text:
    (No. 1753 —
    Franz Rydell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 8, 1931.

    Walter E. Lindgren, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank E. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

Claimant charges in his declaration that while he was working for the Division of Highways on August 12,1930, an automobile, driven by Mrs. Alice Cryderman, struck him knocking him into one of the barricades on the pavement, and as a result thereof his back was wrenched, his left leg bruised and he suffered a nervous shock. The proof does show that Mrs. Cryderman’s car struck him,- but there is no evidence, other than his own statement, that he was injured thereby. A physician called by him testified that he is a person “of low mentality, below normal,” and that such condition was not the result of the accident. He also testified that the claimant was physically capable of doing heavy work. While an employee of the State who is injured and whose injury arose out of and in the course of his employment is entitled to compensation for such injuries, the compensation to be paid depends upon whether the injury incapacitated him from work and, if so,- what length of time. The employee must introduce evidence showing he is entitled to compensation and for what length of time. This claimant has failed to do. As the court cannot base award, upon conjecture the claim is denied and the case dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam:

license: Public Domain

text:
    (Nos. 1794, 1795, 1796, 1797, 1798 —
    W. A. Black Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 8, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

The declarations in these cases are based upon contracts ■ alleged to have been entered into by the claimant with the State, but no copies of the contracts are filed with the declarations as required by Rule 4 of the court. The declarations further show that the claims therein mentioned have been presented to the Department of Public Works and Buildings and are now pending in that department for disposition. The Attorney General has filed a motion to strike the declarations from the files. Rule 4 requires a copy of such contract to be filed with the declaration together with the name and present address of the officer with whom such a contract-was made. Rule 5 requires claimant to state in his declaration whether or not his claim has been presented to any State department and if it has been so presented what action was taken thereon. It is thus apparent from the allegations of these declarations that the claims have also been prematurely filed as they are still pending before the Department of Public Works and Buildings.

The motion is therefore allowed,' the declarations stricken from the files and the claims dismissed, without prejudice.


author: Mr. Justice Thomas

text:
    (No. 1526 —
    American Cereal-Coffee Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 4, 1931.

    American Cereal — Coffee Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; David J. Kadyk, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claim in this case is for the refund of an alleged overpayment of a franchise tax of $13.05. The State has filed a demurrer to the declaration.

It appears from the declaration that the Secretary of State assessed a franchise tax of $75.00 against claimant and that claimant voluntarily paid the tax assessed on June 28, 1928, without making any protest or objection to the correctness of the amount assessed. It is settled in this State that a tax voluntarily paid cannot be recovered back.

The demurrer is therefore sustained.


author: Mr. Justice Bob

text:
    (No. 1609 —
    Rosalthia P. Tunnicliff and G. S. Rollett, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondents.

      Opinion filed November 4, 1931.

    S. S. Groves, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Bob

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim in the amount of $104.00 for damages to a growing crop of corn caused by water overflowing the claimants land in the summer of 1929.

Claimant G. S. Rollett was the tenant of claimant Bosalthia P. Tunnicliff, owner of a farm situated on State Highway No. 96, one-half mile north of the Village of Marcelline, Adams County, Illinois.

Claimants had a crop of growing corn in which they each had an equal share on a 13 acre field adjacent to the highway. A new hard road State Highway, known as S. B. I. Route No. 96 contiguous to this 13 acre field was built prior to the summer of 1929. In the building of the new road the drainage conditions at this point were not materially changed from those which existed on the original road but a new system of drainage incident to changed construction was necessary.

The evidence does not disclose any faulty construction of this State Highway, nor does the record show any negligence on the part of the State in the building of the drainage system. However, the fact is undisputed that in the months of June and July, 1929, during heavy rainfalls, water caused by freshets overflowed the growing crop of corn in the field of the complainants. This field, near the roadway was low, and there was a small basin with no natural outlet. This basin or low land had been subject to overflow prior to the building of the new State Highway. There is some difference of opinion in the evidence as to the exact size of this basin and also as to the size of the portion of the field outside of this basin which was overflowed during June and July, 1929. The claimants allege that the one acre of growing corn was totally destroyed and 50 per cent of two more acres was injured.

It appears from the evidence that the new drainage system at this point was not quite adequate to carry off the water resulting from unusually heavy rainfalls.

From the report on this claim submitted by the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, State of Illinois, we quote the following:

“The matter of drainage at this location was brought to our attention some time during the latter part of the summer of 1929, and there is a well-defined draw to the east of the State Highway and as we were attempting to carry water in our road ditches for too great a distance, we decided to construct a 2 x -2 reinforced concrete culvert at station 198-12 in order to relieve the water from our west road ditch. This culvert was constructed about the middle of May, 1930.
“There is no question in my mind but what the crop in this field was damaged to some extent during the extremely heavy rain falls in that vicinity during the months of June and July of 1929, and that this damage was sustained solely due to the fact that we were attempting to carry the water in our west road ditch for too great a distance without passing it underneath the road and to the east in which the natural course lies at this particular location.”

This report acknowledges responsibility for damage to the growing crop of corn. The question arises as to the extent of the damage. According to the statement submitted by the State of Illinois not mqre than one and one-fourth acres was totally damaged as the result of the overflow. • Claimants estimate two acres were totally damaged. Taking into consideration all the circumstances, facts, and evidence submitted this court finds that one and one-half acres of the growing crop of corn was totally destroyed.

The Bill of Particulars sets forth that the average yield of the field was 65 bushels per acre and claims the price was 80 cents per bushel.

• In the case of Illinois Traction, Inc. vs. State of Illinois, Court of Claims Reports, Volume 5, Page 422, this court held that the State is not liable for damage caused by overflow, therefore we determine that there is in this case no legal liability on the part of the State of Illinois.

Although there is no legal liability we believe that in equity and good conscience the claimants, Rosalthia P. Tunnicliff and G. S. Rollett, should be reimbursed on account of the losses sustained and accordingly an award is allowed in the sum of $78.00.


author: Mr. Justice Roe

text:
    (No. 1809 —
    Henry Wiskirchen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 4 1931.

    Richard F. Scholz, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Roe

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Henry Wiskirchen, claims damages in the amount of $80.00 for embalming, furnishing a casket and burying one Henry C. Dickson, a member of the Illinois Soldiers and Sailors Home of Quincy, Hlinois, on the third day of November, A. D. 1918.

The declaration of the claimant avers a verbal agreement with Captain John E. Andrew, superintendent of the said Home, acting in his official capacity, whereby the claimant was engaged to embalm, furnish a casket and bury the body of Henry C. Dickson, deceased.

A bill for $80.00, the cost of said embalming*, casket and burial was presented to the said Captain John E. Andrew immediately after the burial, but claimant says he never received payment.

Afterward the claimant presented his claim to the Department of Public Welfare which he alleges failed to pay the same.

Finally on the 6th day of August, 1931, he filed his claim in this court.

The respondent, by Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, pleads the Statute of Limitations because the claimant did not file his claim within five years from the time his cause of action first accrued as required by section of “An Act to create the Court of Claims and to prescribe its power and duties,” approved June 25, 1917 (Par. 436, Chap. 37, Smith-Hurd’s Illinois Rev. Statutes, 1929).

Because on the face of the declaration this cause of action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, the plea of the respondent is sustained, the claim disallowed, and the case dismissed.


text:
    (No. 930 —
    Commercial Steel Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes his. motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing’ to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


author: Per Curiam,:

text:
    (No. 943 —
    Marie D. Kenworthy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam,:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes Ms motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show . cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1031 —
    Kenneth Lyle Clayton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes his motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3, 1931, why this ease should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an order and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (Nos. 1170 and 1171 —
    Tony Thomas, Claimant, No. 1170 and Rose Thomas, No. 1171, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A.

D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1181 —
    Harry F. Barnstetter, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A.

D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1233 —
    Stanley Mazarka, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in' accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1293 —
    Sweney Gas & Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes his motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A.

D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed "without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1367 —
    Ed S. Smith, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes Ms motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by tMs court on the 8th day of September, 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1380 —
    Joseph E. Stiles and Ethel P. Stiles, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes his motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by tMs court on the 8th day of September, 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why tMs case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1403 —
    Russell L. Carpenter and John Carpenter, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam,:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes his motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1419 —
    Justus A. Larson, Administrator of Estate of Victer A. Larson, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes his motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1453 —
    Emil Allgaier, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes his motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1502 —
    Everhardt Heissinger, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes his motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1512 —
    Ida Kinkie, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes Ms motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing’ to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1537 —
    Edward G. Martin and Eva S. Martin, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes his motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1541 —
    P. F. Weinrich, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes kis motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing* to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the ease stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1628 —
    Fred W. Epley, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 5, 1931.

   Per Curiam:

Now comes Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and makes motion for dismissal, pursuant to an order to show cause entered by this court on the 8th day of September, A. D. 1931, wherein the claimant was ordered to show cause on or before November 3rd, 1931, why this case should not be dismissed for want of prosecution.

And it appearing* to the court that cause has not been shown by claimant in accordance with said order, it is hereby ordered that the claim be dismissed without an award and the case stricken from the docket.


text:
    (No. 1839 —
    Arcole Construction Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Arcóle Construction Co., pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

On August 24, 1931, the Department of Public Works and Buildings awarded a contract to claimant for the construction of Section 464-MY on State Bond Issue Route No. 46. Claimant executed the contract and bond required by the Department and immediately thereafter commenced performance on the contract. On October 21, 1931, the Department notified claimant that payments for work done under the contract could not be made from the general appropriation for such work because the Act under which the contract was awarded had been held invalid by the Supreme Court. The contract was made and the work thereunder performed in good faith, both the Department and claimant believing it to be valid.

The Department and the Attorney General have stipulated that claimant is entitled to the sum of $6,348.20 for the work done by it and claimant is therefore awarded that sum in compliance with said stipulation.


text:
    (No. 1840 —
    Deckert and McDowell, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Decker and McDowehl, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On September 3, 1931, the Department of Public Works and Buildings awarded a contract to claimants for the construction of Section 430-VB on State Bond Issue Route No. 4. Claimants executed the contract and bond required by the Department and immediately thereafter commenced performance on the contract. On October 21, 1931, the Department notified claimants that payments for work done under the contract could not be made from the general appropriations for such work because the Act under which the contract was awarded had been held invalid by the Supreme Court. The contract was made and the work thereunder performed in good faith, both the Department and claimants believing it to be valid.

The Department and the Attorney General have stipulated that claimants are entitled to the sum of $3,768.81 for the work done by them and claimants are therefore awarded that sum in compliance with said stipulation.


text:
    (No. 1841 —
    Cameron-Joyce Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Cameron-Joyce & Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, -for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On September 19, 1931, the Department of Public Works and Buildings awarded a contract to claimant for the construction of Section 105 on State Bond Issue Route No. 99. Claimant executed the contract and bond required by the Department and immediately thereafter commenced performance on the contract. On October 21, 1931, the department notified claimant that payments for work done under the contract could not be made from the general appropriations for such work because the Act under which the contract was awarded had been held invalid by the Supreme Court. The contract was made and the work thereunder performed in good faith, both the department and claimant believing it to be valid.

The department and the Attorney General have stipulated that claimant is entitled to the sum of $11,359.81 for the work done by it and claimant is therefore awarded that sum in compliance with said stipulation.


text:
    (No. 1842 —
    H. H. Gunther Const. Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    H. H. Gunther Const. Co., pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court :

On September 21, 1931, the Department of Public Works and Buildings awarded a contract to claimants for the construction of Section 1-W on State Bond Issue Route No. 28. Claimants executed the contract and bond required by the department and immediately commenced performance on the contract. On October 21, 1931, the department notified claimants that payments for work done under the contract could not be made from the general appropriations for such work because the Act under which the contract was awarded had been held invalid by the Supreme Court. The contract was made and the work thereunder performed in good faith, both the department and claimants believing it to be valid.

The department and the Attorney General have stipulated that claimants are entitled to the sum of $188.50 for the work done by them and claimants are therefore awarded that sum in compliance with said stipulation.


text:
    (No. 1843 —
    Jansen and Schaefer, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Jansen and Schaefer, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On September 19, 1931, the Department of Public Works and Buildings awarded a contract to claimant for the construction of Section 105-A on State Bond Issue Route No. 89-0. Claimant executed the contract and bond required by the department and immediately thereafter commenced performance on the contract. On October 21, 1931, the department notified claimant that payments for work done under the contract could not be made from the general appropriations for such work because the Act under which the contract was awarded had been held invalid by the Supreme Court. The contract was made and the work thereunder performed in good faith, both the department and claimant believing it to be valid.

The department and the Attorney Greneral have stipulated that claimant is entitled to the sum of $3,202.43 for the work done by it and claimant is therefore awarded that sum in compliance with said stipulation.


author: Mr. Justice Clarity

text:
    (No. 1844 —
    Zimmerly Bridge Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Zimmerlt Bridge Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney Greneral; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney Greneral, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a similar case in fact and law as the Bishop Construction Co., No. 1845, which case this court discusses at length and for that reason will not go into a lengthy discussion in this case.

It appears that claimant entered a bid for certain road construction work on State Bond Issue Boute No. 101. Its bid was accepted by the-Department of Public Works and Buildings and claimant having filed bond as required by law immediately commenced performance of the contract between the State and itself according to the bid and under the direction of the Division of Highways. On the 6th day of October, 1931, they received notice through the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings that no payment could be made for the work under said contract for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which said contract had been let, was held to be invalid by the courts of the State and that in event claimant proceeded further under said contract it did so at its own peril.

It appears that the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways considering the loss and damage to claimant which it suffered without the claimant’s fault, concluded to make an adjustment with claimant and entered into a stipulation. After a review of the loss of the claimant, stipulated that the fair, just and reasonable value of the work done and the damage incurred by claimant in its performance under the invalid road construction contract on Boute No. 101, would amount to $2,351.28 and the claimant through such stipulation agreed to accept said amount in full and complete settlement for any and all work performed and damages incurred by reason of its performance under the said invalid road contract.

That said stipulation was duly executed by claimant and the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways of the State of Illinois, by H. H. Cleveland, Director, and Frank T. Sheets, Chief Highway Engineer, and that said stipulation was approved by Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney G-eneral of Illinois.

Therefore, it is the opinion of the court that this claim has been considered fairly and justly by the State of Illinois through its proper officers and in view of same and the recommendations indicated by said stipulation, this court recommends that claimant be allowed and awarded the sum of $2,351.28.


text:
    (No. 1845 —
    Bishop Construction Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Bishop Construction Co., pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, ' Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears that claimant submitted a bid for certain road construction work on State Bond Issue Route 130-A. Subsequently the claimant received a letter of award from the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings of the State of Illinois and afterwards a contract was entered upon. The claimant furnished bond as required by law and immediately commenced performance under said contract until the 8th day of October, A. D. 1931, when the claimant received notice through the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works aud Buildings that no payment could be made for work done under said contract for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which said contract had been let, was held to be invalid and void by the courts of this State and that in event claimant proceeded further under said contract it did so at its own peril.

It appears that the Division of Highways of the State of Illinois formed an opinion that claimant was damaged through no fault of the claimant and therefore a stipulation of fact and damage was entered into between claimant and the State of Illinois Department of Public Works and Buildings, by H. PI. Cleveland, Director, and Frank T. Sheets, Chief Highway Engineer. In said stipulation it was agreed that the facts set forth in the declaration of the claimant are true and correct; that said claimant suffered material damage by reason of cancellation of the road construction contract; that on account, of the Act under which this contract was made was declared invalid by the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois and that the department would be unable to make any payments on the general appropriation for work performed under said contract or award.

It further appears according to said stipulation that the fair, just and reasonable value of the work done and the damages incurred by claimant in its performance under the said invalid road construction contract should be properly considered to the sum of Three Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-four and 72/100 ($3,484.72) Dollars, as accurately itemized by the statement of claim; that said claimant under said stipulation agrees to accept the sum of ($3,484.72) Three Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-four and 72/100 Dollars in full and complete settlement for any and all work performed and damage incurred by reason of its performance under said invalid road construction contract.

The said stipulation was duly executed and signed by claimant by its president and the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways of the State of Illinois, by H. H. Cleveland, Director, and Frank T. Sheets, Chief Highway Engineer, and approved by Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General of Illinois.

Therefore, it is the opinion of the court that this claim has been considered fairly and justly by the State of Illinois through its proper officers and in view of same and the recommendations indicated by said stipulation, this court recommends that claimant be allowed and awarded the sum of $3,484.72.


text:
    (No. 1846 —
    Stanley Jaicks Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Stanley Jaicks Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a similar case in fact and law as the Bishop Construction Co., No. 1845, which case this court discussed at length and for that reason will not go into a lengthy discussion in this case.

It appears that claimant entered a bid for certain road construction work on State Bond Issue Route No. 53. Its bid was accepted by the Department of Public Works and Buildings and claimant having filed bond as required by law, immediately commenced performance of the contract between the State and itself according to the bid and under the direction of the Division of Highways. On the 6th day of October, 1931, it received notice from the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings that no payment could be made for the work under said contract for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which said contract had been let, was held to be invalid by the courts of the State and that in event claimant proceeded further under said contract it did so at its own peril.

It appears that the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways considering the loss and damage to claimant which it suffered without the claimant’s fault, concluded to make an adjustment with claimant and entered into a stipulation. After a review of the loss of the claimant, stipulated that the fair, just and reasonable value of the work done and the damage incurred by claimant in its performance under the invalid road construction contract on Route No. 53 would amount to $2,187.65 and the claimant through such stipulation agreed to accept said amount in full and complete settlement for any and all work performed and damages incurred, by reason of its performance under said invalid road contract.

That said stipulation was duly executed by claimant and the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways of the State of Illinois, by H. H. Cleveland, Director, and Frank T. Sheets, Chief Highway Engineer, and that said stipulation was approved by Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General of Illinois.

Therefore, it is the opinion of the court that this claim has been considered fairly and justly by the State of Illinois through its proper officers and in view of same and the recommendations indicated by said stipulation, this court recommends that claimant be allowed and awarded the sum of $2,187.65.


author: Mr. Justice Clabity

text:
    (No. 1847 —
    E. D. Otto, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    E. D. Otto, pro se.
    Osoab E. Caklstbom, Attorney General; Gael I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Clabity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a similar case in fact and law as the Bishop Construction Co., No. 1845, which case this court discussed at length and for that reason will not go into a lengthy discussion in this case.

It appears that claimant entered a bid for certain road construction work on State Bond Issue Route No. 59. His bid was accepted by the Department of Public Works and Buildings and claimant having filed bond as required by law, immediately commenced performance of the contract between the State and himself according to the bid and under the direction of the Division of Highways. On the 8th day of October, 1931, he received notice through the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, that no payment could be made for the work under said contract for he reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which said contract had been let, was held to be invalid by the courts of the State and that in event claimant proceeded further under said contract it did so at its own peril.

It appears that the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, considering the loss and damage to claimant which he suffered without the claimant’s fault, concluded to make an adjustment with claimant and entered into a stipulation. After a review of the loss of the claimant, stipulated that the fair, just and reasonable value of the work done and the damage incurred by claimant in its performance under the invalid road construction contract on Route No. 59 would amount to $925.74 and the claimant through such stipulation agreed to accept said amount in full and complete settlement for any and all work performed and damages incurred by reason of its performance under said invalid road contract.

That the said stipulation was duly executed by claimant and the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways of the State of Illinois, H. H. Cleveland, Director, and Frank T. Sheets, Chief Highway Engineer, and that said stipulation was approved by Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General of Illinois.

Therefore, it is the opinion of the court that this claim has been considered fairly and justly by the State of Illinois through its proper officers and in view of same and the recommendations indicated by said stipulation, this court recommends that claimant be allowed and awarded the sum of $925.74.


text:
    (No. 1848 —
    Midwest Improvement Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Midwest Improvement Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Roe

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the claimant, Midwest Improvement Company, a corporation of the City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois, against the defendant, State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contract No. 4576 on State Bond Issue Route No. 5, Section 7-YV awarded on the 21st day of September, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: That after the complainant commenced performance under the said contracts it received a notice from the respondent on the 6th day of October, 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, that no payments could be made for work done under the contracts for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts had been let was held to be invalid and yoid by the courts of this State and that in the event the claimant proceeded further under the said contracts, it did so at its own peril. After this notice was received the complainant’s forces and machinery remained idle from October 6th to November 2nd, 1931 thereby necessitating considerable expense for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there so notified.

Thereupon, the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, through its Director and Chief Highway Engineer, reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $238.63. The Attorney General has approved of the said settlement and stipulation; but the Division of Highways could not pay the claim and therefore recommend that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration and the evidence establishes the claimant’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $238.63.


text:
    (No. 1849 —
    Hartman-Clark Brothers Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Hartman-Clark Brothers Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Roe

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the claimant, Hartmann-Clark Brothers Company, a corporation, of the City of Peoria, County of Peoria, State of Illinois, against the defendant, State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contracts Nos. 4543, 4555, 4556, 4557, 4558, 4559, 4574 and 4587 on State Bond Issue Route No. 9, Sections 46-X and 46-X-l, 48 and 48-X, and Route No. • 88, Section 126, Route No. 165, Section 124-X, awarded on the 16th day of September, 1931, and Route No. 48, Section 137, and Route 120, Section 115, awarded on the 21st day of September, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: That after the complainant commenced performance under the said contracts it received a notice from the respondent on the 6th day of October, 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works'and Buildings, that no payments could be made for work done under the contracts for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts had been let was held to be invalid and void by the courts of this State and that in the event the claimant proceeded further under the said contracts, it did so at its own peril. When this notice was received the complainant had already completed work under all the contracts except one and thereafter the greater part of complainant’s forces and machinery remained idle from October 6th to November 2nd, 1931, thereby necessitating considerable expense in addition to the cost of work completed, for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there so notified.

Thereupon, the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, through its Director and Chief Highway Engineer, after making deductions for cement sacks salvaged, reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $20,648.59. The Attorney General has approved of the said settlement and stipulation; but the Division of Highways could not pay the claim and therefore recommended that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration and the evidence establishes the claimant’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $20,648.59.


text:
    (No. 1850 —
    Gund-Graham Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Gund-Graham Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Bob

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the claimant, Gund-Graham Company, a corporation, of the City of Freeport, County of Cook, State of Illinois, against the defendant, State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contracts No. 4531, 4540, 4541 and 4542 on State Bond Issue Boute No. 47, Section 106, awarded on the 4th day of September, 1931, and Boute No. 85, Sections 102, 102-X, and 103-X awarded on the 12th day of September, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: That after the complainant commenced performance under the said contracts it received a notice from the respondent on the 6th day of October, 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, that no payments could be made for work done under the contracts for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts had been let was held to be invalid and void by the courts of this State and that in the event the claimant proceeded further under the said contracts, it did so at its own peril. When this notice was received the complainant had already completed work under the contracts costing $8,090.69 and thereafter complainant’s forces and machinery remained idle from October 6 to November 2nd, 1931, thereby necessitating considerable expense in addition to the cost of work completed, for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there so notified.

Thereupon, the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, through its Director and Chief Highway Engineer, after making deductions for cement sacks salvaged, reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $19,082.60. The Attorney General has approved of the said settlement and stipulation; but the Division of Highways, could not pay the claim and therefore recommended that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration,'and the evidence establishes the-claimant’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $19,082.60.


text:
    (No. 1851 —
    Pronger Construction Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Pronger Construction Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Roe

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the claimant, Pronger Construction Company, a corporation, of the City of Blue Island, County of Cook, State of Illinois, against the defendant, State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contract No. 4536 on State Bond Issue Boute No. 49, Section 146-X, awarded on the 12th day of September, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: That after the complainant commenced performance under the said contract it received a notice from the respondent on the 6th day of October, 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, that no payments could be made for work done under the contract for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts, had been let was held to be invalid and void by the courts of this State and that in the event the claimant proceeded further under the said contract, it did so at its own peril. When this notice was received the complainant had already completed work under the contract costing $4,940.30, for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there so notified.

Thereupon, the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, through its Director and Chief Highway Engineer, reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $4,940.30. The Attorney General has approved of the said settlement and stipulation; but the Division of Highways could not pay the claim and therefore recommended that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration, and the evidence establishes the claimant’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $4,940.30.


text:
    (No. 1852 —
    McMahan Construction Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    McMahan Construction Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Roe

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the claimant, McMahan Construction Company, a corporation, of the City of Rochester, County of Fulton, State of Indiana, against the defendant,

State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contract No. 4537 on State Bond Issue Route No. 47, Section 125-X awarded on the 12th day of September, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: That after the complainant commenced performance under the said contracts it received a notice from the respondent on the 6th day of October, 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, that no payments could be made for work done under the contracts for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts had been let was held to be invalid and void by the courts, of this State and that in the event the claimant proceeded further under the said contracts, it did so at its own peril. When this notice was received the complainant had already completed work under the contract costing $2,814.30, and thereafter complainant’s forces and machinery remained idle from October 6th to November 2nd, 1931, thereby necessitating considerable expense in addition to the cost of work completed, for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there so notified.

Thereupon, the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, through its Director and Chief Highway Engineer, reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $3,556.13. The Attorney General has approved of the said settlement and stipulation, but the Division of Highways could not pay the claim and therefore recommended that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration and the evidence establishes the claimant’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $3,556.13.


text:
    (No. 1853 —
    E. J. Albrecht Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    E. J. Albrecht Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Bob

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the claimant, E. J. Albrecht Company, a corporation of the City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois, against the defendant, State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contract No. 4549, on State Bond Issue Route No. 46, Section 462-V-B awarded on the 16th day of September, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: That after the complainant commenced performance under the said contract it received a notice from the respondent on the 6th day of October 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, that no payments could be made for work done under the contract for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts had been let was held to be invalid and void by the courts of the State and that in the event the claimant proceeded to go further under the said contract, it did so at its own peril. After this notice was received complainant’s forces and machinery remained idle from October 6th to November 2nd, 1931, thereby necessitating considerable expense for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there so notified.

Thereupon the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, through its Director and Chief Highway Engineer, reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid, and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $2,365.27. The Attorney General has approved of the said settlement and stipulation, but the Division of Highways could not pay the claim and therefore recommended that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration and the evidence establishes the claimant ’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant, the sum of $2,365.27.


text:
    (No. 1854 —
    George Welch, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Geobge Welch, pro se.
    Oscab E. Cablstbom, Attorney General; Gael I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Roe

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the claimant, George Welch, an individual of the City of Beloit, County of Rock, State of Wisconsin, against the defendant, State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contract No. 4524 on State Bond Issue Route No. 63, Section 631-X-I awarded on the 19th day of August, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: That after the complainant commenced performance under the said contracts it received a notice from the respondent State of Illinois on the 6th day of October, 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings that no payments could be made for work done under the contracts for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts had been let was held to be invalid and void by the courts of this State and that in the event the claimant proceeded further under the said contracts, it did so at its own peril. When this notice was received the complainant had already completed work under the contract costing $12,877.44 for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there so notified.

Thereupon the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways of the State of Illinois, through its Director and Chief Highway Engineer, after making deductions for cement and cement sacks salvaged, reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $11,871.44. The Attorney General approved of the said settlement and stipulation; but the Division of Highways could not pay the claim and therefore recommended that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration and the evidence establishes the claimant’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $11,871.44.


text:
    (No. 1855 —
    Chicago Heights Coal Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Chicago Heights Coal Co., pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Roe

delivered the opinion of the court:

This a suit brought by the claimant, Chicago Heights Coal Co., a corporation of the City of Chicago Heights, County of Cook, State of Illinois, against the defendant, State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contracts No. 4529 and No. 4586 on State Bond Issue Route No. 52, Section 524 awarded on the 3rd day of September, 1931, and Route No. 53, Section 539-X awarded on the 21st day of September, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: that after the complainant commenced performance under the said contracts it received notice from the respondent State of Illinois on the 6th day of October, 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, that no payments could be made for work done under the contracts for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts had been let was held to be invalid and void by the courts of this State and that in the event the claimant proceeded further under the said contracts, it did so at its own peril. When this notice was received the complainant had already completed work under the contract costing $26,582.55, and thereafter complainant’s forces and machinery remained idle from October 6th to November 2nd, 1931 thereby necessitating considerable expense in addition to the cost of work completed, for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there so notified.

Thereupon the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, through its Director and Chief Highway Engineer, after making deductions for cement sacks salvaged, reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $41,568.99. The Attorney General has approved of the said settlement and stipulation; but the Division of Highways could not pay the claim and therefore recommended that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration and the evidence establishes the claimant’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $41,568.99.


text:
    (No. 1856 —
    George W. Condon Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    George W. Condon Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On September 21, 1931 the Department of Public Works and Buildings awarded a contract to claimant for the construction of Section 47-B on State Bond Issue Route No. 11. Claimant executed the contract and bond required by the department and immediately thereafter commenced performance on the contract. On October 21, 1931, the department notified claimant that payments for work done under the contract could not be made from the general appropriations for such work because the Act under which the contract was awarded had been held invalid by the Supreme Court. The contract was made and the work thereunder performed in good faith, both the department and claimant believing it to be valid.

The department and the Attorney General have stipulated that claimant is entitled to the sum of $442.10 for the work done by it and claimant is therefore awarded that sum in compliance with said stipulation.


text:
    (No. 1857 —
    Des Moines Asphalt Paving Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Des Moines Asphalt Paving Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Roe

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the claimant, Des Moines Asphalt Paving Company, a corporation of the City of Des Moines, County of Polk, State of Iowa, against the defendant, State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contract No. 4568, on State Bond Issue Route No. 89-C, Section 105-B, awarded on the 19th day of September, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: That after the complainant commenced performance under the said contracts it received a notice from the respondent on the 6th day of October, 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, that no payments could be made for work done under the contracts for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts had been let was held to be invalid and void by the courts of this State and that in the event the claimant proceeded further under the said contracts, it did so at its own peril. Thereafter complainant’s forces and machinery remained idle from October 6th to November 2nd, 1931 thereby necessitating considerable expense for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there notified.

Thereupon the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, through its Director and Chief Highway Engineer, reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $809.51. The Attorney General has approved of the said settlement and stipulation; but the Division of Highways could not pay the claim and therefore recommended that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration and the evidence establishes the claimant’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $809.51.


text:
    (No. 1858 —
    Joseph Kesl & Sons, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Joseph Kesl & Sons, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Bob

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the claimant, Joseph Kesl & Sons, a partnership, of the City of Edwardsville, County of Madison and State of Illinois, against the defendant, State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contracts Nos. 4564 and 4565 on State Bond Issue Boute No. 150, Sections 134 and 135, awarded on the 19th day of September, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: That after the complainant commenced performance under the said contracts it received a notice from the respondent on the 6th day of October, 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, that no payment could be made for work done under the contracts for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts had been let was held to be invalid and void by the courts of this State and that in the event the claimant proceeded further under the said contracts, it did so at its own peril. When this notice was received the complainant had already completed work under the contract costing $8,636.28 for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there notified.

Thereupon the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, through its Director and Chief Highway Engineer, after making deductions for high spots and cement sacks, reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $7,909.28. The Attorney General approved of the said settlement and stipulation; but the Division of Highways could not pay the claim and therefore recommended that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration and the evidence establishes the claimant ’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $7,909.28.


text:
    (No. 1859 —
    I. D. Lain Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    I. D. Lain Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstbom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant and the Department of Public Works and Buildings entered into a written stipulation of facts in this case which stipulation has been approved by the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, and is as follows:

It is Stipulated and Agreed, by and between the parties hereto, that the fair, just and reasonable value of the work done and the damages incurred by claimant in its performance under the invalid road construction contract on Route No. 19, Section 86-Y, and Route 58, Section 584-Y, awarded on August 24th, 1931, and Route 60, Section 120-Y, awarded on the 31st day of August, 1931, shall properly be considered as amounting to the sum of $64,037.65 as accurately itemized and set forth by “Itemized Statement of Claims” attached hereto and made a part hereof; that of this total sum, $64,-037.65, said claimant has received, as partial payment from the said respondent the sum of $24,621.55 paid under three regular payment estimates in accordance with the provisions of Contract No. 4521, Route 19, Section 86-Y, and Contract No. 4523, Route 58, Section 584-Y, as aforesaid, prior to the time when said contracts were held to be invalid by a decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Therefore there is due and owing the claimant an unpaid balance of $39,416.10 on his claim for damages as set forth by “Itemized Statement of Claim” attached hereto; that said claimant hereby agrees to accept the sum of $39,416.10 in full and complete settlement for any and all work performed and damages incurred by reason of its performance under said invalid road contract. ’ ’

Therefore the court recommends that the claimant be allowed an award for the balance due in the sum of $39,416.10 according to the said stipulation.


text:
    (No. 1860 —
    J. C. O’Connor & Sons, Incorporated, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    J. C. 0 ’Conner & Sons, Incorporated, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On September 22, 1931, the Department of Public Works and Building’s awarded a contract to claimant for the construction of Section 143-X on State Bond Issue Route No. 104. Claimant executed the contract and bond required by the department and immediately thereafter commenced performance on the contract. On October 21, 1931, the department notified claimant that payment for work done under the contract could not be made from the general appropriation for such work because the Act under which the contract was awarded had been held invalid by the Supreme Court. The contract was made and the work thereunder performed in good faith, both the department and claimant believing it to be valid.

The department and the Attorney General have stipulated that claimant is entitled to the sum of $11,784.53, for the work done by it and claimant is therefore awarded that sum in compliance with said stipulation.


text:
    (No. 1861 —
    Martin Wunderlich, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Martin Wunderlich, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On September 21, 1931, the Department of Public Works and Building’s awarded a contract to claimant for the construction of Section 101-A, Route No. 124. Claimant executed the contract and bond required by the department and immediately thereafter commenced performance of the contract.' On October 21, 1931, the department notified claimant that payments for work done under the contract could not be made from the general appropriation for such work, because the Act under which the contract was awarded had been held invalid by the Supreme Court. The contract was made and the work thereunder performed in good faith, both the department and claimant believing it to be valid.

The department has stipulated and the Attorney General has approved the stipulation that the claimant is entitled to the sum of $10,956.01 for the work and claimant is therefore awarded that sum in compliance with said stipulation.


text:
    (No. 1862 —
    S. J. Groves & Sons Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    S. J. Groves & Sons Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On August 19, Aug’ust 24, and September 12, 1931, the Department of Public Works and Buildings awarded contracts to claimant for the construction of Section G-BB on State Bond Issue Boute No. 20; Section 23-BB, Boute No. 22; Section 533-H, Boute No. 53, and Section 124-A, Boute No. 100. Claimant executed the contract and bond required by the department and immediately thereafter commenced performance on the contract. On October 6,1931, the department notified claimant that payments for work done under the contract would not be made from the general appropriation for such work, because the Act under which the contract was awarded had been held invalid by the Supreme Court. The contract was made and the work thereunder performed in good faith, both the department and claimant believing it to be valid.

The department, with the approval of the Attorney General for the State, has stipulated that claimant is entitled to the sum of $22,654.61 for the work, the additional expense, and rental of equipment by it, and claimant is therefore awarded that sum in compliance with said stipulation.


text:
    (No. 1863 —
    McCarthy Improvement Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    McCarthy Improvement Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Bob

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by the claimant, McCarthy Improvement Company, a corporation, of the City of Davenport, County of Scott, State of Iowa, against the defendant, State of Illinois, to recover damages caused by the cancellation of road construction contracts Nos. 4547, 4550, 4551, 4554, 4554, 4588 and 4589, on the State Bond Issue Route No. 85, Sections 103 and 104; Route No. 97, Section 142-A; Route No. 148, Sections 106 and 107, awarded on the 16th day of September, 1931, and Route 77, Sections 105-W and 105-W-l, awarded on the 21st day of September, 1931.

The facts in this case are as follows: That after the complainant commenced performance under the said contracts it received a notice from the respondent on the 6th day of October, 1931, through its Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, that no payments could be made for work done under the contracts for the reason that the “Prevailing Wage Law” under which the contracts had been let was held to be invalid and void by the courts of this State and that in the event the claimant proceeded further under the said contracts, it did so at its own peril. When this notice was received the complainant had already completed work under the contract costing $12,097.25, and thereafter complainant’s forces and machinery remained idle from October 6th to November 2nd, 1931, thereby necessitating considerable expense in addition to the cost of work completed, for which the claimant asked damages, and the State was then and there so notified.

Thereupon, the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, through its Director, and Chief Highway Engineer, after asking deductions for cement sacks salvaged reached an agreement in settlement of the damages caused as aforesaid and stipulated to make payment in the sum of $58,508.27. The Attorney General has approved of the said settlement and stipulation but the Division of Highways could not pay the claim and therefore recommended that a claim be filed with this court.

As there is no dispute as to the facts presented in the claimant’s declaration and the evidence establishes the claimant’s right of action, the court is of the opinion that the claim is reasonable and should be paid. The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $58,508.27.


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    (No. 1864 —
    Duffin Iron Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 8, 1931.

    Duffin Iron Company, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl I. Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On September 12, 1931, the Department of Public Works and Buildings awarded a contract to claimant for the construction of Section 462-V. C. on State Bond Issue Route No. 46. Claimant executed the contract and bond required by the Department and immediately thereafter commenced performance on the contract. On October 6, 1931, the department notified claimant that payments for work done under the contract could not be made from the general appropriation for such work because the Act under which the contract was awarded had been held invalid by the Supreme Court. The contract was made and the work thereunder performed in good faith, both the. department and claimant believing it to be valid.

The department, with the Attorney General’s approval, has stipulated that claimant is entitled to the sum of $21,-023.34, for the rental on equipment and additional expense incurred by it, and claimant is therefore awarded that sum in compliance with said stipulation.


text:
    (No. 1693 —
    J. R. McDonald, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 12, 1932.

   Per Curiam:

This is a claim filed to recover for alleged damages occasioned by claimant running into an unlighted barricade on the evening of November 11, 1930, over a new strip of road while it was still under construction on Route 18, near the city of Aurora, Illinois.

It appears from all the evidence that the claimant was familiar with the road in question and ought to know the hazards that he might meet, and we are of the opinion that the claimant was driving at his own risk, the road being in course of construction at which time traveling should be avoided at least at night time.

Therefore, it is recommended that the claim be disallowed.


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    (No. 1710 —
    Reliable Coal & Mining Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 12, 1932.

    Pomeroy & Martin, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim is for $501.75 for an automobile wrecked in a collision near Hanna City on November 8, 1930. The automobile of claimant was being driven by one of its salesmen on State Bond Issue Route No. 8 and collided with a truck and trailer being driven by an employee of the State Highway Department. The declaration alleges and the evidence tends to show the collision was caused by the negligence of the driver of the truck, but in the view we take of the case it will not be necessary to discuss the weight of the testimony.

The claim is predicted upon the negligence of the agent or servant of the State, and unless the State is liable for the negligence of its agents no award can be made. It is a rale of almost universal application that no government is liable for the negligence, lacks or misfeasance of its officers and agents in the absence of a statute making it so liable. This principle has been announced by this court in many of its decisions, and also by our Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States. (Gibbons vs. United States, 8 Wal. 269; United States vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheaton 720; Kinnare vs. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332; Jorgensen vs. State, 2 Ct. C. 134; Watkins vs. State, 6 Ct. C.) Many other cases from the Supreme Court of the United States, our own Supreme Court and this court announcing this rule of law could be cited but we deem the foregoing sufficient. There is no statute making the State liable for the negligence of its employees, and it follows that no award can be made in this case.

If the damages complained of were caused by the negligence of the driver of the track, claimant is not without remedy. It can sue and recover from the driver the damages caused by his negligent conduct.

The claim is denied and the case dismissed.


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    (No. 1757 —
    Union Bank of Chicago, Administrator of the Estate of Leon Johnson, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 12, 1932.

    Samuel J. Spiegel,'for claimant.
    Oscab E. Caelstbom, Attorney General; Cabl Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

The substance of the declaration in this case is that claimant’s intestate, Leon Johnson, a boy eleven years old, was drowned in a lagoon in Washington Park, on April 20, 1930. The declaration also charges the South Park Commissioners were agents of the State and that the death of Johnson was caused by their negligence and carelessness, and asks $10,000.00 damages.

The South Park Commissioners constitute a municipal corporation and have the control and management of Washington Park. (The People vs. Chicago Motor Bus Co., 295 Ill. 486.) Such a municipal corporation has a dual character, the one public the other private. In the exercise of its public or governmental functions no liability attaches to it under the common law and it is not liable for the nonuser or misuser of its powers. (Stein vs. West Chicago Park Commissioners, 247 Ill. App. 479.) A municipality created for governmental purposes is not liable for damages caused by the negligence of its agents unless such liability is expressly provided by statute. (Linstrom vs. City of Chicago, 33 Ill. 144.)

If the Park Commissioners were mere agents of the State, as charged in the declaration, it follows as a matter of course that there is no liability on the part of the State for damages caused by their negligence, as the State is never liable for the torts or negligence of its agents. (Kinnare vs. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332.) As the declaration does not state a cause of action against the State the case must be dismissed.

The claim is therefore denied and the case dismissed.


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      (No. 1778 —
    Lillie Miller, Administratrix of the Estate of Adam Miller, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 12, 1932.

    Carl E. Bobinson, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Bob

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Lillie Miller, administratrix of the estate of her husband, Adam Miller, represents that the deceased was regularly employed as a fireman for more than fifteen years at the Illinois State School for the Deaf at Jacksonville. Although classified as a fireman at a salary of One Hundred and Thirty Dollars per month the deceased was also assigned to the duties of an assistant steam fitter and plumber.

On December 4, 1930, he was assisting one Robert Smith, a steam fitter and plumber, in assembling and installing a new steam boiler in the basement of a large frame building used as an Isolation Hospital at the said school. Standing on a box or crate twenty inches from the floor and using a large Stilson wrench the deceased was engaged in connecting and fitting pipes to the header of the boiler when in some manner he lost his balance and fell backward. In falling, the back of his head struck some iron fittings piled on the concrete floor, causing a severe skull fracture and almost instantaneous death.

The evidence showed that the deceased was a man of good habits, who used neither tobacco nor intoxicants and was a steady worker; that he was in good health prior to his injuries; that he was 69 years of age; that he left surviving him his wife and one married son.

The claimant asks for damages of $10,000.00 and bases her claim for compensation on the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Section 3 of the said Act, as amended in 1917, recites that “the provisions of this Act hereinafter following shall apply automatically and without election to the State * * * in any department of the following enterprises or business which are declared to be extra-hazardous, namely, the erection, maintaining, removing, remodeling, altering or demolishing* of any structure, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section.” Section 6 of the Act of 1917 creating* the Court of Claims and prescribing* its powers and duties says: “The Court of Claims shall have power to hear and determine the liability of the State for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment by any employee of the State, such determination to be made in accordance with the rules prescribed in the Act commonly called the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the Industrial Commission being hereby relieved of any duty relative thereto.”

We believe the deceased was injured while engaged in one of the extra-hazardous occupations enumerated by Section 3 of the said Act and his death resulted from and in the course of his employment. We further believe that there can be no doubt that he was engaged in the erection and maintaining of a structure within the meaning of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The Court of Claims has jurisdiction to determine whether the claimant is entitled to compensation and if so the amount she should be allowed. The Attorney General comes and admits the facts as stated and the law as hereinbefore construed.

It follows from the above facts and conclusions that the claimant is entitled to receive such compensation under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act as this court shall deem she is entitled to receive. It is therefore ordered that claimant be and is awarded the sum of $2,500.00 in full compensation for the injury sustained.


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    (No. 1782 —
    James Hickey, Jr., by his Father and Next Friend, James J. Hickey, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 12, 1932.

    Hector A. Brouillet, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Roe

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, James Hickey, Jr., by his father and next friend, James J. Hickey, presents a claim to this court for damages in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars because of an injury received by him on August 4, 1930. It appears that on the above day the said James Hickey, Jr., who is fourteen years of age, was in line waiting to enter a bathing pool maintained at Garfield Park by the West Park Commission in the City of Chicago. While he was thus in line someone threw a very small article at one Robert Anderson, a policeman in attendance at the pool, whereupon, several of the boys ran away and the said policeman chased those whom he suspected. James Hickey, Jr., was one of the boys who ran away laughing and as he did so the policeman, who had evidently lost his temper, shot the Hickey boy in the chest and the bullet still remains in one of his lungs due to the dangerous consequences of a possible operation.

There seems to be no doubt that this boy received a very serious injury and suffered physically and mentally because of this unfortunate occurrence.

The Attorney General has filed a demurrer on behalf of the State of Illinois settingup the plea that the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction in this case. It is therein contended that the West Chicago Park Board of Commissioners is a Municipal Corporation with the inherent power to sue and be sued and therefore this court has no jurisdiction over claims involving an employee of the said park board.

The claimants take issue with the contention.

We believe that the rule laid down and the law expressed in the case of Perkins, Fellows and Hamilton vs. State of Illinois, Volume 4, Page 197, Illinois Court of Claims Reports is correct. It is there clearly and concisely decided that “the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction over suits against Municipal Corporations.” The Supreme Court of this State has decided that the West Park Board of Commissioners is a Municipal Corporation created by an Act of the Legislature in February, 1869.

Although the question is not raised by the State in this case we believe that a governmental function was being exercised and consequently no liability would attach because of the tort of an officer, agent or employee.

As a matter of law the demurrer filed by the Attorney General in behalf of the State of Illinois is sustained and the case dismissed.


author: Mr. Chief Justice Clarity Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

text:
    (No. 1594 —
    Illinois Stoker Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 10, 1930.

      Rehearing granted November 12, 1930.

      Opinion on Rehearing filed March 9, 1932.

    Green & Verlib, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the- opinion of the court:

This is a claim brought to recover $360.00 for furnishing repairs to a certain stoker located upon the premises of the Illinois State Normal University at Normal, Illinois.

It appears that the president of this institution made arrangements for the repairs in question, that the repairs were installed and that the price claimed was reasonable, although there were certain issues as to whether or not certain general-contractor should not be held liable for the repairs in question; however, that is not an issue determined by this court.

The court takes the same position as was taken in the case of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company, No. 1558 and the Individual Towel and Cabinet Service Company, No. 1547, in that the appropriation made by the General Assembly for the repair and maintenance as is made to the institution in this case, should be the guide in the matter of expenditures. The Constitution of this State will not permit this court, or any other legal body to grant relief other than that permitted by the Legislature. The appropriation was made for repair and re-building and all repairs should be made through this appropriation. If any other rule should be adopted, no limitations would be considered in the matter of expenditures by any department of the State.

In other words, this institution and other institutions of the State should live within the means provided by the Legislature, the same as an employee would be required to live within the salary provided during the course of employment. An employee cannot incur extra expenses or extra liability beyond the salary received, but look forward and provide for the payment of necessary expense from the emoluments to be received.

The court is of the opinion that claimant furnished material and performed services as claimed without authority. This might appear unjust, but it is assumed that all persons must know the requirements of the law and assume all burdens imposed by the law in their dealings with the State of Illinois, the samé as a private corporation, or an individual. Therefore, the claim is disallowed.

A petition for rehearing having been granted by the court, the following opinion was rendered on rehearing*:

Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant asks the sum of Three Hundred and Sixty ($360.00) Dollars as the amount due for furnishing* lower skids for repairs of a certain stoked located on the premises of the Illinois State Normal University, Normal, Illinois.

It appears that the Division of Architects and Engineering-have approved said claim as being just and reasonable as was ordered by the president of the University.

The court heretofore disallowed the claim and thereafter granted a rehearing with the thought in mind largely as to the necessity of proper heating facilities. When the claim was disallowed the court had in mind the fact that the appropriation made for this purpose was exceeded. However, it appears now that when the contract was made for these repairs that there was sufficient funds left in the appropriation to care for same. However, the court wishes to have it understood that the first opinion filed contains principles that should be followed in that all- the departments of the State should carry out their program within the means provided by the Legislature and that any petition filed in this, court for relief should be from an equitable and g’ood conscience viewpoint.

This claim appears to be within the idea sought to be conveyed by the above viewpoint and therefore this court recommends that the claimant be allowed the sum of Three Hundred and Sixty ($360.00) Dollars.


author: Mr. Justice Thomas :

text:
    (No. 1604 —
    Bates Valve Bag Corporation, a Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 9, 1932.

    Brown, Hay & Stephens, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Opinion written by

Mr. Justice Thomas :

The Bates Valve Bag Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, was incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, on June 9, 1927, and admitted to do business in the State of Illinois, as a foreign corporation on July 5, 1927. On or about March 7, 1929, all of the property and assets of the said Bates Valve Bag Corporation, of Delaware were purchased by Bates Valve Bag Corporation, a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of New Jersey, on February 28, 1929. Subsequent to said purchase on March 7, 1929, the said Bates Valve Bag Corporation, of Delaware, executed an affidavit of withdrawal as a foreign corporation from the State of Illinois, and filed the same with the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, on March 25, 1929, which was accepted, and thereupon the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, of Delaware, ceased to possess a certificate of authority to do business in the State of Illinois. On March 5, 1929, the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, of New Jersey, filed an application for admission to do business in Illinois, as a foreign corporation, in the office of the Secretary of State, and it was duly licensed to do business in the State of Illinois, on March 25, 1929. At that time it paid to the Secretary of State, the sum of $1,430.37, as an initial fee, and the sum of $1,907.16, as a franchise tax. The franchise tax was for the balance of the year ending June 30, 1929 and the full period of the year beginning July 1, 1929, and ending June 30, 1930, this franchise tax being a tax equal to one and one-third the annual franchise tax due from it for the privilege of doing business in Illinois.

On May 18,1929, and again on June 1, 1929, the Secretary of State, sent out notices to the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, at the former Illinois address, of the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, of Delaware, notifying it that it had not paids its franchise tax of $901.74, based upon its annual report filed with the Secretary of State on February 21, 1929, prior to its withdrawal from doing business in Illinois. The notices sent out by the Secretary of State, was received by the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, of New Jersey. The officials of the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, of New Jersey, on receiving the notices issued a check for $901.74, in payment of the franchise tax, and sent it to Secretary of State, of Illinois. The mistake was not discovered by the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, of New Jersey, until the books of the corporation were audited several months thereafter, and until after the Secretary of State of Illinois, had turned the money over to the State Treasurer.

It is admitted by the Attorney General for the State, that at the time the Secretary of State sent out the notices to the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, for the payment of the franchise tax, that there was no franchise tax due or owing to the State of Illinois, from the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, of Delaware or the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, of New Jersey, and that if the Secretary of State had not made the mistake of the first instance by sending out the notices to the Bates Valve Bag Corporation, when there was no franchise tax due and owing, the $901.74 would not have been paid by the Complainant. The Attorney General, in his argument admits that the payment of $901.74 made by the' Claimant was a mistake of fact, and recommends that Claimant be awarded a refund of the corporate franchise tax of $901.74. Therefore, on the recommendation of the Attorney General an award of $901.74 is allowed claimant.


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    (No. 1697 —
    Elsie Milligan, a Widow, Etc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 9, 1932.

    Frank E. Lemon and John Bedinger, for claimant.
    Osoar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Bob

delivered the opinion of the court:

Thomas Edward Milligan was employed on October 14, 1930, as a carpenter at the Kankakee State Hospital. On November 4, 1930, while engaged with other workmen in re-roofing Cottage Two South, one of the buildings of the said State institution, he fell from a scaffold upon concrete steps below, a distance of approximately twenty-three feet, and thereby received severe injuries from which he died two days later.

This claim is filed by Elsie Milligan, the widow of the deceased for damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1911. The Attorney General, in his statement, agrees that the facts as set forth in the abstract of testimony and the statement filed by the attorneys for the claimant are substantially correct. The deceased was fifty-one years of age at the time of the accident and his family consisted of the claimant and one minor child, Mary Alberta, whose age was eight years at the time of her father’s death. The deceased was receiving Ten Dollars and 40/100 Dollars ($10.40) per day as wages from the respondent and his earnings during the previous year were about One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00).

It has been the rule of this court to consider the employees of the State of Illinois who are injured in the source of their employment, in the same manner as if they were employed by private individuals. This court has jurisdiction not only to determine whether the claimant is entitled to such compensation, but also to determine the amount that should be allowed.

It is manifest from the provisions of the statute that the employment of the deceased as a carpenter by the respondent for the purpose of remodeling or altering a State structure or building, is of such a nature as properly comes under the Classification of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

We believe that the liability of the respondent is clearly established under the above act and taking into consideration all the circumstances, it is ordered that claimant be and she is hereby awarded the sum of Three Thousand and Seven Hun-, dred Fifty Dollars ($3,750.00), which includes Three Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($350.00), for Mary Alberta, which is statutory allowance for a minor child under the age of sixteen years under the above Act, and the court recommends the payment of the total amount of - Three Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty Dollars in full compensation for the injury sustained.


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    (No. 1792 —
    Ernest Kumpf, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 9, 1932.

    Henry Mansfield and David J. Cowan, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On March 8, 1932, comes Mansfield and Cowan, attorneys for claimant and file their written motion to dismiss suit as the claimant has been paid in full.

Motion granted and suit dismissed.


text:
    (No. 1661 —
    The City of Litchfield, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1932.

    H. B. Tunnell, City Attorney, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Carl Dietz, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Bob

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for damages by the City of Litchfield, Illinois in the sum of Fifty-six and 10/100 Dollars ($56.10).

On September 30, 1929, a State highway motor truck operated by Mr. Howard Billiter, an employee of the Division of Highways, drove into and crashed against 'an ornamental fluted column electric light post at and near the intersection of Edwards and North State Street in the City of Litchfield. The said Howard Billiter was in the service of the respondent at the time, hauling material for the construction of a portion of State Bond Issue Boute No. 126 near the said City of Litchfield. Mr. E. B. Blongh, superintendent of construction, who was in charge of operations at this time and place, reported this accident to Mr. Frank T. Sheets, Chief Highway Engineer, under date of November 14, 1930, as follows:

“This is in answer to your letter of October 20th, 1930, inquiring as to the correctness of the facts as set forth in the declaration of Court of Claims case No. 1661 of the January term in the case of The City of Litchfield versus the State of Illinois, Division of Highways.
It is true that one lamp post and fittings was demolished hy being hit by one of my trucks. Some of the other allegations are not correct. The brakes on the truck were in fair condition. The driver was not -careless or driving improperly.
The accident was caused by a car backing out of a driveway into the path of the truck and in order to avoid hitting the car, the truck driver pulled his truck up on the curb and hit the lamp post.
It is my opinion that the damages asked, $56.10, are reasonable and should be paid.”

In view of the statement above made by the Superintendent of Construction in the Division of Highways and on his recommendation and also because the bill attached to the claim shows the cost of the repairs for the damage to said lamp post at $56.10, we recommend the payment to the claimant of the sum of Fifty-six and 10/100 Dollars ($56.10).