text:
    (Nos. 76-CC-1934 and 76-CC-1936, Consolidated
    Pekin and La Marsh Drainage and Levee District, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 2, 1977.

    Edward C. Moehle, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The facts in this case are stipulated to by both parties and are found in both the complaint and the departmental report. The facts as set forth in the record reveal that the Pekin and La Marsh Drainage and Levee District is a duly organized and existing drainage and levee district under the provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 42. The district is comprised of approximately 2,600 acres in Peoria County, Illinois. The State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, drilled a test hole or boring into the ground at a location approximately 50 feet northerly of Route 9 and approximately 500 feet westerly of the Pekin Highway Bridge, this being within the boundaries of the drainage and levee district. The test hole or boring was drilled for the purpose of gathering information on the subsurface at that particular location. On or about June 2, 1974, a water boil or artesian well developed in the test hole. The water boil developed because of the failure of the State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, to seal the test hole. The Respondent in their departmental report admit that the test holes which were bored in September, 1972, were not plugged and it was known by the State that by the later part of 1972 the test holes had become small artesian wells. However, prior to the first week of June, 1974, the record indicates that the water flowing from the test holes was minimum and did not cause damage to any property. However, the State admits in their report that they were aware of the underground water pressure and that standard engineering practices would have dictated the sealing of these test holes.

On June 3, 1974, the district was informed of the water boil and immediately informed the State, the Department of Transportation. The State then inserted a tube or pipe and other materials into the water boil in such a manner that caused a flow of water from the water boil to increase in volume and to carry with it sand and silt from the subsurface. On subsequent dates the State of Illinois further inserted other materials into the boil which material further opened the channel for the flow of water, again causing the great increase in the flow of water from the boil which carried with it additional sand and silt from the subsurface. This sand and silt flowed into the drainage ditch of the district and was thereafter pumped from the district into the Illinois River by pumps operated and owned by the district. The increased flow undermined the subsurface causing the surrounding area to sink which in turn caused a secondary boil or artesian well to develop which again in turn caused a secondary levee in the district to subside and in general created an emergency flood condition within the district. The flow of water, sand and silt continued until about July 15,1974, when the State of Illinois managed to control the flow. In the Fall of 1974, the State sealed the hole from which the water had flowed.

The State in their departmental report admit that by reason of the water, sand and silt flowing into the drainage ditch of the district, the district was compelled to remove same from the district by pumping into the Illinois River in order to avoid flooding in the district. The Claimant submitted invoices for labor, material and services totalling $41,274.29. Of this amount $20,638.85 was paid by the State. The remaining $20,635.44 was rejected for lack of verification. The Claimant subsequently submitted additional verification to the State of Illinois and it was agreed by the parties in the joint stipulation that the verifications substantiates additional expenses of $15,759.31.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be awarded in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause the sum of $15,759.31.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Polos, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 76-CC-1994
    Harry Harling, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 23, 1977.

    O’Mally & Royce, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Richard Grossman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Polos, C.J.

This is a claim for the unjust imprisonment of Harry Harling, brought pursuant to Section 8(c) of the “Court of Claims Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 37, § 439.8(c), which provides that this Court has jurisdiction over:

“all claims against the State for time unjustly served in prisons of this State where the persons imprisoned shall receive a pardon from the governor stating that such pardon is issued on the ground of innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned ...”

Claimant had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the Circuit Court of Cook County, and on November 16, 1973, was sentenced to a term of from three to nine years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. The conviction was appealed, and was reversed on June 16, 1975, by the Illinois Appellate Court. Thereafter, on May 14,1976, Claimant received a pardon on the ground of innocence from Daniel Walker, the Governor of Illinois.

Claimant was incarcerated in the Illinois State Penitentiary from November 19,1973, to September 4, 1975, a period of approximately twenty-two months. However, from December 23, 1974, to his release on September 4, 1975, he was enrolled in a work release program, which enabled him to work for his previous employer.

Claiiriant was steadily employed prior to his incarceration. W-2 forms introduced into evidence show that in 1971 he had earned $8,329; that in 1972 he had earned $7,960; that in 1973 he had earned $4,332; and that in 1975 he had earned $9,428.

Claimant contends that, based upon his prior earnings, he suffered a loss of earnings of approximately $14,000. Claimant also contends that he should be awarded attorneys fees.

Section 8(c) of the “Court of Claims Act” limits the amount of recovery that may be had for unjust imprisonment of a period less than five years, to $15,000. In computing the award to be made hereunder, the amount of lost earnings incurred by an individual is only one of the factors to be considered. It should be noted that while Claimant’s gross earnings may have been reduced by the amount he claims, his living expenses were also reduced during the period of his imprisonment. Claimant’s net economic loss as a result of his imprisonment thus cannot be fairly measured by his gross loss of earnings. However, loss of earnings is certainly one factor to be considered in assessing the amount of an award for one unjustly imprisoned.

With respect to the additional claim for attorneys fees, this Court has held in Anderson v. State, 26 Ill.Ct.Cl. 119, that the legislature did not intend that an additional award of attorneys fees be made, but that attorneys fees be paid out of funds awarded to a Claimant.

On consideration of the record in this case, the Court finds that Claimant should be awarded the sum of $12,500.00 for his unjust imprisonment in a prison of this State. On consideration of the time expended by the attorney for the Claimant in prosecuting this action, the Court fixes attorneys fees at $3,125.00 pursuant to Section 8(c) of the Act.

It is therfore ordered that Claimant be and hereby is awarded the sum of $12,500.00 to be disbursed as follows:

$9,375.00 to Harry Harling, the Claimant herein;
$3,125.00 to O’Malley & Royce, Claimant’s attorneys.


text:
    (No. 76-CC-2155
    Gritschke and Cloke, Inc., Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 3, 1978.

    Winston & Strawn, by Gregory S. Murray, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Polos, C.J.

This is a claim for the sum of $5,414.58 which Claimant alleges it is due for engineering services performed for the State of Illinois.

On January 8,1968, the engineering firm of Neiler, Rich & Balden, Inc. entered into a contract with the Department of Public Works and Buildings of the State of Illinois, for electrical engineering work at the Manteno State Hospital. Claimant is the successor in interest and assignee of Neiler, Rich & Balden, Inc.

The total compensation due under the contract was $65,985.81. At the hearing herein Claimant established that it performed all work required under the contract, and that it was still due a balance of $5,414.58.

Respondent does not dispute that said sum is due and owing Claimant, and indicated that the monies had remained unpaid because the original appropriation for the expenditure had lapsed.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of $5,414.58 in full satisfaction of its claim herein.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    (No. 76-CC-2202
    Dixie Lynn Nay, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 28, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

This matter comes before the Court on motion of Respondent to dismiss said cause.

Respondent’s motion is based upon the case of Vaughn, et al v. State of Illinois.

The present case is based upon a snake bite received by a child on her right ankle at Cave-In-Rock State Park in Hardin County, Illinois on July 5,1975.

This park being a nature area, it appears the incident occurred is one of the natural hazards of the park.

It is hereby ordered that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be, and the same is, hereby granted.


text:
    (No. 76-CC-2210
    Sam Stewart, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 25, 1978.

   Polos, C.J.

Claimant, Sam Steward, an inmate of Stateville Correctional Center, has brought this action to recover for the loss of certain items of personal property allegedly valued at $49.93.

At a hearing held in this cause, Claimant established by a preponderance of the evidence that on April 6, 1976, he was a prisoner in the Joliet Correctional Center, Joliet, Illinois. He was ordered transferred to the Stateville Branch, and prior to his transfer, his personal property was inventoried by a guard, put in a bag for transfer, and a copy of the inventory was given to Claimant.

When Claimant arrived at Stateville, the prison authorities there turned over to him the bag containing his property. On checking the contents of the bag against the inventory, Claimant found that certain items of property were missing. Claimant introduced into evidence a copy of the inventory made upon his leaving the Joliet Correctional Center, and introduced sufficient evidence to support his contention that the lost items of property had a fair cash market value of $40.00 at the time of their loss.

This Court held in Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl. 1, decided that the State has a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard and return an inmate’s property when it takes actual physical possession of such property during the course of the transfer of an inmate between penal institutions.

While bailment is ordinarily a voluntary contractual transaction between bailor and bailee, various types of constructive and involuntary bailments have been recognized:

“A constructive bailment can be created between an owner of the property and one in possession thereof.” 4A Illinois Law and Practice 550, Bailments, citing Chesterfield Sewer & Water, Inc., v. Citizens Insurance Co. of New Jersey, et al., 57 Ill. App. 12d, 90, 207 NE2d 84.

In Chesterfield, the Court quotes from Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 13 So2d. 172, at 174, as follows:

“An actual contract or one implied in fact is not always necessary to create a bailment. Where, otherwise than by mutual contract of bailment, one person has lawfully acquired the possession of personal property of another and holds it under circumstances whereby he ought, upon principles of justice, to keep it safely and restore it or deliver it to the owner, such person and the owner of the property are, by operation of law, generally treated as bailee and bailor under a contract of bailment, irrespective of whether or not there has been any mutual assent, express or implied, to such relationship.”

The loss or damage to bailed property while in the possession of the bailee raises a presumption of negligence which the bailee must rebut by evidence of due care. The effect of this rule is not to shift the ultimate burden of proof from the bailor to the bailee, but simply to shift the burden of proceeding or going forward with the evidence.

At the trial of this cause the State presented no testimony to explain the disappearance of Claimant’s property, and presented no testimony of its freedom from negligence. Claimant’s prima facie case, therefore, stands unrebutted.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of $40.00.


text:
    (No. 76-CC-2315
    Elmore Jordan, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 30, 1977.

   Polos, C.J.

This is a claim brought by Elmore Jordan, an inmate of Stateville Correctional Center, for the conversion of a radio of the alleged value of $125.00.

At the hearing of this cause, Claimant established by a preponderance of the evidence that on February 9, 1976, prison authorities conducted a shakedown inspection of the cells in Claimant’s cell block. While the inmates stood on the “flag” or floor of the cell block, guards searched the tiers of cells for contraband items. From where he was standing on the flag, Claimant could watch the search conducted in his cell on the third tier. At the conclusion of the search, as Claimant was walking up the stairs to his cell, he met the guard who had searched his cell coming down stairs with Claimant’s radio in his arms — an AM/FM Panasonic Radio & Eight Track Player. He asked the guard to give him his radio. The guard replied that Claimant could have his radio if he could produce a permit for it. Claimant told the guard he had a permit. He ran upstairs to his cell to get the permit, but the cell was in disorder because of the search, and a short time elapsed before he could find the permit. The permit was introduced into evidence by Claimant. While Claimant was looking for his permit the guards were putting the items taken from the cells onto wagons to be hauled from the cell block. By the time Claimant ran back downstairs to the flag, his radio had already been hauled out of the building on one of the wagons. He met a Lieutenant, showed him his permit, and the Lieutenant assured him that his radio would be returned to him. However, the radio has never been located.

The radio had been purchased from the Goldblatt Department Store, Joliet, Illinois, on April 9,1975, for $139.45. It was in good working order on the date of the loss. The Court finds that the value of the radio on February 9, 1976, was $100.00.

Claimant’s case is dissimilar to the class of cases where an inmate, being transferred from one institution to another, surrenders his personal property to prison authorities so that it can be transferred from the old institution to the new. In such cases there is a type of bailment, and proof of negligence on the part of the bailee is part of Claimant’s case.

The facts in this case establish an outright conversion of plaintiffs property. Claimant had a permit to have the radio in his cell. By taking it from him and then failing to return it, Respondent was guilty of a conversion of his property:

“The gist of a conversion has been declared to be not the acquisition of the property by the wrongdoer, but the wrongful deprivation of a person of property to the possession of which he is entitled. A conversion consists of an act in derogation of the plaintiffs possessory rights, and any wrongful exercise or assumption of authority over another’s goods, depriving him of the possession, permanently or for an indefinite time, is a conversion.” 53 Am. Jur. Trover and Conversion 822.

Respondent acknowledged its liability to Claimant for the conversion of his radio in two interoffice memorandums prepared by officials at Stateville, which were introduced into evidence.

One such memorandum from Robert J. Kapture, Assistant Warden-Operations to Elmer Maxwell, Personal Property Control Officer; stated in part:

“Please provide me with an estimate of the approximate value of the above named resident’s Panasonic eight-track tape player. We will have to replace it.”

The second memorandum, from Marvin Reed, Chief of Advocacy Services, to Ernest E. Morris, Warden, Stateville Correctional Center; provided in part:

“During an interview with Mr. Jordan, he expressed concern about the replacement of his radio, which was confiscated during a shakedown of his cell. At the time the resident was advised to produce a permit for same and the property would be returned. Upon complying with the officer’s request his radio could not be located.”
“Attached are memorandums which clearly indicate the responsibility for the loss rests with the institution .. ..”

It is therefore ordered that Claimant be awarded the sum of $100.00.


text:
    (No. 76-CC-2404
    American National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago, as Trustee under Trust No. 13571, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 19, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of Respondent to dismiss the complaint.

And the parties having stipulated to the entry of an award in the amount of $208.84 with respect to a portion of the claim.

And the parties having further stipulated that the complaint be stricken with respect to the remainder of the claim, and that Respondent be granted 30 days thereafter in which to file an amended complaint with respect to that portion of the claim which has been stricken.

And the Court being fully advised in the premises.

It is hereby ordered that Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of $208.84 for the expenditures shown as items Numbers 4 and 5 in Exhibit A to the complaint herein.

It is further ordered that the complaint be stricken with respect to items 1, 2 and 3 as shown on Exhibit A to the complaint, and that Claimant file a First Amended complaint with respect to the items stricken, within 30 days of the date of this order.


text:
    (No. 76-CC-2490
    Edgar Shorter, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 30, 1977.

   Polos, C.J.

This is a claim by Edgar Shorter, an inmate of Stateville Correctional Center, for the conversion of a General Electric Radio.

At the hearing of this cause the Claimant established that on February 9, 1976, the subject radio was confiscated from Claimant’s cell during a shakedown inspection of the cells at Stateville. The occurrence is summarized in a report from the Stateville Inquiry Board to Warden David H. Bri'erton, dated March 10, 1976, which was introduced into evidence:

“The Stateville Inquiry Board interviewed Resident Shorter #69771 on March 4,1976 regarding a grievance concerning a radio. Resident Shorter received a disciplinary report on February 9,1976 for having the radio that could possibly have been stolen. However, resident Shorter stated that the radio has his Pontiac institutional number on it, #31814 and that is why the institution felt that the radio was stolen. On February 12,1976 Mr. Shorter was told by the Adjustment Committee that the radio would be returned to him after his Stateville number was inscribed on the radio. Resident Shorter stated that he has yet to receive the radio. He is requesting that the radio be returned to him as soon as possible since the ticket was dropped by the Adjustment Committee ...”
“It is the recommendation of this committee that the radio be returned to resident Shorter as soon as possible at the completion of the processing procedures.”

The radio has never been found or returned to Claimant, although on various occasions Claimant was told by institution authorities that the radio was being processed and would be returned to him. Respondent offered no testimony to explain the disappearance of Claimant’s radio.

It appears that at the time of its loss the radio had a value of $20.00.

The facts in this case establish a conversion of Claimant’s property.

“The gist of a conversion has been declared to be not the acquisition of the property by the wrongdoer, but the wrongful deprivation of a person of property to the possession of which he is entitled. A conversion consists of an act in derogation of the plaintiffs possessory rights, and any wrongful exercise or assumption of authority over another’s goods, depriving him of the possession, permanently or for an indefinite time, is a conversion.” 53 Am. Jur. Trover and Conversion 822.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant be awarded the sum of $20.00.


text:
    (No. 76-CC-2501
    Herbert Dailey, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 30, 1977.

   Polos, C.J.

This is a claim brought by Herbert Dailey of State-ville Correctional Center, for the loss of certain items of personal property of the alleged value of $17.90.

At the hearing of this cause, Claimant established by the preponderance of the evidence that on April 28, 1976, Claimant, a prisoner in the Illinois State Penitentiary, Menard branch, was ordered transferred to the Stateville branch. On the day in question he was the owner of and had in his possession in his cell at Menard various items of personal property, such as cigarettes, shaving materials, shampoo, a cigarette roller, and notebooks. In transferring Claimant’s personal propety from Menard to Stateville, prison officials had Claimant hand each item of his personal property through the bars of his cell to a guard, who listed the same on a multi-copy inventory form, and who put the items in two cardboard cartons. At the conclusion of the inventorying of Claimant’s property, the guard gave Claimant a copy of the inventory and removed the cardboard cartons for shipment to State-ville.

Approximately one week after he arrived at State-ville, the prison authorities at Stateville turned over to Claimant the two cardboard cartons containing his personal property. Upon checking the contents of the cartons against the inventory, Claimant found that certain items were missing. Claimant testified as to which items were missing, and his copy of the Inventory was introduced into evidence as Claimant’s Exhibit 1. Sufficient evidence was produced to establish that the lost items had a fair cash market value of $17.90 at the time of their loss.

Claimant duly filed a grievance with the Stateville Inquiry Board concerning the missing items of personal property, but the missing property was never found.

This Court has held in Doubling v. State of Illinois 32 Ill.Ct.Cl. 1, (75-CC-833), decided that the State has a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard and return an inmate’s property when it takes actual physical possession of such property during the course of an inmate’s transfer between penal institutions.

While bailment is ordinarily a voluntary contractual transaction between bailor and bailee, various types of constructive and involuntary bailments have been recognized by the Courts:

“A constructive bailment can be created between an owner of the property and one in possession thereof.” 4A Illinois Law and Practice 550, Bailments, citing Chesterfield Sewer & Water, Inc., v. Citizens Insurance Company of New Jersey, et al., 57 Ill. App. 2d 90, 207 NE2d 84.

In Chesterfield, the Court quoted the following language from Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 13 So2d 172, at 174:

“An acutal contract or one implied in fact is not always necessary to create a bailment. Where, otherwise than by mutual contract of bailment, one person has lawfully acquired the possession of personal property of another and holds it under circumstances whereby he ought, upon principles of justice, to keep it safely and restore it or deliver it to the owner, such person and the owner of the property are, by operation of law, generally treated as bailee and bailor under a contract of bailment, irrespective of whether or not there has been any mutual assent, express or implied, to such relationship.” Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 13 So2d 172 at page 174.

The loss or damage to bailed property while in the possession of the bailee raises a presumption of negligence which the bailee must rebut by evidence of due care. The effect of this rule is not to shift the ultimate burden of proof from the bailor to the bailee, but simply to shift the burden of proceeding or going forward with the evidence.

At the trial of this cause the State presented no testimony to explain the disappearance of Claimant’s property, and presented no testimony of its freedom from negligence. Claimant’s prima facie case, therefore, stands unrebutted.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant be awarded the sum of $17.90.


text:
    (No. 76-CC-2837
    Winzeler Trucking Company, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed February 15, 1978.

   Polos, C.J.

This cause is before the Court following oral argument on the cross motions of the parties for summary judgment.

The claim herein arises out of a contract which Claimant entered into in 1974 with the Martin Marietta Corporation, to provide truck transportation for road building supplies to the site of a State highway construction project. The Rock Roads Construction Company was the primary contractor on the job, and it had subcontracted certain work to Martin Marietta Corporation, which in turn has entered into the aforesaid contract with Claimant.

Claimant alleges that it lost substantial sums on the contract because it contracted much of its trucking with other firms, and had to pay increased rates to them when the Illinois Commerce Commission authorized a number of increases in freight rates during the course of the contract. Claimant further alleges that it was unable to pass on the increased rates because of Section 109.20 of the Department of Transporation Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, which allows increases in rates for railroad and barges to be passed on to the State, while not providing for such increases to be passed on from trucking firms.

Claimant alleges that Section 109.20 violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution, and seeks damages in the amount of his losses under the contract.

On consideration of the cross motions for summary judgment filed herein, the memorandums of the parties in support of and in opposition to those motions, and the oral arguments had in this cause, the Court finds that there are no disputed issues of material fact.

The Court further finds that as a matter of law, Claimant has no cause of action against the State of Illinois for his losses under his contract with Martin Marietta Corporation, as the State of Illinois was not a party to that contract.

The Court further finds that as a matter of law, it has no jurisdiction to determine whether Section 109.20 of the Department of Transporation Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction is unconstitutional.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant’s motion for summary judgment be, and hereby is denied, and Respondent’s motion for summary judgment be, and hereby is, granted, and this cause is accordingly dismissed.


text:
    (No. 76-CC-2974
    Armando Arles, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 20, 1978.

    Janet Keleher and Cathleen Cohen, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Richard Grossman and James Stola, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Polos, C.J.

This is a claim brought by Armando Arles, an inmate of Stateville Correctional Center, for the conversion of a watch of the alleged value of $125.00.

On April 6,1976, Claimant was ordered to be transferred from the Joliet Branch to the Stateville Branch of the Illinois penitentiary system.

Prior to his transfer his personal property including the watch in question, was inventoried by a guard at Joliet on the form used for that purpose. Claimant was permitted to keep on his person his watch, rosary, and his belt, but the other items of personal property were transported separately from Joliet to Stateville by truck.

Upon his arrival at Stateville, Claimant was ordered to surrender his watch, rosary and belt to one Officer Maxwell. He was given a receipt for the watch and told that any member of his family could pick it up. His wife came to Stateville to pick up the watch, but it could not be found. After he filed a grievance, the rosary was returned to him, but he was told that the belt and watch were lost.

Claimant testified that his wife bought the watch in April, 1975, from Lustig Jewelers, in Chicago, Illinois for $125.00.

Respondent’s defense consists of correspondence and memorandums from officials at the Joliet Branch to the effect that J oliet records did not show that Claimant had a watch while at Joliet, and if he did he had no permit for it and it was, therefore, contraband.

This negative h eres ay testimony does not overcome the effect of the official inventory form prepared by a guard at Joliet prior to Claimant’s transfer from Joliet, placed in his master record file in Stateville on his arrival at Stateville, and showing that he had a watch. While the watch may have been contraband in J oliet — if he wore it there without permission — the issue is irrelevant, because it never became contraband in Stateville. He surrendered it immediately on arrival, to be picked up by a member of his family.

This Court held in Doubling v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, that the State has a duty to safeguard and return property which it has taken from an inmate in the course of a transfer. In the present case, Respondent had made admissions, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216, as to the genuineness of four documents which indicate that authorities at the Joliet Branch listed Claimant’s watch as an item of his personal property which was being transferred to the Stateville Branch; that authorities at the Stateville Branch made a notation on Claimant’s property sheet that said watch was missing, and that authorities at Stateville did not issue a permit for said watch. These documents demonstrate that Claimant’s watch was in fact delivered to agents of the Respondent and that it was not returned to him.

Respondent’s failure to return Claimant’s watch after it was taken from him by Stateville authorities creates a presumption of negligence. Clark v. Field, 37 Ill. 2d 583, 299 N.E.2d 676 (1967). Since Respondent at no time has offered evidence of its freedom from negligence, this presumption has not been rebutted. Therefore, Claimant has established that Respondent failed to utilize reasonable care in insuring the return of his watch.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant be and hereby is awarded the sum of $125.00.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0080
    Larry Meyer, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 20, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl. , this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State supra, and Doubling v. State supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0232
    Floyd Wallace, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 20, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl. ,this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and the same is hereby dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0233
    Leon Morris, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 19, 1977.

    Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc., Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim comes before this Court following a settlement agreement between the Claimant and the Department of Corrections which was entered into and approved by the Fair Employment Practices Commission under statutory authority granted in Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, para. 858. The Claimant is a 23 year old black, male, high school graduate who on October 2, 1973, completed an application for employment as a prison guard and took an oral examination at Menard State Penitentiary. The Claimant received a grade of “B” on the examination but was not immediately hired. On May 7, 1974, the Claimant was interviewed orally by the Warden, a guard major and two other male personnel of the Menard State Penitentiary at Chester, Illinois. Although having received the grade of “B” on the examination, the Claimant was notified that he was ineligible for appointment as guard following the oral interview. The record does not reflect the reason for the ineligibility.

The Claimant in filing his complaint before the Fair Employment Practices Commission (F.E.P.C.) alleged that certain white persons were hired as guards and that it was his belief that he was denied eligibility because of his race.

The parties through the Office of the Attorney General entered into a joint stipulation of facts with reference to the claim before this Court. That stipulation has attached thereto as exhibits A, B, and C the Order of Dismissal, Terms of Settlement, and Agreement and the recommended Order and Decision of the F.E.P.C.

It is the function of the F.E.P.C. to hear the complaints and determine the facts relative to the alleged unfair employment practices and determine the merits of the allegations. The statute creating the F.E.P.C. encourages settlements by providing for conciliation sessions and authorizing the F.E.P.C. to approve or reject settlements entered into by the parties as a result of the conciliation efforts. Once the F.E.P.C. has made their determination or has approved the settlement, it is not for this Court to look behind the determination or settlement and second guess the Commission as to whether or not fair employment practices were violated. However, it is this Court and not the F.E.P.C. that is charged with the responsibility of determining the merits of a claim for monetary recovery and recommending or not recommending to the Legislature that a given claim be paid or not paid. It is in the fulfillment of this responsibility that this Court would be remiss if it did not scrutinize the dollar amount agreed to, to determine whether or not the Claimant had properly mitigated his damages. It is this sole question to which this Court will address itself once the F.E.P.C. has determined by hearing, or agreement, that there was adequate proof of a fair employment practices violation. This Court does not believe that the Legislature intended that this Court merely rubber stamps the amount agreed to between the parties or recommended by the F.E.P.C. Had this been the intent of the Legislature, there would have been no need to come to this Court. The Legislature could have provided simply that the Claimant take his agreement or F.E.P.C. ruling directly to the Comptroller for payment.

As set forth in the joint stipulation of the parties and as confirmed by the Office of the Attorney General through the Department of Personnel, the gross earnings of the Claimant for the period in question, February 8,1974, through September 9,1975, had the Claimant been employed on February 8, 1974, as a prison guard, would have amounted to approximately $15,640.00. The record reflects that the Claimant was employed at various tasks throughout the period of time for which claim is being made and had gross earnings for that period of time in the amount of $9,868.00. In the joint stipulation of the parties, the parties have waived their right to a hearing except as the Court may direct. This Court finds that the record sufficiently establishes the fact that the Claimant made a reasonable effort to mitigate his losses. No further hearing is therefore ordered. The record establishes that the difference between what the Claimant was able to earn through his mitigating efforts and the amount he would have earned had he been employed as a prison guard on February 8, 1974, amounted to $5,772.00 which sum is hereby awarded.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 77-CC-0514
    George S. Grayned, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 13, 1978.

    Sorling, Northrup, Hanna, Cullen & Cochran, by Michael Meyers, Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court on a petition filed by Claimant for wages allegedly due him as a result of a layoff which was approved by the Director of the Department of Personnel of the State of Illinois. He held the position of Corrections Community Consultant with the Commission on Delinquency Prevention.

Subsequent to said layoff, Claimant requested a layoff reconsideration hearing pursuant to Rule 2-596 but the Director of the Department of Personnel upheld the layoff. A petition was then filed with the Illinois Civil Service Commission alleging that a new employee had been hired subsequent to Claimant’s layoff with the Commission on Delinquency Prevention and that the new employee was doing similar or identical work to that being performed by Claimant at the time of the layoff.

On January 21, 1977, the Director of the Department of Personnel rescinded prior approval of the layoff because of violations of the Department of Personnel Rules and ordered the Claimant reinstated to work.

There has also been filed in this case a joint stipulation as to Facts by Respondent and Claimant which is attached hereto as an appendix to this opinion.

In addition, a letter was sent by certified mail to Robert S. O’Shea, Deputy Clerk of the Illinois Court of Claims, dated June 2, 1977, from Sorling, Northrup, Hanna, Cullen and Cochran, Ltd., Attorneys at Law, and signed by Michael Myers, a member of the firm, which letter claimed an attorney’s lien under Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 13, Sec. 14,1978, in the amount of $556.20.

This Court has on many occasions considered the question of reimbursement to an employee for an unlawful discharge. A well-written opinion was rendered by this Court in the case of Burke v. State of Illinois, 26 Ill.Ct.Cl. 9, which states in part:

“Since the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Kelly v. Chicago Park District, 409, Ill. 91, it has been the rule of the Courts of Illinois that one who is wrongfully discharged is entitled to collect his full salary covering the period of wrongful discharge with the exception that any amounts earned by the individual from other employment during the period of discharge are to be used as a set-off. Claimant urges that this rule has been changed by an amendment to Sec. 62B-111 of Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 127. The amendment was added a few months after the decision was announced in the Kelly case, and the Statute now provides that an officer or employee shall receive “full compensation” for any period during which he was suspended pending the investigation by the Civil Service Commission of charges against him. It is Claimant’s contention that the words “full compensation” evinces legislative intent to abrogate the rule concerning set-off.
Since the decision in the Kelly case, the Courts of Illinois have had occasion to reexamine the rules of set-off in cases involving Civil Service employees who were wrongfully discharged. The following cases all reaffirm the rule set forth in the Kelly case:
Murray v. City of Chicago, 171 N.E.2d 492, 28 Ill. App. 395;
People ex rel. Krich v. Hurley, 169 N.E.2d 107, 19 Ill. 2d 548,
People ex rel. Borne v. Johnson, 48 Ill. App. 2d 307, 199 N.E.2d 68.
The Court of Claims has consistently followed the rule decided in the Kelly case, and it appears conclusive that any award to Claimant for salary loss between March 3, 1961, and June 30, 1961, must be offset by any earning he received from other employment during that period.”

This Court has consistently followed the rule in Volume 26, at pages 117,326 and 502, and in Volume 25 at pages 87, 89, 195, 198, 201 and 205.

This Court, in the case of Randolph, Inc. v. State of Illinois, 28 Ill.Ct.Cl. 279, considered the matter of stipulations.

It appearing to the Court that Claimant was illegally discharged, the Court finds he is entitled to an award.

We find Claimant is entitled to back salary in a gross amount of $6,588.00, less the deductions for offsetting income in the sum of $4,243.90, and, in addition, the sum of $1,110.62 for 16 1/2 days of unpaid vacation at the time of resignation. This makes a total gross of $3,454.72 due Claimant.

We further find that there is due as employer’s contributions the sum of $643.50, making a total award of $4,098.22, to be disbursed as follows:

The sum of $441.40 to State Employees Retirement System as State contribution.
The sum of $202.10 to State Employees Retirement System as State’s share of FICA.
The sum of $202.10 to FICA, as Claimant’s share.
The sum of $86.37 to Illinois Department of Revenue, State Withholding Tax.
The sum of $690.94 to Illinois Department of Revenue, Claimant’s Federal Withholding Tax.
The sum of $2,475.31 to Claimant — net after deductions from gross sum of $3,454.72.

It is ordered that Claimant is hereby awarded total employee benefits of $4,098.22 (which includes employer contributions of $643.50) and that said amount be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.

It is further ordered that the net sum payable to Claimant is subject to an attorney’s lien of $556.20 in favor of Sorling, Northrup, Hanna, Cullen & Cochran, Ltd., attorneys for Claimant.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0517
    Steven T. Davis, Claimant, v. State of Illinois; and Illinois Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Order filed April 17, 1978.

   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Respondent.

Claimants filed a complaint alleging that an accident occurred on the Frontage Road for Route 83, located approximately 300 yards south of the intersection of said Frontage Road and Avery Street, in Du-Page County.

Motion for summary judgment sets forth that the Claimants had heretofore filed a notice of injury with the city of Elmhurst involving the same accident. The motion further states that Claimants have filed in the Circuit Court of DuPage County a lawsuit against the city of Elmhurst, which complaint alleges that at the time of the occurrence, the city of Elmhurst “kept, maintained, supervised, operated and controlled the public streets and highways in said city for use of the public, including the Route 83 Frontage Road approximately 300 feet south of intersection (sic) of said road and Verrett Street in said city.”

It further appears that after the completion of the construction of the new Route 83, which completion was several years prior to the date of the accident alleged in Claimants’ complaint, the duty to maintain, repair and control the roadway where the accident allegedly took place was that of the city of Elmhurst and not the State of Illinois.

Motion for summary judgment is hereby granted and this cause is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0562
    Johnnie Toombs, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 18, 1977.

   Polos, C.J.

Claimant was laid off when the State closed the Illinois Youth Center at Hanna City which was being used by the State for the housing of youthful female offenders. When the center was closed in September, 1971, the Claimant was laid off. When the center reopened in June, 1972, as an institution for the housing of youthful male offenders, Mrs. Toombs applied for re-employment as a counselor and was refused because the State indicated that they were hiring only male counselors.

Mrs. Toombs filed a complaint with the Fair Employment Practices Commission, and, after a hearing on the merits, the Commission found for the Complainant and ordered the State of Illinois to re-employ Mrs. Toombs as a counselor in the male detention center. This claim is for the difference in salary Mrs. Toombs actually earned from the time male employees were hired in June, 1972, until Mrs. Toombs was finally placed back on the payroll in February, 1977.

A question of first magnitude in a case of this type is the determination as to the reasonableness of the Claimant’s efforts to mitigate her losses. Claimant’s efforts to mitigate her loss are reflected in the amounts that she actually earned throughout this period. Had Mrs. Toombs been immediately employed upon her application for re-employment she would have had a gross salary for the period of time in question of $49,826.00. (This differs somewhat from the joint stipulation of the parties inasmuch as their stipulation was based on the departmental report which proved to be in error.) Her actual earnings at various other employment during this period of time were $35,940.96. We find that the efforts of Mrs. Toombs to mitigate her losses were reasonable.

In her complaint Mrs. Toombs asks the Court to grant an award for interest. The Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Lake Front Realty Corporation v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, stated that interest on tax free funds is recoverable only if authorized by statute. In People v. Meyerowitz, 61 Ill. 2d 200, 211, the Court stated that “we hold that the defendants are entitled to the fines and costs they have paid as a result of their void convictions. No interest is due for the reason that the fines and costs were collected in good faith, and there is no statutory provision for interest in this situation.” Inasmuch as there is no statutory provision for interest in the case before this Court, this portion of the claim is denied.

The Claimant by her attorney and the Respondent through the Attorney General entered into a joint stipulation which, with attachments, sets forth in detail the several deductions and set-offs applicable to this claim. Because of the complexities of the calculations, we incorporate the figures into this Opinion by reference rather than to burden the reader.

In summary we find that Claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $49,826.00 less the mitigated actual earnings of $35,940.96, less salary paid on supplemental payroll of $1,316.25 less ten vacation days paid and returned to her credit of $460.70 for an adjusted salary of $12,108.09 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

The sum of $1,993.04 for employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System.
The sum of $3,172.11 for the State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

The sum of $2,630.42 for Claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To Claimant:

The sum of $7,155.83 for Claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the total employee benefit.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant be and is hereby awarded $12,108.09 plus the State’s contribution to Retirement to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0643
    Cyrilla M. Healy, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

This cause coining on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises.

This Court finds that this claim is for reimbursement of medical bills incurred and damages sustained to Claimant, Cyrilla M. Healy, while a visitor at the W. A. Howe Development Center of the Illinois Department of Mental Health.

On January 23, 1977, Cyrilla Healy attended a parent’s meeting in House 202 of the facility. After the meeting, Dwight McCall, a resident in House 202 started to tantrum. He threw a living room table which struck Claimant on the left leg.

The Unit Nurse on duty, LPN Lorraine Scherdin, applied ice to the leg which was swollen. The nurse also called the Dispensary and made arrangements for Claimant to be taken there to have the leg checked.

Claimant was told to go either to an emergency room or to a private physician for further treatment. Pursuant to these instructions, Ms. Healy obtained outside treatment and incurred medical bills in the amount of $98.00. The evidence further shows that Claimant was not insured against this loss.

Respondent has admitted that the amount of $98.00 is due and owing to Claimant for the injuries sustained as alleged in her complaint.

It appears that all matters in controversy between Claimant and the Respondent, State of Illinois, have been adjusted, to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, based on Respondent’s Departmental Report.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $98.00, in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned claim.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0661
    Image Response, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 7, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This cause having come before the Court on the motion of Respondent, and Claimant having failed to respond, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, find that the Claimant, as set forth in Respondent’ s motion to dismiss, failed to attach the contract for services and the joining of two separate agencies in the same complaint is in violation of Rule 5(c) and Rule 5(d)(3) respectively, therefore, this claim should be dismissed according to Rule 9 of the Court of Claims.

It is therefore ordered that this claim be, and the same is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0667
    Phyllis Liddell, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, Phyllis Liddell, seeks from the Respondent a sum of $1,289.34 in damages as a result of the refusal of the State of Illinois to hire the Claimant as a corrections officer , at Jubilee Lodge, a male correctional institution located near Peoria, Illinois, for the sole reason, as determined by the Fair Employment Practices Commission (F.E.P.C.), that she was a female. The F.E.P.C. found that the State was not justified in hiring males exclusively inasmuch as there were openings whose functions could be fulfilled by female correctional officers as well as male correctional officers, even though the institution was one housing males exclusively. The F.E.P.C. found in fact that there was discrimination based upon the sex of the applicant and subsequently approved a settlement as attached to the stipulation of the parties as Exhibit “D”. The settlement reached, included interest at six percent compounded annually over a period of four years. Inasmuch as the State of Illinois is not liable for interest penalties unless specifically authorized by statute, . this Court has consistently refused to grant claims awarding interest penalties. It is the position of this Court that the determination of an unfair employment practice as determined by the F.E.P.C. will not be reviewed by this Court. A finding of unfair employment practices by the F.E.P.C. stands as unrefuted prima facie evidence of such violation before this Court and we are here only concerned with the amount of the damages to be awarded and the question of mitigation. We have reviewed the damages as submitted by the parties and find that the Claimant would have earned a total of $3,834.50 for the period of time from June 19, 1972, until September 15, 1972, the period for which claim is made herein, and that the Claimant’s actual earnings for that period of time amounted to $2,545.16 leaving unmitigated damages of $1,289.34.

Having reviewed the findings of the F.E.P.C. along with the terms of settlement and agreement and the interrogatories to Claimant and supplemental interrogatories to Claimant it is the opinion of this Court that the Claimant made a reasonable effort to mitigate her losses and that she is entitled to and is hereby awarded the sum of $1,289.34.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0855
    Charles Justice, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed August 15, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl. , this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0860
    Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 15, 1978.

    Charles W. Hendrix, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, is an insurance corporation which is authorized to transact insurance business in the State of Illinois. Claimant issued a certain liability insurance policy to the State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, which provided in general for liability insurance coverage for the State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, arising out of the negligence of the Department or its employees. A copy of the casualty insurance policy has been submitted by Claimant in partial support of the complaint filed herein.

While the insurance policy was in effect, and specifically on April 9,1974, Daniel Hodge was involved in an automobile accident upon State Highway #10 just west of Route One in the State of Illinois. As a result of this accident, Hodge allegedly suffered injury, for which he filed a complaint against the State of Illinois in the Court of Claims. Hodge had given notice of personal injury to the State of Illinois in June of 1974, and had attached a copy of that notice to his complaint filed November 24,1975, with the Court of Claims.

Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company was not notified of the claim of Hodge until March 15,1977. The notification received by Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company was approximately two years and nine months after the first notice given to the Department of Transportation, and approximately one year and four months after the filing of the complaint in the Court of Claims. At the time the notice was given to Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, the complaint by Hodge was set for hearing before the Court of Claims Commissioner to whom the file had been assigned.

The policy of insurance in question provided in pertinent part that the insured shall notify the insurer in the event of an occurrence as soon as practicable; further, it was provided in said policy that if a suit is filed, said suit shall be forwarded to the insurer immediately. The above appears under paragraph four of the conditions of said policy.

The Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company seeks “a writ of injunction” against Claimant Daniel Hodge, from prosecuting his personal injury action until a final determination is made in this case and further “that the Court (Court of Claims) may construe the policy of the plaintiff and declare the rights of the parties.” In effect, Claimant, Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, seeks from this Court a declaration of rights under the policy of insurance and more particularly a declaration that, due to the absence of proper notice, the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company owes no obligation to defend or indemnify the State of Illinois in connection with Hodge v. State of Illinois.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does the Court of Claims have jurisdiction to “construe” the policy of insurance to either require the Hartford to defend and indemnity the State on the one hand, or releasing the Hartford from any obligation to defend or indemnify the State on the other?

2. Is the policy provision of the Hartford’s casualty policy, requiring notice under certain circumstances, enforceable against its contracting party, the State of Illinois?

3. Did the State of Illinois comply with the contract of insurance to which it was a party?

Respondent argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. Further, Respondent points out that any opinion or order of this Court is “enforceable” only to the extent that the legislature grants money for the payment of claims awarded by this Court. Respondent points out that Claimant may not have remedy in this case, noth withstanding the provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides in general that for every wrong there shall be a remedy.

The “Court of Claims Act” (Section 8b) provides that the Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine all claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois. Respondent argues that this legislative grant of exclusive jurisdiction should be interpreted to exclude jurisdiction of all claims which cannot be resolved by awarding or denying monetary relief. If the legislature had intended such a result, it would seem that the grant of jurisdiction to decide “claims against the State founded upon any contract” would have been expressed in a much more restrictive manner.

Such a limited interpretation as that urged by Respondent does not appear to have been the legislative intent. No one suggests that enforcement of an order of this Court to the effect that the Hartford should not escape responsibility to defend and indemnify the State of Illinois for the reasons propounded in the Hartford’s complaint could not be enforced by the State in a separate proceeding in the appropriate Circuit Courts of the State of Illinois. Conversely, if this Court should determine that the Hartford does not owe a duty to defend or indemnify, then no problem of enforcement is encountered. In Struve v. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, 303 N.E.2d 32, the Court stated:

“Regardless of the relief sought, the Plaintiff has made claim against the State, founded on a contract. These claims should be resolved in the Court of Claims and, therefore, the Trial Court properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint, and accordingly, we affirm the action of the Circuit Court of Rock Island County.”

In the case of G. H. Sternberg and Company v. Bond, 333 N.E.2d 261, an interlocutory appeal was taken from an order of the Circuit Court of Madison County, which temporarily enjoined the defendant from enforcing contract rights against the plaintiff under a construction contract entered into between the plaintiff under a construction contract entered into between the plaintiff and the State. The Appellate Court for the Fifth District reversed the Circuit Court order, dissolved the injunction, and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. The Appellate Court held that the Circuit Court was without jurisdiction to entertain the suit or issue the injunction, and that the case should have been brought in the Court of Claims.

In the present case, the Hartford has chosen this forum to present the issue of whether or not the Hartford should be bound to defend and indemnify the State of Illinois in the case of Daniel Hodge v. State. A determination of those issues must necessarily involve and be determined by an interpretation of the applicable provisions of the policy of insurance to which the State is a party. It therefore appears that the claim of the Hartford is founded upon a contract. Therefore, this Court should decide the issue presented.

In paragraph 4(a) of the terms and conditions of said policy (located on page 4 of the policy), it is provided as follows:

“In the event of an occurrence, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable information with respect to the time, place and circumstances thereof, and the names and addresses of the injured and of available witnesses, shall be given by or for the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable.”

Paragraph 4(b) of the same section provides as follows:

“If claim is made or suit is brought against the insured, the insured shall immediately forward to the company every demand, notice, summons or other process received by him or his representative.”

It was stipulated by the parties that the notice of injury filed by Daniel Hodge was received at the Attorney General’s office on June 7, 1974, in Springfield, Illinois. On November 24, 1975, Daniel Hodge filed a suit against the State of Illinois in the Court of Claims.

On March 15, 1977, the State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, for the first time, mailed a notice of this occurrence to the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company at its office in Peoria, Illinois. Representatives of the Hartford began an investigation of the claim and occurrence on April 5, 1977, (McGuire deposition, page 8). The Hartford’s investigators were not able to physically inspect Claimant’s vehicle after the accident and were not able to find any witnesses who might have confirmed the allegation that Claimant had been drinking excessively on the evening of the accident, and was not able to examine the roadway for a possible dropoff soon after the accident (McGuire deposition, page 55).

In City of Chicago v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 260 N.E.2d276 at page 278, it was revealed that the City of Chicago contended that late notice of a claim to an insurance company did not relieve the insurance company of its obligation to furnish a defense for three reasons: First, because the policy was issued to protect a municipality in the discharge of a governmental function and was therefore subject to the public policy of conserving public assets. Second, the delay was excusable under the circumstances, since the policy had not been filed in the appropriate municipality office. And third, because the insurance company was not prejudiced by the delay, since there had been an extensive investigation of the accident by other insurance companies as well as the employer of the injured man, the injured man’s lawyers and the City of Chicago itself.

The Court, in the City of Chicago case, supra, set forth the following at page 278:

“As to the first contention, contrary to the City’s position, we deem it of no significance that the insured in this case is a municipal corporation. The City’s argument misapprehends the issue in this case. The City of Chicago, to the extent that it is a named insured under a liability policy, is a contracting party.”

The Court went on to say:

“The City entered into an insurance contract containing several commonly used and clearly understood clauses. The insurance company, as a part of its insurance contract, was entitled to insist on notice of an accident “as soon as practicable” and notice of claim or suit “immediately.”

The Court then went on to state, “The City argues, however, that these contract terms do not apply to it since they operate to violate the principle of conserving public assets.” After further comment, the Court concluded at page 279, “The City must be bound by the contract and grant it has made, and had authority to make, the same as would an individual.” The Court then went on to state, at page 279, “Appellant’s second contention that the delay was excusable under the circumstances, since the policy was misfiled, is likewise without merit. The fact of the matter is that the policy was filed with the Engineering Department. Whether this constitutes misfiling is a matter of conjecture.” The Court then went on to state: “There is nothing to indicate that the policy was stolen or lost; nor is there any explanation or excuse offered as to why the policy was with the Engineering Department instead of the Comptroller’s Office. If the policy was merely filed with the wrong department and if no search was made for it beyond a routine inquiry with the Comptroller’s Office, the fault, if any, lies with the City.” Finally, at page 280, the Court states: “Appellant’s third contention that the Trial Court should not have found for the defendant without a showing by the defendant that it was prejudiced by the delay is not supported by any cases which have been called to our attention.”

The last part of the policy of insurance above quoted specifically makes compliance with the terms of the policy a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action against the company. In such cases where the giving of notice and forwarding of suit papers have specifically been made conditions precedent to a right of action against the insurer, “We find the authorities overwhelmingly in favor of giving full recognition to such provision, in which case the presence or absence of prejudice resulting from a delay in giving notice becomes immaterial.” Citing State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Cassinello, Nev. 227, 216 P.2d 606, 18 A.L.R.2d 471, 441 (1950).

“The issue is not whether the insured has been prejudiced but, rather, whether reasonable notice has been given.” Citing Country Mutual Casualty Co. v. Van Duzen, 351, Ill. App. 113, 113 N.E.2d 852; Simmon v. Iowa Mutual Casualty Co., 3 Ill. 2d, 318; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hoffman, 21 Ill. App. 2d, 314.

Obviously, there is no requirement that an insurer show prejudice because of late notice, although in the instant case prejudice has been shown. Further, the delay of almost three years in giving notice in itself would be obvious prejudice.

Numerous other cases support the position of plaintiff in this declaratory judgment action that it be relieved of any obligation to the State of Illinois relative to the Hodge suit. In Greater Chicago Auction, Inc. v. Abram v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 67; 323 N.E.2d 818, the Court at 820 in referring to a notice provision containing the words “as soon as practicable” stated: “A notice provision is clear and unambiguous and clearly imposes a duty on the insurer to notify the insured.” It then went on to quote from International Harvester Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 Ill. App. 2d 467 and stated: “A notice provision such as this is not to be considered as a technical requirement included in policies merely for the convenience of the insurance company. Rather it is a matter of substance imposing a valid prerequisite to coverage. Upon the happening of an accident, a prompt, as distinguished from a delayed, investigation of the facts of the occurrence can so greatly affect the efficiency of the defense as to change the very character of the risk insured. It follows, therefore, that the notice requirements of a policy apply not only to the named insured but also to the unnamed additional insureds under an omnibus clause.”

In Sowinski v. Ramey, 36 Ill. App. 3d 690; 344 N.E.2d 635, the Court stated at page 638 of its opinion: “An insurance policy is a contract, and where the provisions of that contract are clear and unambiguous and neither illegal nor against public policy, they should be enforced by the Courts. The provisions of the policy in the instant case accord with all these criteria. It is abundantly clear from the record that the defendant did not provide the notice or the assistance that he was contractually obliged to provide to the garnishee.”

Finally, in Walsh v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 91 Ill. App. 2d 156, 234 N.E.2d 394, the Court concluded that the trial judge could reasonably conclude from the evidence adduced that the plaintiff had, under all circumstances, acted in a reasonable manner in notifying the company of the accident when she did, which was one month after the accident. The Court concluded that 30 days could, under the circumstances there adduced, be termed reasonable. The Court further stated, however, at page 399 that: “This phrase was construed by the Court in London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Shafter, 35 F. Supp. 647 to mean that notice of the accident must be given to the insurer within a reasonable time; and whether notice was given within a reasonable time is dependent upon all the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The purpose of such notice requirement in an insurance policy is to provide the insurance company with an adequate opportunity to investigate the accident and prepare its defense.”

Respondent argues that the State should not be prejudiced by the mistakes of its employees, and that the State enjoys a special position which should render it immune from the effect of Claimant’s argument. The Respondent cites the example that the State is never estopped due to apparent authority of its agents Dement v. Rokker, 126 Ill. 174, 199, Schoenig v. State, 11 Ill.Ct.Cl. 634,639). Also, the statute of limitations need not be specially pleaded by the State inasmuch as not even the Attorney General has the power to waive or arrest the statute McChesney v. Becker, 4 Ill.Ct.Cl.5).

Respondent argues that public policy and the propensity of Courts to construe insurance policy coverage questions against the insurer should relieve the State of its obligation to defend itself in the present case. We do not find Respondent’s arguments convincing on the issues at bar.

It is clear that the State violated the contractual provision which bound it to give reasonable notice of occurrences or suits to its insurer. Further, the record demonstrates that the State’s insurer was prejudiced by the lack of notice to which it would otherwise have been entitled (see deposition of McGuire.) Therefore, the Hartford should be relieved of its obligation to defend or indemnify the State of Illinois in Daniel Hodge v. State of Illinois.

The Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims against the State founded upon any contract entered into with the State of Illinois. The insurance policy in question is a contract between the Hartford and the State of Illinois. The claims of the Hartford are based upon its contract and the particular provisions thereof. The Court of Claims does have jurisdiction to declare the rights of the parties in the present case under the terms of the contract between the Hartford arid the State of Illinois.

The insurance policy in question requires that notice be given by the insured (State of Illinois) of occurrences coming under the terms of the liability coverage and further that notice of suit be given immediately by the State to its insurer. The State wholly failed in its contractual obligation to give the notices required by the contract of insurance to the Hartford Insurance Company.

This Court is of the opinion that the obligation on the part of the State to notify the Hartford Insurance Company was completely ignored and that by such act in failing to notify the insurance company as required by the policy, the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company has no obligation to defend or indemnify the State of Illinois, and that said insurance company is relieved of any liability as a result of the failure of the State to comply with its obligations under said policy.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0872
    Anthony Best, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 25, 1978.

   Polos, C.J.

Claimant, Anthony Best, formerly an inmate of the Joliet Correctional Center at Joliet, Illinois, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property which he alleges were lost during the course of its transfer from the Cook County Jail to the Joliet Correctional Center.

On February 4,1977, Claimant was confined at the Cook County Jail in Chicago, Illinois, prior to transfer to the Joliet Correctional Center at Joliet, Illinois. He had in his possession certain items of personal property including a watch, wallet, credit cards, personal papers, a small amount of cash, and a necklace.

Immediately prior to his beginning his journey to Joliet, these items were put in a personal property envelope and carried on a bus, along with Claimant, to the diagnostic depot at Joliet. An officer of the Illinois Department of Corrections had custody of Claimant’s personal property during the bus trip to Joliet.

On arrival at Joliet, Claimant requested that his personal property be sent home. Claimant has attached as an exhibit to his Complaint an “Official Receipt” issued by the Joliet Correctional Center for his watch and wallet. The receipt indicates that the watch and wallet were to be mailed to a relative of Claimant in Chicago, and the receipt was signed by Claimant and an officer of the Department of Corrections.

Claimant’s Aunt received his wallet, but not his watch.

Claimant purchased the watch at Simon’s Jewelry Store in Omaha, Nebraska for $180.60. He said that on February 4, 1977, it was in good working order.

This Court held in Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, (No. 75-CC-833), decided November 7, 1977, that the State has a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard and return an inmate’s property when it takes actual physical possession of such property during the course of the transfer of an inmate between penal institutions.

While bailment is ordinarily a voluntary contractual transaction between bailor and bailee, various types of constructive and involuntary bailments have been recognized:

“A constructive bailment can be created between an owner of the property and one in possession thereof.” 4A Illinois Law and Practice 550, Bailments, citing Chesterfield Sewer & Water, Inc., v. Citizens Insurance Co. of New Jersey, et al., 57 Ill. App. 2d 90, 207 NE2d 84.

In Chesterfield, the Court quotes from Woodson v. Hare, 244 Ala. 301, 13 So2d. 172, at 174, as follows:

“An actual contract or one implied in fact is not always necessary to create a bailment. Where, otherwise than by mutual contract of bailment, one person has lawfully acquired the possession of personal property of another and holds it under circumstances whereby he ought, upon principles of justice, to keep it safely and restore it or deliver it to the owner, such person and the owner of the property are, by operation of law, generally treated as bailee and bailor under a contract of bailment, irrespective of whether or not there has been any mutual assent, express or implied, to such relationship.”

The loss or damage to bailed property while in the possession of the bailee raises a presumption of negligence which the bailee must rebut by evidence of due care. The effect of this rule is not to shift the ultimate burden of proof from the bailor to the bailee, but simply to shift the burden of proceeding or going forward with the evidence.

At the trial of this cause the State presented no testimony to explain the disappearance of Claimant’s property, and presented no testimony of its freedom from negligence.

Claimant’s prima facie case, therefore, stands unrebutted.

It is therefore ordered, that Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of $180.60.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0921

      Order filed August 15, 1977.

    Michael Smith, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl. , this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0935
    Mark Lewellen, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed August 19, 1977.
   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1013
    Eadie E. Skaggs, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed August 15, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1016
    Ellis K. Henderson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed. August 19, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois,

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1020
    Floyd Luckie, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed August 15, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1076
    Marvin Carter, Jr., Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 24, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This cause coming to be heard on the motion of the Respondent to dismiss, due notice being given, and the Court being fully advised;

Finds that the Claimant has received an amount in excess of the statutory limit on damages allowable in this Court on the basis of a loan agreement executed by a joint tortfeasor in favor of the Claimant. The Claimant is entitled to one satisfaction and the recovery of an amount in excess of the statutory limit on damages in this Court is a bar to further recovery of damages in this Court. See, Powers v. State, 28 Ill.Ct. Cl. 130, 131 (1972); William v. State, 25 Ill.Ct.Cl. 249, 255 (1965); and Laboda v. State, 24 Ill.Ct.Cl. 172, 176 (1961).

It is hereby ordered that the motion of the Respondent to dismiss be, and the same is hereby granted and the cause is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1162
    Alfred L. Martin, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 7, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1213
    Leon Miles, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 5, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1245
    Charles Washington, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1246
    Stepehn A. Johnson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1265
    Percy Anderson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1298
    Cathy Yeaman, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 27, 1977

   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties and the Court being fully advised in the premises find that the evidence, as presented by the Record, although circumstantial, indicates that the Claimant’s automobile was damaged by a tractor belonging to the State of Illinois while the Claimant’s automobile was parked in a designated parking area.

It is therefore ordered that the Claimant be awarded the sum of $123.61.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1413
    Angel Calderon, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 7, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1487
    John Tebbens, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 17, 1978

   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court on a motion filed by Respondent to dismiss said cause.

The complaint seeks to recover travel expenses which were incurred in fiscal year 1975, from May through June 1975, in the amount of $894.84. Claimant submitted a voucher for this amount on July 30, 1975, by which time the amount left in the travel appropriation was only $486.52, causing Claimant’s reimbursement to be $408.32 less than his request.

The remaining amount of the claim, $743.95, was part of a request for travel expenses totalling $1,454.66, submitted for travel during fiscal year 1976. Of the total amount, $743.95 was determined by the Commission to be in excess of the allowable maximum. On December 8, 1976, the Commission reconsidered its decision and allowed Claimant the $743.95. By this time, the travel expense appropriation had not only lapsed but had been depleted as well.

Therefore, in regard to the amount of $408.32, the travel fund’s total depletion for the fiscal year of 1975 prevented payment; in regard to the amount of $743.95, payment was denied not only because of depletion of funds for fiscal year 1976, but because the funds had lapsed, as shown by the departmental report.

The Respondent cited the case of Fergus v. Brady, 277 Ill. 272, and the case of Schutte & Koerting Co., et al v. State of Illinois, 22 Ill.Ct.Cl. 591, in which this Court held that “the legislature was expressly enjoined by Sec. 19 of Art. IV of the Illinois Constitution from appropriating a sum of money to pay a claim previously incurred in excess of an appropriation.”

The Court also cited the case of Fergus u. Russell, 277 Ill. 20 at page 25:

“The Court of Claims is a statutory body not provided for in the Constitution, and its action can have no effect upon the power of the legislature to pay claims against the State. If the legislature has no such power in any case, favorable action by the Court of Claims would not give the legislature power to pay such claim by making appropriations therefor.”

Motion to dismiss is hereby granted and this cause is dismissed.