author: ScHUMAN, C. J.

text:
    (No. 4276
    Leah G. King, widow, et al, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 19, 1950.

    Russell J. Topper, Attorney for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General'; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   ScHUMAN, C. J.

Claim was filed herein on March 6, 1950, by Leah G. King for the death of her husband, Merrill B. King, as a result of injuries sustained in an accident on January 20, 1950.

There are no. jurisdictional questions raised and it is admitted by the respondent that proper notice was given, and within the time as provided by statute.

The decedent, Merrill B. King, was employed by the Department of Labor of the State of Illinois as an Unemployment Compensation Offices’ Supervisor. King was Supervisor of area VII, which included eight local offices, serving thirty counties in central and southeastern Illinois. Among these local offices are those, at Decatur, his headquarters; Springfield, Jacksonville and itinerant points, including Winchester, Illinois.

On January 20, 1950, decedent was fifty-two (52) years old, married to claimant and living with her'. She had no dependent children, and was dependent on him for her support. His earnings at that time were $481.00 per month, and in the year preceding the injury he had received more than $5,000.00 as salary.

The evidence and the departmental report discloses the following. On January 20, 1950, at approximately 7:10 o’clock P.M., decedent was enroute from Jacksonville to Springfield, Illinois, for a business conference with Mr. J. A. Fleming, Unemployment Compensation Office Manager at Springfield, which conference had been arranged the previous day. The decedent, while driving east on Illinois Highway No. 36 at a point in the 600 block of Morton Avenue in the City of Jacksonville, Illinois, struck the rear end of a large transport truck parked on the' south side of said street. Both the truck and car' had lights burning. The impact attracted the attention of Dale Bond, who was some distance west of the scene of the accident, and he immediately went to the car to render assistance. He found Mr. King slumped in the seat, and he immediately felt his pulse, which he found to be rather strong. The witness then called for the police and an ambulance. When the ambulance arrived, he noticed that the pulse was either weak or entirely gone. The decedent was taken to Our Saviour’s Hospital in Jacksonville, and apparently after death was seen by Dr. Paul B. Hartley, who stated that in his opinion King died from a crushing injury to the chest. No post mortem was performed at that time.

Later on April 18, 1950, the body of decedent was exhumed, and an autopsy was performed at the Fessant Funeral Home at Bridgeport, Illinois, by Dr. Dennis B. Dorsey and Dr. George Y. McClure, pathologists. Dr. Dorsey was of the opinion that death was caused by a crushing injury to the anterior chest wall with trauma to the base of the heart, causing cardiac arrest. Dr. McClure stated that there was a sudden death as a result of cardiac arrest, caused by a crushing blow to the chest directly over the heart.

It was admitted by the respondent, through the Department of Labor, in the Departmental Report that the decedent was on official business, and in traveling status at the time of the accident, and that subsistence mileage allowances were in effect until his return to his official o station of assignment at Decatur.

From the undisputed facts in this record, there could only be one conclusion in this case, and that is that the claimant is entitled to an award for the death of her husband, as a result of accidental injuries he received while in the course of his employment for the respondent on January 20, 1950.

The Court finds that Hugo Antonacci has rendered a statement for stenographic sérvices in the amount of $70.00, which charge is found to be fair and reasonable.

An award is, therefore, made in favor of Leah G. King, widow of Merrill B. King, deceased, in the amount of $6,000.00, to be paid to her as follows:

$765.00 which has accrued to September 15, 1950, and the balance of $5,235.00, payable in weekly installments of $22.50 each week for 232 weeks, commencing on September 22, 1950, with an additional final payment of $15.00.

All future payments are subject to the terms and conditions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Illinois.

The jurisdiction of this cause is specifically reserved for the entry of such further orders as may from time to time be necessary.

An award is also entered in favor of Hugo Antonacci for stenographic services in the amount of $70.00, which is payable forthwith.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor, as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Delaney, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 4277
    Keith Porter, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 19, 1950.

    McCollum-and McCollum, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Delaney, J.

On March 8, 1949, the claimant, Keith Porter, employed by the respondent in the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, as a Highway section man, was assigned to mix gravel and bituminous material, which was to be used in patching broken places in pavement surfaces. This was done by first drying the gravel in a power-driven rotary drum heated mixer, and after the gravel was properly dried, the bituminous material was added and mixed with the gravel. The work was being done at a Division storage lot approximately one mile west of Flora in Clay County.

At approximately 1:00 P.M., a charge of gravel was being dried in the mixer, when the claimant, Keith Porter, reached into the mixer to secure a sample of the gravel to test for dryness. As he reached into the mixer, the revolving blades caught his right hand, and crushed it between the mixer drum and one of the blades.

After releasing his hand, Mr. Porter went to Dr. E. D. Foss, Flora, Illinois, for treatment, and reported his injury to the Division the same day.

On March 28, 1949, Dr. Foss made the following o report:

“Nature of Injury — Wound, lacerated, multiple, hand, right, severe. Treatment — Cleansing, irrigation and primary closure of the lacerations with non-absorbable suture material following debridement. Penicillin in oil, daily, and tetanus antitoxin administered. Sterile dressings and immobilization of the hand. As of this date, wounds are healing nicely except for small are.a of slough near 4th finger that will not demand skin graft. Some edema and stiffness of hand. Finger exercises to be started. (Tendons to 2 and 4 fingers not lacerated but exposed, causing stiffness.) X-rays — Negative for fractures or dislocation. Estimated date of discharge — April 15, 1949. Estimated date patient able to work — Doing some work now. What permanent disability do you expect? — Possibility of some finger stiffness. Otherwise none.”

Dr. Foss made a subsequent report on April 14, 1949:

“Treatment carried out under general anesthesia. Date patient was discharged — April 14, 1949. Date able to work — App. April 1, 1949. Permanent disability — Some stiffness of fingers of right hand at present with slight edema which should resolve or the most part at least with use of the fingers and hot soaks. All wounds completely healed. Temporary disability when discharged — None.”

At the time of the accident, claimant and respondent were operating under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of this State, and claim for compensation was made within the time provided by the Act. The accident arose out of and in the course of claimant’s employment. No claim is made for temporary total disability, nor for medical expenses, which were paid by the respondent. Claim, however, is made for total permanent disability.

Claimant was 30 years of age, married, and had two . children under 16 years of age dependent upon him for support at the time of the accident.

He was first employed by the Division on March 3, 1949, as a Highway section man at a salary of $203.00 a month. His classification and salary rate remained the same, and he worked continuously from the date of his employment until his injury on March 8, 1949. Other Division employees, working in the same classification as Mr. Porter, worked continuously through the year, arid earned $2,236.00 a year. His compensation rate is, therefore, the maximum of $15.00; since he had two children under the age of 16 years dependent upon him for support at the time of the accident, the weekly maximum rate is increased to $16.00 per week. The injury, having occurred after July 1,1947, this must be increased 30 per cent, making a compensation rate of $20.80 per week.

From the medical testimony, and the personal observations of the Commissioner of this Court, we are of the opinion that, as a result of the accident on March 8, 1949, claimant has suffered a 50 per cent partial, permanent loss of use of the first finger of his right hand, being 20 weeks; and a 50 per cent partial, permanent-loss of use of the third finger of his right hand, being 12% weeks.

An award is, therefore, made in favor of claimant, Keith Porter, for the sum of $416.00 for the first finger of right hand, and for the sum of $260.00 for the third finger of right hand, or a total of $676.00. The respondent has paid the claimant the sum of $25.04 as an overpayment for non-productive time from March 9, 1949 to March 15, 1949. This amount must be deducted from the claimant’s award. This would make a total award due claimant of $650.96, all of which has accrued and is payable forthwith.

The testimony at the hearing before Commissioner Frank Summers was taken and transcribed by Marian McKnelly, who has submitted a statement for her services in the amount of $10.00, payable forthwith.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


author: Lansden, J.

text:
    (No. 4281
    Charles K. Motz, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 19, 1950.

    Gordon E. Winders, Attorney for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C.. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Lansden, J.

Claimant, Charles K. Motz, proceeds under the Workmen’s Compensation Act to recover from respondent for the loss of his right thumb, as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment as highway section man’s helper in the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings.

On April 18, 1949, claimant and his immediate superior were unable to start the truck assigned to them, which truck was stored at a leased lot in Wataga, Knox County, Illinois. So that work could be done on the motor, the hood was removed. While replacing the hood, it slipped, and caught claimant’s right thumb between it and the truck body.

Although his thumb pained him, claimant worked two days, but then saw a doctor who, by X-Rays, discovered a dislocation and fracture of the distal phalange. Between the time of the injury and the first examination of the thumb by a doctor, a traumatic arterial occlusion or thrombosis developed with gangrene in the distal phalange. Although efforts were made to save the thumb, not only the distal phalange but also the proximal phalanges became seriously, damaged by the gangrene, especially the tendon structures, and the soft and surrounding tissues. It became necessary to amputate the thumb on May 21, 1949, leaving approximately one-half to one-third of the proximal phalange.

No jurisdictional questions are involved, and respondent has paid for all medical treatment and hospitalization required.

In 1947, Section 8 (e) (6) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act was amended to read as follows:

“The loss of the first or distal phalanx of the thumb or of any finger shall be considered to be equal to the loss of one-half of such thumb or finger and the compensation payable shall be one-half of the amount above specified; provided that the amputation of the entire distal phalanx of a thumb Or finger proximal to the distal joint at the reasonable point of election for amputation of such phalanx shall be considered to be the loss of one phalanx only.”

Such amendment apparently negatives the effect of. Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Ind. Com., 399 Ill. 76, which was based on the section as it read prior to the 1947 amendment.

Respondent apparently predicated its defense on the above quoted section, but the testimony of respondent’s doctor, and X-Rays introduced in evidence rendered such section inapplicable. The point of election for amputation was made not for the purpose.of determining where the distal phalange should be severed, but where the proximal phalange should be severed to leave the remainder of the thumb unaffected by gangrene. Claimant lost by amputation not only the distal phalange, but also the proximal phalange, and is, therefore, entitled to an award under Section 8 (e) (1) (7) for the permanent and complete loss of his right thumb. This case is very close on the facts with Aeschleman v. State, No. 4153, opinion filed July 8, 1949, and we follow such case in holding claimant is entitled to an award.

On the date of his accident claimant was 64 years of age, married, but had no children under 16 years of age dependent upon him for support.'

. In the year prior to his accident, claimant earned from respondent $2,160.00, and his rate of compensation is, therefore, $19.50 per week.

Claimant was totally disabled from April 20 to and including June 26, 1949, or nine and five-sevenths weeks. For the period of temporary total disability claimant was paid $276.14 when he should have been paid only $189.43. He was thus overpaid $86.71.

Martha M. Tracy, Galesburg, Illinois, was employed to take and transcribe the testimony before Commissioner Wise. Her charges amounting to $19.50 are fair and reasonable, and an award is entered in her favor for such amount. ,

An award is entered in favor of claimant, Charles K. Motz, under Section 8 (e) (1) (7) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act for 70 weeks at $19.50 for the complete and permanent loss of his right thumb in the amount of $1,365.00, from which should be deducted the overpayment of $86.71, leaving a net award of $1,278.29, all of which has accrued and is payable forthwith.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of ifAn Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


author: SCHUMAN, C. J.

text:
    (No. 4285
    Phillips Petroleum Co., a Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 19, 1950.

    Blum and Jacobson, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nbbel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   SCHUMAN, C. J.

The claimant, Phillips Petroleum Company, a corporation, furnished the Division of Highways, Bureau of Construction of the State of Illinois, certain products on June 22, 1949, amounting to the sum of $27.63; and the Department of Maintenance of the State of Illinois certain products from March 21 through August 31,1949, all as listed per exhibits attached to their claim, totalling $75.50.

The Departmental Report indicates that of this total $3.50 was paid direct to the individual service station, leaving the amount of $72.00, which is due.

It was stipulated between the parties that the materials in the amount of $72.00 were furnished to the State, but were not paid because of the automatic date of lapse of appropriation.

For the reasons stated in Case No. 4299, The Haloid Co., a Corp., an award is entered in favor of the claimant in the sum of $72.00.


text:
    (No. 4286
    Dewey E. Stowe, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 19, 1950.
    Dewey E. Stowe, Claimant, pro se.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C.. Abthub, Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Lansden, J.

Claimant, Dewey E. Stowe, seeks to recover from respondent for the loss of his right index finger as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as a highway section man in the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings.

On June 6, 1949, claimant was operating a power mower along State Aid Route No. 18 in Iroquois County. The cutter bar on such mower slipped out of operating alignment, and, while trying to place the cutter bar in operating position, the sickle in the cutter bar moved, catching claimant’s right index finger.

The soft tissues of such finger were severely lacerated, all tendons thereof were severed, and the third phalanx of the finger was fractured. On July 11, 1949, after the splint was removed, claimant, who had been instructed by his attending physician to do so, was forcibly exercising his finger, and, in so doing, the sutured tendons were torn apart, and the finger refractured. As a result of this therapeutic misfortune, claimant’s right index finger became deformed, swollen, painful in some portions, numb in others, and useless. In fact, the finger interfered with the function of claimant’s right hand as a whole.

On August 24, 1949, claimant’s right index finger was amputated at its base where said finger joined the palm of his hand, or in medical terminology at the metatarsophalangeal joint.

No jurisdictional questions are involved, and claimant is entitled to an award under Section 8 (e) (2) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act for the permanent and complete loss of his first or index finger. Respondent has furnished and paid for all medical treatment and hospitalization required.

On the date of his injury claimant was 50 years of age, married, but had no children under 16 years of age dependent upon him for support. . 1

Claimant had worked for respondent only since February 18,1949, at a salary of $203.00 per month, and until his injury had received $729.35. However, under Section 10 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, claimant is held to have earned considerably in excess of $1,560.00 per year, and his rate of compensation is, therefore, $19.50 per week.

Claimant was totally disabled from the date of his injury to and including June 19, 1949, on August 15, 1949, and from August 24 through September 11, 1949. At all other times claimant performed services for respondent, and was paid full salary. For the 33 day period of temporary total disability claimant was paid $150.23 when he should have been paid only $91.93. He was thus overpaid $58.30.

Juanita O. Craig, Danville, Illinois, was employed to take and transcribe the testimony before Commissioner Wise. Her charges amounting to $21.30 are fair and reasonable, and an award is entered in her favor for such amount.

An award is entered in favor of claimant, Dewey E. Stowe, under1 Section 8(e) (2) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act for 40 weeks at $19.50 for the complete and permanent loss of his first or index finger in the amount of $780.00, from which should be deducted the overpayment of $58.30, leaving a net award of $721.70, all of which has accrued and is payable forthwith.

The award is subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


author: ScHTJMAÍT, C. J. SCHUMAN, C. J.

text:
    (No. 4288
    Bessie Marie Joplin, et al, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 19, 1950.

      Supplemental opinion filed April 10, 1951.

    Paul R. Goldman and Irving M. Greenfield, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; William H. Sumpter, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   ScHTJMAÍT, C. J.

Complaint was filed herein on April 3, 1950, by Bessie Marie Joplin, widow of Leslie Earl Joplin, on behalf of herself as surviving widow, and her two' minor children, for the death of the said Leslie Earl Joplin, which occurred on March 10, 1950.

No jurisdictional questions are involved.

The decedent was employed by the Department of Public Welfare at the Kankakee State Hospital as a fireman in a supervisory capacity, and was transferred from the Jacksonville State Hospital to the Kankakee State Hospital on September 19, 1949. His salary was $355.00 per month, and his earnings in the year preceding death were above the maximum.

On March 10, 1950, the decedent reported for work at the- hospital on the afternoon and evening shift, and at approximately 5:45 o’clock P.M. he was found in the coal bunker covered with coal with only one foot sticking out of the coal pile. His body was recovered from beneath approximately seven tons of coal, and he was dead. Mr. Alfred Bergner, Chief Engineer of the hospital, testified that decedent worked under his supervision and direction; that it was the duty of decedent to supervise the men under him; and that his work required him to be at the place of the accident. There were no eye witnesses to the accident. Mr. Bergner and other men reached him shortly after the accident.

On date of March 10, 1950, decedent was forty-one (41) years of age, married, and had two children under the age of sixteen years dependent upon him for support, to-wit, Leslie D. Joplin born January 7, 1935, and Margaret Ella Joplin, born December 11, 1937.

Claimant is, therefore, entitled to an award in the ■amount of $7,500.00.

William J. Cleary & Co. has rendered a statement for stenographic services in the amount of $29.35, which charge is found to be fair and reasonable.

An award is, therefore, entered in favor of the claimant, Bessie Marie Joplin, widow of Leslie Earl Joplin, deceased, and Leslie Daniel Joplin and Margaret Ella Joplin, minor children of Leslie Earl Joplin, deceased, °in the sum of $7,500.00. Of this amount the sum of $648.00 has accrued to September 15, 1950, and is payable forthwith. The remainder amounting to the sum of $6,852.00 is payable in weekly installments of $24.00 per week beginning September 22, 1950 for a period of 285 weeks, with an additional final payment of $12.00.

An award is entered in favor of William J. Cleary & Co. for stenographic services in the amount of $29.35, which is payable forthwith.

All future payments are subject to the terms and conditions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Illinois.

The jurisdiction of this case is specifically reserved for the entry of such further orders as may from time to time be necessary.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor, as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”

Supplemental Opinion

SCHUMAN, C. J.

In an opinion heretofore filed in this cause on September 19, 1950, an award was entered in favor of the • claimant, Bessie Marie Joplin, widow of Leslie Earl Joplin, deceased, and Leslie Daniel Joplin and Margaret Ella Joplin, minor children of Leslie Earl Joplin, deceased.

A petition to modify the opinion and award was filed on the ground that the widow had remarried; A Motion to Dismiss the Petition to Modify the Opinion was filed on behalf of the said Bessie Marie Joplin, and said minor children. The said Bessie Marie Joplin, and the said minor children have also filed a Petition for Increase of Compensation due to vexatious delay. The matters above stated in this paragraph were argued orally before the Court.

The Court is requested to interpret Paragraph (a) of Section 7 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act with reference to the rights of the widow, now remarried, to compensation in the event the two minor children should die before the award is fully paid.

There can be no question that the Court, under the Compensation Act, has the authority to retain jurisdiction to modify the award from time to time with respect to the persons to whom shall be paid the amount of said award remaining unpaid at the time of the modification.

There being no dispute as to the remarriage of the widow, the award will be modified. However, the Court retains jurisdiction of this cause to determine the rights of the widow, if any, in the event the said minor children should die before the- full award is paid. The Court, specifically finds that at the .time of the death of the said Leslie Earl Joplin, the widow, Bessie Marie Joplin, and the minor children, Leslie Daniel Joplin and Margaret Ella Joplin, were members of the class defined under said Paragraph (a) of Section 7.

The unpaid balance ■ under the award is in the amount of $6,708.00. The Petition, under paragraph (k) of Section 19 of the Compensation' Act, is denied.

The award heretofore entered in this cause is hereby modified as follows:

The balance of the award of $6,708.00 is payable to Leslie Daniel Joplin and Margaret Ella Joplin, minor children of Leslie Earl Joplin, deceased, by and through their next friend, natural guardian, and mother, Bessie Marie Wielgus; and said sum is payable as follows:

(a) The sum of $562.29, which has accrued to April 10, 1951, is payable forthwith.
(b) The balance of $6,145.71 is payable in 256 weekly installments of $24.00 commencing April 17, 1951, and one final "payment of $1.71.

Jurisdiction of this award is hereby reserved for the purpose of determining to whom the balance of the award should be paid in the event that said minor children should die leaving a balance of said award unpaid, and for such further orders as may from time to time be necessary.


author: SCHUMAK, C. J.

text:
    (No. 4294
    George Bain, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 19, 1950.
    Mark C. Keller, Attorney for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; William H. Sumpter, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   SCHUMAK, C. J.

George Bain, claimant, employed by the Department of Public Welfare as an operating engineer at the Dixon State Hospital, was injured in an accident at said hospital on-May 2, 1949. Notice of the accident was given immediately to his supervisor, partial medical services were afforded him, and compensation was paid by the department. The claim was filed on April 20, 1950. It was stipulated that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment, and all statutory requirements have been met.

In his complaint, .claimant asked an allowance for temporary total disability, and for reimbursement for certain doctor and hospital services incurred by him, and for certain necessary trips made to Chicago, Illinois.

The facts disclose that on May 2, 1949, while claimant was working on or about a truck, the heavy end-gate fell down, because the iron pin holding it in place became loose and. fell out, and in lifting and replacing the end-gate, which weighed approximately 200 pounds, claimant twisted and injured his back causing a 5th lumbar slipped disc condition. He was first attended by the doctors at the Dixon State Hospital, and later at the Illinois Research Hospital where an operation was performed on his back. Claimant has made a good recovery from the operation, and, at the time of the hearing, stated that he had returned to work on July 17, 1950; that he was performing most of his duties; and, that his back condition was steadily improving. He is making no claim for permanent disability or partial disability or specific loss.

On the date of the accident claimant was forty-six (46) years of age, married, but had no dependent children. His earnings ■ in the year preceding injury were $3,660.00.

Claimant was totally disabled from May 2, 1949 to July 17, 1950, the date he returned to work. During that period he was paid one month’s full salary-of $305.00, 60 per cent of $305.00 for one month, and 60 per cent of $355.00 for four months, making a total payment during his period of disability of $1,340.00. He was given a pay increase effective July 1, 1949 to the. higher amount. Claimant was totally disabled for a .period of sixty-two and five sevenths (62 5/7) weeks. He should have received in compensation for said period, at the rate of $19.50 per week, the total sum of $1,222.93, and has, therefore, received all compensation for temporary total disability.

Claimant expended for doctor and hospital services the following: Drs. Charles H. and Robert T. Lesage, $33.00; Dixon Public Hospital, $44.30; Illinois Research Hospital, $11.50. In addition, it was necessary that he make six trips from Dixon to Chicago, and tie is asking for bus fare and cab fare on these trips at $10.25 each, making a total of $61.50.

The Court finds that Helen Heckman has rendered stenographic services in the amount of $26.25, which charge is found to be fair and.reasonable.

An award is, therefore, entered in favor of the claimant, George Bain, in the amount of $150.30.

An award is also entered in favor of Helen Heck-man for stenographic services in the amount of $26.25, which is payable forthwith.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor, as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


text:
    (No. 4299
    The Haloid Company, a Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 19, 1950.

    Hoff and Hoff, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   ScHUMAN, C. J.

The claimant, The Haloid Company, a corporation, on various dates, commencing with the 4th day of May, 1949 to and including the 27th day of May, 1949, furnished supplies to the Division of Vital Statistics and Records of the State of Illinois in the amount of $541.29.

A report has been filed by the Director of Finance that the material was furnished as claimed by the claimant, and received by the Department, but payment was not cleared before the lapse in appropriation in the 65th Biennium. Claimant comes before this Court upon stipulation waiving brief and argument.

By the repeated decisions of this Court, it has been held that where the facts are undisputed that the State has received supplies ordered by it in accordance with due authority, a.nd has used the same, and, that the bill therefor was not paid before the lapse of the appropriation out of which it could have been paid, an award for the amount may be made. (Shell Petroleum Co. v. State, 7 C.R.R., 224; Shonkwiler 11 C.C.R. 602, and other cases.)

An award is therefore entered in favor of the claimant, and allowed in the amount of $541.29.


text:
    (No. 4318
    County of Will, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 19, 1950.

    John Irving Peabce, Attorney for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; William H. Sumptee, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Lansden, J.

A special statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Chap. 65, Secs. 37-39, permits a county, within the borders of which is located a State penal or charitable institution, to bring an action in this Court to recover from respondent the necessary expenses incurred by it or its officers by reason of habeas corpus proceedings therein by or on behalf of inmates of such institution, who were not residents of the county at the time of commitment, and who were not committed by any court of such county.

Proceeding under such.statute, claimant, County of Will, State of Illinois, within the borders of which is located the Illinois State Penitentiary, seeks to recover from respondent the sum of $522.00.

Claimant has previously been granted two awards in similar cases under the same statute. County of Will v. State, 18 C.C.R. 189, and No. 4218, opinion filed May 9, 1950. Those cases and County of Randolph v. State, No. 4157, opinion filed February 14, 1950, control this case, and are authorities for an award in this case.

A stipulation of facts has been filed herein, and is hereby approved.

The stipulation discloses that claimant has complied with all statutory prerequisites to recovery. From March 31, 1949, through October 27, 1949, sixty-seven petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus were filed in the Circuit Court of Will County, Illinois, by inmates of the Illinois State Penitentiary, who were not residents of the County of Will, or committed by any court therein. In each case the Clerk of the Circuit Court would be entitled to a fee of $5.00, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Chap. 53, Sec. 31, or a total of $335.00. In addition, in some of these cases the Clerk furnished photostatic copies of court records and documents to petitioners, and, in others, including six wherein petitioners paid the filing fee, a photo static copy of the petition was furnished to the Attorney General of the State of Illinois. The cost of such photostatic copies amounted to $187.00.

Claimant seeks no other reimbursable expenses, but is entitled to an award of the full amount sought.

An award is, therefore, entered in favor of the County of Will, State of Illinois, in the sum of $522.00.


author: Lansdbít, J.

text:
    (No. 4038
    Charlotte Lawrence, Admx., et al, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.

    Krusemark and Krusemark, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; William H. Sumpter, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Lansdbít, J.

On March 28, 1946, George S. Lawrence was employed by respondent as a common laborer in the Division of Highways of the Department of Public Works and Buildings. On that day, while so employed, he was struck by a timber projecting from a State Highway truck below the left knee fracturing the tibia. .

Mr. Lawrence was hospitalized until April 20, 1946, and after several examinations by respondent’s doctors it was found that he was able to return to work on May 19, 1947. Mr. Lawrence did not, however, return to work until October, 1947, but from May to October he worked for about three weeks driving a tractor on a farm ten to twelve hours a day.

From the record, we conclude that Mr. Lawrence was able to return to work on May 19, 1947, and the record further discloses that he was paid compensation for temporary total disability from March 29, 1946, through May 19, 1947, at the rate of $18.00 per week, or the sum of $1,072.24.

Respondent furnished and paid for all medical, surgical and hospital services required to cure and relieve Mr. Lawrence from the effect of his accidental injury, which arose out of and in the course of his employment.

On September 16, 1947, Mr. Lawrence filed a claim in this Court alleging that he was entitled to additional compensation by reason of the injuries sustained as the result of his accident, and a partial hearing of this case was held in December, 1947. Mr. Lawrence at that time was again working for the Division of Highways,' and had worked since the middle of October, 1947, and he continued to work until January 25, 1948, upon which day he died at his home after attending to the furnace therein as a result of a cerebral hemorrhage, complicated by hypertension.

It is apparent from the record that Mr. Lawrence’s claim could only have been predicated on a specific loss of use of his left leg, he neither being totally nor permanently disabled, nor being entitled to compensation for any permanent partial disability, since his earnings after he returned to work' for respondent were at a greater rate than prior to his accident.

This claim for specific loss abated as a result of the death of Mr. Lawrence, Section 8 (e) 19 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, since such claim for specific loss had not been determined at the time of his death. This phase of the case is controlled by Neumann v. Ind. Com., 396 Ill. 224.

After leave first had been requested and obtained, an amended complaint was filed herein on May 12, 1949, substituting Charlotte Lawrence, Administratrix of the Estate of George S. Lawrence, Deceased, as claimant, and the amended complaint was predicated on the fact that the death of George S. Lawrence on January 25, 1948, was attributable to the injury he received on March 28,1946, and that claimant was entitled to a death award.

A doctor testified in behalf of claimant that Mr. Lawrence evidenced marked hypertension after his accident, such hypertension becoming progressively more acute with the result that he finally died as a result thereof. We are not impressed by such testimony, since such doctor was vague, evasive and uncertain. Although he had been the attending physician of Mr. Lawrence in his lifetime, he constantly stated that Mr. Lawrence had sustained the fracture of the fibula of his left leg, when it is undisputed that the fracture was to the tibia. Such doctor submitted six written reports to respondent within approximately one year after Mr. Lawrence was injured, and in such reports there was nó mention made of the fact that Mr. Lawrence evidenced hypertension. This doctor blandly explained such omission on the ground that the information was not requested by the form for reporting, or by any representative of respondent. For such doctor to attach such importance to hypertension, as he did at the last hearing in this case, without ever previously mentioning it, is to tax much too heavily the credulity of this Court.

. A doctor testified for respondent, who obviously was much more qualified in the field of hypertension than was claimant’s doctor,' having observed not less than 2,000 cases, and this doctor, in answer to questions propounded by claimant’s attorney, categorically stated that there would be evidence of hypertension after such injury, but that it would tend to diminish in intensity thereafter.

We, therefore, conclude that there was no causal connection between the accident sustained by George S. Lawrence on March 28, 1946, and his death on January 25, 1948, and we are, therefore, not justified in making, any award in this case.

Sarah C. Boris, Joliet, Illinois, was employed to take and transcribe the testimony at the hearings before Commissioners East and Wise. She has rendered a bill in the amount of $83.25, which amount is reasonable and customary. An award is, therefore, entered in favor of Sarah C. Boris in the amount of $83.25.

An award to Charlotte Lawrence, Administratrix of the Estate of George S. Lawrence, Deceased, is denied.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Chapter 127, Section. 180.


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    (No. 4134
    Frank Herrin, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.
    Emmet M. McDonald and Paul Denver, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; William H. Sumpter and William J. Colchan, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Lansden, J.

Claimant, Frank Herrin, seeks to recover from respondent for its. negligence.

On July 19,1948, just before midnight, claimant was riding in, and his brother-in-law, Charles Creveling, was driving an automobile traveling in a westerly direction along 95th Street, Chicago, Illinois, just west of the intersection of such street with Southwest Highway (Route 7). 95th Street, west of Southwest Highway, is a part of the State Highway System, and respondent is responsible for its total maintenance.

At a point 150 feet west of the intersection above referred to, Mr. Creveling stopped the automobile six feet from the north edge of the 20 foot pavement and on the 10 foot shoulder so that he and claimant could change places as operator of the vehicle.

Claimant stepped out of the right front door of the vehicle, intending to walk around behind the car to get into the driver’s seat, but took only a few steps when he fell into a concrete drop box inlet, three feet square and five feet deep, the two-section concrete cover of which had been broken in and rested at the bottom of the drop box.

The drop box had been installed so as to permit surface water to be carried by a culvert under 95th Street to its south side, and was an integral part of the highway as originally constructed.

No signs, flares or flags warned claimant of the location of the drop box, or the fact that its cover had been broken. Weeds and grass partially, but effectively, concealed the drop box from claimant’s view in whatever small amount of light there was at midnight. Neither the lights of passing vehicles, nor those of claimant’s automobile, illuminated the area of the drop box.

It is conceded that the concrete cover of the drop box had been broken and fallen in for so long a period of time that respondent knew, or should have known, of its condition.

Claimant could not be charged with contributory negligence, since he fell into the hole before he could have realized the impending danger, and he had a right to be where he was, and to do what he was doing.

Claimant is, therefore, entitled to an award, since respondent’s negligence has been definitely established by the greater weight of the evidence. Toler v. State, 16 C.C.R. 315; Dockry v. State, 18 C.C.R. 177; Rickelman v. State, No. 4195, opinion filed October 20, 1949.

After the accident, claimant went to the Little Company of Mary Hospital, Evergreen Park, Illinois, where he was hospitalized for three weeks. He was unable to work for two months, having been employed as a bus driver for Suburban Transit Bus Lines at $10.00 per day.

Claimant’s injuries were and are painful and disabling. He is required to wear a sacroiliac belt when not resting. His injuries consisted of a severe, chronic sacroiliac sprain, sacro-lumbar contusions, and sprain, lacerations, and abrasions of his legs. Subsequent to his accident, claimant developed a traumatic arthritic condition in his sacroiliac joint and in his cervical vertebrae. Two of respondent’s doctors found fairly clear manifestations of traumatic neurosis, which had caused claimant to give up work.

Hospitalization, X-Eays, medical care and appliances have cost claimant approximately $400.00. His doctor had treated him eighty-five times up to the time of the last hearing in this case.

Under Section 8 C of the Court of Claims Act, an award in this case is limited to $2,500.00. Whether such sum will compensate claimant for the damages he sustained as a result of respondent’s negligence is doubtful, but he is certainly entitled to that amount.

An award is, therefore, entered in favor of claimant, Frank Herrin, in the sum of $2,500.00.


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    (No. 4141
    Angelo La Mantia, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.

    Frank Martoccio and S. S. Schiller, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; William H. Sumpter and William J. Colohan, Assistant Attorneys General, for Eespondent.
   Lansden, J.

On July 8, 1949, an opinion was filed herein denying an award to claimant because the record failed to disclose that claimant, who was seeking to recover under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, had complied with the jurisdictional requirement of Section 24 of such Act of having made an oral or written demand for compensation within six months of the date of his accident.

On petition of claimant we granted a rehearing, because counsel for claimant had been under the impression such jurisdictional fact had been stipulated, which fact counsel were prepared to prove.

Claimant, Angelo LaMantia, was employed in the Department of Public Welfare on December 15, 1947, as a carpenter at the Chicago State Hospital, Chicago, Illinois. On that day, while in the course of his work and standing on an icy scaffold, claimant and a fellow workman lifted a twenty-two foot rafter weighing approximately 250 to 300 pounds. They had raised the rafter about waist high; suddenly the co-worker dropped his end. The jolt and the entire strain being placed on claimant caused him to bend and fall to one knee. Two hours later about quitting time he first experienced a severe pain in his back. The next day he reported to Dr. Louis Cisman, resident physician at the Chicago State Hospital. Dr. Cisman and Dr.. Colon, his associate, found the presence of tenderness in the lumbar sacral region of claimant’s back. Claimant has continued to suffer pain in his back and legs as a result of the accident.

Respondent had immediate notice of the accident, and claimant was hospitalized at the Chicago State Hospital the next day, where he remained for two weeks. During the period of hospitalization claimant testified that he orally demanded payment for his injuries from his superior, Mr. John Wright, Chief Engineer, at the institution. He made no other demand to any other person. Since Mr. Wright died before the hearing on rehearing , and the supplemental Departmental Report negates the making of any demand, we are inclined to hold against claimant as to an oral demand.

However, during claimant’s period of hospitalization he was paid his full salary when he was unable to perform any services for respondent. Under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois, this constitutes a waiver by respondent of the necessity for such demand for payment of compensation within six months. United Air Lines v. Ind. Com., 364 Ill. 346; Olney Seed Co. v. Ind. Com., 403 Ill. 587. This Court has so held. Roebuck v. State, 12 C.C.R. 236.

Claimant’s complaint was filed within one year of the date of his accident. Therefore, he has complied with all the jurisdictional prerequisites of Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Claimant testified he has continued to suffer severe pain down his back and both legs since the accident, and that prior thereto he never experienced such pain, or had any injury to his back or legs. He described the pain as present in the lower third of his back, and extending down; also, that his legs feel very tired, and, when standing, sometimes give way requiring him to lean against a support. He remarked that occasionally his legs weaken so that he cannot apply brakes when driving a vehicle. He told he had been a carpenter for four or five years prior to the accident; that after the accident he continued to work as a carpenter at the hospital until October 21, 1948, when he had to give it up because it was too painful and hard for him to accomplish. For a while thereafter he did light carpentry for his father-in-law, a contractor. Early in January, 1949, he obtained his present employment as a truck driver with the Indianapolis Forwarding Company.

Mr. LaMantia described his pain as not continuous, except as always present in the morning upon arising. He characterized it as a very tiresome pain, and, that when awakening in the morning the pain made him feel as if he had .just put in a twenty hour work day. He stated it was hard for him to lift objects; that he can bend down, but cannot bring anything up in a lift. At such times he experiences pain in the end of his back. He stated he had a tooth removed, as recommended by Dr. Cisman. However, this gave him no relief.

Dr. S. I. Weiner, witness for claimant, and a specialist in orthopedic and traumatic surgery, is a member of the staffs of Mt. Sinai and Michael Reese Hospitals in Chicago. On February 2,1949, he gave claimant a clinical examination relating to his back and extremities, including X-Rays. He testified such examination revealed a decrease in the lumbar lordosis curve of the back, and a moderate light lumbar left dorsal curvature or scoliosis. Dr. Weiner continued that analysis of X-Rays taken of claimant disclosed about a quarter of an inch shift from left to right of the lumbar vertebrae in relation to the spinal process of the first sacral segment. He further observed that the X-Rays revealed an abnormally sharp and acute angulation at the level of the fifth lumbar and the sacrum, and an abnormally narrow space posteriorly between the fifth lumbar vertebrae and the sacrum. Dr. Weiner diagnosed the condition of claimant as that of a traumatic lumbo sacral arthritis with shifting of the lumbar spine to the right at the lumbo sacral articulation. Dr. Weiner was of the opinion the above condition of the claimant was of permanent nature, and could or might have been caused by the above described accident.

Dr. Weiner explained that the roots of the sciatic nerve come out of the area of the lumbo sacral articulation, and that a shift in the lumbar spine in that region is consistent with irritating the roots of the sciatic nerve. He said such irritation produced the effect of radiating pain from the back down the extremities, and, depending upon which roots were involved, pain could result in the knee or foot. Weakness of the extremities and limitation of movement were listed as further effects. He expressed the opinion claimant was unfit for further work as a carpenter.

Upon cross-examination, Dr. Weiner said Ms opinion was based upon Ms X-Ray findings,, a study of the lumbo sacral region, and the subjective symptoms of claimant. He admitted in a man,of claimant’s age, these symptoms could be aggravated by arthritis caused by dental caries. He explained the condition of claimant was not the result of poor posture, as there would have also been a change in the dorsal curve. Dr. Weiner pointed out, however, the facets of the construction of the lumbo sacral articulation of claimant were more shallow than the average, and, as a result, the sudden strain caused by the present accident would more likely result in the injuries above described than ordinarily.

Dr. Louis Olsman, surgeon at the Chicago State Hospital since 1938, treated claimant, first examining him the day following the above injury. He related claimant’s treatment included antipMogistine and physiotherapy. However, claimant continued to have back pain. Mr. LaMantia was referred to the orthopedic clinic of the University of Illinois on April 21, 1948. WMle he understood claimant by sleeping on a hard bed, as recommended, had improved, Dr. Olsman said he received no further complaint from claimant, and did not further treat claimant after April 28, 1948, although claimant continued his work as carpenter at the Chicago State Hospital until October 21, 1948.

Dr. Olsman stated he again examined claimant on February 13, 1949, and found claimant to have an osteocarthritis (predicated upon the presence of dental caries) of the lumbo sacral spine aggravated by trauma. He stated:

“Examination at that time revealed definite tenderness along the spinous processes of the twelfth dorsal and fifth lumbar vertebra; pain in the back was exaggerated by hyperextension of the spine, but was not aggravated by flexion of the spine.
The pain in the back was aggravated by twisting of the spine to the right and to the left. When the patient was asked to stand on his tiptoes and come down hard on his heels, the pain recurred in the lower back. My clinical impression at that time was that of osteoarthritis of the lumbo dorsal spine aggravated by trauma.”

Dr. Olsman concurred in Dr. Weiner’s testimony concerning the interpretation of the X-Rays taken of claimant, and introduced in evidence. It was Dr. Olsman’s opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the condition of claimant might or could have been caused by the injury complained of.

From the foregoing, we conclude that claimant is entitled to a twenty per cent loss of use of both legs.

This case is largely controlled by Lubertozzi v. State, 18 C.C.R. 152, where an award was granted for loss of use of a leg as the result of a back injury. Significantly, in that case the same counsel and same doctors were involved as in this case, and the accident therein also occurred at the Chicago State Hospital.

On the date of his accident, claimant was 33 years of age, married, and had five minor children dependent upon him for support. Such children were Santo, age 12, Anthony, age 9, Joann, age 8, Bonnie, age 6, and Violet, age 4. In the year prior to his accident, claimant earned. $2,597.00. His rate of compensation is, therefore, $26.00 per week.

All medical and hospital services have been furnished or paid for by respondent.

During claimant’s period of hospitalization he was overpaid compensation for temporary total disability. He was paid the sum of $189.20, when he should have been paid only the sum of $33.42, or a net overpayment of $155.78.

A. M. Rothbart and William J. Cleary & Co., Court Reporters, Chicago, Illinois, were employed to take and transcribe the testimony at the two hearings before Commissioners Young and Tearney, respectively. Their charges are fair, reasonable and customary. Awards are hereby entered in favor of A. M. Bothbart for $73.50, and William J. Cleary & Co. for $20.25.

An award is entered in favor of claimant, Angelo LaMantia, under Section 8 (e) (15) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act for twenty per cent loss of use of both legs, or 76 weeks at $26.00 per week, or the sum of $1,976.00, less the overpayment of $155.78 above referred to, or a net award of $1,820.22, all of which has accrued and is payable forthwith.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Chap. 127, Sec. 180.


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    (No. 4180
    Etna Hedrick, Admx., et al, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.
    Livingston, Murphy and Barger, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   ScHUMAN, C. J.

Decedent, Jesse J. Hedrick, was employed by the Division of Highways on December 21, 1941 as a common laborer, and his earnings in the year preceding his injuries totaled $2,009.79.

On May 13, 1946, decedent was building a fire at a building leased by the Division of Highways at 1315% South Madison, Normal, McLean County, Illinois. In so doing, he used a 5 gallon can of what was presumed to be kerosene, and after he had made the fire he reached for the 5 gallon can to replace it in its proper location. As he reached for the can, it exploded throwing flaming oil over his body. He was taken to the Brokaw Hospital in Normal, and was treated by Dr. George W. Stevenson.

Following the injuries on May 13, 1946, the Division of Highways paid Mr. Hedrick full salary from May 14, 1946 to June 10, 1946, inclusive. Beginning June 11, 1946, Mr. Hedrick was paid compensation at the rate of $18.00 per week to and including August 4, 1947. Payments for total temporary disability total $1,235.41, and were terminated on August 4, 1947, the date which marked the end of the 64 weeks’ period provided for in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

All of the medical and hospital expenses were paid by respondent.

Mr. Hedrick died on April 9, 1948, and at the time of his death he lived and resided with Etna Hedrick, his wife, whom the evidence shows was totally dependent upon him for her support, and at the time of the hearing she had not remarried.

The claim is predicated on the theory that the death of Jesse J. Hedrick was the result of the injuries that he received on the 13th day of May, 1946. Claimant contended that the only question to be determined by the Court is whether the accidental injuries sustained by Mr. Hedrick on May 13, 1946 caused or contributed to his death. The claimant contends that said accidental injuries caused or contributed to Mr. Hedrick’s death, and, by reason thereof, his widow is entitled to 'compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The respondent contends that the injured employee did not die within one year from the date of his injury, and that no award can be made for his death under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The respondent seems to predicate its entire defense on this theory, and does not contend that the cause of death was not the result of the injuries sustained by Jesse J. Hedrick on May 13, 1946.

From a consideration of the testimony in the record, it can also be considered that the question of causation of death is also before the Court. On the point of cause of death there seems to be ai conflict in the testimony, if the medical testimony in the record can be considered as competent testimony — the respondent contending that the death was due to a heart attack in no way related to the injuries sustained May 13, 1946.

The first question for the Court to consider is whether or not the claim is barred under Section 24 of the Compensation Act (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1937, Chapter 48, paragraph 161, as amended in 1939). Said Section, insofar as the same is pertinent in this case, reads as follows:

“Provided, that in any case, unless application for compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within .one year after the date of the accident, where no compensation has been paid, or within one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, where any has been paid, the right to file such application shall be barred; Provided, further, that if the accidental injury results in death within said year, application for compensation for death may be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the date of death, but not thereafter.”

The decedent sustained accidental injuries on May 13, 1946, and on April 9, 1948 he died. If, as contended by the respondent, death would' have to occur within one year from the date of the injuries, there is no question that the claim is barred. In support of its contention respondent cites the case of Hilberg v. Ind. Com., 380, Ill. 102. In that case, Charles Hilberg sustained an injury on April 27, 1937. On January 27, 1938, a lump sum settlement was agreed upon, which said lump sum was paid February 2, 1938. Mr. Hilberg died October 26, 1939, and it was claimed the death resulted from the accidental injuries he received on April 27, 1937. On November 4, 1939, the widow of the deceased filed her application for compensation on account of the death of her husband. The application was dismissed, and was confirmed by the Industrial Commission in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The Court in affirming the decision of the Circuit court held on page 105 :

“The amendment of Section 24 was obviously for the purpose of making a specific time beyond which an employer would not be liable for death resulting from an accident, arising out of or in the course of employment. It required the death to occur within one year. It also protected the right of the dependents by providing they should have one year after the death within which to apply for compensation. The law was thus made certain instead of being uncertain, as it was before the amendment, in that under the construction given the former statute the death might occur more than a year after the accidental injury; and thus an employer, complying with all of the provisions of the law, would never have any certainty that the case was fully determined.”

In the same opinion the Court said on page 104: '

“The limitation of the Act with respect to applying for compensation for accidental death was made more specific by the amendment of 1939. The provision ‘if the accidental injury results in death within said year’ obviously refers to the year within which application for accidental injury may be made. It then further provides that if the death results within said year application may be made within one year after death. With this interpretation the legislative intent appears twofold, — first, that death from an accidental injury must occur within the year in which application must be made for compensation by the injured employee; and second, if death did occur within such time claim for compensation for such death might be filed within a year thereafter. It is possible under this law that claim for death compensation might be filed within two years after the date of the accident, because the injured man might live almost a year, and the Act gives his dependent a year after his death in which to make such claim. This intention is made more specific by the last words of the amendment, in which it is said the application may be made ‘within one year after the date of death, but not thereafter’.”

It appears that in the Hilberg Case, supra, there was no question that the claim was filed more than a year after the last payment of compensation. The lump sum was paid February 2, 1938, and the party died October 26, 1939, which was more than one year after the last payment of compensation.

The respondent also cites the case of Corn Belt Motor Company v. Ind. Com., 389, Ill. 320 as sustaining its view that the Hilberg case held that the death of the employee must occur within one year from the date the accidental injuries were sustained. A reading of this case will show that it was not pertinent to the decision, and was more or less a conclusion drawn from the Hilberg case.

In the instant case, Jesse J. Hedrick was injured on May 13, 1946, and was paid compensation up to and including August 4, 1947. Jesse J. Hedrick died on April 9, 1948, which would be less than one year after the payment of the last compensation. The claim of his widow, Etna Hedrick, was filed March 23, 1949, which would he less than one year after the date of death of her husband, Jesse J. Hedrick.

In the Hilberg case, supra, the Court held: “The provision ‘if the accidental injury results in death within said year’ obviously refers to the year within which application for accidental injury may be made.” There is no question that if Jesse J. Hedrick had lived he could have prosecuted his claim for compensation within one year after the date of the last payment of compensation to him, which was on August 4, 1947, or in other words he could have filed a claim up to and including August 4, 1948.

Section 24, of the Compensation Act, supra, as the Court held in the Hilberg case, supra, that the legislative intent in enacting said section was twofold, — first, that death from an accidental injury must occur within the year in which application must be made for compensation by the injured employee; and second, if death did occur within such time claim for compensation for such death might be filed within a year thereafter. The Court draws the conclusion in this case that the true intent of the interpretation of such statute in the Hilberg case was that where the death occurred within one year after the last payment of compensation that the widow would have one year from the date of such death to file her application for compensation under said Act. The Court therefore concludes that the claim was filed in time, and will proceed to discuss the other points involved in said case.

There is no dispute in the testimony, or in the contentions of the parties, that Jesse J. Hedrick was permanently disabled from the date of his injuries on May 13, 1946 to the date of his death. The only question submitted by the record is whether or not the cause of death could be traced to the accidental injuries sustained on May 13, 1946. As far as the record discloses Jesse J. Hedrick was in good health, an able-bodied man, capable of performing the necessary labor to support his children, now adults, and his wife.

The medical testimony, as far as the record discloses, consisted of medical reports submitted by the following: Dr. George.,W. Stevenson, which appeared in the Departmental Report, and is his testimony taken on the hearing of this cause on November 14, 1949; Dr. Frank McDowell, a specialist in plastic surgery, and an instructor at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, which appears in the Departmental Report; Dr. B. Markowitz which appears in .the Departmental Report, and in the testimony taken before the Commissioner on November 14, 1949; Dr. A. Edward Livingston of Bloomington, Illinois, which appears in the Departmental Report; Dr. W. E. Scott of Lexington, Illinois, which appears in the Departmental Report; Dr. J. Albert Ludin, a specialist in mental and nervous diseases, which appears in the Departmental Report.

The medical reports of Dr. Stevenson were all pertaining to the treatment for the injuries sustained on May 13, 1946. in regards to the burns that Jesse J. Hedrick had received. This is also true of the reports of Dr. Frank McDowell.

Dr. Markowitz in his reports to the Department stated that he first saw Jesse Hedrick on January 12, 1948, and learned that Mr. Hedrick had developed an acute respiratory infection, that his main complaint was chest pain, and his final diagnosis was that Jesse Hedrick had right sided adhesive pleuritis. In his report on March 9, 1948, in addition to the diagnosis previously mentioned, he stated that in his opinion the patient was highly nervous, and because of the treatment he received over a long period of time he presented' a case of psychogenic origin, and suggested that he be sent to St. Louis for further investigation.

Dr. A. Edward Livingston, in a report to the Department dated April 9, 1948, stated that he was called in consultation by Dr. Markowitz on February 29, 1948, and that his diagnosis at that time was an inter-lobar pleurisy, which evidently had nothing to do with any accident or injury.

Dr. W. E. Scott in his report stated that he was called to see the patient primarily for the relief of pain in his right chest wall and weakness.

Dr. J. Albert Ludin in his report to the Department, dated March 3Í, 1948, made the following diagnosis:

11 Traumatic psychosis, involutional depression.”

Jesse J. Hedrick saw fit to secure the services of Dr. Emil Z. Levitin in Peoria, Illinois of his own accord.

The facts showed that Jesse J. Hedrick suffered a heart attack while in the hospital in Peoria, Illinois, and that the heart attack had caused his death on April 9, 1948. This was reported by Dr. Levitin to the Department.

On the trial of the case, Etna Hedrick testified that prior to .his injuries he was an able-bodied man, and never missed a day working; that he had always supported his wife and children, and that after he was hurt he was a helpless invalid until the date of his death.

Dr. Markowitz testified that he began treating Jesse J. Hedrick on January 16, 1948, that he complained of a pain in the right shoulder, and case history of having had severe body burns about 22 months prior to that time; that he had been hospitalized for 14 months following his injury. That during the examination Mr. Hedrick was tense, nervous and complained bitterly of pain in the right shoulder, and shortness of breath, and that he had residual sears from his burning, and a right pleuritis. That the last time he saw him was on April 6, 1948, when he sent him to the Methodist Episcopal Hospital in Peoria, Illinois under the services of Dr. Levitin. He further testified that during the entire time he had Mr. Hedrick under treatment that he noted a psychic element; that decedent was deteriorating very rapidly, and at the time he was referred to Dr. Levitin on April 6, 1948 he was in a condition of premature senility; that by that he meant that all of his arteries, particularly those of the brain, were aging faster than is normally expected for his age. That Dr. Levitin’s report corroborated his findings definitely that a psychosis was connected with his injuries.

That Dr. Levitin gave him a report that the cause of death was coronary thrombosis, but that he felt that he had a generalized hardening of the arteries, particularly those of the brain, and involving all the arteries of the body, in -which the heart would be included, and that he died of premature senility. That in his opinion the injuries that he received accelerated the deteriorating process and that Hedrick would have lived a longer period of time had he not received the injuries. That in his opinion the burns Mr. Hedrick received were a contributory cause of death, and that he felt that the burns and subsequent suffering caused his general arterial degeneration, which resulted in his death, and concluded that Mr. Hedrick had traumatic psychosis.

It was conceded by all of the doctors that the only definite diagnosis of a coronary thrombosis would be by a post-mortem, which was not performed. .

An X-Ray report, made by the Methodist Episcopal Hospital in Peoria and signed by the radiologist of the Hospital, appears in the record with a reading as follows:

“Neurosis is negative for definite changes. Slight osleoporosis of the sella, and sclerosis of the para-sellar vessels.”

Dr. George W. Stevenson testified that he first treated Jesse Hedrick on the 13th day of May, 1946 for the burns that he had received, as previously set out. That he did not treat Hedrick subsequent to July of 1947; that in his opinion the injuries would have no connection with the cause of death of coronary thrombosis. That he did not know of his own knowledge that Mr. Hedrick had died of coronary thrombosis, but only the report that he had received. That it would be conceivable that Hedrick had a general decline over a period of time, that the burns, shock and long period of recovery would hasten a general loss of strength and well being, and that the condition probably caused his death to occur earlier than if he had not suffered said injuries and shock. That even though he had deteriorated, both mentally and physically, as a result of being injured, Mr. Hedrick could have suffered from some other disease, which might have caused his death, and not be connected with the injury.

There is no testimony in the record, outside of comments by Dr. Markowitz, Dr. Stevenson or Dr. Levitin, the last doctor to attend decedent and who described the cause of death as a heart attack. Dr. Markowitz, in his testimony, stated that in his opinion, although he was not attending him at the time, that Mr. Hedrick did not die of a heart attack, but his death was caused by general hardening of the arteries due to premature senility.

The only conclusion that the Court could reach in this case from the examination of the testimony, and the other pertinent facts, is that Jesse J. Hedrick on May 13, 1946 received serious and permanent injuries as a result of burns. That from' May 13, 1946 to the date of his death on April 9, 1949 he was permanently disabled and unable to perform any kind of manual labor. That Ms death was accelerated by Ms long course of treatment and confinement involved with traumatic psychosis. No other conclusion could be reasonably reached on the record, even though a great deal of testimony might be considered incompetent. However, no objections were made to this testimony, and the Court will not search the record- to determine the competency or incompetency of such testimony under such a situation. In fact, such testimony without objections would have to-be considered as competent testimony by the Court.

All of the testimony showed that Jesse J. Hedrick, the decedent, was in good health previous to the time he sustained his injuries.

In Plano Foundry Co. v. Industrial Com., 356 Ill. 186 at 198 and 199 held:

“Proof of the state of the health of the employee prior to and down to the time of the injury, and the change immediately following the injury and continuing thereafter, is competent as tending- to establish that the impaired condition was due to the injury.”

The testimony.at the héaring was transcribed by Bess H. Armstrong, who has submitted a statement for $58.10 for such services. This charge is reasonable.

All medical and hospital expenses have been paid by the State.

From all of the. evidence in the record, the Court concludes that decedent, Jesse J. Hedrick, should have continued to .receive compensation because of his total permanent disability. From undisputed testimony, the decedent was sent to various doctors by the State up to March 25, 1948, and without question the decedent was afflicted with traumatic psychosis. To deny an award under such circumstances, in the opinion of this Court, would be a travesty on justice. To say that the State concluded the man was mentally afflicted, and thén to deny an award because of decedent’s failure to file a claim for an award to which he was justly entitled, would thwart the ends of justice and the liberal interpretation of the Compensation Act. It is as much the duty of the State, in such circumstances, to see that the decedent’s interests were protected, as it was for the claimant himself.

From all the evidence in the record, the Court concludes that the claimant is entitled to an award. An award is, therefore, entered in favor of Etna Hedrick in the amount of $4,800.00. Jesse J. Hedrick, in his lifetime, had received payments in the amount of $1,235.41, which sum shall, for the reasons announced, be deducted from the total award herein granted. The balance of $3,564.59 shall be paid at the rate of $18.00 a week commencing on April 10, 1948, of which 131 weeks have accrued to October 14, 1950, or a total of $2,358.00, less payment of $1,235.41 made to Jésse J. Hedrick, or the sum of $1,122.59, which has accrued and is payable forthwith. The balance of $2,442.00 is to be paid at the rate of $18.00 per week for a period of 135 weeks commencing on October 21, 1950, with one final payment of $12.00.

An award in the amount of $58.10 for stenographic services is entered in favor of Bess H. Armstrong.

Future payments of compensation being subject to the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Illinois, the jurisdiction of this cause is specifically reserved for the entry of such other orders as from time to time may be necessary. ■

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor, as- provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


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    (No. 4215
    Lee Mathewson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.

    James 0. Monroe, Jr., Attorney for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Delaney, J.

This claim is brought under Section 3 of the Workmen’s Occupational Diseases Act by Lee Mathewson, claimant, for damages sustained as a result of contracting tuberculosis during the course of his employment by the above named respondent.

The record consists of the complaint, amended complaint, departmental report, transcript of evidence, claimant’s X-Ray exhibits, motion of claimant for an extension of thirty days, letter waiving additional medical testimony, abstract of evidence and claimant’s brief.

Claimant is married, and has one child. He was first employed by the State of Illinois as an attendant in 1935, and worked in that capacity until 1939. He was then transferred to a truck driver’s position. He stopped work about September 7, 1948 to enter the Madison County Tuberculosis Sanitarium, and remained there three months for treatment. He was then hospitalized in Alton for eight days, and sent home.

The duties of a laundry truck driver include picking up laundry and dirty clothing around the institution, and delivering the clean laundry. He handled all the hospital laundry, and brought it to the laundry from the hospital premises.

Claimant cites this Court in the case of Odle vs. State, 16 C.C.R. 183 as holding that he is entitled to damages under Section 3 of the Workmen’s Occupational Diseases Act. In that case, however, respondent violated the rules of the Department of Eegistration and Education.

On September 3,1946, the Alton State Hospital published their Bulletin No. 160, which contained the following instructions:

“The Institution will secure wheeled carts equipped to hold laundry bags for the wards where there are contagious linens, if they do not now have them. The soiled linens will not be handled under any circumstances by patients, except those patients with arrested tuberculosis may help in the handling of linens in wards housing patients with active tuberculosis under direct supervision of employees. (This means in the presence and sight of employees.) ”

“When linens are gathered into .the laundry bags, such bags are to be closed, and are not to be opened until they are emptied into a washer in the laundry by an employee. In emptying the bags into the washer, the employee shall not handle the linens, but shall invert the bag, emptying its contents, and, thereafter, drop the bag into the washer.”

The departmental report filed herein indicates that the provisions of Bulletin No. 160 were complied with.' To establish negligence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Occupational Diseases Act, claimant must show respondent violated (1) a rule or rules of the Industrial Commission made pursuant to the Health and Safety Act, or (2) violated a statute of this State intended for the protection of the health of employees, Ramsey vs. State, 18 C.C.R. 174.

It has not been shown that respondent has violated a rule of the Industrial Commission, or a statute of the State. Claimant’s claim must be denied.

For the reasons assigned, the claim is denied.

Henry P. Keefe submitted his invoice in the sum of $32.00 for taking and transcribing the testimony in this case, which charge is fair, reasonable and customary. An award is, therefore, entered in favor of Henry P. Keefe in the sum of $32.00.


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    (No. 4265
    Roscoe A. Hopkins, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.

    Stone and Fowler, and Omer W. Jones, Jr., Attorneys for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney- General, for Respondent.
   SCHUMAN, C. J.

The claimant, Roscoe A. Hopkins, was on February 4, 1949, employed by the respondent as a guard at the Illinois State Penitentiary, Menard, Illinois. On February 4, 1949, while sorting hogs on the farm of the respondent at Menard, the claimant slipped and fell -on ice covered ground. As a result of this fall, the claimant fractured his left wrist.

The claim was filed within the time provided by law and notice of the injury was immediate. The only question raised by the respondent was whether or not the accidental injury arose out of and in the course of the employment of the claimant.

The evidence discloses that the accidental injury did arise out of the course of employment of the claimant, so there are no jurisdictional questions to be considered by the court.

The evidence further showed claimant’s yearly wage, preceding the accident, was $2,580.00.

Respondent furnished all. medical and hospital services.

The evidence discloses that it was necessary to operate on the left arm of claimant after it was set by Dr. Garris. The operation was performed by Dr. James A. Weatherly at St. Andrew’s Hospital, Murphysboro, Illinois. The X-Rays showed a fracture of the left radius of the distal end in the wrist. Claimant sustained permanent partial disability to the left hand as a result of the injury, and the estimate was fixed at about 50%. This conclusion being drawn from the testimony of Dr. Weatherly, and the examination by the Commissioner.

Dr. Weatherly testified that the condition found, with reference to the disability mentioned, would be permanent.

The claimant, although off some time, was paid full salary, and there was no claim made for temporary total disability.

The testimony at the hearing was taken and tran- ■ scribed by Imogene Ward Steph, and she has submitted a statement for $54.93, which the Court finds to be reasonable.

On the basis of the record, we make the following award:

For 50 per cent permanent partial specific loss of the use of the left hand for a period of 85 weeks at $19.50 per week or a total of $1,657.50. Claimant was overpaid for non-productive time the sum of $480.92, which deducted from the award leaves a balance of $1,176.58, all of which is accrued and is payable forthwith.

An award is entered in favor of Imogene Ward Steph for stenographic services in the amount of $54.93, which is payable forthwith.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor, as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


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    (No. 4269
    Guy E. Rigdon, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.

    Roy A. Ptacin, Attorney for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; William H. Sumpter, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Lansden, J.

Claimant, Guy E. Rigdon, seeks to recover from respondent under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for injuries sustained by him in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as an Institutional Worker at the Chicago State Hospital operated by the Department of Public Welfare.

On August 12, 1949, claimant was in charge of an outside detail of mental patients, one of whom became unruly, attacked claimant, and kicked him in his right knee immediately below the knee cap.

Claimant was treated by physicians on the staff at Chicago State Hospital, but it is now agreed by the medical witnesses, who testified in the case, that claimant has suffered some permanent loss of use of his right leg.

Claimant testified at the hearing that there was a stiffness in his right knee accompanied by constant pain just below the knee cap, and that he could not extend his leg completely.

Claimant’s doctor found crepitation and pain on manipulation, the pain being located over the head of the tibia. Claimant’s right leg was held in a somewhat flexed deformity with a limitation of extension of about 25 degrees. Claimant’s doctor diagnosed claimant’s injury as a damaged internal semilunar cartilage in his right knee.

Respondent’s doctor, who testified, found the same symptoms as found by claimant’s doctor, and, in addition, found a small swelling on the outer surface of the right knee.

A fairly complete demonstration of the use of claimant’s right leg was made before Commissioner Summers, and in his report he states:

“It is the Commissioner's opinion from hearing the medical testimony in this case and examining claimant’s right leg, with special reference to flexion of his right knee, that the claimant has a 25 per cent permanent loss of use of right leg. For this disability he should receive $22.50 per week for 47V5 weeks, or a total of $1,068.75 under Section 8 (e) (15) (17) (m) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.”

We agree -with the recommendation of Commissioner Summers, and an award will be entered in accordance with his recommendation.

On the date of his accident, claimant was 49 years of age, married, but had no children under 18 years of age dependent upon him for support.

In the year prior to his accident claimant had been employed by respondent at both the Illinois State Penitentiary, Menard, Illinois, and the Chicago State Hospital, and his earnings in the year prior to his accident amounted to approximately $2,300.00. His rate of compensation is, therefore, $22.50 per week.

Claimant lost no time from his work, for which he is entitled to be compensated for temporary total disability. All medical treatment has been furnished by respondent.

William J. Cleary & Co., Court Reporters, Chicago, Illinois, was employed to take and transcribe the testimony before Commissioner Summers. Charges in the amount of $37.60 were incurred, which charges are fair, customary and • reasonable. An award is, therefore, entered in favor of William J. Cleary & Co. for $37.60.

An award is entered in favor of claimant, Guy E. Rigdon, under Section 8 (e) (15) (17) (m) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act for a 25 per cent loss of use of his right leg for which he is entitled to 47% weeks compensation at the rate of $22.50 per week, or the sum of $1,068.75, all of which has accrued and is payable forthwith.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Chap. 127, Sec. 180.


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    (No. 4271
    Harold Cruger, doing business as The Press Publications, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.

    Joseph S. Perry, Attorney for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; William H. Sumpter, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Lansden, J.

Harold Cruger, doing business as The Press Publications, filed complaint herein to recover for the damages to his automobile sustained in an accident on November 10, 1949. The car was a 1949 Cadillac, purchased in June of 1949, and, just prior to the accident in question, was in good mechanical condition and repair.

The accident occurred on Dempster Street just east of its intersection with Milwaukee Avenue in the City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Dempster Street is designated as U.S. Route 14, and Milwaukee Avenue is marked State Route No. 21. By reason of being a part of the system of State highways, Dempster Street is under the control of the" Department of Public Works and Buildings for the purposes of operation, maintenance, etc. Dempster Street, at the point in question, is a four-lane highway running in an easterly and westerly direction, and several days prior to November 10, 1949, an excavation was made in the north half of the pavement for the purpose of repairing same.

On the night of November 10, 1949, Milton John Cruger, son of claimant, accompanied by a young lady, drove to a dance hall in Skokie, and at approximately 11:15 P.M. was returning home. Shortly after 11:15 P.M. he was driving west on Dempster Street at approximately 38 to 40 m.p.h., and when just east of the intersection of Route 21 he suddenly saw barricades ahead of him. He applied his brakes, but struck the barricades and large chunks of concrete on the pavement,' lost control of the car, and landed in the ditch on the north side of the highway with the car headed south. Neither he nor his companion received any personal injuries. The car was considerably damaged along the front, right side and underneath.

The driver of the car testified that there were no warning signs east of the barricades, and that there were no flares or smudge pots burning at the barricade. The driver did not know of the repairs being made on Dempster Street.

John Henning also testified at the request of claimant, and stated that he was a Highway Deputy Sheriff for Cook County. He testified that he received a call at headquarters about 1:00 A.M. advising that there had been an accident just east of Dempster Street and Milwaukee Avenue; that he went immediately to the scene of the accident, and that he found no warning signals or flares east of the barricades to warn approaching motorists. He further testified that there were barricades on the highway protecting a small hole in the highway, and around the hole were several large blocks of concrete. He testified that there were smudge pots at the barricade, but that none were lighted, and, although they were filled with fuel, they would not stay lit when he attempted to light them himself. He states that he then called the Highway Department advising them of the condition. Henning further testified that a complaint was received at their headquarters at approximately 10:50 P.M. on November 10, 1949, that the lights at this barricade were out, and headquarters notified respondent’s highway section man. •

The testimony of Milton John Cruger and John Henning is undisputed, and no objections were made by respondent to any of their testimony.

The departmental report on file herein is not responsive to the testimony of claimant’s witnesses. The report states that at sun down seven smudge pots were burning at the barricades, and one smudge pot was illuminating the barricade sign about 500 feet east of the barricades. The report further states that at 1:45 A.M., more than two hours after the accident in question, three smudge pots were burning at the northeast, southwest and southeast corners of the barricade area and the “barricade” sign was illuminated. However, the report is silent on the crucial fact of whether the smudge pots were lighted at the time of the accident.

We therefore conclude that claimant has made out a case of negligence on the part of respondent. Toler v. State, 16 C.C.R. 315; Dockry v. State, 18 C.C.R. 177; Caudle v. State, No. 4148, opinion filed October 20, 1949; Rickelman v. State, No. 4195, opinion filed October 20, 1949.

Claimant’s automobile was repaired at Les Bierk Chevrolet Inc., Elmhurst, Illinois. The amount of the reasonable repairs for the damages sustained was $714.17. Claimant had no collision insurance.

An award is, therefore, entered in favor of claimant, Harold Cruger, doing business as The Press Publications, in the amount of $714.17.


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    (No. 4293
    Thomas McGinty, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.

    Coutbakon and Coutbakon, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Abthub Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Delaney, J.

Claimant, Thomas McGinty, seeks an award for certain medical expenses, and compensation for complete and permanent disability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The record consists of the complaint, filed April 20, 1950, departmental report, supplemental departmental report of June 21, 1950, and supplemental departmental report of June 29, 1950, transcript of evidence, and stipulation waiving briefs of both parties.

Claimant, Thomas McGinty, entered the service of respondent at the Jacksonville State Hospital October 4, 1944, as an Institution Worker. He was reclassified November 26, 1947, and his position title changed to that of Maintenance Worker (Power Plant).

On April 22, 1949, the claimant was moving large bottles of oil. One of the bottles slipped, and in jerking the bottle to keep from injuring a helper, he felt a pain in his side. Dr. F. A. Norris treated claimant for reduction of a hernia. Dr. James Le Ranes, the examining physician of respondent, reported claimant had a single hernia at the time of his original employment on October 1, 1944. The earnings of claimant during the year immediately preceding the date of alleged injury were $2,292.00. The Jacksonville State Hospital advises that claimant was paid for disability time the sum of $191.00. Claimant returned to work about July 5, 1949, and worked until January 1, 1950, at which time he was discharged by the respondent.

Under Section 8 (d-1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, an injured employee, to be entitled to compensation for hernia, must prove:

1. The hernia was of recent origin;

2. Its appearance was accompanied by pain;

3. It was immediately preceded by trauma arising out of and in the course of employment;

4. The hernia did not exist prior to the accident.

■ Claimant having failed to establish by the evidence that he is entitled to an award, his complaint must be dismissed.

Award denied.

. Hugo Antonacci, Court Reporter, has filed a bill for reporting services in this case in the sum of $37.60. The bill appears reasonable for the services rendered, and is hereby allowed.

Award is hereby rendered in favor of Hugo Antonacci in the sum of $37.60.


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    (No. 4296
    Quentin George Daiber, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.

    Eldon M. Durr, Attorney for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Delaney, J.

On June 13, 1949, the claimant, Quentin George Daiber, was an employee of the respondent in the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways. While cleaning the sickle of a power mower, his hand slipped causing the left ring finger to be caught in the sickle, and the major portion of the distal phalanx was cut off. His foreman, Joseph E. Britt of Alhambra, was notified at. once of the accident, and took Mr. Daiber. to St. Joseph’s Hospital, Highland, where Dr. Ewald Hermann rendered first attention and amputated the finger at the distal joint.

Claimant was first employed by the Division on March 1, 1949, as a highway section man’s helper at a salary of $180.00. a month. Division employees in this classification ordinarily work continuously throughout the year. Claimant was 28 years of age, married,. and had three children under 16 years of age dependent upon him for support. His compensation rate, therefore, would be $18.00 per week. However, as the injury was incurred after July 1, 1947, this must be increased 30 per cent, making his compensation rate $23.40 per week.

At the time of the accident, the employer and employee were operating under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of this State, and notice of the accident, and claim for compensation were made within the time provided by the Act. All medical services were paid by the respondent.

Claimant is entitled to an award for one-half the loss of his left ring finger. Under Section 8, Paragraphs (e), (4^, and (j) as increased by Paragraph (m), this would be 12% weeks at $23.40 per week, or $292.50. The claimant was temporarily totally disabled from June 14, 1949 to June 20, 1949. Respondent paid him full salary for a period amounting to $42.00. The sum of $18.60 must be deducted from the award for nonproductive time.

An award is, therefore, made in favor of the claimant, Quentin George Daiber, in the sum of $292.50, less the sum of $18.60 paid for non-productive time, or the sum of $273.90, all of which has accrued and is payable forthwith.

Henry P. Keefe, Court Reporter, was employed to take and transcribe the testimony, for which he made a charge of $11.60. We find that this charge is fair, reasonable and customary.

An award is, therefore, entered in favor of Henry P. Keefe in the sum of $11.60.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


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    (No. 4315
    Dorothy A. Farrell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.

    Dorothy A. Farrell, Claimant, pro se.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Lansden, J.

On March 3, 1950, claimant, Dorothy A. Farrell, while employed by and in the performance of her duties for the Illinois Public Aid Commission, slipped on an ice covered sidewalk in Monmouth, Illinois, and fell fracturing her right arm.

Respondent did not furnish claimant with the necessary medical and hospital services, but permitted her to secure such services with its full approval.

It is apparent from the departmental report on file herein that such medical and hospital services were reasonably required to relieve or cure claimant from the effects of her accidental injury. Sec. 8 (a) Workmen’s Compensation Act. In fact, the results achieved from the skillful treatment by claimant’s doctors have obviated any claim for disability.

All claimant seeks is an award under Section 8 (a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in the sum of $117.00 for medical expenses, which she incurred as a result of her fall, and to an award 'in such amount claimant is entitled.

An award is, therefore, entered in favor of claimant, Dorothy A. Farrell, for $117.00, payable forthwith as follows:

$15.00 to claimant for the use of Dr. John O. Firth, Monmouth, Illinois,' for professional services.
$27.00 to claimant for the use of Monmouth Hospital, Monmouth, Illinois, for X-Rays and hospital care.'
$75.00 to claimant for the use of Dr. Russell M. Jensen, Monmouth, Illinois, for professional services.

According to the departmental report on file herein,, the Illinois Public Aid Commission has funds available for the payment of compensation awards. Therefore, it is directed that the payment of the above award be made by the State Treasurer, as Trustee Ex-Officio, from the funds heretofore deposited by the Illinois Public Aid Commission, or its predecessor, the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, with the State Treasurer pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Chap. 127, Sec. 181a. Payment of the award from this fund is requested by the Illinois Public Aid Commission in the departmental report, and such request constitutes the necessary statutory direction. Hoppock v. State, 16 C.C.R. 206.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


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    (No. 4326
    Roy Harper, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 13, 1950.

    Lathrop J. Hunt, Attorney for Claimant.
    Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Lansden, J.

On August 12, 1950, claimant, Boy Harper, filed Ms complaint, alleging that on March 18, 1948 he was injured as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment by respondent at the Training School for Boys, St. Charles, Illinois, operated by the Department of Public Welfare.

Seeking to recover under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, claimant further alleged that he was paid no compensation, but that medical, surgical and hospital services were furnished by respondent.

Bespondent has filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that this Court is without jurisdiction of claimant’s case.

It is manifest that claimant’s complaint is filed too late, and that this Court has no jurisdiction of his case. Not only is claimant barred by Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, but he is also barred by Section 22 of the present Court of Claims Act..

Upon the authority of Hexdall v. State, No. 4245, opinion filed April 18, 1950, wherein the same question was decided, thoroughly discussed, and previous decisions of this Court collected, the motion of respondent to - dismiss must be and is hereby sustained.

Case dismissed.