text:
    (Awarded in part; denied in part.)
    Willie Polion, 971; Minnie Brent, Mother and next of kin to DeWitt Brent, a Minor, 972; Anna McGinnis, Mother and next friend to John McGinnis, a Minor, 973; James L. Cox, 974; Percival B. Coffin, Administrator of the Estate of Todd Moseley, Deceased, 975; Percival B. Coffin, Administrator of the Estate of Elmore Baynes, Deceased, 976; Percival B. Coffin, Administrator of the Estate of Charles Wright, Deceased, 977; Percival B. Coffin, Administrator, Estate of Delmos Campbell, Deceased, 978; Percival B. Coffin, Administrator of the Estate of Benjamin Anderson, Deceased, 979; Percival B. Coffin, Administrator, Estate of Henry Williams, 980; Percival B. Coffin, Administrator, Estate of Herbert Durant, Deceased, 981; Thomas Watkins, 1070, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Military service — when State liable for death of member of Illinois National Guard. Where a member of the Illinois Guard is injured or killed while in the performance of his duty under orders from his superior officer, the State is liable under Sec. 143, Chap. 129, Hurd’s Rev. St. 1927. (Art. 16, Sec. II, Military & Naval Code.)

      Same — when claimant entitled to award. Sec. 10, Art. 16, Military & Naval Code. Where claimant is injured or disabled while in the performance of his duty so as to prevent his working at his trade or profession, or other employment he is entitled to an award pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. 16, Military & Naval Code.

      Same — when award will not be made. An award will not be made to an administrator for the death of his intestate where the deceased left no heirs at law or relatives dependent upon him for support.
    Will H. Johnson and Charles J. Jenkins, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

The above claims numbered 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981 and 1070, respectively, are all based on injuries caused by the explosion of a trench mortar on August 24, 1925. All the injured were members of a Howitzer Company of the 8th Infantry Regiment of the Illinois National Guard at the time the injuries were received. As the evidence of the cause of the injuries is the same in all the cases they have been consolidated and will be heard as one.

On the afternoon of August 24, 1925, while the Howitzer Company of the 8th Infantry Regiment of the National Guard were engaged in target practice at Camp Grant, one of the trench mortars exploded. As a result of the explosion Todd Moseley, Elmore Baynes, Charles Wright, Delmos Campbell, Benjamin Anderson, Henry Williams and Herbert Durant lost their lives, and Willie Polion, Dewitt Brent, John Mc-Ginnis, James L. Cox and Thomas Watkins were injured. Percival B. Coffin was appointed administrator of the estates of those that were killed and has filed claims on behalf of their alleged dependents. Polion, Brent, McGinnis, Cox and Watkins have filed claims in their own behalf for their respective injuries.

At the time the injuries were received all the parties wounded or killed were members of the National Guard and were injured while performing duties pursuant to orders of their superior officers. Section 11 of Article-16 of the State. Military and Naval Code provides that a member of the National Guard injured while performing his duty shall have a claim against the State for financial assistance, and that if he is killed his dependents shall have a claim for such assistance, such claims to be acted on and adjusted by the Court of Claims. Section 10 of the same article provides that a member of the National Guard “who may be wounded or disabled in any way, while on duty and lawfully performing the same, so as to prevent his working at his profession, trade or other occupation from which he gains his living, shall be entitled to be treated by an officer of the medical department detailed by the surgeon general, and to draw one-half of his active service pay, as specified in sections 3 and 4 of this article, for not to exceed thirty days of such disability, on the certificate of the attending medical officer; if still disabled at the end of thirty days, he shall be entitled to draw pay at the same rate for such period as a board of three medical officers, duly convened by order of the commander-in-chief, may determine to be right and just, but not to exceed six months, unless approved by the State Court of Claims.” It thus appears that the law has fixed the amount of compensation that can be awarded to a wounded member of the National Guard at one-hálf his active service pay for a period not exceeding six months-unless the Court of Claims shall extend the period beyond six months. The legislature having fixed the basis of compensation or financial assistance at one-half the active service pay of the injured member for such time as the Court of Claims may approve, the court has no power to make any award except upon that basis. It can only order that the payments fixed by statute shall be made for such period of time as the merits of each ease demand.

In the case of Willie Polion the evidence shows he was not permanently injured. He was out nothing for medical and hospital services, the State having furnished them. He was incapacitated for work for about 100 days. His pay as a member of the National Guard was $1.40 per day and his maintenance was estimated at 50 cents per day. One-half of this should have been paid to him during the period of his disability. As the payments were not made he is awarded the sum of $100.00.

In the case of Dewitt Brent the evidence shows he'was severely and permanently injured. His spine was injured and his right arm is rendered useless. It is apparent that his injuries are of such a permanent nature as will materially reduce his earning capacity for a long time if not for life. His pay was $1.00 per day and maintenance Avhich was estimated at 50 cents per day, and he should be paid one-half that amount or 75 cents per day until he becomes able to work. Claimant was only 19 years old at the time he was injured, in good health and was earning $30 per week. We therefore allow him $1,500.00.

In the case of John McGinnis the evidence shows his right foot was so injured that a portion of it had to be amputated. His pay and maintenance also amounted to $1.50 per day. He was incapacitated from work for about 15 months, during which time he xvas entitled to one-half pay, or 75 cents a day, which would have amounted to $750.00. We therefore allow him an award of $750.00.

Claimant James L. Cox received injuries to his right side, right lung and back. These wounds have healed but as a result of them claimant Avas incapacitated for work for about 15 months. His pay and maintenance amounted to $1.50 per day, one-half of which he was entitled to during the time his wounds prevented his working. He is therefore allowed the sum of $1,500.00.

• Claimant Thomas Watkins was injured in the right leg and right groin and his right hand was lacerated. These injuries kept Mm in the hospital about 6 months. After leaving the hospital he was confined- to his home about 3 months before being able to work. All- necessary medical and hospital services were furnished him by the State. His pay and maintenance also amounted to $1.50 per day. As it was 9 months before he was able to go to work he is entitled to one-half his pay and maintenance for that time which amounts to $1,000.00. Accordingly he is awarded that sum.

Todd Moseley was about 18 years old at the time of his death. He left a father, mother and one sister. His funeral expenses, including flowers and a photograph, amounted to $401.00, which were paid by his mother. Prior to his death he earned about $15.00 per week, the greater portion of which ' he gave to his mother to be used for the support of the family. This claim now comes within the provisions of Section 11 of Article 16 of the Military and Naval Code and we therefore allow claimant the sum of $2,000.00.

Elmore Baynes was 18 years old. He had graduated from high school the year he was killed. When not in school he worked and gave Ms earnings to his mother who used it for the support of the family. The family consisted of himself, his father and mother and three younger brothers. Under the law claimant is entitled to an award for the benefit of the surviving members of the family and he is accordingly allowed the sum of $2,000.00.

Deceased Charles Wright was about 26 years old and single. His mother, Anna Wright, appears to be the only member of his family surviving him. She was dependent upon him and he gave her $20.00 to $25.00 each month for her support. Claimant is therefore allowed the sum of $2,000-.00 for her.

Henry Williams was' 26 years of age and left surviving a widow who was dependent upon him for support. The claimant is therefore awarded the sum of $2,000.00.

It is alleged in the declarations filed on behalf of the estates of Delmos Campbell, Benjamin Anderson and Herbert Durant that each of them left a -wife and mother dependent upon .him for support. There is no competent evidence in the record that either of these men left a mother surviving him. Neither is there any evidence showing that either of them had a wife. In order for this court to make an award under the provisions of the Military and Naval Code based upon the death of a member of the National Guard while in the performance of military duty, it must appear that the . deceased left some relative dependent upon him for support at the time of his death. Such dependent relatives must be shown by direct and positive evidence. Mere rumor or hearsay is not sufficient. As claimant in these three cases has wholly failed to show the deceased left any relatives, the . claims are disallowed, and the cases dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 1033
    Claimant awarded $30.00.)
    A. W. Hartman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

      Reimbursement — when award may he made. There being no dispute as to the facts in this case, and no objection made by the State, the court enters an award in favor of claimant to reimburse him for moneys expended in the repair of his property damaged by an employee of the State.
    Anna M. Moore, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for damages on account of an automobile collision between claimant and an automobile, the property and under the direction of the Dixon State Hospital.

The claim is for the sum of $30.00 for injury to claimant’s car, and, according to a letter filed by the managing officer of the Dixon Státe Hospital, the claimant should be reimbursed for the price of a new fender and labor in placing it."

Therefore the court recommends that the claimant be allowed the sum of $30.00.


author: Mr. Justice Leech

text:
    (No. 1035
    Claimant awarded $3,605.20.)
    Bonner & Marshall Brick Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

      Contract — when State liable for material furnished. The State is liable for material furnished it under a written contract where the contract has been performed by claimant according to the terms thereof, although the funds appropriated for the materials have become exhausted.
    W. G. Thon, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

. The declaration filed by claimant alleges that it is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Illinois; that on. or about the 1st day of April, A. D. 1920, it entered into a written contract with the State of Illinois to furnish brick to the State of Illinois, in accordance with terms and prices for said brick as set forth in statement attached to and made part of said declaration; that there is due to it from the' State of Illinois the sum of $3,605.20 for brick furnished to the State of Illinois, in accordance with the terms of said contract; that claimant was informed by said Department of Public Works and Buildings that the appropriation out of which its claim would have to be paid, was exhausted and that the only method whereby claimant could receive payment of its claim would be by having its claim allowed by the Court of Claims of the State of Illinois.

A demurrer was filed by the Attorney General to this declaration, which, as a matter of law, is sustained.

There is n.o dispute as to the major portion of this claim. As item of $580.00 is in disjpute, it being contended that a certain number of brick had been rejected at the institution where shipped, and that the last carload of brick shipped would be considered a replacement of said rejections.

We do not believe that the facts in the case justify this conclusion. We accordingly award claimant the sum of $3,605.20.


author: Mr. Justice Thomas

text:
    (Claims denied.)
    Edward C. Haye, 1042; Glen Haye, by his Father and next friend, Edward C. Haye, 1043; William A. Poulton, 1044; Glenn Flanders, 1045; John H. Anderson, 1055; Thomas Premozic, 1061; Anna Premozic, 1062; Mary Premozic by Thomas Premozic, her Father and next friend, 1063; Claimants, vs. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Non-liability of state — not liable for injuries sustained by visitor at State training ground of Militia. One who visits the camp of training ground of the Illinois National Guard to view its maneuvers, either out of pleasure or curiosity, does so at his own risk, and the State is not liable for injuries sustained by him while on the premises.

      Same — claimant presumed to' have knowledge of risk. Persons who visit the training ground of the Illinois National Guard are presumed to know that dangerous military movements illustrative of warfare may be carried on, and the State is not bound to protect him while he is on the grounds for his own pleasure or convenience.

      Same — permission to enter ground imposes no legal liability or duty. The mere permission given a visitor to enter the training ground of the Illinois National Guard to view demonstrations of the Army does not create a duty or impose an obligation on the State to provide against the danger of accident.

      Same — licensee when State not liable for injuries sustained by. Where claimant entered the premises without invitation but by mere permission, he cannot recover for injuries sustained by him, unless the injuries were intentionally or willfully inflicted.

      Same — licensee has no cause of action when. Where claimant is a mere licensee he has no right of recovery on account of an injury sustained by him through the negligence of the licensor in the place where he is permitted to enter.

      Same — volunteer not entitled to recover. Where claimant voluntarily and unnecessarily encounters danger he does so at his own risk.
    Social justice and equity — when award cannot be made under rule. The court has no power to allow a claim against the State as an act of social justice and equity, unless the claim is based upon some principle of law or equity.
    Large & Reno and Frank M. Ryan, for claimants.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On August 23, 1925, during the annual encampment of the Illinois National Guard at Camp Grant, a chemical warfare demonstration was carried on for the instruction of the troops. The demonstration consisted of laying down, a smoke screen in front of a column of troops that was advancing towards the screen and firing rifle grenades. The purpose of the smoke screen was to demonstrate that persons in front of it could not see what was taking place behind it. The rifle grenades were filled with phosphorus, and when they exploded the phosphorus burned, giving off a dense white smoke. The demonstration took place on the parade ground of the camp, the troops moving from the northeast to the southwest. On the left of the advancing troops, and parallel with their line of march, was a- road or street which intersected another street that ran in a northerly and southerly" direction across the west or southwest end of the parade ground. The smoke screen was laid down four or five hundred feet northeast of this street and at right angles with the line of march of the troops. The ground north and east of these two streets was reserved for the demonstration, and is spoken of in the testimony as the restricted area. The demonstration was under the direct supervision of Major Alfred de Boulet, who carried it out under the orders of his superior officers in the Thirty-third Division. Before the demonstration started, Major de Boulet had sentries posted around the parade ground and himself instructed them to allow no persons on the restricted area. It was the second Sunday of the encampment, and there were many people at the camp to witness the various maneuvers of the troops, the number being estimated by the witnesses from 3000 to 5000. Most of the people came in automobiles, and those who stopped to view the chemical warfare demonstration parked their ears on the sides ■ of the parade ground. After the column of troops had moved a prearranged distance from its starting point the candles used to produce the smoke screen were ignited. They gave off a dense . white smoke, through which nothing- could be seen. As the troops advanced behind this smoke screen, they fired their rifle grenades. Many people, including Glenn Flanders, claimant in this case, got out of their cars and were standing in front of them to better view the maneuvers. When the smoke screen started Some' of the people began moving into the restricted area to. get a better view. Guards and officers endeavored to keep them back and told them there was danger. While claimant was standing in- front of his car watching the demonstration one of the grenades burst near him, setting his clothing afire and burning him seriously, and he has filed this claim against the State for $10,000.00 damages.

The Attorney General filed a general and special demurrer to the declaration. Evidence has been introduced by both the claimant and the State, and the. case will be heard as though a general traverse of the declaration had been filed.

It is alleged in the declaration and urged in argument that claimant was at Camp Grant at the invitation of the officials in charge of the troops, but the evidence does not sustain this contention. While the newspapers published the fact that the demonstration would take place, it was published as an item of news, the orders for all camp activities being open to inspection by all newspaper men. The demonstration was not for the instruction of the public, but for the soldiers at the encampment. It was a military demonstration that was essential for the proper training and instruction of the troops, and was given only for their benefit. The fact that the demonstration was not secret and that all persons who desired to do so were permitted to enter the camp to view it did not amount to an invitation to claimant to be present. In order to entitle claimant to the status of a person entering the camp by invitation, it must appear that his going there was of advantage to the occupants. (20 R. C. L., p. 69.) There is no such showing in the record. On the contrary, the evidence shows he was present merely for his own pleasure or curiosity. He was in no way connected with the encampment or any of its activities and was at most but a mere licensee. 11 The principle appears-to be that invitation is to be inferred where there is a common interest or mutual advantage, while license is inferred where the object is the mere pleasure or comfort of the person using it.” (Bennett v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 102 U. S. 585.) The difference between a visitor who is on the premises of another by invitation and as a licensee is stated in our Supreme Court in Pauckner v. Waken, 231 Ill. 276, in the following language: “It will be found that the distinction between a visitor who is a mere licensee and one who is on the premises by invitation turns on the nature of the business that brings him there, rather than on the words or acts of the owner which precede his coming. Permission involves leave and license, but it gives no right. If one avail himself of permission to cross another’s land, he does so by virtue of the license and not of right. The ’permission of license is a justification for his entry, and while he is not technically a trespasser, yet the duty of the owner to guard him against injury is governed by the rules applicable to trespassers.”

Camp Grant belongs to the State, and is maintained and used to give military instruction and training to the National Guard. Such instruction and training necessarily include dangerous military maneuvers illustrative of actual warfare. Claimant voluntarily went to the camp to view these maneuvers, either out of curiosity or for his own pleasure, and he did so at his own peril. The State was not bound to protect him or provide safeguards for him while he was on its grounds for his own pleasure or convenience. The place was one of danger — a place where a demonstration of actual warfare was to be given — and claimant went there at his own risk and enjoyed the supposed implied license subject to its attendant perils. The mere permission or license to claimant to enter the camp and view the demonstration did not create a duty or impose an obligation on the part of the State to provide against the danger of accident. (I. C. R. R. Co. v. Godfrey, 71 Ill. 500; Wabash R. R. Co. v. Jones, 163 Ill. 167.). It is well settled that the owner of the lands assumes no duty to one who is on his premises by permission only, and as a mere licensee, except that he will not wilfully and intentionally injure him. (20 R. C. L., pp. 59-69; Hansen v. Cromoll, 232 Ill. App. 485, and cases there cited.) There is no evidence in this record that claimant was wilfully or intentionally injured. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the officers in charge of the demonstration took all reasonable precautions to prevent injuries to visitors who were at the camp to view the demonstration. As claimant went on the premises without invitation, and merely by permission, he cannot recover for the injuries received unless they were wilfully or intentionally inflicted. “Where a person is a mere licensee he has no cause of action on account of an injury received through the negligence of the licensor in the place he is permitted to enter.” (Hansen v. Cromoll, supra.)

If it were conceded that the injuries to claimant were the result of the negligence of the officers in charge of the demonstration, it does not follow that the State is liable for such injuries. When officers of the National Guard so conduct the military operations for the instruction and training of the troops as to menace the life or property of a. citizen while on his own premises they thereby become trespassers and are not representatives of the State. (Joos v. Ill. N. G., 257 Ill. 138.) If the State is not liable for injuries suffered by one on his own premises through the negligence of officers of the National Guard, certainly it is not liable for injuries received by one while on the training grounds of the guard for his own pleasure or convenience.

The maneuver which claimant was watching at the time he was injured was a demonstration of actual warfare. He went to the parade ground for the express purpose of seeing it. He knew, or should have known, the demonstration was dangerous, for all actual warfare demonstrations are attendant with danger. His going there to view the demonstration was a voluntary and unnecessary risk. It is well established that one who voluntarily and unnecessarily encounters danger does so at his own risk. That the smoke screen prevented the soldiers behind it from seeing those in front of it was obvious to all. It was also apparent that the soldiers began firing the rifle grenades a considerable distance back of the screen and were moving toward it firing as they came. Under such circumstances common prudence should have caused claimant to at least remain in his car, where the danger would have been less. He did not do so, but got out of it and went about 15 feet in front of it on the parade ground, where he was burned by an exploding grenade.

That there can be no recovery where the person injured was guilty of contributory negligence is so well settled that citation of authorities is unnecessary. And the fact that the negligence of the injured party was slight makes no difference — if his negligence contributed in any degree to the injury, he cannot recover. We have carefully read this record and considered the arguments urged in support of claimant’s demand and have arrived at the conclusion that he is not entitled to any award.

Claimant’s attorneys urge that all the persons injured at the demonstration should be compensated by the State as an act of social justice. This court has no power to allow any claim against the State unless it is based upon some principle of law or equity.

The claim is denied and cause dismissed.

It was stipulated by the Attorney General and attorneys for claimants in cases No. 1042, 1043, 1044, 1055, 1061, 1062 and 1063 that the evidence taken in this case should apply to them also insofar as it might be pertinent. As the same reasons and principles of law apply to them as do to this case, they will each be denied and dismissed accordingly.


text:
    (No. 1049
    Claimant awarded $680.63.)
    Addie Graves, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Respondeat superior — State not liable for injuries sustained by its employees. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty.
    Social justice and equity — award may be made. The court may enter an award in favor of claimant who is injured while in the discharge of his' duty, and base its award upon the rules of the Workman's Compensation Act.
    Carl Choisser, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears that claimant while in the course of employment by the defendant at the Kankakee State Hospital, on December 28, 1924, fell and injured her right arm and breaking it at the wrist.

The claimant makes demand in her statement of claim for damages to the extent of $3,000.00. In the argument of her counsel it is urged that the claimant should recover $5,000.00.

As it has been frequently announced by this court in cases of this kind, there is no legal liability. It has, however, been the practice of this court in cases of this kind to consider as a matter of equity and good conscience this class of cases under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. From the evidence in this case, claimant suffered about 55% of the use of her hand, and following the rules laid down in the Workmen’s Compensation Act," the claimant would recover 55% of 165 weeks,’ salary at the rate of $7.50 per week, which would make a total as computed by the Attorney General, of $680.63. It is contended, however, by claimant that her arm and hand are stiff and useless as the result of such injuries. The claimant is a widow 55 years of age and it would appear that in the condition of her hand she would have a difficult task of earning a living, and it is alleged that she is dependent upon her own efforts or upon charity. However, the court is bound by precedent and must consider these cases on the rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. There is a question in this case of the probability of a permanent disability in so far as claimant being able to follow her usual vocation. Therefore this court recommends taking into consideration all the facts in the case, that claimant be allowed the sum of $680.63.


text:
    (No. 1083
    Claimant awarded $2,150.00.)
    Jesse E. Bartley, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

      Services — when State liable for legal service rendered. Where legal services have been rendered for the State which is beneficial to it, the State . is liable to pay a fair and reasonable attorney fee for such services.
    Jesse E. Bartley, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Prank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action brought by claimant for services rendered in prosecuting a certain suit against E. E. Mitchell in his official capacity of State Treasurer on an alleged breach of his official bond.

It appears that claimant was employed in a legal manner by the Attorney General of the State, and it does appear that he performed valuable services for the State, as shown by the evidence; in fact, the court has been informed and so believes that he recovered for the State of Illinois, through his efforts in the prosecution of the case against said Mitchell, the sum of $20,000.00. As a matter of fact, the- State of Illinois -has been benefited through the efforts of this claimant in that amount, and it is disclosed by the records that substantially all of the legal services performed in connection with this case were performed by claimant.

It appears to this court that efficient services were performed by claimant; that the defendant, the State of Illinois, was benefited in actual dollars and cents by the efforts of the claimant, and it further appears to the court that as a matter of equity and good conscience, if not as a matter of law, and we believe there has been a legal contract between the State of Illinois and claimant for the performance of these services, and that therefore the claimant should be paid a fair and reasonable amount for the services actually rendered the people of the State of Illinois.

This court, after viewing all of the facts in the case and after diligently investigating the value of the work performed by the claimant, is of the opinion that the fair and reasonable •compensation to be paid to the claimant for the services performed would be, and the court hereby recommends, that the claimant be allowed the sum of $2,150.00.


text:
    (No. 1089
    Claimant awarded $300.00.)
    Archie Brown, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.
    Military service — when award may he made. Claimant a private in Co. I, 8th Inf., Illinois National Guard was injured, while obeying orders from his superior Batallion Commander, in riding a horse he was directed to bring to his commander: Held. That while the State is not liable for the injury sustained compensation may be awarded according to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
    Clarence B. Davis, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration filed by claimant alleges that on August 1, 1926, he was a regularly enlisted member of the military force of the State of Illinois, as a private in Company I, Eighth Infantry, Illinois National Guard, and was on duty on the first day of August, 1926, at Camp Grant, Illinois, in pursuance to orders from his company commander; that on said date, while in the discharge of his regular military duties, the plaintiff was commanded by his battalion commander, Major Robert A. Byrd, to go to a certain corral and then and there take possession of a certain horse and bring the horse to the quarters of said battalion commander; that plaintiff, in discharge of his orders and duties, proceeded to the corral and was then and there given a certain horse by the officer in charge, and that he mounted the horse, as he was ordered to do, and attempted to ride said horse to the quarters of said battalion commander; that the horse became frightened and fell to the ground while plaintiff was still on the back of the horse, and the horse in so falling fell upon plaintiff and broke his left leg; that many bones in plaintiff’s foot and leg were broken and he became ill, sore, lame and disabled and so remained for a long time, and that he is permanently incapacitated.

A demurrer filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois is sustained, as a matter of law.

It appears from the testimony that so far as the union of the bone is concerned, that the leg is healed. One physician testifies that there is a 60% disability in the use of the member. The respondent’s doctor stated that there was no permanent partial disability. Claimant is now employed by the State, as a janitor, and is receiving $100.00 per month. He is 53 years of age, and if he were compelled to go to work for an individual, he would be considerably handicapped on account of the injury sustained, and his earning power has been decreased by this disability.

While we do not concede any legal liability on the part of the State of Illinois, if he were employed under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, he would probably be allowed a reasonable sum, and, figuring a disability of 50% to the use of his left leg, he is entitled to receive, and we accordingly award to him, the sum of $300.00, figured according to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Illinois.


text:
    (No. 1090
    Claimant awarded $412.00.)
    Raymond Ellithorpe, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent,

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Hard roads — when employee entitled to award. Reimbursement. There being no dispute as to the facts in this case the court recommends an award to claimant to reimburse him for medical service and hospital expenses incurred by him on account of injuries sustained while in the performance of his duty.
    Charles G. Seidel, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, a resident of the city of Elgin, Illinois, aged 24 years, was an employee of the State Highway Department on the 29th day of October, 1923, and for several years prior thereto, and while on said day he was engaged in his occupation as a truck driver in the reconstruction of the Higgins road in Cook county, Illinois, when he was injured, another truck striking his truck, breaking both bones in his left leg.

There appears to be no contention but that the claimant was in the employ of the State while he was operating his truck and received his injury in the course of his employment. He makes a claim including medical and hospital aid of $412.00. The Department of Public Works and Buildings in a letter to the Attorney General concedes that claimant is justly entitled to the claim of $412.00.

This court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and just and therefore this court recommends that claimant be allowed payment of $412.00.


text:
    (No. 1093
    Claimant awarded $2,000.00.)
    Mary Elizabeth Williams by William Ted Williams, her next friend, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Respondeat superior — State not liable. The State is not liable for the negligence of its employees.
    Social justice and equity — award, may be made. While the State is not liable for the negligence of its employees, yet where the injuries are sustained on account of the negligence of such employee, an award may he made to claimant as an act of social justice and equity.
    B. L. Kirk, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration filed in this case on November 4, 1926, alleges that Mary Elizabeth Williams is a resident of the city of Urbana, Champaign county, Illinois, and that she was a resident of said county on December 14,1925, and that she was a minor and the daughter of William Ted Williams, who is appearing for her as next friend; that on said date she was proceeding on and along Green street, a public highway in the city of Urbana, Champaign county, Ulinois, upon the sidewalk along the south side of said Green street, and that as she was proceeding upon said sidewalk along said street, with all due care and caution for her own safety, and proceeding in an easterly direction,- having crossed the intersection of said Green street with Lincoln avenue in said city of Urbana, she was struck by an automobile five-ton truck, owned by the University of Illinois, and driven by A. A. Johns,' who then and there was in the employ of the State of Illinois, in the occupation of hauling cinders for said University of Illinois, and that while she was so proceeding across said Lincoln avenue, said A. A. Johns drove said truck of said University of Illinois at a high rate of speed along and upon said Green street at a high and dangerous rate of speed, and did then and there turn his said automobile at such high rate of speed from said Green street, upon which he was then and there driving in an easterly direction, onto said Lincoln avenue, to proceed in a southerly direction, in such a reckless manner that he drove to and upon and collided with said Mary Elizabeth Williams, who had already proceeded across said Lincoln avenue, and struck her as she was stepping on and upon the curbing on the east side of Lincoln avenue, knocking her doAvn to and upon the pavement, and causing severe bruises, fractures and lacerations, causing the displacement of two ribs and further derangement of her physical and nervous system, so that she has been from that time hitherto incapacitated for duties in and about her home, and has been caused to expend large amounts of money in obtaining medical attention, and has suffered great physical pains and discomfort, and claimant files claim for damages in the amount of $2,000.00.

A demurrer to this declaration was filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, and, as a matter of law, the demurrer is sustained.

Considerable evidence was taken on behalf of the claimant, and from a careful consideration of same it appears that the girl was injured on account of the carelessness of A. A. Johns, a State employee. It is difficult to determine the extent of the injuries, and, inasmuch as she does not come within the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, we belieA^e that a fair compensation is all that is asked. While there is no legal liability on the part of the State of Illinois, in equity and good conscience, we award claimant the sum of $2,000.00.


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    (No. 1106
    Claimant awarded $2,000.00.)
    Thomas Judge, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Workmen’s compensation act — awrd made to injured employee of State. Where an employee of the State is injured while in the performance of his duty, as a matter of social justice and equity, he may he awarded compensation for such injuries on the basis provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
    W. E. Lindgren and Oscar J. Putting, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill P. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears that the claimant was employed in the construction of hard roads north of the village of Gardner, Grundy county, Illinois, and while claimant was pouring’ tar and filling cracks in the concrete of said hard roads, he was struck hy an automobile being driven north.

It appears that the claimant was knocked unconscious, and it appears from the evidence that the right shoulder bone and right arm were broken and three ribs on the right side of the body were fractured.

The measure of damages in this case, following precedent and law, must measure under the Workmen’s Compensation Act; therefore, the only controversy before the court is as to whether or not the claimant sustained permanent total disability or compensation for the total permanent loss of the use of the right arm.

This court is of the opinion that the record would not sustain total disability, yet, as a matter of equity and good conscience, it is the desire of the court to be as liberal as consistently possible.

We are therefore of the opinion that approximately 50% of the total disability, measured by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, would be a fair and adequate allowance under all the facts and circumstances in this case.

Therefore, it is recommended by the court that the claimant be allowed $2,000.00.


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    (No. 1110
    Claimant awarded $4,000.00.)
    Mary E. Stotts, Administratrix of the Estate of William B. Stotts, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Respondeat superior — State not liable. The State is not liable for an injury sustained by its employee while in the discharge of his duty.
    Social justice and equity — award may be made. Compensation Law. Compensation may be awarded under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, although the State is not liable for the death of an employee caused by injuries sustained in the performance of his duty.
    Fred Rhoads, far claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim brought by Mary E. Stotts, as administratrix of the estate of William B. Stotts, deceased, against the State of Illinois, on account of the death of her husband, who died as a result of an injury received by him while in the employ of the Highway Department of the Department of Public Works and Buildings, while engaged in painting a bridge on the State Highway Route No. 1, at Big Creek, about eight or ten miles south of Paris, Illinois, where Stotts, with other workmen, was standing on a scaffold swing under a bridge. The accident occurred on May 25, 1926, between 9:30 and 9:40 A. M. A ladder used as one support of the swing broke, precipitating Stotts to the ground underneath, where he struck on or between two blocks of concrete that had previously been thrown there from the roadway above resulting in wdiat is commonly known as a broken back. Stotts, at the time of the injury, was under the direct supervision of Ross Hensley, as foreman of the painting department of the district engineers of the highway department located at Paris, Hlinois, who directed and superintended his removal to the Paris Hospital, where he was given medical attention by Dr. Roland Hazen and placed in a plaster cast, where he remained until June 15,1926, at 11:00 P. M., when he died.

At the time of his death Stotts lived with his family on a small farm about six miles east of Paris, and was working as a common laborer for the highway department whenever they had work for him to do, and had been'working about a week or ten days at the time of the accident. He was working nine hours a day and receiving 40 cents per hour and got his pay check on Saturday of each week, amounting to $21.60 weekly. At the time of his death he left surviving him Mary E. Stotts, as his widow, and one son aged 11 years. The State Highway Department of the State of Illinois have paid all of the hospital bills and nurse hire furnished to the decedent during the time between the date of his injury and the date of his death. ■

To the declaration filed by claimant, the State of Illinois, by the Attorney General, filed a demurrer, which is sustained as a matter of law.

Under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Illinois, the claimant is entitled to receive the sum of $4,000.00, and we accordingly award .to her the sum of $4,000.00.


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    (No. 1128
    Claimant awarded $512.92.)
    E. M. Sorrells, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

      Reimbursement — when award may he made to State employee. An employee of the State who has expended moneys for board and lodging, while in the performance of his duty, may be reimbursed by the State for moneys so expended.
    Angerstein & Schneider, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration filed in this case alleges that claimant is one of the arbitrators of the Industrial Commission of the State of Illinois, having been duly appointed as arbitrator by Honorable Len Small, Governor of .the State of Illinois, and that he has since the date of his appointment qualified, acting as 'one of the arbitrators of the Industrial Com-' mission of the State of Illinois; that he is a resident of the city of East St. Louis in St. Clair county, Illinois, and that his duties as arbitrator require his presence in Chicago and other cities for the purpose of hearing and determining cases, and that during the months of February, March and April, 1925, claimant made trips from East St. Louis to Chicago and return and was by reason of Ms duties compelled to remain in CMcago during various periods of time, paying in said city Ms board and room during the time that he was required by his duties to remain there; that during the month of May, 1925, he was required in the performance of his duties to make a trip to Dixon and Galena, and during the month of June to make a trip to Cairo, Metropolis and other towns in the southern part of the State; that during the month of May he was also required to remain in CMcago for various periods of time and to make trips from Chicago to East St. Louis and that during the month of June he was also required in furtherance of his duties to be and remain in Chicago during . the month of June, 1925, and to pay board and room while in said city; that he was compelled during said period of time to pay out for meals and lodging while in the city of Chicago $388.00 and for railroad fare the sum of $194.92, making a total of $512.92, and that he has not been reimbursed for same.

A demurrer filed by the Attorney General to the declaration is sustained as a matter of law.

It appears from an examination of the case that subsequently expenses of a like nature were paid to this arbitrator and other arbitrators similar to this, and that same are now being- approved and paid.

We accordingly award claimant the sum of $512.92.


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    (No. 1132
    Claimant awarded $2,500.00.)
    George Katanich, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Non-liability of state — Posse comitatus. State not liable. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by a member of a posse comitatus in the apprehension of an escaped conyict from its State penitentiary.
    Equity & good conscience — award may be made. While the State is not liable for injuries sustained by a member of a posse comitatus, yet an award may be made to such member on grounds of equity and good conscience.
    Robert E. Larkin, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration filed in this case alleges that on May 5, 1926, Charles Shader, No. 8266; Charles Duschswski, No. 8667; James V. Price, No. 9103; one Vernardo Roa, No. 9083; Robert Torrez, No. 9084; one Gregerio Rizo, No. 9389, and one Walter Spalesky, No. 7132, were inmates of the Illinois State Penitentiary, at Joliet, Illinois, legally confined therein by judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction, for crimes committed within the State of Illinois, and were then and there serving sentences imposed upon them and each of them by said courts for said crimes, and said convicts on said day, without any warrant or authority, committed an act of riot, killed the assistant warden of the State penitentiary, and made an unlawful escape from said penitentiary; that said convicts, after such escape, came to the village of Leonore on the same date, and at or about the same time certain policemen of, for and from the city of Streator, Illinois, in compliance with the legal duty then and there imposed upon them, began a search for said convicts, and in making such search came to said village of Leonore and entered plaintiff’s place of business, a soft drink parlor, and ordered said plaintiff to join the posse commitatus and join in the search for said convicts; that said plaintiff then and there complied with such order and joined such posse commitatus; that about 10:00 o ’clock p. m., of the date above mentioned, said convicts were apprehended in said village of Leonore, and an attempt to capture them was made, and while so attempting to capture said convicts, plaintiff was then and there wounded, to-wit, said convicts then and there being armed with revolvers, pistols, guns and firearms "loaded with powder and leaden bullets, fired said pistols, revolvers, guns and firearms at- and toward said plaintiff, while he, said plaintiff, was in the discharge of his duty as a member of said posse commitatus; that seven leaden bullets so fired from said firearms, as aforesaid, by force of the gunpowder aforesaid, struck plaintiff at divers places upon his body, to-wit, one of said bullets striking plaintiff in the lower right side of the abdomen and piercing through the body; one bullet striking the left side of the abdomen and passing through the body; three of said bullets striking and lodging in the left groin, and two of said bullets entering and passing through the right thigh; and plaintiff claims damages in the sum of $2,500.00.

To the declaration filed by claimant, a demurrer was filed by the Attorney General, which, as a matter of law, is sustained.

A statement filed by the Attorney General sets forth that he believes the claimant has made a fair statement of the facts in this case. While there is no legal obligation on the part of the State of Illinois to compensate claimant on account of the injuries received, on the grounds of equity and good conscience, we award claimant the sum of $2,500.00.


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    (No. 1134
    Claimant awarded $79.65.)
    P. L. Bean, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.
    Respondeat Superior — when State not liable. Injury caused by negligence of its employee. The State is not liable for the negligence of its employees resulting in injury to others.
    Equity and good conscience— award may be made. An award may be made to claimant for damages to his property, caused by the negligence of an employee of the State, where the circumstances of the case warrant it, as a matter of equity and good conscience.
    P. L. Bean, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

Claimant filed a declaration in this court on January 21, 1927, in which he alleges that on December 17, 1926, at about 5:30 p. m., his daughter, Lois Bean, was driving east on University avenue, by consent of her father, P. L. Bean, claimant herein, in the city of Champaign, Champaign county, Illinois; that while so driving she collided with a truck being driven by a State employee, by the name of Tuck Daniels, who was going north on Bandolph street in said city; that his car was being driven with due care and caution for its safety, and the said State highway truck was being driven at about fifteen or twenty miles per hour up to this intersection, and that while going along said street, at said rate of speed, said State truck struck a Chevrolet coach belonging to claimant, damaging it to the extent of $49.60; that in addition thereto, a coat belonging to his daughter, who was driving the- car at the time of the collision, was damaged by reason of acid from the battery being spilled upon it, making a good many holes in it; which coat is beyond repair; that the coat cost $60.00 in the early part of the fall of 1926, and that at the time of the collision it was of the value of $30.00.

A demurrer filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois is sustained, as a matter of law.

A letter from C. B. Miller, director of the Department of Purchases and Construction, and Frank T. Sheets, chief highway engineer, states that after a thorough investigation of the facts in connection with this accident, they believe that Mr. Bean is justly entitled to the amount of his claim.

While we do not concede any legal liability on the part of the State of Illinois, in .view of the circumstances and equity of the case, we award claimant the sum of $79.65.


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    (No. 1139
    Claimant awarded $246.00.)
    Jerry Laurie, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.
    Respondeat superior — State not liable. Employees. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees in the discharge of their duty.
    Equity and- good conscience — award may he made. An award may he made to a State employee who is injured while in the performance of his duty, as a matter of equity and good conscience.
    Angerstein & Schneider, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by Jerry Laurie, to recover on account of an injury sustained by him while in the employ of the State of Illinois. The declaration filed alleges that oh August 25, 1926, while claimant was in the employ of the State of Illinois, in the capacity of clerk in the Department of Labor in the Illinois Industrial Commission, 139 North Clark street, Chicago, Illinois, and while in the pursuance of his duties as clerk of the Illinois Industrial Commission, while lifting a box of stationery weighing about 300 pounds, he sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment, in that he ruptured himself, and that he duly notified William F. Scanlan, chairman of the Industrial Commission, that he had so ruptured himself, within fifteen days after the occurrence of said accident; that he also notified his superior, W. W. Baldwin, and that there were two witnesses to his said accident, namely, W. W. Baldwin and Henry Plattner, both employees of the Industrial Commission of the State of Illinois; that thereafter said claimant was operated on by Dr. Ira Boyd Robinson, on September 13,1926; that he was necessarily in the hospital from September 13, 1926, to September 26, 1926, and was confined to his home, for four, weeks; that for the operation and the after treatment he was charged the sum of $150.00 by his physician and surgeon above mentioned and that his hospital expenses in the Jefferson Park Hospital' in the city of Chicago were the sum of $96.00, and he makes claim for $246.00.

The State of Illinois by the Attorney G-eneral has filed a demurrer, which is sustained, as a matter of law.

While there is no legal obligation on the part of the State of Illinois to make an award in this case, in equity and good conscience we award claimant the sum of $246.00, the amount which he would be entitled to receive were he employed under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Illinois.


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    (No. 1146
    Claimant awarded $3,750.00.)
    David Anderson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Equity and good conscience — when award may he made. Although the State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees, while in the performance of their duty, yet an award may be made as a matter of equity and good conscience in his favor, and compensation fixed according to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
    Gilson Brown, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered .the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by David Anderson, a patrolman employed by the Highway Department of the State of Illinois, on Roads 3 and 4 in Madison county, on account of injuries sustained by him in the following manner: On October 6, 1925, he was assisting his supervisor, Edward M. Stubblefield, in placing a barricade about one-quarter of a mile north of Name old, where some repair work was being done. It was about dusk in the evening and Mr. Anderson was placing red lanterns and putting up the barricades. He had his work about completed, the lights were up, and as he stepped inside the barricade to put another piece along the center of the road an approaching automobile, running at a rapid rate of speed, crashed into the barricade, knocked the barricade against Mr. Anderson, pushing him over into a ditch, face downward in about ten inches of water. He was rendered unconscious, was pulled out of the ditch by his supervisor, Mr. Stubblefield, who was the only witness to the accident, and taken home by a passing automobile. He suffered a severe blow to his head, an injury to his breast and hip, and was confined to his home in St. Elizabeth’s Hospital at Granite City, where he was later removed, for a period of over a month. Since leaving the hospital in December, 1925, he has not been able to do any work; walks with a cane and is a physical wreck; that nurses’ bills, amounting to $84.00 and $144.00-have not been paid; that hospital and doctor bills have not been paid, and that claimant is permanently disabled and wholly incapacitated from performing any labor.

A demurrer filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois to the declaration is sustained, as a matter of law.

On the grounds of equity and good conscience, we believe that the claimant in this case should receive an award, and we accordingly award to him the sum of $3,750.00, being the amount he would be entitled to receive were. he employed under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Illinois.


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    (No. 1155
    Claimant awarded $3,750.00.)
    Minerva A. Miles, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Workmen’s compensation act — when award made under provisions of An award may be made under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, although the State is not legally liable for the death of plaintiff’s intestate.
    Mr. Robert E. Wright, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration filed • by claimant above named alleges that Frank Miles, the deceased husband of claimant, was during Ms lifetime and at the time of his death an employee of the Division of. Highways of the Department of Public Works and Buildings of the State of Illinois; that the said Frank Miles was at said time employed as a laborer, engaged in maintaining a part of the hard-surfaced State Highway known as Route 11, extending north and east from Highland, Illinois; that on September 2, 1926, said Frank Miles while employed as aforesaid, in the excavation of gravel from a gravel pit then being operated by the State of Illinois, to provide gravel for repairing a detour known as Section Patrol No. 80066, received an injury by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, which injury resulted from the fall of a large amount of gravel and earth onto the body of said Frank Miles, deceased; that within thirty days following the date of the death of said deceased, on, to-wit: September 15, 1926, claimant gave notice of said accidental injury and death to said Department of Public Works and Buildings, which said notice was given to Charles Slaymaker, division engineer of said Department of Public Works and Buildings, having charge of the part of said road on which deceased was employed as aforesaid; that said Frank Miles earned in Ms employment the sum of $21.60 per week and that said deceased left claimant, his widow, and no child or children whom he was under legal obligation to support, surviving him; and petitioner prays that she may be awarded the sum of $3,750.00 as compensation for the accidental injury and death as aforesaid.

A demurrer was filed by the Attorney Ceneral to the declaration, which, as a matter of law, is sustained.

We award claimant the amount which she would be entitled to receive if the deceased, Frank Miles, were employed under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Illinois, or the sum of $3,750.00.


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    (No. 1160
    Claimant awarded $336.40.)
    Jefferson Printing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

      Contract — when State liable for supplies. The State is liable for supplies and material furnished to the Attorney-General which purchases were approved by the proper department of the State.
    Noah Gullett, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank F. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Jefferson Printing Company, presented its claim on account of merchandise such as stationery, envelopes, filing cards, carbon paper, and other sundry articles of their goods furnished to the Attorney General and Beekeepers Association of the State of Illinois, which are fully set out in the declaration filed in this case, were ordered from time to time in the usual course of business, and the prices charged for same were the usual and customary prices for articles of that character at the time the same were furnished.

It further appears that the bills for said articles were approved by the Director of Purchases and Construction, and the Superintendent of Printing; that the same were not paid for the reason that no appropriation was previously made and no funds available for said payment.

There being no controversy as to claimant’s having furnished the merchandise in his bill of particulars, the court therefore awards claimant the sum of $336.40.


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    (No. 1168
    Claimant awarded $2,500.00.)
    Harry Miller, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Non-liability of state — posse comitatus. State not liable for injuries to member of. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in the case of Katanich v. State, supra.

    Robert E. Larkin, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, a police officer in and for the city of Streator, Illinois, on the 5th day of May, A. D. 1926, was called and notified to assist in capturing certain convicts who escaped from the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet, Illinois. Miller responded to the request and encountered the convicts that night on the railroad tracks in said village. A gun battle commenced and a bullet hit the face of claimant about the-end of the upper jaw between the nose and ear traveling upward and backward and lodged in front of the spine behind the mouth and between the first and second vertebrae, the bullet is still lodged there, and it is not possible to remove the bullet'without-grave danger to claimant’s life and health. The bullet shot away the upper left second and third molars, took away a portion of the upper anterior of the first and second vertebrae. As a result of the bullet wound Mr. Miller has difficulty in speaking and in closing his jaws, and has some impediment of speech, pains through the neck region and intermittent headaches. Physicians testified that the injuries were permanent and may get worse, and it appears further from the evidence that claimant has continuous headaches and is obliged to quit work frequently.

The Attorney General comes and admits the facts to be fairly stated by claimant.

It must be admitted that there is no legal liability on the part of the State, however, it must be recognized that where an officer was commanded by superiors to enter upon the pursuit of. escaped convicts, that it was a hazardous undertaking and consequently as a matter of equity and good conscience the State should respond as far as practical to help a person like this claimant who bravely and, efficiently performed his duty in face of grave danger.

While as a matter of fact the court is impressed by the rules of equity and good conscience, yet it cannot be unmindful of the rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and taking all the evidence and facts under consideration, the court recommends -that the claimant be allowed the sum of $2,500.00.


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    (No. 1173
    Claimant awarded $261.50.)
    Byron C. Gibson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Respondeat superior — State not liable. The State is not liable for the negligence of its employees while in the discharge of their duty.
    Equity and good conscience — award may be made. Property damage. An award may he made in favor of claimant for damages to his property, on ground of equity and good conscience.
    Benj. F. Cassiday, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by Byron C. Gibson, claimant, to recover damages sustained to his Oakland sedan, on November 24, 1926, at about 4 P. M., while he was driving west on State Bond Route No. 10, between Decatur and Springfield, when he was collided with by a converted Packard truck, bearing 1926 Illinois license No. 36987, driven by State Highway Policeman „ W. Connors, about one mile west of Buffalo, in the county of Sangamon and State of Illinois, at which place the road was straight and level, with an unobstructed view in- both directions. The declaration further alleges that said patrolman was driving said truck in an easterly direction on said highway and immediately prior to the collision saw an Hlinois Power Company truck parked on the patrolman’s side of the concrete slab, and on account of the slab being covered with ice at this time and place, was unable to stop, and in attempting to avoid striking the Illinois Power Company truck turned to the left and collided with claimant’s automobile, hitting said automobile on the left rear side; that claimant drives his said automobile in the prosecution of his business on an average of 500 miles a week; that he was out the use of his said car for a period of 14 days; that the value of the loss of the use of said automobile during said time was $15.00 a day; that he spent the sum of $81.50 in making necessary repairs, and claims damages in the sum of $261.50.

A demurrer filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois is sustained as a matter of law.

A statement filed by the Attorney General alleges that claimant in his statement correctly states the facts.

While we do not concede any legal liability on the part of the State of Illinois, to compensate claimant on account of the alleged damages, in equity and good conscience we award claimant the sum of $261.50.


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    (No. 1174
    Claimant awarded $4,350.00.)
    Erma Clendening, Administratrix of the Estate of Paul E. Clendening, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.
    Respondeat superior — State not liable. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty.
    Equity and good conscience — award, may be made. While no legal liability exists against the State for injuries sustained by its employees in the discharge of their duty, an award may be made to him for such injuries, as a matter of equity and good conscience and the amount of the award fixed upon the basis of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
    Oscar J. Putting, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the. court:

In this case Paul E. Clendening was employed by the State of Illinois as a State highway patrolman on State Bond Issue Route No. 5. His district was between Elgin and Melrose Park, Illinois.

On the 16th day of February, A. D. 1927, he was patroling within his district with another State highway patrolman, under the orders of his superior officer, both being on the lookout for holdup men who had been working this particular territory a great deal of that time.

The two patrolmen were riding in an automobile, the other patrolman driving the car. While driving on said hard road about 4:00 or 5:00 o’clock of the morning on said date, the car ran onto some ice upon the pavement, which caused it to skid, throwing the deceased through the top of said automobile, after which the car turned over on the deceased, killing him almost instantly.

At the time of his death the deceased left surviving him two children under the age of 16 years and a wife, with whom he was living and supporting.

■ The salary of the deceased was $150.00 per month as said employee.

Under Paragraph a, Section 7, of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which is as follows: “If the employee leaves any widow, child or children whom he was under legal obligations to support at the time of his injury, a sum equal to four times the average annual earnings of the employee, but not less in any event than $1,650,00 and not more in any event than $3,750.00. Any compensation payments other than necessary medical, surgical or hospital fees or services shall be deducted in ascertaining the amount payable on death,” and Paragraph h of Section 7, which is as follows: “Whenever in paragraph (a) of this section a minimum of $1,650.00 is provided, such-minimum shall be increased in the following cases to the following amounts: $4,350.00 in case of two or more children under the age of 16 years at the time of the death of the em- • ployee,” this claimant would be entitled to $4,350.00.

For the reason that as a matter of law the State is under no legal obligation to compensate for injuries of this kind, we hold the demurrer filed in said' cause good. However, as a matter of equity and social justice, we recommend that an award be made in this case on the basis of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

We therefore recommend an award of $4,350.00.


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    (No. 1175
    Claimant awarded $4,350.00.)
    Blanche Coons, Administratrix of the Estate of Charles J. Coons, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Workmen’s compensation act — when award fixed under provisions of. Where an employee of the State engaged in a hazardous employment, and is ' injured while in the discharge of his duty, an award will be made, and the Workmen’s Compensation Act will be used as a basis in fixing the amount of the award to him.
    Policy op state — when award made under. The court will consider and treat the employees of the State in the same manner as if they1 were employees of private individuals.
    Oscar J. Putting, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, as administratrix of the estate of Charles J. Coons, deceased, comes and represents that said deceased was regularly employed as foreman in charge of sewer work at Elgin State Hospital; that on the 22nd day of March, 1927, while employed laying sewer pipe in a ditch and while cementing the joint of the pipe so laid the sides of the ditch caved in, suffocating and seriously injuring deceased, that as a result of such injuries said deceased died; that deceased was 37 years of age and in good health prior to his injuries; that deceased left surviving him his wife and five minor children, the oldest of said children being 15 years and the youngest 6 years at the time of his death. The claimant asks for damages of $6,000.00. However, the only rule the court can follow in a case of this kind is the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as it has been the rule of this court to endeavor to treat the employees of the State of Illinois who are injured in the employment of the State of Illinois in the same manner as if they were employed by private individuals.

■ The Attorney General comes and admits the facts as stated and the law as hereinbefore construed.

Under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as a measure for damages in this case, the claimant would be entitled to $4,350.00. Therefore this court recommends that payment be allowed in the sum of $4,350.00. .


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    No. 1179
    Claimant awarded $1,811.02.)
    Anna Clary, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Respondeat superior — when State not liable. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty.
    Equity and good conscience — award may be made. Upon the ground of equity and good conscience an award may be made to claimant for injury sustained by him while in the discharge of his duty.
    Edward P. Allen and Marks Alexander, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant herein filed a declaration in this court on April 8, 1927, in which she alleges that on January 24, 1924, she was an employee of the State of Hlinois, in the Soldiers ’ and Sailors’ Home in the State of Illinois, located at the city of Quincy, Illinois, employed there as a cook; that for services rendered in her said employment she was paid $35.00 a month, and in addition thereto she received her full maintenance, including her room, her board, her laundry and the uniforms used by her in her said employment as cook; that it was the duty of said State of Illinois to provide safe and secure sidewalks in and about the said charitable institution where the plaintiff was then employed, and to keep said sidewalks free and clear of ice so as to make same safe and secure for use of plaintiff in going in the course of her employment, from building to building at said institution; that said State of Illinois wholly failed in its duty in this behalf, and allowed the sidewalk between the library building and the dining-room, which are parts of said institution, to become covered with ice and slippery, so as to render same dangerous to anyone attempting- to pass over same; that on said 24th day of January, 1924, she was in the course of her said employment walking on said-sidewalk between said library building and said dining room, and was then and there in the exercise of due care and caution for her own safety, and that she fell, by reason of said icy and slippery condition of the sidewalk, and by reason of said negligence and carelessness of said State of Illinois she then and there suffered a severe fracture of the hip and severe fracture of the pelvic bone, and was otherwise wounded, maimed and injured, and suffered great pain and anguish and is permanently injured and crippled. A bill of particulars filed shows damages sustained amounting- to $1,811.02.

A demurrer filed by the Attorney General to the declaration is sustained, as a matter of law.

' While there is no legal liability on the part of the State of Illinois to make any compensation on account of the injuries above mentioned, in equity and good conscience, we feel that claimant has suffered an injury while in the employ of the State of Illinois, and we award to her the sum of $1,811.02.


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    (No. 1182
    Claimant awarded $671.00.)
    Elmer C. Frein, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Equity and social justice — when award made under rule of. Although no liability exists against the State for injuries sustained by its' employees while in the discharge of their duty, an award may be made to him for the injury sustained, on grounds of equity and social justice, and the award fixed under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
    McCarthy & McCarthy, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case Elmer C. Frein, claimant, was employed as a laborer in the maintenance department of the State of Illinois. While engaged in his capacity as laborer on the 7th day of October, A. D. 1926, claimant was unloading a snow plow from a truck at Plainfield, Illinois, and in attempting to lift the snow plow from the truck, claimant was injured internally and it became necessary, as a result of said injury, to submit to an operation.

In consequence of said injury and resultant operation, claimant was physically unable to perform any kind of manual labor for a period of six months, to-wit, from the 7th day of October, A. D. 1926, up to and including the 7th day of March, A. D. 1927.

Under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Chap. 48, Sec. 8, Smith-Hurd’s Ill. Rev. Stat.), claimant is entitled to a sum of $200.00 for medical and hospital expenses, and under the same section is entitled to $471.00 for the time during which he was incapacitated.

As a matter of law, this court sustains the demurrer of the Attorney General; however, as a matter of equity and social justice, we recommend that an award of $671.00 be made, which is the amount allowed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.


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    (No. 1184
    Claimant awarded $424.78.)
    Joe La Flamme, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

      Reimbursement — award may Be made. Damage to property. Where there is no dispute as to the facts in this case, and the claim being equitable and just, the court may enter an award in favor of claimant for damage to his property.
    John H. Walker, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank B. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration -filed by claimant in this case alleges that on July 1, 1926, he was driving from Chicago • Heights to Streator, Illinois, on State Bond. Bonte No. 17; that while driving toward Streator on said date he collided with William Winkle; that at the time and place of said accident, claimant was driving at a legal and reasonable rate of speed, using all due care and caution for his own safety and the safety of others, on the right hand side of said road; that as a result of said collision it was necessary,- and he did expend in and about the repairing of said car the sum of $424.78; that said William Winkle was an employee of the State of Illinois.

A demurrer was filed to this declaration by the Attorney General, which is sustained, as a matter of law.

A letter from C. B. Miller, Director of Public Works and Buildings, who investigated this claim, recommends that an award be granted and states that the claim is equitable and just.

.We accordingly make an award to claimant of $424.78.


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    (No. 1185
    Claim denied.)
    Herman B. Meyers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.
    Fees & salaries — when award will not he made. The court will not attempt to adjust differences of opinion between departments of the State and its employees as to salaries, except where there is a lack of funds in the department to pay the salary fixed by law, or some effort made by the department and its employees to adjust their differences.
    Herman B. Meyers, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim to recover for additional salary as inspector of lodging houses for the State of Illinois under the Department of Public Health of the State of Illinois. The claimant complains that he received only $1,800.00 per year and that his additional compensation should come under an act of the legislature, effective July 1, 1925. The Attorney General comes and offers a copy of a report of the Director of the Department of Public Health, which appears to fix this claimant’s salary at $150.00 per month, and this court cannot gather from said report any other construction.

There is nothing in this record to indicate any demand or why there was not any. change made, or if there was a misunderstanding between claimant and the Department of Public Health. This court does not feel that it is called upon to settle differences of opinion between departments and its employees, at least not until there would be some effort shown to get together, or a showing made that there was lack of funds in this department.

It is the opinion of this court from the records before it, that there is not a reasonable basis to make an allowance Therefore this claim is disallowed.


author: Mr. Justice Leech delivered

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    (No. 1186
    Claimant awarded $2,466.19.)
    The Liquid Carbonic Company, name changed to McIntosh Carbonic Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Franchise tax — when refund will Be made. Overpayment. Where through an error in the computation of the tax claimant paid a larger tax than is legally due the State, it is entitled to a refund of the amount of the overpayment.
    Gillespie & Gillespie, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; David J. Kadyk, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech delivered

the opinion of the court:

This is a claim to recover $2,466.19, being the sum paid the State of Illinois as franchise tax for the years 1923 and 1924, in excess of the sum due the State of Illinois for those years. The claimant, the Liquid Carbonic Company, in its declaration, states that it is an Illinois corporation, with its principal business office at 3100 South Kedzie avenue, in the city of Chicago, State of Illinois; that' in the year 1923 it had an authorized capital stock of $5,500,000.00 par value shares, and that the total value of all the property of the corporation, located everywhere, and the total business of the corporation, transacted everywhere, amounted to $13,514,284.00, and the total amount of its business transacted, in the State of Illinois amounted to $4,117,524.00; the proportion of its authorized capital, taxable in the State of Illinois, was therefore .30467, and the value of the authorized capital stock taxable in that year amounted to $1,675,685.00, and the tax due the State of Illinois on such portion of its authorized capital stock $837.84, but that through an error in computation, petitioner paid in the year 1923 a franchise tax of $2,009.26, which sum was $1,171.42 in excess of the amount lawfully due the State of Illinois as a franchise tax from petitioner; that in the year 1924 it had an authorized capital stock of $5,500,000.00 par value shares, and that the total value of all of the property of ' the corporation, located everywhere, and the total business of the corporation, transacted everywhere, amounted to $13,-537,289.00, and the total value of its property located in the State of Illinois, and the total amount of its business transacted in the State of Illinois amounted to $3,932,975.00; the proportion of its authorized capital taxable in the State of Illinois was, therefore, .29052, and the value of its authorized capital stock taxable in that year amounted to $1,597,860.00, and the tax due the State of Illinois on its authorized capital stock was $798.83; but that through an error in computation, petitioner paid in the year 1924 a franchise tax of $2,093.60, which sum was $1,294.77 in excess of the amount lawfully due the State of Illinois as a franchise tax from petitioner, and that there is due therefore to claimant the sum of $2,466.19.'

A written consent of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois to the allowance of claim of petitioner in the sum of $2,466.19 was filed, and we accordingly award claimant the sum of $2,466.19.


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    No. 1187
    Claimant awarded $896.38.)
    Ayer & Lord Tie Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Franchise tax- — when claimant entitled to refund. The decision of the court in the case of McIntosh Carbonic Co. v. State, supra, governs this claim.
    Gillespie & Gillespie, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; David J. Kadyk, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim to recover $896.38, being a sum heretofore paid as franchise tax to the State of Illinois in excess of the amount legally due. Claimant in its declaration sets out that it is an Illinois corporation, having its principal office in the State of Illinois at 80 East Jackson boulevard, in the city of Chicago; that in 1926 it had an authorized capital stock of $2,450,000 of par value shares, and in that year the total value of its property located everywhere and the total amount of its business transacted everywhere' amounted to $8,102,907.00; that the total value of its property located in the State of Illinois and the total amount of its business transacted in the State of Illinois in that year amounted to $2,173,692.00; the taxable proportion of its authorized capital stock being .26826 or $657,237.00 taxable authorized capital stock for the year 1926; that the franchise tax lawfully due the State of Illinois on such proportion of its authorized capital stock for the year 1926 was $328.62, but that it paid a franchise tax in that year of $1,225.00, which sum was in excess of the amount lawfully due the State as franchise taxes to the amount of $896.38; that the error in computation resulted through no fault of petitioner, but from a misinterpretation of the statements made by petitioner in its annual report to the Secretary of State for the year 1926.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois has filed herein a written consent to the award of $896.38, being refund of franchise fee paid in excess of the legal fee due through an error in computation for the year beginning July 1, 1926, and we accordingly award claimant the sum of $896.38.


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    (No. 1191
    Claimant awarded $2,105.00.)
    Schuyler E. Redpath, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.
    Fees & salaries — when award will he made. Where the salary of a State officer has been fixed by law, and the legislature fails to appropriate a sufficient sum to pay the salary, an award will be made in favor of such officer for the difference between the amount fixed by statute and the amount paid to him under the appropriation made by the General Assembly.
    Noah Gullett, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant was appointed in due course as a member of the State Mining Board, and entered upon the duties of his position on the 5th day .of December, 1923, and has been continuously employed in said position since the date aforesaid.

It appears that the legislature in making the appropriation for the salary in question, did not take into consideration the law enacted by the Fifty-second General Assembly, effective July 1, 1921, which increased the salary of the members of the State Mining Board from $500.00 to $1,000.00 per annum, being an increase of from $5.00 to $10.00 per day for 100 .days’ services per annum; and that the legislature has not appropriated sufficient money to pay the increase in salary which was so provided for by the Fifty-second General Assembly, as aforesaid.

That claimant has been paid by the State of Illinois a salary of $500.00 per annum, being $5.00 per day for 100 days’ services per annum, and it appears that there is now due and will be owing to him as unpaid salary from the 5th day of December, 1923, to the 1st day of July, 1927, the sum of $2,105.00, this being the difference between the amount paid him and the amount allowed by the statute, up to July 1,1927.

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State, has filed his statement in this cause, and makes no defense thereto, but submits the same upon the recommendation of the Director of Mines and Minerals.

The court therefore awards claimant the sum of $2,105.00.


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    (No. 1192
    Claimant awarded $2,630.00.)
    Francis M. Devlin, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Fees & salaries — when award will he made. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Redpath v. State, supra.

    Noah Gullett, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court i

The claimant was appointed in due course as a member of the State Mining Board, and entered upon the duties of his position on the 1st day of December, 1922, and has been continuously employed in said position since the date aforesaid.

It appears that the legislature in making the appropriation for the salary in question, did not take into consideration the law enacted by the 52nd General Assembly, effective July 1, 1921, which increased the salary of the members of the State Mining Board from $500.00, to $1000.00 per annum, being an increase of from $5.00 to $10.00 per day for 100 days’ services per annum; and that the legislature has not appropriated sufficient money to pay the increase in salary which was so provided for by the 52nd General Assembly, as aforesaid.

That claimant has been paid by the State of Illinois a salary of $500 per annnm, being $5.00 per day for 100 days’ services per annnm, and it appears that there is now due and will be owing to him as unpaid salary from the 1st day of December, 1922,- to the 1st day of July, 1927, the sum of $2,630.00, this being the difference b.etween the amount paid him and the amount allowed by the statute, up to July 1,1927.

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State, has filed his statement in this cause, and makes no defense thereto, but submits the same upon the recommendation of the Director of Mines and Minerals.

The court therefore awards claimant the sum of $2,630.00.


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    (No. 1193
    Claimant awarded $3,000.00.)
    Mont S. Coleman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Fees & salaries — when award will he made. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Redpath v. State, supra.

    Noah Gullett, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion-of the court:

The claimant was appointed in due course as a member of the State mining board, and entered upon the duties of his position in 1917, and has been continuously employed in said position since the date aforesaid. .

It appears that, the legislature, in making the appropriation for the salary in question, did not take into consideration the law enacted by the 52nd General Assembly, effective July 1,1921, which increased the salary of the members of the State mining board from $500.00 to $1,000.00 per annum, being an increase of from $5.00 to $10.00 per day for one hundred (100) days services per annum; and that the legislature has not appropriated sufficient money to pay the increase in salary which was so provided for by the 52nd General Assembly, as aforesaid.

That claimant has been paid by the State of Illinois a salary of $500.00 per annum, being $5.00 per day for one hundred (100) days services per annum, and it appears that there is now due and will be owing to him as unpaid salary from the 1st day of July, 1921, to the 1st day of July, 1927, the sum of $3,000.00, this being the difference between the amount paid him and the amount allowed by the statute, up to July 1,1927.

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State, has filed his statement in this cause, and makes no defense thereto, but submits the same upon the recommendation of the director of mines and minerals.

The court therefore awards claimant the sum of $3,000.00.


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    (No. 1194
    Claimant awarded $3,000.00.)
    James Needham, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1927.

    Fees & salaries — when award will be made. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Redpath v. State, supra.

    Noah Gullett, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant was appointed in due course as a member of the State mining board, and entered upon the duties of his position in 1917, and has been continuously employed in said position since the date aforesaid.

It appears that the legislature, in making the appropriation for the salary in question, did not take into consideration the law enacted by the 52nd General Assembly, effective July 1,1921, which increased the salary of the members of the State mining board from $500.00 to $1,000.00 per annum, being an increase of from $5.00 to $10.00 per day for one hundred (100) days services per annum; and that the legislature has not appropriated sufficient money to pay the increase in salary which was so provided for by the 52nd General Assembly, as aforesaid.

That claimant has been paid by the State of Illinois a salary of $500.00 per annum, being $5.00 per day for one hundred (100) days services per annum, and it appears that there is now due and will be owing to him as unpaid salary from the' 1st day of July, 1921, to the 1st day of July, 1927, the sum of $3,000.00, this being the difference between the amount paid him and the amount allowed by the statute, up to July 1,1927.

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State, has filed his statement in this cause, and makes no • defense thereto, but submits the same upon the recommendation of the director of mines and minerals.

The court therefore awards claimant the sum of $3,000.00.


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    (No. 722
    Claimant awarded $2,514.20.)
    Sunbeam Chemical Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1927.
    Franchise tax — when refund will be made. This case is similar to that of Altorfer Bros. v. State, and the decision of the court there announced governs this claim.
    Blum, Blum & Delaney and Paul O’Donnell, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; David J. Kadyk, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for a refund of excess franchise taxes paid • to the State of Illinois in the years 1921 and 1922. The excess amount is $2,514.20. The only question involved in this case is the question whether this money was paid under duress and compulsion or whether it was paid voluntarily. . The facts and law on this point are exactly identical with those, in the Altorfer Brothers case, in the opinion in which case we fully discussed this subject. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this claimant is entitled to a refund of $2,514.20, and hereby award that sum.