluntarily and without compulsion or duress.

To grant this Claimant a recovery would invite every licensee who simply changed their minds about wanting a license to seek a refund claiming mistake. No license transaction would ever be final until the lapse of the licensing period.

For the above reasons, this claim is hereby denied.


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    (No. 83-CC-2390
    Lee County, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 24, 1983.

    Robert E. Roth, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This cause coming to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This court finds that this expenditure was for the return, by the County of Lee, of fugitives from justice. Law enforcement officers are required to travel to other jurisdictions for the return of fugitives when the fugitives have been located and apprehended in various jurisdictions throughout the country. The expenses herein reflect the expenses incurred by the County of Lee in sending its law enforcement officers to return apprehended fugitives. The investigation and reports from the Department of Law Enforcement indicate that the appropriations for this purpose were expended, leaving some of these expenses unpaid. Under the rules set forth in Fergus v. Brady (1917), 277 Ill. 272, this Court finds that inasmuch as the State was unable to anticipate the amount necessary to appropriate for this expense and that since this expenditure was one required of the State by statute, this Court awards the Claimant the amount of $5,543.09.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $5,543.09 be and is hereby awarded to Claimant, County of Lee, in full satisfaction of the claim herein presented to the State of Illinois.