text:
    (No. 74-CV-8
    William F. Boswell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1975.

    William F. Boswell, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on January 15, 1974, at 6245 South Drexel, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. William F. Boswell, victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the AcC).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, William F. Boswell, age 64, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2 (c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4)

2. That on January 15,1974, claimant was shot by an unknown assailant or assailants as he was entering his car. The assault was completely unexpected and claimant did not see who fired the shot.

3. That there was no evidence found by police investigation of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That, as a result of this injury, claimant suffers complete paralysis of his lower extremities. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported there in are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant or assailants were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for lost earnings to the date of this opinion as a result of his continuing disability.

8. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his injury were $946.88. As a result of his injury claimant was unable to work from January 15, 1974, to January 15, 1975, and continues to be unable to work as the date of this opinion. Using his average monthly earnings as a basis, claimant has sustained a loss of earnings of $5,681.28 for the first 26 weeks of his disability. He was, however, indemnified by Metropolitan Life Insurance in the amount of $5,200.00, resulting in á net loss for the first 26 weeks of $481.28.

9. Claimant has sustained an unindemnified loss of earnings for the second half of the one year period of $5,681.28. The maximum compensation for loss of earnings in a period of one half year, or 6 months, pursuant to Sec. 4 of the Act, is $3,000.

10. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Loss of Earnings...............................$ 3,481.28
2) Hospital .....................................$20,123.25
3) Medical......................................$ 1,195.00
$24,799.53

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7 (d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .)”.

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim and deduction of $200, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point, we are adopting a recent opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of the Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth (1973) 296 N.E. 2d 477.

12. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by Sec. 7 (d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $120.00. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in Par. 10, leaves an amount of $24,479.53 as the actual loss sustained by the claimant. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the maximum amount payable under the Act, $10,000.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $10,000 be awarded to the claimant, William F. Boswell, the innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety Nine Dollars and Ninety Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant is the sum of $9,000.01 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 74-CV-17
    Violet Mae Watermann, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1975.

    Violet Mae Watermann, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on November 6, 1973, 207 East Chicago Street, Elgin, Kane County, Illinois. Violet Mae Watermann, a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as “the Acf ).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Violet Mae Watermann, age 56, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit: "Aggravated Battery”,

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on November 6, 1973, claimant was stabbed twice by an unidentified assailant, during an apparent robbery of her store at 207 East Chicago in Elgin.

3. That an investigation by the police investigators after the crime was committed presents no evidence of any provocation by the victim for the attack upon her.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from November 6,1973, to November 11,1973, as a result of the injuries she received as a result of the stabbing of November 6, 1973. A further, and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and her assailant were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. The investigation is presently continuing.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of earnings caused by her absence from her store as a result of her injuries.

8. That the victim was unable to work during the period of November 6,1973, to November 20,1973, as a result of her injuries; that she sustained loss of earnings during this period in the amount of $375.00 based on her average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceeding her injury. This amount is compensable pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

"Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

9. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Loss of earnings................................ $ 375.00
2) Hospital...................................... $ 451.75
3) Medical.......................................$ 207.00
$1,033.75

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefits of the applicant . . .)”.

11. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by Sec. 7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $684.70. This amount, the statutory deduction of $200, and an uncompensable service charge of $2.05 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in Par. 9, leaves an amount of $147.00 as the actual compensable loss sustained by the claimant. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $147.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $147.00 (One Hundred Forty Seven Dollars) be awarded to the claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-24
    Doris Spencer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1975.

    Doris Spencer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on February 26,1974, at Armitage and Orchard Streets in Chicago. Doris Spencer, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71 et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Doris L. Spencer, age 24, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

“Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 38, sec. 12-4).

2. That at approximately 10:00 P.M., on February 26,1974, the claimant was waiting for a bus at the corner of Armitage and Orchard Avenue. That she was approached by an unidentified person, brandishing a gun, who told her to "be quiet and don’t move.” That she was shot three times. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That a passing motorist, one Robert L. Fried-lander, hearing the shots fired and seeing the claimant fall, stopped his car and hailed a passing police car.

4. That the claimant was taken to Augustana Hospital where she was hospitalized from February 26,1974, to March 7, 1974.

5. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance by viewing suspect photos. That claimant was unable to make an identification of her assailant and that no arrests have been made in connection with this criminal offense.

7. That the claimant and her assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

8. That claimant seeks compensation under the Act for medical expenses and lost wages.

9. That claimant was unable to work from February 26,1974, to March 22, 1974. That claimant’s average net earnings for the six month period immediately preceding the injury was $458.09. That claimant received sick pay of $130.81. That claimant’s actual net earning loss was $327.28.

10. That, in addition to lost earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$2,128.76
2) Medical...................................... 75.00
3) Loss of Earnings............................... 327.28
$2,531.04

11. That in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the ’Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source . . .”

12. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from her loss, as contemplated by sec. 7(d) of the Act, were shown to be $2,104.00. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in sec. 10, leaves an amount of $227.04.

It Is Hereby Ordered, that the sum of $227.04 (Two Hundred Twenty-Seven Dollars and Four Cents) be awarded Doris L. Spencer, as an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-53
    Juan A. Solano, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1975.

    Juan A. Solano, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on April 18, 1974, at Beldon and Bissell Streets in Chicago. Juan A. Solano, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Juan A. Solano, age 24, is a victim of a violent crime as defined in Sec. 2 (c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on April 18, 1974, at approximately 7:30 P.M., the claimant was walking home from De Paul University where he is a law student. That as he approached the corner of Beldon and Bissell streets, he was hit over the head twice with a steel pipe by an unknown assailant. That the assailant then fled. That the claimant made his way a half a block to his home. That his parents took the claimant to the hospital and called the police. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That the criminal offense was reported promptly by the claimant’s parents to the Chicago Police Department, and that the claimant has cooperated fully with their requests for assistance. That the claimant was able to give a general description of his assailant, but no arrests have been made in connection with this offense.

4. That statements taken by the police shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

5. That the claimant and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the claimant was taken to Augustana Hospital, where a scalp laceration was closed with 16 sutures.

7. That as the result of his injuries, the claimant has sustained the following expenses:

1) Hospital....................................... $472.00
2) Doctor........................................ 50.00
3) Medication..................................... 5.00
$527.00

8. That the claimant was a full time law student at De Paul University and is not making a claim for lost earnings.

9. That the claimant has received no benefits or reimbursements, directly or indirectly, nor is he or his family entitled to any such benefits from other sources as a result of his injuries.

10. That in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act’, or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source . . .”

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $327.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered, that the sum of $327.00 (Three Hundred Twenty-Seven Dollars) be awarded Juan A. Solano, as an innocent victim of the violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-10
    Frank Beato, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1975.

    Frank Beato, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on June 7, 1974, at 522 South Laramie Avenue, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Frank Beato, a victim of crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act’).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence presented at a hearing held before the Commissioner on December 5, 1974, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Frank Beato, age 56, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(d) of the Act, to wit:-

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on June 7, 1974, claimant was shot in the back while working in his sandwich shop at 522 South Laramie. Prior to the shooting, Frank Beato was getting ready to close his shop and pick his daughter up from school.

3. That no evidence was presented of any provocation by the claimant for the shooting of him in his shop.

4. That Mr. Aaron Harris of 8223 South Jeffrey, discovered the body and notified the Chicago Police who transported the victim to Loretto Hospital, 645 South Central, Chicago. The victim was transferred to Presbyterian Saint Lukes Hospital, 1753 West Congress, on June 25, 1974, and to Marionjoy Rehabilitation Hospital in Wheaton on July 26, 1974. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant, fled in an unknown direction and has not been identified.

6. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their request for assistance.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for medical expenses, loss of earnings and loss of future earnings.

9. That investigation by the Attorney General’s Office revealed that claimant is paralyzed from the waist down. That this is a permanent disability which will keep claimant from working for the remainder of his life.

10. That at the time of Frank Beato’s injury, he was 56 years old and has a life expectancy to age 76 according to actuarial tables. Therefore, we must conclude that the claimant has lost his earnings and future earnings for the remainder of his normal life expectancy, computed to be 20 years.

11. That the claimant’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his injury were $369.17. This is to be considered as the basis for determining loss of earnings, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

"Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

12. That, based on the claimant’s normal life expectancy of 20 years, and taking $369.17 per month as his average earnings, the loss of earnings and future earnings is computed to be $88,600, an amount far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded as compensation under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

13. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Loss of earnings and future earnings..............$ 88,600.00
2) Hospital....................................$ 24,775.01
3) Medical....................................$ 2,907.53
$116,282.54

14. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7 (d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefits of the applicant. . .)”.

15. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant and anticipated benefits, as contemplated by Sec. 7 (d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $23,884.24. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in Par. 13, leaves an amount of $92,198.30 as the actual loss sustained by the claimant. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the maximum amount payable under the Act, $10,000.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000.00, be awarded Frank Beato, as an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety Nine Dollars and Ninety Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $9,000.01 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-11
    Lawrence A. Haupt, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1975.

    Lawrence A. Haupt, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on April 15, 1974, at 810 South Kilbourn, in Chicago. Lawrence A. Haupt, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Lawrence A. Haupt, age 35, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2 (c) of the Act, to wit:

“Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 38, sec. 12-4).

2. That on April 15, 1974, the claimant entered an alley behind 810 South Kilbourn, where, without warning, he was struck on the head from behind. The claimant, who was knocked unconscious, fell forward striking his face on the pavement.

3. That the claimant was found by one Gil Ashford, who helped the claimant to a nearby residence and called the police. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

4. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

5. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials. That claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance, but has not been able to make an identification of his assailants.

6. That the victim and his assailants, were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the claimant was hospitalized at Loretto Hospital from April 15, 1974, to April 18, 1974, where he was treated for multiple lacerations of the face and head, a sprained neck and a cerebral concussion.

8. That the claimant was unable to work as the result of his injury from April 15, 1974, until April 19, 1974, a total of 4 working days. That based upon the claimant’s average net earnings for the six months immediately preceding his injury, his net earnings per day were $20.45.

That the court shall determine loss of earnings based on victim’s average monthly earnings of $500 per month, whichever is less. That claimant’s net earning loss is $81.80.

9. That the claimant has incurred medical, hospital expenses, and loss of earnings as follows:

1) Hospital.......................................$464.75
2) Doctor........................................ 45.00
3) Loss of Earnings ................................ 81.80
$591.55

10. That the claimant has received no benefits or reimbursements, directly or indirectly, from any other source, nor is he entitled to any such benefits from any other source as the result of his injuries.

11. That in determining the amount of compensation to which the applicant is entitled, sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the "Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source . .

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $391.55.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $391.55 (Three Hundred Ninety-One Dollars and Fifty-Five Cents) be awarded Lawrence A. Haupt, as an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-17
    Dorothy Serritella, on behalf of Russel P. Serritella, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1975.

    Dorothy Serritella, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on October 31, 1973, at 29th Avenue and St. Charles Road, Bellwood, Cook County, Illinois. Dorothy Serritella, mother of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70 Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act").

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased son, Russell P. Serritella, age 25, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit: "Murder”, (Ill. Rev.

"Murder”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 9-1).

2. That on April 4,1974, claimant’s son was shot by unknown assailants after leaving Mock Fun Casino at Mannheim Road and North Avenue, in Stone Park. Prior to the shooting, Russell P. Serritella had been driving home after an evening of drinking at several taverns.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the decedent for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim died on October 31, 1974, as a result of the wound he received in the shooting of October 31, 1974. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailants have not been identified.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim at the time of his death was unemployed and not contributing to the support of the claimant.

9. That the claimant incurred medical, hospital and funeral expenses for the victim which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$ 129.00
2) Funeral and Burial.............................$2,893.80
$3,022.80

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7 (d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”.

11. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by Sec. 7 (d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $400. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in Par. 9, leaves an amount of $2,422.80 as the actual compensable loss sustained by the claimant. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award payable under the Act of $2,422.80.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $2,422.80 be awarded to the claimant, Dorothy Serritella, as a relative who assumed the funeral expenses for Russell P. Serritella, the deceased victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety Nine Dollars and Ninety Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $1,422.81 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-102
    Sonja Buzan, on behalf of William P. Buzan, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 6, 1975.

    Sonja Buzan, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on January 5, 1974, at Derby Tavern, Christian County, Taylorville, Illinois. Sonja Buzan, wife of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Ac?).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the court, the court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband, William P. Buzan, age 35, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, eh. 38, §9-1).

2. That on January 5, 1974, claimant’s husband was shot to death by Jack Stevens at Derby Tavern in Taylorville. Prior to the beating, William Buzan had been sitting peaceably at the Derby Tavern, drinking.

3. The police investigation, after the crime was committed, presents no evidence of any provocation by the decedent for the attack upon him by Jack Stevens on the night of January 5, 1974, at the Derby Tavern.

4. That the victim died on January 5, 1974, as a result of the injuries he received in the shooting of that night. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That Jack Stevens was indicted in Christian County on charges of murder and subsequently tried and found guilty in said county and sentenced to a period of 50 to 90 years in the State of Illinois correctional institutions.

6. That the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of support to herself and her daughter, Susan Jane Buzan, age 10.

9. That at the time of William P. Buzan’s death, he was 35 years old and had a life expectancy to age 76 according to actuarial tables. Therefore, we must conclude that the. decedent’s family has lost his financial support for the remainder of his normal life expectancy, computed to be 41 years.

10. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his death were $800, but earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of support, pursuant to the following provision in §4 of the Act:

". . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

11. That, based on the victim’s normal life expectancy of 41 years, and taking $500 per month as his average earnings, the loss of support to this family is computed to be an amount far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded as compensation under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

12. That, in addition to loss of support, the claimant incurred funeral expenses for the victim which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

Funeral Expenses $1,855.48

13. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, [except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . .

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death, and deduction of $200, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point we are adopting a recent opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth (1973), 296 N.E. 2d 477.

14. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $1,855.48. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 1111 and 12, leaves the amount of the actual loss sustained by the claimant and her child far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime. Hence, the claimant and her child are entitled to an award in the maximum amount payable under the Act, $10,000.

The Court takes notice of the fact of the minor child of the deceased victim, who is named in 118 of this opinion, was also dependent on William Buzan as was his surviving spouse, Sonja Buzan, the claimant, and the mother of decedent’s said minor child.

Under these circumstances the court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in §8(b):

"(b) If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for [her] support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it [the Court] shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled, and (3) order that those amounts to be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor or incompetent, to his [her] guardian or conservator, as the case may be.”

To comply strictly with the above legislative directive, it would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution of the $10,000 award in accordance with the rule of distribution stated in §11(1) of the Probate Act. This rule would allow one-third ($3,333.33) to the victim’s surviving spouse, and the remaining two-thirds ($6,666.66) to the victim’s minor child. This would create a separate estate in the amount of $6,666.66 for Susan Buzan, age 10.

However, to make distribution in this manner, we believe would impose an undue hardship on the mother. If the $10,000 award were paid to her in a lump sum, she would be holding $6,666.66 in trust for her minor child. Although she is guardian of her person, she would have no power to administer her estate nor use her funds unless she is duly appointed guardian of the minor’s estate as provided by law. Perry v. Carmichael, (1880), 95 Ill. 519. After such appointment, she would be required to manage her child’s funds frugally under the direction of the appointing Court and present periodic accounts of her guardianship to such Court. She would also be responsible for Court costs and any legal expenses required in filing her petition for appointment, oath, surety bond, and accounts.

To obviate necessity of the claimant being appointed guardian of her child’s estate, and considering all other facts in this case, the Court believes that the best interest of the victim’s family would be served by our ordering that this award be disbursed to the claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized in §8(a) (4) of the Act. As the natural guardian of the minor child, the mother has a legal obligation to provide for her suitable support and education. In fulfilling this obligation, we believe she would necessarily be required to expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and nurture of her child as well as for her own necessities.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $10,000 be awarded to the claimant and her minor child, collectively, as persons who are dependent for their support on William Buzan, the deceased victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the aforesaid award be paid to the claimant, Sonja Buzan, in twenty (20) equal monthly installments of $500 each. The Court directs that said monthly payments shall be made from the Court of Claims Fund insofar as it is legally possible to do so.


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    (No. 74-CV-2
    Clarence Austin, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Clarence Austin, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on December 8, 1973, at 6954 South Yale Avenue, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Clarence Austin, victim of crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat, 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act’).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence presented at a hearing held before the Commissioner on December 5, 1974, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Clarence Austin, age 25, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on December 8, 1973, claimant was accosted by three men as he was getting out of his car at 6954 South Yale in Chicago. One of the men took out a straight razor and slashed the victim on the face and fingers.

3. That there was no evidence presented that the injury to the claimant was attributable to his wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant.

4. That the victim transported himself to Wood-lawn Hospital, 6060 South Drexel, Chicago, Illinois, where surgery was performed by Dr. Edlberto Nepomunceno. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailants, fled from the scene and have not been identified.

6. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for medical expenses and loss of earnings.

9. That the claimant was unable to work from December 8, 1973, to February 12, 1974, a total of 2 1/5 months, or 67 days.

10. That the claimant’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceeding his injury were $650 or $21.35 per day and $1,430.68 for the 67 days. That claimant received compensation for his lost earnings in the amount of $600, and that his lost earnings as a result of his injury were therefore $830.68. This amount is less than $500 per month and is therefore compensable pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

"Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

11. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$1,527.95
2) Medical......................................$ 840.00
$2,367.95

12. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7 (d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments of awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”.

13. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by Sec. 7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $2,084.95. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in Par. 10 and 11 leaves a loss compensable under the act of $913.68. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $913.68, i.e.,

Net loss of earnings................................$ 830.68
Net Hospital and Medical ........................... 283.00
$1,113.68
Less $200 deductible ............................... 200.00
Amount awarded...............................$ 913.68

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $913.68 (Nine Hundred Thirteen Dollars and Sixty Eight Cents) be awarded to the claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 74-CV-29
    Elnora Price, on behalf of Ellis Price, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Irving Drobny, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on November 16, 1973, at 2936 West Adams Street, Chicago. Elnora Price, widow of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act").

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband, Ellis Price, age 49, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 9-1).

2. That on November 16, 1973, at approximately 6:15 p.m., Ellis Price was returning to his home from a grocery store when he was accosted by two unidentified men at the entrance to an alley at 322 South Whipple, who attempted to rob him. There was a struggle and one of the men shot Price in the back of the head.

3. That there were two eye witnesses to the shooting: Michael Parker, age 13, of 318 South Whipple, and Michael D. White, age 14 of 323 South Albany.

4. That a third witness, Manyou Mickels of 330 South Whipple, heard a shot, looked out her window and saw the victim lying on the ground and two men running down the alley. That Ms. Mickels telephoned the Chicago Police Department immediately after the shooting. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of provocation by the decedent for the attack upon him by his two assailants.

6. That the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has cooperated fully with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim was taken to Mt. Sinai Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. That death was caused by a large caliber bullet entering the top of the head and shattering the brain.

9. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of support to herself and her three children, Michael, age 17, Terry, age 15, and Leewanda, age 13.

10. That at the time of Ellis Price’s death, he was 49 years old and had a life expectancy to age 73 according to actuarial tables. Therefore, we must conclude that the decedent’s family lost his financial support for the remainder of his normal life expectancy, computed to be 24 years.

11. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding his death was $965.59, but earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of support, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

. . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

12. That based on the victim’s normal life expectancy of 24 years, and taking $500 per month as his average earnings, the loss of support to his family is computed to be $144,000.

13. That, in addition to loss of support, the claimant incurred funeral expenses in the amount of $1,786.00. That the gross amount of the pencuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Loss of Support ..............................$144,000.00
2) Funeral....................................$ 1,786.00
$145,786.00

14. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act’, or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .)”

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death, and deduction of $200, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point we are adopting a recent opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth (1973) 296 N.E. 2d 477.

15. That, in the claim before us, the claimant has received life insurance benefits in the amount of $70,013.27. That pursuant to Sec. 7(d) of the Act, the first $25,000 of life insurance that inurs to the benefit of the applicant are exempt from the statutory deductions. Accordingly, $45,013.27, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as shown in Par. 13, leaves an amount of $100,572.73 as the actual loss sustained by the claimant and her children. Hence, the claimant and her children are entitled to an award in the maximum amount payable under the Act, $10,000.

The Court takes notice of the fact that the three minor children of the deceased victim, who are named in Par. 9 of this opinion, were also dependent on Ellis Price as was his surviving spouse, Elnora Price, the claimant and the mother of decedent’s said three minor children.

Under these circumstances the Court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in Sec. 8(b):

"(b) If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for (her) support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it (the Court) shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled, and (3) order that those amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor or incompetent, to his (her) guardian or conservator, as the case may be.”

To comply strictly with the above legislative directive, it would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution of $10,000 award in accordance with the rule of distribution stated in sec. 11(1) of the Probate Act. This rule would allow one-third ($3,333.33) to the victim’s surviving spouse, and the remaining two-thirds ($6,666.66) divided equally among the victim’s three minor children. This would create three separate estates in the amount of $2,222.22 each for Michael, age 17, Terry, age 15, and Leewanda, age 13.

However, to make distribution in this matter, we believe would impose an undue hardship on the mother. If the $10,000 award were paid to her in a lump sum, she would be holding $6,666.66 in trust for her three minor children. Although she is guardian of their person, she would have no power to administer their estates nor use their funds unless she is duly appointed guardian of each minor’s estate as provided by law. Perry v. Carmichael (1880) 95 Ill. 519. After such appointment she wuold be required to manage her children’s funds frugally under the direction of the appointing Court and present periodic accounts of her guardianship to such court. She would also be responsible for Court cost.; and any legal expenses required in filing her petition for appointment, oath, surety bond, and accounts.

To obviate the necessity of the claimant being appointed guardian of her children’s estates, and considering all other facts in this case, the Court believes that the best interest of the victim’s family would be served by our ordering that this award be disbursed to the claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized in sec. 8(a)(4) of the Act. As the natural guardian of her three minor children, the mother has a legal obligation to provide for their suitable support and education. In fulfilling this obligation, we believe she would necessarily be required to expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and nurture of all three of her children as well as for her own necessities.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $10,000 be awarded to the claimant and her three minor children, collectively, as persons who were all dependent for their support on Ellis Price, the deceased victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the aforesaid award be paid to the claimant, Elnora Price, in twenty (20) equal monthly installments of $500 each. The Court directs that said monthly payments shall be made from the Court of Claims Fund insofar as it is legally possible to do so.


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    (No. 74-CV-83
    Judith Dulin, on behalf of Jimmy B. Dulin, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Judith Dulin, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 16, 1974, at 7933 South Parnell, Chicago. Judith Dulin, wife of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71 et seq. (hereafter referred to as “the Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband, Jimmy B. Dulin, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 9-1.

2. That on the morning of March 16,1974, the body of Jimmy B. Dulin was found in the basement of 7933 South Parnell, Chicago. The body had been stabbed 55 times.

3. That Wilbur Hilliard of 7933 South Parnell called the police to report that a dead man was in the basement. That when the police arrived, it was determined that the victim had been dead for several hours.

4. That subsequent police investigation revealed that the victim had been drinking the night before; that he met Wilbur Hilliard who invited him to spend the night at his home; that the victim accompanied Hilliard to his home; that during the early morning hours, Hilliard went into the basement and stabbed the victim to death with a kitchen knife; that Hilliard then attempted to dispose of the knife by throwing it on the roof top of a neighboring house.

5. That statements, taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the decedent for the attack upon him by his assailant. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

6. That in a jury trial held the week of January 27, 1975, before Judge Romiti in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Wilbur Hilliard was found guilty of the murder of Jimmy B. Dulin.

7. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

8. That the criminal offense was reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

9. That the victim had been unemployed for two years preceding his death.

10. That loss of support is determined pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

"Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

11. That the court must follow the statutory language when determining the dependent’s loss of support. That as the victim had not been supporting his family for the six month period immediately preceding his death, this Court can not make an award for loss of support.

12. That the claimant has incurred funeral expenses for the victim in the amount of $1,102.00.

13. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other sources, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”

14. That the claimant or her family has not received nor will be entitled to receive any benefits from any other sources as the result of the victim’s death.

15. That the claimant has incurred $1,102.00 of expenses from which $200 must be deducted pursuant to Sec. 7(d) of the Act.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $902.00 (Nine Hundred and Two Dollars) be awarded to Judith Dulin, as widow of Jimmy B. Dulin, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-21
    Jerome E. Zaring, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Jerome E. Zaring, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on January 31, 1974, at 624 West Division Street, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Jerome Zaring, victim of crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (Hereafter referred to as "the Act’).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Jerome Zaring, age 40, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on June 7, 1974, claimant was struck over the left eye with a baseball bat while decending the stairs from the 12th floor of the Cabrini Green Housing Project at 624 West Division Street. Prior to the battery Jerome Zaring was making a sales call in apartment 1209.

3. That no evidence was presented that claimant’s injury was attributable to either his wrongful act or substantial provocation on his part.

4. That the victim notified the Chicago Police Department who transported the victim to Henrotin Hospital, 111 West Oak Street, Chicago, where he was treated in the emergency room and transferred to Northwestern Memorial Hospital, Superior and Fairbanks Street, Chicago, where he was treated for a skull fracture and deep lacerations. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. However, the assailant has not been identified and the police have suspended their investigation.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for medical expenses and loss of earnings.

8. That the claimant was in the hospital from January 31, 1974, to February 6, 1974, and that he did not return to work for two weeks after he came home from the hospital. That this was a reasonable amount of time for recovery from the type of injury that the claimant suffered.

9. That the claimant’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his injury were $566, but earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of support, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

"Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

10. That based on a period of three weeks lost time, and taking $500 per month as his average earnings his loss of earnings is computed to be $375.

11. That in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, the amount of pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

1) Hospital ........•.............................$1,308.13
2) Medical......................................$ 135.00
$1,443.13

12. That in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”

13. That in this claim before us the claimant has not received any benefits from other sources. The statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in Paragraphs 10 and 11 leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $1,618.13. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $1,618.13.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $1,618.13 be awarded to the claimant as an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred and Ninety Nine Dollars and Ninety Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $618.04 be referred forthwith the General Assembly for its approval.

The Court adds this parenthetical note for imformational purposes. The claimant has informed the Court that he is contemplating having plastic surgery to remove scars on his face that resulted from his injury. Without further evidence that this is an appropriate medical expense pursuant to Sec. 4 of the Act, the court can make no determination as to this issue. The claimant may, however, seek modification of this award at a future date pursuant to Sec. 9 of the Act.


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    (No. 75-CV-83
    Kenneth J. Weinberger, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Kenneth J. Weinberger, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on June 15,1974, at 4348 Cullom, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Kenneth J. Weinberger, a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70 Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "iZie Act’).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Kenneth J. Weinberger, age 25, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery,” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on June 15, 1974, claimant was shot by unidentified assailants upon entering the scene of a burglary in process at the home of his girl friend. This same criminal action resulted in injuries to other victims which are not discussed in the subject claim.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the victim for the attack upon him by the unidentified burglars.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from June 15 to June 26, 1974, as a result of the injuries he received in the shooting of June 15, 1974. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

7. That the claimant was unemployed at the time of his injury and can not show any loss of earnings for the period of his disability.

8. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

1) Hospital..................................... $4,295.50
2) Medical...................................... $1,160.00
$5,455.50

9. That there is no evidence that claimant has received any compensation from, local, state or federal funds, insurance of any kind, or from any other source.

10. Pursuant to Sec. 7(d) of the Act, the court must deduct the first $200 of expenses.

11. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all the requirements of this Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $5,255.50 be awarded to claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred and Ninety Nine Dollars and Ninety Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $4,255.51 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 74-CV-71
    Joan M. Price, on behalf of Richard J. Price, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 20, 1975.

    Joan M. Price, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on November 29, 1973, at 3158 N. Clark, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Joan M. Price, wife of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, etb seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act").

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband, Richard J. Price, age 40, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 9-1).

2. That on November 29, 1973, claimant’s husband was shot in the head during a robbery of Stahl’s Auto Supply, 3158 N. Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois, where he was employed as store manager.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the decedent for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim died on December 5, 1973, as result of the injuries he received in the shooting of November 29, 1973. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailants, Sylvester Buckner and Charles Taylor, were indicted in Cook County on charges of murder.

6. That the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of support to herself and one child, Joan Marie Price, age 16.

9. That at the time of Richard Price’s death, he was 40 years old and had a life expectancy to age 73 according to actuarial tables. Therefore, we must conclude that the decedent’s family lost his financial support for the remainder of his normal life expectancy, computed to be 33 years.

10. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his death were $676.08, but earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of support, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

. . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

11. That, based on the victim’s normal life expectancy of 33 years, and taking $500 per month as his average earnings, the loss of support to his family is computed to be an amount far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded as compensation under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

12. That in addition to loss of support, the claimant incurred funeral expenses for the victim which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

Funeral ..........................................$755.00

13. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this court—

"shall deduct $200. . .”

We interpret this provision to mean that the deduction of $200, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act.

14. That the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in Secs. 11 and 12, leaves the amount of the actual loss sustained by the claimant and her child far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime. Hence, the claimant and her child are entitled to an award in the maximum amount payable under the Act, $10,000.

The Court takes notice of the fact that the child of the deceased victim, who is named in Sec. 8 of this opinion, was also dependent on Richard Price as was his surviving spouse, Joan M. Price, the claimant, and the mother of decedent’s said minor child, who is under age 18.

Under these circumstances the Court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in Sec. 8(b):

"(b) If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for (her) support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it (the Court) shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled, and (3) order that those amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor or incompetent, to his (her) guardian or conservator, as the case may be.”

To comply strictly with the above legislative directive, it would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution of the $10,000 award in accordance with the rule of distribution stated in Sec. 11(1) of the Probate Act. This rule would allow one-third ($3,333.33) to the victim’s surviving spouse, and the remaining two-thirds ($6,666.66) to the victim’s minor child.

However, to make distribution in this manner, we believe would impose an undue hardship on the mother. If the $10,000 award were paid to her in a lump sum, she would be holding $6,666.66 in trust for her minor child. Although she is guardian of her person, she would have no power to administer her estate, nor use its funds unless she is duly appointed guardian of the minor’s estate as provided by law. Perry v. Carmichael (1880) 95 Ill.519. After such appointment she would be required to manage her child’s funds frugally under the direction of the appointing Court and present periodic accounts of her guardianship to such Court. She would also be responsible for Court costs and- any legal expenses required in filing her petition for appointment, oath, surety bond, and accounts.

To obviate the necessity of the claimant being appointed guardian of her child’s estate, and considering all other facts in this case, the Court believes that the best interest of the victim’s family would be served by our ordering that this award be disbursed to the claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized in Sec. 8(a)(4) of the Act. As the natural guardian of her minor child, the mother has a legal obligation to provide for her suitable support and education. In fulfilling this obligation, we believe she would necessarily be required to expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and nurture of her daughter as well as for her own necessities.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $10,000 be awarded to the claimant and her minor child, collectively, as persons who were dependent for their support on Richard J. Price, the deceased victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the aforesaid award be paid to the claimant, Joan M. Price, in twenty (20) equal monthly installments of $500 each. The Court directs that said monthly payments shall be made from the Court of Claims Fund insofar as it is legally possible to do so.


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    (No. 75-CV-53
    Rodney K. Peterson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Rodney K. Peterson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of a criminal aggravated assault on March 13,1974, in Farmer City, Illinois. Rodney K. Peterson seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Par. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates the matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant was a victim of a violent crime covered under the Act to wit:

"Battery”, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973, Ch. 38, Par. 12-3.

2. A detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported herein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That said crime occurred at 12:15 p.m. on Water Street, Farmer City, Illinois, at which time claimant was severely beaten. Claimant suffered a severe break of the left ankle and other severe contusions.

4. That said crime was promptly reported to the Farmer City Police Department and that claimant at all times has cooperated with law enforcement officials.

5. That the alleged assailant, Wayne Freeman, has pled guilty to one count of battery before the DeWitt County Circuit Court.

6. Claimant, as indicated by the report of the Attorney General, did not provoke the incident.

7. Claimant is not related to or a member of the same household of the assailant.

8. Claimant has suffered pecuniary loss in excess of $200 compensible by section 74 of the Act, to wit:

Hospital and Doctor $2,109.98

9. Claimant has received $1,908.60 in hospital and medical insurance as a result of this injury which shall be considered a set-off to this award.

10. Claimant was unable to work for a period from March 13, 1974, to May 20, 1974. Claimant’s average gross monthly income for the six months prior to this incident was $625.

11. Claimant’s lost income for the 68-day period he was unable to work computed on the basis of $625 per month was $1,486. Claimant received disability benefits in the amount of $728, leaving a net loss of income of $758.

12. Pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Par. 71, this Court must deduct the first $200 of pecuniary loss.

13. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of this Act and the claim is, therefore, compensible thereunder.

It Is, Hereby Ordered that the sum of $759.38 (Seven Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Thirty Eight Cents) be awarded Rodney K. Peterson as a victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-27
    Gary Wheaton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 14, 1975.

    Gary Wheaton, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of a criminal aggravated assault and battery on January 21, 1974, at approximately 2:24 a.m., on 5th Street in Madison, Illinois. Gary Wheaton seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Par. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates the matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant was a victim of a violent crime covered under the Act to wit:

"Aggravated Assault, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973, Ch. 38, Par. 12-2.”

2. A detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in an Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported herein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That said crime occurred at 2:24 a.m. at 5th Street, Madison, Illinois, at which time claimant was severely injured by two gunshot wounds fired by Tom Dalton.

4. That said crime was reported to Madison City Police Department promptly and claimant at all times has cooperated with law enforcement officials.

5. That the alleged assailant, Tom Dalton, has been indicted for aggravated assault, aggravated battery and attempted murder by a Madison County Grand Jury.

6. Claimant, as indicated by the report of the Attorney General, did not provoke the incident.

7. Claimant is not a relative of or a member of the same household of the assailant.

8. Claimant has suffered damages in excess of $200 compensible by section 74 of the Act, to wit:

St. Elizabeth Hospital..............................$3,330.60
Lag Surgical Clinic...............................: 650.00
Doctor.......................................... 150.00
$4,130.60

9. Claimant has not received nor is he entitled to any sums of money as a result of this injury which would be considered a set-off to any award.

10. Pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Par. 71, this Court must deduct the first $200 in expenses.

11. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of this Act and the claim is, therefore, compensible thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $3,930.00 be awarded Gary W. Wheaton as a victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 74-CV-5
    Fred W. Roeder, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 17, 1975.

      Fred W. Roeder, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Jerome Felsenthal, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of a criminal battery on February 15, 1974, at 10:00 p.m. at 3403 N. Marshfield, Chicago, Illinois. Fred W. Boeder, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act” (thereafter referred to as the "Act”), Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973 Chap. 70 Sec. 71 est. seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant was a victim of a violent crime covered under the Act to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973 Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4.

2. That the claimant has suffered pecuniary loss in excess of $200 compensable by Sec. 4 of the Act to wit:

A. Hospital Expenses .............................$10,057.15
B. Nurses...................................... 164.00
C. Doctor Expenses............................... 1,378.00
Total Medical Expenses......................$11,599.15
D. That claimant was unable to work from 2-16-74 to 6-17-74 as a result of his injuries. That he sustained an actual net loss in wages in the amount of $4,440.00 for this period. $4,440.00
less insurance reimbursement................. —800.00
Net Wage Loss ............................ $3,640.00
Net allowable wage loss $500 month............ 2,000.00
Total Expenses and Loss Wages................ 13,599.15
E. That direct benefits have been paid to the hospital and doctors and nurses by Continental Assurance Company Certificate No. L-10637-D4 in the amount of $9,423.92 and no other insurance compensation has been received or is claimant entitled to.
Less insurance benefits ......................-9,423.92
Total unreimbursed expenses.................. 4,175.23
Less $200 deductible pursuant to Sec. 7 (d) ....... —200.00
Total.................................... $3,975.23

3. That the appropriate law enforcement officials, The Chicago Police Department were notified of the perpetration of the crime allegedly causing the injury to the victim as soon after its perpetration as was reasonably practicable under the circumstances.

4. That claimant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials. That, James Matin, the assailant has been identified, apprehended and pleaded guilty to aggravated battery.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related and sharing the same household.

6. That there was no evidence presented that the injury to the claimant was attributable to his wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant.

7. That a Notice of Intent to File a Claim was duly filed as required by the Act on 3-11-74. That claimant’s application, subrogation, and authorization for records and reports were timely filed with the Court.

8. That, briefly summarized, the facts are: On February 15, 1974, at about 10:00 p.m., Fred Roeder, age 45, of 3403 North Marshfield, Chicago, was at his home when he heard loud yelling out on the street. He went outside to investigate and to make sure his son was not involved. He walked about a block and returned to the entrance of his home. Then he heard a noise "like a firecracker” and turned to see who was there. Roeder saw a man with a sawed off shotgun standing in a "gangway” pointing the weapon at him. At this point, the offender shot the victim in the stomach.

Subsequent investigation by the Chicago Police Department identified the offender as one James Michael Martin who confessed to the crime.

A more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in an Investigative Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report remains in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

9. That at the conclusion of a hearing held before Commissioner Fisher on December 5,1974, it was determined that the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all the requirements of the Act.

10. That this claim is, therefore, compensable under the Act.

11. That the amount of compensation due the claimant is $3,975.23 as determined by Sec. 4 and 7(d) of the Act.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $3,975.23 (Three Thousand Nine Hundred Seventy-five and 23/100ths Dollars) be awarded Fred W. Roeder as an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-nine and 99/100ths Dollars) be paid to the claimant immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $2,975.24 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 74-CV-59
    Rosolino Zappia, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 17, 1975.

    Lloyd E. Gussis, Mass Miller & Josephson, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Jerome Felsenthal, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of criminal act of murder of Joseph J. Zappia on December 20, 1973, at 3149 West Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Rosolino Zappia age 81, father of decedent, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act” (thereafter referred to as the "Act”), Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71 et. seq.

After hearings held before Commissioner J. Barry Fisher, on 12-5-74 and 1-29-75, this Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates the matter set forth in the application. Based upon the documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant’s decedent was a victim of a violent crime covered under Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 72, to wit:

"Murder” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 91.

2. That said crime occurred at approximately on December 20, 1973, at 3149 West Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, at which time claimant’s decedent suffered a fatal gunshot wound.

3. That said crime was reported promptly to the Chicago Police Department and claimant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials. That the assailant or assailants have not been identified and that the investigation is ongoing by the Chicago Police.

4. That there was no evidence that claimant was a relative or member of the same household of the assailant.

5. That there was no evidence presented that the injury to the decedent was attributable to his wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant.

6. That claimant has incurred expenses in excess of $200 compensable by Sec. 74 of the Act, to wit:

A. Funeral Expenses — Rago Bros.....................$1,133.50
Total Expenses................................$1,133.50

7. That there is no evidence that claimant has received or is entitled to any compensation from Workman’s Compensation, local, state or Federal funds or insurance of any kind. ($255.00 already deducted from funeral bill.)

8. Pursuant to Par. 77 (d) of the Act, the Court must deduct the first $200 of expenses.

200.00
$ 933.50

9. That a timely Notice was filed 4-16-74. That claimant’s timely application, subrogation and authorization for records were filed with the clerk on 6-7-74.

10. Claimant has made a claim for loss of earnings. The claimant was 81 years old and lived with his decedent son who was 50 years old in a building owned by the claimant which also had a tenant.

The claimant’s pension $282.00 a month, was intermingled with the decedent’s earnings. Claimant’s exhibit #4 show the following gross earnings for the decedent. 1972 — $3,326.44, 1973 — $3,022.86.

11. In view of the age of the claimant, his earnings and building income together with the tax returns of the decedent, we feel that the claimant has failed to prove a loss of earnings claim. Therefore, this portion of the claim should be denied.

12. A detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in an Investigative Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report remains in the Court’s file in this matter. The facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference, and are briefly summarized as follows: On December 20, 1973, Joseph J. Zappia, age 50, of 1064 N. Spaulding Avenue, Chicago, was working at the "Chez Joe Snack Shop,” which he owned at 3149 W. Chicago Avenue. On said day, at about 2:30 p.m., was emptying garbage in the alley behind his restaurant when he was shot and killed by an unknown person or persons.

The victim was discovered by one Joseph Liginza, a friend of the victim, who had been sitting in the victim’s restaurant. Liginza stated that the victim had been disposing of garbage in the alley; that when the victim did not return after about 10 minutes, Liginza proceeded to the alley behind the restaurant and discovered the victim lying in the snow. Liginza ran to the corner of Kedzie and Chicago, flagged down a passing police car, and informed a Sgt. Morseth, Star #1732, of the Chicago Police Department. The victim was removed by ambulance to Mt. Sinai Hospital and was pronounced dead on arrival. The coroner’s report indicated that the victim suffered two wounds from a pistol (caliber unknown) that entered the heart and liver.

13. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all the requirements of this Act, and that the claim is, therefore, compensable thereunder in the amount of $933.50 for the funeral expenses incurred. There were no doctor or hospital expenses since the victim was pronounced dead on arrival at Mt. Sinai Hospital. As stated in ¶11, we find that the decedent’s income was scarcely enough for his own subsistence, and that the claimant was not dependent upon the deceased victim for support. Hence the claim for loss of support must be denied.

14. That claimant was represented at the hearing by the law firm of Mass Miller & Josephson of Chicago, and that a fee charged to the claimant for their services in the amount of $185.00 would be reasonable.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $933.50 (Nine Hundred Thirty-three and 50/100ths Dollars) be awarded Rosolino Zappia, as father of an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 74-CV-85
    Clarence E. Johnson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Amended opinion filed March 18, 1975.

    Clarence E. Johnson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This Court has previously filed its opinion in the above matter awarding compensation to the claimant in the total sum . . . $422.43.

In that opinion, compensation for loss of three days’ earnings from part-time employment was denied to claimant. This claim of $105.00 was denied pursuant to the standards set down by the General Assembly in §4 of the Act.

However, re-evaluation of the legislative intent of this section, as interpreted by the Court, will permit loss of future earnings for such employment when established by competent evidence. Upon investigation by the Attorney General, such competent evidence of lost earnings has been established by claimant.

Accordingly, the Court hereby supplements and amends the opinion and order previously filed in this claim by adding the following further order:

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $105.00 (One Hundred and Five Dollars) be paid to the claimant immediately from the Court of Claims Fund to complete the total award due the claimant.


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    (No. 75-CV-16
    John Frances Littler, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 18, 1975.

    John Francis Littler, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on February 1,1974, at 860 North DeWitt, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. John F. Little, victim of crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, John F. Littler, age 61, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on February 1, 1974, claimant was beaten and kicked as he was walking two women home.

3. That statements, taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any wrongful act or provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him by the assailant.

4. That the victim was transported by police car to Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 222 West Fairbanks Street, Chicago, where he was treated for orbital hematoma by Dr. T. B. Rothstein. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials; however, the assailants have not been identified.

7. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance, as follows:

1) Medical......................................$ 70.50
2) Hospital ..................................... 670.00
$ 740.50

8. That in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act’, or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”.

9. That in this claim before, us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act were shown to be in the total sum of $469.46. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss, as calculated in Paragraph #7, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $71.04. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $71.04. i.e.,

Net Hospital & Medical............................. $271.04
Less $200 deductible................................ — 200.00
$ 71.04

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $71.04 (Seventy One Dollars and Four Cents) be hereby awarded to the claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime.