text:
    (No. 5637
    Chris Stratakos, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 12, 1972.
    Sudak and Grubman, Attorney for Claimant.
    WILLSAM J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

Claimant was bitten by a dog owned or kept by the respondent and brings this action for damages resulting from the injury he sustained. The pertinent facts which are undisputed in this case are as follows:

At the time of the incident, claimant, an employee of the Edward Don Company, was delivering a package to the office of the DuPage State Boys School located at Nape~'ille, Illinois, After making his delivery and while leaving the said office, claimant was bitten on the lower calf of his right leg by a medium sized collie dog, which was kept on the grounds of the school by the reSpOn(leflt.

Ronald J. Fos, acting principal of the DtiPage State Boys School, testified that the dog was a Toy Collie that had been at the school about two months after he had been given to the school by a family that was leaving the state. Mr. Fos said the dog was generally kept on a chain to prevent him from running around and from leaving the school, but had never previously bitten or threatened to bite anyone.

Being in his office at the time of the incident, Mr. Fos examined the claimant’s wound and then called the N aperville Police who had the dog checked' for rabies. Shortly thereafter, claimant went to the Edwards Hospital in Naperville where he received first aid. Subsequently, he was treated by his own physician, Dr. Stanley Budrys.

In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we conclude that the dog attacked the claimant without provocation and that claimant was peaceably conducting himself in a place where he had a lawful right to be. Under these circumstances, the liability of the respondent for claimant’s injuries is absolute, by statute, even though respondent did not know of the vicious propensities of the dog. See Ch. 8, Sec. 12d, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The only remaining question to be determined is the amount of injury sustained by the claimant.

Claimant’s medical specials are as follows:

Edwards Hospital.....$ 6.60
Dr. Stanley Budrys .... 185.00
Medicines............ 20.00

Claimant testified that he saw Dr. Budrys ten or twelve times over a period of one month and that, as a result of the treatments, he suffered an allergic reaction which caused him much pain and difficulty. He further testified that he lost approximately six days from work, or a monetary loss of about $300.00.

Medical reports of Dr. Stanley Budrys and Dr. Lydia Serenynski, who treated claimant at the Edwards Hospital, were admitted into evidence by stipulation. Claimant was examined on behalf of the respondent by Dr. Zygmunt Buchsbaum, and his report was also introduced into evidence by stipulation. Dr. Buchsbaum states that claimant now has “A well healed wound, very faint, hardly visible small scar on his right calf” and “Probability of no residuals in the future”. Dr Lydia Serenynski’s report concurs with that of Dr. Buchsbaum. Nevertheless, we cannot entirely discount the less favorable prognosis of Dr. Budrys who stated, “In view of the persistence of the complaints of pain upon activities of standing, walking and driving, there is a strong probability of deep tissue damage to the leg, which, if present, will continue to plague him indefinitely.” Nothing that this opinion is based merely on “complaints of pain” given by the claimant, we must conclude that the weight of the medical evidence does not support a finding of any injury of long duration.

It is our judgment that an award be made to the claimant in the amount of $1,500.00.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Perlin, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 5803
    Burlington Northern, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Waterways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 12, 1972.

    T. G. Schuster, J. L. Pilón and P. M. Lee, and Barry N. Gutterman, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6220
    Riveredge Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 14, 1972.
    Riveredge Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6435
    Berz Ambulance Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 14, 1972.
    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul H. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6436
    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 14, 1972.
    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scorr, Attorney General; Saul H. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6439
    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 14, 1972.
    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 5244
    William Burke, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 18, 1972.
    Russell J. Goldman, John R. Snively, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Willian J. Scoot, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This is a claim for severe injuries sustained by the claimant when he was an inmate at Menard Penitentiary. The complaint, stated in three separate counts, contends that claimant’s injuries were caused by respondent’s negligence; a violation of the Structural Work Act; and by respondent’s failure to provide claimant with timely and proper medical care and treatment after he was injured.

Claimant, in his testimony, gave a detailed account of the circumstances and events before and after his injury which have a bearing on his claim. Respondent offered no rebuttal testimony but challenges the conclusions as to liability that may be drawn from claimant’s statement of the facts.

Claimant was a bricklayer by trade and had followed that occupation for over 17 years prior to his incarceration. On October 22, 1963, while an inmate at Menard, claimant was ordered by the respondent to do certain tuck pointing and masonry work on the penitentiary wall. The wall was approximately 22 feet high. Although claimant had asked the officers in charge for a swinging scaffold, he was required to work on a plank suspended between two 20 ft. wooden ladders with inserted brackets to support the platform plank. Claimant described the wooden ladders as having been repaired with wire and protested to the guards that he did not believe they were safe. He again asked for a swinging scaffold which he said would go up fast and be safer for the workers. In claimant’s unrefuted testimony he quoted Sgt. Kisro, one of the guards, as saying that the ladders were in; that claimant would have to use them and ordered him to do so.

While claimant was engaged in the directed work, another prisoner who was assigned to the same task came up one of the ladders and stepped onto the plank. As he did so, the supporting brackets gave way, causing the plank to tilt and the claimant to fall to the ground. Claimant suffered a compound fracture of the left leg. He saw the bone sticking out about three inches above the ankle.

Claimant’s unrefuted account of the medical care and treatment he received shortly after his fall, and for a long period of time thereafter, paints a vivid picture of intense pain and suffering.

Immediately after the accident, claimant lay on the ground for a short period of time before he was finally administered a shot requested for him by a Catholic priest. About 10 minutes later, he was removed on a stretcher to the prison hospital. There his leg was set by Dr. Wham and placed in a cast. No anesthesia was administered.

The leg became swollen and he ran a high temperature. When the leg became very discolored, the cast was cut off, the leg was opened and drained without benefit of anesthesia.

For several months, the condition of his leg did not improve. It was constantly draining. Three or four months after the original accident another doctor was called in for consultation. Claimant had requested an orthopedic surgeon shortly after the accident, but none was provided until after he was transferred to Stateville. There Dr. Duffy, an orthopedic surgeon from J oliet, was brought in to see him on April 23, 1964. One week later Dr. Duffy performed an operation on the leg, scraped and cleaned the bone, and put in a hose to keep it draining. There was further surgical procedure in November of 1964 when Dr. Duffy performed a bone graft and put in a pin or a rod in the claimant’s leg.

In March of 1965, after claimant was paroled, he was transferred to Hines Hospital where he stayed for approximately three and one half to four weeks. From Hines he was transferred to Rockford Memorial Hospital where

Dr. Sam Behr took over. Dr. Behr removed the cast which extended from the left hip down to the toes. The Jieg was still troubling the claimant, emitting a strong odor, and started swelling again. After several months of therapy treatment, Dr. Behr performed a final operation and removed the pins in August of 1985.

Respondent, i~i a well presented brief, has analyzed claimant's testimony and bases its conclusion, that liability should he denied, on four theories:

1. Respondent did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known that the rungs would pull out from the ladder at the time in question.

2. Respondent was not guilty of a "willful" violation of the Structural Work Act.

3. Respondent exercised reasonable care in providing medical treatment for claimant's injuries.

4. Claimant did not carry his duty of proof by the preponderance of the evidence.

The Court finds that the facts do not support respondent's first theory. It need not have been foreseeable that "the rungs would pull out from the ladder at the time in question~'. We hold that, if the respondent had exercised reasonable care for claimant's safety, it could have determined that the ladders used were unsafe as claimant had warned, particularly for two men, a plank, and the weight of the working materials. Claimant was a man with long experience in the type of work he was required to do for the respondent, knew the dangers and hazards of such work, and the type of equipment needed to protect the workman. Yet respondent did not heed claimant's professional opinion and warning that the ladders were not safe and refused his request for a scaffold which he deemed proper. In the absence of any contradictory evidence, we alSo accept chuinants statement that Captain Fry, a ~flSOfl euhph)vec, adnutted to the claimant that the ladders had been condenmed and should not have been used.

We find that the facts in this case support a finding of actionable negligence by the respondent.

The record also clearly shows that claimant could not he found guilty of any contributory negligence. The defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence are often properly available to the respondent in actions brought by a convict, hut certainly not under the facts in this case. The rule is well stated in Moore vs. State, 21 C.C.R. 282, p. 290:

"Claimant, as a convict, was required to take orders, and carry them out. In refuse to do so would subject him to disciplinary action, afl(l the forfeiture of his limited privileges, including prompt coflSi(leratiofl for parole. Thus, he did not occupy a position of independence, which a person outside a penitentiary occupies. His choice of action being limited, he, therefore, kept silent and did as he was ordered. In fact, he did not possess, under the circumstances in this case, the freedom of choice inherent in the doctrines of assumed risk and contributory negligence."

Respondent undertakes to distinguish Moore from the case at bar. The facts are different, hut the rules of law stated in Moore are applicable here.

H~aving determined that claimant is entitled to an award for his injuries, we need not discuss the conflicting arguments presented by the parties concerning the Structural Work Act, Nor do we need to elaborate on the question as to whether respondent exercised reasonable care in providing medical treatment for claimant's injuries. Suffice it to say that claimant's injuries are serious and permanent, according to the testimony of i)r. Behr. The appearance of claimant's leg, which the Court saw when he appeared before us on his crutches, left no doubt in our mind as to the accuracy of Dr. Behr's conclusion and prognosis.

Dr. Behr stated that claimant has permanently lost ap- proximately 50% of the use of his left leg and can do no work that requires the use of that leg. He can walk with the use of crutches but can no longer work at his former trade of bricklayer and stone mason. Claimant was 36 years old, bodily sound, and in good health at the time he sustained his permanent injuries.

Claimant is hereby awarded damages in the amount of $25,000.00.


text:
    (No. 5494
    Gerald T. Koehler, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Ray H. Freeark, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks recovery of $25,000 for injuries suffered on December 22, 1967, as a result of a motor vehicle accident.

Claimant contends that the accident was the result of respondent’s negligence in permitting flood water to cover U.S. Route 50 at a point where it crosses Silver Creek; negligently failing to apply salt to prevent the flood water from freezing; failing to prevent the water escaping from Silver Creek onto the highway; failing to make inspections; failing to warn the plaintiff of the icy condition on the highway; failing to detour traffic around the alleged dangerous condition; and failing to close the highway.

Claimant testified that he was a teacher and basketball coach at Althoff High School in Belleville on the date of the accident and at the time of the hearing; that he drove from Belleville to a school game at Breese by way of Route 50, having left Belleville about 6:00 p.m. The eastbound lane of the road was dry and in good condition. Claimant followed the same route back to Belleville about 9:30 p.m. The weather was clear, and he was going fifty to fifty-five miles per hour (the speed limit was 65 miles per hour) when the car started to spin. He then blacked out and woke up in the car. He had no previous warning of slickness or icy conditions prior to spinning and sliding and the accident occurred at a level stretch of road. Prior to the accident, he enjoyed good health. Injuries included having his spleen removed, a damaged liver and heart, an injured kidney, a hole knocked in the orbit of the eye and a broken bone below the left eye.

Claimant further testified that he was confined in the hospital from the date of the accident until January 29, 1968, with a second confinement for an operation to the orbit of his left eye. He lost weight and at the time of the hearing in 1968, was still unable to work a full day or play tennis or basketball, activities he had previously enjoyed.

State Trooper John R. Mayer, who investigated the accident, testified that he arrived at the scene about 10:25 p.m. He observed that there was rain or water that had come up on the highway in the eastbound lane and that it was freezing, causing slick conditions. He further testified that there were both water and ice on the westbound lane and that after he arrived on the scene, another car swerved off the road at that point. His investigation showed that the Mustang car driven by claimant apparently lost control and came across into the eastbound lane where it was struck in the side by a 1966 Chevrolet pickup truck. There was a low spot on the road where the water came up. There was no rain at the time of the occurrence. After the witness completed his investigation, he called the highway department to cinder and salt the highway and put a low spot warning that there was ice on the road. The following day, the road was closed for high water and traffic was rerouted. At the time of the accident, there were no barricades, signs, cinders, or salt'on the road.

Leon Streif, who operated a garage and wrecking service, was called to the scene of the accident. Road conditions were “a sheet of ice,” but it was not raining at the time of the accident. He had seen water over the road on other occasions, but he had not seen icy conditions. He testified that during the five previous years, water had been on the road after a heavy rain because of Silver Creek “obstruction or congestion.” He remembered floods closing the road at the point in question in 1951 and 1954, and that within five years there had been water on the road on several occasions.

Michael Pier, a student, testified that on the date of the accident, he was driving along Route 50 at the point in question between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. and noticed the water was high and almost on the road and was up to the side of the pavement. He came home on the highway about 9:00 and slowed down because the road was becoming slick. He had seen water on the road before. He had also, on occasion, seen the highway barricaded when water was on the road.

Charles Gray testified that he was a member of the volunteer fire department for Lebanon and was called to the accident between 10 and 11 p.m. The creek was on the verge of going over the road. He remembered that 1958 was a time of a big flood. He stated that there is usually a small amount of water which collects after a rain at several spots. He did not remember if the creek had gone over the road in the last five years.

Wiliam Pfeffer, a farmer, testified that part of his farm is between Silver Creek and the channel. He has seen water from Silver Creek overflow at the banks at Highway 50 many times, although he could not give the dates. Water would come up to the edge of the concrete and the wind would cause it to splash over the road.

Another farmer in the area, Terry Plab, testified that Silver Creek has overflown its bank and gone up on the pavement at Route 50 about 3 or 4 times during the past five years.

Witnesses for respondent included the following: Edward Jankowski, Assistance District Maintenance Engineer of the area in question, a job which he had held since April, 1867, who testified that between December BO-21, 1087, there were 3.35 inches of rain and a trace of rain on December 22, 1967. He did not know of Silver Creek overflowing its banks between 1961 and the date of the accident.

George Huhman, civil engineer with the Division of Highways testified that he inspects highways and oversees twenty-three maintenance sections. On the day of the accident, he encountered flooding at another point and spent most of the day there. He had passed through Silver Creek at 7:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. that day, but could not see too much because of darkness. He had come into the maintenance section in October and was not familiar with the Silver Creek bottom area. He was called to the scene of the accident where he observed ice and water completely across the road. On the day in question, there were floods throughout the area and the maintenance personnel were so concerned about other areas that they “weren’t hardly paying any attention to Silver Creek.” Mr. Huhman explained that the Silver Creek bottom area is a large, flat, marshy area and that whenever Silver Creek is high, it overflows into the area and causes a backup area in the bottom. Mr. Huhman further testified that there is a low place along Silver Creek “where the road has a tendency to collect water after a heavy rain.”

Walter Dawson, a section man for the State Highway Department, testified that he was familiar with the water in the Silver Creek area, and that he has known water to come over Silver Creek in 1961 or 1962. He was called to the scene of the accident where he put salt on the pavement and noticed about six inches of water on a small strip of pavement. On the afternoon of the accident, he had looked at a red flag he had placed along the water edge to see what the water level was and he had “Water on Pavement” signs with him, but did not put any at that place.

Another section helper, Ralph George Herman, testified that he passed through the Silver Creek area about 8:45 p.m. the evening of the accident and the highway condition

looked normal, but noticed water on the highway upon his return at the scene of the accident. He stated that he had worked for the Highway Department since 1963, and that this was the first time he had seen water on the highway.

Joe Madura, also a Highway Department worker testified that he noticed that the water level had risen during the day of the accident, but the workers did not put up any signs, although they did put up a stake.

Respondent contends that there was no verified flooding since 1961 and that not one witness testified that he had ever seen ice on the pavement due to flooding, therefore the State had no reason to believe that water would encroach upon the highway or if it did, that it would constitute any more than a nuisance. “Reasonable care,” according to respondent would not appear to include having to anticipate simultaneous circumstances of encroachment and freezing, when encroachment was very rare and encroachment and freezing combined was never known to have occurred before. Respondent also suggests that claimant did not use due care, although no evidence was introduced to support that allegation. The Court fails to understand why no apparent effort was made toward this end to obtain the testimony of Vernon Coleman, the driver of the pickup truck which collided with claimant’s automobile.

No one disputed that there were no barricades or warning signs advising the public of the condition of Silver Creek, nor that there was a history of water upon the road at the spot in question, due to the overflow conditions of Silver Creek.

The instant case is similar to the following Court of Claims cases: in Carr vs. State, No. 4901, the respondent was held negligent for failing to take precautions where an unusual accumulation of ice existed on the highway and the surrounding area was dry. In Bovey vs. State, 22 C.C.R. 95, the respondent was held liable for an accident which occurred on an icy bridge, although it had taken precautions to help alleviate conditions and posted a “Bridge Slippery When Wet — Frosty” sign, because its precautions were inadequate to remedy the situation. The bridge was subject to freezing when there was no evidence of ice, snow, or extremely cold weather in the surrounding area . . . “thus creating a trap for the unwary traveler.” (p. 111) The court cited other cases which involved traps created by unexpected icy areas.

Although the area in question may never have become icy in the past when there was water on it, it was reasonably foreseeable that it would become icy and hazardous when the temperature dropped below freezing after the amount of rainfall it sustained. The failure of'respondent to erect signs, barricades, or other warnings of the “trap” was negligent and was the proximate cause of claimant’s accident.

Claimant’s physician, John S. Hipskind, testified that claimant suffered interabdominal hemorrhage, a lacerated spleen, which was removed, and a lacerated liver, as well as pneumothorax of the left lung. He testified that there would be residual effects because of loss of the spleen and that there could be a problem with regard to the lung, which would take surgical procedure to correct.

Dr. Lorenzo P. Maun testified that he performed plastic surgery on claimant to correct the eye receding into the skull. The doctor stated that claimant would need additional surgery to correct the condition if it recurred and that he has a residual disability causing a sinus problem and numbness on one side of the face. That surgery was performed on April 10, 1968.

Claimant has incurred substantial damages and medical fees, and is entitled to recover therefor. A total award in the amount of $20,000.00 is hereby made in this case, payable as follows:

Gerald T. Koehler.......................... $ 8,229.03
Althoff Catholic High School and the Maryland Casualty Company, as subrogees................ 11,770.97


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 5543
    Sebron Beard, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Glenn C. Fowlkes, Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

For time unjustly served in prison, according to the complaint in this action, the claimant asks payment of damages from the State of Illinois pursuant to the provisions of Ch. 37, Sec. 439.8(c), Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, which confers upon this Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine:

(c) All claims against the State for time unjustly served in prisons of this State where the persons imprisoned prove their innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned; provided, the court shall make no award in excess of the following amounts: for imprisonment of 5 years or less, not more than $15,000; for iml)risonment of 14 years or less hut over 5 years, not more than $30,()Q0; for itoprisonment of over 14 years, not more than $35,000; and provided further, the court shall fix attorneys fees not to exceed 25% of the award granted.

The claimant, Sebron Beard, was a~ested in the City of Chicago on February 24, 1961, charged with and indicted for the murder of one Herbert Holmes.

The case was tried before a jury in the Criminal Court of Cook County. The jury rendered a verdict finding the defendent guilty. His motions for a mistrial, for a directed verdict, for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment were overruled by this trial court. judgment was entered on the verdict and Beard was sentenced to a term of 50 years in the State penitentiary.

About 5 years later, on january 21, 1966, the Appellate Court of Illinois reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County and remanded the case for a new trial. (People vs. Beard, 67 Ill.App.2d 83; 214 N.E. 2d 577).

The matter was again placed on the docket of the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County for trial. At the new trial the People did not present any evidence against Beard. No witnesses were called to testify. On Beard’s motion, an order was entered by the Court discharging him on July 25, 1966.

From February 24, 1961, the date of his arrest, until July 25,1966, the date of his final discharge, claimant spent a total of five years and five months in custody in the Illinois State Penitentiary and’the Cook County Jail.

The key question before this Court is whether the claimant, Sebron Beard, has proved that he was innocent of the crime for which he was imprisoned. This Court has consistently held that Illinois Statute, cited above, makes it clear in plain language that such proof of innocence is a condition precedent to any recovery of damages under Illinois law.

This Court in Jonnia Dirkans vs. State of Illinois, 25 C.C.R. 343 (1965) was called upon for the first time to interpret the then comparatively new §439.8(c) in the Illinois Court Claims Act, which the Legislature had added to this Court’s jurisdiction in 1958, the subsection under which this claim is brought. Our opinion in Dirkans dealt in depth with the intent and meaning of the said subsection and particularly with the words, “Where the persons imprisoned prove their innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned”. Dirkans held, inter alia, that said language, which is unique in the Illinois law, means that a claimant filing under this subsection must prove affirmatively in this Court, by a preponderance of the evidence, that claimant was innocent of the “fact” of the crime for which he was convicted.

To hold otherwise would distort the clearly expressed intent of the legislature and open the treasury of Illinois to a flood of claims that were never contemplated by this subsection (c).

Consistent with the Dirkans decision, supra, which has been cited and reaffirmed many times by this Court, we would merely add a principal of law that is long and well established in this state, namely, “Statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed.” I.L.P. Statutes §176.

To make a fair determination and judgment of the evidence submitted by the claimant to this Court as proof of innocence, it is necessary to review briefly the conflicting evidence submitted at the original trial.

Evidence in the trial court on behalf of the people was as follows: the decedent, Herbert Holmes, was employed part-time as a bartender at the Anchor Inn Tavern in Chicago. The proprietor of that establishment refused to serve defendant Beard further at about 10:30 or 11:00 p.m. on February 24, 1961. Beard left the premises and returned almost immediately. The decedent, Holmes, went up to Beard, talked with him for two or three minutes, then escorted him out of the tavern. Ten or fifteen minutes later a gun went off, and Holmes was dead. The People’s key witness, Jearlean Rubio, testified that she had seen the two men “tussle” with each other in front of the Anchor Inn; that Beard pushed Holmes onto the hood of an automobile, and that Beard then came up with a gun. Mrs. Rubio turned her head away and then heard the gun go off three times. When she looked back, Beard was standing over Holmes and was holding the gun in his hand. Holmes staggered onto the street before collapsing and dying. The police arrived about fifteen minutes later, arrested the defendant, and charged him with murder. The police took a gun which the defendant was holding in his hand.

The defendant (claimant before this Court) took the stand in his own behalf and testified that when the decedent pushed him out of the door, the claimant asked Holmes if he was crazy. Thereupon, Holmes kicked him. Beard started to grab him, and Holmes came up with this gun. The claimant then grabbed for the gun and the two men started tussling over it. During the struggle the gun went off, and Holmes toppled over dead.

The claimant Beard, also testified that the gun was not his, nor did he have it on his person prior to the tussle. By the testimony an issue was raised as to whether or not the gun belonged to the decedent and as to whether or not it was discharged while the defendant and the decedent were struggling for its possession.

In the Appellate Court, the claimant, Sebron Beard, successfully argued that many alleged errors were committed in the trial court; among others, that the court erred in admitting into evidence People’s Exhibit One — a revolver; in restricting the cross-examination of the State’s principal witness; in ruling that the defendant’s request addressed to the Assistant State’s Attorney for statements of witnesses taken before trial would be refused unless the request was made in the presence of the jury; and in preventing the defendant from having a fair trial because of the prejudicial conduct and remarks of both the trial judge and the Assistant State’s Attorney.

The Appellate Court, after agreeing with several of Beard’s specific charges of errors at his trial, concluded:

“It is unnecessary to dwell upon the many claims of defendant that he did not receive a fair trial because of the tactics of the State’s Attorney and the rulings and comments of the trial judge during the trial. There were endless objections to the form of questions and to the answers made. There were countless interruptions and continual bickering. We hope that this will not be repeated when the case is retried. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook County is reversed and the case is remanded.”

Apparently there was no bickering at the claimant’s new trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County as the People offered no evidence against Beard and he was discharged. There is no explanation in the record as to why the State’s key witness, Mrs. Jearlean Rubio, was not called by the State at Beard’s second trial since her testimony had undoubtedly carried weight with the jury in securing claimant’s original conviction. The record shows that Mrs. Rubio died in Chicago on August 7, 1968, nearly two years after Beard’s second trial and shortly after he filed his case in the Court of Claims. Circumstantial evidence, supported by the record, suggests a motive and the probability that Mrs. Rubio gave perjured testimony at the claimant’s original trial and, therefore, refused to appear at his second trial.

In claimant’s presentation of his case before this Court, he called as a witness, Stonewall Barksdale who completely denied all of the statements made by the State’s key witness, Jearlean Rubio, at Beard’s first trial. Barksdale testified that he was in the company of the said Jearlean Rubio in The Budweiser Tavern across the street all the time while the fight between claimant and the decedent was going on; that they knew nothing of the matter until they heard the shots fired; that when they got out onto the street, Holmes had already been shot; that, contrary to Jearlean Rubio’s testimony in the original trial, she had not seen the shooting or any part of it.

Barksdale’s rebuttal of Jearlean Rubio’s testimony in the trial court, while interesting, is by no means conclusive nor entirely relevant to the essential issue before this Court. Barksdale’s testimony, which we accept for such probative value as it may have, merely impeaches the credibility of the State’s key witness and supports the conclusion that Beard did not receive a fair trial in the Circuit Court. But that fact was established by the Appellate Court’s order reversing and remanding. In this Court, to sustain his claim for damages, it is incumbent upon the claimant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is innocent of the crime for which he was imprisoned.

Confining ourselves to this issue and to the evidence submitted before this Court, we next consider a summary of claimant’s own testimony at the hearing before this Court.

The Anchor Inn was located on the northwest corner of Madison and Hermitage Streets in Chicago. On the northeast corner was located the other tavern known as The Budweiser. Claimant testified that he had spent the evening of February 24,1961, going from the one tavern to the other from 4:30 p.m. until approximately 10:00 p.m. At about 10:00 p.m., as claimant was leaving The Anchor Inn, the owner of the tavern told him “to get out; that he didn’t want my business.” As claimant was inquiring of him why he took this attitude, Herbert Holmes, the bartender, came up and struck claimant saying, “Get out of here. You heard what the man said. Get out of here. He don’t want your business.” Holmes then pushed claimant out the door of the tavern and closed the door. The door had a small glass pane in it and claimant tried to talk to Holmes through the glass. Holmes opened the door and kicked claimant. The two men started to fight with each other. While they were struggling, Holmes reached back and pulled a pistol out of his right hip pocket.

Claimant said, “When I went to grab him, he upped with his pistol. I grabbed him and we began tussling; we were going around and around. The gun went off two or three times; somehow, I don’t know exactly how it happened, the gun twisted around and it went off and the bullet hit him in the shoulder and he began to weaken and he turned the gun loose to me and fell. I did not get the gun in my hand until after he was shot.”

“I do not know which hand the deceased used to pull out his pistol; I grabbed the first hand I seen; I never did turn that hand loose; I do not know if he shifted the pistol from one hand to the other; if he did, I don’t know anything about it; I was holding onto the hand that had the pistol in it.”

As respondent points out in its brief, the only person alive when the hearing was held before this Court who could testify as to whether Holmes was murdered, died accidentally, or was killed by the claimant in self defense, was the claimant. Naturally, as respondent contends, claimant’s statement must be viewed as likely to be self-serving. But, self-serving or not, claimant’s statement stands unimpeached before this Court. The respondent failed to offer any rebuttal testimony or any evidence of any kind before this Court. As stated in Card, Illinois Evidence Manual, on page 661;

“Where testimony is uncontradicted and is not inherently improbable or otherwise self-impeaching it may not be disregarded.”

To this Court the claimant also presented William Henry, Jr., an eye witness, who testified that while the struggle was going on he and his girl friend were sitting in the front seat of his car parked immediately east of the intersection on the north side of the street, facing west. They were parked in front of The Budweiser Tavern and looking towards The Anchor Inn. He stated that his view of the struggle was unobstructed and he was sufficiently close to the scene to watch it. He testified that the gun was at all times in Holmes’ hand until after Holmes was shot.

The testimony of this eye witness also stands unimpeached before this Court except for his unswerving insistence that the incident took place in the late afternoon rather than late at night. However, the witness Barksdale testified that there was ample light from a Budweiser sign and a street light so that a person “could see good”. “You could see from one side of the street to the other", Barksdale said.

Respondent challenged the credibility of claimant’s witnesses, William Henry, Jr. and Stonewall Barksdale, because neither of them had testified at the original trial of the claimant even though both of them were accessible at the time. Respondent contends that this Court, in the Dirkans case, announced the position that the production of a witness at a Court of Claims hearing who was accessible to the claimant at the criminal trial, but not called at that time to testify, so impairs that witness’s credibility as to impeach him. We do not find that the Dirkans case went that far nor stated respondent’s conclusion as an inflexible rule. These circumstances are merely factors which this Court will consider in assessing the credibility of witnesses, as we did in questioning the credibility of the State’s key witness, Mrs. Rubio, who helped convict the claimant at his original trial but was not presented by the State at his second trial although she was accessible.

Finally, respondent states in its brief, “If Beard has raised a doubt as to whether he committed murder, it seems clear that he was guilty of manslaughter”. This suggestion overlooks the plain language of the statute which states that the claimant must prove only that he is innocent of the crime “for which he was imprisoned”. That crime was murder, not manslaughter or some lesser crime of which he might well have been found guilty under the admitted facts in this case. Obviously we cannot apply a rule of strict construction to one part of the statute and place a liberal construction on another part of the same sentence.

It appears to us that, under the ordinary rules of evidence, claimant has made a prima facie case before this Court that he is innocent of murder, the crime for which he was imprisoned. He has done so by a preponderance of the evidence. We are obliged to acknowledge claimant’s evidence as preponderant because his was the only evidence presented at the hearings before this Court.

We realize that the task of obtaining competent evidence concerning a crime committed more than five years earlier is often extremely difficult. In this case the respondent apparently found the task impossible, as did the State’s Attorney of Cook County.

This Court takes no pleasure, under these circumstances, in granting an award for time “unjustly” served in prison when the admitted facts in this case would appear to justify a prison sentence had the claimant been charged with a lesser crime than that of murder. However, we must conclude that the time claimant served in prison for the crime of murder was time served for the wrong reason and was, therefore, technically, time unjustly served.

It is the judgment of this Court that claimant be awarded the sum of $7,500.00.


text:
    (No. 5588
    Harold Henry Stege, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Gabriele and Nudo, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

In this case claimant is seeking to recover for personal injuries he received under the following circumstances.

On April 1, 1968, at about 2:00 a.m., claimant was operating his automobile in a northerly direction on and along Route 43 (commonly known as Oak Park Avenue), at or near 18020 South in the Village of Tinley Park, Cook County, Illinois; claimant testified his automobile struck a hole in the road as a result of which his automobile veered off the road, struck a concrete culvert or abutment, and as a result of the impact, sustained severe and permanent personal injuries.

Claimant testified that he was driving about 35 miles per hour. He stated that he saw the rut in the road and attempted to avoid hitting it but that in doing so, caught his right wheel in the rut and that this caused the car to veer to the right striking the cement abutment. As a result of injuries received, he was taken to South Suburban Hospital where he remained for 8 days. Several of his teeth were knocked out and the cuts he received required about 100 stitches.

The law involved in a case like this has been stated on many previous occasions. The State has the duty to maintain its highways in a safe condition or to warn traffic of the existence of unsafe conditions. Rickelman vs. State of Illinois, 19 C.C.R. 54. Also, if the State has knowledge, either actual or constructive, of a dangerous condition on its highway and fails to warn the public of the danger, then it must respond in damages for injuries received as a result. Bovey vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 95, page 108. We have also held, however, that the State is not an insurer against accidents on its highways. Bloom vs. State of Illinois 22 C.C.R. 582. The law is the law of negligence and not the law of warranties.

The issues in cases where a member of the traveling public is injured as a result of a claimed defect in the highway are issues of fact to be determined by the Court.

In the case at hand, the claimant had the burden of proving that there was a defect in the highway, that the State had actual or constructive notice of the defect, and that claimant was free of contributory negligence.

The test of whether or not a fact has been proven is best set forth in Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction where it is said, in defining burden of proof: that this means

“........you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case that the proposition on which (claimant) has the burden of proof is more probably true than not true.”

Thus, there is room for reasonable doubt and still a fact has been proven. The crux of the definition is whether or not the evidence persuades the Court that the fact is more probably true than not.

In the case at hand, claimant described the hole in the road as being about two or three feet long, seven inches deep at its deepest point and about four inches deep on the edge. His observation was made while traveling and immediately before he hit the hole. The hole was on the right-hand edge of the road. Claimant testified that he had traveled over this road at least once a week for over a year and that approximately one month after the accident the hole had been repaired.

Two police officers of Tinley Park testified. One stated that he viewed the area for approximately 300 feet south of the scene and that he observed no chuck holes. The other police officer testified that on the morning of the accident that he too did not observe any chuck holes. Neither testified, however, that they were on the look out for defects in the highway.

In answer to this, however, claimant produced a photograph of the road at the approximate place at where the accident happened. The pictures showed definitely that a repair had been made to the highway at sometime. The pictures were taken in June of 1968, approximately two months after the accident.

The Court believes that it is more probably true that there was a hole in the road of some sort though not necessarily the size and shape stated by claimant. On this issue the claimant has met his burden of proof.

The claimant also was required to meet the burden of proving that the State had actual or constructive notice of such a defect. The record is silent as to any actual notice, and, therefore, the ultimate issue in the case at hand is whether or not there is sufficient evidence in the record to persuade the Court that the State had constructive notice of a defect which required fixing or of giving warning. The Court is of the opinion that claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof of this fact. While there is some evidence supporting claimant, it is believed that the evidence is insufficient.

The two police officers did not notice any hole in the pavement. No other person testified as to the presence of the hole or of having any knowledge of the hole other than an attorney who at one time apparently had some interest in the case on behalf of the claimant. The attorney’s testimony was inconclusive in identifying the hole in the highway noticed by him as being the same hole that was involved in the claimant’s accident. The attorney’s testimony was weakened by the fact that he said there was no white line along the edge of the road. However, photos taken the day after the accident show clearly and plainly that there was a white line along the east side of the road. His observations were not accurate. The Court believes his testimony was too weak to be persuasive.

The Court therefore is of the opinion that the claimant has failed to prove by competent evidence that the alleged defect was of a nature to have been noticed by the State in ample time to repair or to post warnings.

It would be unreasonable for the State to be held liable for every possible defect in its highways.

There are unnumerable rough spots in public highways and such should be anticipated by motorists. Some defects are more unusual or are more glaring than others. These could well be the basis for requiring the State to respond in damages where they exist for such a time that it is reasonable to say that the State should have known of their existence.

The defect must be substantial enough, and it must exist for such a length of time that reasonable persons would conclude that immediate repairs should be made or warning signs posted. The traveling public must anticipate some defects. There is no absolute duty on the State, however, to discover and remedy all defects. Joyner vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 213.

It is evident that claimant has failed to prove his asserted cause of action by preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.

Award to claimant is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 6025
    Ronald Landsman and David Zaransky, As Co-Administrators of the Estate of Lou Fushanis, Deceased, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Bernard Allen Fried, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This cause is now before the Court on respondent’s motion to dismiss claimants’ amended complaint. A reply to respondent’s motion, filed by the claimants on January 17, 1972, is also before us.

Respondent makes a persuasive argument on several points, in support of its motion, which raises a serious doubt as to the merits of the claim. However, the Court finds that the statute of limitation, having run before claim was filed, is a bar to the action and is sufficient grounds for dismissal. Therefore, we need not discuss the other issues presented in the pleadings.

We will, however, explain the Court’s interpretation of the statute of limitation involved since claimants have urged a different interpretation in their reply to respondent’s motion to dismiss.

In this action claimants sought to collect the sum of $1,800.00 for rent withheld by the Illinois Department of Public Aid because of building violations on property located at 705 S. Claremont Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, for the period of October 1, 1967, through March, 1969. The claim was filed in this Court on January 12, 1971, some 22 months after the end of the period for which claim is made.

Claimants subsequently offered in evidence a “Certificate of Inspection” dated September 30, 1971, as proof that the building was brought into full compliance on that date. An examination of this document shows it to contain the following statement which indicates that there were still violations then: “Replace broken, missing or defective window panes.” In any event, the date of this certificate, showing violations rather than compliance, is 2 years and 7 months after the period for which rent was withheld by the Department of Public Aid.

The statute of limitations which bars this claim is found in the following language of §22 of the Court of Claims Act (Ch. 37, Sec. 439.22, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971) which reads as follows:

“Claims cognizable against the State by vendors of goods or sendees under ‘The Illinois Public Aid Code’, approved April 11,1967, as amended shall have a period of limitation of 1 year after the accrual of the cause of action, as provided in Section 11-12 of that Code.”

Claimants contend, in a reply to respondent’s motion, that the above limitation does not apply to landlords who rent housing to Public Aid recipients but only to “vendors of goods and services directly to the State”. We do not agree. The statute does not contain the words “directly to the State”. On the contrary, it uses the words, “goods and services under the Illinois Public Aid Code”. Section 2-5 of the Public Aid Code defines “Vendor Payment” as a payment made directly to a person or firm. . . . “supplying goods or services to a recipient”. (Ch. 23, Sec. 2-5 Ill. Rev.Stat., 1971) A common example of claims by vendors in this category, which this Court receives in abundance, is the claim of a doctor or hospital which supplies medicine, medical or hospital services to public aid recipients.

Similarly, a landlord is a vendor of services if the landlord purports to furnish a tenant with such necessities as light, water, heat or janitor services. A landlord is also a vendor of an interest in real estate when renting or leasing housing to a tenant, as the term vendor is used in the Public Aid Code.

Section 11-13 of the Public Aid Code contains a restatement of the one-year statute of limitation contained in §22 of the Court of Claims Act and we repeat it here for emphasis. (Ch. 23, Sec. 11-13, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971)

“V endors seeking to enforce obligations of a governmental unit or the Illinois Department of Public Aid for goods or services (1) furnished to or in behalf of recipients and (2) subject to a vendor payment as defined in Section 2-5, shall commence their actions in the appropriate Circuit Court or the Court of Claims, as the case may require, within one year next after the cause of action accrued.”

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that respondent’s motion be, and the same is, granted and the instant cause is herewith dismissed.


text:
    (No. 6111
    Dave Narro, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Dave Narro, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6207
    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Various Agencies, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Giffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk and Cohen, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6256
    Robert T. Fielding, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Dr. Robert T. Fielding, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6354
    Skelly Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Skelly Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6391
    Robert M. Quesenberry, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Robert M. Quesenberry, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6442
    International Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    International Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6444
    Gerald Heller, Roscoe Wise, John Balbach, Logan Parkinson, Haldor Schap, Eldon Hesselbacher and Earl Phillips, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Peter A. Hindrichs, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6468
    Village of Westchester, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Civil Defense, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Village of Westchester, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6470
    J. H. Schmitt, Jr., Vaughn Brown, Raymond Carter, W. Orloff Smith, Ralph E. Campbell, Jesse Hunley, Jr., Charles L. Du Laney, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Virgil D. Shafer, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6487
    Triangle Tire and Battery Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1972.

    Triangle Tire and Battery Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 3025
    Elva Jennings Penwell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Gosnell, Benecki and Quindry, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant filed her petition for reimbursement for monies expended for nursing care and help, medical services and expenses from January 1, 1971, to December 31, 1971, praying for an award in the sum of $11,377.60.

Claimant was seriously injured in an accident on the 2nd day of February, 1936, while employed as a Supervisor at the Illinois Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Children’s School at Normal, Illinois. The complete details of this injury can be found in the original cause of action, Penwell vs. State of Illinois, 11 C.C.R. 365, in which an initial award was made, and at which time jurisdiction was retained to make successive awards in the future, and this Court has periodically made supplemental awards to claimant to cover expenses incurred by her, the last award covering the time period from January 1, 1970, through December 31, 1970.

A joint motion of claimant and respondent was filed herein requesting leave to waive the filing of briefs and arguments. This motion was granted, and no further pleadings have been filed herein.

Since the Attorney General does not contest the veracity nor the propriety of the items and amounts set forth in claimant’s petition, except for the following items set out in claimant’s bill of particulars:

May 22, 1971, Alfred Reed, repair air conditioner............$ 3.50
June 19, 1971, Alfred Reed, repair bedlamp switch........... 2.50
December 31, 1971, Dale Newbum, checking ambulance
before trip.............................. 9.50
$15.50

this court must assume that the Attorney General agrees with all other amounts thus set forth.

The Court, therefore, enters an award in favor of the claimant in the sum of $11,362.10 ($11,377.60 less the above $15.50). The matter of the claimant’s need for additional care is reserved by this Court for future determination.


text:
    (No. 5233
    Sam Weisman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Barbera and Friedlander, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Bruce Finne, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant, Sam Weisman, filed a claim under date of May 27, 1965.

Claimant alleges in his claim that on February 14,1964, respondent maintained and operated a certain expressway known as Dan Ryan Expressway, which expressway merged into and became designated as Calumet Expressway, at a point about 9900 South on said expressway in the City of Chicago.

Claimant further alleges that at the juncture of said underpass road with the Dan Ryan Expressway, the respondent constructed a V shaped metal guard rail approximately one and one-half feet high from the surface of the road, which guard rail was placed at the separation point of the inner lane of the northwest bound Dan Ryan Expressway and the outer lane of the intersecting road leading to the Halstead Street Underpass.

Claimant further states that the State of Illinois did one of several things which was the proximate cause of the collision and the injuries and damages sustained by claimant:

a. Allowed said guard rail to be constructed at a dangerous and excessive height above the surface of said highways at the dividing point of said highways, although respondent knew or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known that said highways were heavily traveled at that point and that northwest bound automobiles would be liable to collide into the point of said V shaped divider while in the exercise of reasonable care.

b. Failed to keep said area properly and adequately lighted in the nighttime.

c. Failed to give motorists any warning by appropriate sign, signals, reflectors or other means of warning northwest bound motorists of the presence of said dangerous and hazardous divider on said highway.

d. Failed to remove said dangerous divider and replace said divider with a low level concrete curb or separator, although respondent knew or should have known that said metal divider was dangerous, hazardous and unsafe for vehicular traffic prior to the happening of the occurrence herein, and although the removal of said metal divider and its replacement with a low level curb or concrete separator could have been done by said respondent at a relatively small cost.

Claimant testified that he was driving his car in a northwesterly direction on the expressway in the inner or third lane, and that somewhat to his right and in front of him in the outer or first lane was a truck; that in the second lane to his right and in front of him was a tractor and trailer; that he slowed down to let the second truck get in front of him so that he could get into the lane going northbound to the Chicago loop; that this truck interfered with his vision ahead and that he did not see the guard rail.

Claimant also testified that certain signs that appear in the photographs in evidence as claimant’s Exhibits 3, 4,5,6 and 7 were not present on the night of the accident. The photographs in question were taken approximately one month after the accident.

Claimant testified that his automobile ran up on the guard rail and he was injured and taken to Ros eland Community Hospital and from there to Jackson Park Hospital.

Claimant testified that he lost three weeks from work; that his weekly salary was $135.00 per week and that he lost approximately $2,000.00 in bonuses from his employer, Goldblatt Bros., Inc.

The testimony of the doctors and the x-rays show that the claimant had a fracture of the twelfth thoracic vertebra.

Edward Chrapla, Special Studies Engineer for the Division of Highways, produced the records of his department showing where the signs were on the expressway on the date of the accident. He also testified to the existence of a corrugated or rumble strip at the divider and that a driver at 50 miles per hour would have thirty-four seconds after seeing the signs to choose his lane before reaching the divider.

Irving Lang, a commercial photographer, called as a witness for claimant, testified that he observed a rumble strip about one hundred feet long in front of the divider.

The evidence also shows that the area in question was lighted on the evening of the accident and also that claimant had been over this road on at least one previous occasion.

Before recovery can be made by the claimant, it must be proved that he was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety; that the State was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

The record seems clear in that the area was well-lighted, that signs warning the approaching public of the existence of the divider were in place and, in addition, there was a rumble strip which would give every driver ample warning of the existence of the divider ahead.

The evidence is that this divider was in such a position that drivers exercising due care for their own safety would have seen the same and avoided it.

The proximate cause of this accident was the lack of due care exercised by the claimant and was not in any way the result of any act of omission by the State of Illinois. Court of Claims, Vol. 24, Page 324.

Claimant has failed to prove that he was free from contributory negligence or that the negligence of the respondent was the proximate cause of the accident.

An award to claimant is therefore denied.


text:
    (No. 6072
    Max Shaps, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Max Shaps, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L.S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6163
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Various Agencies, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6371
    Raymon A. Oberlander, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Financial Institutions, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Raymon A. Oberlander, Attorney, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6418
    Continental Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Continental Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6459
    Barnes Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Barnes Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6477
    Maija I. Mednieks, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Maija I. Mednieks, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6479
    Rockford Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Rockford Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L.S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6484
    Marsha C. Schacht, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Marsha C. Schacht, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6492
    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6495
    David Lynn Bender, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    David Lynn Bender, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6497
    Wilma Kay (Polley) Dangremond, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Wilma Kay (Polley) Dangremond, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6512
    Esther M. Vatthauer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Esther M. Vatthauer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6516
    Belden Manor Shelter Home, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Cenco Care Corporation, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6521
    A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6534
    Memorial Hospital of Springfield, An Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Brown, Hay and Stephens, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6536
    Kenneth R. Kocher, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Military and Naval Department, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Kenneth R. Kocher, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6549
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Aeronautics, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6557
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Registration and Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6573
    Kent D. Rickey, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Military and Naval Department, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    Kent D. Rikey, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6580
    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6581
    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6582
    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6583
    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6584
    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6585
    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6586
    St. Mary Hospital, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1972.

    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5765
    The County Of Livingston, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    John G. Satter, Jr., Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

THIS COURT FINDS that this claim is for filing fees, sheriffs’ fees, and state’s attorneys’ fees for the County of Livingston.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sum of $770.60 be awarded claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 5931
    West Publishing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Appellate Court, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    West Publishing Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5990
    Des Plaines Funeral Home, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Des Plaines Funeral Home, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6021
    Theodore R. Beck, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Personnel, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Theodore R. Beck, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6139
    Carle Foundation Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.
    Carle Foundation Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6154
    Max Shaps, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Max Shaps, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6156
    Alton Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Alton Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6164
    Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6332
    California Computer Products, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    California Computer Products, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


author: Perlin, C.j.

text:
    (No. 6381
    Reo Movers and Van Lines, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Reo Movers and Van Lines, Inc., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.j.


text:
    (No. 6390
    Berverly J. Bicknell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.
    Opinion filed June 13, 1972.
    Medansky, Cohan, Medansky and Valentino, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6407
    Charles F. Kneedler, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.
    Opinion filed June 13, 1972.
    Dr. Charles F. Kneedler, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6414
    Savin Business Machines, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Normandt and Normandt, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6431
    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6433
    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6434
    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6480
    James H. Breihan, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Dr. James H. Breihan, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6493
    Mpati, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

      Mpati, Inc., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

   Perlin, C.J.


text:
      (No. 6500

      Franklin-Cress Construction Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

      Franklin-Cress Construction Co., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Wabber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

   Perlin, C.J.


text:
      (No. 6503

      Willett Truck Leasing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

      Willett Truck Leasing Company, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6513
    Monterey Convalescent Home, Inc., (Drexel Branch), Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Cenco Care Corporation, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6522
    A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6525
    A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6533
    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6538
    V. M. Markets, Inc., a/k/a Vito’s Certified Food Market, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Malkin and Gottlieb, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6540
    A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6546
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6547
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Local Governmental Law Enforcement Officers Training Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6548
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6550
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Local Government Affairs, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6551
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6553
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6554
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6555
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6556
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6558
    Curry Court Reporting Agency, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Curry Court Reporting Agency, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6559
    Curry Court Reporting Agency, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Curry Court Reporting Agency, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

THIS COURT FINDS that this claim is for court reporter fees for two depositions taken from the Claude J. Flynn vs. George E. Mahin, et al., case in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, a copy of said report being attached to the Joint Stipulation of the parties.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sum of $26.00 be awarded claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 6564
    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6569
    University of Wisconsin—Extension, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    University of Wisconsin — Extension, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6598
    The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Appellate Court, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.
    The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6600
    Ozark Air Lines, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Personnel, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Ozark Air Lines, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6619
    Central Office Equipment Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Drach, Terrell and Deffenbaugh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6640
    Josephine Birdsong, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Josephine Birdsong, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6642
    Illini Moving and Storage Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Insurance, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Illini Moving and Storage Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6647
    County of Cook and Cook County Department of Public Aid, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Edward V. Hanrahan, State’s Attorney for Cook County, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6648
    Salvatore Salla, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Finance, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Paul W. Brust, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 00006
    Mary Jo Gillan, as wife of Martin M. Gillan, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Mary Jo Gillan, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

This claim was filed pursuant to Ch. 48, Sec. 281, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”. The Court is in receipt of the Application for benefits and Statement Supervising Officer, as well as an investigative report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office. Based upon these documents the Court finds as follows:

That the claimant, Mary Jo Gillan, is the wife of decedent and is the named beneficiary under the Application for Benefits. That the decedent, Martin M. Gillan, was a fireman for the Village of Maywood, Illinois, engaged in the scope of duty on December 25 and 26, 1971, within the meaning of Section 282 of the aforecited act. On said dates he suffered heavy smoke inhalation while fighting a fire, resulting in his death on January 18,1972. The court further finds that the Attorney General’s office in its investigation has determined that this claim is within the scope of the above cited statutes:

“Section 282(e) ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer or fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause . . .

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sum of $10,000.00 (TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS) be, and the same hereby is, granted to Mary Jo Gillan as wife and next of kin of the decedent, Martin M. Gillan.


text:
    (No. 00010
    Birda Towns, as wife of Jimmie C. Towns, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 13, 1972.

    Birda Towns, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

This claim was filed pursuant to Ch. 48, Sec. 281, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”. The Court is in receipt of the Application for Benefits and Statement of Supervising Officer, as well as an investigative report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office. Based upon these documents the Court finds as follows:

That the claimant, Birda Towns, is the wife of the decedent and is the named beneficiary under the Application for Benefits. That the decedent, Jimmie C. Towns, was a patrolman for the Village of Brooklyn, engaged in the scope of duty on December 18,1971, within the meaning of Section 282 of the aforecited act. On said date he suffered gunshot wounds in his back and chest resulting in his death. The Court further finds that the Attorney General’s office in its investigation has determined that this claim is within the scope of the above cited statutes:

“Section 282 (o) ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injur)- received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer or fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injur)' was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause. . .

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sum of $10,000.00 (TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS) be, and the same hereby is, granted to Birda Towns as wife and next of kin of the decedent, Jimmie C. Towns.


text:
    (No. 5904
    Trans International Moving and Van Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    Trans International Moving and Van Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6113
    #2 Sutclif Pharmacy Corporation, and Sutcliffe Pharmacy, Inc., Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    Allen L. Ginsberg, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6416
    Charles H. Northrup, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Insurance, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

      Charles H. Northrup, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6437
    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6438
    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6440
    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6466
    Park View Home Thrift Shop, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    Jerome H. Stein, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6498
    Savin Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Governor’s Office of Human Resources, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    Savin Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6506
    Mason-Barron Laboratories, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    Mason-Barron Laboratories, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6507
    Mason-Barron Laboratories, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    Mason-Barron Laboratories, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


author: Berlin, C.J.

text:
    (No. 6511
    Roy Greathouse, Ray Wax, Carl G. Livengood, Myron Whisnand, Ross Reeder, and Martin Stock, Jr., Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Superintendent of the Educational Service Region, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    W. A. Bozarth, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Berlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6563
    Chicago Housing Authority, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1972.

    Calvin H. Hall, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Berlin, C.J.