author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 5324
    John Patton and Jacqueline R. Patton, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Leiter, Mewlin, Fraser, Parkhurst & McCord, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

A house on a hilltop, claimants’ residence, was so badly damaged by a landslide that it became virtually worthless and had to be abandoned. Claimants charge that the landslide which resulted in a total loss of their property’s value was caused by acts of negligence on the part of the Illinois Division of Highways.

Claimants’ residence was located on the top of a steep hill some 100 feet back from the highway known as U.S. Route 24, south of Bartonville, in Peoria County. The complaint charges that the respondent, while constructing this highway in 1954, was negligent in cutting back the hillside in front of claimants’ house and in failing to exercise due care to avoid unnecessary damage to claimants’ property.

Various other acts of negligence alleged in the complaint include the following. No prior notice was given to the claimants as to the magnitude of the cut which was made into the hillside. Respondent removed a concrete block garage set into the hillside at the foot of the hill where the cut was made. No retaining wall or other structure was constructed by the respondent to shore up or support the hillside after the cut was made. The employees of the Division of Highways should have known that cutting into the base of the hillside below the claimants’ property would constitute a dangerous, unsafe condition and would be conducive to landslides.

The complaint further states that various representations and promises were made to the claimants by employees of the Division of Highways, both before claimants purchased their property in 1953 and after respondent had made the changes in the hillside in 1954 which allegedly caused claimants’ loss. Claimants state that none of these representations and promises were carried out by the respondent.

Subsequent to the cutting and removal of the dirt from the base of the hill, according to the complaint, four landslides occurred on the claimants’ property, which caused varying degrees of damage. These were in 1958,' 1961, 1964 and, finally, the most serious one in 1965 tore away the foundation under claimants’ house and otherwise damaged it so that it was not habitable and repair would not be economically feasible.

The complaint alleges that the claimants were forced to move out of the property in January of 1966 because it was no longer safe to live there; that the negligent acts of the Division of Highways caused the property to become valueless and claimants to lose the investment which they had made in the acquisition and improvement of the premises.

The amount of $7,500.00, which claimants ask in damages, is shown by the evidence to be a fair and even a modest estimate of their actual financial loss. None of the testimony relating to the amount of claimants’ damages is denied or controverted.

No answer having been filed by the respondent, a general traverse or denial of the facts set forth in the complaint is considered as filed pursuant to the rules of this Court. However, in the voluminous record of the hearing in this case, we find that none of the testimony upon which claimants rely was disputed by the respondent. It is therefore accepted as factual. Following is a summary of these undisputed facts presented by the claimants.

In September 1952, before the claimants purchased and moved into the property, they called the Highway Division for information regarding its plans for the improvement of the highway below and in front of the property which they were considering buying. A representative from the Highway Division came out and talked to-the claimants, gave them a plat showing the approximate boundary of the proposed frontage road, and told them that the construction would not involve a cut into the hillside. He said that just a little bit of the bottom of the hill would be scraped away in order to put in a curb and gutter at the edge of the new frontage road. Thus assured, and relying on this assurance, the claimants purchased the property and moved in.

In the spring of 1954, without notice to the claimants, the Highway Division cut a slice off the base of the hill all along the front of claimants’ property within the area of the highway right-of-way. This cut extended some 20 feet into the hillside, and was 3 to 5 feet deep. An old garage at the foot of the hill was removed at the time the cut was made. The edge of the claimants’ driveway was left hanging some 2 or 3 feet above the level of the road. No shoring, bracing or retaining wall was built by the respondent in or against the cut-back hillside although, after the cut, employees of the Highway Division at various times represented to the claimants that some sort of retaining wall would be constructed.

Prior to this cut, no slide or movement of earth had occurred on the hillside for more than 50 years. Prior to making the cut, the Highway Division had made some test borings to determine the nature of the soil in the hillside. None were made directly in front of the claimants’ house, but a test boring some 110 feet away showed that the top surface of the hillside was silty clay to a depth of 7 feet. No attempt was made to compact or tamp down any of the fresh dirt on the hillside which had been exposed by the cut. The respondent was aware that the land in the general area was conducive to sliding.

In 1958, after the completion of the highway improvement, a landslide occurred on the hillside in front of the claimants’ house. Some of the concrete blocks fell out from underneath their front porch and rolled down the hill. The footings underneath the front porch sank about 6 inches. Mrs. Patton, one of the claimants, called the Highway Division, notified them of the slide, and asked if it was due to their cutting at the bottom of the hill. She was assured there was nothing to worry about, and so her husband poured some concrete on top of the old footings, replaced the blocks under the foundation of the house, and supported the porch floor with some heavy timbers.

In 1961 another landslide occurred some 80 feet north of the claimants’ house, uphill from their driveway, and almost directly above the place where the old garage had been removed from the foot of the hill. This slide came down over claimants’ driveway and closed it off. The Division of Highways was notified immediately and one of its engineers, Mr. Louis Baxter, came out, observed the landslide and talked to Mrs. Patton. He declined to do anything about the removal of the dirt, and told her that there was nothing he could do about it because it was not on the State’s right-of-way. The claimants then contacted the County Highway Department which sent men out to the site with a bulldozer and cleared claimants’ driveway.

In 1964, another slide occurred uphill from the driveway, in approximately the same area as the 1961 slide. Again the claimants’ driveway was closed by the sliding earth. Again the Highway Division was immediately notified and asked to clear the driveway. Again Mr. Baxter talked to Mrs. Patton, but told her that it was not within the State’s right-of-way, and nothing could be done about it. He didn’t bother to come out and look at it. That second time, the County Highway Department refused to come back again and clear claimants’ driveway because they said it was the State’s responsibility. Mr. Patton finally shoveled enough of the dirt off the driveway himself to get his car up to the house.

In March of 1965 the final catastrophic slide occurred. This time, again, it was directly in front of the claimants’ house. It tore out the foundation beneath the porch and carried dirt, debris, trees and shrubs down the hillside onto the frontage road below. It left the claimants’ house precariously overhanging the hillside, and damaged it .beyond repair. The slide originated about 20 feet above and uphill from the top of the cut.

The landslide was newsworthy enough to cause the Peoria Journal Star to take pictures of the scene from a helicopter and run them in the newspaper on April 10,1965. These published photos were among claimants’ exhibits.

On the morning after the landslide, several employees of the Highway Division went to the site and evidenced great concern. Mr. J. E. Harland, respondent’s district engineer, looked over the situation and caused a number of pictures to be taken. Twenty-five of these photos were selected by the attorney for the claimants as being representative of the scene and were admitted in evidence as claimants’ exhibits. Mr. Louis Baxter, respondent’s field engineer, and a Mr. Scribner went to the scene also, talked to Mrs. Patton, and suggested that she move out of the house immediately because it was dangerous and unsafe to live there. While these men were talking with Mrs. Patton, a messenger came with a special delivery letter and handed it to Mrs. Patton. The letter stated the Highway Division was not responsible for the landslide.

After viewing the scene, a decision was made by the respondent to leave things alone and place barricades around the dirt and debris which had slid down the hill and partially obstructed the frontage road. These barricades for the protection of passing motorists remained in place for months after the slide and are shown in the newspaper pictures among claimants’ exhibits. The dirt and debris which obstructed the road was left in place and not disturbed because it was feared by all concerned that its removal might precipitate another landslide. The dirt pile had not been removed at the date of the hearing on this matter, November 20, 1967, and traffic was required to move around it.

Respondent, in denying liability, argues that under the doctrine of lateral support, as enunciated in I.L.P. Adjoining Landowners, Sec. 11 and in numerous Illinois decisions, claimants’ right to lateral support extends only to their soil in its natural condition and not to their house or any structure on their land.

We could accept this well established rule of law as controlling if we did not have before us the question of negligent excavation which is governed by the equally well established rule stated in I.L.P. Adjoining Landowners, Sec. 14:

“In the leading case of City of Quincy vs. Jones, 76 Ill. 231, as well as in other decisions, the courts of this state have established the rule that the right to excavate on one’s own property should be exercised with reasonable skill and care in order to avoid unnecessary damage to buildings and structures on adjoining properties, taking into consideration the character of such buildings or structures and the nature of the soil.”

A comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of lateral support in Illinois, and the right of action for negligent excavation, is set forth in 1956 Law Forum, pages 646 to 650. The writer, after a review of all the applicable Illinois cases, concludes as follows:

“Absent contributory negligence, there is always a right to recover for injury to improved land for damages to both land and buildings, where the injury was caused by negligent excavation, even though the land would not have subsided without the additional weight of the buildings.”

The above rule is restated to the same effect in I.L.P. Adjoining Landowners, Sec. 16.

The two essential questions in this case are, first, whether or not the Division of Highways was negligent in some manner in cutting away the foot of the hill in front of claimants’ house and, second, whether that negligence caused the landslides and the accompanying damages.

Respondent insists, in its brief, that claimants failed to maintain the burden of proving negligence on the part of the Division of Highways. We disagree. The evidence, taken as a whole, reveals a pattern of negligent conduct by the respondent in this case. Several acts of the respondent have each been the basis for a finding of negligence in the cases cited in claimants’ brief. When these acts are considered together and in their relationship to each other, respondent’s negligence is even more clearly established.

We find that the Division of Highways was negligent in some, if not all, of the following ways: when it represented to the claimants that it would not cut into the hillside; when it gave no notice of the cut which was made in the spring of 1954; when it failed to compact or tamp down the raw earth exposed by the cut; when it failed to shore up the hillside, or put up any sort of retaining wall; and when it failed to anticipate that its cut might cause a landslide in front of the claimants’ house.

The finding of negligence in these acts is buttressed by the evidence showing that the respondent took no test borings in front of the claimants’ house. Respondent knew the soil condition some 110 feet away to be silty clay to a depth of 7 feet and that the hillsides in the area were conducive to slides. It knew that the claimants’ hill was steep and that the cut at the bottom made it steeper: It knew that landslides had occurred in front of claimants’house in 1958 tearing out a part of the foundation. It knew that landslides had occurred in 1961 and 1964 which obstructed the claimants’ driveway. It knew, or should have known that, prior to the cut, no landslides had occurred on claimants’ property, for more than 50 years. Even after the slides of 1958,1961 and 1964 on the claimants’ property, respondent made no effort to shore the hillside with railroad ties, as it had done elsewhere, or put in any retaining wall, although its employees on more than one occasion assured the claimants that this would be done. Respondent’s negligence is clearly established by a very substantial weight of evidence.

We come now to the final question as to whether respondent’s negligent removal of lateral support was the proximate cause of the landslide which damaged claimants’ property.

The evidence, again taken as á whole, proves conclusively that the cut at the base of the hill did cause the subsequent landslides. The testimony of claimants’ witnesses shows that there had been no movement of the earth on claimants’ property for more than 50 years prior to the cut that respondent made. Frank Petri, a neighbor, testified that he tended his cow on the meadow where the claimants’ house was built as far back as 1912 and has been thoroughly familiar with the property ever since. He knew that the plateau extended out beyond claimants’ front porch and that there was room to walk around in front of it. The claimants told about the condition of the house when they moved in, in 1953. There were then no cracks in the plaster of the upstairs wall or ceilings, no cracks in the foundation. Other neighbors testified that the hillsides in the entire area, in front of the old road, had been stable and unchanging over the years until highway improvements involving cutbacks were made along the base of the hills.

No rebuttal or denial was offered by the respondent to this cumulation of evidence that (a) there had been no landslides for half a century on the claimants’ property and other property in the vicinity prior to cutbacks in the base of the hillsides, and (b) after such cuts, a rash of landslides occurred. This evidence of causation is certainly strong and persuasive.

The respondent made one effort to refute the circumstantial evidence of causation. It brought in an expert, as its only witness beside Mr. Harland, the District Highway Engineer. The expert was Dr. Thomas H.

. Thornburn, a Professor at the University of Illinois, working in the field of soil engineering. He visited the claimants’ property the morning of his appearance as a witness, and spent about an hour looking over the premises and examining some of the photographs and drawings which the Highway Division showed him. On direct examination, he gave an opinion that the cut at the bottom of the hill was not the cause of the 1965 slide in front of the claimants’ house, and that it was probably due to the bad weather that spring. On cross-examination, Dr. Thornbum admitted that he did not know of the 1958 slide in front of the claimants’ house, within 4 years after the cut, and he didn’t have any basis for determining what might have caused that slide. He also admitted that the removal of dirt from the bottom of a hill, if in sufficient quantity, could be a “contributing factor” to a subsequent landslide which originated at the top of the hill. Dr. Thomburn further acknowledged that the condition of the soil, the history of adjacent terrain, the steepness of the hill, and the prior slides on the claimants’ premises, none of which factors he had studied, would have affected his opinion.

Under these circumstances, Dr. Thornbum’s first conclusion lacks significant credibility. The factors he suggests, as being proper considerations in a reasonable determination of cause, have been well met by claimants’ evidence. This was no minor “scraping off”, or slight changing of the grade of the hill. It was a deep and penetrating cut. To take the base of the hill back 20 feet, and cut down a perpendicular slice a distance of 3 to 5 feet all along the front of the claimants’ property, was almost an act of wilful disregard for the safety of the claimants and the safety of the public traveling on the frontage road below. It is incredible that anyone could have assumed, under the circumstances, that the hillside would remain in place very long after taking away that much of its base support. To compound the situation by refusing to put. in place any sort of shoring or support, even a few railroad ties or some sort of ground cover, indicates an apparent disregard for the foreseeable consequences.

Finally, respondent’s District Highway Engineer, Mr. J. E. Harland, testified at the hearing, which was held nearly two years after the landslide, that the Division of Highways had not removed the dirt and debris that slid down onto the highway from claimants’ property, although it created a traffic problem, because “the removal of the debris may create further sliding up the hill”. If so, it is the heighth of inconsistency for respondent to deny that its cut in the hillside was the cause of the slide which damaged claimants’ property. The extreme care exercised by the Highway Division after the damage was done merely accentuates the carelessness of its previous actions which caused claimants’ financial loss.

The facts in this case distinguish it from Wheeler vs. State, 6 C.C.R. 65, in which we held that the slides were not caused by the excavation of the road but by other factors. In the case at hand, the burden of proving causation has been fully met by the claimants.

Claimants have also proved that they have sustained a financial loss of at least $7,500.00, the amount asked for in the complaint, by any reasonable interpretation of the evidence. As we stated earlier in this opinion, none of the testimony relating to damages is denied or controverted.

Claimants, John Patton and Jacqueline R. Patton, the joint tenant owners of the damaged property, are hereby awarded the sum of $7,500.00.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 5383
    Woodrow Womble and Velda Womble, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 27, 1971.
    Schimmel and Schimmel, Attprneys for Claimants.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This is an action to recover damages for the pollution and contamination of claimants’ well. The pollution was allegedly caused by acts done or permitted by the respondent at a place along the shoulder of U. S. Route 54 in reasonably close proximity to the residence and well of the claimants at Atlas, in Pike County, Illinois.

The complaint consists of two counts. The first count alleges that the claimant, Yelda Womble, suffered personal injuries as a result of drinking water from her well that contained excessive amounts of calcium chloride. The second count is a claim for damages to property owned by both claimants as a result of the saturation of calcium chloride in their well.

The facts appearing from the record, which were not disputed or effectively answered by the respondent, are these:

For several years prior to 1958, the respondent commenced depositing cinders in a pile along the south shoulder of U. S. Route 54. The pile was approximately 150 feet from the point at which, in the year 1958, claimants drilled a water well on their own property near their dwelling, which had been built in 1956.

In or about the year 1959, respondent deposited large amounts of calcium chloride upon and around the said cinder pile which respondent maintained for the purpose of using material from it, when needed, to remove or control ice and snow on the highway. Respondent continued to maintain the said storage pile of cinders and calcium chloride until respondent removed it in the latter part of 1966, shortly after the claimants became aware of the fact that the water in their well was contaminated by an excessive amount of calcium chloride.

The said storage pile of cinders and calcium chloride was never under cover and it blocked the natural drainage of water along the side of the highway. After a rain, surface water often accumulated around the pile until it seeped into the ground. Respondent acknowledged in its stipulation of facts that, “Undoubtedly calcium chloride saturated the soil and a vein of water under, beneath and running in a course toward the well of Claimants”.

In May or June of 1966, claimants observed rusting and deterioration of their household utensils, fixtures, appliances and particularly their water system. When this damage to the property of claimants was noticed, claimants had analyses made of the water coming out of their well and were informed by responsible authorities that the corrosion, deterioration and disintegration of their appliances and water system was caused by the saturation of calcium chloride in their water supply.

At or about the same time, claimant Yelda Womble became ill and was hospitalized. Medical examination showed that she was suffering from the results of chlorides in her intestines and other parts of her body. Claimant Woodrow Womble does not allege any injury to his health from drinking his well water, apparently explained by his testimony that he had quit drinking the water when it began to taste too salty. Mr. Womble said that his wife continued for a short time to drink the water until she became ill and the tests of the water indicated its contamination.

It is not clear from the record just how long the said storage pile of cinders and calcium chloride remained at its same location after Yelda Womble became ill and after the contamination of the well water was confirmed in a test made by the Illinois Department of Public Health. Nor was there any evidence showing that respondent had notice of these facts prior to the removal of the pile. The stipulation of facts by the parties on this point states: “Thereafter respondent removed several feet of the cinders and calcium chloride deposited along said U. S. Route 54 and filled the hole made by such removal with gravel, crushed rock and dirt, which dirt they took from a ditch along State Route 96.”

Suffice it to say, official tests of the water in claimants’ well, which were made after the pile was removed by the respondent, indicated a sharp drop in chloride concentration. It had not, by the last reported test on January 31, 1968, fallen below the maximum chloride concentration acceptable for drinking water which the parties stipulated to be 250 milligrams per liter. This stipulation agreed with the reports of the Illinois Department of Public Health.

We accept from the stipulation of facts by the parties, supported by claimants’ exhibits, the following list of the results of analyses of water taken from claimants’ well. Said analyses were made by the State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, George F. Forster, Chief, Division of Laboratories, and disclosed chloride content as follows:

Date of Test Chloride Concentration
1. May 9, 1966 1700 mg. per liter
2. October 7, 1966 420 mg. per liter
3. November 7, 1966 330 mg. per liter
4. December 30, 1966 450 mg. per liter
5. January 27, 1967 290 mg. per liter
6. March 17, 1967 450 mg. per liter
7. May 8, 1967 710 mg. per liter
8. June 15, 1967 530 mg. per liter
9. July 5, 1967 390 mg. per liter
10. August 18, 1967 400 mg. per liter
11. October 5, 1967 450 mg. per liter
12. January 31, 1968 380 mg. per liter

It was stipulated by the parties that pollutional bacteria also appeared in all of said water analyses. There was some testimony to the effect that the dirt used by the respondent to fill the hole, after the removal of its pile of cinders and calcium chloride, may have been responsible for some such further and continuing pollution of claimants’ well. We did not consider this particular evidence to be conclusive. In any event, it merely tends to support our decision in this case to award compensation to the claimants in the amount of the damages which the evidence shows they sustained.

At a second hearing in this case, held after respondent had asked leave to have further tests and surveys made, the parties entered into the stipulation of facts previously referred to in this opinion. The said stipulation also contained an agreement as to the amount of claimants’ damages and as to any further liability of the respondent.

On these points it is stipulated as follows:

“13. As a result of the effect of said chloride in the body of claimant Velda Womble, the said claimant Velda Womble spent a total of $458.84 for hospitalization, doctors and drugs to cure herself of her ailments.
“14. Claimant Velda Womble also sustained loss or damages in the amount of $1695.80 for loss of time while hospitalized and recuperating and for partial temporary or permanent disability resulting from the serious hemorrhages she sustained due to the destruction of the mucous membrane and lining of her digestive tract caused by the deposit of the calcium chloride from the drinking water.
“15. Claimants Woodrow Womble and Velda Womble sustained damage and loss in the amount of $2845.36 to their water system, pumps, washing machines, refrigerator, humidifiers and as the cost of drilling a new well.
“17. It is further stipulated and agreed that if claimants drill or dig a new well, respondent shall in no wise be liable for any chloride or other contamination of any kind which therein appears.”

Independently of the stipulation of facts and tacit admission of liability entered into between the parties, claimants sustained the burden of proving the allegations contained in the two-count complaint. The evidence introduced showed conclusively that the respondent contaminated the claimants’ water system and well by depositing the calcium chloride over a long period of time and that the personal injuries of the claimant Velda Womble were a result of drinking the water containing excessive quantities of calcium chloride.

This Court holds the respondent liable for damages in this case, not only on the admissions of its legal representative, but because the applicable law of this state is clear.

A property owner has a right to have the water in the wells on his property possess its natural quality, free from pollution caused by other landowners polluting percolating waters on their land. (Phoenix vs. Graham, 1953, 349 Ill. App. 326. Van Brocklin vs. Gudema, 1964, 50 Ill. App. 2d 20.) Furthermore, it is also a public nuisance to pollute the water of a spring or well. (Ch. 100 ½, Sec. 26, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1969.)

The State of Illinois takes a stern view of any act that results in water pollution. In the impartial exercise of its sovereign authority, the State must take the same view of any acts of its Division of Highways, however innocent the intentions may have been, if such acts result in the pollution or contamination of a well on neighboring property.

The Court finds that claimants are entitled to the following awards:

Claimant Velda Womble is hereby awarded the sum of $2154.64 for loss due to personal injuries.
Claimants Velda Womble and Woodrow Womble, jointly, are hereby awarded the sum of $2,845.36 for damages to their property.


author: Burks* J.

text:
    (No. 5390
    Ward Anderson Movers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Giffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General,- William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks* J.

This is a claim for damages to claimant’s tractor trailer which ran into a ditch after its driver lost control of his vehicle as he was attempting to pass a snowplow operated by the respondent. Claimant alleged and proved that respondent’s snowplow turned from the right lane into and across the left lane in front of claimant’s vehicle and that the latter thereupon turned sharply to the right to avoid a collision. In making this sharp right turn, claimant’s vehicle jackknifed and came to rest in the ditch on the side of the highway.

The complaint was filed on February 24,1967, exactly two years and some hours after the mishap in question occurred, approximately 6:00 o’clock in the morning of February 24,1965. This action, however, was not barred by the statute of limitations as time is computed pursuant to Ch.131, Sec. 1.11, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973.

The only witness who testified at the hearing was the driver of claimant’s vehicle, John Jenkinsen. Respondent did not call any witnesses in its behalf and bases its defense entirely on the testimony of Mr. Jenkinsen. Respondent contends that his testimony does not sustain claimant’s burden of proving that respondent’s alleged negligence was the proximate cause of claimant’s loss or that claimant was free from contributory negligence.

To arrive at an accurate summation of the relevant facts, it was incumbent upon the Court to make a careful study of the transcript of the testimony presented at the hearing in the light of the conflicting interpretations placed upon it by the briefs submitted by each of the parties.

In the absence of any evidence in the record controverting the testimony of John J enkinsen, driver of claimant’s vehicle, his testimony must be taken as true and correct insofar as it is consistent and not contradictor-

We believe that the pertinent and salient facts in Mr. Jenkinsen’s testimony, taken in its entirety and with appropriate inferences arising therefrom, may be summarized as follows:

The early morning accident in question occurred directly west of Springfield, Illinois, on Interstate 55 at a location approximately two miles south of the Clear Lake Avenue access. Interstate 55 is a four-lane highway with two lanes for northbound traffic and two lanes for southbound traffic, divided by a dirt median. A light snow had fallen during the evening before the accident in question.

Mr. Jenkinsen, driving claimant’s vehicle, a 1959 International Harvester rig consisting of a cab and trailer fully loaded with nursery stock and having a total weight of about 30 thousand pounds, entered Interstate 55 from Clear Lake Avenue headed south. He had gradually accelerated his speed to 40 or 45 miles per hour when he first observed respondent’s snowplow truck about a mile in front of him traveling in the same southerly direction and in the same right hand lane.

Respondent’s vehicle was a State-owned and State-operated dump truck, equipped with a snowplow and appropriate lights, including a mounted rotating yellow caution light which was flashing.

Claimant’s driver made the following statement in his testimony, “I would estimate the speed of the snowplow at about 35 to 40 miles an hour. I knew the driver was having trouble since he was swerving in his lane. He had been throwing up a lot of snow and, when he had trouble, he lifted the plow.” At another point in his testimony, when asked as to the speed of the snowplow when he “started to make his move to pass”, Mr. Jenkinsen answered, “He wasn’t going fast at all; that is why I was going to pass him. I couldn’t judge what speed he would be going. Let’s say he was going around 25 miles an hour. I could tell I was closing the distance and, you know, I would have to pass.”

When Mr. Jenkinsen decided to pass and had approached a point approximately 300 feet behind the snow plow, he turned into the left hand passing lane after indicating his intentions to change lanes by use of his turn signals. His left turn signal apparently remained on, but there was no evidence indicating that respondent noticed claimant’s vehicle approaching. Claimant did not sound his horn nor give audible" signal of his approach.

When claimant’s vehicle approached a point approximately 100 feet back of the snowplow, the latter made a turn to the left across the left lane in front of claimant’s vehicle and into a “cross over” in the median strip. Respondent’s snowplow gave no signal of intention to make a left turn.

At “the very instant” claimant’s driver saw that the snowplow had turned into the left lane, approximately 100 feet ahead, he “tapped” his brakes and slowed from 40 miles per hour to 5 miles per hour. At the “last moment” he “swerved” sharply to his right to avoid hitting the snowplow; lost control of his vehicle which jackknifed and came to rest in the ditch on the west side of the highway about 100 feet south of the cross over into which respondent’s snowplow had turned. There was no contact between the vehicles.

On the above statement of facts, we conclude that respondent was negligent in the operation of its snowplow when it made a left turn into the lane of claimant’s on-coming vehicle without giving any signal or warning. This conclusion is supported by Hargrave vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 463, which held that the State was negligent in the operation of a snowplow. The Hargrave case also contains the following words which are applicable in this as in all other claims sounding in tort and based on respondent’s negligence:

“To recover in this action, claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that not only was respondent negligent, but that claimant was free from contributory negligence.”

We have agreed with claimant’s contention as to the negligence of the respondent, a contention well supported by the points of law cited in claimant’s brief. We now turn to the legal authority cited by the claimant in support of its second essential allegation, required to sustain its burden of proof, that claimant was free from contributory negligence. On this issue, claimant calls our attention to Ch. 95½, Sec. 153, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, and to Rysdon v. Wice, 34 Ill. App. 2d 290; 18 N.E. 2d 754. We have undertaken to apply claimant’s cited authority to the facts in this case.

Chap. 95½, Sec. 153 reads as follows:

§ 153. Overtaking a vehicle on the left
The following rules shall govern the overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in the same direction, subject to those limitations, exceptions, and special rules hereinafter stated:
(a) The driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle proceeding in the same direction shall pass to the left thereof at a safe distance and shall not again drive to the right side of the roadway until safely clear of the overtaken vehicle.
(b) Except when overtaking and passing on the right is permitted, the driver of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on audible signal and shall not increase the speed of his vehicle until completely passed by the overtaking vehicle.

Subsection (a) appears to support claimants contention that its vehicle was properly in the left lane when attempting to pass the respondent’s snowplow and that under subsection (b) the respondent’s snowplow should have given way to the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle on audible signal.

The weakness in claimant’s position lies in the fact that claimant gave no audible signal. We believe that this subsection establishes a condition precedent to the duty to yield, and until such time as the overtaking vehicle sounds its horn there is no duty on the driver of an overtaken vehicle to “give way to the right”.

Subsection (b) places a duty on the claimant to blow his horn if he expected the vehicle that he was about to pass to remain in or return to the right lane. If claimant’s driver did not expect the snowplow to return to the right lane, then he obviously should have turned his rig back into the right lane when he saw the danger approximately 100 feet ahead in the left lane. Failure of the claimant either (1) to make a timely move back to the right lane or (2) blow his horn, indicates that claimant was negligent.

As regards the duty of claimant to blow his horn, let us also look at Section 212 of the same chapter of the statute which reads in part:

“Every motor vehicle of the first and second division when operated on a highway shall be equipped with a horn in good working order and capable of emitting sound under normal conditions audible from a distance of not less than 200 feet,°°°. The driver of a motor vehicle shall when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation give audible warning with his horn(Emphasis supplied)

We assume that claimant’s-vehicle was equipped with a horn capable of giving audible warning, under normal conditions, for a maximum of 200 feet as the statute requires. If so, claimant’s driver was certainly in a position to give audible warning of his intention (as per Section 153) or his presence (as per Section 212) at some point between 200 feet and 100 feet distance from respondent at which time claimant alleges that respondent began to make his left turn.

As an experienced semi-trailer truck driver, which Mr. Jenkinsen said he was, he should have known, as he approached a snowplow traveling at a slow speed; one that had just raised its plow; one that was having trouble; one that was swerving in his lane; that here was a situation envisioned by the drafters of Section 212 when they provided that “the driver of a motor vehicle shall when reasonably necessary to insure safe operation give audible warning with his horn.” Claimant’s failure to give audible warning of his approach under these circumstances violated Section 212 and was, therefore, negligent per se.

We have examined Rysdon vs. Wice, 34 Ill. App. 2d 290, which claimant cites as authority. This case held that a motorist was not negligent in passing on the left when the automobile being passed negligently veered into and collided with the right rear fender of the passing motorist. The passing motorist, however, was held guilty of negligence in failing to maintain proper control of his vehicle immediately after the said collision when he veered into an oncoming traffic lane and became involved in a head-on collision with another car.

Insofar as there is any similarity of facts, we believe that Rysdon supports our conclusion in the case before us. Rysdon enunciates the rule that “a person has the -duty to exercise due care to control his car even though that car was wrongfully set in motion by the impact of another car.”

This rule, when-applied to-the facts before us in which there was no contact between vehicles, is even stronger as to a driver’s duty to control his vehicle. In the instant case, claimant’s driver admits that he lost control of his vehicle even though it had been slowed down to 5 miles per hour. It should also be noted that after respondent’s snowplow turned into its cross-over, claimant’s vehicle traveled a distance of about 100 feet before leaving the road and going off into the ditch.

We find that both of the parties were guilty of negligence in this case. It is pointless to consider the extent or degree to which each party was negligent, since the doctrine of comparative negligence does not prevail in Illinois. Chapin vs. Foege, 296 Ill. App. 96. Claimant failed to prove that it was free from contributory negligence.

An award to claimant is, therefore, denied.


author: Perlin, C.J.

text:
    (No. 5392
    Kurt Jonatat and Loretta Jonatat, husband and wife, and Kane County Mutual Fire Insurance Company, An Illinois Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Redman and Shearer and Richard L. Cooper, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimants bring this action to recover damages to a home and personal property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Jonatat allegedly caused by the escape of two inmates from the Illinois State Training School for Boys at St. Charles, Illinois. Neither the facts nor the amount of damages are in dispute.

One of the claimants, Mr. Kurt Jonatat, testified that on or about February 7,1967, he was in Florida on a vacation. On that day, he received a call from his daughter telling him that his house had been broken into and that he should come home immediately. Upon returning home, he found his house in shambles, which damage as he later discovered was the result of a gun battle between police officers and two escaped inmates.

Mr. Joseph J. McGovern, the assistant superintendent of the Illinois State Training School for Boys testified that he took part in the search for the two escaped boys and discovered that they had broken a window and entered the Jonatat home. He further testified that an attempt was made to coax the boys from the home, but the attempt failed and the gun battle, which did damage to the home, resulted.

The remainder of Mr. McGovern’s testimony dealt with the escape and the normal security precautions taken by the training school. He testified that the school is fenced with a fence 16 feet high with barbed wire 2 feet high on the top of it, and that the entire enclosed area is patrolled by three radio cars.

All of the boys with a previous history of being an escape risk are housed in cottages inside the fence. Each cottage has house parents, a man and a woman, and an assistant house parent. The inmates in the instant case were according to Mr. McGovern, housed in such a cottage.

Mr. McGovern conducted an investigation to discover what had occurred at the time of the escape. It was learned that the boys in this particular cottage were going to the gymnasium that evening to play basketball. The cottage father lined the boys up in the basement, opened the basement door and started to walk out of the basement. At that time, the two boys in the front of the line broke and ran. The cottage father went back into the building and notified the switchboard operator, who then notified a guard in his parked radio car in front of the cottage.

The testimony points out that the standard procedure in moving from one cottage to another would be to walk the boys in twos. Then when they would get out of the -building, a -deputy -or guard in a radio -car -would -follow them down to the gymnasium with the cottage parents. -When an-employee learns that a-boy-has~eseaped,-he must notify the switchboard. The switchboard then is to immediately notify the deputy in the radio car.

In order for the claimants to recover, they must show negligence on the part of the respondent, for, as a review of the cases decided by this court points out, the mere proof of an escape followed by subsequent damages, will not sustain an award. Paulus vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 215 and Dixon Fruit Co. vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 271.

The Illinois State School for Boys is not an institution which can be classified as a penitentiary and any alleged negligence must be determined in the light of the standard security procedures instituted by the respondent for a school of this nature. It appears from the record that if the security guard had placed himself at the rear of the building, where he should have been in order to observe the boys exiting, the avenue of escape taken by the boys would have been cut off. It would also appear that the standard procedure precludes direct contact with the security guard by the cottage parentalthough the guard, as in this instance, was only a few feet away. This negligence gave the boys ample time to scale the fence and escape.

The record shows that $6,233.00 was paid by intervenor, Kane County Mutual Fire Insurance Company, to claimants, and that claimants incurred and paid an additional sum of $384.74 as a result of the incident.

The damages caused were the proximate result of the negligence of the respondent. An award is therefore made to the intervenor, Kane County Mutual Fire Insurance Company of $6,233.00 and to the Jonatats in the amount of $384.74.


text:
    (No. 5415
    Lawrence Goldring, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Greenberg, Janssen and Becker, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This is a claim for damage to claimant’s property caused by an inmate who had escaped from respondent’s mental institution, Peoria State Hospital.

Following the hearing on this matter which was held in Peoria on October 30, 1967, and an investigation conducted by respondent, the latter filed a stipulation stating that the facts as set out in claimant’s brief, filed J une 14,1968, are a fair and true representation of the facts developed by the evidence.

The facts stated in claimant’s brief, which respondent has admitted, may be summarized as follows: at 10:35 a.m. on March 16, 1967, one Arnold Eugene Hoff, a mental patient and inmáte at Peoria State Hospital, came to the used car lot owned and operated by the claimant in Barton-ville. The said inmate, who talked only with his hands, by gestures indicated to claimant’s lot boy, one Oran Brokaw, that he wanted the lot boy to start a 1959 Chevrolet automobile parked in the front row of cars facing the street. Patient made the lot boy understand by gestures that he merely wanted to “hear” the car’s motor run. The lot boy complied with the patient’s request but did not give him permission to drive the car. The patient got into the car; raced the motor a couple of times; put the car in gear; backed up a little bit and then took off forward across the sidewalk, across the curb and down the street weaving. Five blocks north of the lot from which the patient had taken the car, without claimant’s consent, he crashed the vehicle into Bartonville’s World War II Memorial Monument. The car was totally wrecked and claimant’s resultant financial loss was $500.00.

Records of the Peoria State Hospital indicate that its patient, Arnold Eugene Hoff, was issued a ground pass which made it possible for him to escape from the institution. The same records show that Hoff had escaped on prior occasions and each time had wrongfully converted other automobiles- to his own use and caused them to be damaged.

Claimant’s conclusion, which respondent tacitly concedes by its stipulation, is that respondent’s institution was negligent in issuing a grounds pass to this particular patient, in the light of his record, and that such negligence was the direct or proximate cause of claimant’s loss.

Respondent stated that its stipulation and recommendation were made in accordance with Ch. 23, Sec. 4041, IlI.Rev.Stat., 1969, which reads as follows:

§ 4041. Claims
Whenever a claim is filed with the Department of Mental Health, the Department of Children and Family Services, the Department of Public Safety, the Youth Commission or the Department of Youth, as the case may be, for damages resulting from personal injuries or damages to property, or both, or for damages resulting from property being stolen, heretofore or hereafter caused by an inmate who has escaped from a charitable, penal, reformatory or other institution over which the State of Illinois has control while he was at liberty after his escape, the Department of Mental Health, the Department of Children and Family Services, the Department of Public Safety, the Youth Commission or the Department of Youth, as the case may be, shall conduct an investigation to determine the cause, nature and extent of the damages and if it be found after investigation that the damage was caused by one who had been an inmate of such institution and had escaped, the Department or Commission may recommend to the Court of Claims that an award be made to the injured party, and the Court of Claims shall have the power to hear and determine such claims.

Since the Court also finds that the facts give no indication of contributory negligence on the part of the claimant, he is entitled to recover the amount of his loss.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $500.00.


text:
    (No. 5429
    Great American Insurance Company, A Corporation, as subrogee of Raye and Company Transports, Inc., A Corporation, and Raye and Company Transports, Inc., A Corporation, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Clausen, Hirsh, Miller and Gorman, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This is an action to recover a loss for damages to a tractor-trailer unit owned by claimant, Raye and Company Transports, Inc. Claimants allege that said trailer unit was damaged when its top struck an overhead bridge that was apparently lower than the height of the trailer. Respondent is charged with negligence in its maintenance of the bridge or underpass and in its failure to warn the public, using the underpass, of the low clearance by appropriate signs along the approaches to the bridge or on the bridge structure itself.

The file in this case includes the respondent’s answers to written interrogatories directed to it through former Attorney General William G. Clark who, prior to the expiration of his term of office on Janury 13, 1969, represented the respondent in this cause.

The sworn answers to claimants’ interrogatories, signed by A. R. Tomlinson for the Division of Highways, admits that there was no sign on the bridge structure stating the clearance for vehicles using the underpass. This is apparent from photo exhibits presented by the claimants. It appears from the evidence submitted that such markings on the bridge structure itself would have provided additional protection to the claimants, but that such markings are not mandatory as are the warning signs in advance of the bridge.

Respondent’s sworn statement does, however, contain the following answer to interrogatory #4 which tends to dispute claimants’ contention that there were no adequate signs giving early warning of the bridge’s low clearance on the date the claimant’s trailer struck the bridge, November 24, 1965:

“There is a sign 200 feet west of the overpass along the right curb for eastbound traffic. There are three signs east of the overpass, the first is 100 feet east in the center island for westbound traffic, the second is 250 feet east of the overpass for westbound traffic along the right curb, and the third sign is 750 feet east of the overpass for westbound traffic along the right curb.”

To a second part of the same question in the claimants’ interrogatories, respondent stated that the above mentioned signs were erected on May 14, 1964, some eighteen months prior to the occurrence on which this cause of action is based.

Respondent presented no evidence at the hearing to prove that the said signs were still in place on November 24, 1965, the date of the accident.

The hearing on this cause of action was held in Chicago on June 25, 1969.

From the evidence introduced at this hearing, it appears that on November 24,1965, the claimant, Raye and Company Transports, Inc., a corporation, was the owner of a tractor-trailer unit which was being operated by its driver, Dale R. Robinson, in a westerly direction on Illinois Highway 64 (which is also known as North Avenue in Chicago) and was passing under the Lake Street Bridge, a bridge running in a general northerly and southerly direction and crossing over the said Illinois Highway 64; that, while passing under the bridge, the trailer unit struck the west edge of the bridge damaging the trailer and the refrigeration unit attached to it.

The evidence confirmed that the cost of repairing said damaged trailer was $3,620.99. Of this amount, $500.00 was paid by the Raye and Company Transports, Inc., and the balance of $3,120.99 was paid by the Great American Insurance Company, the insurance carrier, which brings its claim as the subrogee of its insured, Raye and Company Transports, Inc.

John W. Powell, office manager and treasurer of the Raye and Company Transports, Inc., testified as to the sums expended to repair said trailer. Bills were admitted into evidence showing that the claimant, Great American Insurance Company, expended the sum of $3,120.99 and a $500.00 deductible was paid by claimant, Raye and Company Transports, Inc.

Dale R. Robinson testified that he was driving the tractor-trailer at the time of the accident. He stated that he proceeded under the bridge in question at a speed of approximately 25 miles per hour; that the authorized speed limit at that location is 40 miles per hour; that he was in the outside lane next to the curb; that his trailer struck the west sill of the bridge as he was coming out from under the bridge; that his trailer then became wedged under the bridge.

Mr. Robinson pointed out, on the photographs in evidence, the place where his trailer struck the bridge and the damage to the trailer. He said that the height span of his trailer was 13 feet 2 inches; and that no sign was posted prior to the bridge stating its clearance; that after the accident he went back and checked to see if there were any signs to advise the motoring public as to the height of the bridge and confirmed that there were no such signs.

Introduced into evidence was a State of Illinois Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, published by the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, Springfield, Illinois, which sets forth the type of signs that are to be posted advising the public of the clearance height of such bridges. Mr. Robinson stated again that no such signs were posted.

It was stipulated by the parties that the signs in question, identified in the manual as W12-2 and W13-3, are mandatory in Illinois to advise motorists of clearances of underpasses that are less than 14 feet 6 inches in height.

Since no rebuttal testimony was offered on behalf of the respondent, the evidence presented at the hearing conclusively proves that the respondent was negligent in the maintenance of this bridge or underpass and in its failure to post markings and signs indicating the height of the bridge; and that respondent’s negligence caused the property damage complained of in this case. Claimant had a right to rely on the respondent to post and maintain the required warning signs and was not under a duty to stop and examine this bridge or underpass as it came to it. The record shows no evidence of contributory negligence on the part of the claimant herein.

Awards are hereby made as follows:

To Great American Insurance Company the amount of $3,120.99.

To Raye and Company Transports, Inc., the amount of $500.00.


text:
    (No. 5487
    Consolidated Engineering Division, A Division of Azzarelli Construction Company, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Bissonnette and Nutting, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This is a claim for a refund of $7,500.00, the amount of a bid deposit cashier’s check which accompanied claimant’s bid for a contract to do certain construction work for the respondent.

The facts set forth in the complaint and in claimant’s brief are supported by the evidence submitted at the hearings on this matter and are not disputed by the respondent.

The testimony given at the hearings discloses that on July 11, 1967, claimant, by its employee, Charles S. Tudor, submitted a bid to the Department of Public Works and Buildings on a project known as No. 74-457 for the rehabilitation of an auditorium building located at the Kankakee State Hospital. Mr. Tudor personally delivered claimant’s bid to the respondent’s office in Springfield prior to the deadline on the day bids were to be opened. Just before delivering the bid, Mr. Tudor made a phone call to claimant’s office in Kankakee to see if any sub-contractors had submitted lower cost proposals as sometimes happens. There being no changes thus indicated in the total amount of claimant’s bid, Mr. Tudor, while still in the phone booth, filled in the blank lines in his bid on which the total amount is to be written in words and in numerals. The other parts of claimant’s bid had been carefully completed in advance and Mr. Tudor had his cost sheets with him showing what the total amount would be, subject to any last minute charges.

In the space on the bid form where the amount of the bid was to be expressed in numerals, Mr. Tudor wrote the correct amount, $139,284.00. However, in the space where the amount of the bid was to be expressed in words, he inadvertently left out thirty-nine thousand and wrote: “one hundred thousand two hundred eighty-four”. As stipulated by the parties, Mr. Tudor’s cost sheets showed that the bid was intended to be in the amount he wrote in figures, $139,284.00.

Mr. Tudor put his bid in an envelope, sealed and delivered it to respondent’s Architectural Office where it was stamped as received. Enclosed in the envelope with the bid was claimant’s bid deposit, a cashier’s check in the amount of $7,500.00. Whether this check should be recovered by the claimant or forfeited to the respondent is the question before the Court and the subject matter of this controversy.

In the afternoon of the same day, on a stage in the Armory, the bids were opened and read aloud. When they finally came to the job on which claimant was bidding, three other bids were read before claimant’s bid was announced. Two of the three bids were slightly lower than the amount Mr. Tudor thought he had bid, intended to bid and had written in figures, the amount of $139,284.00. All other bids were substantially higher than Mr. Tudor had written in words, $100,284.00. Mr. Tudor said that, as far as he was concerned at this point, he had been eliminated by the lower bids. When the official in charge opened and looked at claimant’s bid, he hesitated a few seconds, asked his assistant to look it over, and then read claimant’s bid in the amount Mr. Tudor had erroneously written in words, “one hundred thousand two hundred eighty-four dollars”. Mr. Tudor then got up, walked to the official’s table and said, “There must be something wrong. That isn’t what I bid.” The official in charge showed Mr. Tudor the amount he had written in words and explained that he was required to read the numbers that were written in words rather than in figures.

Exhibits attached to the complaint show that claimant wrote to the Department of Public Works and Buildings on July 13, 1967, asking that its erroneous bid be withdrawn, but on September 21, 1967, the respondent awarded the contract to the claimant. Claimant thereupon notified the respondent that it could not carry out the contract. The respondent subsequently awarded the contract to another company which did the work. The respondent has refused to return claimant’s $7,500.00 bid deposit.

The Court recognizes that respondent’s officer in charge of opening bids followed correct procedure in reading the amount of claimant’s bid as expressed in words rather than figures. Section 3-118(c) of the Commercial Code states, “Words control figures except that if the words are ambiguous, figures control.” In this case the words were not ambiguous.

The Court is also mindful of the fact that public officials should exercise extreme care and caution to avoid abuses of the competitive bidding processes which have come to light in the past. An example would be a case in which a low bidder, after being awarded a contract, discovers that he has made a mistake in his bid and is allowed to raise his price so long as it does not exceed the amount of the next lowest bid. Such a practice would be manifestly unfair to all other bonafide bidders and would open the door to collusion, favoritism and fraud. Such is not the situation in the case before us.

As we view the facts in this record, claimant’s error was unintentional, not fraudulent, and did not amount to culpable negligence. It is important to note that claimant did not seek to have the contract awarded at the higher of the two figures shown in its bid but merely asked permission to withdraw its bid when it noticed its error. Here the respondent had immediate notice of the error in claimant’s bid, knew that the amount involved in the error was substantial, and its position would not have been prejudiced by allowing the requested withdrawal of claimant’s bid. The rule applicable to the facts in this case is well expressed in 13 AM. JUR.2d, Building and Construction Contracts, Sec. 107:

“A bid based on a unilateral mistake which is so great that it must be considered fundamental may be avoided in equity where the mistake is honestly made, without negligence, and the acceptor of the bid does not alter his position prior to notice of the mistake and would not be prejudiced by the cancellation.”

The Illinois Supreme Court followed the above rule in Bromagin vs. Bloomington (1908) 234 Ill. 114. In upholding a decree rescinding a bid and restraining the forfeiture of a deposit, the Court noted that the bid was hastily prepared; that within a few hours after its acceptance the bidder. notified the city attorney of his mistake (weight of pipe inadvertently used for cost price), and asked to be relieved; that the city engineer had himself also noticed the mistake when the bids were opened, and that there apparently was nothing to prevent the board from awarding the contract to another bidder; and said that the circumstances did not show such negligence as should bar the relief awarded.

Bromagin appears to be the only Illinois case on the subject other than an earlier case, Steinmeyer vs. Schroeppel (1907) 226 Ill. 9, wherein the bidder’s mistake was not discovered until some time after the bid was accepted. In Bromagin the Court said that this case is distinguished from Steinmeyer in two respects: “First, here there seems to have been some reasonable excuse for the error made in calculating the bid; there was no such excuse in the Steinmeyer case. Second, here the party to whom the bid was made knew of the mistake at the time the bid was accepted; it was not so in the case in the 226th.”

This Court agrees with claimant’s contention that it should have been allowed to withdraw its bid without penalty, and is entitled to a refund of $7,500.00, the amount of its cashier’s check deposited with the respondent.

Claimant is hereby awarded a refund in the amount of $7,500.00.


text:
    (No. 5567
    Elmhurst-Chicago Stone Company, A Delaware Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Arthur J. Rudolph, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, and James Rubin, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.


text:
    (No. 5665
    Associated Service & Supply Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Eugene Ward, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. That hearings before the Court held on March 26, 1971, and April 20, 1971, revealed that the respondent was liable for the unpaid balance of the contract;

2. That the respondent, acknowledging such liability, has filed a Joint Stipulation herein agreeing to the entry of an award in the amount of $12,979.36;

3. That the sum of $12,979.36 is hereby awarded to claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State under Cause No. 5665.


text:
    (No. 5715
    Julian, Dye, Javid, Hunter and Najafi, Associated, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Julian, Dye, Javid, Hunter and Najafi, Associated, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5799
    John D. Singer, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    John D. Singer, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 5807
    Wieboldt Stores, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Wieboldt Stores, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5808
    Goodwill Industries of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Governor’s Committee on Employment of the Handicapped, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Goodwill Industries of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Bruce J. Finne, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5810
    Goodwill Industries of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Goodwill Industries of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5811
    David B. Hershenson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Board of Vocational Education and Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    David B. Hershenson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5812
    Goodwill Industries of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Goodwill Industries of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5816
    Travenol Laboratories, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    W. J. Kendall III, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5818
    Carmen Alonzo, d/b/a Carmen’s Movers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Edwin M. Raffel, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5831
    Ellsworth Hasbrouck, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Ellsworth Hasbrouck, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5832
    James L. Hall, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    James L. Hall, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5834
    200 X-Ray Laboratory, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    200 X-Ray Laboratory, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5835
    Francois J. Conte, M.D., Claimants vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Francois J. Conte, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5836
    George Kersey, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    George Kersey, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5837
    Gerson Kaplan, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Gerson Kaplan, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5838
    Evansville Association for the Blind, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Evansville Association for the Blind, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5841
    The Salvation Army, An Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Kennedy, Golan, Morris, Sprangler and Greenberg, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5843
    Monterrey Convalescent Home, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Monterrey Convalescent Home, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Bruce J. Finne, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5844
    Rogers Park Manor, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Dixon State School, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Rogers Park Manor, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5849
    Frank Milloy, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Frank Milloy, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5869
    Licata Moving and Storage Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Licata Moving and Storage Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5871
    Licata Moving and Storage Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Licata Moving and Storage Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5875
    St. Francis Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    St. Francis Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5881
    Garden City Engineering Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Clausen, Hirsh, Miller and Gorman, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5887
    W.G.N. Flag and Decorating Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    W.G.N. Flag and Decorating Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5888
    New England Nuclear Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, State Psychiatric Institute, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    New England Nuclear Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5891
    County of Cook, and Cook County Department of Public Aid, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    County of Cook, and Cook County Department of Public Aid, Claimants, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5900
    Joseph K. Calvin, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Joseph K. Calvin, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5903
    Robert Speer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Gillespie, Burke and Gillespie, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

This cause coming on by motion of respondent to dismiss and the Court having been advised in the premises, having considered respondent’s suggestions in support of its motion and accompanying documents, and claimant’s objection to the motion find that:

Because of the importance of the subject matter involved in the motion to dismiss submitted by respondent, this Court feels compelled to set forth fully the reasons behind the action herein taken by this Court.

This case involves the Illinois National Guard and revolves around the dual status peculiar to the National Guard of the United States.

This dual status of the National Guard is brought about by Title 10 and Title 32 of the United States Code which are the basic federal laws governing the National Guard.

Although the National Guard is composed of local units from the various states, and although these various local units are subject to the call of the Governor of the particular state involved when the Governor feels that he needs the services of the National Guard for state purposes, it is clear from a reading of Title 10 and Title 32 that the mission of the National Guard is primarily a federal mission.

Title 10, Section 261 establishes the National Guard of each state as a reserve component of the Federal Armed Forces.

Title 10, Section 262 establishes the purpose of these reserve components to be to provide trained units and qualified persons to the Federal Armed Forces in time of war or national emergency, etc.

Title 10, Section 263 establishes the right of Congress to call upon these reserve components “Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security”, and we note that this authority is assumed without regard to the wishes of the state or states involved.

Title 32, Sections 502 and 503 give the authority to prescribe the type, location, time and duration of training, in preparation for the National Guards’ primary mission, to the President and the Secretary of the branch of the armed forces involved.

It follows then that, whenever the National Guard is either called into federal active duty under Title 10, Section 263 or into inactive federal training under Title 32, Sections 502 and 503, generally and Section 502(2) in particular, they are on a federal mission and not performing a state function.

Since they are not, at these times, performing a state function, any tort committed by any one or more members thereof would not constitute a tort by the State and no liability would ensue thereby as against the State.

The Congress being aware of this situation has provided a means of paying claims arising from torts committed by National Guard members while on these federal missions.

The first of these remedies is embodied in the Federal Tort Claims Act which provides a source of recovery for third parties damaged by members of the National Guard while in the course of their mission on active federal duty.

The second of these remedies is embodied in the National Guard Claims Act, Title 32, Section 715, which provides a source of recovery for third parties damaged;

“by a member of the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard, as the case may be, while engaged in training or duty under Section 316,502,503,504 or 505 of this title or any other provision of law for which he is entitled to pay under Section 206 of Title 37, or for which he has waived that pay, and acting within the scope of his employment; or otherwise incident to noncombat activities of the Army National Guard or the Air National Guard, as the case may be, under one of those sections.”

Respondent in its Suggestions in Support of Motion to Dismiss points to Army Regulation 27-24 as amended by change 1 dated 28 January 1969 which establishes an Army policy of treating the National Guard Claims Act as a secondary source of recovery when other sources of recovery in the various states exist.

Respondent then states that this policy established by the Department of the Army is arbitrary, discriminatory and capricious, and outside the authority granted the Secretary by the Congress.

It is not for this Court to decide policy for the Department of the Army, and this Court takes no position on the question, as the Department of the Army is outside the jurisdiction of this Court.

It is also outside the purview of this Court to express any opinion as to whether the claimant has any recourse against the federal government under either the Federal Tort Claims Act or the National Guard Claims Act as these Acts are, also, outside the jurisdiction óf this Court.

It is not for this Court to say that this claimant should recover his damages from anyone.

It is only for the Court to say that claimant has failed to state on the face of his complaint allegations sufficient to show a cause of action against the State of Illinois in that he has failed to show the National Guard driver was on a mission for the State of Illinois, and in his objections to respondent’s Motion to Dismiss claimant does not deny respondent’s contentions that the National Guard driver was on a federal mission and not on a mission for the State of Illinois.

Claimant having failed to state a sufficient cause of action, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

This Court, therefore, finds that respondent’s Motion to Dismiss should be allowed.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and this case is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 5913
    South Suburban Hospital Foundation, A Not-For-Profit Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Edmund G. Urban, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5919
    R. C. Balagot, M.D. and Associates, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    R. C. Balagot, M.D. and Associates, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5920
    James John Hilger, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Richard F. McPartlin, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5921
    Joseph Markel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Blacker, Buckun, Nellis and Fagel, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5925
    Univac Division of Sperry Rand Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Auditor of Public Accounts, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Univac Division of Sperry Rand Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5928
    Brooks Institute of Photography, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Brooks Institute of Photography, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5934
    Sangamo Electric Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Sangamo Electric Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5935
    Bismarck Hotel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Bismarck Hotel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5938
    Booker T. Wright, d/b/a Wright’s Moving, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Booker T. Wright, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5944
    Institute of Lettering and Design, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Institute of Lettering and Design, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5945
    Ray Irby, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Hollis L. Green, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5946
    The Salvation Army Booth Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    The Salvation Army Booth Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5952
    Dreyer Medical Clinic, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Dreyer Medical Clinic, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5959
    Newena Argiroff, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Newena Argiroff, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5964
    Elvis E. Spencer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Charles F. Read Zone Center, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Richard F. McPartlin, Attorney for Claimant.
    Williám J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5965
    Commonwealth Edison Company, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Joseph C. Sidley, Jr. and George O. Shaffner, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5967
    Cotler Drugs, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Cotler Drugs, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5968
    Max Shaps, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Max Shaps, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5977
    John R. Castro and George R. Backer, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Kleiman, Cornfield and Feldman, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5984
    Illinois Bell Telephone Company, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Robert R.V. Dalenberg, L. Bow Pritchett and Alan N. Baker, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5985
    Soiltest, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Soiltest, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5986
    Jeffrey Center Clinical Laboratory, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Jeffrey Center Clinical Laboratory, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5992
    Otis Elevator Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    McLaughlin, Kinser and Bryant, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5993
    Shorecrest Convalescent Home, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Shorecrest Convalescent Home, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5996
    International Harvester Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    International Harvester Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6002
    Belmont Community Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Belmont Community Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6004
    Bell Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Bell Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6006
    Rockford Beauty Academy, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Rockford Beauty Academy, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6009
    Constance V. Youker, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Constance V. Youker, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6010
    S. Meltzer and Sons, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    S. Meltzer and Sons, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6011
    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Elgin State Hospital, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6014
    Patricia Stevens Career College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Patricia Stevens Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6018
    Revzen Office Equipment Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Insurance, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Revzen Office Equipment Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6022
    Lydia Taylor, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Lydia Taylor, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6031
    Walter P. Anderson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Local Governmental Law Enforcement Officers Training Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Walter P. Anderson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6038
    Ralph Kozanecki, d/b/a Ralph’s Decorating Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Ralph Kozanecki, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6040
    Community Medical Center, S.C., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Community Medical Center, S.C., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6041
    Evans Construction Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Evans Construction Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6043
    Robert L. Meyer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    Robert L. Meyer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6045
    George A. Conn, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Board of Vocation Education and Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    George A. Conn, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6052
    The American Appraisal Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1971.

    The American Appraisal Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.