author: Sommer, J. JANN, J.

text:
    (No. 97-CV-2285

      In re Application of Carol McLuckie

      Order filed April 24, 1997.

      Opinion filed September 2, 1999.

    Carol McLuckie, pro se.

    Jim E. Ryan, Attorney General (Donald C. McLaughlin, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Sommer, J.

This cause is before the Court on Claimant’s petition and application for benefits. Claimant filed her application oh February 14, 1997, which states that Claimant was the victim of a violent crime that occurred between 1968 and 1973.

Section 6.1 of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (740 ILCS 45/6.1) requires that claims be filed with the Court within one year of the date of the occurrence of the crime. The Court may extend that period by one year. These limitations periods are, however, jurisdictional. (705 ILCS 505722(h).) In the present case, Claimant’s application was filed over 23 years after the date of the crime. The Court sympathizes with Claimant’s plight but is constrained by statute from making an award.

It is hereby ordered that Claimant’s petition and application for benefits is denied and this cause is dismissed with prejudice.

OPINION

JANN, J.

This cause arises out of an incident of childhood sexual abuse. The Claimant alleges that she was sexually abused as a child by her brother for many years. The Claimants brother passed away several years ago. Claimant never brought charges against her brother because she had allegedly repressed any memory of the abuse due to post traumatic stress syndrome.

Claimant filed her application on February 14, 1997, and she states that she was the victim of a violent crime which occurred between 1968 and 1973.

The issue in this case is whether the Claimant meets a required condition precedent of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, specifically section 6.1 (740 ILCS 45/6.1.) Section 6.1 of the Act requires that claims be filed within one year of the date of the occurrence of the crime. In this case, the Claimants application was filed over 23 years after the date of the crime, and, thus, her original claim was denied and dismissed by the Court.

Section 13 — 202.2(b) and (c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 — 202.2(b), (c)) provides:

“(b) an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 2 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse.
(c) If the injury is caused by 2 or more acts of childhood sexual abuse that are part of a continuing series of acts of childhood sexual abuse by the same abuser, then the discovery period under subsection (b) shall be computed from the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover (i) that the last act of childhood sexual abuse in the continuing series occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by any act of childhood sexual abuse in the continuing series.” 735 ILCS 5/13 — 202.2(b)(c).

At the hearing, Claimant entered into evidence an exhaustive document which states what Illinois and other courts have held as to the issue of repressed memory in terms of their statute of limitations. Claimant entered the Illinois Courts’ most recent case involving the Illinois Statute of Limitations for Childhood Sexual Abuse, Clay v. Kuhl (2d Dist. App. Ct., 1998), 297 Ill. App. 3d 15.

In Clay v. Kuhl, the Illinois Appellate Court states that the plain language of the statute mandates that the limitations period for an action for childhood sexual abuse begins to run only when the person discovers, or should have reasonably discovered, that she was the victim of childhood sexual abuse. The Court also recognized that a plaintiff in a childhood sexual abuse case may subsequently suffer from repressed memory, a condition or disability that renders her unable to recognize that the event occurred or that she suffered a resulting injury. Without specifically considering whether repressed memory represents a valid claim, the Court stated that it is compelled to agree with other courts that recognize it, “in instances where the plaintiff is suffering from a recognized and accepted condition or disability which prevents knowledge of the sexual abuse, section 13 — 202.2 of the Code may apply to toll the applicable limitations period.” Clay v. Kuhl (1998), 297 Ill. App. 3d at 15.

The Court stated that the second requirement is whether the plaintiff’s actions are timely filed. The Court noted that section 13 — 202.2(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure is a codification of the judicially created “discovery rule.” The discovery rule as developed by common law requires both knowledge of the injury and its wrongful cause before the statute of limitations begins to run. In Clay, the Court noted that the plaintiff did not file her complaint within two years of reaching age 18. The plaintiff was 28 years old at the time she filed her complaint, and alleged that she “had no memory of the molestation at any time during her majority until February of 1995.” The Court found that her allegation was ambiguous and insufficient to toll the statute of limitations under section 13 — 202.2 and noted that, where the discovery rule has applied, the plaintiff had provided a well articulated explanation of why it was impossible to discover her injury sooner. The Court concluded that “as a matter of law mere forgetfulness cannot constitute a sufficient ground to toll the statute. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the statute which is to require prosecution of a right of action within a reasonable time to prevent the loss or impairment of available evidence and to discourage delay in the bringing of claims.” The Court argued that if the plaintiff intends to rely on the psychological condition of “repressed memoiy” in order to toll the statute of kmitations, then the plaintiff is obligated to plead the condition with sufficient specificity to advise the defendant of the alleged basis on which section 13 — 202.2 applies.

As in Clay v. Kuhl, Claimant here has failed to plead her cause of repressed memoiy with sufficient specificity. Claimant, similar to the plaintiff in Clay, merely stated that she had forgotten the instances. Claimant did not present any witnesses or other evidence of her repressed memory at her hearing. Although Claimant submitted numerous bills from social workers and psychotherapists for counseling and treatment, none of her doctors or counselors testified or submitted affidavits on her behalf.

This case was an extremely difficult one because the Claimant appeared to be credible and well versed in this area of law of repressed memory. Nevertheless, she failed to present any witnesses and/or documentation that stated that her condition was linked to her alleged childhood sexual abuse. Moreover, unlike the case of Clay v. Kuhl which was a civil action for damages where the defendant was given the opportunity to reject plaintiffs allegations, in this case, the .Court would have to accept all of Claimants allegations without sufficient specificity to advise the Respondent of the alleged basis by which section 13 — 202.2 applies.

We must affirm our previous denial of this claim. This cause is hereby dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mitchell, J. Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 97-CV-3327

      In re Application of Barbara Freeman

      Opinion filed March 3, 2000.

      Opinion filed May 10, 2000.

    Barbara Freeman, pro se.

    Jim E. Ryan, Attorney General (Kimberly M. Pate, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Mitchell, J.

This cause is before the Court following a hearing. This Court denied Claimants application for benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.) on August 22, 1997, on the basis that the victims injuries were substantially attributable to, or provoked by, the victims own wrongful actions as proscribed by section 6.1(d) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act. 740 ILCS 4576.1(d).

Claimant filed a timely request for a hearing. A hearing was held before this Court on December 15,1999.

At the hearing, the Claimant testified that her son was not involved in any type of gang activity. No one has been arrested for his murder. The Claimant believes that the victim was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time.

The office of the Attorney General introduced the police reports into evidence. The reports contain a statement from a witness to the shooting. This person stated that at 2:00 a.m., when the E. T. Lounge closed, everyone inside the bar went outside. Two factions of the Gangster Disciple street gang became engaged in a verbal altercation. Gunfire erupted and the victim was shot and killed. Approximately 50 people were present. The only evidence that the victim was a member of a street gang is the blanket statement in the police report that: “As of this report it appears all parties involved are Gangster Disciples."

The Court must decide this matter based solely on the evidence contained in the record. The evidence in this matter is that two rival factions of the Gangster Disciples street gang were taunting each other. Someone then fired randomly into the crowd killing the victim.

There has been no evidence introduced that the victim was a member of the Gangster Disciples. The police reports do not contain any statement that the victim was a gang member. Nor has any other evidence been presented to the Court. There has been no evidence introduced that the victim did anything to cause or provoke the shooting. There is no evidence that the victim was involved in the verbal altercation.

It is hereby ordered that the August 22, 1997, order of this Court denying Claimant’s application for benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act is reversed. This claim is referred to the Office of the Attorney General for calculation of an award and for preparation of an amended investigatory report within sixty (60) days of entry of this opinion.

OPINION

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 27, 1997. Barbara Freeman, mother of the deceased victim, Tomas Keith Hughes, sought compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1, etseq. (1996).

The Claimant was denied compensation by order of the Court on August 22, 1997. This claim is now before the Court pursuant to a request by the Claimant to reconsider her claim for compensation funeral and burial expenses.

This Court has carefully reviewed its prior order in this cause, the Claimant’s request to reconsider her claim for compensation and a supplemental investigatory report by the Attorney General’s office. Based on all of the above, the Court finds:

1. That on August 22, 1997, the Court of Claims entered an order denying the Claimant compensation for funeral/burial expenses because the victim had engaged in contributory misconduct by inciting an altercation with rival street gang members.

2. That on September 18, 1997, the Claimant requested the Court to reconsider her claim for compensation. The Court granted the Claimants request and assigned the claim to Commissioner Blanche Hill-Fawell on September 13,1999.

3. That following a hearing conducted by Commissioner Blanche Hill Fawell, the Court entered an order on March 3, 2000, in which it ruled that the victim did not engage in contributoiy misconduct. The Court determined that there was no evidence that the victim was a street gang member, nor was there any evidence contained in the police report that the victim was involved in any kind of verbal altercation with rival street gang members prior to the incident. Further, the Court concluded that there is no evidence that the victim did anything to cause or provoke the shooting incident. The Court vacated its original order and referred the claim to the Attorney Generals office for calculation of the award.

4. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $5,642, all of which have been paid. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum amount of $3,000.

5. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as an applicable deduction under section 10.1(e) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

6. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and is entitled to compensation thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $3,000 (Three Thousand Dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Barbara Freeman, mother of Tomas Keith Hughes, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


author: Per Curiam. Raucci, C.J.

text:
    (No. 98-CV-2872

      In re Application of Ralph Whited

      Order filed February 9, 1999.

      Opinion filed March 3, 2000.

    Ralph Whited, pro se.
    Jim E. Ryan, Attorney General (Donald C. McLaughlin, Jr. and Kimberly M. Pate, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that allegedly occurred on June 29, 1996. The Claimant, Ralph Whited, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740ILCS 45/1 etseq. (1996).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on May 21, 1998, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on June 29, 1996, the Claimant alleges that he was beaten by an offender who was known to him. The alleged incident occurred at Cook County Department of Corrections, 26th and California Avenue, Division, II, Chicago, Illinois. However, the Cook County Sheriffs Police Department could not locate any record of the alleged incident.

2. That according to section 6.1(b) of the Act, a person is entitled to compensation under this Act if the appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime allegedly causing the death or injury to the victim within 72 hours, or in the event such notification was made more than 72 hours after the perpetration of the crime, the applicant establishes that such notice was timely under the circumstances.

3. That the Claimant has failed to establish that the appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of said incident as required by section 6.1(b) of the Act. The police have no record of a police report on the above incident.

4. That the Claimant has failed to furnish proof that a crime has been committed.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Raucci, C.J.

This cause is before the Court on a recommendation from Commissioner Blanche Fawell Hill following a hearing. This Court denied Claimants application for benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.), on Februaiy 9, 1999, on the basis that Claimant failed to notify appropriate law enforcement officials within 72 hours of the perpetration of the crime as required by section 6.1(b) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act. 740 ILCS 45/6.1(b).

Claimant filed a timely request for a hearing. A hearing was held before the Commissioner on December 15, 1999.

At the hearing, the Claimant testified that on June 29, 1996, while he was an inmate at the Cook County Jail, he was the victim of an attack by another inmate and that he suffered extensive damage to his jaw. He testified that immediately after the incident he reported it to the guard on his tier. The guard told him, “You must have fallen out of bed.”

Three days later a tier guard whom the Claimant trusted returned from vacation. The Claimant reported the incident to this guard. He was transported to Cook County Hospital where he was hospitalized for six days for treatment of a fractured jaw.

The office of the Attorney General introduced documents from the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office that indicated that the Cook County Jail shows no report of the Claimant making a report of his injury.

The Court finds the Claimant’s testimony that he attempted to report the incident credible. The Claimant’s injuries were severe, as he was hospitalized for six days. The Claimant was incarcerated at the time of the incident. The Court finds that the Claimant did report the incident to the tier guard immediately after it happened.

However, we find that as to the amount of compensation, if any, the Claimant has failed to sustain his burden of proof.

At the time of the hearing, the Claimant presented the Commissioner with a thick folder full of various documents which he asked to be considered as evidence of loss. The Commissioner then asked the Claimant if he was only seeking reimbursement for medical bills at Cook County Hospital. Claimant replied that he was also seeking compensation for loss of earnings and the injuries that he sustained. The Commissioner properly advised the Claimant that the Crime Victims Compensation Act did not allow compensation for pain and suffering. The Claimant responded that all of his problems stem from what he felt was his wrongful incarceration and the broken jaw, including his skin ailment.

Initially, we find that the medical bills which accrued when Claimant was hospitalized are by law the responsibility of the Cook County Jail, so no money will be awarded Claimant for those items. The relationship of the other items to the incident was not proven and is found to be highly speculative. For example, his proffered psychiatric report states he said his inability to work was due to a skin condition, chronic pain from a bullet which had been in his foot since 1981, and difficulty breathing. His records also indicate he has been on SSI disability since before his incarceration. Dental records indicate pre-existing conditions. No explanation was offered or could be discerned for his provision of a residential lease.

Wherefore, it is ordered that this claim be, and it hereby is, denied.


text:
    (No. 00-CV-1205

      In re Application of Terrence R. Taylor

      Order filed, January 10, 2000.

      Order filed March 3, 2000.

    Terrence R. Taylor, pro se.

    Jim E. Ryan, Attorney General (Kimberly M. Pate and Debbie Sladek, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 22, 1999. The Claimant, Terrence R. Taylor, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (1998).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on November 8, 1999, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois, which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Rased upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Attorney Generals Office, the Court finds:

1. That on September 22, 1999, the Claimant, Terrence R. Taylor, age 60, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (740 ILCS 4572(c)) to wit: aggravated battery. See 720 ILCS 5/12-^t (1998).

2. That the crime occurred in Decatur, Illinois and all of the eligibility requirements of section 6.1 of the Crime Victims Compensation Act have been met.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for the cost of repairing his automobile as a result of the incident.

4. That automobile repairs are not specifically enumerated as compensable expenses under section 2(h) of the Act.

5. That pursuant to section 10.1(a) of the Act, a person may be compensated for his pecuniary loss.

6. That the Claimant has not suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of the incident at this time.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

ORDER

Raucci, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard after our denial of the claim for the reason that the Claimant was not entitled to be reimbursed for repairing his automobile, which was damaged as a result of his body being slammed against the vehicle during the commission of the crime. Claimant has asked us to reconsider the denial, and we shall do so.

Claimant maintains that section 2(h) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act provides that (and we quote from Claimants letter of February 8, 2000):

“Para, (h) of the Act states ‘Pecuniary loss means’ * * ° ‘the purchase, lease, or rental of equipment necessary to create usability of and accessibility to the victim’s real and personal property, or real and personal property, * * *.
Para, (h) further defines real and personal property ‘includes, but is not limited to, vehicles * 8 V Vehicles are not specifically excluded, but are specifically included, in Para, (h) of the Act.” Emphasis is Claimant’s.

Claimant has misinterpreted paragraph (h). It reads:

“(h) ‘Pecuniary loss’ means, in the case of injury, appropriate medical expenses and hospital expenses including expenses of medical examinations, 8 8 8; prosthetic appliances, eyeglasses, and hearing aids necessary or damaged as a result of the crime; the purchase, lease or rental of equipment necessary to create usability of and accessibility to the victim’s real and personal property, or the real and personal property which is used by the victim, necessary as a result of the crime; 8 8 ®. Real and personal property includes, but is not limited to, vehicles, houses, apartments, townhouses, or condominiums. Pecuniary loss does not include pain and suffering or property loss or damage.” Emphasis ours.

In order for there to be pecuniary loss, there must be injury which requires medical treatment, or prosthetic, eye or hearing devices, or “equipment necessary to create usability of and accessibility to the victims” property. The “equipment” is equipment such as wheelchairs, walkers, or similar devices necessaiy because of the victims injuries suffered because of the crime. It does not include his damaged personal property.

Our view is reinforced by the express provision that “(p)ecuniary loss does not include pain and suffering or property loss or damage.”

We are constrained to affirm our prior decision. It is therefore ordered that the claim is denied.


author: Mitchell, J.

text:
    (No. 90-CC-0570
    Central Illinois Public Service Co., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 6, 2001.

    Craig S. Burkhardt, for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Phillip McQuillan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Mitchell, J.

The Claimant originally filed to collect a claim in the amount of $180,222.85 against the State of Illinois for utility services rendered to Eastern Illinois University. The claim included $173,291.21 for utility services and $6,931.64 for late payment charges.

At the trial Claimants witness Laurie Karman testified that she was the Credit and Collections Administrator for Central Illinois Public Service Company (CIPS). Ms. Karman testified that the bill in question for monthly utility service was for the period of May 22nd to June 22nd, 1989 and the bill was issued June 24th. In accordance with the rate schedule of CIPS that bill was due July 10th. Ms. Karman testified that late fees of $3,465.82 were added for August and September, the fees being calculated on the basis of 2% of the overdue bill per month and based on the State Prompt Payment Act. (30 ILCS 540/0.01 et seq.) When the bill was not paid by September 29, Claimant filed with the Court of Claims.

Eastern Illinois University paid the bill for electric service on or about September 29 but did not pay the interest. This payment was received by Claimant on or about October 2,1989.

Ms. Karman further testified that Exhibit 2 is rate 9B which is one of the CIPS filed rates with the Illinois Commerce Commission which would have been in effect during the period in question. Rate 9B provided for late fees of lVz% per month if utility bills were not paid within the 14-day period after they were issued. Ms. Karman testified that if the late fees were calculated according to Rate 9B, they would be lVz% of the amount due on July 10, August 10, and September 10 for a total due of $7,798.11.

Claimant then moved to amend its complaint to request a total of $7,798.11 and the Respondent did not object.

Marlyn Finley testified on behalf of the Respondent that he is Director of Business Services and Treasurer at Eastern Illinois University. Mr. Finley admitted that the CIPS bill would normally had been paid within a two-week period in accordance with the usual practice of the University and he did not know why this particular bill was not paid within that period. Mr. Finley further testified that at the time in question the CIPS bill was being paid from non-appropriated local funds which were revenue bond funds for the operation of facilities for which the bonds were issued. At that time EIU could carry over two months of operating money to pay current operating expenses. This would have amounted to 2.2 million dollars of revenue that would carry over each year for the bond fund in question.

Mr. Finley also testified that it was his understanding that the State Prompt Payment Act would apply to these bills. Mr. Finley testified that, although they paid the utility bills out of the bond revenue funds, he felt that they could not pay late payment fees from the bond revenue funds.

In its brief, Claimant noted that since the funds used to pay the utility bill are not appropriated funds, but were from the Respondent’s revenue bonds, that the State Prompt Payment Act does not apply. Rate 9B, the applicable rate sheet which was applied to Respondent for electric utility services, provides for a lVz% penalty of the unpaid balance for bills remaining unpaid 14 days from the date of the issue of the bill. Based on Claimants standard billing procedures the bill remained unpaid for each of three months, July 10, August 10, September 10, 1989, resulting in a penalty of VA% for each of the three months for a total of $7,798.11.

The provisions of the revenue bonds, which were applicable on the dates in question, allow full payment of “* * * all necessary operating expenses, current maintenance charges, expenses of reasonable upkeep and repairs, equipment purchases, fees due the paying agent on the 1978 bonds and the Prior Refunded Bonds and the Registrar on the Bonds, properly allocated share of charges for insurance and all other expenses incident to the operation of the System.”

At the end of each fiscal year, Eastern Illinois University may retain in its revenue fund moneys sufficient for operation and maintenance for the next 30 days and an operating reserve not to exceed one month. It is clear that the Respondent is not precluded from paying the late fees on the utility bill by the fact that the fiscal year changed on June 30. The late fees were incurred July 10, August 10, and September 10, 1989 and thus were incurred during the 1990 fiscal year and would have been payable from bond funds which were available during that year.

In this case, it is uncontradicted that the bill for utility services was not paid until the end of September 1989. For whatever reason it was paid late and therefore it appears that late fees are due from Eastern Illinois University to Central Illinois Public Service.

In view of the fact that the payment of the utility bill was from non-appropriated funds, calculating the late payment in accordance with the State Prompt Payment Act was an error. As for interest pursuant to the utility rate schedule, based on our decision in Illinois Power Company v. State (1995), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 506, it too is denied.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied.