text:
      In re Petition of Mattie Ramsey

      Order filed May 9, 1984.

    Legal Assistant Foundation of Chicago (Devereux Bowley, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This matter is before the Court on the petition of Mattie Ramsey for an extension of time to file documents to claim compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

On August 27, 1982, we ruled that we were constrained by operation of law to deny the petition on the grounds that too much time had lapsed since the date of the alleged crime. The crime was alleged to have occurred on May 9, 1980. Section 6.1 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 76.1), provides in pertinent part that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if:

“(a) within 6 months of the occurrence of the crime he files a notice of intent to file a claim with the Attorney General and within one year of the occurrence of the crime upon which the claim is based, he files an application, under oath with the Court of Claims .... Upon good cause shown, the Court of Claims may extend the time for filing the notice of intent to file a claim and application for a period not exceeding one year.”

Accordingly, we would only have authority to extend the filing time for a period not to exceed November 9,1981, for the notice of intent and May 9, 1982, for the application. The notice of intent was submitted to the Attorney General on July 12, 1982, and the petition for the extension of time was filed on July 21, 1982, both dates being beyond our periods of discretion.

The Petitioner requested a hearing to review that decision which is a right provided under section 13.1(3) of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 83.1(3).) The case was assigned to a commissioner of the Court. At his suggestion the parties elected to file memoranda in lieu of holding a hearing.

The Petitioner’s first contention is that she filed her application within 21 months of the date of the crime and thus the Court was mistaken when it stated in the fourth paragraph of the aforementioned order that the application was not tendered. Petitioner attached to her petition as an exhibit a letter from the deputy chief of the Attorney General’s crime victims division to the Petitioner which states that the application was received in their Springfield office on February 4, 1982.

Petitioner also argues that this entire case has been fraught with confusion and error not only in regard to its handling by the Court but also the Attorney General’s office. The letter referred to above was sent on June 15, 1982. The letter purported to return the application to the Petitioner because it was unsigned. It also stated, “As you sent this application two years after the incident occurred, you must show good cause for the Court of Claims, which handles these matters, to extend this filing deadline”. In her memorandum Petitioner stated:

“Claimant submitted her application on February 4, 1982, less than 21 months after the crime. The Attorney General’s Office then took more than 5 months to compose a 7 sentence letter to respond to Claimant. To add insult to injury, the letter states that claimant sent her . . . ‘application two years after the incident occurred. . .’ when in fact only 21 months had gone by, and the remainder of the two year passage of time occurred during the 5 months she waited for his reply.”

It is the Petitioner’s contention that under these facts the State should be estopped from complaining about delays in this case because it contributed to and encouraged the very delays it complains of.

The Petitioner filed a reply brief which purports to address certain “myopic” and “distorted” views of the facts and case law contained in the State’s brief which Petitioner noted was filed almost two months late. We find it impossible to comment on those arguments because the State apparently neglected to file its brief with the Court (the docket shows no indication of it) and without knowing what was said in the State’s brief we cannot make sense out of Petitioner’s reply.

After having considered the record we find no error in our order of August 27,1982. Section 6.1(a) of the Act (quoted above) clearly states that applications for benefits are to be filed under oath with the Court of Claims. The statute contains no mention of filing applications with the Attorney General. Neither the docket nor the Court’s file contains an application made by the Petitioner here. No mention of one being filed with the Court appears in Petitioner’s memorandum or reply brief. It is our conclusion that none was tendered as stated in the previous order. The petition for an extension of time bears the filing stamp of the clerk’s office dated July 21, 1982. That date is well beyond the period within which we are authorized to grant an extension of time. Petitioner admitted that her notice of intent was filed beyond the discretionary period.

Petition denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: POCH, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 75-CV-0254

      In re Application of Irene A. Nancy and Margaret Burke.

      Opinion filed July 20, 1983.

    Irene Burke, Nancy Burke, and Margaret Burke, pro se, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 28, 1974. Irene Burke, Nancy Burke, and Margaret Burke, wife and daughters, respectively, of the deceased victim, Alexander Burke, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on January 31, 1975, on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Alexander Burke, age 61, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1).

2. That on July 18, 1974, the victim was discovered unconscious at a gas station located at 103rd and Western Avenues, Chicago, Illinois. The victim had been beaten by an unknown person, and a police investigation could not determine a motive. The victim was transported to St. Joseph Hospital for treatment of his injuries, and expired on August 1, 1974.

3. That the Claimant, Irene Burke, seeks compensation for funeral expenses and for loss of support. The Claimants, Nancy Burke and Margaret Burke, seek compensation for loss of support only. They were 15 and 16 years of age, respectively, at the time of the incident.

4. That the Claimant, Irene Burke, incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $4,192.41, all of which the Claimant has paid. Of this amount, $2,000.00 has been deemed reasonable and therefore compensable by the Court.

5. That the Claimants, Irene Burke, Nancy Burke, and Margaret Burke, were dependent upon the victim for support.

6. That prior to his death, the victim was employed by the Chicago Board of Education and his average monthly earnings were $1,600.00.

7. That section 4 of the Act states, “. . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 74.

8. That the victim was 61 years of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1978, Life Tables, volume II, his life expectancy would have been 77.2 years. Therefore, the projected loss of support suffered by the Claimant, Irene Burke, is 16.2 years or 194.4 months.

9. That this claim complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

10. That pursuant to section 7(d) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 77(d)), this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the “Workmen’s Compensation Act” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.), from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

11. That the Claimant, Nancy Burke, born February 19, 1959, reached the age of majority on February 19, 1977, or 29 months after the death of her father. She is therefore eligible for loss of support for these 29 months.

12. That the Claimant, Margaret Burke, born December 4,1957, reached the age of majority on December 4,1975, or 16 months after the death of her father. She is therefore eligible for loss of support for these 16 months.

13. That based on $500.00 per month, the maximum compensation for loss of support for 194.4 months, which is the maximum period a Claimant in this incident is eligible for, is $97,200.00, which is in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum amount compensable under section 7(c) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1977, ch. 70, par. 77(c).

14. That the Claimant, Irene Burke, has received $27,000.00 from various life insurance policies as a result of the victim’s death, $2,000.00 of which can be counted as an applicable deduction. Additionally, the Claimant has received $255.00 in Social Security Administration burial benefits and $400.00 in Veteran’s Administration burial benefits. These amounts can be counted as applicable deductions under section 7(d) of the Act.

15. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss resulting from the victim’s death is in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum allowed in section 7(e) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 77(e).

16. That the Claimant, Irene Burke, is entitled to an award based on the following:

Funeral expenses $2,000.00

Loss of support (81% of total compensable loss of support) 6,480.00

Total $8,480.00

17. That the Claimant, Nancy Burke, is entitled to an award based on the following:

Loss of support (12% of total compensable loss of support) $ 960.00

18. That the Claimant, Margaret Burke, is entitled to an .award based on the following:

Loss of support (7% of total compensable loss of support) $ 560.00

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $8,480.00 (eight thousand four hundred eighty dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Irene Burke, wife of Alexander Burke, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that the sum of $960.00 (nine hundred sixty dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Nancy Burke, daughter of Alexander Burke.

It is further ordered that the sum of $560.00 (five hundred sixty dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Margaret Burke, daughter of Alexander Burke.


author: Roe, C.J.

text:
    (No. 76-CV-0748

      In re Application of Michael DeBartolo, Joan Benedetti and Joan Eisenhaur.

      Opinion filed August 16, 1982.

      Opinion on rehearing filed May 9, 1984.

    Keefe, Ehemann & Jaffe (Hope Keefe, of counsel), for Claimant Joan Benedetti.
    Michael DeBartolo, pro se, for Claimant Michael DeBartolo.
    Joan Eisenhaur, pro se, for Claimant Joan Eisenhaur.
    Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General (Maureen Cain and Faith Salsburg, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This is a consolidated claim for compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act. It arises out of an incident which occurred on or about January 31, 1976. The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, the investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois, the evidence presented at the hearing before a commissioner of the Court, the post-hearing briefs, and the arguments and evidence presented at oral arguments before the full Court sitting en banc. Based on the entire record in this cause we make the following determination.

This case involves two issues. The first issue is whether or not the death of the victim was substantially attributable to his wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant as conditioned by sections 3(f) and 7(c) of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 70, pars. 73(f), 77(c)). If the first issue is decided in favor of the Applicants, the second issue is whether or not the decedent had any lawful earnings in the six months prior to his death upon which to base an award for the loss of support claimed.

On the aforementioned date Louis DeBartolo, age 29, was found murdered in a room behind a discount dry goods store which he operated located at 5900 W. North Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. He had been shot in the head prior to which the physical evidence indicated that he had been brutally tortured. Several packets of a white substance were found at the scene of the crime. The substance was later determined to be heroin and had a street value of tens of thousands of dollars. Additionally, the record shows that seven months prior to his death, decedent was convicted of bank robbery in Federal court and that 45 days before his death a judgment in the amount of $30,477.00 was entered against him in a civil proceeding in Cook County circuit court, said sum representing unrecovered proceeds from the bank robbery.

With respect to the first issue, it is the State’s position that the circumstantial evidence, including the manner of death, the decedent’s involvement in criminal conduct almost a year before his death for which he was subsequently convicted, and the severe financial pressure brought about by the judgment and order of restitution, all constitute conduct which would preclude recovery or reduce it. We are asked to find that the death was a result of a crime of retribution and/or crime resulting from involvement in narcotics.

The circumstances, although quite bizarre, are insufficient to allow us to conclude that the decedent was not an innocent victim of the crime. There was no evidence as to how the heroin came to be where it was found. There was no evidence of any previous history of involvement of the decedent with heroin. Although the decedent was convicted seven months before his death of having committed a bank robbery a year before his death, there was no evidence linking this conduct with his death. The same is true with respect to the judgment owed by the decedent. Therefore we find in favor of the Applicants on the first issue.

The second issue involves compensation. Before awarding loss of support in cases such as this, it is our practice to first make an award for funeral expenses incurred.

Michael DeBartolo, father of the decedent, seeks $1,007.25, representing one-half of the expense of the funeral which he paid. Although the evidence is not exactly clear, we find that payment of the other half of the funeral expense is attributable to Joan Benedetti, the former wife of the decedent. We have previously determined that $2,000.00 is a reasonable amount of compensation for funeral expenses under the Act. Therefore, Michael DeBartolo and Joan Benedetti are each entitled to their prorated share, or $1,000.00 each, for funeral expenses.

With respect to the second issue, that of loss of support, section 4 of the Act provides that loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the crime or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 70, par. 74.) The relevant time frame in this case is July 31, 1975, to January 31, 1976. The burden is on the Applicants to prove loss of support by the preponderance of the evidence.

The decedent was incarcerated at M.C.C. Federal prison in Chicago during the six months preceding his death. However, he was on a work release program, working during the days and returning to the prison at night. As a condition of eligibility for participation in the program he had to show that he had a job which paid some amount of monetary compensation. He secured a position as a manager of International Discount Sales, a discount clothing store, which qualified. The business was a sole proprietorship owned and previously operated by Joseph J. Esposito.

Mr. Esposito testified that his business was in serious financial trouble, but that because the decedent was a long time friend and because of his predicament he turned the business over to the decedent. After relinquishing control Mr. Esposito did not pay attention to the affairs of the business and knew little or nothing about the amount of inventory on hand at any given time, the amount of revenue generated, the records of the business, etc. There was testimony that all the business records on the premises were seized by the Chicago Police Department and never became part of the record in this claim. The store went out of business the day the decedent’s body was discovered.

As to the exact amount of compensation the decedent received, the evidence is not clear. Mr. Esposito’s testimony conflicted at several points. He testified that the decedent was not an employee. When asked by the decedent for a job he said he replied, “I have a sick business here. If you want to come in, I can’t pay you or anything.” He further testified that, “I wrote him — I think I wrote him checks because I couldn’t hire him. I just wrote him checks because I couldn’t hire him. I couldn’t afford to hire him.” Later, in response to a question whether or not the checks were to compensate the decedent for the work he was doing in the store, Mr. Esposito replied in the affirmative.

There were either four, five, or six checks in the amount of $150.00 each given to the decedent by Mr. Esposito. He could not remember how many nor could he recall the exact dates they were given to him, but the time appears to be around the beginning of the six-month period preceding the murder. As for other earnings during that period, Mr. Esposito testified that the decedent took money out of the cash register, but he had no idea how much was taken. He never saw it taken; the proceeds of sales were just not there, and the decedent never turned any money over to Mr. Esposito. At one point he testified that there was $8,000.00 or $9,000.00 worth of inventory in the store, but later said there was only $4,000.00 or $5,000.00 worth. The merchandise remaining at closing was liquidated for $1,500.00.

There was evidence of other jobs held by the decedent during 1975, but it appears they were outside the relevant six-month period. The tax return filed for that year did not disclose any income earned by the decedent from the store.

The amount of support provided to the Claimants, by their testimony, was far in excess of any earnings the decedent obtained from any identifiable source.

We conclude from the testimony of Mr. Esposito and reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence that the decedent had earnings during the six months immediately preceding his death and that from those earnings he contributed $100.00 a month toward the support of the Claimants.

At the time of his death, Mr. DeBartolo was married to Joan DeBartolo and they had two children, Gina and Louis, Jr., born August 2, 1966, and August 20, 1967, respectively. Joan DeBartolo remarried eight months after Mr. DeBartolo’s death. She applied for loss of support for herself and their children. Also at the time of his death, Mr. Debartolo was living with Joan Eisenhauer, who had given birth to a son, Frank, approximately two and a half years prior to Mr. DeBartolo’s death, which he acknowledged to be his. She is seeking loss of support on behalf of the son. Based upon ordinary life expectancies and $100.00 per month support among the dependents, the amount of loss exceeds the maximum amount of compensation awardable under the Act, which was $10,000.00 at the time of the crime. In view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 be awarded in this matter as follows:

1. To Michael DeBartolo — $1,000.00 for reimbursement for funeral expenses;

2. To Joan Benedetti — $1,000.00 for reimbursement for funeral expenses;

3. To Joan Benedetti on behalf of Gina DeBartolo — $2,666.66;

4. To Joan Benedetti on behalf of Louis DeBartolo, Jr. — $2,666.66;

5. To Joan Eisenhauer on behalf of Frank DeBartolo — $2,666.66;

said awards to be paid in lump sums.

OPINION ON REHEARING

Roe, C.J.

This case is before the Court on petition by Respondent for rehearing of the opinion rendered by this Court on August 16, 1982, concerning the above-captioned claims.

In said opinion this. Court granted awards pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act, to the following persons:

1. To Michael DeBartolo — $1,000.00;

2. To Joan Benedetti — $1,000.00;

3. To Joan Benedetti on behalf of Gina DeBartolo — $2,666.66;

4. To Joan Benedetti on behalf of Louis DeBartolo, Jr. — $2,666.66;

5. To Joan Eisenhauer on behalf of Frank DeBartolo — $2,666.66.

The awards granted to Michael DeBartolo and Joan Benedetti were for reimbursement of the funeral expenses of the victim, Louis DeBartolo. The awards granted to Joan Benedetti on behalf of Gina DeBartolo and Louis DeBartolo, Jr., along with the award made to Joan Eisenhauer on behalf of Frank DeBartolo, were granted as compensation for loss of the victim’s support.

The Respondent’s petition for rehearing essentially sets forth three points supposedly overlooked or misapprehended by the Court.

Respondent first contends that Joan Benedetti, the victim’s wife at the time of his death, should not have been granted award for reimbursement of funeral expenses because there was insufficient evidence in the record proving that she paid any part of the funeral bill.

A thorough review of the record does indeed reveal that Joan Benedetti failed to provide sufficient evidence that she paid a portion of the funeral expenses. The evidence indicates that her father, James Sena, paid the portion of the funeral bill that was not paid by Michael DeBartolo, the victim’s father. We find, therefore, that Joan Benedetti is not entitled to receive any award for reimbursement for funeral expenses.

Section 3(a) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 70, par. 73(a)), in effect at the time of the crime, provides in pertinent part that;

“Any person related to the victim, even though not dependent on that victim for support, is eligible for compensation but only for reasonable funeral expenses . . . for the victim, provided that such expenses were paid by him.”

Although the Act in effect at the time of the crime did not contain a definition of “relative”, a later amendment provided a definition of “relative” which includes a spouse’s parent. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(f).) Since the record indicates that James Sena was the father-in-law of the victim at the time of the victim’s death and that he paid the portion of the funeral bill that was not paid by the victim’s father, we find that James Sena is entitled to receive an award of $1,000.00 for reimbursement of funeral expenses.

The second contention set forth by the Respondent is that Joan Benedetti should not have been granted the awards on behalf of Gina DeBartolo and Louis DeBartolo, Jr., because no evidence was introduced to show that Gina DeBartolo or Louis DeBartolo, Jr., were in fact being supported by the victim and dependent upon him at the time of the crime which caused his death.

The Act is silent concerning the degree of proof required to prove a Claimant’s dependency on the victim for support at the time of the crime. However, this Court has found that dependency must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Application of Sole (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 713.) A proposition proved by the preponderance of the evidence has been described as one that is more probably true than not. (In re Estate of Ragan (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 8, 13, 398 N.E.2d 198, 203.) It is this Court’s duty, as the trier of fact, to weigh the evidence and determine whether a proposition is more true than not. While the record in this case was not always clear, we concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record to infer that it was more true than not that the victim was contributing to the support of Gina DeBartolo and Louis DeBartolo, Jr., at the time of the crime. After again reviewing the record, it is our opinion that our initial conclusion regarding the victim’s support of Gina DeBartolo and Louis DeBartolo, Jr., was correct. We therefore affirm the decision to grant Joan Benedetti awards on behalf of Gina DeBartolo and Louis DeBartolo, Jr., as compensation for the loss of the victim’s support.

The Respondent’s final contention is that all of the awards for loss of support should not have been granted because the Claimants failed to show that the victim had earnings during the six-month period preceding his death which could serve as a basis for determining the level of support lost.

The Act is also silent concerning the degree of proof required to prove that the victim earned any money during the six-month period preceding his death. As in the case of the degree of proof required to prove dependency, this Court has determined that the Claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the victim earned money during the six months prior to his death. (In re Application of Sole, supra.) Having reviewed the record, we find that there was sufficient evidence presented to prove that it was more true than not that the victim had earnings during the six-month period preceding his death and that from those earnings he contributed $100.00 a month toward the support of the Claimants. All of the awards granted for loss of support are therefore affirmed.

In our prior opinion we found that based upon the ordinary life expectancies and $100.00 per month support among the dependents, the amount of loss exceeded the maximum amount of compensation awardable under the Act, which was $10,000.00 at the time of the crime. An award was granted in the sum of $10,000.00 which was divided as ordered by the Court. We affirm our decision to grant an award of $10,000.00 in this matter. However, due to our deciding in this opinion to grant an award for funeral expenses to James Sena instead of Joan Benedetti, it is hereby ordered that the $10,000.00 award be distributed as follows:

1. To Michael DeBartolo — $1,000.00;

2. To James Sena — $1,000.00;

3. To Joan Benedetti on behalf of Gina DeBartolo — $2,666.66;

4. To Joan Benedetti on behalf of Louis DeBartolo, Jr. — $2,666.67;

5. To Joan Eisenhauer on behalf of Frank DeBartolo — $2,666.67.


text:
    (No. 77-CV-0437

      In re Application of Mary L. Burton.

      Opinion filed September 22, 1983.

    David H. Goldenhersh, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 20, 1975. Mary L. Burton, wife of the deceased victim, Luster Burton, Jr., seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased husband, Luster Burton, Jr., age 26, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: arson (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 20 — 1).

2. That on July 20, 1975, the victim’s body was removed from his home at 2008 North 36th Street, East St. Louis, Illinois, after a fire explosion had totally destroyed the residence. The victim was pronounced dead at the scene. Police investigation was unable to determine the cause of the fire, although the East St. Louis Fire Department report indicates the fire was the result of arson.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and for loss of support for herself and for her minor children, Marcus, age 4, Desmond, age 3, and Maurice, age 1.

4. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $1,811.50 of which the Claimant has paid $1,811.50, all of which has been deemed reasonable and therefore compensable by the Court.

5. That the Claimant and her minor children were totally dependent upon the victim for support.

6. That prior to his death, the victim was employed as a security guard and his average monthly earnings were approximately $1,500.00.

7. That section 4 of the Act states “. . .loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 74.

8. That the victim was 26 years of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1978, Life Tables, volume II, his life expectancy would have been 71.6 years. The projected loss of support for 45.6 years is in excess of $10,000.00, which is the maximum amount compensable under section 7(e) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 77(e).

9. That this claim complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

10. That pursuant to section 7(d) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.), from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

11. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

12. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss resulting from the victim’s death is in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum allowed in section 7(e) of the Act.

13. That the Claimant’s interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the alternative provisions of section 8 of the Act.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 (ten thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Mary L. Burton, wife of Luster Burton, Jr., an innocent victim of a violent crime, to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $2,000.00 (two thousand dollars) to be paid to Mary L. Burton in a lump sum;

(b) Sixteen (16) equal monthly payments of $500.00 (five hundred dollars) each to be paid to Mary L. Burton for use and benefit of Marcus, Desmond and Maurice Burton;

(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimant or the Claimant’s children, it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.


text:
    (No. 77-CV-0596

      In re Application of Helene Thanasouras and Nicholas Thanasouras.

      Opinion filed February 29, 1984.

      Order on review filed April 6, 1984.

    Nicholas C. Pamel, for Claimant Helene Thanasouras.
    William J. Harte, for Claimant Nicholas Thanasouras.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 27, 1977. Helene Thanasouras, mother of the deceased victim, Mark Thanasouras, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased son, age 49, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1).

2. That on July 22,1977, the victim was shot on the street at 5500 N. Campbell, Chicago, Illinois. He was transported to Swedish Covenant Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. No assailants have ever been apprehended.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation under the Act for funeral expenses only. The Claimant was not dependent upon the victim for support.

4. That funeral and burial expenses were paid by the Claimant in the amount of $3,134.50, of which $2,000.00 is deemed compensable by the Court.

5. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

6. That pursuant to section 7(d) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.), from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

7. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

8. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the Claimant’s loss is in excess of the $2,000.00 maximum award deemed compensable by the Court for funeral benefits.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $2,000.00 (two thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Helene Thanasouras, mother of the deceased victim, Mark Thanasouras.

ORDER ON REVIEW

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an alleged criminal offense which occurred on July 27, 1977. Nicholas Thanasouras, son of the deceased victim, Mark Thanasouras, seeks compensation for loss of support pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the Claimant’s application for benefits and the commissioner’s report and transcript of the evidentiary hearing that was held on November 21,1983.

The Claimant contends that he is entitled to loss of support compensation for the contributions with which his deceased father would have provided him, but for the father’s crime-related death. The Claimant testified that he was born on May 7,1960, and that he was 17 years old at the time of the crime. He further testified that his parents did not live together on the date of the crime and that he lived with his mother. The Claimant has been a full-time student prior to and since the victim’s death.

The issues presented to the Court are whether a child is eligible for compensation for loss of support that has been incurred after the child reaches the age of 18, and whether the Claimant here has shown that he suffered a loss prior to or after that time.

It is clear from the language of the Act that the Claimant cannot be compensated for loss of support allegedly incurred after his eighteenth birthday. Section 2(h) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h)) provides for loss of support compensation for “dependents of the victim.” In section 2(e), “dependent” is defined as “a relative of a deceased victim who was wholly or partially dependent upon the victim’s income at the time of his death and shall include the child of such victim born after his death.” Section 2(g) specifically narrows the definition of “child” to mean “an unmarried son or daughter who is under 18 years of age . . .” Therefore, Nicholas was no longer a “child” within the statutory meaning of the term after he had reached the age of 18.

Our interpretation of the loss of support provision is consistent with the legislative mandate expressed in section 10.1(g) that states that the Act is a secondary source of compensation. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(g).) The Claimant is asking the Court to rely solely upon his unsubstantiated testimony that the victim would have contributed to his support after any possible legal obligation to do so ceased. In effect, he asserts that the State is legally required to provide support where his father would have borne no such duty. The limited relief provided by the Act does not allow the Court to engage in this type of speculation.

The Claimant has therefore failed to show that he suffered any compensable loss of support after his eighteenth birthday. Further, he has presented insufficient evidence to show that he incurred a loss of support prior to his eighteenth birthday. Section 8.1 of the Act states that “(n)o award of compensation shall be made for any portion of the applicant’s claim that is not substantiated by the claimant.” Here, the Claimant presented only his own unsubstantiated testimony as evidence of his loss. This Court has previously held that the testimony of an interested party, standing alone, is insufficient to show a loss of support:

“The burden of proof is on the Claimant to prove her dependency and to prove the income of the decedent. In view of the unsubstantiated nature of the Claimant’s testimony . . . the Court is of the opinion that the Claimant has not proved dependency by her upon the decedent by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Application of Sole (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 713, 715.

The Claimant in the instant case was unable to produce any witnesses or documentary evidence other than his own testimony to show that his father had any earnings upon which loss of support is based. In addition, the Claimant offered only his own unsubstantiated testimony to show that he received actual support from the victim. The Claimant therefore has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he incurred a compensable loss of support under the Act.

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that the claim of Nicholas Thanasouras be and is hereby denied.


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    (No. 78-CV-0410

      In re Application of John A. Kaloyeros, Jr.

      Opinion filed October 20, 1983.

    Cirricione, Block, Krockey & Cernugel, P.C. (Michael D. Block, of counsel), for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on December 18, 1977. Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, John A. Kaloyeros, Jr., age 21, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12-4).

2. That on December 18, 1977, the Claimant was assaulted by one John Harasti, without provocation. Claimant sustained extensive injuries. The incident occurred at the 7-Eleven parking lot, Romeoville, Illinois. Claimant was taken to the Silver Cross Hospital, Joliet, Illinois, for treatment of his injuries.

3. That Claimant seeks compensation for medical/ hospital expenses and for loss of earnings.

4. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $1,391.57, none of which was paid by insurance.

5. That section 4 of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 74.

6. That Claimant’s average net monthly earnings for the six months preceding the date of his injury were in excess of $500.00 per month.

7. That Claimant was disabled and unable to work from December 19, 1977, to January 30, 1978, for a period of one month and six working days.

8. That based on $500.00 per month, the maximum compensation for loss of earnings for one month and six working days is $636.38.

9. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

10. That pursuant to section 7(d) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.), from local governmental, State or Federal funds, or from any source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

11. That the Claimant obtained a judgment against his attacker, John Harasti, in the amount of $10,000.00, which, pursuant to section 7 (d) of the Act, is a permissible deduction.

12. That Claimant has received $1,421.88 out of the $10,000.00 in civil damages.

13. That on July 29, 1982, Claimant was informed by John Harasti thát further payments would not be forthcoming due to Harasti’s economic condition.

14. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Compensable loss of earnings 636.38

Medical/hospital expenses $1,391.57

Total $2,027.95

Less restitution -$1,421.88

Less $200.00 deductible 200.00

Total $ 206.88

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $206.88 (two hundred six and 88/100 dollars) be and is hereby awarded to John A. Kaloyeros, Jr., an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 81-CV-0298

      In re Application of Irvin Holley.

      Order filed March 4, 1983.

      Order on review filed January 23, 1984.

    Thomas P. Young, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on January 29, 1979. Irvin Holley, husband of the deceased victim, Henderstene Holley, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on October 29, 1980, on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Henderstene Holley, age 39, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1).

2. That on January 29, 1979, the victim and two of her daughters were shot by the victim’s son-in-law. The incident began when the offender went to the victim’s home, located at 1155 Hecker Court, Elgin, Illinois, looking for his wife and son. The offender’s wife and son had been living with the victim approximately one week at the time of the incident. When the offender was informed by the victim that she did not know their whereabouts, the offender produced a gun and shot the victim. The offender then left this residence in his automobile and a short time later discovered his wife, son, sister-in-law and niece sitting in an automobile at a gas station located at 54 North State Street, Elgin, Illinois. The offender exited his automobile, approached the vehicle occupied by his wife and the others, and began arguing with his wife as to when he could visit his son. During this argument the offender became enraged and shot both his wife and his sister-in-law and fled the scene.

The victim and her daughter, the offender’s wife, were pronounced dead on arrival at Sherman Hospital. The offender was apprehended, prosecuted and found guilty of murder, attempted murder and aggravated battery.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and loss of support for the victim’s minor children, Ivonne and Irvin Holley, Jr.

4. That section 3(e) of the Act states that the Claimant is eligible for compensation if the victim and the assailant were not related and sharing the same household. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 73(e).

5. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim and the assailant were related, in that the victim was the mother-in-law of the assailant.

6. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

ORDER ON REVIEW

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an alleged criminal offense which occurred on January 29, 1979. Irvin Holley, husband of the deceased victim, Henderstene Holley, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This claim was originally filed October 10, 1980. Based upon the investigatory report of the Attorney General and other documentary evidence, the claim was denied on March 4, 1983, in that section 3(e) of the Act states that the Claimant is eligible for compensation if the victim and the assailant were not related and sharing the same household. The investigatory report of the Attorney General disclosed that the victim and the assailant were related, in that the victim was the mother-in-law of the assailant; therefore, the Claimant had not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

The Claimant filed his objections to order and requested a full hearing on the merits of the claim.

An evidentiary hearing was held before commissioner John P. Simpson on December 1, 1983, at the Court of Claims of Illinois, Chicago, Illinois.

At the hearing, it was stipulated by the parties that Henderstene Holley was in fact a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, namely, murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1). On January 29, 1979, she was shot by her son-in-law at her home. She and her son-in-law did not share the same household.

At issue in this case is the application of the following provision of the Act:

“Section 3. A Person is entitled to compensation under this Act if:
(e) the victim and his assailant were not related, and sharing the same household”. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 73.

Claimant contends that the victim and her son-in-law were not related, and points out that at the time of the crime the statute did not define the word “related” or the word “relative”.

The statute currently in force defines “relative” as follows:

“(f) ‘Relative’ means a spouse, parent, grandparent, step-father, step-mother, child, grandchild, brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, half brother, half sister, spouse’s parent, nephew, niece, uncle or aunt.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, eh. 70, par. 72(f).

While the legislature has now seen fit to spell out the meaning of the word “relative” by adding subparagraph (f) to section 2 of the Act, it is submitted that both popularly and legally the definition of the word “relative” has always been broad enough to include persons related by affinity.

“Relative. A kinsman; a person connected with another by blood or affinity. When used genetically, includes persons connected by ties of affinity as well as consanguinity, and, when used with a restrictive meaning, refers to those only who are connected by blood.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 1968, 1453.

The Illinois Supreme Court has discussed the matter as follows:

“Affinity is the relation contracted by marriage between the husband and his wife’s kindred and between the wife and her husband’s kindred. The marriage places the husband in the same degree to the blood relations of the wife as that in which she herself stands toward them and gives the wife the same connection with the blood relations of the husband.” Clawson v. Ellis (1918), 286 Ill. 81, 83.

From the above it is clear that even without the statutory definition of the word “relative” now present in the Act, the victim and her assailant were relatives.

Claimant next contends that even if the victim and her assailant were related, they were not sharing the same household, and therefore the claim is not barred. In other words, Claimant contends that for the claim to be barred, both circumstances set forth in section 3(e) of the Act must have existed at the time of the incident.

However, this Court has held in at least two cases, In re Application of Gordon (1975), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 223, and In re Application of Williams (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 388, that the existence of either condition bars compensation.

“It is our opinion from the words of section 3(e) of the Act, that it was the intent of the legislature to deny compensation for injuries arising out of domestic quarrels. It did not intend that this Court enter into a morass of trying to determine provocation or causes of quarrels between relatives or persons who reside together.
From a grammatical standpoint, the comma after the word related in sect.on 3(e) indicates that either a condition of being related to the assailant or a condition of sharing the household of the assailant disqualifies a person from compensation. If the legislature intended that both the condition of being related to the assailant and sharing the same household must be present in order to disqualify a person, then the comma would not have been required. To hold otherwise is also to hold that the legislature intended to pay a victim who shared the household of his assailant although not related to him. This Court cannot agree that such was the intent of the Act.” In re Application of Williams, 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 388, 390.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of March 4, 1983, denying the claim is hereby affirmed. The claim of Irvin Holley is denied.


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    (No. 81-CV-0529

      In re Application of Georgia Simms.

      Opinion filed November 8, 1983.

    Georgia Simms, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on March 9, 1980, at the victim’s place of employment at 2211 East 71st Street, Chicago, Illinois.

Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, eh. 70, par. 71 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

Based upon the request of the Attorney General this claim was assigned to a commissioner for the taking of evidence.

On September 20, 1983, a hearing was held before Commissioner John R. Fielding, where the following facts were established by a preponderance of the evidence.

1. That Charles Simms, age 68, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: aggravated kidnaping (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 10 — 2).

2. That on March 9, 1980, the victim was abducted by an unknown offender during the course of an armed robbery. The incident occurred at the victim’s place of employment located at 2211 East 71st Street, Chicago, Illinois. On March 10, 1980, the victim’s body was found in the middle of a roadway in Highland, Indiana. An investigation by Highland, Indiana, police determined that the victim may have been shot in Indiana. The victim was taken to the Community Hospital of Munster where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The offender has not been apprehended.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral, medical/hospital expenses, and loss of support for herself.

4. That although the death of the victim may have occurred outside of the jurisdiction of Illinois, his death would not have occurred but for the fact that he was kidnaped in Illinois. Therefore, the victim’s medical and funeral expenses and loss of support suffered by his wife are reasonable expenses related to a crime committed in Illinois.

5. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $2,288.00. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum amount of $2,000.00. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h).

6. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $458.75, $367.00 of which was paid by Medicare, leaving a balance of $91.75 which the Claimant has paid.

7. That the Claimant, Georgia Simms, was dependent upon the victim for support.

8. That the victim was employed by the Washing Machine prior to his death and his average monthly earnings were $200.00.

9. That section 2(h) of the Act states “. . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per . month, whichever is less.”

10. That the victim was 68 years of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1976, Life Tables, volume II, his life expectancy would have been 80.2 years. The projected loss of support for 12.2 years is $29,280.00, which is in - excess of $15,000.00 which is the maximum amount compensable under section 10.1(f) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 80.1(f).

11. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security payments payable to dependents of the victim, and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

12. That the Claimant has received $450.00 from the Veterans Administration and $255.00 from the Social Security Administration in reimbursements for burial benefits as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as an applicable deduction under section 7.1 of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 77.1.

13. That after making all applicable deductions, the Claimant’s pecuniary loss resulting from the victim’s death is in excess of $15,000.00 maximum allowed in section 10.1(f) of the Act.

14. That the Claimant’s best interests would be best served if the award hereunder is paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 11.1 of the Act, to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $7,500.00 (seven thousand five hundred dollars) to be paid in a lump sum;

(b) Ten (10) monthly payments of $750.00 (seven hundred fifty dollars) each to be paid for the Claimant’s use and benefit;

(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimant, it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.


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    (No. 81-CV-0672

      In re Application of Joyce and Mary Cowherd.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1984.

    Joyce Cowherd and Mary Cowherd, pro se, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This is a claim for compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

At the request of the Attorney General this claim was assigned to a commissioner for the taking of evidence.

On March 15, 1984, a hearing was held before Commissioner Robert E. Cronin where the following was established by a preponderance of evidence.

1. The decedent, Paul Stewart, was the victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, par. 9 — 1).

2. That the Claimants are Joyce Cowherd, mother of the deceased victim, Paul Stewart, and Mary Cowherd, step-grandmother of the deceased victim.

3. Claimants seek compensation for funeral expenses. They were not dependent upon the victim for support.

4. That the funeral and burial expenses incurred as a result of the victim’s death were $1,090.00.

5. That the Claimants submitted conflicting evidence as to which of them paid the funeral expenses and in what amount.

6. That the Assistant Attorney General and Claimant Joyce Cowherd appeared at the hearing. Claimant Mary Cowherd failed to appear.

7. That Rule 26 of the Court of Claims provides that an action may be dismissed for want of prosecution when the claimant makes no attempt in good faith to proceed.

8. That the failure of Mary Cowherd to appear on March 15, 1984, and her previous failure to appear at a pre-trial scheduled in this cause for February 10, 1984, show that she has made no good faith attempt to proceed.

9. That the Claimant Mary Cowherd is ineligible for compensation for funeral expenses under the Act because she is not a relative of the victim as required by section 10.1(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, par. 80.1(c)). Mary Cowherd is the step-grandmother of the deceased victim. Section 2(f) (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 70, par. 72(f)), states that “relative” means a spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, half brother, half sister, spouse’s parent, nephew, niece, uncle or aunt. A step-grandmother is therefore not eligible for compensation.

10. That Claimant, Joyce Cowherd, under oath stated that after having obtained a funeral bill that had Mary Cowherd as payor, she deleted Mary Cowherd’s name from the document, and then typed in her own name as the payor and then submitted the altered bill to the Attorney General as proof that she, and not Mary Cowherd, paid the funeral expenses.

11. That section 20(a) of the Act states that “a person who the Court of Claims finds has willfully misstated or omitted facts relevant to the determination of whether compensation is due under this Act or of the amount of that compensation, shall be denied compensation under the Act”. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 90(a).

12. That Claimant Joyce Cowherd committed a willful misstatement in violation of section 20(a) of the Act when she submitted a false document to the Attorney General.

It is hereby ordered, that this claim for compensation be and is hereby denied.


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    (No. 81-CV-1022

      In re Application of Chester Kosman.

      Order filed June 28, 1984.

    John Paniici, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This is a claim arising out of a criminal offense which occurred on July 3, 1980, at 2254 North Parkside, Chicago. Claimant seeks compensation under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, eh. 70, par. 71 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

On April 12, 1982, this Court entered an order finding that the Claimant was a victim of a violent crime but denied the claim inasmuch as the Claimant was not employed for the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident out of which the claim arose and therefore suffered no loss of earnings compensable under section 2(h) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h)), and further that the Claimant incurred medical/ hospital expenses, not otherwise reimbursed, in an amount less than $200.00.

Following the issuance of the April 12, 1982, order, the Claimant timely requested, pursuant to the Act, that a hearing be held before a commissioner. A hearing was subsequently held and the commissioner has duly filed his report with the Court.

The Court has carefully considered the commissioner’s report, a brief filed by the Claimant and other documents concerning this claim. Based on the foregoing information we find as follows:

The sole issue in this case is whether a Claimant who was unemployed for six months immediately preceding the date of the injury but who received unemployment compensation payments from the State may use such payments as “earnings” within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Act. This issue was recently decided by this Court in In re Application of Smith, No. 83-CV-0312, filed May 8, 1984, wherein we held that unemployment compensation payments from the State do not constitute “earnings” within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Act. This claim must therefore be denied due to Claimant’s failure to show that he suffered a loss of earnings compensable under section 2(h) of the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied.


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    (No. 82-CV-0099

      In re Application of David R. Herndon.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1983.

    David R. Herndon, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 7, 1980. David R. Herndon, former husband of the deceased victim, Cathy Sue Santy, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 29, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the deceased victim, Cathy Sue Santy, age 25, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1).

2. That on August 7, 1980, the victim and her husband were shot by a neighbor. The incident occurred at the victim’s residence, located at 1603A Lyndhurst, Champaign, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the shooting was the result of a sequence of events during which the offender harassed the victim for no apparent reason. The victim and her husband were both pronounced dead at the scene of the incident.

3. That the Claimant alleges that his minor child, Alicia Catherine Herndon, age 3, was dependent upon the victim for support and seeks compensation for loss of support on her behalf.

4. That the victim’s father, Frederick Obermiller, incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $2,610.65. The maximum compensable amount of $2,000.00, pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h)), was paid to Frederick Obermiller, under claim No. 81-CV-0408.

5. That section 2(h) of the Act states “. . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s avrage net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.”

6. That the victim was unemployed at the time of her death. However, the victim had been employed by P.A. Bergner during the six months prior to her death and her average monthly earnings were $166.08.

7. That under the divorce decree in Herndon v. Herndon, case No. 78 D 980, filed in the Circuit Court, Third Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Illinois, the Claimant was ordered to pay $250.00 per month for the support of his daughter, Alicia Catherine Herndon. In addition, according to information submitted by the Claimant, the victim was not claiming Alicia Catherine Herndon as a dependent. The Claimant has presented no evidence to support his allegation that the victim’s minor child was dependent upon her for support.

8. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(e)), this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older) and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

9. That the Claimant has failed to meet required conditions precedent for compensation of loss of support under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of David R. Herndon be and is hereby denied.


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    (No. 83-CV-0300

      In re Application of Patricia Bennett.

      Opinion filed February 8, 1984.

    Patricia Bennett, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 17, 1982. Patricia Bennett, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on September 27, 1982, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Patricia Bennett, age 30, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 1).

2. That on July 17,1982, the Claimant was assaulted by an unknown offender in an unprovoked attack. The incident occurred on the street at 6635 North Olmsted, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant was taken to Resurrection Hospital for treatment.

A suspected offender was arrested. However, he was released without being charged after the Claimant could not make a positive identification.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses and for loss of earnings.

4. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $823.22, $481.20 of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $342.02. The Claimant has paid the entire balance.

5. That the Claimant was employed by GCA Corporation prior to the incident and her average monthly earnings were $641.00. Claimant was disabled and unable to work from July 19, 1982, to October 4, 1982, a period of two months and 10 working days.

6. That section 2(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h).

7. That based on $641.90 per month, the maximum compensation for loss of earnings for two months and 10 working days is $1,575.80.

8. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

9. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 80.1(e)), this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older) and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

10. That the Claimant has received $1,099.61 in disability benefits in reimbursements that can be counted as an applicable deduction.

11. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Compensable loss of earnings $1,575.80

Net medical/hospital expenses 342.02

Total $1,917.82

Less disability benefits - 1,099.61

Less $200.00 deductible 200.00

Total $ 618.21

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $618.21 (six hundred eighteen dollars and twenty-one cents) be and is hereby awarded to Patricia Bennett, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 83-CV-0312

      In re Application of Daniel Smith.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1984.

    Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago (Lauren B. Simon, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident which occurred on August 25,1981. Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

On February 4, 1983, this Court entered an order finding that the Claimant was injured as a result of a shooting on August 25,1981, and was the innocent victim of a violent crime but was denied an award on the basis that the medical/hospital expenses were less than $200.00 and on the basis that Claimant was not employed for the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident out of which this case arose and therefore suffered no loss of earnings compensable under section 2(h) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 72(h).

Claimant’s claim for loss of earnings is based on unemployment compensation insurance payments made to him within six months prior to the date of the injury.

The sole issue in this case is whether Claimant’s receipt of payments under the Illinois unemployment insurance program constitutes earnings which may form the basis of an award for loss of earnings within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Act. This Court has previously ruled that public aid benefits are charity and not earnings as contemplated by the Act. (In re Chandler (1978), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1084; In re Cooper (1978), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 400.) The question of whether- unemployment compensation payments qualify as such earnings is one of first impression in this Court.

Claimant argues forcefully that the unemployment insurance program established by the United States Congress in Title III of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 501 et seq.) and implemented in Illinois through the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 300 et seq.), were enacted to lighten the economic burden of involuntary unemployment through a compensation insurance program which provides for setting aside of reserves during periods of employment to be used to pay benefits during periods of unemployment. Thus, Claimant argues, the unemployment compensation payments are related to and measured by the worker’s former employment, and are for services rendered, satisfying the requirements of “earnings” under the Act.

To further buttress his argument, Claimant cites 42 U.S.C. sec. 1104 to the effect that money paid for unemployment insurance must be kept in a trust fund and payments to workers are made out of that fund and not from the State’s general budget, thus distinguishing these payments from public welfare programs. Unemployment compensation payments are therefore tied to the former employment, and not upon need, and thus the employment compensation payments are not charity. Furthermore, unemployment compensation payments are taxable as income. 26 U.S.C. sec. 85.

Respondent argues that the courts have consistently refused to classify unemployment benefits as earnings, citing National Labor Relations Board v. Marshall Field & Co., (7th Circ. 1942) 129 F.2d 169,171, affd. 318 U.S. 253, which stated the unemployment benefits were not earnings. See also National Labor Relations Board v. Gullett Gin Co. (1951), 341 U.S. 361; National Labor Relations Board v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc. (7th Circ. 1942), 127 F.2d 198; Johnson v. Williams (1945), 235 Ia. 688, 17 N.W.2d 406; and United Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Zwan (1940), 143 S.W.2d 977.

The Act, in pertinent part provides as follows:

“2(h) . . . Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less . . .”

In the opinion of the Court, unemployment compensation payments are not earnings within the meaning of sec. 2(h). As the Supreme Court of the U.S. said (in a different context) in National Labor Relations Board v. Marshall Field & Co., supra:

Only by distorting the English language could we say that unemployment benefits are “earnings”. The word “earnings” denotes an “economic good to which a person becomes entitled for rendering economic service”.

The Supreme Court reasoning is applicable here.

Unemployment compensation payments are, of course, income. They are taxed as income. But income and earnings are not synonymous. It is significant that the Act, when using the word “income” uses the same only in conjunction with the word “work”. Thus section 2(h) talks of future earnings being reduced by “income from substitute work actually performed by the victim or by income he would have earned in available appropriate substitute work he was capable of performing.” (Emphasis added.)

Even more important, the Act required determination of lost earnings “on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury . . .” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, even if, arguendo, unemployment compensation payments were to be considered as earnings, and Claimant’s arguments were to be wholly accepted, the unemployment compensation payments would have been earned prior to the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury, part of which earnings were set aside in an insurance fund to be paid during the period of unemployment. Thus, the payments were made within the six-month period but they were earned prior to the six-month period. Hence, payments of “insurance benefits” would not qualify as earnings during the statutory six-month period.

For the above reasons, this claim will be denied.


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    (No. 83-CV-0470

      In re Application of Eileen Carmody.

      Opinion filed December 27, 1983.

    Eileen Carmody, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on January 16, 1982. Eileen Carmody, mother of the deceased victim, Andrew Carmody, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased son, age 28, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: voluntary manslaughter (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-2).

2. That on January 16, 1982, the victim was fatally shot in the abdomen during a dispute with his landlord. The incident occurred in the offender’s apartment at 3956 West Dakin, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the victim was complaining about the lack of hot water in his apartment when.the offender shot him in the stomach. The victim was taken to Swedish Covenant Hospital where he expired during surgery for his injuries. The offender was apprehended, charged with murder and convicted of voluntary manslaughter.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation under the Act for funeral expenses, medical/hospital expenses and for loss of support.

4. That the Claimant alleges that she was partially dependent upon her son for support. However, she has not submitted any documentation to substantiate dependency and, therefore, she has not established eligibility for loss of support under the Act.

5. That according to section 10.1(c) of the Act, a person related to the victim is eligible for compensation for funeral, medical and hospital expenses for the victim provided that such expenses were paid by him.

6. That the Claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $6,829.31, none of which has been paid to date. Pursuant to section 10.1(c) of the Act, these expenses cannot be considered for compensation unless they have been paid.

7. That funeral and burial expenses were paid by. the Claimant in the amount of $8,689.50. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum of $2,000.00. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h).

8. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

9. That pursuant to section 10.1(c) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims, (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older) and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

10. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

11. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the Claimant’s loss is in excess of the $2,000.00 maximum award deemed compensable under the Act for funeral benefits.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $2,000.00 (two thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Eileen Carmody, mother of the deceased victim, Andrew Car-mo dy, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 83-CV-0545

      In re Application of John J. Caulfield.

      Opinion filed August 18, 1983.

    John J. Caulfield, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 30, 1982. John J. Caulfield, father of the deceased victim, Michael Caulfield, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on December 16, 1982, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based ’ upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased son, age 22, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1).

2. That on September 30,1982, the victim was shot by an unknown offender while on duty as a Forest Park policeman. The incident occurred in the Forest Park Police Station, located at 517 Des Plaines Avenue in Forest Park, Illinois. As the victim was processing the offender for two traffic warrants, the offender grabbed a gun from the victim’s partner and shot the victim and his partner. A third officer then shot the offender. The victim was taken to Foster McGaw Hospital where he was pronounced dead a short time later.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation under the Act for funeral expenses only. Medical/hospital expenses of the victim were covered by workers’ compensation. The Claimant was not dependent upon the victim for support.

4. That funeral and burial expenses were paid by the Claimant in the amount of $2,113.40. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum amount of $2,000.00. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h).

5. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

6. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(e).

7. That the Claimant has received $1,750.00 from Workers’ Compensation, $20,000.00 from the Illinois Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act, and $687.10 in life insurance as a result of the incident that can be counted as applicable deductions.

8. That after considering all the applicable deductions under the Act, the Claimant’s net loss for which he seeks compensation is as follows:

Funeral expenses $ 2,113.40

Less Workers’ Compensation - 1,750.00

Less Illinois Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen

Compensation Act -20,000.00

Less life insurance - 687.10

Less $200.00 deductible 200.00

Net loss 0.00

9. That section 6.1b of the Act limits the right of compensation to persons who have suffered a pecuniary loss of $200.00 or more attributable to a violent crime resulting in the injury or death of the victim. The Claimant did not sustain a compensable loss under the Act after applicable deductions are considered. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 76.1(b).

10. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


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    (No. 83-CV-0582

      In re Application of Matthew and Jewel Moore.

      Amended opinion filed October 20, 1983.

    Matthew and Jewel Moore, pro se, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 31, 1982. Matthew and Jewel Moore, parents of the deceased victim, Carol Moore, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigtory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimants’ deceased daughter, Carol Moore, age 24, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 28, par. 9-1).

2. That on July 31,1982, the victim was pronounced dead by the Du Page County Coroner at the victim’s apartment located at 585 E. Gunderson, Carol Stream. The victim appeared to have been beaten at the time of her death. The coroner determined that the victim died as a result of a cocaine overdose, but he was unable to find a point where the drug had been injected into the body. The official inquest verdict stated that the cause of the victim’s death was undetermined.

3. That the Claimants seek compensation under the Act for funeral expenses only.

4. That according to section 10.1(c) of the Act, a person related to the victim is eligible for compensation for funeral expenses for the victim provided that such expenses were paid by him. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(c).

5. That the victim was unemployed for the six months prior to the crime and that the Claimants therefore could not have suffered any loss of support.

6. That at a pre-trial hearing held on September 20, 1983, before Commissioner John R. Fielding, the parties determined that the Claimants were entitled to an award of $1,181.90 for funeral expenses that they incurred as a result of the victim’s death.

7. That the Claimants have complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualify for compensation thereunder.

8. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payment or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security payments payable to dependents to the victim and the net proceéds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(e).

9. That the Claimants have received no reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $1,181.90 (one thousand one hundred eighty-one dollars and ninety cents) be and is hereby awarded to Matthew and Jewel Moore, parents of Carol Moore, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 83-CV-0848

      In re Application of Precious J. Dixon.

      Order filed August 18, 1983.

    Precious J. Dixon, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on December 15,1982. Precious J. Dixon, sister of Theopolis Mays, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred . to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on March 14, 1983, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on December 15, 1982, the victim was stabbed. Available evidence indicates that the victim was stabbed by his brother for undetermined reasons. The incident occurred on the street at 11032 South Vincennes, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was taken to St. Francis Hospital where he expired shortly thereafter. The suspected offender was apprehended and is being prosecuted. The victim and the suspected offender were sharing the same household at the time the crime occurred. '

2. That section 3(e) of the Act states that the Claimant is eligible for compensation if the victim and the assailant were not sharing the same household at the time the crime occurred. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 73(e).

3. That it appears from the investigatory report that the victim and the suspected offender were sharing the same household at the time the crime occurred.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


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    (No. 83-CV-0897

      In re Application of David Sharpe.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1984.

    David Sharpe, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on May 1, 1982. David Sharpe, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on March 25, 1983, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, David Sharpe, age 26, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: aggravated assault (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 2).

2. That on May 1, 1982, the Claimant was beaten during the course of a robbery by the offender. The incident occurred on an exit ramp on Interstate 80, Geneseo, Illinois. Prior to the incident, the Claimant had accepted a ride in a car containing the offender and three others. Upon reaching the exit ramp, the offender beat and robbed the Claimant. The Claimant was initially taken to Geneseo Hospital for the treatment of his injuries. The offender was apprehended, prosecuted and convicted of aggravated assault.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses only.

4. That section 2(h) of the Act states that the loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h).

5. That the Claimant was not employed for the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident out of which this claim arose and therefore suffered no loss of earnings compensable under the Act.

6. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $392.50, $84.00 of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $308.50.

7. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

8. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(e).

9. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

10. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Net medical expenses $308.50

Less $200.00 deductible - 200.00

Total $108.50

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $108.50 (one hundred eight dollars and fifty cents) be and is hereby awarded to David Sharpe, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 83-CV-0900

      In re Application of Lucille Garrett.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1984.

    Lucille Garrett, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on February 13, 1983. Lucille Garrett, mother of the deceased victim, Dorothy Lang, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on March 28, 1983, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Rased upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased daughter, Dorothy Lang, age 45, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: reckless homicide (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3).

2. That on February 13,1983, the victim’s body was found on the street at 649 East 46th Street, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at Provident Hospital. The medical examiner determined that the victim had been struck by an automobile and ruled the death a homicide.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation under the Act for funeral expenses only. The Claimant was not dependent upon the victim for support.

4. That according to section 10.1(c) of the Act, a person related to the victim is eligible for compensation for funeral expenses for the victim provided that such expenses were paid by him. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(c).

5. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $1,751.00.

6. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

7. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(c).

8. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

9. That the Claimant is over 65 years of age and therefore, pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, she is exempt from the $200.00 deductible.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $1,751.00 (one thousand seven hundred fifty-one dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Lucille Garrett, mother of Dorothy Lang, an innocent victim of a violent crime.