text:
    (No. 00164

      In re Application of Doreatha Days.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1980.

    Doreatha Days, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (James S. Stephenson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The Claimant seeks payment of compensation as the widow of James Days, pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. 111. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, pars. 281-285.

The Court has reviewed the application for benefits submitted by Claimant together with a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and has also reviewed the report of the Attorney General of Illinois. From a consideration of these documents, the Court finds:

1. That Doreatha Days is the widow of decedent, police officer James Days. Doreatha Days was separated from James Days at the time of his death, but was not divorced from him.

2. That decedent, James Days, was a police officer employed by the Chicago Police Department, and, on November 10, 1978, began duty at 12:01 a.m.

3. Days and his police partner were assigned patrol of the Hyde Park area of the city of Chicago. They observed a “suspicious car” and began to follow it. As they followed the car, the driver and passenger jumped out while the car was still moving.

Days and his partner searched the area of 1370 East Madison Park, where the moving vehicle stopped after striking a tree. Days then went around to the front of the building at 1371 East 50th Street. He was found at approximately 2:45 a.m., on the sidewalk in front of 1371 East 50th Street. He was pronounced dead on arrival at Billings Hospital at 3:25 a.m., November 10, 1978.

4. The medical examiner’s certificate of death shows the immediate cause of death to be arteriosclerotic cardio-vascular disease.

5. There is no evidence to show that decedent’s death resulted from willful misconduct or alcoholic intoxication.

6. A designation of beneficiary form dated February 14, 1970, and prepared and signed by decedent, recites benefits of $8,000.00 for Doreatha Days and $2,000.00 for Melvin Days, the son of James and Doreatha Days.

Under the statute, the benefits for deaths occurring after December 31, 1973, is to be $20,000.00. It is the opinion of this Court that the added increment of $10,000.00, which amount was not designated by decedent to pass to certain named beneficiaries, pass according to section 3(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, eh. 48, par. 283(a)). Section 3(a) provides that where there is a surviving spouse, the entire sum shall be paid to the spouse.

7. By reason of the foregoing, this Court orders that an award of $18,000.00 be made to Doreatha Days, the surviving spouse, and that the sum of $2,000.00 be awarded to Melvin Days, the son of decedent.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 00167

      In re Application of Darlene Heath.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1980.

    Darlene Heath, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (James S. Stephenson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Fireman Compensation Act, (hereafter, the Act). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

The Court has reviewed the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, official reports of the Seneca (La Salle County) Volunteer Fire Department, and a report of the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Darlene Heath, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits.

2. That the decedent, William J. Heath, was a volunteer Fireman employed by the Seneca (La Salle County) Volunteer Fire Department, and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of section 2(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, eh. 48, par. 282(e)), on July 6, 1978.

3. That on said date, Fireman Heath had been handling a hose during a training exercise. Low-hanging, dense smoke shrouded the scene of the fire where the exercise was being conducted. This, coupled with high humidity, made breathing difficult.

While engaged in the exercise, the department received a call regarding a fire at a residence. Fireman Heath and others returned to the Seneca Station, at which time Heath was heard to say, “I’ve had it.” Fireman Heath then collapsed onto the station floor, unconscious and breathing with difficulty. He stopped breathing shortly thereafter. Efforts by paramedical personnel to revive him failed. Fireman Heath was removed to Morris Hospital where he died at 10:17 p.m., July 6,1978. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as “acute myocardial infarction.”

The Court finds, therefore:

(A) that Fireman Heath was killed in the line of duty as defined in section 2(e) of the Act; and

(B) that the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and is hereby awarded to Darlene Heath, as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased Volunteer Fireman, William J. Heath.


text:
    (No. 00170

      In re Application of Linda J. Caisse.

      Opinion filed December 28, 1979.

    Linda J. Caisse, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Francis M. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose from the death of a police officer employed by the police department of the City of Paxton. The Claimant seeks payment of compensation as the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act, (hereafter, the Act). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

The Court has reviewed the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office. Based upon these documents, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the Claimant, Linda J. Caisse, is the wife of the decedent, and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, section 3(a) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 283(a)) provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow.

2. That the decedent, William O. Caisse, was a police officer employed by the Paxton Police Department in Paxton, Illinois, and was engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of section 2(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 282(e)), on April 7, 1979.

3. That on said date, decedent had commenced his duties at 8:00 p.m. The statement of the decedent’s supervising officer shows that Officer Caisse responded to a call for help from State Trooper Mike McCarter on this date during his tour of duty. Documents on file with the Office of the Illinois Attorney General show that Trooper McCarter stopped several speeding vehicles on 1-57, and, he encountered difficulty with a subject, and that he and Officer Caise, who arrived to aid Trooper McCarter, were killed by gunfire at the scene. The approximate time of death of Caisse was 9:15 p.m. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death lists Officer Caisse’s immediate cause of death as a gunshot wound.

We find, therefore:

(a) that Officer Caisse was killed in the line of duty as defined in section 2(e) of the Act; and

(b) that the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and is hereby awarded to Linda J. Caisse, as wife and beneficiary of the deceased police officer, William O. Caisse.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 00172

      In re Application of Katherine Farmer.

      Order filed February 4, 1980.

   Holderman, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant cause, and, it appearing to the court that claimant has received due notice of said motion, and this court being fully advised in the premises;

It being determined that claimant has failed to file her claim within the time period limited by law;

It is hereby ordered that the motion of respondent be, and the same is, hereby granted and the instant cause is herewith dismissed with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 00175

      In re Application of Madeline W. Hill.

      Opinion filed December 4, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

The applicant, mother of Arthur W. Hill, deceased, filed a verified claim for death benefits pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, pars. 281-285), on August 20, 1979. It appears from the evidence considered at the hearing that Arthur W. Hill was a police officer employed by the city of Chicago and that he died on August 11, 1979.

Sgt. Robert J. Faust, supervising officer of decedent, filed his written report covering the facts leading to the death of Officer Hill on August 27, 1979. It appears that decedent commenced his tour of duty at midnight preceding his death at about 5:40 a.m. on August 11, 1979. The decedent had responded to a radio call from a police car, and he went to the area of 57th Street and King Drive, Chicago, where he pursued a robbery suspect. Upon returning to his car, Officer Hill complained of chest pains. He was taken to Michael Reese Hospital where, despite efforts of the medical staff, he died. The death certificate shows that Officer Hill died as the result of an acute coronary insufficiency.

The designation of beneficiary form signed by Officer Hill on December 3, 1974, names his mother, Mrs. Madeline W. Hill, as the sole beneficiary, and the facts available to the court show that Officer Hill died in performance of his duty, and that his death was not the result of intoxication or willful conduct.

The Court finds that Officer Hill died in the line of duty, and that the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and is hereby awarded to Madeline W. Hill, mother and sole beneficiary of Arthur W. Hill, deceased.


text:
    (No. 00177

      In re Application of Ines Torres.

      Opinion filed February 29, 1980.

    Inés Torres, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (James S. Stephenson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The Claimant seeks payment of compensation as the widow of Jose M. Torres, pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. (111. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, pars. 281-285.

The Court has reviewed the application for benefits submitted by Claimant together with a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and has also reviewed the report of the Attorney General of Illinois. From a consideration of these documents, the Court finds:

1. That Ines Torres is the widow of decedent, police officer, Jose M. Torres, and that in the absence of a designated beneficiary, section 3(a) of the Act provides that any award made pursuant thereto shall be paid to the surviving widow.

2. That decedent, Jose M. Torres, was a police officer employed by the Chicago Police Department, and, on August 5, 1979, was working the 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. shift.

3. Decedent responded to a radio call to investigate a traffic accident at 2516 Blue Island in Chicago, Illinois. While standing next to a Buick automobile which had been involved in that accident, another vehicle approached and sides wiped the Buick, striking decedent. Decedent suffered multiple injuries to his legs, chest, and head. He subsequently died of these injuries on August 21, 1979.

4. The medical examiner’s Certificate of Death shows that Officer Torres died due to a pulmonary embolism resulting from a fractured leg.

5. There is nothing in the investigation to show that decedent’s death resulted from willful misconduct or alcoholic intoxication.

6. By reason of the foregoing, this Court orders that an award of $20,000.00 be made to Ines Torres, the surviving spouse of Jose M. Torres, deceased.


text:
    (No. 00180

      In re Application of Helen Zimmerman.

      Opinion filed February 29, 1980.

    Militello and Zanck, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (James S. Stephenson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The Claimant seeks payment of compensation as the widow of Elzo Zimmerman, pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. 111. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, pars. 281-285.

The Court has reviewed the application for benefits submitted by Claimant together with a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and has also reviewed the report of the Attorney General of Illinois. From a consideration of these documents, the Court finds:

1. That Helen Zimmerman is the widow of decedent, fireman Elzo Zimmerman, and that in the absence of a designated beneficiary, section 3(a) of the Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 283(a)) provides that any award made pursuant thereto shall be paid to the surviving widow.

2. That decedent, Elzo Zimmerman, was a fireman employed by the Hebron-Alden-Green wo o d Fire Protection District in Hebron, Illinois, and, on October 28, 1979, began duty at 11:30 p.m.

3. Decedent drove a pumper truck to a fire in Hebron. Upon arriving at the scene of the fire, he helped set up a portable tank adjoining the pumper truck into which the fire hose is placed. He worked in an area of exhaust fumes and heavy smoke. Fireman Zimmerman collapsed at the scene, and was taken to Memorial Hospital in McHenry County. He was pronounced dead at 1:07 a.m., October 29, 1979.

4. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites acute coronary thrombosis as the immediate cause of death. The autopsy report shows a blood carbon monoxide level of 10 percent.

5. There is no evidence to show that the decedent’s death resulted from willful misconduct or alcoholic intoxication.

6. By reason of the foregoing, this Court orders that an award of $20,000.00 be made to Helen Zimmerman, the surviving spouse of Elzo Zimmerman, deceased.


text:
    (No. 00184

      In re Application of Nettie Tapscott.

      Opinion filed May 7, 1980.

    Nettie Tapscott, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (James S. Stephenson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The Claimant seeks payment of compensation as the mother and designated beneficiary of David R. Tapscott, pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, eh. 48, pars. 281-285.

The Court has reviewed the application for benefits submitted by Claimant together with a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and has also reviewed the report of the Attorney General of Illinois. From a consideration of these documents, the Court finds:

1. That Nettie Tapscott is the mother and designated beneficiary of decedent, police officer David Tapscott.

2. That decedent, David Tapscott, was a police officer employed by the Springfield Police Department, and, on December 24,1979, was working the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift.

3. Decedent received a call to investigate a disturbance at a location in Springfield. En route to the disturbance, decedent swerved the police van he was driving to avoid an automobile, hit a support of a viaduct, skidded sideways and came to rest underneath a rail overpass. Decedent suffered multiple traumatic injuries, and subsequently died of these injuries on December 27,1979.

4. There is no evidence to show that decedent’s death resulted from willful misconduct or intoxication.

5. By reason of the foregoing, this Court orders that an award of $20,000.00 be made to Nettie Tapscott, the mother and designated beneficiary of David Tapscott, deceased.


text:
    (No. 00185

      In re Application of Dorothy Dickey.

      Opinion filed May 7, 1980.

    Dorothy Dickey, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (James S. Stephenson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The Claimant seeks payment of compensation as the widow of William Richard Dickey, pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, pars. 281-285.

The Court has reviewed the application for benefits submitted by Claimant together with a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and has also reviewed the report of the Attorney General of Illinois. From a consideration of these documents, the Court finds:

1. That Dorothy Dickey is the widow of decedent, volunteer fireman William Dickey.

2. That decedent, William Dickey, was a volunteer fireman employed by the Hutsonville Township Fire Department, and, on January 28, 1980, began duty at 10:15 p.m.

3. On January 28, 1980, the firemen of the Hutsonville Township Fire Department received a fire call at 10:15 p.m. Fireman Dickey was the first to arrive at the station. He unlocked the station door, turned on the station lights and the fire siren, and started the fire truck. As the other firemen arrived, they found Dickey slumped over in the driver’s seat of the truck. The time was approximately 10:20 p.m.

Dickey was pronounced dead on arrival at Crawford Memorial Hospital in Robinson, Illinois.

4. The medical examiner’s certificate of death shows acute myocardial infarction to be the cause of death.

5. There is no evidence to show that decedent’s death resulted from willful misconduct or intoxication.

6. A designation of beneficiary form, dated September 28, 1970, and prepared and signed by decedent, recites benefits of $10,000.00 for Dorothy Dickey.

Under the statute, the benefits for deaths occurring after December 31, 1973, are to be $20,00t).00. It is the opinion of this Court that the added increment of $10,000.00, which amount was not designated by decedent to pass to certain named beneficiaries, pass according to section 3(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 283(a)). Section 3(a) provides that where there is a surviving spouse, the entire sum shall be paid to the spouse.

7. By reason of the foregoing, this Court orders that an award of $20,000.00 be made to Dorothy Dickey, the surviving spouse of William Dickey, deceased.


author: POCH, J.

text:
    (No. 75-CV-0290

      In re Application of Suzette Delisa Young.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1979.

    Heath, Vital, Stroger, Bo arm an & Williams (Leroy P. Vital, of counsel), for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Leonard Cahnman, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of the death of Jerome W. Young which took place on July 30, 1974, at 6500 S. Carpenter, Chicago, Illinois. Claimant seeks compensation for loss of support under the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 70, par. 70 et seq., (hereafter referred to as the Act).

On September 23, 1975, this Court entered an order denying this claim. Claimant requested a hearing, and a hearing was held before a Commissioner of this Court.

The Court finds the issue presented to this Court was whether the Claimant was a dependent of the deceased.

The facts of the incident were that Jerome W. Young while walking at or near 6500 S. Carpenter, Chicago, Illinois, on July 30, 1974, was shot in the head after having been accosted by his assailant. The deceased was dead on arrival at St. Bernard’s Hospital, Chicago, Illinois, of the bullet wound to his head.

The Chicago Police Department was notified immediately of the incident. An arrest was made of the alleged assailant who was indicted for murder and was, at the time of the hearing before the Court, awaiting trial.

The Court finds that the Claimant cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant; that the victim and his assailant were not related nor did they share the same household; that the death of the victim was not in any way attributable to his own wrongful act or provocation of the assailant; and that the appropriate notice was timely filed as contemplated by the Act.

Accordingly, this Court finds that Jerome W. Young was the innocent victim of a violent crime to wit: Murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 9 — 1.

Suzette Newell is the ex-wife of the deceased victim. She has filed this claim on behalf of her daughter, Suzette Delisa Young, age 12 at the time of the death of her father, who alleges that she was dependent upon the victim for partial support.

Suzette Newell was divorced from the deceased victim on March 11,1964. The decree of divorce specified that Suzette Young (Newell) have the custody of Suzette Delisa Young. The matter of child support was reserved by the Court. On July 15, 1965, the decree for divorce was modified to require the deceased victim to pay $15.00 per week for child support to the plaintiff.

Suzette Newell testified that although she had not known her former husband’s residence address, he paid support payments through his sister, with whom the child visited. According to her testimony payments of between $15.00 and $30.00 were paid intermittently but mostly every two weeks.

Her testimony, however, was severely impeached by the application filed by her in this Court in which the Claimant answered “none” to Question No. 30 in the application which asked for the “amount contributed to or on behalf of dependents by victim.”

The Claimant, Suzette Newell, stated that her answer to the question was not true but that she was induced to answer in that manner by her brother, Levy Witfield, an attorney (but not licensed in Illinois) who helped her prepare the application. Her brother advised her to answer the question in that manner because her former husband was in arrears in payments at that time.

The Claimant was interviewed by an investigator of the Attorney General at which time she was asked the same question. She testified that she remained silent while her brother who was present at the interview answered the question in the same manner, i.e. no money was being contributed by the victim to or on behalf of his daughter, Suzette Delisa Young.

The victim’s sister, Gloria Hudson, testified on behalf of Claimant that the victim saw his daughter many times, averaging every two weeks and left money some of the times he visited, and that the amount of money varied from time to time. She testified that payments were made in cash and that the money was left with her because the victim did not want his ex-wife to know his address. In addition to payments, she testified that the victim brought clothes and toys to the child at various times.

The victim, at the time of his death, was employed by Arrow Security Company and had been earning $1,495.00 per month during the six-month period immediately preceding his death.

This Court held in the case of In re: Application of Ida Smith, (1976), 75-CV-0055 that:

“It is the opinion of this Court that mere entitlement to support is not dependency under the Act.”

The Court further said that:

“In looking at the Act as a whole, it is clear that the legislature intended to compensate those persons who lost actual out-of-pocket money as a result of violent crime. Every provision of the Act is strictly limited to out-of-pocket expense. One who is not actually receiving support, at the time of the crime, cannot be said to have had an out-of-pocket loss. An expectancy of support is not dependency under the Act."

Although in the Smith case, supra, there was no Court order which ordered the victim to support the alleged dependent, the opinion of this Court was stated clearly and is applicable to the instant case.

It was, therefore, Claimant’s burden to show actual contributions of support.

It is the opinion of this Court that, in view of the answers given by Claimant in her application to this Court and the statements made to the investigator for the Attorney General of Illinois, no award should be given for lost support.

The application was signed by Claimant who admitted reading and understanding it. She was helped in its preparation by a person educated in the law. She admitted standing silent when the question was orally answered in the same manner by her brother at the interview with the investigator of the Attorney General.

If the Court were to believe the testimony of the Claimant that she knew the statement on the application was false and that she knew her brother’s statement to the Attorney General investigator was false, then she is ineligible for any compensation whatever by virtue of section 13 of the Act which states:

“In addition to any other civil liability or criminal penalty provided by law, a person who is convicted of having wilfully misstated or omitted facts relevant to the determination of whether compensation is due under the Act or of the amount of that compensation, whether in making application for compensation or in the further proceedings provided for in this Act, shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. No compensation under this Act may be paid to an applicant who violates this section or knowingly acquiesces in a violation of this section.”

This Court believes that the Claimant did not sustain her burden of proof and is further ineligible for compensation by virtue of section 13 of the Act.

The Court, therefore, finds no cause to modify its order of September 23, 1975, denying this claim.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0173

      In re Application of Gerardo Courtade.

      Affirmed on rehearing March 20, 1980.

    Gerardo Courtade, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Jerry Felsenthal, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on 3035 West Irving Park Road, in Chicago, Illinois. Gerardo Courtade, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the Act.)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Rased upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Gerardo Courtade, age 43, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: “Aggravated Rattery.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4.

2. That on May 11, 1975, at about 12:30 a.m., the Claimant was walking at 3035 West Irving Park Road, in Chicago, Illinois, when two still unidentified youths stopped him and demanded money to buy pot. When the Claimant refused, the youths attacked him, one hitting him in the face with a bottle of soda pop. After a fight, the youths fled. The Claimant then went home but did not notify the police. On May 12, 1975, Claimant went to work, and, after work, saw his dentist, Dr. Pedro Cabrera, who advised him to go to the hospital. Claimant arrived at Forkosh Memorial Hospital in Chicago, Illinois, at 7:30 p.m., where the nurse on duty notified the police. Claimant was found to have a fractured jaw. No identification or arrests have been made in this matter.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the investigatory report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence that the Claimant’s injuries were in any way attributable to his wrongful act or the substantial provocation of his assailant.

4. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

5. That the Claimant in this case incurred hospital and medical expenses and suffered a loss of earnings. However the attack upon Claimant was not reported to the police until nearly 43 hours after it occurred. This is a violation of section 3(c) of the Act which requires that the appropriate law enforcement officials be:

“ ° ° * notified of the perpetration of the crime allegedly causing the * * * injury to the victim as soon after its perpetration as was reasonably practicable under the circumstances.”

Therefore, this claim must be denied since Claimant did not act in compliance with section 3(c) of the Act.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the claim of Gerardo Courtade be denied.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0512

      In re Application of Eleanor Klereski.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1980.

    Chapman & Cutler (Keehn Landis, of counsel), for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Wendy Weidberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on or about the 31st day of May 1975. Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the applicable provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq. (Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act).

The claim was filed on or about the 5th day of December 1975. Thereafter, based upon the investigatory report submitted by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois and the other documentary evidence, the Court rendered its opinion on or about the 27th day of December 1977. Claimant filed her objections to said opinion and requested a full hearing on the merits.

The hearing was conducted by Commissioner Leo J. Spivack on the 25th day of April 1979, in Chicago, Illinois. As a result of the hearing the following facts were established by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. Claimant, Eleanor Klereski, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to-wit: “Battery.”

2. Claimant notified appropriate police authorities of the occurrence within 24 hours, which under the facts presented was a reasonable amount of time and she has, therefore, complied with all the pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

3. Claimant incurred the following medical and/or hospital expenses, part of which were paid for and/or reimbursed by insurance:

Expense__Amount Insurance Net Claim

Hospital $951.25 $852.20 $ 99.05

Medical 584.30 314.69 269.61

Mise. 114.06 -0- 114.06

$482.72

4. Claimant was employed by Chapman and Cutler prior to the injury and her average monthly earnings were in excess of $500.00 per month. Claimant was disabled and unable to work from June 2, 1975, to September 12, 1975, a period of three months and ten days.

5. Section 4 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 74) states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.

6. That based on $500.00 per month, the maximum compensation for the loss of earnings for three months and ten days is $1,700.00.

7. The evidence shows that Claimant’s employer, although not contractually bound to do so, continued to pay Claimant her normal salary deducting therefrom withholding and Social Security taxes.

8. Claimant’s contention that the monies received were a “gift” is not supported by the evidence inasmuch as “gifts” are not deductible as business expenses by the donor, as was done in the existent case.

Based on the foregoing facts, it is the opinion of this Court that Claimant is not entitled to an award inasmuch as she received from her employer a sum in excess of that to which she might otherwise be entitled under the Act.

The Court, therefore, finds no grounds for reconsidering its opinion of December 27, 1977, denying the claim for compensation herein.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0550

      In re Application of Julia De Palma.

      Order filed April 30, 1980.

    Mahoney & McArdle, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion of Respondent to dismiss the claim heretofore filed by Julia DePalma, as guardian and next friend of Denise Simone, Anthony Simone, and Michelle Simone, minors.

Respondent’s motion sets forth that on June 19,1974, Rosemary Simone, wife of the deceased victim, William V. Simone, filed an application under the Crime Victims Compensation Act for funeral expenses and loss of support on behalf of herself and her three minor children, Denise, Anthony, and Michele Simone. Said motion also sets forth that on March 8,1976, Julia DePalma, Claimant therein, filed an application under the Act as guardian and next friend of Denise, Anthony and Michelle Simone. This claim is for funeral expenses and loss of support on behalf of the minor children.

The present claim arises out of the same incident for which benefits were claimed under Rosemary Simone v. State of Illinois, 74-CV-0072. Claimant was denied benefits in that case on the grounds that she did not cooperate with law enforcement officials as required by the Act. A copy of the Court’s opinion, dated September 5, 1975, was attached to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

It is Respondent’s contention that the Court’s decision of September 5, 1975, is conclusive to the entire matter and that the present claim should be dismissed. Respondent cites the case of Rolando v. Farmers and Miners Rank of Ladd (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 158, 376 N.E.2d 760. In that case, the Appellate Court used the following language:

“The doctrine of res judicata, which the bank seeks to invoke, provides that a former adjudication is an absolute bar to a subsequent proceeding if there is an identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the two actions. In such a situation the prior judgment is conclusive not only as to what was actually determined in the first case but is conclusive also as to any question which could have been raised. Smith v. Bishop (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 434, 187 N.E.2d 217. Thus if the party against whom the doctrine is raised had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action, the former determination is conclusive. Hedlund v. Miner (1946), 395 Ill. 217, 69 N.E.2d 878.

Claimants in the present case were also Claimants in the original suit and the State of Illinois is a party to both suits, and the subject matter in the case heretofore disposed of by the Court of Claims and the present case are the same. Thus res judicata is a bar to the present case and said cause is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-1071

      In re Application of Daniel D. Welter, Jr.

      Order filed April 24, 1980.

    Stephen G. Vargo, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on December 31, 1975. Daniel D. Welter, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on December 31, 1975, the Claimant and his friend were taken to a farm house located on or around Route 30, near Plainfield, Illinois, by two unknown offenders for the purpose of continuing a card game which they had begun in Sully’s Tavern, located on East Washington Street, Joliet, Illinois. An argument ensued as a result of the card game and the Claimant and his friend were shot and stabbed by the unknown offenders when they left the house. They were taken to St. Joseph’s Hospital for treatment.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to his wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant. Gambling is a crime in the State of Illinois under the provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 28.1. This Court has consistently held since the Court’s decision in the case of In re Application of Hardy, 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 230, that where a victim was killed as a result of arguments during gambling, such a victim substantially contributed through his illegal acts to his own injury or death.

This Court in the Hardy case said:

“Although this Court can not ignore this brutal killing, neither can it ignore the evidence before it as to the circumstances leading to it. The Act under which this claim is made is intended to compensate for injuries or death to victims who were innocent of any contribution to their own injury or death. The victim in this case, placed himself in a situation, through his illegal activities, where further illegal activities would be the probable result. Surely, the victim did not expect to be murdered, but just as surely he did place himself in a situation where he can not be considered an innocent victim.”

This reasoning is wholly applicable to the case before us.

3. That the evidence indicates that the Claimant was involved in a card game for money prior to his being shot, and that the shooting resulted from a dispute as to the winner of the card game. Playing cards for money is an illegal act in violation of the Illinois Criminal Code, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 28 — 1). Therefore, the claimant’s injury was substantially attributable to his wrongful act.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-1291

      In re Application of Terrisita Orante.

      Order filed May 29, 1980.

    Bienvenido M. Llaneta and Arc Joaquin, Jr., both for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 8, 1976. Terrisita Orante, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on July 8, 1976, the victim’s body was discovered in his automobile which was parked in the vicinity of 3035 W. Taylor Street, Chicago, Illinois. The victim had been beaten and then strangled. The victim’s body was taken to Mount Sinai Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

2. That section 3(c) and (d) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime and the applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the police report that the Claimant declined to cooperate fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension of the assailant, in that she fled the country with a man who has since confessed his participation in the murder before her affair with this person came to the attention of the authorities, thereby blocking further local police investigation of her participation in the murder. Currently both reside in the Phillipines, a country with which the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty.

4. By reason of the Claimant’s refusal to fully cooperate with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant as required by the Act she is not eligible for compensation thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 77-CV-0081

      In re Application of Lessie M. Curry.

      Order filed November 26, 1979.

    Lessie M. Curry, pro se, for Claimant.
    David L. Martinson, for the Town of Rockford.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Wendy Weidberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 27, 1976. Lessie M. Curry, wife of the deceased victim, Paul Edward Curry, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71, et seq.

Claimant stipulated that the facts of the matter were as follows (being essentially the same as found in this Court’s order filed herein on December 19, 1978):

1. The Claimant’s deceased husband, Paul Edward Curry, age 20, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1.

2. On July 27,1976, the victim was approached by a known offender who accused the victim of stealing a television set from the offender’s sister. The victim claimed to have no knowledge of the incident and the offender shot him. The victim was taken to Rockford Memorial Hospital where he expired the next day.

3. The Claimant seeks compensation under the Act for funeral expenses, medical/hospital expenses, and for loss of support.

4. The funeral and burial expenses were not paid by the Claimant; they were paid by Rockford Township.

5. The Claimant was billed $8,417.63 for various hospital and medical expenses which have not been paid to date. See Claimant’s Group Exhibit 1.

6. The victim was not employed for the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident out of which this claim arose.

Because of the provisions of sections 3(a) and 4 of the Act, Claimant is not eligible for an award for the hospital or medical bills, nor for loss of support. The Town of Rockford, not being “any person related to the victim”, cannot recover for the funeral expenses. Claimant, again by virtue of the provisions of section 3(a) of the Act, is also barred from claiming an award for the funeral expenses.

Accordingly, the claim herein is denied and the Order of December 19, 1978 is affirmed.


text:
    (No. 78-CV-0102

      In re Application of John Middleton.

      Opinion filed May 29, 1980.

    John Middleton, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 30, 1976. John Middleton, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, John Middleton, age 25, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Aggravated Battery. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4.

2. That on July 30,1976, the Claimant was shot by an unknown offender when he went to the aid of his brother who was being beaten by five offenders. The incident occurred in the hallway of an apartment building located at 1510 W. 13th Street, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant was taken to Cook County Hospital for treatment. The offender has been apprehended and convicted.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses and for loss of earnings.

4. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $21,701.28, $13,965.00 of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $7,736.28. Of this $7,736.28 balance, the Illinois Department of Public Aid has assumed the responsibility for $5,621.28, leaving a balance of $2,115.00 for which the Claimant is responsible.

5. That the Claimant was employed by Checker Taxi Company prior to the injury and his average monthly earnings were $877.08. Claimant was disabled and unable to work from July 31, 1976, to November 16, 1976, from January 18, 1977, to February 9, 1977, from October 30, 1977, to December 26, 1977, and from May 3, 1979, to May 29, 1979, for a total period of six months and 18 working days.

6. That section 4 of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.

7. That based on $500.00 per month, the maximum compensation for loss of earnings for six months and 18 working days is $3,409.25.

8. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

9. That pursuant to section 7(d) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.), from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

10. That the Claimant has received $1,688.57 in disability benefits.

11. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Compensable Loss of Earnings $3,409.25

Net Medical/Hospital Expenses 2,115.00

Total $5,524.25

Less Disability Benefits -1,688.57

Less $200.00 Deductible - 200.00

Total $3,635.68

12. That the Claimant will have additional medical/ hospital expenses and loss of earnings in the future as a result of this incident. Therefore, under section 8 of the Act he may petition this Court to reopen his claim in order to determine what additional compensation may be due.

It is hereby ordered that a temporary award of $3,635.68 be and is hereby awarded to John Middleton, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 78-CV-0144

      In re Application of Arthur L. Hackett.

      Order filed June 18, 1980.

    William D. O’Neal, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on December 10, 1977. Arthur L. Hackett, brother of the deceased victim, William Hackett, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on December 10, 1977, the victim was shot by an offender known to him. The incident occurred during a dice game at 4947 S. Federal, Chicago, Illinois. During the dice game, the offender accused the victim of cheating and shot him. The victim was taken to Provident Hospital where he died shortly after admission. The offender was apprehended and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of voluntary manslaughter.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to his wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant. Gambling is a crime in the State of Illinois under the provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 28.1. This Court has consistently held since the Court’s decision in the case of In re Application of Hardy, 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 230, that where a victim was killed as a result of arguments during gambling, such a victim substantially contributed through his illegal acts to his own injury or death.

This Court.in the Hardy case said:

“Although this Court can not ignore this brutal killing, neither can it ignore the evidence before it as to the circumstances leading to it. The Act under which this claim is made is intended to compensate for injuries or death to victims who were innocent of any contribution to their own injury or death. The victim in this case, placed himself in a situation, through his illegal activities, where further illegal activities would be the probable result. Surely, the victim did not expect to be murdered, but just as surely he did place himself in a situation where he can not be considered an innocent victim.”

This reasoning is wholly applicable to the case before us.

3. That the evidence indicates that the victim was involved in a dice game for money prior to his being shot, and that the shooting resulted from a dispute as to the winner of the dice game. Playing dice for money is an illegal act in violation of the Illinois Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 28 — 1). Therefore, the Claimant’s injury was substantially attributable to his wrongful act.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 78-CV-0258

      In re Application of Mary Slightom.

      Order filed November 30, 1979.

    Beth Johnson, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 11, 1977, in Peoria, Illinois. Mary Slightom, wife of the victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the victim, Frank Slightom, age 22, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1).

2. That the Claimant’s deceased husband, Frank Slightom, age 22, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1.

3. That on March 11, 1977, Claimant’s husband, Frank Slightom, was stabbed and killed by Jimmy Jones after Slightom approached Jones with a broken broomstick. Slightom waved the stick in front of Jones and the stick was knocked from Slightom’s hand. Jones pulled a knife and stabbed Slightom three times.

4. That section 3(b) of the Act provides that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

5. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s death was attributable to his substantial provocation of the assailant when he approached the assailant with a weapon.

6. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of Mary Slightom be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 78-CV-0268

      In re Application of Sharon Naumes.

      Order filed October 5, 1979.

    Sharon Naumes, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Wendy Weidberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 4, 1978. Sharon Naumes, ex-wife of Warren G. Naumes, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on March 4, 1978, the deceased was strangled during a scuffle with the offender, with whom he had been sharing an apartment. The incident occurred at the apartment located at 2108 W. Belmont, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was dead on arrival at Illinois Masonic Hospital.

2. That in case number 78-1-1475 in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal Division, the offender was found not guilty of murder in this incident.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral and burial expenses. The deceased was not employed for the six months prior to his death and the Claimant was not dependent upon him for support.

4. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $1,350.00, all of which she paid.

5. That section 3 of the Act states that any person related to the victim is eligible for compensation for funeral and burial expenses provided that such expenses were paid by them.

6. That under 73-D-24327 in the Divorce Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Claimant was divorced from the victim on October 18, 1974, and was not related to the victim at the time of the incident.

7. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered, that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 78-CV-0403

      In re Application of Mae Ella and Joseph Johnson.

      Order filed April 7, 1980.

    Mae Ella Johnson and Joseph Johnson, pro se, for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Allen R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on October 28,1977. Mae Ella Johnson and Joseph Johnson, mother and stepfather, respectively, of the victim, Eugene T. Spearman, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds.

1. That on October 28,1977, the victim was shot by an unknown offender. The shooting stemmed from an incident that occurred a short time before it. The offender encountered the victim in a tavern, where they had a brief argument. The victim told the offender to go outside the tavern with him and the offender complied. Once outside the tavern, he initiated an attack on the offender by striking him and repeatedly kicking him. The offender fled the attack and ran to his home two blocks away, where he obtained a handgun. The offender returned to the tavern where he had first encountered the victim. Failing to find the victim there, he went to the next tavern, the E & L Lounge, 5627 W. Madison, Chicago, Illinois, where he located the victim and shot him twice. The victim was dead on arrival at Loretto Hospital.

2. That the Claimants seek compensation for funeral and burial expenses. Neither of the Claimants were dependent upon the victim for support.

3. That the Claimant, Joseph Johnson, has paid $350.00 of the total funeral and burial expenses of $1,289.50. The Claimant, Mae Ella Johnson, has paid $644.50 of the total funeral and burial expenses. The Illinois Department of Public Aid has paid $295.00 of the funeral and burial expenses.

4. That section 7(c) of the Act, states that the Court of Claims shall determine the degree or extent to which the victim’s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injuries or death and reduce or deny the award of compensation accordingly.

5. That the Court finds that the victim’s conduct contributed to his death to such a substantial degree as to warrant a full denial of this claim pursuant to section 7(c).

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 78-CV-0758

      In re Application of Eddie Mae Atkins.

      Order filed August 14, 1979.

    Eddie Mae Atkins, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Wendy Weidberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of incident that occurred on January 15, 1977. Eddie Mae Atkins, wife of the victim, Floyd Atkins, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. On January 15, 1977, the victim accused the offender, a woman whom he was living with, of running around with other men. A fight ensued in which the victim used physical force against the offender and threatened to kill her. In order to protect herself, the offender shot the victim one time. This incident occurred at 538 W. 60th Place, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was taken to St. Bernard’s Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. At trial the offender was found not guilty of murder.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act provides that a person is entited to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s death was attributable to the victim’s substantial provocation of the assailant.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 78-CV-0775

      In re Application of Joseph Burkes and In re Application of Valerie Addison.

      Opinion filed June 18, 1980.

    Joseph Burkes and Valerie Addison, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 17, 1978. Joseph Burkes and Valerie Addison, father and wife, respectively of the deceased victim, Willie Addison, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Willie Addison, age 22, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Voluntary Manslaughter. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1.

2. That on August 17, 1978, the victim was shot several times by an offender who was known to him. The incident occurred in the lobby of the apartment building at 7456 South Shore Drive, Chicago, Illinois. Minutes before the shooting, the victim had become involved in an altercation with the offender. During the altercation, the victim struck the offender, inflicting a wound on the offender’s eye. After being struck, the offender ran to his home several doors away and obtained a handgun, returning to the scene of the altercation within minutes. At that time, the offender shot the victim several times. The victim was taken to Jackson Park Hospital, where he expired shortly after admission. The offender was apprehended and entered a plea of guilty to the charge of voluntary manslaughter.

3. That the Claimant, Joseph Burkes, seeks compensation for funeral expenses only. He was not dependent upon the victim for support.

4. That the Claimant, Joseph Burkes, incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $1,400.00.

5. That the Claimant, Valerie Addison, seeks compensation for loss of support for herself and for her minor child, Dametre Damont Davis, age one.

6. That section 7(c) of the Act, states that the Court of Claims shall determine the degree or extent to which the victim’s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injuries or death and reduce or deny the award of compensation accordingly.

7. That the Court finds that the victim’s conduct contributed to his death to such a substantial degree as to warrant a full denial of this claim pursuant to section 7 (c) of the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the claims of Joseph Burkes and Valerie Addison be, and are, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0018

      In re Application of Leonard H. Turner.

      Order filed April 7, 1980.

    Richard Huszagh, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on April 20, 1977. Leonard H. Turner seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on April 20, 1977, the victim was shot by an offender known to him. The incident occurred in a tavern at 723 S. Kedzie, Chicago, Illinois, following a dice game. Police investigation revealed that the offender had lost a sum of money in the dice game to the victim and other participants. The offender, angered by his losing money, announced a robbery and then shot the victim. The victim was taken to Mount Sinai Hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound to his back.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the Claimant’s injury was substantially attributable to the Claimant and the offender participating in a dice game for money.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0055

      In re Application of Mayetta Edwards.

      Order filed June 18, 1980.

    Mayetta Edwards, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on October 30,1978. Mayetta Edwards, wife of the deceased victim, Robert Edwards, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on October 30,1978, the victim was stabbed by an offender known to him. The victim stabbed the offender during an altercation concerning the victim’s attempt to purchase a controlled substance. The victim attempted to flee the scene of the stabbing but was chased by the offender, who stabbed the victim upon reaching him. The incident occurred on the street at One South Oakley, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was taken to Cook County Hospital where he expired on November 13, 1978. The offender was apprehended, prosecuted and convicted of voluntary manslaughter.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s death was substantially attributable to the fact that he had stabbed the offender during an altercation concerning the purchase of a controlled substance.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0071

      In re Application of Linda B. Cotton.

      Order filed April 7, 1980.

    George Marchetti, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on November 4,1978. Linda B. Cotton, wife of the deceased victim, John A. Cotton, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on November 4, 1978, the victim was struck across the chest with a metal pipe by Mr. William Burnett. The incident occurred when the victim brought his son to Mr. Burnett’s property at 720 Yates, Romeo-ville, Illinois, to fight Mr. Burnett’s son over an earlier altercation. Mr. Burnett came out of his house to aid his son, and ordered the victim and his family off his property. An altercation then began between the victim and Mr. Burnett. The victim picked up a rake and began poking Mr. Burnett. Mr. Burnett was handed a metal pipe by his son and swung it at the victim, hitting him across the chest. The victim was dead on arrival at Silver Cross Hospital. Cause of death was attributed to acute cardiorespiratory failure. An inquest ruled that the death was accidental. No criminal charges were placed against Mr. Burnett as the case was classified self-defense.

■2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s death was substantially attributable to the victim’s refusal to leave Mr. Burnett’s property and his subsequent attack on Mr. Burnett with a rake.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0092

      In re Application of Edward J. Ryan.

      Order filed March 19, 1980.

    John Haskins, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on January 20, 1978. Edward J. Ryan, brother of the deceased victim, Bernard F. Ryan, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on January 20, 1978, the victim was shot by an unknown offender. The body of the victim was found in an automobile parked at 1657 N. 44th Avenue, Stone Park, Illinois. The victim was taken to Northlake Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

2. That Federal and local enforcement agencies have linked the victim’s death to his involvement in a six-man burglary ring which fenced stolen merchandise. All six members of this burglary ring were found slain within a few months of each other. To date no assailant has been apprehended.

3. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

4. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s death was substantially attributable to his involvement in a burglary ring.

5. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0131

      In re Application of Craig Phillips.

      Order filed September 9, 1979.

    Craig Phillips, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Wendy Weidberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on May 6,1978. Craig Phillips, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on May 6, 1978, the Claimant suffered a puncture wound to his heart as he waited alone for his friends on the school grounds of the Locke School located at 2823 N. Newcastle, Chicago, Illinois. Police invetigation indicated that the Claimant suffered this wound when he collapsed to the ground and cut himself on a broken bottle, many of which litter the school grounds. The Claimant was taken to Northwest Hospital for treatment of his injury.

2. That in order for a Claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence of one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 2(c) of the Act.

3. That an accidental injury is not one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 2(c) of the Act.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered, that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0164

      In re Application of Nathan Hampton.

      Order filed February 21, 1980.

    Nathan Hampton, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on December 22,1978. Nathan Hampton seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on December 22, 1978, the Claimant was shot by Bennie Brown, the uncle of his girlfriend. The Claimant had followed his girlfriend to Mr. Brown’s apartment at 1639 W. 66th Street, Chicago, Illinois, where the incident occurred. After Mr. Brown refused to let the Claimant into the apartment, the Claimant forcibly entered the apartment by breaking the locks from the door. When he entered the apartment, the Claimant threatened to kill his girlfriend and Mr. Brown. At this time, the Claimant was shot by Mr. Brown. The Claimant was taken to Englewood Hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound to his abdomen. Mr. Brown was charged with failure to register the gun involved in the shooting. The Claimant was charged with criminal damage to property regarding his entrance into Mr. Brown’s apartment.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the Claimant’s injury was substantially attributable to the Claimant’s forcing entry into Mr. Brown’s apartment and the threats he directed against his girlfriend and Mr. Brown.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0223

      In re Application of Dorothy Lacey.

      Order filed April 7, 1980.

    Dorothy Lacey, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 12, 1978. Dorothy Lacey, mother of the deceased victim, Cheryl Lacey, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, eh. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on June 17,1980, the body of the victim was found near Michigan City, Indiana. The victim had been beaten with a blunt object. The victim had been last seen leaving a Midlothian, Illinois, tavern. Police investigation revealed that the victim had left the tavern with three unknown offenders and that they had driven to a LaPorte County, Indiana, location. At that location, one of the three offenders struck the victim several times with a hammer. The three offenders were charged with the victim’s murder by the LaPorte County, Indiana, State’s Attorney.

2. That section 2(d) of the Act, defines a “victim” as a person killed or injured in this State.

3. That Cheryl Lacey was not a victim of a crime which occurred in the State of Illinois.

4. That the crime was not committed in the State of Illinois and the deceased was not a “victim” according to section 2(d) of the Act.

5. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0248

      In re Application of David Debold.

      Order filed February 21, 1980.

    Samuel J. Ruffolo, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on February 12,1977. David Debold, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on February 12, 1977, the Claimant was stabbed by an unknown offender. The incident occurred during a fight concerning the Claimant’s attempt to purchase narcotics from the offender. The location of the incident was a hallway at 1538 S. Claremont, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant was transported to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital and admitted for treatment of a stab wound to the chest.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the Claimant’s injury was substantially attributable to his conduct in attempting to purchase narcotics.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0255

      In re Application of Earl Knight.

      Order filed April 7, 1980.

    Earl Knight, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on February 10, 1978. Earl Knight, father of the victim, Keith Knight, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on February 10,1978, the victim was shot by his girlfriend at the residence they shared at 6512 S. Ross, Chicago, Illinois. The incident stemmed from an altercation between the victim and his girlfriend during which he repeatedly struck her and threatened her with a gun. After a struggle for the gun, the victim’s girlfriend gained possession of the gun and shot him. The victim was taken to St. Bernard’s Hospital where he expired shortly after admission. Police investigation classified the incident as justifiable homicide. The victim’s girlfriend was charged with unlawful use of weapons.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s death was substantially attributable to the victim’s physical assault against his girlfriend and his threats to use a gun against her.

4. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral and burial expenses incurred as a result of the victim’s death.

5. That section 3(a) of the Act states a person related to a victim is eligible for compensation for reasonable funeral expenses provided that such expenses were paid by him.

6. That the total funeral and burial expenses for the victim were paid by the Illinois Department of Public Aid in the amount of $550.00.

7. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0319

      In re Application of Erica Darmstatter.

      Order filed February 8, 1980.

    Erica Darmstatter, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on April 7,1978, in Murphysboro, Illinois. Erica Darmstatter, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois. Rased upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Erica Darmstatter, age 19, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Battery. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12 — 3.

2. That on April 7,1978, Claimant’s boyfriend hit her in the face breaking her jaw as they were preparing to go to a party. The incident occurred at his residence. The boyfriend then made a deal with Claimant that he would pay the bills if she did not report him to police. Claimant informed police of the attack on June 14,1979, more than 1 year later, but would not press charges.

3. That the Act requires that one who claims to be an innocent victim of a crime must cooperate fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

4. That it appears from the police report that the Claimant declined to cooperate fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the known assailant in that she failed to press charges.

5. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of Erica Darmstatter be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0389

      In re Application of L. Mildred Sutherland.

      Order filed May 27, 1980.

    James May, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 4,1978, in Bureau County, Illinois. L. Mildred Sutherland, mother of the victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased son, Gregory Sutherland, age 25, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Battery. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 1 — 3.

2. That on June 4,1978, Claimant’s son was struck in the face by Roger Richardson after arguing over a traffic dispute. All witnesses to the incident stated that Gregory Sutherland verbally threatened Roger Richardson and pushed him. Mr. Richardson then struck Mr. Sutherland in the face. Mr. Sutherland fell to the ground striking his head on the pavement. Mr. Sutherland died on June 5, 1978, of head injuries.

3. That section 3(b) of the Act provides that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

4. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s death was attributable to his substantial provocation of the assailant when he verbally threatened the assailant and then pushed him.

5. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of L. Mildred Sutherland be, and is hereby dismissed.


text:
    (No. 79-CV-0398

      In re Application of Joyce Cook Bey.

      Order filed April 24, 1980.

    Joyce Cook Bey, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 22, 1978, as a result of which the Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant alleges that on September 22, 1978, the victim was beaten by four unknown offenders for no apparent reason. She further states that the alleged victim was found by his brother in an alley at 57th and Peoria, Chicago, Illinois. The alleged victim was taken home and was complaining of back pains. The following day, the alleged victim became comatose and was taken to Cook County Hospital, where he began receiving treatment for a blood clot to his brain. Prior to the incident, the alleged victim had a history of a heart condition and had been receiving treatment for rheumatic fever. The alleged victim remained in a hospital until his death on November 17, 1979. Cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest brought on by penumonia.

2. That according to section 2(d) of the Act, “victim” means and includes a person killed or injured in this State as a result of a crime of violence perpetrated or attempted against him.

3. That the Claimant has failed to establish that her husband, Hass an Cook Bey, was a victim of a crime of violence in that there is no record of a police report nor any other document verifying that said injury was the result of a crime of violence.

4. That by reason of the Claimant’s failure to establish that the injuries sustained by her husband, Hassan Cook Bey, were the result of a crime of violence, the Claimant is not eligible for compensation under the Act.

It is therefore ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 80-CV-0050

      In re Application of Richard Belter.

      Order filed May 29, 1980.

    Richard Belter, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on January 22, 1978. Richard Belter, stepfather of the victim, Jerry Cavette, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, eh. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on January 22, 1978, the victim was stabbed by an offender known to him during an altercation. The incident stemmed from a party the victim and the offender were attending at 4925 Olde Wilke Road, Rolling Meadows, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that there had been an argument between the victim and the offender. During the course of the argument, the victim produced a knife and threatened the offender. The offender then also produced a knife and stabbed the victim. The victim was taken to Northwest Community Hospital for treatment.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s injury was substantially attributable to his threatening the offender with a knife first.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 80-CV-0064

      In re Application of Dennis R. King.

      Order filed April 8, 1980.

    Dennis R. King, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 12, 1979, in Danville, Illinois. Dennis R. King, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Dennis R. King, age 22, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Aggravated Battery. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12 — 3.

2. That on March 12, 1979, Claimant was shot in the groin by a subject with whom he had been fighting. Claimant was at a private club and had re-entered the club after being asked to leave.

3. That section 3(b) of the Act provides that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

4. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the Claimant’s injury was attributable to his substantial provocation of the assailant.

5. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the Claim of Dennis R. King be, and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 80-CV-0069

      In re Application of Ralph Baker, Jr.

      Order filed February 21, 1980.

    Ralph Baker, Jr., pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 19, 1978. Ralph Baker, Jr., seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on August 19,1978, the Claimant was shot by David Rodriquez in the back yard of Mr. Rodriquez’s home at 2821 Chicago Road, South Chicago Heights, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the Claimant and three friends were attacking Mr. Rodriquez’s brother. In response to his brother’s cries for help, Mr. Rodriquez shot the Claimant and two of his friends. The Claimant was taken to St. James Hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound to his left arm. No criminal charges were brought against Mr. Rodriquez.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the Claimant’s injury was substantially attributable to his attack on Mr. Rodriquez’s brother.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 80-CV-0085

      In re Application of John R. Doud.

      Order filed February 21, 1980.

    John R. Doud, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 19,1978. John R. Doud, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, eh. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. On August 19, 1978, the Claimant was shot by David Rodriquez in the back yard of Mr. Rodriquez’s home at 2821 Chicago Road, South Chicago Heights, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the Claimant and three friends were attacking Mr. Rodriquez’s brother. In response to his brother’s cries for help, Mr. Rodriquez shot the Claimant and two of his friends. The Claimant was taken to St. James Hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound to his abdomen. No criminal charges were brought against Mr. Rodriquez.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the Claimant’s injury was substantially attributable to his attack on Mr. Rodriquez’s brother.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is, hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 80-CV-0206

      In re Application of Linda Bradshaw.

      Order filed May 29, 1980.

    Linda Bradshaw, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on November 4,1978. Linda Bradshaw, on behalf of Reggie Washington, son of the deceased victim, Henderson Washington, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on November 4, 1978, the victim was shot following an altercation by an offender who was known to him. The incident occurred at 6033 S. Vernon, Chicago, Illinois, where the offender, Eddie Jennings, lived with the Claimant, the mother of the Claimant, and Reggie Washington, the son of the victim and the Claimant. While the victim was visiting his son at the above address, he began making verbal threats to the occupants and then struck the Claimant and her mother. At this time, the offender shot the victim once. The victim was taken to Billings Hospital where he expired shortly thereafter.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s death was substantially attributable to his threatening and then striking the Claimant and her mother before the offender shot him.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 80-CV-0272

      In re Application of Vito and Hattie Brando.

      Order filed May 29, 1980.

    Vito and Hattie Brando, both pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Alan R. Boudreau, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 3, 1979. Vito and Hattie Brando, parents of the deceased victim, George Edward Brando, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on September 3,1979, the victim was shot by Mr. Nathan Landfair, who was known to him. The incident occurred when the victim was visiting Mr. Landfair at his residence located at 9129 S. Colfax, Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Landfair saw that the victim had a gun and asked him to leave. When he didn’t leave, Mr. Landfair got his own gun and fired a warning shot. The victim then aimed his gun at Mr. Landfair, and Mr. Landfair shot him. The victim was dead on arrival at South Chicago Hospital. No charges were placed against Mr. Landfair.

2. That section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s death was substantially attributable to his producing a gun and aiming it at Mr. Landfair before Mr. Landfair shot him.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.