text:
    (No. 96-CC-4338
    Board of Directors of 345 Fullerton Parkway Condominium Association, Claimant, v. Teachers’ Retirement System of The State of Illinois, and T. R. Fullerton Corp., Respondents.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1998.

    Boehm, Pearlstein, Bright, Ltd. (Gary I. Black-man, of counsel), for Claimant.
    James E. Ryan, Attorney General (Thomas S. Gray, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION AND ORDER

Epstein, J.

This claim is brought against the Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois (the TRS), a statutory pension system for certain school district employees, seeking damages from the TRS pension fund arising from a real estate investment of the TRS. This court sua sponte raised the issue of our subject matter jurisdiction over this claim, and over a similar claim against the TRS in another case, which has since settled and been withdrawn.

The Jurisdictional Issues

The issue is whether this courts subject matter jurisdiction under section 8 of the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/8) — and, concomitantly, whether Illinois’ statutory sovereign immunity (under the Immunity Act (745 ILCS 5/1)) — covers (a) liabilities of TRS pension fund assets, and (b) liabilities of a business corporation that is (allegedly) an alter ego of the TRS, a State agency. The first jurisdictional issue has two aspects because of the different funds from which a TRS liability might be paid: (i) liability of the TRS pension fund itself payable from pension funds, and (ii) liability of the State payable from appropriated State tax-derived funds.

Decision

This court now dismisses this claim and holds that:

(1) This court lacks jurisdiction over the TRS pension fund (and sovereign immunity does not cover that fund) because it is a trust fund for the sole benefit of present and future TRS members, and is not a State fund;

(2) This court lacks authority to order funds paid out of the TRS pension fund to satisfy a TRS liability; the General Assembly cannot do so because the pension fund is not appropriated;

(3) This court therefore lacks jurisdiction over the TRS Board in its capacity as trustee-owner of the TRS pension trust fund, and lacks jurisdiction over this claim, which asserts a liability arising out of the TRS’ ownership of a real estate investment of the TRS pension fund;

(4) Insofar as this claim seeks to impose liability on the State, payable from State general funds, for a liability of the TRS pension fund, we have jurisdiction over such claim as it claims against the State, but such claim fails to state a cause of action against the State because:

(a) liabilities of the TRS pension fund are not State liabilities,- except insofar as such liabilities have been statutorily assumed by the State;

(b) the only TRS liabilities statutorily assumed by the State are those obligations assumed in §16 — 158(c) of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/16 — 158(c)):

"Payment of the required State contributions and of all pensions and * * * other benefits granted under or assumed by this retirement system, and all expenses in connection with the administration and operation thereof, are obligations of the State.”

(c) This claim is an investment liability and is not an “expense [] [of] * * * die administration and operation” of the TRS and is therefore not an assumed State obligation. See Jones v. Jones-Blythe Construction Co. (4th Dist. 1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 53, 501 N.E.2d 374, 103 Ill. Dec. 353.

(5) This court lacks jurisdiction over the T.R. Fullerton Corporation, an Illinois business corporation, notwithstanding the allegation in the complaint that it is an alter ego of the TRS, a State agency.

Our decision recognizes a bifurcated jurisdiction over the TRS and, impliedly, over some other statutory governmental agencies that function in both State and non-State capacities. Under our decision, such agencies may sometimes be “State agencies” and sometimes not, depending on the particular function or capacity that gives rise to a particular claimed liability. We recognize that this subtle distinction in Illinois sovereign immunity law may well create a trap for unwary litigants and their lawyers until finally resolved by the Supreme Court or codified by the General Assembly. We would prefer to avoid claims bouncing between the constitutional courts and this statutory court, which can prejudice good claims, but we are constrained to apply the statutes as we find them.

Nature of the Claim

This claim arises out of a residential apartment building in Chicago (the “345 Fullerton Building”) that was converted to condominium ownership and which the TRS allegedly acquired from the defaulted original developer that the TRS had financed. The complaint seeks damages on behalf of the purchasers of the condominium units for certain alleged contractual liabilities of the developer, which are alleged to fall on the TRS as successor “equitable” owner and as indirect defacto operator and successor developer of the condominium building. The complaint also names an Illinois business corporation, the T.R. Fullerton Corporation (“TRF Corp.”), which is alleged to hold legal title to the building as an alter ego and subsidiary of the TRS.

Another claim against the TRS based on its investment ownership of the 345 Fullerton Building — a contractor’s contract claim for HVAC work done on the building — was also brought in this court, but was settled and withdrawn. Mid Res, Inc. v. Teacher's Retirement System of the State of Illinois, No. 95 CC 3515.

Procedural History

Both this case and Mid Res were filed here after the circuit court dismissed the claimants’ actions in that court on sovereign immunity grounds, holding that this court has exclusive jurisdiction of the claims against the TRS and, apparently, of those against TRF Corp.

This court sua sponte raised the issue of our subject matter jurisdiction over this claim and the Mid Res claim, and directed the parties in both cases to brief the jurisdictional issues. None of the parties filed a brief, and the Mid Res case settled as noted above. Because of the importance and recent recurrence of the peculiar sovereign immunity and jurisdictional issues presented, we now decide the matter without further delay.

Analysis

The TRS Pension Fund and State Funds.

The crux of the analysis is that the TRS pension fund is a statutory trust fund for the benefit of its present and future members- — certain local school district employees — and is not a State fund and is not owned by. the State in any material sense. Accordingly, as the funds and other investment assets of the TRS pension fund are not State funds or assets, they are outside the scope of this courts jurisdiction, which is limited to claims “against the State” (see section 8 of Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS 505/8) and are outside the scope of the sovereign immunity established by section 1 of the Immunity Act (745 ILCS 5/1), which immunizes the “State of Illinois” from being sued as a defendant or party except in this court (or in the Public Labor Relations Board).

Although the TRS and its Board and staff may be a “State agency” for some purposes, as they surely are, the TRS’ capacity with respect to the TRS pension fund is purely as fiduciary trustee for the benefit of the TRS members, as the statutory scheme makes clear.

Article 16 of the Illinois Pension Code is the current codification of the Teachers’ Retirement System statute, and like its legislative pre-Code antecedents, plainly establishes the TRS for the benefit of certain defined classes of individuals, and not for the benefit of any governmental entity much less the State. The current version of the lead section of Article 16 (40 ILCS 5/16 — 101) states:

“§16 — 101. Creation of System. Effective July 1, 1939, there is created the Teachers' Retirement System of the State of Illinois’ for the purpose of providing retirement annuities and other benefits for teachers, annuitants and beneficiaries. All of its business shall be transacted, its funds invested, and its assets held in such name.”

Under the Illinois sovereign immunity caselaw— which extends back at least as far as the adoption and constitutionalization of State sovereign immunity in the 1870 Illinois Constitution (see Art. IV, section 26) — the primaiy and most dispositive factor in determining whether a particular governmental entity or agency is, or is not, part of the “State” for purposes of sovereign immunity is the character of the funds held or controlled by it. As our Supreme Court held in People v. Illinois State Toll Highway Com. (1954), 3 Ill. 2d 218, 227, 120 N.E.2d 35, 41 (Toll Highway Com. not a State agency, outside Court of Claims jurisdiction):

“The multiplicity of factors which the courts have considered in reaching a decision of this question makes it impracticable to extract a simple rule which will fit every situation. The factor entitled to most weight, in our opinion, is [whether] * * * the general funds of the State [can] be reached in order to satisfy an obligation of the [defendant agency].”

Review of the sovereign immunity decisions of our Supreme Court discloses no more significant factor and discloses no qualification of this principle that sovereign immunity attaches to the State’s funds and not to other funds. There are undoubtedly situations in which the character of particular funds is ambiguous or doubtful, as between being State funds, non-State governmental funds, private funds or some hybrid of these categories.

But this case does not present an ambiguous or doubtful situation in this regard. The TRS pension funds are trust funds and are not State funds available for general State purposes. In this regard, we point out but do not rest upon the additional Illinois constitutional protection afforded to all Illinois pension rights. (See, 1970 Illinois Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 5.) This reinforces our conclusion that the Illinois statutory pension fund is separate from the State treasury and from State funds.

This pension fund situation is analogous to cases in which state agencies act as court-appointed fiduciaries of private parties and their private funds. In such cases, we have held that this court lacks jurisdiction over the private funds over which the State agency has fiduciary custody. See, eg., Kulas v. Vogler (1997), 49 Ill. Ct. Cl. 172, No. 95 CC 3631 (Public Administrator and Guardian of Lake Co., as court-appointed administrator of a decedents probate estate); Reynolds State Bank v. Office of State Guardian (June 12, 1997), No. 97 CC 423 (Office of State Guardian, as court-appointed guardian of an incompetent individuals estate).

On the other side of the coin, but equally fundamentally, State general funds are not available to pay investment losses of pension trust funds like the TRS pension fund — or losses of other private trust funds over which a State agency may have fiduciary custody or trust ownership, as in Kulas, supra, and Reynolds State Bank, supra. This consideration bears additional comment as it is such a fundamental concern.

If this Court were to find liability against the TRS arising out of this investment asset (which happens to be improved real estate) and if we were then to pay the award from our general claims appropriation or if the General Assembly were then to appropriate the award from the general revenue fund — as ordinarily occurs under the present statutory scheme — then the claim against the pension fund would ultimately be paid from general State funds. That would result in the State (the taxpayers) subsidizing the pension fund and its investment risks and losses. This court finds no basis for permitting such a legislatively unauthorized State subsidy of the TRS pension fund.

Under such a scheme, which we have rejected today, the State would effectively become a guarantor of all State-administered pension fund investment liabilities and many losses. In our view, that is not the law; has never been the law or the practice in Illinois; and would be a potentially huge and unpredictable drain on the State treasury. It should not escape notice that such a result would be an inversion of the principle and purpose of sovereign immunity.

This brings the discussion to the two reported Illinois reviewing court decisions addressing jurisdiction over the TRS:

Jones v. Jones-Blythe Constr. Co. (4th Dist. 1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 53, 501 N.E.2d 374, 103 Ill. Dec. 353 (slip-and-fall on TRS office premises) (held that exclusive jurisdiction lies in the court of claims, based on statutory assumption of State liability under section 16 — 158, Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/16— 158) providing that “all expenses in connection with the administration and operation [of the TRS] are obligations of the State”); and
Utterback v. Board of Trustees of the Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System (4th Dist. 1997),___Ill. App. 3d ___ (slip-and-fall in White Oaks Mall, a TRS investment property) (held that exclusive jurisdiction lies in the court of claims, putatively based on Jones and the absence of an exception in section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act, which grants exclusive jurisdiction over “all claims against the State for damages * * * sounding in tort”).

Both Jones and Utterback held that exclusive jurisdiction over those tort claims against the TRS lie in this court rather than in the constitutional courts. We agree with and follow the analysis of Jones, but thereby arrive at the opposite conclusion on the facts of this case. We disagree with the result and with the incomplete analysis of Utterback, which we find to be inconsistent with Jones, and we decline to follow Utterback.

In the 1986 Jones decision, the appellate court ultimately applied the statutory division of liability in section 16 — 158 of the Pension Code. That statute assumes State financial responsibility for “administration and operation” expenses and thus liabilities of the TRS, as we observed above, and thereby opens the door to State liability in this Court for claims that fall within the statutory standard, as the Jones court concluded was the case for that slip-and-fall claim on TRS office premises. Jones was thus a straightforward application of tire statute.

Utterback, however, ignored the statute and arrived at an incorrect result by following Jones’ disposition while disregarding its reasoning. The Utterback opinion neither considered nor applied the section 16 — 158 “administration and operation” standard prescribed by the legislature for State responsibility for TRS liabilities. Although Utter-back correctly rejected the common law proprietary-governmental distinction for determination of the scope of State sovereign immunity, that court never reverted to the statutory distinction that the legislature adopted for assuming responsibility for TRS liabilities.

Thus Utterback wound up treating a TRS real estate investment liability as a TRS operating expense. If that treatment were followed, the effect would be to shift that TRS investment liability onto the States general revenue fund sub rosa through the procedures of this court and the routine appropriations process. These consequences were apparently not pointed out to the Utterback court nor were considered by it. Utterback’s result is wrong in imposing the expense of a slip and fall in a shopping mall onto the taxpayers merely because that mall is owned by a teachers’ pension fund that is administered by a State board. It is the pension fund that should pay, assuming negligence of the TRS is proven, and not the Illinois taxpayers through the appropriations process.

We must observe that there is nothing inherently improper about this court adjudicating claims against the TRS or any other statutory pension system in Illinois if that were someday the will of the legislature. The problem is that this court cannot allocate pension fund investment liability to the responsible pension fund without statutory authority to direct payment from such funds. We now lack such remedial authority, which only confirms our conclusion that we lack adjudicatory jurisdiction over TRS pension fund liability claims. We do not seek such jurisdiction, but must point out that such jurisdiction would make little sense without the corresponding authority to allocate liability to the responsible fund, all of which would require legislative authority that in almost 100 years has not been deemed suitable for this court.

Jurisdiction over the Corporate Alter Ego.

Claimant named the T.R. Fullerton Corporation as a Respondent on the allegations that it is owned and controlled by the TRS and is effectively the TRS’s alter ego for purposes of ownership and operation of the 345 Fullerton building which is alleged to be a TRS pension fund investment. The short answers to this are (1) the TRF Corp. is as a matter of law a private business corporation which is therefore outside our statutory jurisdiction irrespective of its ownership, and (2) assuming arguendo as we must on these pleadings that the TRS does own it and assuming further that it is legal for the TRS to own a subsidiary business corporation (neither of which issues we consider or decide here), this Court is still without jurisdiction over the TRF Corp. because, as we held above, we lack jurisdiction over its alleged principal, the investment properties of the TRS pension fund; because we lack jurisdiction over the principal we lack jurisdiction over its [alleged] alter ego absent an independent jurisdictional basis.

Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, this claim is dismissed.

       Due at least in part to Illinois’ extraordinary complex of statutory governmental entities that evolved during the century (1870-1970) of growth under the constraints of the 1870 Constitution, our courts have had to wrestle with some difficult issues of classification of various statutory entities (and their funds), as in Toll Highway Commission, supra. See, also, Gocheff v. State Community College of East St. Louis (5th Dist. 1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 178, 386 N.E.2d 1141, 25 Ill. Dec. 477 (Community College of E. St. Louis as of 1977 not a State agency; outside Court of Claims’ jurisdiction). See, also, Williams v. Medical Center Comm’n (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 389, 328 N.E.2d 1; Ellis v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 387, 80 Ill. Dec. 750, 466 N.E.2d 202; see, generally, S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. State of Illinois (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 397,67 Ill. Dec. 92, 444 N.E.2d 131.

       Instead the Utterback opinion focused on the “all claims” language of this court’s jurisdictional grant over tort claims against the State. (See section 8(b) of the Court of Claims Act.) That analysis, however, evades the dispositive issue of whether or not “the State” and State funds are the liable parties.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Hess, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 97-CC-0170
    Black Knight Productions, Inc., Claimant, v. The University of Illinois at Chicago, Black Student Association, Respondent.

      Order filed May 13, 1998.

    James, James, & Manning (Lüke A. Casson, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Burditt & Radzius (Norman P. Jeddeloh & Patrick J. Sullivan, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Hess, J.

This cause comes before the Court on motion of Respondent, the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, to dismiss, filed November 14, 1997, and motion of Claimant for oral argument, filed February 2, 1998. For the reasons discussed below, Claimants motion for oral argument is denied and Respondents motion to dismiss is granted.

Claimant’s Motion for Oral Argument

In its motion for oral argument, Claimant argues that it must be afforded an opportunity to rebut “additional materials” submitted by Respondent for the first time in Respondent’s reply in support of its motion to dismiss. On February 10, 1998, Respondent filed its objections to Claimant’s motion for oral argument stating that “any purported ‘additional material’ set forth by [Respondent] in its reply brief was simply a response to new matter not contained in [Claimant’s] complaint but instead raised for the first time in [Claimant’s] opposition to [Respondent’s] Motion to Dismiss.”

Section 790.200 of the Court of Claims Regulations (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.200) states that “[t]here shall be no oral argument on motions or objections to motions, except on motions to dismiss where, in the Courts discretion, oral arguments thereon would be of value to the Court.” Having considered the pleadings of record, it is the Courts opinion that oral arguments in this instance would be of no value to the Court. Therefore, it is hereby ordered that Claimants motion for oral argument be, and the same is, denied.

The Court will now consider the motion of Respondent to dismiss.

Respondents Motion to Dismiss

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, all facts properly pleaded in the complaint and those contained in exhibits made part of the complaint are to be taken as true for purposes of (and only for the purposes of) the motion. Royal Dental Manufacturing v. State (1989), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 252.

On July 22, 1996, Claimant filed its two-count complaint with the court clerk. In count I of its complaint, Claimant alleges that on July 31, 1992, Claimant and the Black Student Association of the University of Illinois at Chicago, Inc. (BSA), entered into the following contract:

"Contractual Agreement between
BLACK KNIGHT PRODUCTIONS and
BLACK STUDENT ASSOCIATION of the
University of Illinois at Chicago
July 30,1992
The BLACK STUDENT ASSOCIATION [hereafter BSA] has hired BLACK KNIGHT PRODUCTIONS [hereafter BKP], a non-profit company, to organize, coordinate and manage the First Annual African American College Expo/Fair (AACE). BSA is the main sponsor of the First AACE which will be held on UIC campus from Friday, July 31, 1992 through Sunday, August 2,1992.
As defined by BSA, throughout this agreement the term proceeds shall mean all money collected and the term profits shall mean proceeds less expenses. BSA and BKP understand that all door money proceeds are to be deposited into the BSA account by Monday, August 3, 1992. After all UIC incurred costs have been met, the BSAs percentage of the door money profits shall be fifteen percent (15%) of which five percent (5%) will go towards the Grace Holt Scholarship Fund and eighty percent (80%) of the door money profits are to be turned over to BKP no later than Thursday, August 6, 1992 to be distributed as follows:
45% Chicago housing rehabilitation (South and West)
15% Donated to Roseland Community Hospital
10% Lewis University Black Student Union
10% Chicago State University Student Government Association
BSA and BKP understand that the remaining five percent (5%) of the door money profits will remain in the BSA account for at least two months after tire AACE to absorb any remaining UIC expenses associated with this event. After that time period, the five percent or its remains will be turned over to BKP. If other UIC expenses associated with the AACE arise after the five percent (5%) or its remains have been turned over to BKP, the expenses are to be paid 50/50 with Black Knight Productions paying fifty percent (50%) of the bill and BSA paying the remaining balance.
BSA and BKP understand that vendor sale proceeds are to be counted on the premises each night. Ten percent of the vendor proceeds is to be paid each night to the University of Illinois at Chicago for rental space. BSA, the sponsoring organization for this event, is entitled to a percentage of the profits from vendor sales. Thus, three percent (3%) of the profits from all vendor sales from three all days is to be paid to the BLACK STUDENT ASSOCIATION by Black Knight Productions before any money is turned over to BKP.
There shall be at least one BKP and one BSA staff member present at all times when handling, counting money associated with the AACE. BKP will receive copies of the receipts for all AACE deposits into the BSA account.
The concept of the First African American College Expo/Fair was developed on October 4, 1991 by Yett-i Howard, President of Black Knight Production in Matteson, Illinois. The Black Student Association of the University of Illinois at Chicago is a proud official sponsor of the First Annual African American College Expo/Fair.
The signatures below verify that the Black Student Association and Black Knight Productions understand that the contents of this contractual agreement are binding in order for this event to take place on UIC campus.
_ Date: 7/31/92
Lisa M. Boyd, President Black Student Association
_ Date: 7/31/92
Yett-i Howard, President Black Knight Productions
_ Date: 7/31/92 Phone: [ ]”
Witness
(Emphasis in original.)

The contract is signed by Lisa M. Boyd, President Black Student Association and Yett-i Howard, President Black Knight Productions. The contract also bears the signature of Christine Grgurich for University of Illinois at Chicago as “Witness.” Claimants count I goes on to allege that BSA breached the above contract.

In count II of its complaint, Claimant seeks breach of contract damages against Respondent. Claimant alleges it entered into a written contract with Respondent “whereby [University of Illinois at Chicago] UIC agreed to allow and permit [Claimant] to promote, manage and coordinate the AACE and UIC was at all times relevant herein in control of all facilities which were to be used in the execution of the event.” (Paragraph 21 of Claimants complaint.) Claimant further alleges that “UIC is held responsible for breach of the terms of the contract directly and under the theory of respondent [sic] superior.” (Paragraph 23 of Claimants complaint)

Although the caption of the contract states that it is an agreement between Claimant and BSA, Claimant appears to allege that Respondent is a party thereto as a result of Ms. Grgurich signing the contract as a witness. Assuming arguendo that Ms. Grgurich was acting as an agent of Respondent, it is a well settled principle of law that in dealing with an agent of the State one must ascertain at his peril the authority of the agent, and the mere assertions of the agent are not sufficient to bind the State. (New Life Development Corp. v. State (1992), 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 65, 86; Melvin v. State (1989), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 88; Dunteman v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 51.) “There are statutes dealing with State purchases and there are rules and regulations. These statutes, rules and regulations are all published and available to any vendor who cares to acquaint himself with them.” (Central Office Equipment Co. v. State (1979), 33 Ill. Ct. Cl. 90 at 91.) "[A] purchase order emanating from an office or official authorized to obligate the funds of the State is a prerequisite to the establishment of an obligation * * * against the State.” 33 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 91.

Respondent, citing Rend Lake College Federation of Teachers v. Community College District (5th Dist. 1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 308, 405 N.E.2d 364, 39 Ill. Dec. 611, argues that the same principles apply in the case of Respondent. This Court agrees. The general rules concerning university organization and procedure of the University of Illinois are quite clear as to the party[ies] having authority to execute contracts on behalf of Respondent. The general rules in effect on July 31, 1992, the date of the contract in issue, state:

“ARTICLE II. BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES
SECTION 1. THE COMPTROLLER
As an officer of the Board of Trustees, and in accordance with the Bylaws of the Board, the Comptroller shall. ..
(d) Sign contracts to which the University is a party, unless otherwise ordered by the Board in specific cases.
SECTION 4. AWARD AND EXECUTION OF UNIVERSITY CONTRACTS
(a) Purchases, construction contracts, and other contracts shall be awarded by the Board of Trustees in accordance with applicable State law and with regulations adopted by the Board of Trustees ...
(b) All contracts, other than purchase orders, shall be executed at least in duplicate, and the original thereof shall be filed with the Secretary of the Board of Trustees and remain in the custody of the Secretary...
(c) Contracts relating to appointments to the staff may be executed by the Secretary of the Board of Trustees. Agreements providing for the appointments of Resident Physicians and Dentists may be executed by the Chief of Staff of the University of Illinois Hospital. Purchase orders issued pursuant to awards made by the Board of Trustees may be signed by the University official in charge of the purchasing activity, as designated by the Vice-President for Business and Finance. Unless otherwise ordered by the Board of Trustees in specific cases, other contracts to which the University is a party shall be signed by the Comptroller of the Board of Trustees and attested to by the Secretary of the Board of Trustees.
888
SECTION 5. DRAFTING AND APPROVAL OF UNIVERSITY CONTRACTS
(b) All contracts prior to the execution thereof shall be approved as to legal form and validity by the University Counsel, such approval to be endorsed in writing on the contract, provided that such approval and endorsement shall not be required with respect to individual contracts or extensions or renewals thereof, the form of which has been previously approved by the University Counsel as a standard and which contains no substantive changes or additions, other than those pertaining solely to the description of the project, the amount involved, and the term of the contract or extension.”

In view of the general rules, Respondent cannot be considered as a party to the contract in issue because it was not signed by the comptroller of the Board of Trustees and attested to by the secretary of the Board of Trustees. Assuming that Ms. Grgurich was in fact acting as an agent of Respondent and not merely as a witness to the execution of the contract in issue, the burden remained on Claimant to ascertain whether she had the authority to execute the contract on behalf of Respondent. Claimant failed to do so and, therefore, its claim against Respondent for breach of contract must also fail.

Claimant also alleges that Respondent is responsible for breach of the terms of the contract under the theory of respondeat superior. Respondeat superior is a tort doctrine, premised neither on contract principles or policies. Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Vukmarkovic (1st Dist. 1990), 205 Ill. App. 3d 176, 187, 150 Ill. Dec. 270, 562 N.E.2d 1073; appeal denied (1991), 136 Ill. 2d 544, 567 N.E.2d 332, 153 Ill. Dec. 374. Claimant fails to state or maintain against Respondent a claim for tortious interference of contractual relations or any other tortious action. Consequently, Claimants claim in count II against Respondent for breach of contract under the doctrine of respondeat superior necessarily fails. Douglas Theatre Corp. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1st Dist. 1997), 288 Ill. App. 3d 880, 681 N.E.2d 564, 224 Ill. Dec. 249; appeal denied (1997), 174 Ill. 2d 558, 686 N.E.2d 1160, 227 Ill. Dec. 4 (1997).

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that Respondents motion to dismiss be, and the same is, granted and this cause is dismissed, with prejudice.

       The contract in issue is not a "standard" contract and thus to be enforceable against Respondent would have had to be signed by the Comptroller of the Board of Trustees and attested to by the Secretary of the Board of Trustees.


author: Epstein, J.

text:
    (No. 97-CC-2793
    Charles E. Knox, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 2, 1997.

    Charles E. Knox for Claimant.
    James E. Ryan, Attorney General (Diann K. MarSALEK, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Epstein, J.

Claimant Charles E. Knox, an inmate of the Department of Corrections (IDOC) brought this claim seeking reimbursement for damaged property in the amount of $255.99. The case is before us after hearing on the record and our Commissioners report.

At the June 11,1997, hearing on this claim, the Claimant testified that during his incarceration at Joliet Correctional Center he was the owner of a television and radio that were in working order prior to the alleged incident. Claimant testified that on or about. October 30, 1996, he was watching his television when a “gush of smoke” came from the television and both the radio and television became inoperable. He testified that one appliance was plugged into an extension cord and the other directly into the outlet, and asserts that the damage was the result of an electrical power surge at the institution. Claimant produced receipts for the television in the amount of $204.34 and for the radio in the amount of $51.65.

The Respondent produced William Schriever, a Plant Maintenance Engineer II, and the Chief Engineer for the Correctional Center. Mr. Schriever testified that he had reviewed the facts and allegations, and that there was no evidence of a power surge on that date.

Claimant urges us to find that a power surge occurred, and that it was the cause of the injury to his personal property. Claimant then asks us to find that the Respondent was negligent (and presumably that that negligence caused the power surge somehow) and thus Hable to Claimant for the cost of the appliances.

Claimant has produced no evidence — by testimony or by documentation — of (1) a power surge, (2) such a surge “causing” injury to the appliances, (3) any negligence by the IDOC, or (4) any causal connection between IDOC acts or omissions and a power surge. In short, this claim is 100% unsubstantiated and baseless, except for the lonely fact that Claimants property was damaged somehow. This is not a close case.

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds for the Respondent as to liability and denies this claim in its entirety. It is therefore ordered that this claim is denied and forever barred.


author: Per Curiam. Sommer, C.J.

text:
    (No. 94-CV-3047

      In re Application of Deloris Armstrong

      Order filed December 6, 1994.

      Order filed June 7, 1996.

    Deloris Armstrong and Gail Toney, pro se, for Claimant.
    James E. Ryan, Attorney General (Paul Cho, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 29, 1993. Deloris Armstrong, aunt of the deceased victim, James Earl Thomas, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on May 6, 1994 on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on September 29, 1993, the victim was shot by the alleged offender. The incident occurred near 4216 West Jackson, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the victim was known as a chief of a street gang. He went to this area to confront members of a rival street gang about an earlier altercation. During an ensuing dispute, the alleged offender shot the victim. The alleged offender has been apprehended and charged with first degree murder. The criminal proceedings against him are currently pending.

2. That section 10.d of the Crime Victims Compensation Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victims acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that this incident occurred due to the fact that the victim and the alleged offender were members of opposing street gangs. This incident occurred as a result of their gang affiliation, gang rivalry and face to face provocation.

4. That the victims conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

ORDER

Sommer, C.J.

On September 29, 1993, James Earl Thomas was shot to death on West Jackson in the City of Chicago. Pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq., now 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.) a claim was made by Deloris Armstrong, the decedents aunt, for funeral expenses she had paid. On December 6, 1994, this Court originally denied the application for benefits submitted by the Claimant due to the fact that the Claimant’s decedent was participating in gang activity which contributed to his death.

A hearing on this matter was held on August 14, 1995. Submitted during the course of the hearing was the report of the pathologist who conducted an autopsy on Mr. Thomas. In his opinion, the decedent died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds to the body. According to the reports submitted by the Chicago Police Department, the decedent was found at the scene of the shooting in clothes which exhibited gang graffiti and symbolism. A friend of the victim informed the police that Mr. Thomas was a member of the Black Gangster Disciples. That person also indicated that the victim was in that location to talk with another gang about a prior fight. The investigating officers checked the Chicago Police Department records and determined that the victim was a Black Gangster Disciple, with a criminal record. Further investigation by the police confirmed that the victim was at the scene of the shooting because of a prior incident. The man eventually arrested for shooting Mr. Thomas admitted that the motive for the shooting was a previous gang altercation.

It is clear that the victim and the alleged offender in this case were from opposing street gangs. This incident occurred because of their gang affiliation, gang rivalry and previous gang incidents. The victim’s conduct and his membership in a gang provoked and contributed to his own death and, therefore, the claim will be denied under section 10.1(d) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (740 ILCS 45/10.1(d)), which states that an award may be denied where the decedent provoked and contributed to his own death.

It is therefore, ordered that this Court’s order of December 6, 1994, is affirmed and the present appeal is denied.


author: Per Curiam. Mitchell, J.

text:
    (No. 95-CV-0309

      In re Application of Margaret Givens

      Order filed September 12, 1995.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1998.

    Margaret Givens, pro se, for Claimant.

      James E. Ryan, Attorney General (Paul H. Cho and Donald C. McLaughlin, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 30, 1994. Margaret Givens, mother of the deceased victim, Marvin Givens, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on August 3, 1994, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on July 30, 1994, the victim was fatally shot, allegedly by an offender who was known to him. The incident occurred at 223 West 111th Place, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that prior to the incident, the victim and the alleged offender were involved in an egg fight which escalated to a fist fight. During this altercation, the victim produced a knife and stabbed the alleged offender in the back. The offender then left the scene but quickly returned, armed with a handgun. The alleged offender then shot the victim. The alleged offender has been apprehended and charged with first degree murder. The criminal proceedings against him are currently pending.

2. That section 10.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim’s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim and the alleged offender were involved in an egg fight which escalated to a fist fight. During this altercation, the victim stabbed the alleged offender in the back. The alleged offender left only to return moments later and shoot the victim.

4. That the victims conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Mitchell, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 30, 1994. Margaret Givens, mother of the deceased victim, Marvin Givens, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as tire Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

On September 12, 1995, the Court entered an order denying the claim based on the investigatory report. Claimant made a timely request for a hearing. The cause was tried before Commissioner Sternik.

The testimony, police reports, and investigatory report all indicate that the victim, Marvin Givens, was killed by an offender that knew him on July 30, 1994. The victim and neighborhood young men were involved in an egg fight over two days. The participants agreed to change to water balloons but someone threw an egg at Marvin Givens. A fight ensued and the victim ended up cutting the offender with a knife and leaving a superficial wound in the offenders back. Shortly thereafter, the offender obtained a gun and shot the victim in the chest. The victim was found in the alley.

The only testimony presented at the hearing was the testimony of Claimant, Margaret Givens, the mother of the victim. She did not witness the incident and only relayed hearsay testimony that her son had stopped fighting and was at home in bed. However, the undisputed evidence was that the shooting occurred in the alley at 223 W. 111th Place, Chicago, Illinois, and not in the bedroom.

The Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she has met all conditions precedent for an award under the Act. Section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim’s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim. While it is clear the offender murdered the victim, it is also clear that the conduct of the victim contributed to his death. The victim started the fighting and drew and used a knife against the offender. Even though time passed and the offender was not justified under the criminal law in shooting the victim, the victim’s acts are significant enough to completely deny an award under the Act.

While the death of the victim is tragic, we find that Claimant has failed to prove her entitlement to an award under the Act. Claimant has failed to prove that she has met all conditions precedent for an award under the Act. The victim’s act of cutting tire offender with a knife contributed to the victim’s death to such an extent that an award must be denied.

For the foregoing reasons, it is the order of the Court that Claimant’s claim be and hereby is denied.


author: Per Curiam. Epstein, J.

text:
    (No. 96-CV-0206

      In re Application of Rodrigo Arzaluz

      Order filed April 15, 1996.

      Opinion filed October 29, 1997.

    Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago (Devereux Bowly, of counsel), for Claimant.
    James E. Ryan, Attorney General (Paul H. Cho and Donald C. McLaughlin, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 6, 1995. The Claimant, Rodrigo Arzaluz, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered tire application for benefits submitted on July 25,1995, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, tire Court finds:

1. That on July 6, 1995, tire Claimant was allegedly shot by an offender who was known to him. The incident occurred at 1121 North Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that, prior to the incident, the Claimant and the alleged offender were involved in a verbal dispute. During this dispute, the alleged offender punched the Claimant in the face. The alleged offender was apprehended and charged with battery. However, due to the Claimants failure to appear in court, an order of stricken on leave to reinstate by the Court and the criminal charge was later dismissed.

2. That section 6.1(c) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

3. That an investigation by the Attorney Generals office shows that the Claimant declined to cooperate fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant, in that he failed to appear in Court for the criminal proceedings. As a result, an order of stricken on leave to reinstate was entered by the Court and the criminal charge was dismissed.

4. That by reason of the Claimants refusal to fully cooperate with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant as required by the Act, he is not eligible for compensation thereunder.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Epstein, J.

This crime victims claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 6, 1995, in which the Claimant was a victim of a battery. Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act (the Act). 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

History of the Claim

On July 25, 1995, Claimant filed his application for compensation; on March 1, 1996, the Attorney Generals investigatory report was filed; and on April 15, 1996, this Court issued an order denying the claim for failure to cooperate with law enforcement officials. On May 13, 1996 Claimant filed his request for reconsideration and hearing on the matter, which we granted and assigned the claim to our Commissioner for hearing, which was set for February 20,1997.

The Evidence at Hearing

At the hearing, Claimant appeared with his attorney. Claimant testified that he is 25 years old and a pharmacology student (Transcript 5), and that on July 6,1995, he was the innocent victim of a battery. Claimant was taken from the scene of the incident by ambulance. (Transcript 12.)

He learned the court date would be on August 29, 1995, at 9:30 a.m., in Room 1000 at 1121 S. State Street from the police report and from his friends, who were witnesses to the incident. (Transcript 19.) The police did not notify him of the offenders name. (Transcript 6-7.)

Claimant appeared on the court date. The courtroom was very crowded and noisy and Claimant did not hear or recognize the name of the offender when his case was called. However, Claimant did recognize the names of some of the witnesses called by the States Attorney whom the Claimant approached. The prosecutor advised Claimant that his name was not on the witness list and that they would request another hearing to get his name on the list. (Transcript 8-9.) Claimant attempted to explain that he was the victim but in the confusion he was apparently unable to make himself clear to the States Attorney, who appeared to believe that he was another occurrence witness. The States Attorney told Claimant that the case would be called again. (Transcript 9-10.)

Claimant testified that he had no prior experience in court and that he went immediately to the public phone and called the crime victim advocate at the Legal Assistance Foundation and asked what he should do. She advised him that she would have to get back to him. (Transcript 9-10.) Claimant left the court after 10:00 a.m. thinking the case would be continued. (Transcript 11.)

Claimant testified that as a result of the incident he lost 17 days from work. His lost wages totaled $2,685.75.

Concepcion Tapia, a friend of the Claimant, also testified. She said she was present and witnessed the offenders attack on Claimant. She testified that he was the innocent victim of the crime. Tapia also testified that she appeared late on the court date, and saw Claimant in the hall outside the courtroom. Claimant then related the events in the courtroom to her much as he testified in this proceeding. She also was unfamiliar with the court system and assumed the case would be continued. (Transcript 24-25.)

Discussion

Section 6.1 of the Act provides that a person is entitled to compensation if the applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant. The sole question in this case is whether Claimant has done so.

The Claimant was clearly and undisputedly the innocent victim of a batteiy, which is a covered crime under the Act.

In reviewing Claimants conduct, we take note of the fact that at the time of the incident, Claimant was taken from the scene by ambulance and only later advised of the court date. There is no issue of his cooperation or non-cooperation on the date of the incident.

Claimant makes a showing of his intent to prosecute the offender, which is supported by his court appearance. The record affirmatively reflects a consistent course of conduct that is cooperative and that reflects an effort to testify. There is no police or prosecution testimony or documentation of Claimant being uncooperative. The Claimants testimony was clear and credible to our Commissioner.

The statutory intent of section 6.1 of the Act is to preclude recovery to persons who fail to cooperate with law enforcement. Clearly in this case, Claimant made a sincere attempt to prosecute the offender. Unfortunately, due to the all too common circumstances of our criminal justice system, his attempts were thwarted. But his efforts are sufficient to convince this Court that he should not be denied recovery under the Act for non-cooperation under section 6.1.

Claimant also produced clear testimony and sufficient supporting documentation to establish both his claim for lost wages in the amount of $625, and for medical expenses to Northwestern Memorial Hospital in the amount of $2,041.75 and to Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation, Inc. in the amount of $644.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant is awarded the sum of $3,310.75 from the crime victims fund as his compensation under the Act as an innocent victim of battery on July 6,1995 to be paid as follows:

Lost wages to Claimant $ 625.00

Medical expenses to

Northwestern Memorial Hosp. $2,041.75

Northwestern Medical Facility

Foundation, Inc. $ 644.00

$3,310.75


author: Per Curiam. Frederick, J.

text:
    (No. 96-CV-0514

      In re Application of Betty Goss

      Order filed February 26, 1996.

      Opinion filed December 3, 1997.

    Betty Goss, pro se, for Claimant.

      James E. Ryan, Attorney General (Paul H. Cho and Michael F. Rocks, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 18, 1995. Betty Goss, mother of the deceased victim, Antonio Goss, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 750 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on August 18, 1995, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That July 18, 1995, the victim was fatally shot by the alleged offender. The incident occurred in a parking lot located at 1559 North Central Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the victim was standing in the driveway of the parking lot when the alleged offender began yelling for the victim to move his auto as it was blocking the parking lot exit. The victim and his accomplice then entered the victim’s auto and drove southbound on Central Avenue while the alleged offender drove northbound on Central Avenue. As the alleged offender stopped at a stop light, the victim made a u-tum and drove up to the alleged offender’s auto. Both the victim and his accomplice exited the car, walked over to the alleged offender, and punched him through the window of his car. As a result, the alleged offender produced a handgun and fired several shots, striking the victim in the chest and leg areas. The alleged offender has been apprehended and charged with first degree murder.

2. That section 10.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim’s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that as the alleged offender stopped at a stop light, both the victim and his accomplice approached the offender and punched him through the window of his car. As a result, the alleged offender produced a handgun and fired several shots, striking the victim in the chest and leg areas.

4. That the victim’s conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 18, 1995. Claimant, Betty Goss, mother of the deceased victim, Antonio Goss, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

The Claimant, Betty Goss, is the mother of the deceased victim, Antonio Goss, who was fatally shot on July 17, 1995, at North and Central in Chicago, Illinois. The police report indicates that the victim and the offender, Joseph Gilmore, were arguing in a 7-Eleven parking lot about Mr. Gosss auto blocking Mr. Gilmore who was trying to exit the lot. Mr. Goss moved his car and Mr. Gilmore pulled onto Central Avenue northbound and stopped at the traffic light at North Avenue. Mr. Goss then entered his auto with Brant Barber and they were proceeding south on Central when they made a u-turn and pulled up at the corner of North and Central. Subsequently, they exited the car and went up to Mr. Gilmore’s car. Two police officers who happened to be stopped at the light westbound on North Avenue saw one of the two men reach through the window of Mr. Gilmore’s vehicle and strike Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Gilmore then produced a pistol and fired four or five shots at the two men, killing Mr. Goss and wounding Mr. Barber. Mr. Gilmore was then apprehended by the officers and charged with first degree murder.

On February 1, 1996, Betty Goss filed her claim pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act seeking $4,412.57 for funeral expenses, $180 for clothing, and $1,484.50 for medical expenses. The Court of Claims denied the claim on February 26, 1996, stating the facts as noted above and that section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent the victims acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death. The victims conduct in this case contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

The Claimant requested a review of the Courts decision. A hearing was held before Commissioner Michael E. Fiyzel on June 24,1997.

The Claimant did not witness the incident upon which her claim is based. The Claimant testified that she heard that Mr. Gilmore had left and come back and started shooting. The police interviewed several people, including the two officers who witnessed the shootings. All witnesses stated that the offender left the scene and was followed by the victim, who along with the other shooting victim, threatened and hit the offender in his car. The shootings resulted from the actions of the two victims. Section 10.1(d) of the Act provides that an award shall be reduced or denied to the extent that the victims acts and conduct provoked or contributed to his death. In re Application of Casey (1993), 46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 610; In re Application of Blackman (1984), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 466.

It is more likely than not that the victim would be alive if he had not followed, threatened and struck Mr. Gilmore. The Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she has met all conditions precedent for an award under the Act. (In re Application of Hogan (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 409.) Claimant has failed to prove that the victim did not provoke the incident which caused his death. In re Application of Spain (1993), 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 552.

For the foregoing reasons, it is the Order of the Court that Claimants claim be and hereby is denied.


author: Per Curiam. Frederick, J. Per Curiam.

text:
    (No. 96-CV-1740

      In re Application of Rebecca Ramberg

      Order filed February 26, 1996.

      Opinion filed October 3, 1997.

      Opinion fled December 31, 1997.

    Rebecca Ramberg, pro se, for Claimant.
    James E. Ryan, Attorney General (Paul H. Cho and Donald C. McLaughlin, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 3, 1994. The Claimant, Rebecca Ramberg, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on December 6,1995, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on September 3, 1994, the Claimant was beaten and robbed by several unknown offenders. The incident occurred at 1115 North Sacramento, Chicago, Illinois. While being questioned by the investigating police officer, the Claimant refused to give a full disclosure about the incident. Due to the Claimants lack of cooperation, no further action was taken by the Chicago Police Department.

2. That section 6.1(c) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the police report that the Claimant declined to cooperate fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant in that she refused to give a full disclosure about the incident to the investigating police officer.

4. That by reason of the Claimants refusal to fully cooperate with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant as required by the Act, she is not eligible for compensation thereunder.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 3, 1994. The Claimant, Rebecca Ramberg, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

On February 26, 1996, the Court, relying on the investigatory report, denied the claim. The Court found that Claimant failed to cooperate fully with the law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant pursuant to section 6.1(c) of the Act. The Claimant timely filed a request for hearing and the cause was tried before the Commissioner.

The evidence before the Court consists of the testimony of the Claimant and the police reports.

The Claimant testified that she was in the process of packing up personal property as she was moving. She was also in the process of selling some of the furniture. Two girls and a man agreed to buy some things and indicated they would come back with a truck. The three buyers came back. Instead of buying the property, the two girls locked the doors and the man beat the Claimant. The Claimant was tied up with an extension cord and dragged into the kitchen. She was told she would be killed if she had them arrested. Claimant did not know the three suspects. Shortly thereafter, the suspects found Claimant trying to untie her feet. Then they picked Claimant up and threw her out the window. Claimant landed in the garden next to the house. She felt paralyzed.

The police were called when a witness found Claimant lying in the garden. An ambulance was called and Claimant was taken to the hospital. Claimant testified she talked to the police and told them everything, including giving them a description of the perpetrators. Claimant indicated that her back was broken. She had surgery and rods were put in her back. She was in the hospital for six weeks but no police made any inquiries. Claimant testified she worked for Jewel prior to the incident but has too much pain to work now.

Claimant did indicate that a Detective Jaglowski interviewed her. She agreed he may have asked her if the incident was drug related. Claimant indicated she told the detective it was not drug related and it was about selling furniture. She did not recall becoming hostile when the detective asked her if the incident was drug related.

Claimant testified she never saw the perpetrators before and did not know who they were.

Claimant indicated she had numerous medical bills which she had sent to the Attorney General. She did not know the full extent of the bills or if they had been paid by Public Aid. From what she understood, they all had been paid by Public Aid but she did not know for sure.

Claimant also testified she cleaned houses and worked for Jewel part-time. She claims a loss of support for her 13-year-old son. Claimant was receiving $250 per month from AFDC.

The Court has also carefully reviewed the police report. The reports substantiate Claimants testimony in all factual respects regarding the occurrence. The reports indicate the police responded to a home invasion. The Claimant was found lying on the ground below a second-floor window. The Claimant told the police what occurred and the report taken by the police is consistent with Claimants testimony. Claimant gave a description for the offenders but indicated she did not know them. The police reports indicate that “R/Os noted several inconsistencies in victims statement.” However, the alleged inconsistencies are not stated in the report and no police officers testified at the trial to explain the purported inconsistencies.

The supplemental report states: “During this interview [of the victim], it was determined that this incident might have been drug related and when the victim was confronted with this information, the victim became hostile towards R/O refusing to answer additional question.” This confrontation occurred after the Claimant had related the information concerning the incident to the detective. The detective suspended the case. Detective Jaglowski did not testify at the trial to explain how the incident “might be” drug related. Claimant testified this incident was not drug related.

To receive compensation pursuant to the Act, a Claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she has met all conditions precedent for an award under the Act. (In re Application of Cox (1994), 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 586.) Section 76.1 of the Act provides that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime and the applicant cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant. In re Application of Dymon (1992), 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 460.

Claimant testified that she reported the crime as she lay on the ground with a broken back and gave descriptions of the assailants who were not known to her. She testified she cooperated with police. She denied the incident was drug related. The best that can be said for the police report is the police thought there were some vague unidentified discrepancies in Claimants version of the facts and that a follow-up detective thought the incident “might be” drug related. When Claimant denied the relation to drugs, the detective felt Claimant was hostile and suspended the investigation. No police officer testified at the trial to explain their suspicions to the Court.

The Court must decide a case based on the evidence. A review of the evidence leads to a finding that Claimant cooperated with law enforcement officials. Based on the evidence, we must reverse our order of February 26,1996.

It is therefore ordered:

A. That the Courts order of February 26, 1996, is vacated.

B. That the Claimant cooperated with law enforcement officials.

C. That the cause is remanded to the Attorney General with directions to file a supplemental investigatory report indicating whether Claimant complied with all other conditions precedent to an award, whether Public Aid paid some or all of the medical bills, the amount of unpaid medical bills, if any, and the extent of lost wages and/or support.

D. That the Attorney General shall file its supplemental investigatory report within 120 days.

OPINION

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 3, 1994. The Claimant, Rebecca Ramberg, sought compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

The Claimant was denied compensation by order of the Court on February 26,1996. This claim is now before tire Court pursuant to a request for reconsideration filed by the Claimant on March 18,1996.

This Court has carefully reviewed its prior order in this cause, the Claimants request for reconsideration and a supplemental investigatory report by the Attorney Generals office. Based on all of the above, the Court finds:

1. That on February 26, 1996, the Court of Claims entered an order denying compensation on the grounds that the Claimant failed to cooperate with law enforcement officials.

2. That on March 18, 1996, the Claimant requested the Court to reconsider her claim and the case was assigned to Commissioner Jerry Douglas Blakemore on April 3,1996.

3. That on February 27,1997, subsequent to a hearing conducted by Commissioner Jerry Douglas Blake-more, the Court entered an order vacating its original decision. The Court ruled that the Claimant had cooperated with law enforcement officials and that the Claimant is eligible for compensation. The Court also directed the Attorney General s Office to file a supplemental investigatoiy report indicating the award amount for medical/hospital expenses and for loss of earnings.

4. That the Illinois Department of Public Aid has assumed responsibility for the Claimants medical/hospital expenses with the exception of $361.95, for which the Claimant is responsible. To date, the Claimant has paid nothing towards this amount.

5. That after considering insurance and other sources of recovery, the Claimants net compensable loss for medical/hospital expenses is based on the following:

Compensable Amount

St. Clair Radiology $184.00

Sherman Hospital 177.95

Total . $361.95

6. That section 8.1 of the Act states that no award of compensation shall be made for any portion of the applicants claim that is not substantiated by the applicant.

7. That the Claimant has indicated that she was employed during the six months preceding the incident. However, the Claimant has not submitted documentation to substantiate her net earnings or her period of disability. Therefore, the Claimant has not met required conditions precedent for loss of earnings under the Act.

8. That the Claimant has complied with pertinent provisions of the Act and is entitled to compensation thereunder.

9. That pursuant to section 18(c) of the Act, the Court may order that all or a portion of an award be paid solely and directly to the provider of services. In the instant case, the Court finds this section applicable and orders that direct payment be made.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $184 (one hundred eighty-four dollars) be and is hereby awarded to St. Clair Radiology for the medical expenses of Rebecca Ramberg, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that the sum of $177.95 (one hundred seventy-seven dollars and ninety-five cents) be and is hereby awarded to Sherman Hospital for the medical expenses of Rebecca Ramberg.


text:
    (No. 96-CV-1895

      In re Application of Gladys Johnson

      Order filed August 22, 1996.

      Opinion filed February 23, 1998.

    Gladys Johnson, pro se, for Claimant.
    James E. Ryan, Attorney General (Paul H. Cho and Michael A. Wulf, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on November 8, 1995. Gladys Johnson, mother of the deceased victim, Andre Levon Rurdette, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on December 22, 1995, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Rased upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on November 8, 1995, the victim was shot, allegedly by an offender who was known to him. The incident occurred at 126 Parkview, Johnson City, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that prior to the incident, the victim and the alleged offender were involved in a verbal dispute. During this dispute, the victim produced a lead pipe and smashed out one of the alleged offenders car windows. The victim then threatened to kill the alleged offender and his wife. As a result of these actions, the alleged offender produced a handgun and shot the victim. The alleged offender has been charged with second degree murder and the criminal proceedings are currently pending.

2. That section 10.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victims acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim produced a lead pipe and threatened to kill the alleged offender during a verbal altercation. As a result of these actions, the alleged offender fatally shot the victim.

4. That the victims conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Sommer, C.J.

This is a claim arising out of the shooting death of the Claimants son, Andre Leon Burdette, which occurred in Williamson County, Illinois, on November 8, 1995. Gladys Johnson, mother of the deceased victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

This Court originally denied the claim because it found that the deceased victims conduct contributed to his death. This Court found that the victim was shot by an offender, who was known to him, in Johnston City, Illinois. The police investigation revealed that before the shooting, the victim and the offender were involved in a verbal dispute, and that during the dispute the victim produced a pipe and smashed out one of the offenders car windows. The police investigation further determined that the victim threatened to kill the offender and his wife, and that immediately thereafter, the offender produced a handgun and shot the victim between the eyes. As a result of the incident, the offender was charged with second degree murder and was subsequently convicted by a jury in Williamson County.

The issue presented by the Claimant, the victim’s mother, Gladys Johnson, arises from the fact that the offender was convicted of second degree murder by a Williamson County Jury after a full trial, and the offender’s defense of self-defense was rejected by the juiy and the Williamson County Circuit Court. Accordingly, the Claimant reasons that since the defense of self-defense on the part of the offender was not successful at the criminal trial, this Court committed error in refusing compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

Under the Act, section 10.1 indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(b) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim’s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, and to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

In this case, the victim was killed after he had voluntarily gone to the home of the offender because he was upset that the offender’s wife was trying to interfere with the victim’s relationship with her daughter. The victim threatened to kill her. Later the same day, the offender and his wife drove to their daughter’s apartment with a loaded gun and a wooden club. When they arrived at their daughter’s apartment, the victim was there with their daughter and he was intoxicated. The victim then took a steel pipe and he moved toward the offender and his wife. The offender and his wife then got back in their vehicle, which was running at the time, and the victim broke out the passenger side window of the car with die steel pipe. Thereafter, the offender shot the victim between the eyes although at the time the victim did not have the steel pipe, was holding his hands up, and did not represent an immediate tiireat to the offender. The steel pipe apparently came out of the victims hand and went into the front passenger floorboard of the offenders vehicle where it was found by police after the incident. All of this information came from a review by the Court of the trial transcript which describes the death of the victim and the criminal prosecution of the offender.

The Claimant in this case appeared pro se, and the Respondent has chosen not to present the Court with any brief on the issues presented. This Court is of the opinion that the fact that the offender is found by a criminal trial jury to have been unjustified in his use of deadly force under a theory of self-defense does not foreclose the question of the victims actions provoking or contributing to the violent crime for which the Claimant is seeking compensation.

It is clear from the newspaper reports and a review of the trial transcript in Williamson County, that the victim in this case, Andre Levon Burdette, engaged in serious and prolonged provocation, which not only helped to bring about his murder, but which was a motivating cause of tire whole unfortunate incident. The offenders failure to establish a defense of self-defense at the trial does not detract from the fact that the victim engaged in prolonged and serious provocation which ultimately resulted in his death at the hands of the offender. The taxpayers should not be required to pay monies on behalf of the victim, as he was not an innocent victim of crime. Thus, this Courts original decision was correct.

It is therefore ordered that this Courts previous opinion is affirmed and this claim is denied.


text:
    (No. 97-CV-0464

      In re Application of Joseph A. Mosley

      Order filed December 26, 1996.

      Opinion filed April 14, 1998.

    Macchitelli & Associates (James J. Macchitelli, of counsel), for Claimant.
    James E. Ryan, Attorney General (Donald C. McLaughlin and Michael F. Rocks, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 19, 1995. The Claimant, Joseph A. Mosley, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on August 19, 1996, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on August 19, 1995, the Claimant was shot, allegedly by an unknown offender. The incident allegedly occurred at 9th and Burr, Gary, Indiana. The Claimant alleges that he was a passenger on a school bus when he was shot by the offender.

2. That pursuant to section 2(d) of the Act, a victim is defined as a person killed or injured in the State as a result of a crime of violence perpetrated or attempted against him.

3. That the shooting incident allegedly occurred in the State of Indiana, not the State of Illinois. Because the crime did not occur in Illinois, the Claimant is not eligible for compensation pursuant to section 2(d) of the Act.

4. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 19, 1995. The Claimant, Joseph A. Mosley, seeks compensation pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

On December 26, 1996, based on the investigatory report, the Court denied the claim. The Court found that the victim was injured in the State of Indiana. Pursuant to section 2(d) of the Act, a victim is defined as a person killed or injured in this State as a result of a crime of violence perpetrated or attempted against him. (Emphasis added.) The Claimant, who lives in Chicago, Illinois, was shot through the rear window of a school bus on August 19, 1995, by an unknown offender while he was riding on the school bus at 9th and Burr in Gary, Indiana. Claimant was 15 years old at the time of the shooting and was an orphan. Claimant now has limited use of his legs due to die injuiy. On August 19, 1996, he filed his claim under the Crime Victims Compensation Act for medical, transportation and education expenses. Because the crime did not occur in Illinois, the Claimant is generally not eligible for compensation pursuant to section 2(d) of the Act. The Claimant, through his attorney, requested a review of the Courts decision denying tire claim. A hearing was held before Commissioner Michael E. Fiyzel on June 24,1997.

The Claimant testified that he is seeking benefits for medical bills, tuition and transportation. His medical bills were being paid by public aid, however, when his mother died, he did not reapply in his own name because he did not have a guardian. Claimants attorney believes the Claimant should be paid $25,000 pursuant to the Illinois Act for three reasons: The first reason advanced by the Claimant is that the maximum limit of compensation is higher in Illinois than it is in Indiana. The second reason is that Claimant applied to Indiana for compensation but has not heard from Indiana in regard to his claim. The third reason is that the Claimant lives in Chicago and was on a Chicago school bus when the incident happened. Further, all of the witnesses are from Illinois, and most of Claimant’s medical treatment was in Illinois. The facts are not in dispute that the crime and injury occurred in Indiana. Claimant has made a claim pursuant to the Indiana Compensation for Victims Act but the limit for compensation in Indiana is $10,000.

Section 2(d) of the Act defines a “victim” as a person killed or injured in Illinois as a result of a crime of violence perpetrated or attempted against him. Because the crime in this case did not occur in Illinois, the Claimant is not eligible for compensation pursuant to this section of the Act.

The Crime Victims Compensation Act is a secondaiy source of recovery. (In re Application of Lavorini (1989), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 390.) The Act is intended to aid and assist crime victims under certain circumstances to receive compensation to help pay for the damage victims sustain. The rules and procedures applicable to such claims must be followed before the Court of Claims can award benefits. (In re Application of Geraghty (1989), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 388.) The Claimant has the burden of proving his claim and that he has met all conditions precedent for an award under the Act by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Application of Sole (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 713; In re Application of Hogan (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 395; In re Application of Steffel (1993), 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 546.

Claimant asks the Court to find that a crime committed in Indiana against an Illinois resident is compensable under the Act. This Court must strictly construe the Act. (In re Application of Drake (1994), 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 563.) Section 2(d) of the Act clearly requires the crime and injury to occur in Illinois to be compensable under the Act except under limited circumstances. Section 2(d)(6) of the Act does give Illinois residents certain relief for crimes committed in other states. This section states:

“[A]n Illinois resident who is a victim of a ‘crime of violence’ as defined in this Act except, if the crime occurred outside this State, die resident has the same rights under this Act as if the crime had occurred in this State upon a showing that the state, territory, country, or political subdivision of a country in which the crime occurred does not have a compensation of victims of crimes law for which that Illinois resident is eligible.”

Based on the evidence that Claimant has made a claim under the Indiana Victims of Crime Act and that we must strictly construe the Illinois Act, it is clear that Claimant is not eligible for compensation pursuant to the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act. In re Application of Drake (1994), 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 563.

Claimant has not proven that Indiana does not have a victim of crimes compensation law for which Claimant is not eligible. Claimant’s complaint is that the maximum recovery is less pursuant to the Indiana law than it is under the Illinois law. A strict construction of our Act does not allow for that circumstance alone to be an exception so that Claimant can bring his claim under Illinois Act. Such a construction is best left to our legislature if that body believes an exception should be made for those circumstances. At this time, however, no such exception exists. Claimant must proceed with his claim in Indiana.

For the foregoing reasons, it is the order of the Court that Claimant’s claim be and hereby is denied.


text:
    (No. 96-CV-3246

      In re Application of Rhonda F. Johnson

      Order filed August 21, 1996.

      Opinion filed April 20, 1999.

    Rhonda F. Johnson, pro se.

    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Michael F. Rocks and Donald C. McLaughlin, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 12,1996. Rhonda F. Johnson, friend of the deceased victim, Lucille Henderson, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on May 9, 1996, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on March 12, 1996, Lucille Henderson, age 86, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: first degree murder. See section 9 — 1 of the Criminal Code, 720 ILCS 5/9 — 1.

2. That the crime occurred in Chicago, Illinois and all of the eligibility requirements of section 6.1 of the Act have been met.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral and burial expenses.

4. That pursuant to section 10.1(c) of the Act, a person related to the victim may be compensated for funeral expenses of the victim to the extent to which she has paid or become obligated to pay such expenses.

5. That section 2(f) of the Act defines “relative” as a spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, half brother, half sister, spouses parent, nephew, niece, uncle or aunt.

6. That on her application for compensation, the Claimant indicated that she was a friend of the deceased victim. Because she is not one of the relatives as defined in section 2(f) of the Act, the Claimant is not eligible for compensation for funeral expenses, pursuant to section 10.1(c) of the Act.

7. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby, denied.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

This cause comes before the Court on Claimant, Rhonda F. Johnsons, Crime Victims Compensation Act application, brought pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act (the Act). (740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.) Claimant seeks reimbursement for burial and funeral expenses arising out of the death of Lucille Henderson. The application, dated May 19, 1996, states that the victim was a family friend of the Claimant. The victim was struck in the head with a blunt object, stabbed repeatedly, then robbed. According to the application, the victim did not have any family and Claimant paid the entire burial cost.

On August 21, 1996, the Court entered an order denying the claim. The order included a finding that the deceased victim, Lucille Henderson, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in paragraph 1 of section 2(c) of the Act. However, section 10.1(c) of the Act specifies that a person related to the victim may be compensated for funeral expenses of the victim to the extent that person has paid or is obligated to pay such expenses. Section 2(f) defines “relative.” The Court concluded that Claimants claim did not meet a required condition precedent to compensation as Claimant was not a relative of the decedent.

Claimant submitted a written request for review and reconsideration of the denial. Claimant stated therein that she was the only “family” the victim had. Claimant did the victims shopping, took her to the doctor, got her medication, took her on outings, and did her errands. Claimant testified that the victim was like a surrogate grandmother.

A hearing was scheduled for December 27,1996, before our Commissioner; however, Claimant did not appear. Another hearing was scheduled for June 27,1997, at which time Claimant appeared and testified.

Claimant testified that she paid $3,360 for the funeral and burial expenses of the decedent. The victims death was very emotional for Claimant and Claimants son. The victim had kept Claimant’s son from age six months until he started to school. The decedent was like a grandmother to him. The Claimant used part of her son’s college tuition to pay for the funeral expenses. The victim had no family, but Claimant considered her family. The victim did not live with Claimant. Claimant’s family did not provide any financial assistance to the victim. Claimant did all of the victim’s errands.

This is a very sad case. Claimant should be commended for her help to the victim during her life. Claimant deserves to be lauded for her generosity and her decision to help in a time of need. However, the Act does not grant the power or authority for the Court to order compensation to a person not defined as a “relative” in section 2(f) of the Act. A relative is defined in the Act as a spouse, parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, half brother, half sister, spouse’s parent, nephew, niece, uncle or aunt. Claimant is not a relative as defined by the Act. She was a true friend. Unfortunately, a surrogate grandmother is not a “relative” under the Act.

The Law

The burden of proof in a Crime Victims Compensation Act case is on the Claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence all conditions precedent for an award under the Act. (In re Application of Mercado (1996), 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 650; In re Application of Barnett (1996), 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 661.) The Crime Victims Compensation Act has been strictly construed by the Court as the Act is statutory. The Court has no lawful authority to expand the provisions of the Act. In re Application of Richardson (1996), 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 612.

Section 10.1(c) of the Act allows a person related to a victim of a violent crime to be eligible for funeral expenses of the victim to the extent to which the relative has paid or becomes obligated to pay such expenses. (In re Application of Cox (1994), 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 586.) This Court in separate cases has previously denied the claims for funeral expenses for a cousin and for the mother of a victims children where the mother and the victim were not married because in both cases the Claimants were not relatives as defined by the Act. (In re Application of Hussain (1993), 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 72; In re Application of Reynold (1992), 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 525.) The Court has also denied the claim of a five-in girlfriend of the victim decedent as she was not a relative as defined by the Act. In re Application of Curry (1992), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 473.

The Court cannot expand the Act to include friends. While we sympathize with Claimant, we must find that Claimant has failed to meet a condition precedent for an award under the Act for funeral expenses, as Claimant was not a relative of the decedent as defined by the Act.

For the foregoing reasons, it is the order of the Court that Claimants claim be, and hereby is, denied.