text:
    First Trust & Savings Bank of Chicago, Trustee of the Estate of George L. Carman, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1922.

    Inheritance Tax — refund. There being no dispute as to the facts and law in this case, the Court enters an award for the amount of claimant’s demand.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim of the First Tfcust & Savings Bank of Chicago, trustee of the estate of George L. Carman, deceased, for a refund of inheritance tax in the amount of fifty-four and 10/100 ($54.10) dollars, together with interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum from August 8, 1914. Ho objection or defense of the claim is interposed by or on behalf of the State and the Attorney General representing defendant, consents to an award in the sum of fifty-four and 10/100 ($54.10) dollars, together with interest at the rate of three per cent per annum from August 8, 1914.

We therefore award the claimant the sum of fifty-four and 10/100 ($54.10) dollars, together with interest at the rate of three per cent per annum from August 8, 1914, to date when an appropriation to pay this amount is available.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

text:
    Public Service Company of Northern Illinois v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1922.

      Contract — no available funds for payment. Where a contract entered into between the State and contractor has been completed but before payment is made the appropriation out of which payment is to he made lapses, a legal obligation arises against the State for the contract price.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney Genera], for State.
   The claimant, an Illinois corporation, in the year of 1920 amongst other things, engaged in the selling and distribution of water to the defendant, State of-Illinois, in and in the vicinity of Pontiac, Illinois.

While thus engaged, claimant as a part of its Public Utility business, sold and delivered to defendant for its use at the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac, from the 29th day of September, A. I). 1920, to the ,29th day of October, A. D. 1920, six million seventy-four thousand seven hundred and seventy-five (6,074,775) gallons of water, for which the State agreed and promised to pay claimant nine hundred forty-one dollars and fifty-nine cents ($941.59) being amount due under contract price at thirty-one cents per 1,000 gallons, less a discount of 50 per cent. When bill was presented, there seemed to be some little errors, and when finally corrected, and presented for payment, the time had elapsed for payment of the appropriation made to pay for such service, and it becomes necessary to present this case to this Court for adjudication.

The claim has the approval of the "proper officials, and the Attorney General concedes in his statement herein, that said sum is due from defendant to claimant.

The Court therefore awards to claimant, the said sum of nine hundred forty-one dollars and fifty-nine cents ($941.59).


text:
    Central Trust Company of Illinois, Executor of the Estate of George H. Clark, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1922.

    Inheritance Tax — when claimant entitled to a refund. There being no dispute as to the facts and law governing this case the Court enters an order in favor of claimant for the amount of his claim.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim of the Central Trust Company, of Illinois, executor of the estate of George II. Clarke, deceased, for a refund of inheritance tax in the amount of five thousand two hundred twenty-eight and 24/100 ($5,228.24) dollars, together with interest at the rate of three (3) per cent per annum from July 20tli, 1920. Ho objection or defense of the claim is interposed by or on behalf of the State and the Attorney General representing defendant, consents to an award herein in the sum of five thousand two hundred twenty-eight and 24/100 ($5,228.24) dollars, together with interest at the rate of three (3) per cent per annum from July 20, 1920.

We therefore award the claimant the sum of five thousand two hundred twenty-eight and 24/100 ($5,228.24) dollars, together with interest at the rate of three (3) per cent per annum from July 20th, 1920, to date voucher is issued upon appropriation by Legislature.


text:
    James G. Davis, Director General of Railroads and Agent Appointed By the President of the United States Pursuant to the Terms of the Transportation Act of 1920. v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1922.

    Freight Charges — liability of State. The State is liable for freight charges for transportation of coal by claimant to State Institution.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim of James G. Davis, Director General of Railroads and agent' appointed by the President of the United States pursuant to the terms of the Transportation Act of 1920, for freight charges for transportation of coal during March and April 1918, over C. P. & St. L. E. E. to Illinois School for the Deaf, Jacksonville, Illinois, in the sum of two hundred eighty-eight and 65/100 ($288.65) dollars. Ho objection or defense of the claim is interposed by or on behalf of the State and the Attorney General representing defendant, consents to an award herein in the sipn of two hundred eighty-eight and 65/100 ($288.65) dollars.

We therefore award the claimant the sum of two hundred eighty-eight and 65/100 ($288.65) dollars.


text:
    Esther Friedlander, et al., Executors of the Estate of Gustav Friedlander, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

    Inheritance Tax — when refund will be made. See. 25. The County Judge assessed an inheritance tax upon certain contingent interest under Section 25, Inheritance Tax Law. The tax was paid. Afterwards upon proper proceedings the County Court entered an order finding that the contingent interests had become vested, and the tax was re-assessed. Held, claimant entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount paid under the original assessment and the amount of tax found to be due under the re-assessment made by the County Court.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for refund of $1,107.73 on inheritance tax assessed by the County Judge of Cook County, Illinois, in the estate of Gustav Friedlander, deceased, upon certain contingent interests under Section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Law.

The contingent interests have now vested and claimant has secured an order from the County Court of Cook County, re-assessing the inheritance tax and finding such contingent interests to ..have vested. The total amount' of tax originally paid on June 12, 1917, less five per cent discount, was $2,025.47. The amount of the re-assessment, less five per cent discount, is $917.74, leaving $1,107.73 to be refunded, therefore, with interest thereon at three per cent per annum from said June 12, 1917.

The Attorney General has filed a statement in this case, admitting the facts above set forth, and consenting to the allowance of said claim for the amount above mentioned.

Claimant is therefore awarded the sum of $1,107.73 with interest at the rate of three per cent per annum from June 12, 1917, until paid.


text:
    Logan Baker v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

    Respondeat Superior — doctrine not applicable to State. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty.
    Workman’s Compensation Act — not applicable to the State. The provisions of the Workman’s Compensation Act are not binding upon the State, it having never elected to pay compensation under said Act.
    Non-Liability of State — not liable for acts of an independent agency. Where claimant is injured by an independent agency not connected in any way with the State, or its institutions, no liability can arise against the State for such injuries.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant, Logan Baker, was on December 7th, 1920, an inspector in the Division of Game and Fish of the State of Illinois, at a salary of one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) per month.

On that date, while traveling by train from Pittsfield, Illinois, to Meredosia, Illinois, and when leaving the train at Bluffs, Illinois, to change cars, he caught the third finger of his right hand in the door of the car and had about one-half an inch of the end of his finger cut off.

The evidence shows that claimant was standing at the door, with his hand up against the door jam, when the door, which had been open, was by a sudden stopping or jerking of the train suddenly and forcibly closed. Claimant received prompt medical treatment for this injury. A portion of the finger was amputated with some of the bone. Claimant paid out for surgical and medical aid the sum of thirty-eight dollars ($38.00); was wholly disabled for five (5) weeks, but received his salary during that time.

Claimant states that he is permanently disabled and asks for an award in accordance with the Workman’s Compensation Law of this State.

As has been held in many decisions of this Court, the State is not liable for injuries received by its employees in the course of their employment. While the allowance provided for in the Workmen’s Compensation Act have to some extent been followed by this Court in making recommendations as a matter of social justice ivhere no legal liability existed, yet this Court has held that the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not apply to the State, and that the provisions of said Act are not binding in any way upon the State. The State has never elected to pay compensation under said Act.

tinder the facts in this case, we do not believe that the injuries received by claimant were sustained in the course of his employment. He was a passenger on this train, going from Pittsfield to Meredosia to perform certain duties in the line of his employment at the latter place. The injuries received by him were received from an independent agency and not from anyone in any way connected with the State, and the State is not liable in any way to claimant, and the claim is therefore rejected.

However, as an act of social justice and equity, we recommend to the Legislature that if it sees fit, it allow claimant the sum of three hundred dollars ($300.00).


text:
    Mathilda Moore v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

    Social Justice and Equity — claim may be alloiced on ground of social justice and equity. Claimant while in the performance of her duty as an employee in the Illinois Eye & Ear Infirmary at Chicago, was injured while operating an elevator in the institution. Held, that while there exists no legal liability against the State by reason of the injury received, as an act of social justice and equity, claimant is entitled to an award.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant, Mathilda Moore, files claim herein for damages resulting from a sprained, bruised and lascerated ankle and leg, incurred while she was in the employ of the State in The Illinois Eye & Ear Infirmary in Chicago.

She alleges that while in line of duty, and without fault on her part, she tripped and fell, injuring her anide, which gave her pain for two weeks; that later sometime in September, 1919, while endeavoring to operate an elevator, her foot was caught in the door, and she suffered sprained ankles and legs, besides lacerations and bruises on the legs which partially incapacitated her for a period of three months.

In all this, her deductions are sustained by other evidence and not contradicted by the State.

She was a widow, 51 years old, and was getting $37.00 per month. Instead of applying to the State Authorities for medical assistance, which would have been furnished gratis, she chose to have her family physician treat her, and to buy her own drugs, all of which amounted to about $85.00. Her monthly salary was paid regularly without any deductions. She was disabled from the performance of her duties only three weeks, and went back to work, but suffered pain and inconvenience for three months after the accident.

It is very clear that the injuries were not very serious, and that they resulted in no permanent disability to claimant. She was back at her work in three weeks, and entirely well in three months.

While this Court has repeatedly held in this class of cases that the State is not liable, yet in view of the advanced age and poverty of claimant, and in the interest of social welfare and equity, we have decided to make a small allowance for claimant, and we recommend the payment of two hundred dollars.


text:
    Eben P. Clapp v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

    Inhekitance Tax — When refund will be made. Under the fact proved and admitted by the State, the Court awards claimant the amount of inheritance tax over-paid.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for refund of certain, inheritance taxes assessed by the County Judge of Cook County, Illinois, in the estate of Mary N. Clapp, deceased.

At the death of said deceased, she left surviving, her husband, the claimant, Eben P. Clapp, who took out letters of administration, and one child, Matthew M. Clapp, a minor son, as her only child, and only heirs at law her surviving. Claimant was also appointed guardian of said Matthew M. Clapp.

The claim is based upon an order of the County Court of Cook County upon an appeal from the order of the County Judge aforesaid, reducing the assessment so erroneously made by the County Judge.

The appeal was taken in due time, and the evidence and facts submitted in the case and admitted by the State, and are as follows:

Mary S". Clapp> decedent, died March 31st, 1920, Inheritance Tax assessed by County Judge of Cook County, September 30th, 1920, less 5% discount. Order entered by Court on appeal May 4th, 1921.

Eben P. Clapp:

Amount assessed by County Judge............ $66,046.27

Amount paid under said assessment......... $62,743.95

Amount assessed by County Court on appeal.. $63,953.49

Amount due under order on appeal..,......... $60,755.82

Befund due Eben P. Clapp, individually..................$ 1,988.13

Matthew H. Clapp, minor:

Amount assessed by County Judge.........$150,492.55

Amount paid under said order............. . $142,967.92

Amount fixed by County Court on appeal.. .$146,306.97

Amount due under said order................. $138,991.62

Befund due Eben P. Clapp, guardian of Matthew M. Clapp,

minor ................................................$ 3,976.30

The Court under above facts, accordingly award to Eben P. Clapp, individually, $1,988.13; and to Eben P. Clapp, guardian of Matthew IST. Clapp, minor, $3,976.30.


text:
    American Eagle Fire Insurance Co. v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

    Insurance Tax — when refund will be made. Mistake of fact. Where the tax is paid under a mutual mistake of fact, or where paid on an oversight the claimant is entitled to a refund of the tax paid.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for refund of $2,125.16 paid by the claimant to the Department of Trade and Commerce, May 18, 1921, as the Insurance privilege tax of the claimant for the year ending June 30, 1922.

The claim for refund is based on the assumption that the payment was made by reason of a mutual mistake of fact or an oversight. This appears to be the position of the Attorney General representing defendant. The Attorney General accordingly consents to awarding the claimant.

We, therefore, award the claimant the sum of $2,125.16 without interest.


text:
    Swift and Company v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

      Coktbacts — when State liable for supplies. The State is liable for merchandise furnished by claimant to its institution.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for goods and merchandise furnished by claimant and consisting of eggs and soap sold to the Illinois Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Home at Quincy by the claimant from September 29, 1920, to December 7, 1920..

The Attorney General comes and appears- in behalf of the defendant, consents to the allowance of said claim in the sum of $607.75.

We, therefore award the claimant the sum of $607.75 without interest.


text:
    Minnie B. Moore v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

    Inhepatance Tax — io7ien claimant entitled to refund. Under the facts proven and admitted by the State, the Court enters an award for refund of inheritance tax paid under Section 25, Inheritance Tax Law.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim under section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Law, for refund of a portion of the inheritance taxes assessed in the estate of David B. Googins who died a resident of Cook County, June 12, 1919.

The order of the County Judge of Cook County, assessing the inheritance tax was entered December 5, 1919, and the entire residue and remainder in the estate after the life estate and award of the widow, was distributed for the purpose of the assessment to Minnie B. Moore, the amount of the assessment against her being $917.50.

Such tax, less 5% discount for payment within six months, to-wit: $871.62 was, on the 10th day of December,- 1919, paid to the County Treasurer of Cook County, Illinois, by the claimant herein.

Subsequently, to-wit: July 5, 1920, the widow died and all but $10,000.00 of the said remainder vested indefeasibly in four children of said decedent, to-wit: the claimant, Minnie B. Moore, Joseph B. Googins, Celia E. Yansant and Florence G. Miller, and thereafter, the County Court of Cook County entered an order reassessing the tax on said remainder at $54.38 against each of the said four children with the addition of the sum of $100.00 against Minnie B. Moore by reason of the contingencies applying to the said $10,000.00 trust fund.

Thus a total tax of $317.52 was assessed against said remainder, the sum due thereunder being said sum less 5% discount, $301.64. The claimant, having paid the sum of $871.62, is now entitled to a refund of $569.98 with interest at the rate of 3% per annum from the date of payment, December 10, 1919.

The Attorney General has filed a statement, admitting the above facts, and consenting to the allowance of said claim.

Claimant is therefore awarded the sum of $569.98, together with interest thereon at the rate of three per cent per annum, from December 10, 1919.


text:
    John Ohmsgerds v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

    Governmental Function — when State not liable. The State in conducting the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty.
    Social Justice and Equity — recommendation. Where an employee is injured while in the performance of his duty, the Court as a matter of social justice and equity may recommend to the Legislature an appropriation for his benefit.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a suit for damages resulting from injuries incurred by claimant from an attack upon him by three convicts while in the lawful discharge of his usual and assigned duties as guard in the Illinois State penitentiary at Joliet, Illinois, one of the institutions of the State of Illinois.

The claimant was in the employ of the State as a guard at the above named penitentiary on a salary of $12'5.00 per month, and on the 4tli •day of September, while so employed as a guard, and in the performance of his usual duties, while in the gallery at No. 6 in the west wing of the said penitentiary, three convicts, who had secretly made keys to open their cell doors in said gallery, where they were stationed, opened the doors of their cells and suddenly without warning rushed upon claimant, two approaching him from behind, and one in front of him, and assaulted him with great violence, trying to force him into one of the cells. At that moment, one of the prisoners was heard to exclaim "God damn, let’s get him now,’’ when one of them drew from his clothing, a long pair of shears and endeavored to stab claimant. There being no other way or means- of escape, claimant jumped off the gallery, alighting on the first landing, which was three floors below, thereby causing fractures and infraction of both feet, breaking the ankles and causing deformities of the feet, causing permanent injuries to the feet of claimant, so that he is now able to move about only by use of a cane. Claimant is a married man, having a wife and one daughter dependent upon him for support.

This evidence is substantiated by a number of other witnesses and no evidence by the State is given to contradict it.

Dr. Alfred M. Houston, a witness, testified in part, that he made an X-ray examination of both feet and ankles of claimant (which are on file in this cause, and. constitutes part of the evidence herein), and found that there was a dorsal dislocation of the proximal end of the first metatarsal on the right foot and evidence of a previous fracture involving the posterior end of the oscalcis of the left foot.

That the conditions found in both feet are causing deformities that will not adjust themselves and which cause difficulty in walking and produce loss of normal function. Dr. Fletcher, the prison physician attended from the time of the injury to December 2, 1921, and as a witness states that his examination “disclosed that there were fractures and infractions to both feet, broken arches, torn ligaments and crushed bones, and that claimant cannot walk as well as before the injury; that there is a deformity to the instep of the right foot and that it is with difficulty, and only by use of a cane, that claimant walks.” David Murray also testifies that claimant “walks with a cane.” Claimant was in the hospital five weeks, and on being released returned to his work as guard, at same rate of pay as before injury he received. During the entire time he was so incapacitated, he received his regular monthly wages of $125.00 per month. There being nothing in the record to contradict it, is presumed that claimant’s medical, surgical and hospital services were furnished him gratis by the State.

In his brief and argument, claimant claims compensation for total incapacity for right foot and 25% partial incapacity of left foot.

The evidences discloses that so far, the claimant lost no money or wages on account of his injuries, nor has he incurred any medical expense, no hospital nor nurse bills, all having been paid for by the State. The claim then, if any, goes only to the permanent disability, and not to the total temporary disability or medical expense.

We cannot concede that the evidence shows a total loss of the use of the right foot, nor 25% loss of use of the left foot. Claimant’s own evidence shows that claimant after being discharged, returned to his usual employment, as a guard, on same salary as was received before injury received, and that he walked, but with difficulty and with a cane.

Our ideas are that to be an efficient guard and able to discharge the usual duties incumbent upon him, requires a person of reasonably fair action of the feet, and limbs at least. A person of total loss of use of one foot and 25% loss of the use of the other, would scarcely be put on so important duty as an able bodied guard at full pay.

As long as his present connection with the State continues (receiving his usual salary) his earnings have not been affected by the injury. There is no evidence (except what may reasonably be deduced from the evidence as to the extent of the injury) of the loss of earning capacity in case he leaves his present employment. There is nothing in the declaration to indicate that he is a married man, has a wife or child. The evidence (claimant’s affidavit, which is by stipulation admitted as evidence) discloses that claimant has wife and one child (Esther), but does not state age of child, or that it is dependent upon him for it$ support.

This Court has uniformally held in all cases of the character of at bar, that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to; the State. It follows therefore that as a matter of law, the demurrer should be sustained and claim dismissed, but we view this case as being one where claimant was badly crippled without fault on his part, while in the lawful discharge of his duties as an employee of the State, which at least entitles claimant to equitable relief.

Therefore from an equitable view point and in the interest of social welfare, we recommend to the Legislature that it make an appropriation for claimant in the sum of fifteen hundred dollars.


text:
    Merchants Loan & Trust Co., Administrator of the Estate of Lillie Billow, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

    Inheritance Tax — when refund will be made. Where an inheritance tax is assessed by the County Judge, and is paid, and upon appeal to the County Court it is found that no inheritance tax is due the State, the claimant is entitled to a refund of the tax paid.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant prosecutes this suit to recover an inheritance tax erroneously assessed and erroneously paid on the estate of Lillie Billow, deceased.

The evidence of record discloses and same is conceded by the State, that Said estate was assessed by County Judge in the sum of $3,363.09, which under protest ivas paid by administrator, less 5%, making $3,-

194.94. In due time, this order was appealed to the County Court, which found that no inheritance tax was due to the State from said estate, and ordered a refund of the $3,194.94, less $35.00 cost of the prosecution of said appeal, which was adjudged against the appellant.

This proceeding was never appealed from.

The Attorney General consents to the allowance of the claim of $3,-194.94, less $35.00 making $3,159.94.

The interest contended for will be disallowed and an award of $3,-159.94 ordered paid to the claimant.


text:
    Sophie Jones and Joseph Martin Jones, by Said Sophie Jones, His Mother and Next Friend v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

      - Governmental Function — when State, not liable. The State in conducting the Illinois State Reformatory exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty.

      Same — State not liable for torts of inmates of its institutions. The State is not liable for torts committed by inmates of its institutions.
    Social Justice and Equity — when award will be mads. Although the State is not liable, where the employee sustains an injury while in the performance of his duty, the Court will as an act of social justice and equity enter an award in favor of claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This claim is presented by claimants on account of the killing of John S. Jones, an employee of the defendant at the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac, Illinois. The act complained of occurred at that institution on June 15th, 1922. It appears that the deceased was a young man about 38 years of age, able bodied and in excellent health at the time of his death. It further appears that he was employed at the Illinois State Reformatory about two years; that he was in charge of what is known as the “yard gang” at that institution, and while he was in charge of his duties an inmate of said institution named Cor-bridge, came upon Jones while Jones’ back was turned and struck him a blow on the back of his head with ani iron gas pipe. Jones fell to the floor and Oorbridge hit him repeatedly upon the head, neck and face with the gas pipe and as the result of such assault, J ones expired shortly after the assault was made, and as a result of the assault.

The said deceased Jones left as his only heirs and next of kin Sophie Jones, his widow, and Joseph Martin Jones his minor child, who are the claimants in this cause.

The Attorney General appearing in behalf of the defendant and represents to this Court that there is no dispute about the material facts in this case, assuming however that' a demurrer would be sustained. This Court is of the opinion that the demurer should be sustained and that the recommendation of this Court and its award herein, can only be considered as a matter of equity and social justice.

In this case it is uncontradicted that the employee Jones while in the employ of the State of Illinois and in the discharge of his duties, was engaged in a hazardous occupation, and as this Court has heretofore announced, the State of Illinois desires to have faithful, efficient and courageous men in charge of the inmates of the various institutions of the State and should therefore accord the employes of the State Institution or their dependents the same consideration at least as is given to the employes of private corporations or individuals. However, it is the opinion of the Court that only under unusual circumstances should this Court depart from the rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Act as a measure in the allowance of claims of this character against the State of Illinois. It is of course the belief of this Court that the element of social justice and equity is very prominent in this case and consequently it is our desire to be as liberal as the rules and circumstances will permit.

It is therefore the opinion of this Court that the demurrer of the defendant should be sustained but the Court in view' of the principals of equity and social justice for the furtherance of which this tribune was established, is justified in recommending an allowance to the claimants in this case.

It is therefore recommended by this Court that a sum of two thousand five hundred dollars be allowed by the State of Illinois and paid to the legal guardian of the minor child Joseph Martin Jones for the exclusive benefit of said child and that the five thousand dollars be allowed and paid to Sophie Jones, widow in this case for her exclusive benefit.


text:
    Northern Trust Company, Trustee, Estate of Edward W. McCready v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 11, 1922.

    Inheritance Tax — refund made under Section 25. Under the facts proven and admitted hy the State claimant is entitled to a refund, under Section 25, Inheritance Tax Law, to the amount of its claim.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for refund under Section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Law of a certain amount of the inheritance tax assessed and paid on the estate of Edward W. McCready, deceased.

It appears that decedent died a resident of Cook County in September, 1919, leaving a last will and testament, and as his only heirs at law and next of kin, Caroline P. McCready, widow and daughter, Suzanne McCready. The residue of the estate was devised to the Northern Trust Company as trustee. The Trust Company was to manage the property and pay the income from one-half thereof to the widow during her life and the income from the other half to the daughter for her life.

In the inheritance tax proceedings had on said estate, the remainders over were contingent or defeasible and were in such inheritance tax proceedings, taxed at the highest possible rate. Afterward the daughter died leaving her mother Caroline P. McCready as her only heir, whereby under the terms of the will, the remainder in one-half of the said residue of the estate, became vested indefeasibly in the said Caroline P. McCready. Whereupon pursuant to petition in the County Court of Cook County of which the Attorney General had proper notice, an order was entered re-assessing the tax upon said remainder.

The total inheritance tax assessed in the estate by the original order was $29,323.50, which amount less 5% discount was duly paid March 12th, 1920.

The total tax assessed by the order of re-assessment was $25,923.16, which amount less 5% discount, to-wit: $24,627.00 was the amount due thereunder.

The Attorney General coming and defending makes no' objection to this claim and agrees tliat claimant is entitled to a refund of $3,230.33, together with interest at the rate of 3 per cent from March 12th, 1920.

We, therefore award the claimant the sum of $3,230.33 together with interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum from March 12th, 1920.


text:
    The Merchants Loan and Trust Company, as Trustee Under the Last Will and Testament of Frederick Whitney Newall, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion, filed September 11, 1922.

    Inheritance Tax — when claimant entitled to refund. There being no dispute as to the facts and the law governing this case the Court enters an award in favor of claimant for the amount of the claim, with interest thereon.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim under section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Law for refund of a portion of the inheritance tax in the estate of Frederick Whitney Rewhall, deceased.

The essential facts are as follows: Said decedent died testate August 28,1914, a resident of Cook County, and the claimant was appointed executor, acted as such and is now acting as trustee under the will. In the inheritance tax proceedings in the estate one-third of the net estate, being subject to certain contingencies, was assessed at the highest possible rate, under section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Law on the assumption it would ultimately vest in a stranger, the tax so assessed being one hundred fifty-nine and 05/100 dollars ($159.05). Said tax together with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from decedent’s death, to-wit: $20.41, was duly paid by the executor October 16, 1916, the total payment being one hundred seventy-nine and 46/100 dollars ($179.46). Said one-third of the net estate on February 26, 1922, became vested and indefeasible in Myrtle Rewhall and Elinor Rewhall, daughters of an adopted son of said decedent. Thereafter, an order was entered by the County Court of Cook County which was approved by the Attorney General, reassessing the inheritance tax in said estate in which it was ordered that no inheritance tax is due upon said one-third of the estate.

The Attorney General has filed a statement, admitting the above facts, and consenting to a refund of $179.46, together with interest on same at the rate of 3% per annum from October 16, 1916.

Claimant is therefore awarded the sum of $17'9.46, together with interest at the rate of three per cent per annum from October 16, 1916.


text:
    Louis J. Baden, et al, Trustees Under Will of John Baden, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Inheritance Tax — when refund will be made. Under the facts proven and admitted by the State claimant is entitled to a refund of inheritance tax paid under Section Twenty-five (25) Inheritance Tax Law.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   Tills is a claim for refund of inheritance tax, by Louis J. Baden, and Charles F. Loercli, trustees under the last will and testament of John Baden, deceased; and payment of the amount of $413.68, with interest thereon at the rate of 3% per annum from June 19th, 1914, is consented to in his reply by the Attorney General.

Under the will, the entire residue of the estate was placed in trust, claimants being named as trustees until decedent’s youngest child should attain the age of twenty-one years, who became of age April 2d, 1917.

April 28th, 1914, an inheritance tax was assessed in said estate of $63,544.60 against 2/3 of the residue of the trust property subject to such contingencies as might arise under section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Law.

When the said youngest child reached his majority, the property became by law, divisable to all the legatees, and it is ascertained that the share of no one of the said children would equal $20,000.00.

It is therefore manifest that no inheritance tax is due in said estate. The evidence introduced sustains the declaration, and an award is hereby made to claimants in the sum of $413.68, with interest thereon at the rate of 3% per annum, from June 19th, 1914.


text:
    Joseph Tiller v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Governmental Function — State is not liable for injuries sustained by an inmate of its institutions during the period of his confinement. The State in conducting the Joliet Penitentiary exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries sustained by the inmates thereof during the period of their confinement.
    Workman’s Compensation Act — Sec. 5- (Session Laws, 1913.- page 3'¡0j construed. The word “employee” as used in the Workman’s Compensation Act of 1913, means:
    1. Every person in the service of the State under appointment, or contract for hire, express or implied, oral or written, except any official of the State, etc.
    2. Every person in the service of another under any contract or hire, express or implied, oral or written.
    Contractual Relation — does not exist between State and inmates of its institution. Claimant when convicted of crime and sentenced to the State Prison, forfeited his liberty and civil rights, his right to contract and be contracted with — all are suspended during his confinement as a part of the penalty for his crime; and no contract of employment for hire, express or implied, exist between him and the State.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim filed by Joseph Tiller, claimant, an inmate of Joliet State penitentiary of Illinois for compensation for alleged injuries incurred by him while serving, under sentence, and doing time as a convict under the laws of the State.

The facts, as disclosed by the evidence are briefly stated, and are as follows:

On December 31st, 1914, while an inmate of the State penitentiary at Joliet, the claimant who had been assigned the duty of “Ash-pit man,” while in the act of cleaning out the ashes from the pit, was badly burned by steam, ashes, etc. The pit, early in the morning, had become filled with water from the boiler, out of which, the flue had blown a short time prior to the accident.

At the request of the chief (officer we suppose) who asked for volunteers to go down in the ash pit and clean it out, claimant volunteered to undertake the job. It is stated in the declaration and argument of counsel for claimant, that the cleaning out of the ash-pit at this particular time, under the particular circumstances, to-wit: The ash pit

being full of water and the boiler flues blown out, was a very dangerous operation.” The fires in the furnace above had not yet been cleaned out. However, in response to - such call for volunteers, the claimant volunteered and went down into the ash-pit, which was about four feet deep in water, to clean it out. The water came up to his breast. Claimant went to the manhole to get the car in which to load the refuse from the pit, and while so doing, the fireman (whom we assume* was a fellow-convict), turned the grate, releasing a large quantity of fire, ashes, etc., which fell into the water, in the pit, causing an explosion by reason of the contact of the fire and water, and the claimant was badly scalded and burned by the steam thus produced, his arms, hands, face, neck, chest, both ears partially burned off, eyelids on left eye partially burned off, left ear entirely closed up, and'caused a cataract on left eye. He was entirely blind in his right eye when he was admitted as a convict in said institution, the cause of which, is not disclosed by the evidence. The sight of the left eye is damaged to the extent of % of normal vision. These afflictions laid him up and he was confined in the prison hospital for eleven months. Before his’ incarceration in the penitentiary, he was a strong able bodied man, except he was totally blind in right eye. He has since his confinement in the prison and prison hospital, been “released,” and is working in Chicago, shoveling coal. He says the prison authorities promised to help him in some way, and that he thought his claim had been filed with the Court of Claims long ago. The declaration states that he believes that this claim has never been presented to any State institution or State officer for payment.

The evidence does not disclose the full extent of his physical disability and our information as to that is mostly drawn from inference from the facts in evidence.

The attorney in his argument and brief states that claimant knew that the act of cleaning out the pit at that time was one of peril and dangerous, and that he, the claimant, was not required or coerced to undertake the “job,” but that it was a voluntary act; of the claimant in response, however, to a request of the “chief” for volunteer to undertake the task. The attorney classes the claimant as a hero for his attempt to perform this perilous act under circumstances very unusual and hazardous. As the flues had blown out and the pit filled with water, we assume that the cleaning out of the pit at that time was an emergency; and being done at an unusual hour, the fireman, who evidently had not been informed by claimant or any one else of his intentions to enter the pit at that time, turned the grates and let fire and ashes into the water-filled pit below while claimant was at the manhole getting the car, with results, as stated.

The claimant, is a married man, his first wife being dead, and he has married subsequent to his release. That claimant was badly and seriously injured, there can be no doubt, which might have been avoided by claimant or the “chief” giving notice to the fireman of the presence of the claimant in the ash-pit below. But this claim is brought on the theory that the claimant is entitled to compensation under the laws of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, citing said Court of Claims Law. Session Laws of 19.17, section 6, paragraph 6 in support of his right of action.

This case does not come under the “Workmen’s Compensation Act.”

The claimant’s attorney defines the word “Employer” to mean the “State, County,” etc., which is correct; but does not define the word “Employee” as used in said Act.

Section 5, page 340, Session Laws 1913, under what is known as “Workmen’s Compensation Act,” the word “Employee” is defined as follows: “The term 'Employee’ as used in this Act, shall be construed to mean. First — Every person in the service of the State, County, etc., under appointment, or contract of hire, expressed or implied, oral or written, except any official of the State, etc.”

The claimant was duly convicted of crime, sentenced to the penitentiary to serve his sentence. He had by his crime forfeited his right of personal liberty, his right of social and business relations with the world, his citizenship, his civil rights to contract or to he contracted with, to collect his earnings from any work he might do while serving his sentence, were suspended and his earnings go to the State, as a part of penalty for his crime. There is no employment, express or implied, for hire between the State and its convicts. The convict has no control over his time, right of occupation or money. The State authorities even prescribe the articles of food and the quantity of each kind, which shall he provided for the convicts; and shall determine the number of hours each day they shall be required to labor. Smith’s. Illinois Bevised Statute 1921, chapter 108, section 13.

The labor of the convict is under the direction of the warden, and goes toward keeping up the expenses of the operation of the penitentiary. Smith’s Bev. State, 1921, chapter 108, section 19.

On his discharge, each convict is furnished a suit of clothing, transportation and $10.00 cash, and whatever small incidental allowances he may have earned by working overtime while hired or leased out to some contractor. Section 21, same chapter, same Statute. This is by consent of warden, and under his supervision. Chapter 108, penitentiaries show clearly the relation of State and its convicts.

Harper’s Workmen’s Compensation second edition, page 185, section 98 says: It has been said “Employer” and “Employment” are not of the technical language of the law or any science or pursuit and must therefore be construed according to the context and approved usage of language.

Accepting the term therefore in its ordinary signification, an employer is held to he one who uses or engages the services of another for pay. An “Employee” has alrearv been defined by Statute to mean a person in the employ of another, under contract for hire. To pass a law making the State liable for injuries or death to convicts occurring while serving sentence would not tend to the betterment of the economic condition in the State.

It would open a floodgate for the prosecution of numberless questionable claims by an undesirable class of people; most of whom care but little for themselves or the interest of others, or the laws of the State.

The State is not an industrial insurance company for its convicts.

Such laws, if passed, would be contrary to public policy and void. While we sympathize with this claimant in his injured condition, yet we cannot find a shadow of law, whereby he may maintain a claim.

The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to the State in this case.

Henry Henke v. State, Vol. 2, page 11, C. of C. and cases cited.

Schmidt v. State, 1 Court of Claims, page 76.

The claimant does not show a legal or equitable cause at action.

For the reasons set forth, the demurrer is sustained, and that case dismissed.


text:
    J. S. Lovellette v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.
    Governmental Function — when State not liable. The State in conducting the St. Charles School for Boys exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries received by its employees in the discharge of their duty.

      Reimbursements — when reimbursement will be made. While no legal liability exists against the State, as an act of social justice and equity the Court may award to claimant compensation to reimburse him for various sums of money expended incident to the death and burial of his wife.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This claim was filed in this Court by J. S. Lovellette, husband of Grace E. Lovelette, deceased, who had been an employee of the State of Illinois, at the St. Charles School for Boys, at St. Charles, Illinois, from March 14th, 1914, up to and including the date of her death.

The facts in this case are not disputed. The testimony shows that Grace E. Lovellette was employed as, what is known as, a House Mother in the St. Charles School for Boys, owned, maintained and controlled by the State of Illinois; that she was the wife of the claimant, who was also employed at said State institution; that on February 11th, 1921, one of the inmates, Franklin Gossett, attacked Mrs. Lovellette with a heavy iron bar, commonly used as a shaker for the furnace in the cottage at which Mrs. Lovellette resided, and that on February 13, two days later, Mrs. Lovellette died. Franklin Gossett was arrested, confessed to the murder and was duly convicted and sentenced for murder in the Circuit Court of Kane County.

The claimant, in his petition states and the testimony shows that lie spent a large sum of money for funeral expenses, railroad fare, the transportation of his wife’s remains, for cemetery lot, tumbstone, etc.

Claimant does not claim to be dependent, he, on the contrary admits that he is not. He does not claim damages under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. There can be no question but what there is no liability on the part of the State of Illinois, even if the Workmen’s Compensation law applied. This question has been decided in numerous cases heretofore passed on by this Court.

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State of Illinois, has filed a demurrer which demurrer, as a matter of law will be sustained.

The Court has carefully reviewed the evidence presented in this case and we find that there is no liability on the part of the State of Illinois.

We find that the claimant has paid out various sums of money for the burial of his wife and other expenses attending her death and burial and that as a matter of social justice and equity he should be reimbursed.

We therefore recommend an award to the claimant in the sum of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00).


text:
    John D. Smiddy v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Governmental Function — when State not liable. The State in conducting the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac exercises a governmental function, and is not liable to its employees for injuries sustained through the tortious act of.an inmate of the institution.
    Social Justice and Equity — when allowance will be made. Although there may be no legal liability against the State where the facts and circumstances justify the Court will as an act of social justice and equity enter an award in favor of claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for compensation for injuries received by the claimant while in the performance of duties as a guard at the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac, Illinois on April 9, 1918, and again while acting as a guard and superintendent of a squad of prisoners from the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet, Illinois, who were doing sewer ditch work at the Illinois State Colony near Dixon, Illinois. There is no dispute as to the facts in the case. The claimant then a man 58 years of age received the first injury from blows dealt him on the head with a drill gun in the hands of an inmate of the Illinois State Reformatory, as a consequence of which he received a fracture of the skull and was confined to his bed at his home for about five weeks. The second injury, an assault upon the claimant while in the discharge of his duties was made by a prisoner from the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet over whom the claimant had charge. He was struck with an iron implement and his jaw broken. Testimony of physicians who treated him shows that it took about two years for the jaw to mend completely and that the physical condition of the claimant as a result of his injuries is such that he is unable to pursue his former regular employment.

It is not seriously contended that there is any legal liability upon the State in this case, and the Court holding to .its already extensive line of decisions in cases of this kind, holds that there is none, but the facts of this case on the other hand, clearly show it to be one of the character in which this Court has repeatedly stated that the doing of equity and social justice requires an' allowance to be made to the claimant. He has suffered painful injuries and a lasting disability while engaged in a dangerous duty in behalf of the State of Illinois.

It is therefore recommended by this Court that the sum of four thousand dollars be paid to the said claimant.


text:
    Albert Williamson v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.
    Governmental Function — Smiddy v. State, Supra, followed. This case is similar to that of Smiddy v. State, supra, and the decision of the Court as there announced governs this case.
    Edward J. Brunkage, Attorney General, for State.'
   This is a claim for compensation for an injury received by the claimant while in the employ of the State of Illinois at Watertown State Hospital at East Moline, Illinois. There is no dispute as to the facts in the case. On February 28th, 1921, while engaged in unloading ice at the ice house on the institution grounds, claimant was struck by a chunk of ice and his leg broken. The evidence indicates that the injury resulted from the tortorious act of a patient at the institution. The claimant was in the institution hospital for eight months following the injury and suffered great pain as a result of the injury and the treatment necessary in effecting a cure. It appears that the claimant suffered a permanent partial disability.

The State has demurred as to its legal liability and the demurrer is sustained following our practice in eases of this kind. However there is no serious contention on either side that there is any responsibility except that existing from the standpoint of social justice and equity. The claimant here was injured while in the performance of his duty as an employee of the State of Illinois without his fault and we therefore hold that this case is in line with others in which we have recommended an allowance as a matter of social justice and equity.

It is therefore recommended by'the Court that the sum of fifteen hundred dollars be allowed by the State of Illinois and paid to the claimant.


text:
    Margaret Pearson, Administratix of the Estate of Mauritz Lindstrom, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Governmental Function — when State is not liable. The State in constructing the new penitentiary at the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet, exercised a governmental function and is not liable for injuries received by the employees engaged in its construction.
    Social Justice and Equity- — when claim will be allowed. The Court may enter an award in favor of claimant as an act of social justice and equity although no legal liability exist against the State.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This case comes before the Court upon the petition of Margaret Pearson, administratrix of the estate of Mauritz Lindstrom, deceased, praying that the Court will award damages to the amount of $10,000.00, by reason of the death of said Mauritz Lindstrom, caused while in the employment of the State of Illinois.

The testimony in this case shows that the deceased was in his lifetime and on the first day of December, 1921 employed as a carpenter in the construction of, what is known as the new penitentiary at the Illinois State penitentiary in Lockport Township, Will County, Illinois; that said construction was being carried on by the State of Illinois by and through the penitentiary commission; that on the first day of December, 1921, the deceased ivas assigned to work by his foreman or superintendent, on a scaffold erected about a concrete and steel cell house, known as Cell House E, at a height of about sixty feet, and that the said scaffolding broke and fell to the basement of the cell house, while the said Mauritz Lindstrom was engaged in his work on the same, as a result he fell to and upon the basement, whereby he received external and internaL injuries from which he afterwards, on December 2nd, 1922, died; that said Mauritz Lindstrom left him surviving, Britta Lindstrom, his mother, Linnea Lindstrom, his sister, John Lindstrom, Jonas Lindstrom and Alfond Lindstrom, his brothers who all reside in Sweden, also Anna Lindstrom and Margaret Pearson, who reside in Illinois.

The testimony shows that said Mauritz Lindstrom and Eric Lindstrom, now deceased, were contributing equal monthly amounts to their mother in Sweden and had also contributed a considerable amount to their sister, Anna Lindstrom; that said Anna Lindstrom sometimes worked at her trade but that in the past few years she had submitted to several operations which has undermined her health and was dependent on her two brothers for partial support; that the sister, Margaret Pearson was not a dependent, neither was the sister, Linnea, who resided in Sweden, although the evidence shows that said Linnea Lindstrom' was now living at home with her mother, since the death of her two brothers, owing to the condition of her mother’s health, caused by the shock of the death of Mauritz Lindstrom and Brie Lindstrom.

While the testimony does not show that the mother was wholly dependent upon her two deceased sons for her support, still it is not unreasonable to presume that she was, as the two sons, Jonas and Alfond were of tender years and physically incapable of doing heavy manual labor, besides the evidence shows that Alfond was attending school. The son, John, was in the military service in Sweden and by reason of his small pay was unable to contribute but a very small, if any, amount toward the support of his mother. The sister, Linnea, was living away from home, earning her own way it is reasonable to presume that she was unable to contribute toward the support of her mother. The daughters, Anna, Lindstrom and Margaret Pearson, evidently contributed nothing toward the support of her mother, as Anna was a dependent of her two deceased brothers, as we have heretofore stated, while Margaret Pearson was married and is dependent on her husband and is, without doubt, financially unable to contribute to the support of her mother.

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State of Illinois has filed a demurrer to this petition, which, as a matter of law will be sustained.

Under the numerous previous decisions of this Court, there can be no question but what the State of Illinois is not liable for injuries sustained by or for the death of its employees while in the performance of their duties, as either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable to the State.

The Court has reviewed the evidence and finds that there is no question but that Britta Lindstrom, Linnea Lindstrom, Jonas Lindstrom, Alfond Lindstrom and Anna Lindstrom are dependent on the deceased for partial support, and while we find that there is no liability on the part of the State of Illinois, still we believe, that as an act of social justice and equity an award should be made that would be equal to one-half of the maximum amount allowed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided said Act applied to the State of Illinois.

We therefore award to said petitioner, Margaret Pearson, as administratrix of the estate of Mauritz Lindstrom, deceased, the sum of one thousand eight hundred and'seventy-five dollars ($1,875.00).


text:
    J. Whitfield Smith v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Medical Services — when State liable therefor. Where a physician aging Officer, and the claim is approved by the proper State authorities, the renders medical services at a State institution, at the request of its Man-State is liable for the services rendered.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim filed by Dr. J. Whitfield Smith, for medical servicers rendered by claimant at the Illinois Soldiers’ Orphan Home, at Hormal, Illinois, at request of the institution’s managing officer, during a period commencing March 22nd, 1919, and ending June 24th, 1921, amounting to $1,065.00.

This claim has been approved by the Director of the Department of Public Welfare. At time the bill for such services was presented to the department for payment, the appropriation out of which it was to have been paid, had lapsed, and a claim is presented to this Court for same.

The Attorney General consents to an award for said amount. The Court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $1,065.00.


text:
    Gust Carlson, Administrator of the Estate of Charles Nelson, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Governmental Function — Minnie Johnson v. State, Supra, followed. This case is similar to that of Minnie Johnson v. State, Supra, and the decision of the Court as there announced governs this claim.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a case wherein Gust Carlson, Administrator of the estate of Charles Kelson, deceased, files a claim for .the sum of $10,000.00, by reason of the death of said Charles Kelson, while in the employment of the State of Illinois.

The testimony in this case is identically the same as in the case of Minnie Johnson v. State of Illinois, with the exception of the date of the death and the dependents.

The testimony in this case shows that there are the following dependents left, him surviving, Lina Kelson, widow, Myrtle L. Kelson, Walter M. Kelson and Grant C. Kelson, his children, as his sole heirs at law and next of kin, and all of whom were dependents upon him for their support.

The Attorney General has filed a demurrer to said petition, which is sustained by this Court.

That the State of Illinois is not liable for injuries sustained by, or for the death of its employees while in the performance of their duties, has been decided by this Court in numerous eases.

However, as a matter of equity and social justice an award should be made in this case, and the Court recommends an award in the sum of three thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars ($3,750.00).


text:
    Samuel B. McDaniels v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.
    Governmental Function — Johnson v. State, Supra, followed. This case is similar to that of Johnson v. State, Supra, and the decision of the Court as there announced governs this claim.
    Social Justice and Equity — when award will be made. While the State is not liable, where claimant is engaged in a hazardous employment, the Court will as a matter of social justice and equity will enter an award.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for compensation for an injury sustained by claimant on March 13th, 1922, while in the employ of the State as a guard at the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet. It appears that the claimant ivas struck upon the right hand by a rock thrown by a prisoner at the institution and that the bones in the third finger and little finger of the hand were broken. There is no dispute as to the fact that the claimant was in the discharge of his duty and that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment by the State in an extra hazardous undertaking. A demurrer to the claim has been filed by the State which must be sustained as a matter of law but the considerations of equity and social justice compel the Court to hold in this case as it has in many similar cases that the claimant is entitled to an allowance. It appears that he was compelled to cease the performance of his employment for about five days and carry his hand in splints and bandages for about five weeks. The claimant testifies that his fingers were permanently injured but his is the only testimony to that effect.

It is therefore recommended by the Court that the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) be allowed by the State of Illinois and paid to the claimant.


text:
    Frank L. Kness v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.
    Governmental Function — Jones v. State, Supra, followed. This case is similar to that of Jones v. State, Supra!, and the decision of the Court announced in that case governs this claim.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for compensation for injuries received by claimant while performing his duties as a guard at the Illinois State penitentiary at Joliet on July 4th, 1921. On the morning of said day he had charge of the dining room where the prisoners at that time were eating breakfast. It appears at that time a negro convict attacked another negro convict with a knife. The claimant attempted to separate the convicts and during the altercating the claimant was cut on the head commencing at a point near the upper part of the right temple, thence directly over the right eye through the base of the claimant’s nose and over his left upper lip and cut him also three or four other places in the vicinity of the right temple. As a result of such injuries claimant suffered pain for a considerable period of time and it further appears that the claimant’s nose had been disorganized.

The State has demurrer to this claim and it is the opinion of this Court that the demurrer should be sustained as a matter of law. This position has been taken by this Court in this line of cases.- However it has also been the practice of this Court to recognize claims of this character from the view point of equity and social justice believing that the claimant was engaged in a hazardous occupation in behalf of the State of Illinois. It is therefore recommended by this Court that the sum of one thousand dollars be allowed by the State of Illinois and paid to the said claimant, Frank L. Kness.


text:
    Raymond M. Kettinger, Administrator of the Estate of Maud Helen Kettinger, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Respondeat Superior — when State not liable. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty.
    Social Justice and Equity — 'when award will be made. While there is no legal liability against the State, where claimant is injured while in the performance of her duty, the Court will as a matter of social justice and equity enter an award in her favor.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim filed by Raymond M. Kettinger, administrator of the estate of Maud Helen Kettinger, deceased, on account of injuries sustained by his intestate while employed as a housekeeper at the Women’s Dormitory of Illinois State Normal University, at Normal, Illinois, which injuries later caused the death of decedent.

To this declaration, the Attorney General, has demurred generally and specially and has filed brief and argument.

A stipulation ivas entered into by and between parties of the suit, consenting that the letters attached thereto, might be considered in evidence, as fully as if they had been introduced in evidence by proper legal proceedings.

The facts in the case, as disclosed by the evidence, that decedent was a housekeeper at the Women’s Dormitory of the Illinois State Normal University at Normal, Illinois, at a salary of $90.00 per month, and maintenance. That on the 15th day of November, 1921, while in said dormitory, going to supper, “she tripped and fell in the hall, breaking her left hip,” that on November 18th, she was taken to Brokaw Hospital in Normal, Illinois, where she received medical attention from Dr. F. C. McCormick, and the services of a special nurse, who was paid by deceased. She remained there until December 24th, 1921, when she was removed to her room at the dormitory, where she received personal care of friends and relatives. On January 30th, 1922, she arose from her bed, and got upon crutches, and fell, breaking her right (other) hip. It is not clearly disclosed by the evidence whether the nurse or attendant was then present. February 2, 1922, she died as a result of the injuries received in this last fall. David Felmy, president of the College in his affidavit, admitted by agreement, in evidence, states that the deceased was housekeeper in said institution; that amongst other things, it was her duty to purchase supplies, employ the needed help in the hall, and supervise all service rendered by such employees. That, among her duties, was also the supervision of the work of the laundress, who operated the laundry machine, which was a steam laundry, with modern laundry machinery, including a steam washer, centrifugal drying ma; chine, and mangle, that she had supervision of the ice machine, all of which machinery is driven by electric motors.

The claim is filed for the recovery of the total amount stated to be due for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for the period of total incapacity, for necessary hospital, medical and nurse bills, amounting to ten hundred seventy dollars, thirteen cents, as claimed by the attorney for the plaintiff, in his argument and brief. But the bill of particulars sets forth claim for the following items, viz:

Brokaw Hospital bill....................................$ 351.13

Miss Gaines, 10 days special nurse......................... 00.00

Miss Albers, special nurse............ 222.00

Dr. McCormick........................................ 198.00

Dr. Bian.............................................. 12.00

Dr. Chapin............................................ 25.00

Dr. Gailey ............................................ . 25.00

Funeral and Burial Expenses............................. 150.00

Compensation during period of total incapacity for 12 2-7 weeks and $14.00 week, less compensation, paid by Fell Hall ............................................... 127.00

Total 'amount due .....................................$1,170.13

But, as above stated, the attorney for claimant asks for an award of only $1,070.13. Mr. Britton, Assistant Attorney General makes a vigorous and able argument against the allowance of this claim or any part thereof, contending that the State is not liable under any section of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; and that if it were liable under such Act, that it was not liable in this case under section 8, as contended by counsel for claimant, as the employment as shown by the evidence is not extra hazardous.

This Court has repeatedly held that the State is not liable for damages in such cases and the demurrer to said cause is sustained, but in the interest of social justice and equity and good conscience, we have decided to recommend that the Legislature make an appropriation for claimant in the sum of eleven hundred seventy- and 13/100 dollars to be applied on the aforesaid expense bills.


text:
    Edith Shotwell v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Governmental Function — Lamb v. State, Supra, followed. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty.
    Social Justice and Equity — reeommetidation. As a matter of social justice and equity the Court under the circumstances in the case, recommends to the Legislature an appropriation to claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for compensation for injuries received by one Louis F. Shotwell, now deceased, while in the discharge of his duties as a guard at the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet on September 10th, 1917, and on September 21, 1920. The claimant is the widow of the Louis F. Shotwell, and he left no issue surviving him and no administration has been had upon his estate. The injuries received were inflicted upon the deceased while he was engaged in his duties and endeavoring to quell or prevent disorder among inmates of the institution. The petition sets forth that in the encounter of September 10th, 1917, he suffered severe knife wounds in the neck, causing great pain and suffering and leaving permanent scars, and that in the encounter of September 21, 1920, two bones in the fingers of his left hand were broken causing a partial loss of the use of said fingers. There is no dispute as to the facts but the State demurred to the claim.

It is the opinion of the Court that the demurrer should be sustained as a matter of law and this Court has repeatedly held in cases of this kind that there is no legal liability upon the State. However, the Court has just as consistently held in many cases where the facts have been similar to those in this case that as a matter of social justice and equity some compensation should be paid. The facts of this case show that the injured man received his injuries while unhesitatingly engaged in the performance of a dangerous duty, we are therefore of the opinion that an allowance should be made to the claimant, his widow. It is therefore recommended by this Court that the sum of twelve hundred fifty dollars be allowed by the State of Illinois and paid to the said claimant, Edith Shotwell.


text:
    Edward J. Birk, et al. v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Inheritance Tax — when refund will be made. There being no dispute as to the facts and law governing this claim the Court enters an award in favor of claimant for the amount of their claim.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for refund of inheritance tax, erroneously assessed and erroneously paid.

Decedent died testate in Cook County, March 2nd, 1920, and his will was duly probated.

By proper proceedings, an inheritance tax was assessed in said estate -in the sum of $4,587.27, which less 5% was paid, making $4,357.91, paid into the County Treasury of said county.

Thereafter, it was alleged by the executors that the Federal Government claimed the sum of $15,816.95, as additional income taxes of decedent for the years 1917, 1918 and 1919, which amounts were not deducted in the inheritance tax proceedings in computing the net estate and the inheritance tax due thereon.

And upon petition to the County Court, of which the Attorney General was duly notified, the County Court entered an order August 21st, 1922, modifying the original order of the County Judge, reassessing the tax at $4,289.91, from which order, no appeal was taken. It is found that amount of inheritance tax due the State is $4,289.91, less o% discount equals $4,075.42, showing claimant entitled to a refund of $282.49.

The Attorney General admits this to be due and consents to an award accordingly. The sum of $282.49, without interest is accordingly awarded claimants, Edward J. Birk, Frank Birk and Amelia Birk, executors of the last will of Jacob Birk, deceased.


text:
    A. L. Denton v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Respondeat Superior — when State not liable. The doctrine of Respondeat Superior does not apply to the State and it is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty.
    Social Justice and Equity — recommendation. While the State is not liable for the injuries sustained by claimant, the Court as an act of social justice and equity recommends to the Legislature an appropriation to compensate him for the injuries sustained.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant, A. L. Deaton, files his declaration herein, claiming $30,000.00 for personal injuries alleged to have been incurred by him, while in line of duty, and in the exercise of due caution, care and diligence for his personal safety, while in the employ of the State at the State Capitol on the 18th day of November, A. D. 1922.

In his declaration, claimant alleges that he is a married man, 61 years old, has wife, two daughters, and one son, who reside with him, the latter being under 16 years of age, at the time of the alleged injury. That he has been in the employ of the State of Illinois as an engineer under the Secretary of State since January 2nd, 191.2, and immediately prior to that time, he for a period of approximately one year, was employed by the State in a similar capacity at the State Hospital at Bartonville, Illinois. His Salary was, and still is $150.00 per month. That, as suclr engineer in the office of Secretary of State, it became, and was the duty of claimant to perform such work as the Secretary of State might direct, said work consisting mainly and largely7, if not wholly, in the inspection and repairing, when necessary, the elevators, heat and water systems in the Capitol building, commonly known as the “State House,” and the power plant of the State at the Capitol City.

In the course of such employment, while in line of his duties, and while using ordinary care and caution for his personal safety, while putting on grease or dressing on the machinery, as directed by his immediate superior, his hand was caught between the drum and steel cable or rope around it, and the elevator being then in motion, the claimant was thrown violently over the said drum, resulting in tearing off his entire left hand, except the thumb, the breaking of one rib, deep cuts and scars in his chin, and face, terribly disfiguring him, and maiming him for life; that he suffered a great nerve shock, and being old, has almost totally incapacitated him from performing of hard manual labor. The claimant presented Ms case without counsel. He appeared in open court, and was examined and interrogated orally by the Court and exhibited his wounds. The facts stated in the declaration are not denied by the Attorney General, who -files his answer herein, consenting that the documents A, B, C, D and B attached to his answer might be considered in evidence, without objection, and malting no objection to the Court’s recommendation in such an amount as equity and good conscience may demand.

The various exhibits so introduced are in proof of the various amounts expended by claimant to physicians, hospitals, nurses, etc., amount to about $400.00.

“Exhibit E” is the evidence of Dr. Fred P. Cowdin, who in part, testified as follows: I was called November 18th, 1931, to dress the

wounds and to treat claimant. His injuries consist of loss of hand, except thumb; the extensor tendons were torn out of his wrist up into the forearm, resulting in a wrist drop and practical uselessness of the part of the hand that remains.” “Also a deep laceration in his chin, which healed, leaving a permanent disfiguring scar, great shock to the nervous system, and cerebral concussion. There were also two ribs broken on the left side, etc.”

The claimant’s appearance in open court, disclosed to the Court that he was badly disfigured by wounds and that he was almost totally incapacitated from performance of manual labor, as a result of the injuries alleged. While the Court has repeatedly held that the State is not legally liable in such eases, yet in this case, we certainly think this a case strongly appealing to the Court, in eqriity and good conscience, and in the interest of social welfare, to compensate the claimant in part for his said injuries, sustained. We have decided to, and hereby do award to claimant, the sum of four thousand dollars, and we recommends an appropriation for said amount.


text:
    The Western Electric Company, Inc. v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

      Contract — ivhen State liable for freight charges. Claimant entered into a contract with the State, through the Department of Public Works, to furnish certain cedar poles of specified length, etc., at a certain price. The poles were delivered prepaid by claimant as per terms of contract. The shipment was refused by the proper authorities and claimant was required to take back the shipment and pay the freight charges on same. Held, claimant entitled to recover from the State the freight charges paid.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The petition of the Western Electric Company, a corporation, filed in this Court, sets forth the following:

That on or about, to-wit, the 10th day of February, 1921, the State of Illinois, through the Department of Public Works and Buildings, by Fred J. Postel, Supervising Engineer of the Division of Engineering, entered into a contract with the said plaintiff, whereby the said Department of Public Works and Buildings agreed to purchase from the said plaintiff, and the said plaintiff agreed to sell to the said department seven cedar poles of standard grade and quality, each being thirty-live feet long and having a minimum diameter of six inches at the top, for an agreed price for said poles for the sum of two hundred thirty-five dollars and fift3’-five cents ($235.55), said poles to be shipped to Menard, Illinois, for the use of the Southern Illinois Penitentiary, freight to be prepaid on same by the plantiff, etc.

The petition set forth that said poles were shipped as per contract; that said shipment was refused by the defendant and that the plantiff was required to take back said shipment and to pay the freight charge on same to and from Menard, Illinois, which said freight charges amounted to the sum of one hundred seventy dollars and fifty-seven cents ($170.57).

The Attorney General, Edward J. Brundage, waives proof of the above claim and says that the defendant has no defense to the same and consents that an award be made by this Court in the sum of $170.57.

It is therefore considered by the Court that the claim be allowed for the said sum of one hundred seventy dollars and fifty-seven cents ($170.57).


text:
      Anna Peters, Executrix of the Will of Fred Peters, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Ixhebitakce Tax — refund. There being no dispute as to the facts and law governing this claim, the Court enters an award in favor of claimant for the amount of her claim.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for refund of inheritance taxes in the estate of Fred Peters, deceased.

Decedent died testate a resident of Iriquois County, Illinois, March 23d, 1921, and claimant was duly appointed executrix of his will, and is now acting- as such. Claimant was given power by the will as administratrix to sell the real estate belonging to deceased and to pay the proceeds, after setting aside a fund for decedent's widow, to decedents eight children, in equal shares, or to the survivor of them in the event that any having no issue surviving before sale.

The County Judge of said county on the 2.0th day of June, A. D. 1921, assessed a total inheritance tax in said estate of $835.94, against the inheritance of said children, said tax being assessed under section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Law, and at the highest possible rate; and the same with interest was paid to County Treasurer, March 1st, 1922, the total payment being $883.31.

On the 25th day of September, 1922, upon the hearing of petition of the executrix for a re-assessment of the tax, by reason of the fact that the land had then been sold, and the proceeds divided among the said eight children, none having pre-deceased, that event, the County Court entered an order finding no inheritance tax due in said estate, which order no appeal has been taken and none will be taken by the Attorney General, as admitted by the Attorney General.

From the evidence in the case, and admitted by the Attorney General, the Court finds that the sum of $883.31 is clue as refund to claimant, together with interest thereon at 3% per annum, from March 1st, 1922, which said sum with interest as aforesaid, is hereby awarded the claimant.

The Attorney General admits the correctness of the award.


text:
    J. L. Doyel, Administrator of the Estate of Elias Doyel, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Inheritance Tax — refund of tax erroneously paid. In this case the administratrix after the inheritance tax had been assessed and paid, filed a petition in the County Court praying for a modification of the original order of assessment to correct an error in failing to deduct therefrom the Federal Tax and the payment of back general property taxes. The original order was modified by the County Court allowing the deductions. Held,claimant entitled to a refund of the excess inheritance tax erroneously paid, without interest.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for refund of inheritance tax erroneously paid by the estate of Elias Doyel, deceased.

The deceased died intestate January 18tli, 1922, a resident of Green County, Illinois, and claimant was duly appointed administrator of his estate.

On July 12th, 1922, the County Judge of said county assessed a total inheritance tax in said estate of $4,103.64, which amount less 5% discount for payment within six months of decedent’s death, was paid July 14th, 1922, the net payment being $4,468.46.

The evidence discloses that after such payment so made as aforesaid, the administrator filed a petition with the County Judge alleging that after said assessment, certain claims against the estate, not considered in said assessment, had been paid by the estate to-wit: The Federal Estate Tax in said estate, and a certain assessment made by the Board of Review of said Green County for back general property taxes upon said decedent’s property; and also alleging in said inheritance tax assessment, a deduction of $1,911.45 was claimed by the administrator, and allowed by the Court on account of general property taxes for 1921; and the petition prayed a modification of said assessment to correct said errors.

Upon hearing of the petition, October 16th, 1922, the County Judge entered an order as prayed in modifying the original order and assessing a total tax in said estate of $4,599.38. This amount less the 5% is the correct amount of the inheritance tax in said estate. The State having been paid $4,468.46, the claimant is entitled to a refund of inheritance taxes erroneously paid of $99.05, without interest, to which award, the Attorney General consents, and award is accordingly made for the said sum of $99.05.


text:
    Eva Wilson v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Inheritance Tax — refund of tax erroneously paid. Where it appears that certain property was inadvertently and erroneously assessed which did not belong to the deceased, and an inheritance tax paid thereon, and upon proper proceedings the County Court modified the original order and reassessed the tax, correcting the error. Held, claimant entitled to a refund of the tax erroneously paid.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for refund of inheritance taxes erroneously assessed and erroneously paid.

The decedent died May 30th, 1921, testate, a resident of Cook County, and claimant was duly appointed executrix of the will.

The County Judge of said county assessed a total inheritance tax in the estate of $2,163.48, which less 5% which was paid November 30th, 1921.

Thereafter, it ivas found that in making the appraisement, certain property was inadvertently and erroneously appraised and assessed, ivhich did not 'belong to deceased, and thereupon a petition was filed in the County Court, and the Attorney General duly notified of such procedure.

On the 29th day of August, 1922, the County Court re-assessed the inheritance tax in said estate at $362.30, from which order, no appeal was taken. The amount actually due was found to be $344.21. The amount paid was $2,055.31. The difference between the last two sums is the amount due claimant on refund to wit: $1,711.10, and that

amount is accordingly awarded to claimant without interest.


text:
    Margaret Pearson, Administratrix of the Estate of Eric Lindstrom, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Governmental Function — This case is similar to that of Margaret Pearson, Admr’x., etc., v. State, Supra, and the decision, of the Court in that case governs this case.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This case conies before the Court for its consideration and opinion, upon ¡letition of Margaret Pearson, administratrix of the estate of Eric Lindstrom, deceased, praying that the Court will award damages to the amount of $10,000.00, by reason of the death of said Erie Lindstrom, caused while in the employment of the State of Illinois.

The testimony in this case is substantially the same as in the case of Margaret Pearson, administratrix of the estate of Mauritz Lindstrom, deceased; that said testimony shows that said deceased was a brother of said Mauritz Lindstrom, deceased, and that each had contributed equal amounts toward the support of their mother and certain sisters and brothers.

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State of Illinois has filed a demurrer to this petition, which, as a matter of law will he sustained.

Under numerous decisions of this Court it has been held that the State is not liable for injuries sustained by, or for the death of its employees, neither does the Workmen’s Compensation Act apply to the State of Illinois.

In this case, as in the Mauritz Lindstrom case, this Court has carefully reviewed the evidence and finds that Britta Lindstrom, Linnea Lindstrom, Jonas Lindstrom, Alfond Lindstrom and Anna Lindstrom, were dependent on said deceased, Eric Lindstrom, for partial support, and while we find that the State of Illinois is not liable, still we believe that an award should be made that would equal one-half of the maximum amount allowed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, provided said act was applicable to the State.

We, therefore, as an act of social justice and equity award said petitioner, Margaret Pearson, administratrix of the estate of Eric Lindstrom, deceased, the sum of one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five dollars ($1,875.00).


text:
    Joseph H. Hartley v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Respondeat Superior — token State not liable. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees in the discharge of their duty.
    Social Justice and Equity — token allowance will be made. While no liability exist against the State for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty, yet as an act of social justice and equity, where the circumstances of the case justify, the court may recommend to the Legislature an allowance of compensation to claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant in this case was injured by being struck by lightning on June 10th, 1921, while in the employ of the State of Illinois as a foreman in the instating of sewers and other like work at the new Illinois State Penitentiary then in course of construction at Joliet, Illinois. The evidence shows that the place at which the injury Avas received Avas especially attractive to lightning by reason of the existence of a high tension electric transmission Avire and 66,000 volt electric transformer in the immediate vicinity together Avith the facts that the east wall of the penitentiary Avhich is re-enforced Avitli steel and iron Avas Avitliin some two hundred feet of the spot at which the accident occurred and that the place Avhere the claimant was Avorking was Ioav and damp and that a pool of Avater stood nearby. It further appears that the claimant prior to the time he was struck by lightning appeared strong and healthy, had working and industrious, and was reputed to be one of the hardest Avorking men at the penitentiary, and that subsequent to the injury he seems to become tired and fatigued easily and frequently ceases Avorlc to rest and is nervous and easily excited. His left side was almost completely paralyzed by the shock and this paralysis continued for several days but gradually improved. Testimony of the physician who treated the claimant Avas that his central nervous system Avas almost shattered; that he is very nervous and at times hardly able to control himself and that in the opinion of the Avitness, a part of the nerve cells of the claimant Avere destroyed and it is questionable Avhether he aauII ever recover and the witness is inclined to the opinion that he will not. It is admitted by the State that the employment of the claimant was extra hazardous, that the injury arose in the course of his employment and it is not disputed that it arose out of his employment.

A demurrer to the legal liability of the State Avas interposed and .following our practise in these eases based upon clearly recognized doctrines of law the demurrer sustained. However, it is also the practise of this Court in seeking to comply with the requirements of equity and social justice to recommend an allowance in cases of this kind where we must hold as we do here that there is a moral responsibility upon the State. Our only further concern is as to the amount wldc-h the claimant should be entitled to receive. Claimant is 41 years of age and resides with his family which consists of his wife and four children. The evidence shows that the claimants employment with the State and his salary have not been affected by the injury. He is still receiving a salary of $200.00 per month, the same that he received at the time of the injury. While there is therefore no showing that the claimant is not earning as much as he did before the injury yet the facts of the case clearly indicate that his earning power is actually not as great and were he to lose his employment with the State he would doubtless be unable to secure employment at the salary he is now receiving from the State. The evidence shows that before the injury the claimant was a hoisting engineer and that due to the impairmen of his nervous system as a result of the injury he is no longer able to obtain employment as such. We do not consider however that the injury is such as to entitle claimant to a compensation equal to the maximum amount which he would receive if compensation were computed in accordance with the rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. We have considered what in our judgment would be a proper allowance in view of all the facts in this case and it is recommended therefore by the Court that the sum of fifteen hundred dollars be allowed by the State of Illinois and paid to the claimant.


text:
    Minnie D. Johnson v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed November 28, 1922.

    Governmental Function — This case is similar to that of Margaret Pearson, Adrar*®., etc., v. State, Supra, and the decision of the Court in that case governs this case.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This case comes before the Court upon the petition of Minnie -D. Johnson, widow of Neis Johnson, praying that this Court award her the sum of $10,000.00 by reason of the death of her said husband, Neis Johnson, caused while in the employment of the State of Illinois.

The testimony in this case shows that the deceased was in his lifetime and on the 1st day of December, 1921, employed as a carpenter in the construction of, what is known as the new penitentiary at the Illinois State penitentiary in Loekport Township, Will County, Illinois; that said construction was being carried on by the State of Illinois by and through the penitentiary commission; that on the 1st day of December, 1921, the deceased was assigned to work by his foreman or superintendent, on a scaffold erected about a concrete and steel cell house, known as Cell House E., at a height of about sixty feet, and that said scaffolding broke and fell to the basement of the cell house while said Neis Johnson was engaged in his work on the same, as a result he fell to and upon the basement, whereby he received external injuries from which he afterwards, on the 2nd day of December, died.

The testimony shows that said Nels Johnson left, him surviving his widow, Minnie D. Johnson, Sophia Johnson, Rudolph Johnson, Agnes Johnson, Harry Johnson, Viola Johnson, Theodore Johnson, Howard Johnson and Alfred Johnson; that all of the said persons were dependent upon the said Neis Johnson for support, except Sophia Johnson and Rudolph Johnson who reside in the City of Chicago and are supporting themselves.

The attorney general filed a demurrer to the petition, which as a matter of law will be sustained.

There can be no question under the law but what the State of Illinois is not liable for injuries sustained by or for the death of its employees while in the performance of their duties, as neither the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable to the State of Illinois.

However, the Court finds that as a matter of equity and social justice an award should be made and we therefore award the petitioner the sum-of three thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars ($3,750.00).


text:
    Eugene H. McColm v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1923.

    Governmental Function — Illinois State Reformatory. The State in conducting the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty.
    Social Justice and Equity — when award will he made. While no legal liability exists against the State for the injury received by its employees in the discharge of their duties as an act of social justice and equity the Court recommends to the Legislature an appropriation to claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.,
   The declaration in this case discloses that, the claimant, Eugene H. McColm, was, on February 16, 1922, and for a long time prior thereto, a civil service employee of the State of Illinois and was located at Pontiac, Illinois, and employed in the Illinois State Reformatory, said Reformatory being an institution under the control of said State of Illinois; that by the direction of the officials of said institution, he, the said Eugene H. McColm, was on February 18, 1922, stationed as an officer and instructor on duty in the book bindery, that on said day there was a great deal of work to be done in said department, and in the operating of a paper cutter, and while using due care for his 'own safety, the knife of said machine came in contact with claimant’s hand and thereby the index finger of his left hand was severed below the second joint and that plaintiff is thereby permanently injured.

Claimant further shows that he is a book binder by trade, is of the age of 52 years, is married, and has a wife and family, hut no minor child or children; that he has been engaged at said State institution since 1904 with the exception of about one year in 1910-1911 and of about 11 months in 1917-1918; that he is injured and damaged by reason of the injury aforesaid and seeks damages in the amount, of $2,000.00.

The Attorney General, in behalf of the State of Illinois has filed a demurrer, which as a matter of law will be sustained by the Court.

The law is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to the State and that in the absence of Statute, the State is not liable for the torts of its officers, agents, inmates or employees; that the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not apply to the State and that the State in conducting a State institution exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries to employees thereof.

Plaintiff’s counsel, in his statement to the Court admits that the claimant suffered no loss of time and that claimant has been to no expense for treatment, treatment having been administered by the physician at the reformatory.

The plaintiff is a man along in years, is married and evidently has been a valued servant of the State of Illinois and while there is no legal obligation on the part of the State to allow an award for any amount, still we believe that as a matter of good conscience, social justice and equity an award should be made in this case.

It is therefore the judgment of this Court that it be recommended to the Legislature that the claimant be awarded as his damages the sum of one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars.