author: Mr. Justice Clarity

text:
    (No. 988
    Claimant awarded $3,888.00.)
    Dora Girhard, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.
    Workmen’s1 compensation act — award may he made under. Where an employee of the State is killed while in the performance of his duty, an award may he made and the basis of compensation fixed by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
    Kasserman and Kasserman, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The facts as appearing in this case are not disputed. It appears that Paul W. Girhard was an employe of the automobile department of the Secretary of State’s office as an Automobile Investigator at a salary of $150.00 per month and expenses. He was furnished a motorcycle with side car in which to travel and was ordered to do duty in different parts of the State. On Oct. 25,1925, under orders from the Secretary of State’s 'office, he proceeded on his motorcycle to Fairmont a racing track near Collinsville, Illinois, to assist in taking care of the traffic there, and while returning from such employment on Oct. 31, 1925, to his home in Newton, Illinois, over Route 11, and when just east of Vandalia' near an intersection he met an automobile approaching with its bright lights on, while at the same time there was a horse and buggy in front of them. Presumably the lights from the approaching car blinded him causing his motorcycle to strike the wheels of the buggy upsetting his motorcycle and throwing him to the pavement, his head striking the concrete causing a fracture of the skull and concussion of the brain which caused his death on Nov. 6, 1925.

The Attorney General comes and files statement, brief and argument in which the facts are admitted in so far as the deceased was a State employe and was engaged in a line of duty as such employe at the time of his death by said accident. The Secretary of State forwarded a letter to the Attorney General’s office in which he recommended and urged that this case be settled on the basis of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The Attorney General also suggests that under the Workmen’s Compensation Act in this case said claimant should receive $3,750.00, plus the necessary medical, surgical, hospitalization and nursing services which, appear to amount to $133.00 in this case.

It is therefore considered by the court that the claimant be allowed the sum of $3,883.00.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Thomas

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 990
    Claimant awarded $797.97.)
    Saint Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Privilege tax — when refund may he made. Overpayment. Where a privilege tax has been assessed and paid, and credit therefor was not given by the department, and the tax is again paid for the same year, claimant is entitled to a refund of the overpayment.
    C. J. Doyle, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank B. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by the St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company for a refund of $797.97 privilege tax overpaid to the Division of Insurance of the Department of Trade and Commerce of the State of Illinois in the year 1925. This amount was paid by claimant to the city collector of the city of Chicago, and, under the provisions of the statute, should have been credited on the amount of its assessment for the year 1924, payable in 1925, but by oversight the credit was not given.

The Attorney General has filed a statement on behalf of the State to-which is attached as an exhibit a letter of the Supérintendent of Insurance which admits that claimant should have had a credit of $797.97 on its privilege tax for that year, and advises that the claim be allowed.

The Attorney General accordingly consents that an award be allowed cláimant in the sum of $797.97. It is manifest that claimant has paid a double tax to the extent of the claim filed and we therefore allow it an award of $797.97.


text:
    (No. 993
    Claimant awarded $250.00.)
    C. A. Roberts Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.
    Franchise tax — when claimant entitled to refund for overpayment. Claimant is entitled to a refund of an overpayment of the tax, where it is required to pay an amount in excess of the tax due the State.
    Benj. F. Cassiday, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim of C. A. Roberts Company for a refund of franchise tax erroneously paid to the Secretary of State for the period beginning June 30, 1921, and ending July 1, 1923. The amount of tax legally due the State for this period is the sum of $250, but the Secretary of State demanded and claimant paid $500.00. •

The Attorney General has filed a statement on behalf of the State, and attached thereto as Exhibit “A” a copy of a letter from the Secretary of State in which he admits the claim is proper and should be allowed, and the Attorney General in his statement consents to an award of $250.00 in favor of claimant.

As it is clear claimant was erroneously required to pay $250.00 more tax than was due, we therefore allow an award in its favor in the sum of $250.00.


text:
    (No. 994
    Claimant awarded $250.00.)
    The Cable Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Franchise tax — when refund will be 'made. Overpayment. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in C. A. Roberts & Co. v. State, supra.

    Benj. F. Cassiday, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinioirof the court:

This is a claim filed by the Cable Company for a refund of $250.00 franchise tax erroneously paid to the Secretary of State for the period beginning July, 1923, and ending June 30, 1924. The amount legally due the State from claimant for this period was the sum of $250.00, but the Secretary of State demanded, and claimant paid, $500.00.

The Attorney General has filed a statement and attached - thereto a letter from the Secretary of State as an exhibit, in which the Secretary of State admits that this claim is just and should be allowed, and the Attorney G-eneral in his statement consents to an award in favor of claimant in the sum of $250.00. • • ,

As. the amount of tax legally due was only $250.00, we therefore allow claimant an award in the sum of $250.00.


text:
    (No. 995
    Claimant awarded $540.35.)
    Englander Spring Bed Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Franchise tax — when claimant entitled to refund. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in case of G. A. Roberts & Go. v. State, supra.

    Benj. F. Cassiday, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion-of the court:

-This is a claim for $540.35 filed by the Englander Spring Bed Company for a refund of franchise tax erroneously paid to the Secretary of State for the period beginning June 30, 1924, and ending July 1,1925, in excess of the amount legally due under the provision of the General Corporation Act.

The Attorney General has filed a statement, and attached thereto is a copy of a letter from the Secretary of State in which he admits that claimant is entitled to a refund of $540.35, and the Attorney General in his statement consents ' to an award in favor of claimant in the sum of $540.35.

As it is clear the State collected this sum in excess of the amount due it, we therefore allow an award in favor of claimant in the sum of $540.35.


text:
    (No. 1024
    Claimant awarded $393.72.)
    Federal Match Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Franchise tax — claimant entitled to refund when. There being no disputeis to the facts and no objection by the State, the court enters an award in favor of claimant.
    Benj. F. Cassiday, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim of the Federal Match Corporation for a refund of $393.72 franchise tax erroneously paid to the Secretary of State for the period beginning July 1, 1925, and ending June 30, 1926, in excess of the amount legally due under the provisions of the General Corporation Act.

The Attorney General first filed a demurrer on behalf of " the State, and afterward filed a statement, attached to which is a copy of a letter from the Secretary of State admitting claimant is' entitled to a refund of $393.72, and the Attorney General consents to an award in favor of claimant for that amount.

As the State was overpaid that amount, the demurrer will be overruled and claimant awarded the sum of $393.72.


text:
    (No. 1027
    Claimant awarded $1,871.95 with interest.)
    State Mutual Life Assurance Company of Worcester, Mass., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Privilege tax — when claimant entitled to refund. Where through a mistake the State has collected the privilege tax twice, claimant is entitled to a refund of the overpayment.
    Irving T. F. Ring, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for a refund of excess privilege tax on insurance premiums paid by mistake to the Department of Trade and Commerce of the State of Illinois. Claimant is a corporation incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts for the purpose of issuing life insurance, and is licensed to do business in Illinois. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ©f New York is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of New York for the purpose of issuing con- ■ tracts for life insurance, and is also licensed to do1 business in Illinois. ' A portion of the insurance written in Illinois by claimant was re-insured in the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, this reinsurance being legal under the provisions of Chapter 73, revised statute of Illinois. The amount of premiums collected on the insurance that was reinsured in the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company was $93,597.38. On May 25, 1925, claimant paid a 2% tax on this sum, said tax amounting to $1,871.95. On June 22, 1925, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company also paid a 2% tax on this same amount and for the same premiums.

It thus appears that a double tax has been collected by the State from the claimant and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, and that the State has received $1,871.95 more than is due it. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has filed a disclaimer in favor of claimant, .and the Attorney General on behalf of the State has filed a written consent to an award in favor of claimant for that amount.

We, accordingly, award claimant the sum of $1,871.95, together with interest thereon at 3% per annum from May 25, 1925, until paid.


text:
    (No. 1028
    Claimant awarded $1,049.24.)
    Jourdan Packing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

      Contract — when State liable. The State is liable for supplies furnished the Dunning State Hospital.
    Siebel & Severin, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim of the Jourdan Packing Company for $1,-049.24 for meats supplied the Dunning' State Hospital in Cook county, Illinois. Payment was not made for the reason that invoices for the goods were received by officials in charge of the hospital after the close of the biennial period for appropriation of the 53d General Assembly.

The Attorney General filed a demurrer, and afterward filed a statement, attached to which are copies of letters from the Director of Public Welfare and the Managing Officer of said hospital admitting that the claim is a correct and proper charge against the State, and the Attorney General consents to an award in favor of claimant in the sum of $1,049.24.

As it is clear this amount is due claimant from the State, the demurrer will be overruled and claimant awarded the sum of $1,049.24.


text:
    (No. 1030
    Claimant awarded $154.11.)
    American Bosch Magneto Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Franchise tax — when claimant entitled to refund. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Federal Match Oorp. y. State, supra.

    Benj. F. Cassiday, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim of American Bosch Magneto Corporation for a refund of $154.11 franchise tax erroneously paid to the Secretary of State for the period beginning July 1, 1925, and ending June 30, 1926, in excess of the amount legally due under the provisions of the General Corporation Act.

The Attorney General first filed a demurrer on behalf of the State and afterward filed a statement, attached to which is a copy of a letter from the Secretary of State admitting that claimant is entitled to a refund of $154.11, and the Attorney General consents to an award in favor of claimant for that sum.

As the State was overpaid that amount, the demurrer will be overruled and claimant awarded the sum of $154.11.


text:
    (No. 1048
    Claimant awarded $200.00.)
    The Consolidated Assurance Company, Ltd., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Privilege tax — when refund may be made. Overpayment. Where there has been an overpayment of the tax through a mistake of the Department of the State, claimant is entitled to a refund of the amount overpaid.
    Hagedorn & Co., for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for $200.00 refund of privilege tax erroneously paid to the Department of Trade and Commerce by claimant for the year 1921.

No defense of the claim is interposed by or on behalf of the State, and the Attorney General filed a statement and attached thereto as an exhibit a letter from the Director of the Department of Trade and Commerce in which he admits the overpayment was due to a clerical error and that the claim should be allowed. Accordingly, an award is allowed in favor of claimant in the sum of $200.00.


text:
    (No. 1064
    Claim denied.)
    Frank J. Heinl, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Statute of limitations — when claim barred by. Where the declaration shows on its face that the cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations it will not be allowed.
    John J. Reeve, for claimant
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim is for $554.53 paid to the Peoria State Hospital for the support of William Cox while an insane patient at said hospital. Claimant was appointed conservator of Cox August, 24, 1903, by the county court of Morgan county, Cox having been adjudged insane prior to that time. The money was paid by claimant March 23, 1914. In April, 1917, the law under which this payment is alleged to have been made was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This claim was filed July 2, 1926, more than nine years after that decision. The claim is not filed on behalf of Cox, nor by claimant in his official capacity as conservator, but on the theory that claimant will lose the money so. paid to the hospital unless he is reimbursed by the State.

The above facts all appear from the declaration. To this declaration the Attorney General has filed a demurrer. Section 10 of the act creating the Court of Claims provides that every claim against the State cognizable by the court shall be forever barred unless it is filed with the secretary of the court within five years after it first accrues. It appearing on the face of the declaration that this claim was not filed within the time required by the statute, the demurrer is sustained and the case dismissed.


text:
    (No. 1069
    Claimant awarded $556.25.)
    Perfection Stove Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Fbanchise tax — refund when erroneously paid. Where it clearly appears that a larger tax has been computed by the Secretary of State through a mistake, than is due the State, and the tax is paid, a refund will be awarded for the overpayment.
    Benj. F. Cassiday, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for a refund of $556.25 franchise tax erroneously paid to the Secretary of State in excess of the amount legally due the State under the provisions of the General Corporation Act, for the yean beginning July 1,1924, and ending June 30, 1925.

The declaration alleges that claimant is a corporation existing under the laws of the State of Ohio; that on June 28, 1918, it was authorized to do business in the State of Illinois under the name of the Cleveland Metal Products Company, and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted to foreign corporations under the laws of Illinois; that its principal place of business for Illinois is in Chicago; that it has a capital stock of $10,000,000.00; that on February 2, 1924, it filed a certificate of increase of capital stock from $10,000,000.00 to $15,000,000.00 and on June 2, 1924, filed a certificate of decrease of capital stock from $15,000,000.00 to $10,000,000.00. The declaration also states that on the 16th day of October, 1925, claimant filed with the Secretary of State of Illinois a certificate of amendment changing its name from the Cleveland Metal Products Company to the Perfection Stove Company.

The Secretary of State, through mistake, computed the franchise tax for the year ending June 30, 1925, on $15,000,-000.00 capital instead of on $10,000,000.00. The tax as thus erroneously computed amounted to $1,000.00, which claimant paid, whereas, had it been correctly computed on the actual capital of $10,000,000.00, the tax would have been only $443.75. It thus appears claimant paid $556.25 more than the State was entitled to receive.

The Attorney General has filed a statement and attached thereto as a part thereof a copy óf a letter from the Secretary of State, in which letter the Secretary of State admits that claimant is entitled to a refund of $556.25.

As it clearly appears, from the sworn declaration of claimant and the statement of the Attorney General that a mistake was made in computing the franchise tax of claimant, we award claimant the sum of $556.25.


text:
    (No. 1073
    Claimant awarded $277.78.)
    E. E. Stephens, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

      Contract — when State liadle. The State is liable for work and material furnished for the improvement of its property.
    S. Bartlett Kerr, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim of $277.78 is for materials and labor furnished for improvements at Fort Massac State Park on the request of the custodian of the Park, and the State Supervising Architect. Claimant presented his statement for the amount due him to the Department of Public Works and Buildings, but it was received too late for payment, as the appropriation had then lapsed.

The custodian of Fort Massac State Park and the State Supervising Architect admit the claim is just and unpaid.

There being no dispute as to this claim, it is ordered by the court that an award be allowed in favor of claimant in the sum of $277.78.


author: Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

text:
    (No. 1076
    Claimant awarded $3,750.00.)
    Ida Donahue, Administratrix of the Estate of Robert J. Donahue Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Governmental function- — State not liable. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty at its State Penitentiary.
    Social justice and equity — award may be made. While the State is not liable, yet where claimant is engaged in a hazardous employment the court will as a matter of social justice and equity enter -an award in his favor.
    Alfred A. Isaacs, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears from the allegations in this case that Robert J. Donahue, now deceased, was on the 19th day of September, 1922, employed by the defendant and in and about his duties as deputy warden of the Southern Illinois- Penitentiary at Menard, Illinois, and in the course of such employment, he was attacked by two convicts who.were prisoners in the institution aforesaid, and who were attempting to escape from said penitentiary. In the attack the said Robert J. Donahue was struck with an iron bar and a steel shovel by the said convicts. It is charged by claimant that the said deceased came to his death as a result of such injuries. It is further alleged that said deceased left surviving him his widow and three children who were dependent upon him for support. There does not appear to be much contradiction, as to the facts as alleged except that the Attorney General contends that the decline in health of the deceased, was not steady between the time of the injury and the time of the death of the deceased and that the testimony of some of the doctors on cross examination was hot certain in that it would be more or less a- conjecture. However the Attorney General admits there can be . argument on same both for and against claimant.

However there is no question but what the deceased was struck by the convicts with heavy instruments and severely injured while in course of employment. The evidence shows that he was performing his duties bravely and loyally, and it appears that he was a man who served the State well and faithfully for some considerable time, and that he was ready and willing to face severe dangers to carry out the trust reposed in him by his employer, the State of Illinois. And it would appear to this court that this is a case that would come within the rule of equity and good conscience. Here is a faithful employee who received serious and fatal injury in a line of duty and from all the evidence and files in the case, we are of the opinion and this opinion is sustained by reasonable conclusions iri face of all the facts and circumstances that such injury caused the death of the said Donahue; that said deceased left dependents who had a right to his support and care.

Therefore it is the opinion of this court that allowance should be made based upon the rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Illinois, and this court hereby recommends the allowance to claimant of $3,750.00.


text:
    (No. 1079
    Claimant awarded $550.00.)
    Bessie Brinkerhoff, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Fees & salaries — award may be made for balance clue on salary. A State employee is entitled to recover the salary fixed by the Legislature for such employment.
    Evan L. Searcy, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, a resident of Springfield, Illinois, claims that she was employed by the State of Illinois in the position of stenographer-bookkeeper in the general manager’s office of the Illinois State Fair; that by an act of the 53d General Assembly, effective July 1,1923, her salary was fixed at $1,800.00 per-annum; that the wages formerly paid for this position before said act went into effect, was $1,500.00 per year, the increase being $25.00 per month; that she continued her employment for a period and received pay at the rate of $1,-500.00 per year for two years, but was paid for two months at the rate of $150.00 per month which left twenty-two months of her employment in which she did not receive the $25.00 per month additional as allowed by the legislature, therefore-leaving a balance due her of $550.00. It appears from copies.of letters herewith filed that the Department of Agriculture does not care to oppose the above claim. It therefore appears to the court that, as- a matter of equity and good conscience, this employe of the State of Illinois should receive the wages that the Legislature of the State of Illinois,deemed proper to allow for the occupant of this position.

This court therefore recommends that claimant be allowed the sum of $550.00.


author: Mr. Justice Leech

text:
    (No. 1060
    Claimant awarded $17,039.09 with interest.)
    Frank C. Feutz Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

      Contract — hard-roads. When State liable. Claimant entered into a contract with the State for the construction of a part of its Hard Road State Bond Issue Route No. 3, and proceeded to carry out the terms of the contract and expended money for material and labor under his contract when he was compelled by an order of court to stop work and a writ of mandamus was issued against the Department of Public Works and Buildings directing the location of the highway, specified in the contract, upon a route not contemplated in the contract and by virtue of the order of court claimant was forced to abandon the work upon the route specified in his-contract: Held. Claimant entitled to an award for material furnished and labor performed under his contract,
    Otto McMahan, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; S. S. DuHamel, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

Claimant in this case avers that on June 23, 1925, the claimant corporation entered into a contract with the State of Illinois, through the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, whereby claimant ágreed to construct and build State Bond Issue Route No. 3, Federal Aid Project No. 93, Section 32, copy of contract being attached to and made part of claim; that pursuant to said contract and bid previously made by claimant, and the award of the work to claimant, they proceeded to perform their part of contract and continued upon said work until the 17th day of July, 1925, when the circuit court of Sangamon county, Illinois, issued an order, based upon a petition previously filed by the people of the State of Illinois, at the May term of said court for the year 1925, in a cause entitled “The People of the State of Illinois ex rel J. C. Bartlow et al. v. The Department of Public Works and Buildings of the State of Illinois, Cornelius E. Miller as Director of Public Works and Buildings and Frank T. Sheets, Superintendent of Highways, ’ ’ by which order of said court, it was decreed that the route upon which the work had been done and was being done by claimant was more than a minor change from the route as fixed by an act of the Legislature of the State of Illinois previously enacted; that said order made by- said court on July 17, 1925, directed that a writ of mandamus issue as prayed for to said defendants and said order commanded said defendants to locate said highway upon a route different from the route contemplated by said contract entered into by claimant, and on July 17, 1925, as directed by said order, claimant abandoned said work upon said route; that all work done and labor performed by claimant from May 11,1925, until and including July 17,1925, was done in good faith and the material for the work was furnished in good faith; that claimant was never paid for said labor and materials, and makes claim for $17,640.00, together with interest thereon.

We find that the Attorney G-eneral, on recommendation from Hon. C. E. Miller, Director of the Department of Public Works and Buildings of the State of Illinois, has consented to the allowance of said claim, and recommends that said claim be allowed, in the sum of $17,039.09 with interest.

We therefore award to the claimant, Frank O. Feutz Company, the sum of $17,039.09, together with interest thereon from July 17,1925, at the rate of 5% per annum.


author: .Mr. Justice Thomas

text:
    (No. 1087
    Claimant awarded $4,269.74.)
    Grennan Bakeries, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

      Corporation — initial fee. When refund made for overpayment. Where by an oversight of the Secretary of State claimant was required to pay a larger initial fee than the State is entitled to receive, a refund of the overpayment will be awarded.
    James L. Brown, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   .Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim is for the return to claimant of the sum of $4269.74 paid to the Secretary of State to cover the initial fee due the State on the increase of its capital stock. It appears from the record in the case that on June 22, 1925, claimant paid the Secretary of State an initial fee of $4269.74 covering its increased capitalization, and again on June 30, 1925, paid him an initial fee of $5037.09 to cover the same increased capitalization.' The last payment appears to be the correct amount due the State, and claimant should have been credited with the first payment and have been required to pay only the difference between the amount paid June 22nd, and the correct amount of fee due. By some oversight in the office of the Secretary of State, this was not done, and claimant was required to pay $4,269.74 more than was due. This the Secretary of State admits in a letter attached to the declaration as an exhibit. In a letter to the Attorney General, a copy of which the Attorney General has filed in the case, the Secretary of State says the facts shown in the declaration and exhibits are true and that claimant is entitled to a return of the amount claimed in its declaration.

The Attorney General first filed a demurrer to the declaration, but after investigation filed a statement including the copy of the letter from the Secretary of State above mentioned.

As it is clear claimant paid the State $4,269.74 more than was due, the demurrer is overruled and claimant is allowed an award for that amount.


text:
    (No. 1109
    Claimant awarded $25.00.)
    Williams Articulator Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1927.

    Franchise tax — award may be made when. Where a franchise tax has been assessed and is paid, and it appears afterwards that on account of misstatement in the annual report of the corporation, to the Secretary of State, the tax paid is in excess of the amount legally due the State, a refund of the overpayment may be awarded.
    Williams Articulator Company, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank E. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for refund of franchise tax paid to Honor-, able Louis L. Emmerson, Secretary of State, on account of mis-statement in the annual report of the claimant. It appears that said company paid a tax of $25.00 in excess of the amount of taxes lawfully assessable against said claimant.

We therefore award to the said claimant, Williams Articulator Company, the sum of $25.00.


text:
    (No. 683
    Claimant awarded $260.00.)
    Stanley Stachowiak, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Respondeat superior — State not liable for torts of inmates of its institutions. While the State is not liable for the torts of an inmate of its institution, an award may be made to claimant for an injury sustained and damage caused by the negligence of an inmate of its institution.
    Gorey & Gorey, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank B. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for damages caused by reason of an accident which occurred on the morning of May 2, 1924, between six and seven o’clock at the intersection of Hickory and Euby streets in the city of Joliet, Illinois, whereby claimant was struck by a truck operated by an inmate of the state penitentiary.

The truck continued traveling after striking the claimant, for a distance of about fifteen feet or more, when it crashed into a curbing north of Buby street, and there is some testimony to the effect that the driver of the truck did not sound his horn until he was about to strike claimant. This testimony is contradicted by witnesses for the State. We are of the opinion that the driver of the State truck was guilty of negligence in not stopping his car when he saw the claimant crossing the street “head down.” It is the duty of the driver of an automobile or truck to keep a careful and prudent lookout for pedestrians, in order to avoid colliding with them. From the evidence submitted here on behalf of claimant, this was not done.

As the amount of damages, it appears from the evidence that claimant was disabled for a period of six months, and that he was earning about $3.60 a day, and that he incurred a doctor’s bill amounting to $50.00.

While we do not believe that there is any legal liability on the part of the State for damages sustained by the claimant, yet as a matter of equity and good conscience we award to claimant $260.00.


text:
    (No. 687a
    Claim denied.)
    Moline Plow Company, Incorporated, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Franchise tax — lohen court is without jurisdiction to refund. The court is without jurisdiction to award a refund of a franchise tax erroneously paid, where claimant has a remedy at law in a court of general jurisdiction.

      Same — rule of equity and good conscience. This court will not invoke the rule of equity and good conscience in a case where claimant has an adequate remedy at law in a court of general jurisdiction.

      Same — will not usurp powers of court of .general jurisdiction. This court will not invade the field of courts created by the constitution, nor usurp the powers of or contradict or compete with courts of general jurisdiction.
    Secretary of state — loill not review acts of. The Secretary of State is a constitutional officer and the court will not review his acts or conduct in the administration of the duties of his office, where the party aggrieved has a remedy at law in a court of general jurisdiction.
    L. C. Shonts, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Edward C. Fitch, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, a foreign corporation, presents claim for refund of payments demanded and collected from it by the Secretary of State as franchise taxes and initial fees in excess of the amount claimed legally due. We will not discuss the legal merits of this claim or the particular phases of claimant’s contention as against the Secretary of State for collecting these fees, or whether or not the fees collected were excessive, illegally collected, or improperly collected as it is the intention of the court to dwell only upon the question of taking jurisdiction of cases wherein a remedy at law was provided by statutes in courts of general jurisdiction.

This court is impressed with the vast increase of demands filed in this court and consequently it is considered necessary and proper to establish a precedent in this line of cases in harmony with opinions heretofore announced in other claims, in that wherein a claimant had a remedy in a court of general jurisdiction and failed to pursue such remedy, that this Court would not take jurisdiction.

It cannot be urged that there would be any need of this court if there was a remedy prescribed by statutes for all the cases that could be brought before .this court. We do not believe the court should invoke the rule of equity and good conscience in a case where claimant had an adequate remedy at law and it would not seem consistent for this court to adopt any rule in conflict with the well established practice of courts of general jurisdiction in the State of Illinois. In such courts if a complainant slept on his legal rights, no court of equity would take jurisdiction on the theory that the claim wás just or equitable if the complainant failed to pursue his legal remedy in apt time. Therefore can it be assumed that the Legislature of this State had in mind at the time it created this court a plan to open wide the doors to all litigants to choose between the courts' already established by the constitution and this court, or was it not the thought back of the act creating this court, to give claimants the right to recover legal claims or claims sustained by the rule of equity and good conscience an opportunity to be heard who had no right either by the basic law of the State or through statute to pursue their claim for relief in any court of general jurisdiction? It is the opinion- of this court that it should not invade the field of courts created by the constitution of the State and we believe that it cannot be contended that the Legislature intended to create this court to usurp the powers of,.to contradict, or to compete with courts of general jurisdiction.

This court wishes to cite herein the following provisions of the statutes taken from the brief and argument of defendant which seems to .support the contentions heretofore in this opinion stated:

Paragraph 172, Chap. 127, Smith-Hurd’s Statutes, 1923 (Section 28, of Act in Relation to Payment of Public Money of the State into the State Treasury, approved June 9; 1911), the provision that requires the Secretary of State, among other officers, “to hold for thirty days all moneys received for or on behalf of the State under protest and on the expiration of such period, to deposit the same with the State Treasurer, unless the party making such payment shall within such period file a bill in chancery and secure a temporary injunction restraining the' making of such deposit, in which case such payment shall be held until the final order of decree of the court.”

There is also another theory which this court considers proper to comment on in passing on the propositions involved in this case.

The office of the Secretary of State was created by the constitution of the State. The constitution and the Legislature placed large responsibilities upon the incumbent of this office. The rapid increase of the population of this State has increased many fold the duties of this officer. Therefore it ' would seem that this court should be reluctant to enter any order that might presume to review the acts or conduct of the man whom the people of the State of Illinois placed in this high position of prominence and responsibility in view of the fact that in cases of this character the Legislature provided a method wherein a claimant would believe himself to be aggrieved by the acts of the Secretary of State that he could proceed as indicated in the statute above cited in courts of general jurisdiction making the Secretary of State a special defendant, thereby giving this officer an opportunity of being heard directly and his acts reviewed by a court of general jurisdiction with such rights of appeal that may be provided by law. Therefore it appears to the court in fairness to all concerned that in all cases where the law of this State provides a remedy for a hearing in courts of general jurisdiction that claimant should avail himself of this method rather than come to this court.

Therefore, for the reasons aforesaid, this claim is disallowed. -


text:
    (No. 690
    Claim denied.)
    Pyramid Lumber Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Franchise tax — when court without jurisdiction to refund. The case is governed by the decision of the court announced in the case of Moline Plow Company v. State, supra.

    Hopkins, Stark & Hopkins, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Edward C. Fitch, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

For the reasons set forth in the opinion filed in this court in the case of Moline Plow Company v. State of Illinois, No. 687a, this claim is disallowed.


text:
    (No. 713
    Claim denied.)
    Will & Baumer Candle Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Franchise tax — when court without jurisdiction to refund. The decision of the court announced in the case of Moline Plow Go. v. State, supra, governs this claim.
    Albert J. Will, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Edward C. Fitch, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

For the reasons set forth in the opinion filed in this court in the case of Moline Plow Company v. State of Illinois, No. 687a, this claim is disallowed.


text:
    (No. 783
    Claim denied.)
    Dearborn Chemical Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Franchise tax — when court without jurisdiction. The decision of the court announced in the case of Moline Plow Co. v. State, supra, governs this claim.
    Mills & Howe, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Edward C. Fitch, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

For the reasons set forth in the opinion filed in this court in the case of Moline Plow Company v. State of Illinois, No. 687a, this claim is disallowed.


text:
    (No. 804
    Claim denied.)
    Gardner Governor Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Franchise tax — when court without jurisdiction to refund. This case is governed by the decision of the court in Moline Plow Co. v. State, supra.

    John T. Inghram, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Edward C. Fitch, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

For the reasons set forth in the opinion filed in this court in the case of Moline Plow Company v. State of Illinois, No. 687a, this claim is disallowed.


text:
    (No. 886
    Claim denied.)
    Western Newspaper Union, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Franchise tax — tohen court without jurisdiction to refund. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Moline Plow Co. v. State, supra.

    Tenney, Harding, Sherman & Rogers, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Edward C. Fitch, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

For the reasons set forth in the opinion filed in this court in the case of Moline Plow Company v. State of Illinois, No. 687a, this claim is disallowed.


text:
    (No. 957
    Claimant awarded $2,730.00.)
    Meakin Keith, Administrator of the Estate of Henry T. Keith, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Governmental function — hard roads. When State not liable. The State in constructing its hard roads exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees thereon.
    Workmen’s compensation aot — award made under. Although no legal liability exists against the State, an award may be made to an employee of the State who is injured in the course of his employment, and compensation fixed according to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation act.
    Knotts & Knotts, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim growing out of injuries sustained by one Henry T. Keith, while employed by the State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways.

The evidence shows that the claimant, Henry T. Keith, had been employed by the Department of Public Works and Buildings of the State of Illinois, Division of Highways, some time prior to the accident which occurred on May 3, 1924; that he was employed as a common laborer at a wage of $3.60 a day in and about the repair and maintenance of Section 607 on Route 4 of a certain public highway, and that in the course of his employment he was under the supervision and direction of the Division, of Highways.

That at about 10 o ’clock A. M. on the 3rd day of May, 1924, the said Henry T. Keith was pouring, by hand, heated asphalt ' from a vessel somewhat similar to a garden sprinkler into a certain crack in said pavement near the center of the north half of said hard road at a point about a quarter of a mile east of the village of Nilwood in the county - of Macoupin, where said hard road extends in an easterly and westerly direction, and in so .pouring said asphalt as aforesaid said Plenry T. Keith was facing southward.

That on the date of the injury while said Henry T. Keith was employed as aforesaid, one Gus.tin Wilton drove his Ford touring car at the rate of about ten or fifteen miles an hour along said highway where said Henry T. Keith was working; that the said Wilton, when within a short distance of the said Henry T. Keith, suddenly and without warning drove his car in a careless and incompetent manner along said highway in such a way as to strike the said Henry T. Keith with such force and violence that he, Keith, was thrown for a distance of ten or fifteen feet, rendering him unconscious; that the impact of said automobile broke both bones of the right leg of Keith and dislocated his right shoulder, tearing the ligaments of the same, and also badly bruising his body.

That as a result of said injuries sustained by Keith, he was confined in the Springfield Hospital at Springfield, Illinois, for a period of about one month and was wholly prevented from earning any wages or from pursuing any gainful occupation for a period of eleven months from and after the date of his injuries, and that he was permanently disabled in the use of both his right leg and right arm to the extent of 50% in the former and 40% in the latter; that prior to the accident Henry T. Keith was able-bodied; that at the time of his injury he was 62 years of age.

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State of Illinois, has filed a demurrer, which, as a proposition of law, is sustained. It is an old established rule of law that the State of Illinois is not liable for the torts of its officers, agents or employes; that the State in conducting the Division of Highways exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries to those in its employ.

However, it has been the practice of this court, where claims of employes for injuries sustained while in the employment of the State to follow the Workmen’s Compensation law in allowing claims for injuries in order that equity and justice be done to injured employes.

There is no dispute in the evidence, and.the statement filed by the Attorney General admits that the statement, brief and argument of claimant is a correct statement of facts and that claimant properly applies the law under the Workmen’s Compensation Act; that claimant’s statement, brief and argument are accepted and the case submitted to the court for such disposition as they care to make on the basis of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

According to the statement of claimant, the acceptance of said statement by the Attorney General and the fact that the evidence is undisputed, we will allow this claim in accordance with the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as follows:

The sum of $514.80 for temporary total disability, computed as follows: $10.00 per week, being 50% of his average weekly wage of $21.60, for a period of 47 2/3 weeks; and also the sum of $1,922.40 for his said permanent partial injuries, computed as follows: for the permanent partial loss 6f the use of his right leg 50% of 50% of his average weekly wage of $21.60 for a period of 180 weeks, making a total of $972.00, and for the permanent partial loss of the use of his right arm and shoulder 40% of 50% of his average weekly wage of $21.60 for a period of 220 weeks, making a total of $950.40, and for the reasonable expenses amounting to the sum of $293.00, making a final total of $2,730.00.

We therefore allow this claim in the sum of $2,730.00.


text:
    (No. 958
    Claim denied.)
    Cora D. Summer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

      Services — when State not liable. Where claimant fails to comply with the requirements of the Civil Service Law no recovery can be had for personal injury sustained or services rendered while in the employment of a department of the State.
    Pearl M. Hart, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank E. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Cora D. Summer, has filed in this court a claim in the total sum of $11,135.00, on account of a purported injury to her eye, and for extra work done while she was employed, under civil service, as" stenographer in the Attorney General’s office. To the petition filed on September 10, 1925, the Attorney General has filed a demurrer, which is sustained.

There is a large volume of testimony, and we believe there can be no question as to the ability of Miss Summer to handle the work assigned to her by her various employees. However, she has not complied with the requirements of the Civil Service Law necessary to entitle her to recover for any injury to her eye. She has received and accepted the salary allotted to her on acceptance of the positions which she held.

We believe that the Attorney General had the power and authority to discharge the claimant for the reasons set out, as required by the statute, and that he properly exercised his power. The claim is accordingly disallowed.


text:
    (No. 963
    Claim denied.)
    Abe Vannoy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Wobicmen’s compensation act — when State not liable under provisions of. . The Workmen’s Compensation act does not make an employer an insurer - against all injuries sustained by his employees, nor does it apply to every accidental injury that may happen to a workman during his employment.

      Same — how liability arises. It is not enough that the injury was sustained in the course of the employment, but it must also arise out of the employment.

      Same — burden of proof upon claimant. The burden of proof is on the claimant to prove by direct or positive evidence that the accident causing the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment.

      Same — what does not constitute conveyance under the act. The fact that the State furnished gas and oil for claimant’s car, when not required by the contract of employment, did not make the car a conveyance furnished by the State.
    Assumption of bisk — when claimant assumes risk. When claimant used the public highway in going and returning from his work he assumed equally with the general public all the risk incident thereto.

      Same — injury must be traceable' to this employment. The injury must be traceable to the employment as the proximate cause. If it comes from a hazard to which the employee is equally exposed aside from his employment, it does not arise out of the employment.

      Same — when employer is not liable. An employer is not liable for an injury sustained by an employee in going to or from his work, unless the injury occurred on the premises of the employer or in a conveyance furnished by the employer.
    Constkuction of statute — compensation act, sec. 1. The term “arise out of” as used in the compensation act, points to the origin of the cause of injury, and the term “in the course of” points to the time, place and' circumstances under which the injury occurred.
    Robert Ferdinand Tunnel, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

To the declaration of claimant in this case the Attorney General has filed a general and special demurrer. After the filing of the demurrer it was stipulated by counsel for claimant and the Attorney General that claimant might take the depositions of his witnesses to be read in evidence, in support of his claim. Under this stipulation the depositions of claimant’s witnesses were taken, the Attorney General being represented by one of his assistants. Although the declaration is informal and inartificially drawn, in view of the above facts, the demurrer will be overruled and the cause will be heard as though a general traverse of the declaration had been filed.

The evidence shows that claimant was employed by the State as a general laborer on one of the State’s paved roads and was working somewhere between Woodriver and Nameoki. It is not clear from the evidence just what his duties were, nor where he worked. He said, “I was trimming along the pavement for the work. ’ ’ He lived at Woodriver and went from his boarding place to his work in his Ford car. He said, “We had been working right towards Nameoki.” He began work at 7 o’clock in the morning and worked nine hours, for which he was paid 40 cents an hour. On the morning of June 26, 1925, he got in his ear and started to his work.. After he had gone about three blocks from where he boarded he said “There was a man coming up the road and I stopped to keep from running into him and my car stopped dead, and I got out to crank it and it kicked me”. The blow from the crank broke the ulna of his right arm two or three inches above the wrist. The fracture was reduced by a physician and at the time the testimony was taken in November, 1925, his arm was still somewhat stiff and sore and he could not use it to do heavy work. The accident occurred in Woodriver at about 6:30 in the morning. ■

It is the contention of claimant that his injury arose out. of and in the course of his employment, and that under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act the State should compensate him for the injury. Assuming, but not deciding, that the Workmen’s Compensation Act applies to the State, the burden is on claimant to prove by direct and positive evidence that the accident causing the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. (Madison Coal Gorp. v. Industrial Com., 320 Illl. 298). The Workmen’s Compensation Act does' not make the employer an insurer against all injuries; it does not apply to every accidental injury that may happen to a workman during his employment. It is not enough that the injury was received in the course of the employment but it must also have arisen out of the employment; it must have been the result of some risk which it can be seen might have been reasonably contemplated as incidental to the employment (Boorde v. Industrial Com., 310 Ill. 62). If the injury be not fairly traceable to the employment at the proximate cause or if it comes from a hazard to which the employee would have been equally exposed aside from the employment, it does not arise out of the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work and incidental to the character of the business. (Edelweiss Gardens v. Industrial Com., 290 Ill. 459). It appears from the evidence that claimant was a day laborer employed to do general work in the maintenance of a State paved road. His duties began at 7 in the morning and continued for nine hours. The injury occurred at 6:30 in the morning on a public highway in Woodriver. It is therefore apparent that the injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment.

Claimant, however, contends that as the injury occurred after he had started to his work it did arise out of and in the course of his employment, and cites in support of his contention Friebel v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 280 Ill. 76; Rainford v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 289 Ill. 427, and Wabash Ry. Co. v. Industrial Com., 294 Ill. 119. There is language in the Friebel case which warrants the position of claimant but that language was obiter dictum and has since been so declared and modified. (Fairbanks Co. v. Industrial Com., 285 Ill. 11; Schweiss v. Industrial Com., 292 Ill. 90). The Rainford case cited by claimant does not decide this question and is not in point. In that case the plaintiff was not injured on his way either to or from work, but was injured while on the premises of his employer. No case has been cited, and we have been unable to find any, holding the employer liable for an injury received in going to or from work unless the injury occurred on the premises of the employer or in a conveyance furnished by the employer. The general rule,is that one’s employment does not begin until the place where he is to work is reached and does not continue after he has left unless the conveyance in which he travels to and from the premises is furnished by the employer. An accident suffered by an employee on his way to or from his work cannot be held to arise out of the employment unless it occurs after he has arrived at or before he leaves the sphere of his employment. (Schweiss v. Industrial Com., supra). In order to make the. employer liable the injury must “arise out of and in the course of”.the employment. The term “arise out of” points to the origin of the cause of the injury, and the term “in the course of” points to the time, place and circumstances under which the injury occurred. (Board of Education v. Industrial Com., 321 Ill. 23; D. U. & C. Ry. Co. v. Industrial Com., 307 Ill. 142). In Fairbalts Co. v. Industrial Com., supra, the facts were somewhat similar to the facts in this case. In the performance of his duties the employee was required to visit the plants of others than his employer to inspect the fats offered for sale to his employer and to obtain samples of such fats. It was his custom, if he could obtain the samples in time, to return with them to his employer’s plant before 6 o’clock. But if he could not finish his inspection and obtain the samples in time to return to the plant before closing time, he would bring the samples to his employer’s plant the next morning. On the day of the accident he had been sent to the plant, of Darling & Co. to procure samples of fat. He left the plant of Darling & Co. about 7:20 with a small pail of tallow and walked about two blocks where he was struck and killed by a street car. The Industrial'Commission allowed compensation on the ground that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased, and the circuit court refused to set aside its decision and award. The judgment of the circuit court was reviewed by the Supreme Court on writ of error. In the opinion, pages 13 and 14, the Supreme Court said: “In our view of the case it is immaterial whether or not he had left the pail of tallow with some friend in that locality until he should return for it on the following morning or whether he still had it at the time he was killed., The deceased had finished his work for the day and was on his way to his home at the time this accident occurred, and the sole question for our determination is whether the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. * * * When work for the day has ended and the employee has left the premises of his employer to go to his home the liability of the employer ceases, unless after leaving the plant of • the employer the employee is incidentally performing some act for the employer under his contract of employment. * * * In this case there is no circumstance to show that after the deceased had left the plant of Darling & Co. he was performing any mission for 1ns employer. He had completed his work for the day. It is true that he had in his possession a small pail of tallow which it was necessary for him to deliver at the plant of plaintiff in error the next morning, but if he still retained possession of this pail at the time he was injured he did so for his own convenience, and that fact did not contribute in any way to his injury. * * * At the time the deceased was injured his duties for the day had ceased and he was on his way to his home. He was not doing anything incidental to his employment, and the applicant is not entitled to compensation for his death.” The reasoning of the Fairbanks case applies with equal force to the facts in this case. Claimant was not fulfilling any duty of his employment before he arrived at the place where he was to work. The same reason would bar recovery for an injury received in going to work as one received on returning from work. It is said the State furnished the gasoline and oil claimant used in his car and that is urged as a reason for holding the State liable. The State was not required by its contract of employment to furnish the gasoline and oil to claimant and its doing so did not constitute his car a conveyance furnished by the State. Neither did the fact that he had his tools in the car at the time of the injury change the rule. He no doubt took them back and forth because it was more convenient to do so than to store them in the tool house.

Claimant was injured on a public highway in Woodriver a half hour before time for him to begin his work. He was not at the place where he worked, and must have been a considerable distance from it if he expected to be thirty minutes driving there in his automobile. His contract of employment required him to be at his place of work at 7 o ’clock, and it was immaterial to his employer what method he used to get there.

If he traveled the public highway he assumed all the risk incident thereto, whether he traveled on foot or. in an automobile, and such risk was not incident to — did not arise out of— his employment. It was a risk to which he was exposed equally with the general public.

The claim is therefore denied and the suit dismissed.


text:
    (No. 970
    Claimant awarded $1,000.00.)
    William A. Crookston, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.
    Military service — when award may be made. Where claimant an officer of the Illinois National Guard under orders from his superior officer, is injured while obeying said orders, the court may as a matter of social justice and equity allow an award to him for the injuries sustained.
    Clarence B. Davis, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

Claimant is in the employ of the State Auditor’s office. He is also an officer of the Illinois National Guard; that in the summer of 1925, while as such officer he attended the guard encampment at Camp Grant. On Sunday afternoon, August 23, 1925, claimant was ordered by a superior officer at Camp Grant to place-entries for the Roman race. The entries were placed, and while claimant was obeying his orders he was struck by an unmanageable horse ridden by another superior officer. The claimant was knocked down, sustaining injuries to his face and jaw. His upper jaw bone was broken and five teeth were knocked out at the time. His lower lip was cut and his entire face was bruised. He was taken to a hospital at Rockford, Illinois, where his injuries were dressed and treated, and as a result of the accident fourteen of the upper teeth and a portion of his jawbone were removed. In fact, it was shown by the testimony that he suffered a considerable length of time on account of this injury and that he is now using artificial teeth, although it is shown that his teeth were in fair condition before the accident occurred. There is no contradiction of hearing as to the extent of the injury or the manner of the accident, and it appearing to the court that this claimant suffered this accident while in a line of patriotic duty therefore, as a matter of equity and good conscience, an allowance is recommended.

Therefore it is considered by the court that claimant be allowed $1000.00.


text:
    (No. 989
    Claimant awarded $1,058.50.)
    Alice Wigginton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Workmen’s compensation act — award may he made under. This case is controlled' by the decision of the court in case of Girhard v. State, supra.

    E. V. Champion and Charles F. Mansfield, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The evidence in this case shows that on the 13th day of November, A. D. 1924, the claimant, Alice Wigginton, was employed as nurse at the State hospital at Bartohville, Illinois, operated by the State of Illinois under the direct control of the Department of Public Welfare of said State.

The evidence further shows that the claimant was at the time of the accident standing upon a ladder in and at said hospital, and that without any fault upon her part and without any warning to her, a patient of said hospital, pushed, knocked and bumped the ladder from underneath the claimant, and as a result she fell á distance of practically ten feet to the floor and received a fracture of the oscalis of the left foot and other injuries.

The Attorney General, in his statement, admits that the claimant properly states the facts.

Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the claimant would be entitled to receive the sum of $1296.00, but the amount of $237.50 which she received from the State should be deducted.

We therefore award the claimant the sum of $1058.50.


text:
    (No. 996
    Claimant awarded $605.00.)
    Tully Halterman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Respondeat superior — State not liable for injuries sustained by its employees. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty.
    Social justice and equity — award may be made. As an act of so.cial justice and equity an award may be made an employee who is injured while in the discharge of his duty although there may be liability existing against the State.
    Russell E. Townsend, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a case in which the claimant -was, at the time of his employment, an employee of the State of Illinois. The evidence in the case is substantially as follows:

The claimant on the 7th day of December, 1925, was employed by the State of Illinois at the Illinois Southern Hospital for the Insane, at Anna, Illinois, as a laborer, and while so employed he was under the order and direction of B. H. Elkins, a steamfitter for and at said State institution. The claimant and Elkins, together with a patient employee were engaged in the rebuilding of a steam radiator; that about 9:30 o’clock on the day of injury these workmen had completed the rebuilding of the radiator, had detached same from the testing water pressure pipes used in that test; that the radiator when empty weighed about 405 pounds' and when filled with water weighed about 550 pounds. The patient employe had, after making the test, tilted the radiator for the purpose of draining the water, when so tilted the radiator became overbalanced and fell over on its side to the concrete floor of the machine shop, in which these men were employed. "When the claimant saw that the radiator was going to fall he attempted to catch • it in order to keep it from falling on the cement floor and breaking, and in so doing claimant’s right hand caught between the radiator and the concrete floor and was bádly ■ crushed, bruised and otherwise injured. That because of said injury it became necessary to amputate the first phalange and one-half of the second phalange of each of the second and third fingers of said right hand, causing a permanent and complete loss of each of said fingers, and his hand has become permanently disfigured.

The Attorney General has filed a demurrer, which, as a matter of law, will be sustained. The Attorney General admits in his statement herein filed that, if this claimant were working for a private individual, he would be entitled to compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

As a matter of law, the State would not be liable, but we believe that as a matter of equity, good conscience and social justice an award should be made. We therefore allow the claimant the sum of $605.00.


text:
    (No. 1019
    Claimant awarded $3,400.00.)
    Pearl L. Hardesty, Administratrix of the Estate of Ellis Hardesty, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Respondeat superior — State not liable for injuries sustained by its employees. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty.
    Social justice and equity. Where an employee of the State is engaged in a hazardous employment or in a dangerous place, and is injured an award may be made to him as an act of social justice and equity and such compensation fixed according to the provisions of the Workman’s Compensation act.
    John M. Peefers, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

• Claimant’s intestate, Ellis Hardesty, deceased, was employed as house father at the St. Charles School for Boys, and had been so employed since the year 1911. On February 7, 1925, six of the inmates of the school escaped and the deceased was directed by Charles E. Saushe, head farmer of the school, to go with Matthew J. Oberwis, another employee of the institution, to the Chicago & Northwestern yards in West Chicago to search for the escaped boys. The deceased and Oberwis left the institution about 7:20 in the evening, arriving at the yards near 8:00 o’clock. They made a search through box cars and wherever they thought it likely the boys might be. As they were walking east between two of the switch tracks a freight train passed them going west, and they stepped over near the track on the north of the one the freight train was on to be out of danger from that train. Another train on the north track was backing eastward without any lights on the rear car and without giving any signals. The noise of the passing freight was so great that the approach of the train backing to the east could not be heard. This train struck the deceased, crushing his head and killing him instantly.

The deceased left claimant as his widow and left no children or descendants of children. Claimant has' filed this suit for compensation on the ground that, being an employee of the State and killed in the line of his duty, it is obligatory on the State to recompense her for his death. The evidence clearly shows that part of the duties of deceased was to make a search for escaped inmates of the institution whenever directed to do so by those in authority above him, and that Saushe was one of the officials who had.authority to direct him to make such searches. Saushe directed him to go to the railroad yards, a dangerous and hazardous place, and especially so in view of the weather conditions at the time. It is also clear from the evidence that the death of deceased was not caused by any negligent act of his.

The Attorney G-eneral has filed a general and special demurrer on behalf of the State,' but makes no argument in support thereof and concedes that the facts as. above stated are true. This court has uniformly held that the State is not liable for injuries received by its employees in the course of their employment, and the demurrer must, therefore, as a matter of law, be sustained and the claim rejected. But in cases of this kind this court has uniformly recognized the principle that, as a matter of social justice, the widow and heirs of the deceased should be recompensed by the State and that such compensation should be based upon the rules prescribed in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

At the time of his death deceased was earning $90 per month, and under the rules prescribed by the aforesaid act the maximum amount which could be paid to the claimant is $3,750.00, which sum would be paid in installments, but Section 9 of the act provides that such compensation may be paid in a lump sum, which sum shall be an amount which will equal the total sum of the probable future payments capitalized at their present value upon the basis of interest calculated at 3% per annum with annual rests.

The court therefore recommends to the Legislature that an appropriation be made to the claimant in the sum of $3,400.00.


text:
    (No. 1020
    Claimant awarded $345.00.)
    Clyde W. Solomon, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Military service — when award will he made. When a member of the Illinois National Guard is injured while in active service, and in the line of his duty, he is entitled to an award for the injuries sustained. (Sec. 10, Art. 16, Military & Naval Code, Rev. St. Ill. Chap. 129.)
    C. D. Rogers, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The evidence in this case clearly shows that the claimant, Clyde W. Solomon, was injured while in line of duty as a member of the Illinois National Guard, on the 20th day of August, 1924, during encampment. The claimant, while in active service, received a scratch on the knuckle of the third finger of his left hand, arid as a result of this injury the claimant was unable to work for a period of eleven weeks; that while working at his regular vocation he had received $25.00 per week; that he paid out in doctor’s bills the sum of $40.00 and became indebted to certain doctors in the additional sum of $20.00 and for stenographer’s fees for taking testimony in this case the sum of $10.00, a total of $345.00.'

This case comes squarely within the Military and Naval Code, and we believe that inasmuch as the claimant lost full time for eleven weeks and paid out certain sums of money as above stated, that he is entitled to receive the amount in full. We therefore award the claimant the sum of $345.00.


text:
    (No. 1025
    Claim denied.)
    Clifford Deane Shellabarger, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Independent contractor — State not liable for acts of. An independent contractor in the construction of a part of the State hard roads is not an agent of the State.
    Respondeat superior — when State not liable for negligence of its employees. The State is not liable for the negligence of its agents or employees.
    Russell F. Meyer, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim is for damages caused by an automobile accident which occurred on the 30th day of April, A. D. 1925, on State Highway No. 2, about one mile and a half south of the town of Minonk in Woodford county. At the time of the accident the highway was still under construction, and was not received and taken over by the State for maintenance until December 15,1925.

About 10:30 p. m. on the day before the accident claimant left Mattoon, Illinois, in company with Buth Edwards. They were in a Buick coupe and were going to some town in Iowa, where they had a theatrical engagement for the next day. It was a dark night and raining, and claimant was driving about thirty miles an hour at the time of the accident, which happened about 4 o’clock in the morning. The day before the accident workmen had been building the dirt shoulders along the sides of the pavement and left dirt upon it from a fourth to a half inch deep. When claimant reached the place where this dirt was, his car skidded and turned over, throwing both of the occupants out, and damaging the car and "claimant’s wearing apparel. Claimant alleges that his salary was $125.00 per week, and that, as a result of the accident, he was unable to work for six weeks, and that he should be paid at that rate for the time he lost from work, amounting to $750.00; that his car was damaged $600.00, his wearing apparel $100.00, and that his past and prospective actual pecuniary loss for bodily injuries is $1000.00; for which amounts he asks to be reimbursed by the State.

The attorneys representing claimant and defendant have stipulated that the contract for the construction of the slab of concrete on and along Route No. 2 at the point where the accident occurred was awarded September 14, 1923, that the construction on said contract began on May 14,1924, and that the contract was not finished and accepted by the State until December 15,1925. The evidence also shows that at the time of the accident the road was under construction and that signs were posted in plain view reading, “Road under construction, travel at your own risk, ’ ’ and ‘1 Men working. ’ ’

Section 12 of the Bond Issue Act provides that the public highways upon which such roads are being constructed shall, during the construction period and continuously thereafter be under the jurisdiction and control of the Department of Public Works and Buildings, but the duty of maintaining such highways shall rest on the local authorities until such construction work has been completed. Route No. 2 at the point of the accident was under construction at the time these injuries and damages were received and had not been accepted by the Department of Public Works and Buildings, but was still under the jurisdiction of the local road authorities of Woodford county.

The Attorney General has filed a general and special demurrer to the declaration, and contends the State is not liable for the damages suffered by claimant.

- The road in question was not being constructed by the agents of the State, but by an independent contractor. But even if the contractor could be held to be an agent of the State, that would not make the State liable, for it is well settled that the principle of respondeat superior does not apply to the State.

The Supreme Court of this State has repeatedly held that towns and counties are not liable for damages caused by the negligence of the agents and officials of such municipalities in constructing and maintaining roads. The reason is that such municipalities are sub-divisions of the State for governmental purposes. Upon the same principle the State, being the whole body of people organized for governmental purposes, is not liable for such damages. (Dunning v. State, No. 806, decided this term.)

We are of the opinion that the State is not liable in this case, and the demurrer will be sustained and case dismissed.


author: Mr. J ustice Thomas

text:
    (No. 1026
    Claim denied.)
    Ruth Edwards, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Respondeat superior — when State not liable. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Shellabarger v. State, supra.

    Russell F. Meyer, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. J ustice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for $3000.00 damages caused by an accident which occurred April 30, 1925, on State Highway No. 2 near Minonk in Woodford county.

The facts in this case are the samé as in the case of Clifford Deane Shellabarger v. The State of Illinois, No. 1025, and the decision of the court in this case will be the same as in that one.

The demurrer will be sustained, the claim disallowed and case dismissed.


text:
    (No. 1040
    Claim denied.)
    Henry J. Heiss, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Respondeat superior — doctrine of not applicable to State. The doctrine of Respondeat Superior is not applicable to the State and it is not liable for the negligence of its employees, servants or officers.
    Governmental function — State not liable. The.State in the construction of its hard roads exercises a governmental function and is not liable for the negligence of its officers, agents or officials.
    Carl E. Sheldon, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim is for $1164.95 damages to the claimant’s automobile caused by an accident which happened near Henkel February 6,1926, while claimant’s son, Henry, aged 17 years, and four other boys were driving to Mendota on State Highway No. 2 to attend a high school basketball game.

At the point where the accident occurred a gap had been left in the pavement for the construction of a proposed viaduct over the Illinois Central Railroad. Counsel for claimant and defendant stipulated that the accident occurred about 25 feet beyond the end of the pavement on Route No. 2, seven-tenths of a mile north of Henkel, just north of the overhead bridge; that about one-tenth of a mile north of the end of the pavement and on the side thereof was an octagonal sign bearing the inscription “End of pavement — Danger”; that within about 75 feet north of the end of the pavement there were two more signs adjacent thereto, one of which bore the inscription “Pavement gap, proposed overhead I. C. R. R.,” and the other of which bore the inscription “Slow 400 feet.” That each and all of said signs were in their present respective locations at the time of the accident on February 6, 1926. It also appears from the record that at the end of the pavement there was a dirt road leading south and a little west into Henkel.

Claimant lives at Sterling. On the evening of the accident his son and four other boys left Sterling for Mendota in claimant’s Hudson seven-passenger touring car. Claimant’s son was driving the car, one of the boys being in the front seat with him and the other three in the rear seat. The evidence shows he drove between 30 and 35 miles per hour all the way from Sterling and until he came near the end of the pavement, when he saw the sign, ‘1 End of pavement — Dangerous, ’ ’ and slowed the speed to between 25 and 30 miles per hour. Instead of following the dirt road south and west, he turned south and east and ran into an earth embankment and wrecked the car. The. accident occurred about eight o ’clock in the evening. He had dimmed the lights about a mile back from the place where the accident happened. He testified he only saw the sign, “End of pavement — Dangerous,” but the boy in the seat with him saw all of the signs, and there was nothing to keep Henry from seeing them, had he been watching.

The Attorney G-eneral has filed a general and special demurrer to the declaration and contends the State is not liable for the damages claimed.

The agents of the State had put up proper signs and warnings to the public to prevent accidents at the place where this one occurred, and if claimant’s son had heeded these signs, the accident would not have happened. But even if the agents of the State had not put up the proper signs, that would not make the State liable, for it is well settled that the principle of respondeat superior does not apply to the State. Claimant has cited many cases holding cities and villages liable for injuries caused by permitting streets and sidewalks to become unsafe for public travel, and seems to take the view that the' same rule applies to the State. In this claimant is in error.' Neither the^ State nor any sub-division thereof for governmental purposes is liable for damages caused by the - negligence of its agents, servants or officials. The Supreme Court of this State has held, in a long line of decisions,- that towns and counties are not liable for damages caused by the negligence of the agents and officials of such municipalities in constructing and maintaining roads. The reason is that such municipalities are sub-divisions of the State for governmental purposes. And if a sub-division of the State is not liable for such damages, it follows, as a matter of course, that the State is not.

The demurrer will be sustained, the claim refused and the case dismissed.


text:
    (No. 1041
    Claimant awarded $216.23.)
    W. J. Potter and A. M. Potter, Partners, Doing Business Under the Firm Name and Style of Potter Brothers, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Property damage — reimbursement. When may be made. Claimant in this case permitted the use of their scales to weigh a truck, at the request of a State Automobile Investigator, in order for the investigator to determine whether the State law was being violated, whereupon the scales were broken beyond repair: Held. Claimant entitled to an award for the damage to the scales.
    W. A. Blodgett, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank R. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears from the files in this case that Emerson Fellows, a State automobile investigator, working under the direction of the Secretary of State’s office, found a truck on the streets of Morrison, Illinois, which he considered overloaded and, consequently, he ordered the driver - of the truck to drive on the scales of claimants for the purpose of weighing the truck and load. It appears also that claimant, Albert M. Potter, was afraid the truck and load was too heavy for the scales and testified and stated that it would break down the scales, and that Mr. Fellows stated that it wouldn’t, although that statement by Mr. Fellows is. contradicted. However, there appears to be no question about the truck being driven on the scales and breaking them down beyond repair. It is the' opinion of this court that there is a possible question of fact in this case, as it appears that both claimant and Mr. Fellows should be men of good judgment as to weight of trucks and loads and the capacity of scales. There is also another question as to whether or not the scales were in reasonable repair so that it would stand its weighing capacity. However, the scales were broken, as it appears, beyond repair. The attempted weighing was done to determine whether or not a law of the State of Illinois was violated, and it is not reasonable to conclude that the automobile investigator had good reason to believe that the scale would not stand the weight of a truck loaded as shown.

The court is of the opinion, however, that it would not be proper to allow the price of a new scale in face of the fact that the one damaged was in use twelve or thirteen years, and we are of the opinion that the amount suggested by the Attorney General as an allowance, if an allowance was made, namely, $216.23, would be as large an amount as should be allowed.

Therefore it is recommended that claimant be allowed the sum of $216.23.


text:
    (No. 1117
    Claimant awarded $1,500.00.)
    Tony Blasi, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Fees & salaries — when award, will be made. Where an appropriation has been made by the Legislature providing for an increase in the salary of a State employee, and award may be made to him for the amount of the increase where he appears to be entitled to it.
    Harry Smitz, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

Tony Blasi presents a claim against the State on account of a deficiency in salary allotted to the chief inspector in the Division of Private Employment Agencies, in the Department of Labor, for deputy hire, said claimant being a deputy in said service. It appears that the General Assembly in making the appropriation for the salaries in question did not take into consideration that the law enacted contains a provision as follows': “If the deputy inspector has served or hereafter serves more than one year, $100 shall be added to his salary for each year of service' until a maximum salary of $3,000 is reached,” and that no allowance for such increase in salary is made in the law.

The Attorney"1 General of the State of Illinois has filed a demurrer, which is sustained, as a matter of law.

George B. Arnold, director of labor of the State of Illinois, has recommended that- this deficiency be awarded to the employee.

We accordingly award to the claimant the sum of $1,500.00.


text:
    (No. 1118
    Claimant awarded $1,500.00.)
    Hector Durante, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.
    Fees & salaries — when award will he made. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in the case of Blasi v. State, supre.

    Harry Smitz, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

Hector Durante presents a claim against the State on account of a deficiency in salary allotted to the Chief Inspector in the Division of Private Employment Agencies, in the Department of Labor, for deputy hire, said claimant being a deputy in said service. It appears that the General Assembly in making,the appropriation for the salaries in question, did not take into consideration that the law enacted contains a provision as follows: “If the deputy inspector has served or hereafter serves more than one year, $100 shall be added to his salary for each year of service until a maximum salary of $3,000 is reached,” and that no allowance for such increase in salary is made in the law.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois has filed a demurrer, which is sustained, as a matter of law.

George B. Arnold, director of labor of the State of Illinois, has recommended that this deficiency be awarded to the employee.

We accordingly award to the claimant the sum of $1,500.00.


text:
    (No. 1119
    Claimant awarded $1,500.00.)
    Martin Cannon, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Pees & salaries — when award may he made. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Blast v. State, supra.

    Harry Smitz, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill P. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

Martin Cannon presents a claim against the State on account of a deficiency in salary, allotted to the chief inspector in the Division of Private Employment Agencies in the Department of Labor, for deputy hire, said claimant being a deputy in said service. It appears that the General Assembly in making the appropriation for the salaries in question, did not take into consideration that the law enacted contains a provision as follows: “If the deputy inspector has served or hereafter serves more than one year, $100 shall be added to his salary for each year of service until a maximum salary of $3,000 is reached,” and that no allowance for such increase in salary is made in the law.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois has filed a demurrer, which is sustained as a matter of law.

George B. Arnold, Director of Labor of the State of Illinois, has recommended that this deficiency be awarded to the employee.

We accordingly award to the claimant the sum of $1,500.00.


text:
    (No. 1120
    Claimant awarded $1,150.00.)
    Thomas Bouchier, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Fees & salaries — when award will he made. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Blast v. State, supra.

    Harry Smitz, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

Thomas Bouchier presents a claim against the State on account of a deficiency in salary, allotted to the chief inspector in the Division of Private Employment Agencies, in the Department of Labor, for deputy hire, said claimant being a deputy in said service. It appears that the General Assembly in making the appropriation for the salaries in question, did not take into consideration that the law enacted contains a provision as follows: “If the deputy inspector has served or hereafter serves more than one year, $100 shall be added to his salary for each year of service until a maximum salary of $3,000 is reached, ’ ’ and that no allowance for such increase in salary is made in the law.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois has filed a demurrer, which is sustained, as a matter of law.

George B. Arnold, Director of Labor of the State of Illinois, has recommended that this deficiency be awarded to the employee.

We accordingly award to the claimant the sum of $1,150.00.


text:
    (No. 1121
    Claimant awarded $1,150.00.)
    Louis J. Strelitsky, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Fees & salaries — when award will he made. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Blasi v. State, supra.

    Harry Smitz, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

Louis J. Strelitsky presents a claim against the State on account of a deficiency in salary, allotted to the chief inspector in the Division of Private Employment Agencies, in the Department of Labor, for deputy hire, said claimant being a deputy in said service. It appears that the General Assembly in making the appropriation for the salaries in question, did not take into consideration that the law enacted contains a provision as follows: “If the deputy inspector has served or hereafter serves more than one year, $100 shall be added to his salary for each year of service until a maximum salary of $3,000 is reached, ’ ’ and that no allowance for such increase in salary is made in the law.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois has filed a demurrer, which is sustained, as a matter of law.

George B. Arnold, Director of Labor of the State of Illinois, has recommended that this deficiency be awarded to the employee.

We accordingly award to the claimant the sum of $1,150.00.


text:
    (No. 1122
    Claimant awarded $550.00.)
    Fred W. Busse, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Pees & salaries — when award will be made. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Blasi v. State, supra.

    Harry Smitz, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

Fred W. Busse presents a claim against the State on account of a deficiency in salary, allotted to the chief inspector in the division of Private Employment Agencies, in the Department of Labor, for deputy hire, said claimant being a deputy in said service. It appears that the General Assembly in making the appropriation for the salaries in question, did not take into consideration that the law enacted contains a provision as follows: “If the deputy inspector has served or hereafter serves more than one year, $100 shall be added to his salary for each year of service until, a maximum salary of $3,000 is reached,” and that no allowance for such increase in salary is made in the law.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois has filed a demurrer, which is sustained, as a matter of law.

George B. Arnold, Director of Labor of the State of Illinois, has recommended that this deficiency be awarded to the employee.

We accordingly award to the claimant the sum of $550.00.


text:
    (No. 1123
    Claimant awarded $550.00.)
    Fred L. Huchberger, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1927.

    Fees & salaries — when award will be made. This case is controlled by the decision of the court in Blasi v. State, supra.

    Harry Smitz, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Merrill F. Wehmhoff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

Fred L. Huchberger presents a claim against the State on account of a deficiency in salary, allotted to the chief inspector in the Division of Private Employment Agencies, in the Department of Labor, for deputy hire, said claimant being a deputy in said service. It appears that the general assembly in making the appropriation for the salaries in question, did not take into consideration that the law enacted contains a provision as follows: “If the deputy inspector has served or hereafter serves more than one year, $100 shall be added to his salary for each year of service until a maximum salary of $3,000 is reached,” and that no allowance for such increase in salary is made in the law.

. The Attorney General of the State of Illinois has filed a demurrer, which is sustained, as a matter of law.

George B. Arnold, Director of Labor of the State of Illinois, has recommended that this deficiency be awarded to the employee.

We accordingly award to the claimant the sum of $550.00.