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    Lawrence Ryan v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Deputy Warden — State not liadle for family expense. Whilé the statute fixe's the salary of a deputy warden at the State Penitentiary it does not provide for the payment of the supplies, necessaries and expenses of his family.
    Power to Purchase — lohen State officer is unauthorised to purchase. A State officer cannot voluntarily make himself a purchasing agent of the State, unless expressly authorized hy statute to do so.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   Lawrence Ryan, claimant, was appointed Deputy Warden of Joliet State Penitentiary June 16th, 1915, and filled the position until October 20th, 1915, when he was transferred to Southern Illinois Penitentiary at Chester. He goes into minute detail of all the incidents connected with the said transfer, which deem unimportant, and not helpful in reach a conclusion as to his right of recovery herein.

He was appointed Deputy Warden at Southern Illinois Penitentiary and assumed the duties of that office at once. After his transfer, as aforesaid, it seems that it was, and is the custom of the Commissioners of the Joliet Penitentiary to furnish the Deputy Warden his provisions, and that it never had been the custom of the Commissioners of the Southern Illinois Penitentiary to do so.

We assume (with what little knowledge we have outside of the evidence) that each of these institutions were furnished a residence for the Warden, built at, or within the prison walls by the State. When claimant went down to Chester to assume his duties as Deputy Warden of the Southern Illinois Penitentiary, he found that he needed new- articles of furniture, stove, curtains, etc., for his comfort in keeping house. He accordingly purchased and paid for same. He bought his provisions for sustenance of life, some from various stores up in the city of Chester, some from the country, and some from the Commissary Department of the Penitentiary.

He later makes demand upon the Commissioners to re-imburse him for amount he thus paid out. He does not endeavor to make an itemized statement or file a bill of particulars of the various items constituting claim, but files this “Statement of Claim.”

Paid by petitioner to Southern Illinois Penitentiary for groceries and other provisions from March 22, 1916 to

June 30th, 1917......................................... $454.68

Expended for groceries and other provisions purchased of stores

in Chester ............................................ 188.47

Paid for furniture for Warden House, etc................... 79.55

Expended for bed linens, towels, etc., for Deputy House..... 25.00

To furniture for same purchased in Chicago.................... 47.50

To Curtains for same.................................... 4.50

To electric stove, etc...................................... 18.75

To repairs for same........................ 3.75

Paid out for household help................................... 120.00

Expense trip to Chicago, to interview President Civil Service

Commission relative to transfer of petitioner, etc......... 25.00

Trip to Springfield to see the Governor, relative to this matter 10.00

Total $978.85

Credits :

By furniture removed by petitioner when leaving Chester.... $87.25

By cash received for stove sold.....!......................... 10.00

Beware! received of Government for return of deserter........ 50.00

$147.25

Balance due petitioner .................................. 831.70

$978.85

Many letters of correspondence are introduced which are not competent evidence in the case. The statute clearly fixes the salary and compensation to be paid to the Deputy Warden; but nowhere do we find any provision in the statute at the time covered for which claimant claims compensation, authorizing the Commissioners to furnish provisions to the Deputy Warden and his family. It had never been done for any of his predecessors and the Commissioners, we think properly refused the claimant.

Claimant does not attempt to show by his books, if he kept any, or by receipts, if he took them, all these amounts" he paid out, to whom paid, when paid, and what items constituted those various charges, except he does itemize as to the furnishings of the Warden House. The claimant regrets that he can furnish no precedent upon which to base his claim. We are also lost in our search for a precedent on all fours with this case. It is clear then that we must establish a precedent in by our opinion in this case.

An officer of the State cannot voluntarily and arbitrarily make himself a Purchasing Agent of the State, nor purchase of the State unless expressly authorized by statute to do so. To permit a person holding a minor office, as Deputy Warden, arbitrarily to buy and furnish articles of furniture or other house or office furnishings for any State institution, pay the price for same, and then demand that the State re-pay him the price he paid, would be to establish a very bad precedent. There is no law authorizing this, no difference how much he was in need of the same. Such matters were within the powers of the Commissioners. They only could delegate him such power to purchase. The Commissioners of the Penitentiary had no express statutory power to furnish the Deputy Warden and his family provisions for the table. If they had an implied power or authority to do so, it would seem to be discretionary with them in the premises. They declined to furnish such supplies and in doing so, we do not think they abused such discretionary powers.

The Attorney General states that the evidence is meager and unsatisfactory, and in that, we concur with him.

October 8th, 1917, “The Department of Public Welfare” of Illinois, by Special Order Xo. 899, the Deputy Warden of Southern Illinois Penitentiary and his family were to be allowed the use of the residence of Deputy Warden, and allowed to draw supplies from the Penitentiary store room not exceeding $35.00 for each calendar month. There was no provision or regulation up to that date, making any allowance for supplies for Deputy Warden of The Southern Illinois Penitentiary. In view of the foregoing, the demurrer will be sustained, and the case dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

license: Public Domain

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    James E. Johnson v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Respondeat Superior — doctrine not applicable to the State. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty.
    Equity and Good Conscience — when award may be made. Where claimant is injured while in the discharge of his duty, although no legal liability exist against the State, the Court in equity and good conscience, may recommend an allowance.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   James E. Johnson, claimant, brings this suit against the State of Illinois, asking for compensation, as provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Laws, and the provisions of the laws of Illinois of 1917, creating the Court of Claims, and providing for the payment of certain characters of claims, therein mentioned.

The evidence offered by the claimant is not denied and supports generally the facts, which are as follows:

Claimant was on or about the 28th day of December, 1917, in the employ of the State of Illinois, as watchman at the State House 'at Springfield, Illinois, that a part, at least, of his duties as such watchman consisted in receiving and discharging of goods, wares, material and property of the State, and that under orders and directions of his superiors, he ivas required to be during business hours, on the first or basement floor of the State House, and that while there, so located, and while in the performance of his duties, as such watchman, a large box filled with heavy material, belonging to the State, was brought into the basement, and being inspected and looked over by him, the box was accidentally turned or rolled over by another employee on the - right foot of claimant, thereby from its great weight and force, badly crushing and greatly injuring his foot, and that by reason thereof, he has been disabled from pursuing his usual vocation in life. Such injuries necessitated the use of crutches for a period of about nine months, since which time, he has walked with a cane. He says that this will incapacitate him from the performance of manual labor for the remainder of his life. He was, at the time of receiving the injury, receiving $75.00 per month. After the incurrence of the injury, he was forced, hv circumstances, to surrender his position with the State, and “since then has not been able to do any manual labor of any consequence.”

Dr. Fletcher was called to treat claimant, and attended him about a month, then he went to the army, and soon after died. An affidavit, which he made with a view of aiding the claimant to collect an insurance policy, was by consent of Attorney General admitted in evidence. While the claimant has continuously used a cane since discarding his crutches, we do not think the evidence is sufficiently strong or certain to bear out the fact'that there is a total disability of the foot or ankle, so that he is totally incapacitated to perform manual labor; or that he is totally and permanently reprived of the use of the foot. There is proof however, that he is permanently disabled in the foot and ankle, as a result of the accident. Claimant’s statement of facts are borne out by other witnesses. The claimant is a pensioner of the United States, and draws a pension from U. S. Government of $50.00 per month.

This Court, has so recently, in so many cases, similar to this discussed the liability of the State, we do not deem it important here to discuss the law in the law in this case. We are of the opinion that the injury received by the claimant, was without fault on his part, and received while in line of duty, and is one in which the Court in equity and good conscience, should adjust.

We accordingly therefore recommend an allowance to claimant in the sum of $2,000.00.


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    Frank Klebosky v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Military Service — when State is liable for injury sustained by soldier. Claimant was injured while in the discharge of his duty, in pursuance to order of Commander-in-Chief, as a member of the Illinois National Guard. Held, claimant entitled to an award under Section II, Art. 16, Military & Naval Code of Illinois.
    Basis of Award — Workman's Compensation Act provisions applied. Claimant is entitled to recover the difference between the amount earned prior to the injury and the amount he is able to earn subsequent to the injury sustained, under the rule applicable to lump sum settlements under the Workman’s Compensation Act.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claim in this case is for alleged disability resulting from injuries received while a member of the Illinois National Guard engaged in the performance of his duty in pursuance of orders. There is no dispute about the facts in this case. The claimant who was then a member of Co. D, 2nd Ink, Illinois National Guard entrained with his regiment on June 18th, 1910, for the point of mobilization at Springfield, Illinois. While leaving the train at Springfield and while in ranks and in uniform and in discharge of his duty as a soldier carrying a rifle and pack, in stepping from the train to the ground, claimant turned his foot a little and slipped and suffered a severe strain, resulting in a rupture. There was no platform at the point at which the troops detrained and the distance which the claimant stepped from the car to the ground was about two and one-half feet. Evidence shows that he was a large man, the largest in his company. A few days after arrival at Springfield he was mustered into the "Federal Service but later on July 29, 1916, he was discharged because of this injury. After his discharge he was operated on by medical officers, the evidence showing he had a double hernia and that his operation was unsuccessful as to one side on which the more serious rupture had occurred. Claimant has previously presented a claim against the State to this Court for expenses incurred in the operation and loss of time which was allowed in the sum of $469.00. It appears that the claimant by reason of his injury has suffered a partial permanent disability. There appears to be grave doubt that. a further operation to relieve him of his injury would be successful. He is a barber by trade and the evidence shows that he was able to earn $40.00 to $50.00 per week, and that since the injury he has only been able to earn the sum of $15.00 per week. The Court is. of the opinion that claimant is clearly entitled to an award for the injury sustained and this view is concurred in by the Attorney General in behalf of the State. The evidence further goes to show that the claimant had a long record of honorable service in the State Militia and that although he was a man of 37 at the time of his last enlistment just prior to the injury, he still desired to serve the State and that he sought an operation after his discharge because he desired to fit himself to re-enter the service.

The question then arises as to the amount of compensation in a case of this kind and in the opinion of the Court it can well be based upon the rules applicable to lump sum settlements under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The difference between the amount which the claimant can now earn and that which he earned prior to his injury is more than double the maximum weekly allowance of $13.00 provided under the Compensation Act. The claimant has already been paid $350.00 for loss of time. The amount to which he would now be entitled as a lump sum almost exactly equals the sum of $3,000.00. We accordingly award the claimant the sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) in full compensation for the injury sustained.


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    M. Uhlman & Company v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

      Corporations — when license fee cannot he refunded. Where application for license to open books for subscription to the capital stock of a corporation accompanied by the license fee and the license is issued, no refund of the fee, or any part thereof, can be made. The fact that the books were not opened, or that the incorporation was not completed makes no difference.

      Same — subsequent legislation changing the fee does not authorise a refund. That a statute is passed subsequent to the issuance of the license reducing the incorporation fee does not entitle claimant to a refund of the difference between the fee paid before the enactment of the statute and that fixed by the later law.
    Genera! Incorporation Act of 1919 — claim not within its provisions. Claimant does not come within the provisions of Section 158 of the General Incorporation Act of 1919, and that Act did not repeal or revoke the license issued to claimant under the prior law.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant is an Illinois corporation, with an authorized capital stock of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00). On June 23, 1919, commissioners proposing to form said corporation made application for license, and paid an incorporation fee of three hundred forty-five dollars ($345.00), under the provisions of an act concerning corporations, in force July 1, 1872, and an act regarding fees for the incorporation and increase of capital stock of companies incorporated in this State, in force July 1, 1895, and amendments thereto.

The organization of the corporation was not completed until after July 1, 1919, at which time the General Corporation Act of 1919 went into effect. The claimant had afterwards completed its organization, and a certificate of incorporation was issued on July 31, 1919. Under the act of July 1, 1919, the fee for incorporation of a company with a capital stock of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.00) became one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00).

The claimant now seeks to recover the difference between this amount and the amount paid by the commissioners who commenced its incorporation, to-wit: three hundred forty-five dollars ($345.00), the difference claimed being one hundred ninety-five dollars ($195.00).

The State filed a general demurrer. The Court is of the opinion that the demurrer should be sustained. It has been decided by this court in several cases, notably, McKinley, Hood, and Ebersole v. State, 2 C. of O., 125, that where an application for a license to open books for subscription to the capital stock of a corporation is made, accompanied by the license fee, and the license issued, no refund of the fee or any part thereof can be made, no matter whether the books were opened or not, or whether the incorporation was completed or not.” If, therefore, no further steps had been taken to complete the incorporation under the license issued, the claimant could not have obtained a refund, but the 51st General Assembly made an appropriation, which provides as follows : “For refund of corporation fees where the organization of a corporation or corporations is not completed under license issued, or where the license to sell securities under any act regulating the sale of such securities has not issued and the fee paid for the issuance of such license has heretofore or hereafter been turned into the State Treasury * * * the sum of $6,500 for the first year and the sum of $5,000 for the second year.” It then arises whether the claimant falls within the classification to whom refund might be made under this appropriation. The General Incorporation Act of July 1, 1919, provided in Section 158 thereof, as follows: “Whenever commissioners licensed to open books of subscription to the capital stock of a proposed corporation to be organized under any law of this State, shall desire to complete the organization of such company, they may proceed to do so in the same manner as provided by this act, provided they complete the organization of such proposed corporation within the time specified by the act under which such license was issued.” The incorporators of M. Uhlmann & Company must have acted under this section in completing their incorporation. The court is of the opinion that this act did not revoke or repeal the license issued to the incorporators under the prior act, and that the incorporation was completed under this license. In this view no refund can be awarded to the claimant, the demurrer is sustained, and the case is dismissed.


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    County of LaSalle v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Respondeat Superior — damages for over-fioiv of State Canal. This claim is for damages to crop caused by the breaking of the south hank of the Illinois & Michigan .Canal, whereby water oVer-flowed the lands of claimant and destroyed its crops grown and growing thereon, caused by the negligence of and carelessness of the Canal Commissioners. Held, that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State and that the State is not liable for the negligence of its officers. (PMTlips v. State, I-C. C. 332, followed.)
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This suit is brought by the county of LaSalle against the State to recover damages caused by the breaking of the South bank of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, thereby causing the water therefrom to flood the claimant’s land, and destroy its crops, then growing thereon.

The claimant county maintained within its limits a county home for the care of certain classes of unfortunate citizens in said county. Said institution belonged to the county, and consisted of about 300 acres of land in Sections 16 and 17, T. 33, H. R. 3, E-. 3d, P. M. in said county with a number of buildings thereon. Said lands were productive and used for fanning purposes, producing corn, potatoes, oats and other crops, and was operated by the County Warden and Home Committee appointed by the Supervisors of said county. The proceeds are used for the maintenance of said institution.

The farm is located immediately south of the Illinois & Michigan Canal about three miles west of the City of Ottawa. Through the negligence and carelessness of the Canal Commissioners the banks of said canal were allowed to become and remain in a defective condition. About July 7th, 1919, the south bank of said canal gave way and broke a short distance east of said lands, and flooded portions thereof several feet deep, and remained thereon for some two weeks and upwards. About 17.17 acres of corn then growing thereon, was damaged to the extent- of 70%, and that comparing the prospective yield with the yield of 1918, the damage is placed at $1,938.00. The price fixed on corn is 600 bushels at $1.16 per bushel.. .$ 698.00 Loss of 8.28 acres potatoes at $150.00 per acre.............. 1,242.00

Making a total of claimed as damages.....................$1,938.00

The above facts are proven by a number of farmers, as witnesses and no proof is offered to the State in rebuttal. While the method of proving the damages is not entirely satisfactory to the Court, no objection is made by the State, and it is probable that the damages as laid and proven, are approximately correct. It probably would have cost several hundred dollars to harvest and market the crop, but this may have been taken into consideration in the estimates by witnesses. This point is not clear in our minds. The Attorney General's demurrer generally and specifically to the claim, claiming that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not apjilicable; but cites no authorities. We fail to concur in the views of the defendant.

Many claims of this character have been tried by our predecessors and damages allowed. The doctrine that the State is not liable for the negligence of its officers, does not apply to the officers in charge of the Illinois and Michigan Canal.-

In support of this, we cite:

Eugene B. Phillips v. State, 1 C. C. 332; we also in this connection, cite:

Mathias Hosier v. State, 1 C. C. 57.

Heirs of Grane, deceased v. State, 1 C. C. 88.

Warner Coms v. State, 1 C. C. 89, which the evidence further shows that the canal was scarcely ever inspected and that the banks had been in bad condition for a long time.

In view of the fact there is no evidence negative of the evidence offered by claimant, we are of the opinion that claimant has fairly made out its case, arid is entitled to an award of amount claimed.

We accordingly award it the sum of $1,938.00.


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    Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway, a Corporation v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Demurrage — toñera State liable therefor. This case is similar to that of Peoria é Pekin Union R. R. Go. v. State, Supra, and the decision of the Court there announced governs this case as to the liability of State for the demurrage claimed.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for demurrage on cars of building material delivered by the claimant to the Illinois State penitentiary, a State institution located at Joliet, Illinois, during a period of time extending from February 20th, 1916, to February 28, 1917. The liability of the State for demurrage has alread)r been settled in cases recently decided before this Court. A stipulation has been entered into between the claimant and the State fixing the amount due from the State to the claimant for this demurrage at the sum of five hundred eighty-nine dollars ($589.00), and the State consents that judgment may lie entered in that amount. We accordingly award the claimant the sum of five hundred eighty-nine dollars ($589.00) in payment of this claim.


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    Robert M. Paden v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Governmental Function — the State not liable when exercising governmental function. The State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty. (Morrissey v. State, 2-C. C. 254, followed.)

      Same — an employee of State ass.umed risk. A guard or keeper at a State Penitentiary assumes all risk and hazards of his employment.
    Workman’s Compensation Act — claim not within provisions of Act. The claim does not come within the provision of Section Three (3) of Workman’s Compensation Act.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   There is no dispute about the facts in this case, the Attorney - General admitting that the statement of facts made by claimant’s attorneys in their Brief and Argument, is substantially true.

The claimant, while employed as guard and keeper at the Illinois State penitentiary, at Joliet, on March 13tli, 1919, was attacked by Lewis Young, a convict in the penitentiary and was cut about the head and neck, and across the back, and on the arm, with a razor, receiving something like eighteen or twenty gashes. The attack was without the fault of claimant, and as a result of the injuries received, he was taken to the hospital and received medical treatment, the expense of same of which was paid by the State, but claimant paid out about $200.00 for medical services. Claimant is forty-seven years old and unmarried, and had been a strong and healthy man. He lost considerable time from his employment on account of these injuries, and claims that he is now permanently disfigured, and should receive compensation therefor.

We cannot agree with the contention of claimant’s counsel that this claim comes under the provisions of the Workmens’ Compensation Act, and that the State is liable under section three of said Act, on account of maintaining a structure. This Court has repeatedly held that the State, in conducting the State penitentiary at Joliet, is exercising a governmental function, and is not liable for injuries received by employees therein.

“Morrissey v. State, Vol. 2 Court of Claims, 267.

“Taylor v. State, Vol. 2, Court of Claims, 243.

In the case of North Administrator v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 201 Ill., App. 449, the Court held that the Workmens’ Compensation Act did not apply to the University of lilinois, because the University was not engaged in any of the kinds of enterprises named in section three of said Act.

If the State was not engaged in maintaining a structure at the University of Illinois, it cannot be said that it was so engaged in conducting the State penitentiary at Joliet.

We are of the opinion that there is no liability on the part of the State for damage for claimant's injuries, or for loss of time, or money paid out for medical services, as in accepting employment as a guard at the State penitentiary, he assumed all the risks and hazards of such employment.

The claim is therefore rejected.

As a matter of social justice and equity, and in view of the injuries sustained, even though the State is not liable for damages, after considering all the facts in the case, this Court would recommend that if the Legislature sees fit, it appropriate the sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) for claimant.


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    Ella Woodruff, Administratrix of the Estate of Joseph E. Woodruff, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Military Service — contracting disease causing death. Claimant’s intestate, a member of the Illinois National Guard died while on duty, and orders of Commander-in-Chief, from menengitis directly induced by severe exposure in the discharge of his duty. Held, that claim does not fall within the provisions of Section 354, Chapter 129, Hurd’s Rev. St. (Sec. II, Art. 16, Military & Naval Code.)

      Same — construction of Section 15J¡. The words of the statute “that if an enlisted man shall he injured, wounded or killed “does not include the death of the soldier resulting from illness which does not arise or grow out of an injury or wound sustained by him while on duty.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim by the administratrix of the estate of Joseph E. Woodruff, deceased, for an award on account of his death at Springfield, Illinois on October 7tli, 1917, while he was a member of Go. B, 9th Inf. I. H. G., on duty and under orders.

It appears that his death occurred from menengitis and we are justified in a finding that his illness was directly induced by severe exposure while on duty. The claimant sets up in her brief Chapter 129, Sec. 154 Hurd’s Revised Statutes, 1917, as the law which supports her demand. We are however of the opinion that the facts in this case do not disclose a right to claim under this statute. The words of the statute are “that if an enlisted man shall be injured, wounded or killed.” The death of the soldier in this case resulted from an illness which did not grow out of injury or a wound. However, the evidence discloses that the mother of the soldier who is also the administratrix, claimant here, was in good part dependent upon him.

It is the oponion of the Court that while the facts do not disclose a right in the claimant to a demand upon the State under the Statute cited, yet the Court in view of the principals of equity and social justice for the furtherance o.f which this tribunal was established is justified in making an award in this case. It is the opinion of the Court, however that this award should go solely to the mother of the deceased, and we therefore award the claimant Ella Woodruff, administratrix, the sum of seventeen hundred fifty dollars for the exclusive use and benefit of Ella Woodruff, mother of the deceased.


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    E. Vincent Gale, et al, Executors, Etc. v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Inheritance Tax — when refund will he made. In this claim there being no dispute as to the facts and law governing the case the Court enters an award in favor of claimant for the amount of inheritance tax over-paid.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   Walter H. Gale died March 22, 1916, leaving a last will and testament, which was duly admitted to probate in Cook County, Illinois, May 11th, 1916, and letters testamentary were issued to Vincent Gale and G. Whittier Gale, as shown by certified copy of will filed in the cause.

A tax of $4,932.17 was assessed upon the succession of Cora B. Gale, widow of deceased, and a tax of $21.25' upon the succession of E. Vincent Gale, a brother of deceased. An order was entered by the County Judge, September, 1916, fixing the tax as appraised, and fixed as mentioned, from which order, claimants appealed to the County Court in due.time. All proper parties were duly notified of the appeal, and were before the County Court at hearing on appeal.

On 8th day of July, 1919, the Sounty Court on hearing in the case found that a tax in the sum of $877.81, in excess of what was due the State had been paid, and made an order for re-fund of said sum, as provided by statute. The evidence justifies their contention; and the Attorney General consents to allowance of the claim as just.

In view of that fact, the entire facts are not set out in this opinion.

The Court therefore awards claimants the sum of eight hundred seventy-seven and 81/100 dollars refund of taxes as prayed..


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    Wilson & Company v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

      Contract — when the State is liable. The State is liable for food supplies furnished to a State Institution.

      Same — State liable for the usual and customary prices for supplies furnished. Where the contract is a general one for the furnishing of supplies for a State Institution the prices charged therefor must be the usual and customary prices for supplies of that character.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim of Wilson and Company against the- State for meat products furnished to the Chicago State Hospital at Dunning, Illinois, in June and July, 1919, amounting in all to $1,028.16.

It appears that claimant had a general contract with said hospital for the furnishing of meat products, and that the items included in this claim, which are fully set out in the declaration filed in this cause, were ordered from time to time, in the usual course of business, and that the prices charged for same were the usual and customary prices for articles of that character at the time the same were furnished.

It further appears that the bills for said articles were approved by the chief clerk of said hospital, but that the same were not paid for the reason that the appropriation previously made for supplies for said hospital, had lapsed, and no funds available for said payment.

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State, has filed his statement in this cause, admitting that there is no defense to the claim, and consenting that the same be allowed for the full amount thereof.

The Court therefore awards claimant the sum of $1,028.16.


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    Foreman Brothers Banking Company, Administrator Driscoll Estate v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Respondeat Superior — doctrine not applicable to State. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State, unless the State through its Legislature expressly waives its application.
    Governmental Function — Chicago State Hospital. The State in conducting the Chicago State Hospital at Chicago, exercises a governmental function, and is not liable for the death or injuries of its employees while in the discharge of their duty.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   Timothy Driscoll, an employee of the Chicago State Hospital, a State institution located in Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, met with an accident from which it is alleged his illness and death resulted. Claimant filed a claim with the Industrial Board of Illinois, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Claimant now seeks compensation before this Court, for the alleged wrongful death and for medical surgical and hospital expenses incidental to decedent's last illness. The facts as to the manner and nature of the injury are not in dispute. The decedent ivas a boiler washer and had worked at the hospital for 19 or 20 years. On Nov. Gth, 1919, under orders from the chief engineer he went to an old-plant located at the institution which had formerly been used as an engine plant, but had then been out of use for a year and a half, for the purpose of breaking out some grates from an old boiler located there. The room where this boiler was located was dark, damp and full of foul odors from excretions left there by patients and others in wrongfully using it as a toilet. While engaged in his work, the deceased stood on planks over a pit in front of the boiler, this pit being nearly full of foul, cold stagnant water. In striking a blow at -the grates with a heavy sledge, he lost his balance, and slipped, one of his feet going into the water up over his ankle. Shortly after this the decedent and his helper went to lunch, and the former complained that he did not feel well, and did not eat as usual. He went back to the old plant after lunch but stayed only about 40 minutes, and then went home, where his wife found him later, and found him lying down, and complaining of "not feeling well. He did not go back to work again after that, but developed pneumonia and died about three weeks later. The evidence contains the tstimony of only one physician, the doctor who attended the deceased during his last illness, and his testimony, in the opinion of the Court strongly supports the conclusion that the illness from which the decedent came to his death was brought on by the shock and exposure under the conditions in which Driscoll was working at the time of the accident. From an examination of the authorities in both this and other states we concluded from the, evidence produced in this case that the decedent came to his death as a result of the accident complained of.

We now come to the question of the liability of the State in a case of this kind.. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the Statey as has been frequently decided by this Court, and this doctrine will apply unless the State through the Legislature has expressly waived its application in cases of this kind. It is also our opinion that the State in conducting the Chicago State Hospital at Chicago, Illinois, exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries to those in its employ, again unless the Legislature has by some act directly burdened the State with this responsibility. We are not prepared to conclude that the State has not been made liable to the payment of compensation in a case of this kind under the provisions of the Workmens’ Compensation Act, section 3, sub-paragraphs 1 and 8, as amended by the Act of June 28, 1919. However, it does not appear to us to be necessary to reach a conclusion on this point in this case, as from the facts of the case we find that as a matter of equity and social justice the claimant is entitled to an award. The service of the State should not be less attractive than that of private individuals and corporations of the same nature has been made by legislative enactment, and in performing its functions we believe that this Court is following the course and applying the principals, which it is the providence of this Court to take and apply, when we conclude that the claimant here is entitled to .a compensation. We therefore award the claimant the sum of two thousand ($2,000.00) dollars.


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    E. Wunderlick Granite Co. v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion -filed January 19, 1921.

    Non-Liability of State — when State not liable. This claim, is brought for damages to claimant’s truck caused by a collision at a street, intersection and crossing in the city of Joliet, due to the negligence of an employee of the State. Held, that the State is not liable for torts, negligence and wrongdoing of its agents, servants or employees. (Henke v. State, C. C., Yol. 2, Page 11, followed.)
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This action brought for the recovery of damage done to the truck of claimant in a collision, between the trucks "of the respective parties, at a public crossing on the streets in the city of Joliet.

The evidence discloses that at the time of the collision, the claimant’s car was being driven at the rate of eight to ten miles per hour. As it approached the street crossing, and that in accordance with the rules and traffic regulations of the city, it had the right of way over the defendant’s car, at that particular time and place.

The defendant’s truck was being, at the time, driven by an employee of the State, at a rate of speed of about twenty-five or thirty miles per hour, which exceeded the speed limit, fixed by the Statute and the city ordinances.

The evidence, which is uncontraclicted, shows conclusively that at the time of the collision, the claimant was using ordinary and due care and proper precaution for his safety, and for the safety of others, at the time of the collision, at the intersection and crossing of two streets, and that the servant and agent, who was running at the speed above indicated, did not attempt to stop, or even to slacken his unlawfll speed, but crashed headlong into plaintiff’s car or truck with great violence, damaging it to the amount of $456.05, the amount claimed in the declaration.

Eo evidence is furnished in behalf of the State in refutation of any of the claimant’s evidence. The State demurr specially and generally to the declaration and each count therein, and cites many authorities in support of his contention, that the State of Illinois is not liable for the torts, acts of negligence or wrongdoing of any of its agents or employees, in all of which we concur, citing: Henry Hench v. State, C. C. 2, p. 11; Arthur G. Haines v. State Board of Agriculture, 184, Ill. App. 191; and many others which we may cite to sustain his contention, but we cite no others as we have so recently cited these authorities in opinions written in similar cases, and without further comment, we deem this such a case as the State ought not to pay. Therefore claim is rejected.


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    Minnie McGhee v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Governmental Function — no liability for Ultra Vires act of militiamen. The State in the use of the State Militia to maintain order, to quell a disturbance or race riot, exercises a governmental function and is not liable for the Ultra Vires act of a militiaman.
    Social Justice and Equity — when claim may be allowed. While there may be no legal liability existing against the State yet where the circumstances of the case warrant it, the Court may as an act of social justice and equity enter an award in favor of the claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This claim is brought by Minnie McGhee a colored girl. It appears from the evidence that in 1916 she came from Mississippi to East St. Louis, Illinois. She lived in East St. Louis continuously to the time of the riot beginning July 1st, 1917. It appears on July 3rd, 1917 and for sometime prior thereto the said Minnie McGhee, claimant, had been working as a domestic at the boarding house of Mary Gray and William Gray on the Island in East St. Louis. It appears from the evidence that there were 21 Companies of Militia sent to the City of East St. Louis during these times. It appears from the evidence that on the morning of July 3rd, that Minnie McGhee had gone into the backyard of the premises where she was employed, to empty garbage in the course of her employment and as she turned to go back from the house, one of a party of three militiamen raised his rifle and without provocation so far as the evidence discloses, shot off her right arm. It appears from the evidence that no other colored persons were near or between her and the soldiers or in such a position that the militiamen shooting at them, might have accidently shot the girl. It appears that the claimant is positive that this militiaman shot at her. It further appears from the evidence that neither Minnie McGhee or any other witness knew or could ascertain the name of the militiaman who fired the shot. He was not arrested at the time of the riot. The name of this man was not disclosed by anyone or by any investigation had relative to the riots or of this particular incident. It further appears that the facts as herein stated have been substantially agreed upon between the State and the claimant. It is the opinion of this Court in this case the State of Illinois and the City of East St. Louis in their efforts through the State Militia and the police force to maintain order to quell a disturbance or a riot, were exercising the police power of the State and city and it is the opinion of this Court that the State is not liable for ulra vires act of a State Militiaman under the circumstances surrounding this case. It is the opinion of this Court that under our laws this claim has no place against the State of Illinois. It is a deplorable case, one which naturally attracts the sympathy of all. This Court recognizes in full the necessity of a State or city to exercise police power in maintaining law and order within its jurisdiction and apparently the only means at hand to procure peace in East St. Louis territory during the riot- was through the Militia. Yet it must be conceded that the law abiding citizens in this territory during those trying times had their rights. While of course it is reasonable to assume if the riots did not take place the Militia would not have been called there and consequently the injury to the claimant would not have occurred. It is also a matter of fact that in extraordinary conditions, injuries will he done persons and property damaged and it is not the intention of this (Yurt in this decision to making any precedent obligating the State of Illinois under such conditions as existed in the case at issue. However, in view of the fact this is a particularly unfortunate case, the claimant being thus deprived of a member of her body which enabled her to earn her living, it is the opinion of the Court that as a matter of equity and social justice, that the claimant be allowed some compensation to assist her in her life efforts. However, in making an allowance it is not the intention of the Court, nor has the Court the power of any precedent to fully compensate the claimant for the loss sustained, however, in conformity with the recent rulings of this Court wherein particular cases warranted the Court to consider equity and socity justice, it is ordered that the claimant be awarded the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars.


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    Clarence A. Burley, Executor, and Trustee, Under the Last Will and Testament of Elizabeth J. Whitney, Deceased, Louisa Chapin Telling, Elizabeth Chapin Greene, Edward F. Chapin, Jr. and Mary W. White. v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Inheritance Tax — refund. Under the facts proven and there being no dispute as to the law governing the case the Court enters an award in favor of claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The record evidence and oral proof sustain claimant’s claim of amount claimed, showing claimant entitled to a refund of $34.83, which is amount hereby awarded to claimant with interest thereon from March 30tli, 1911, making a total of award $44.75.


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    Illinois Central Railroad Company v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

      Contract — when State is liable for freight charges. Where claimant under an Order of the Public Utilities Commission for hauling crushed stone from one point to another in the State, for the State, and is authorized by such order to charge a certain rate per ton therefor, complies with the order of the Commission, it is entitled to recover from the State the contract price, or the amount per ton fixed by the Commission for hauling the stone.
    State Aid Road — separation of grade. When State liable for its proportionate part of expense. Where the Public Utilities Commission enters an order for separation. of grades, and all parties interested are made parties to the proceedings, and the Commission under Par. 2, of Section 58 of Public Utilities Act, apportions the cost of the improvement between the claimant and the State, and other parties interested, and claimant completes the construction, of the work necessary to the separation of the grades, and pays the amount apportioned, by the Commission, to the State, the claimant is entitled to recover from the State the amount paid by it on behalf of the State for the improvement.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This claim is for the amount of two demands, one of ninety-one dollars and five cents ($91.05) with interest thereon from April 15, 1920, and one for four thousand four hundred sixty-one dollars and fifty cents ($4,461.50) with interest thereon from June 5th, 1919. The first is for freight alleged to have been earned for transporting crushed stone for the State. The second is for the amount fixed by the Public Utilities Commission as the amount which the State ought to pay for its portion of the costs of a separation of grades at a point where State Aid Boad Bo. 15 crosses the track of the Illinois Central Eailroad Company about one mile west of Broadview in Proviso Township, Cook County, Illinois. There is no dispute as to the facts relating to either of these demands. It appears that in October, 1915, the claimant hauled some nine cars of crushed stone from Pickneyville, Illinois, to Carbondale, Illinois, for which through a subsequent "order of the Public Utilities Commission claimant was authorized to charge a rate of S3 cents per ton. The State does not dispute its liability on this claim and in the opinion of the Court from the law and facts in this case the claimant is entitled to an award of that amount with interest at the rate of 5 per cent from April 15th, 1920.

As to the second demand it appears that after an order of the Utilities Commission for the separation of grades where State Aid Eoad No. 15 commonly known as 12th street in Cook County, Illinois, crosses the right-of-way and tracks of the claimant, had been entered on March 22, 1917, the claimant in pursuance of that order undertook and completed the construction necessary for the separation of the grades at that point. The Commission in its order pursuant to paragraph 2, section 58 of the Public Utilities Act 1913, apportioned the costs of this improvement between the Eailroad Company and the Township of Proviso, County of Cook and the State Highway department, while admitting its inability to enter an order against the State in view of the prohibition on section 26, article 4 of the Constitution of the State, yet the Commission sets forth its opinion that he State was a proper party in interest in this matter and should bear its reasonable portion of expense of improvement. It was there tinted out that this highway is one of the greatest highways running across the State west from Chicago beyond Cook County connecting with other main highways running to various cities remote from Chicago. The benefit of the improvement, it was pointed out would extend not only to the township of the County but to the people of the State as a whole and the Commission stated the amount of four thousand four hundred sixty-one dollars and fifty cents ($4,461.50) to be the just proportion which the State should pay. It is the opinion of this Court from the consideration of the law and evidence in this case that this demand is just and reasonable. It appears to us that it was the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the Public Utilities Act above cited that the State should pay its proportion of the expenses of a construction of this kind where the State was a party in interest and we believe that it was their intention that the Public Utilities Commission should determine whether and to what extent the State is a party in interest in such cases. It is our judgment therefore that the claimant is entitled to payment of this demand. We accordingly award the claimant the sum of $4,461.50 with interest at the rate of 5 per cent thereon per annum from June 5, 1919, to the date of this award, and the further sum of $91.05 with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per annum thereon from April 15th, 1920, to the date of this award.


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    Esley Cantrall v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Militaba Service — when claimant entitled to an award. There being no dispute as to the facts in this case, the Court holds that the State is liable under Section II, of Art. 16, of the Military and Naval Code of Illinois, for the injuries sustained by claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant was injured on September 16tli, 1917, in the performance 'of his duty while a member of the Reserve Militia, Ninth Regiment, Company E, Illinois National Guard, by being ruptured while carrying some timbers, under orders from his superior officer.

The Attorney General, in his statement on file, admits that there is no dispute as to the facts in this case, and that such facts are properly set forth in the brief and argument of claimant.

Section eleven of article sixteen of the Military and Naval Code of the State of Illinois, in force July 1,1917, makes the State liable for injuries received by any member of the Illinois National Guard, while in the performance of his duty, under orders from his superior officer, and provides that such claim shall be filed with the Court of Claims, and that such Court shall adjust the same as the merits of each case may demand.

Unuder the law and facts in this case, the. State is liable. The claimant does not claim any particular amount for such injury, but leaves the fixing of the same to the consideration of this Court.

After carefully examining the testimony taken in this case, the Court is of the opinion that claimant should receive the sum of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00) for his injuries.

The Court therefore awards claimant the sum of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00).


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    Booth Fisheries Company, a Corporation v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Fish and Game Law — State is not liable for value of fish confiscated under the Fish and Game Laws. Section 18, of the Fish and Game Division is a valid legislative enactment, and the action of the State in confiscation of the fish was legal and not unconstitutional.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claim before this Court as it appears from the evidence and facts now before the Court is on account of certain “black bass” which claim arose on the legality of the confiscation of the black bass involved. In the'first place it appears that when the controversy arose as to whether or not this case came within the State or not, an agreement was entered between representatives of the petitioners and the Game and Fish division to submit to the Attorney General of this State for an opinion as to the validity of the confiscation in question. The Attorney General rendered an opinion upon such statements of facts and briefs submitted by both parties to the controversy and it appears that the Attorney General held that the confiscation so made was not unconstitutional and that the black bass in question were subject to confiscation by the Division. It is the opinion of this Court that the opinion of the Attorney General rendered as aforesaid, was in compliance with the law independent of the fact or any agreement made between the parties to abide by the opinion of the Attorney General. This Court does not believe it necessary to pass upon the proposition of whether or not the value of the property in question was properly proved within the rules of evidence. This Court considers that section 18 of the Game and Fish Code is valid and that the action of the Game and Fish Division was not unconstitutional. It is therefore the judgment of this Court that this claim be and the same is hereby rejected.


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    J. J. Quinn v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Governmental Function — when the Slate is not liadle. The State in conducting the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty. (Taylor v. State, 2-C. C. 243, followed.)
    Social Justice and Equity. — While the State is not legally liable the Court as a matter of social justice and equity recommends an appropriation to claimant for injuries sustained and disbursements made by him.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant, James J. Quinn, who has been employed as guard at the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac from February 12, 1893, to August 28, 1918, brings this suit for damages for injuries received by him while in the performance of his duty. The testimony in this case shows that on August 28, 1918, said claimant, while in charge of the yard gang at said reformatory, was attacked and beaten, choked, knocked down and badly injured by four convicts under his charge, in an attempt by them to obtain his keys to the outer gates, and escape. The convicts did obtain the keys, and opened the railroad gate and endeavored to » escape, but they were noticed by the guard in one of the towers who opened fire on them. One convict was shot by the guard from the tower, two others thereupon returned and surrendered and the fourth escaped and has not yet been recaptured. These convicts were in the third class, being the worst characters in the reformatory. This attack was made shortly after noon, while the yard gang was being given its regular three-quarters of an hour for recreation. The claimant was attacked while at his desk and had no opportunity to defend himself. He put up the best fight possible against overwhelming odds, but was unable to escape from his assailants. He called for help but no one heard him in time to give him assistance.

The testimony of the physicians attending the claimant, shows that he was semi-conscious, suffering from shock and loss of blood and that his head and face were one mass of cuts and bruises, and that there were large contusions on the shoulder, side and back, and over the region of the kidney.-

Claimant was treated at the hospital by the hospital physicians, and also by the State surgeon from Peoria, and also received treatment from a specialist at Joliet, and from the Mayo Brothers at Rochester, Minnesota, and the testimony of said physicians and specialists shows that they are of the opinion that the injuries received by claimant are permanent. The testimony further shows that the claimant was of the age of thirty-five years when he entered the employ of the State, in 1893, and that he was sixty years of age at the time of the above assault; that he received $50.00 per month at the time he began working for said institution and that at the time he ivas injured he was receiving $130.00 per month; that during his employment, he had saved up $1,100.00 in cash and owned a house and lot in Pontiac in which he was living with his daughter, and that he had no property excepting said house and lot and said $1,100, and no income excepting his salary; that during the time he was injured, he was unable to report for duty and lost six months of wages, and that he spent all of his $1,100 of savings in treatments, in attempting to be cured of his injuries; that while' being treated, claimant returned to work several times, but was compelled to give up work.

The State, through the Attorney General, has interposed a demurrer to the declaration and evidence, setting up as a defense that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State, and that the State in conducting the reformatory at Pontiac, is exercising a governmental function and is not liable for the injuries of those it employs.

The Attorney General, in his brief, states that there is no dispute about the facts in the case, but that they are substantially correct as stated in the brief and argument filed by claimant.

Under the previous decisions of this Court, the contentions of the State, through the Attorne]1' General, must be sustained.

The State is not liable for injuries received by its employees in the performance of their duty as ‘the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State.’

Hedges v. County of Madison, 1 Gilm., 567.

Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners, 135 Ill., 369.

‘The State, in conducting the reformatory at Pontiac, is exercising a governmental function, and is not liable for the death and injury of those it employs.’

Morrisey v. State, Vol. 3, Court of Claims, 367.

Taylor v. State, Vol. 3, Court of Claims, 343, and other cases passed upon by this Court.

Under these decisions, this Court holds that the State is not liable to claimant for his injuries. Under the law, this claim is therefore rejected.

However, the Court feels that as an act of social justice and equity, under the facts in this case, an. allowance should be made to claimant for his injuries, as the Court cannot legally make an award in this case. It therefore recommends to the Legislature that an appropriation to claimant be made in full of his injuries and disbursements, of the sum of four thousand dollars.


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    Augusta Schutte v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Governmental Function — ichcn State not liable. The State in managing and conducting the Chicago State Hospital for the Insane at Chicago exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries sustained by its inmates or employees. (North v. State, Supra, followed.)
    Court of Claims — exercises equitable jurisdiction as a Court of Conscience. Under the Act of 1917 the Court of Claims is given a broad and liberal jurisdiction as a court of conscience.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant, Augusta Schntte, brings this suit for loss of the use of her right arm and right hand, caused by a vicious attack upon her by one of the male inmates of the ‘‘Chicago State Hospital,” a State institution, used for the care and treatment of the insane and diseased persons, at which time, she was an employe of the State, as an attendant in said institution.

The evidence is brief, clear and not disputed, but on the contrary, is admitted by the State.

The facts in the case seem clearly set out in the declaration and in the amendment to the declaration.

About the 6tli day of April, A. D. 1920, the claimant, who is shown to be a widow about 50 years of age, and lived with her mother, who was 83 years old, and contributed to her support. She was without means of support in life, and became an employee of the State at a salary of $125.00 per month, which included her living expenses of $60.00 per month.

While engaged in her duties in said institution, and without fault on her part, and while exercising ordinary care and caution for her safety, she was viciously set upon by one, Peter Xoviskie, one of the inmates and crushed to the floor. In her frantic efforts to extricate herself from the attack of the madman, she became unconscious. On awakening, she discovered she was on a bed, and being cared for b)r certain other inmates of the institution, who were less viciously inclined than the said Peter.

Her condition was serious, and in a few days, the physician was called in, who made ex-rays of the shoulder and arm. He did not discover anything wrong with the shoulder joint; but did discover a torn or lacerated ligament of the arm. In his testimony, he says the muscles of the right hand and arm are completely atrophied, and that the effect of the injury is a complete loss of the use of the right hand and arm. The claimant testifies to about same condition of her arm and shoulder, and in this, she is supported by the evidence of others.

The claimant claims for full compensation under the ‘Workmens’ Compensation Act.” The facts are admitted by the State, and a general demurrer filed by the Attorney General. The evidence all being before the Court, the demurrer will be disposed of in the opinion of the Court.

The State of Illinois, in conducting the Chicago State Hospital for the Insane is exercising a governmental function, and is not liable under the law for the death or injuries of its inmates or its employees. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State. In support of this contention, the Attorney General cites the following cases: Hedges v. County of Madison, 1 Gil. 567; Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 348; Hollenbeck x.Winnebago County, 95, Ill. 148 and 516, and others; and we may cite the case of North v. The State University, and many other similar cases holding to and announcing this doctrine.

But in view of the fact that the Act of 1917, creating the Court of Claims, and giving it very broad and liberal equitable jurisdiction as a Court of Conscience, apparently intended to give the Court the right to adjust such cases as the one at bar; and in view of the fact that the claimant is growing old, and is poor, with no means of support for herself and her aged mother, we recommend an award to claimant in gross in the sum of $2,500.00 and would recommend an appropriation for the same.


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    Jerusha Foster v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Respondeat Superior — doctrine, not applicable to the State. The doctrine of Respondeat Superior is not applicable to the State, and it is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty.

      Pension — no statutory authority for allowance of pension. There is no statutory authority for the allowance to a claimant, by the Court of Claims, a pension for life.
    Social Justice and Equity — recommending an allowance. Where the circumstances and facts warrant the Court will recommend to the Legislature and appropriation to claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant, on May 11, 1919, while employed by the State of Illinois as night attendant at the State Hospital for the Insane at Elgin, and while giving one of the patients a bath in said hospital, slipped upon the wet floor and fell heavily and sustained a, fracture of the left femur, which is generally known as a broken hip. She remained in said hospital in bed until September 3,1919, when she was taken to the Sherman hospital,-a private institution in Elgin, where she was operated upon by one of the leading surgeons of the city of Elgin. • After said operation, she returned to the State hospital and remained in bed for eight weeks, when she again returned to said Sherman hospital for about twenty-five days, after which she again returned to the State hospital. She was confined in her room and remained out of employment until March 22, 1920'. when the State gave her minor employment marking patients’ clothing, and she is so employed at the present time.

At the time she was injured, she was receiving $35.00 per month, with hoard, laundry, maintenance and medical attention, but she is now receiving $47.00 per month, with hoard, room, maintenance and medical attention. She was forty-four years old in November, 1920. She has expended for hospital and physicians’ bills in said Sherman hospital, a total of $199.00. Two operations have been performed, both of which have been unsuccessful, and the opinion of the superintendent of the State hospital, as shown by the testimony in this case, and of another physician in charge of said State hospital is that the injury is permanent and that claimant will never recover the use of her limb, and that she will be compelled to go on crutches and will never be able to obtain outside employment.

Claimant is without means of livlihood, and has no relatives upon whom she can rely for support.

The Attorney General has filed a demurrer, stating that there is no dispute about the facts in this case, as above mentioned, and stated in the brief and argument filed by claimant, but claiming that the State is not liable because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State, and that the State of Illinois, in conducting the Insane Asylum at Elgin is exercising a governmental function and is not liable for the injuries of inmates and those it employs.

Tins contention has been repeatedly sustained by this Court in previous decisions, and in opinions filed at this term, and a further citation of authorities is unnecessary.

Claimant asks for compensation and also for a pension for life, but this Court does not know of any law which would authorize it to award a pension for life, and no authority for such an award has been cited to this Court by the attorneys for claimant in their brief.

This claim is therefore rejected.

The Court, however, feels that even though the State is not liable to claimant, as an act of social justice and equity some compensation should be made to claimant for injuries, under the circumstances of this case.

• The Court therefore recommends to the Legislature an appropriation to the claimant of the sum of two thousand dollars ($2,000.00).


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    J. J. England for His Own Use and Use A. S. Herman v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 21, 1921.

      Contract — ivhen State liable for repairs. Assignee. There being no dispute as to the facts and law governing this case the Court enters an award in favor of claimant for the amount of his claim.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   In October, 1915, Captain Holmes, then custodian of the State Armory Building at Springfield, Illinois, employed J. J. England to do certain repair work by installing new flashing, repair leaks and put on new coat of paint on the building, for an agreed sum of $425.00. It is shown in the evidence that Captain Holmes acted for the State in the employment aforesaid, that the work was done according to contract ; that the building was in the immediate need of such repairs and furnishings; that claim was properly presented to the proper department of State, and demand made for payment, which was refused only for lack of funds. The claim seems to be reasonable, and repairs were approved by the State, and an award will be made to J. J. England for his own use and to use of A. S. Herman, to whom an interest seems have been assigned (to secure rents, etc.) in the sum of $425.00.


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    Hugh Abney v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Governmental Function — when State is not liable. The State in conducting the Soldiers and Sailors Home at Quincy, 111., exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while performing their duty.
    Social Justice and Eqitity — vjhen claimant entitled to an award. Under the facts proven the Court as an act of social justice and equity recommends to the Legislature an appropriation to claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant, while employed by the State at the Illinois Soldiers and Sailors Home at Quincy, Illinois, on January 12, 1919, in the performance of his duty in disinfecting the hospital ward furniture with a sprat* pump and liquid disinfectant supplied by the authorities of said hospital, was injured by the disinfectant from said spray lodging in his left eye. He was treated in said hospital by the hospital physicians and also taken to St. Mary’s Hospital at Quincy, for treatment. On February 18, 1919, it became necessary to remove said eye, and on said date claimant submitted to an operation in said hospital and his left eye was removed in order to save the sight of his right eye, and on March 24, 1919, claimant was fitted with a glass eye, which he now wears. Claimant receives a salary of $63.00 per month; is a married man, and has one son, aged four and one-half years. ’Claimant expended $131.00 for hospital expenses and medical services and claims $2,000.00 for damages for the loss of said eye, making a total claim of $2,131.00.

The State, through the Attorney General, has set up the defense that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State, and that the State in conducting the Soldiers and Sailors Home at _ Quincy, Illinois, is exercising a governmental function, and that therefore the State is not liable for the injuries of those it employs.

These contentions have been repeatedly upheld under former decisions of this Court, and under such rulings, this Court holds that the State is not liable to the claimant in this case.

Said claim is therefore rejected.

The Court, however, under the facts in this case, believes that as an act of social justice and equity, claimant should receive some compensation for Ms injury.

The Court therefore recommends to the Legislature an appropriation to claimant of the sum of two thousand one hundred and thirty-one and no/100 dollars ($2,131.00), in full payment for disbursements and injuries in this cause.


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    Thomas I. Motter and West Suburban Hospital for the Use of F. W. Winkler v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Non-Liability of State — the State is not liable for the torts, wrongs or negligence of its employees.

    Social Justice and Equity — when claimant entitled to an award. Under the facts proven, while no legal liability exists against the State, but upon principles of equity and social justice claimant is entitled to an award for expenses incurred for hospital care and medical aid furnished.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   There is no dispute about the facts in this case. They show that one F. W. Winkler, an inspector of the Division of Game and Fish, of the Department of Agriculture of the State of Illinois, while driving an automobile belonging to the State, and in the performance of his duties as such inspector, struck and injured one Sam Slutsky, a youth of approximately 14 years. The accident happened in the city of Chicago. It. appears that Winkler ivas complying with the law in all respects as to the control of his car when he struck Slutsky, and that the latter, who jumped from a moving street car in front of him, was at fault, if fault lay anywhere. Winkler took the boy to a hospital and arranged i'or hospital care and medical aid and attendance for him, and it is for the amount of the charges for these services that this claim is presented. The accident happened on June 4th, 1920, and the boy was in the hospital 30 days. It appears that the charges are reasonable, the injury having consisted of a fractured leg.

The Court is of the opinion that the facts in this case do not show a ground of legal liability on the part of the State. However, the act and conduct of the State’s agent in looking after the injured was commendable, and the State taking this view, ‘interposes no objections to allowance of this claim. And the Court upon the principals of equity and social justice for the furtherance of which it was created, considers the claimants entitled to an award of the amount sought. Wherefore, we award the claimants, Thomas I. Hotter and West Suburban Hospital for the use of F. W. Winkler, the sum of two hundred ninety-seven and 22/100 ($297.22) dollars, and direct that one hundred fifty ($150.00) dollars of that sum be paid to said Thomas I. Hotter, and one hundred forty-seven and 22/100 ($147.22) dollars of that sum be paid to said West Suburban Hospital.


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    The Browning Company, an Ohio Corporation v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Franchise Tax — when claimant entitled to a refund. There being no dispute as to the facts in this case, under the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. The Public Utilities Commission, 292 111. 427, claimant is entitled to recover the amount of franchise tax over-paid.
    Foreign Corporations — when State cannot collect franchise tax. The State cannot collect a franchise tax based upon the business and property of a foreign corporation admitted to do business in 'this State based on business transacted outside the State.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant is an Ohio corporation, but is duly authorized to do’ business in the State of Illinois. Pursuant to section 102 of the General Corporation Act of this State, claimant made its annual report in writing to the Secretary of State of Illinois for the calendar year 1919, on a form furnished by the 'latter. Claimant negligently, but without any intent to evade the laws of the State of Illinois, failed to include in said report certain detailed information called for in paragraphs 10 to 16, inclusive, of said form, said information relating to the total value of the property of the claimant, everywhere, the total value of the property of the claimant located in Illinois, the total business of the claimant for the year 1919 transacted by it at or from places of business in Illinois, and the total business of the claimant transacted everywhere during the- year 1919. The Secretary of State of Illinois received said report, but failed to call claimant’s attention to the fact of claimant’s failure to furnish said detailed information, or to request claimant to furnish same thereafter. The Secretary of State proceeded to assess against claimant a franchise tax of $500, based upon all the.authorized capitalization ($1,000,000.00) of claimant, and also assessed against claimant an additional fee of $485 for claimant’s certificate of authority to do business in the State of Illinois, based upon all the authorized capitalization of claimant. Claimant, on August 31st, 1920, paid the tax and fee thus assessed, but under protest. The total value of all tangible property of claimant everywhere is approximately $1,118',170.00, and the total value of all.its tangible property located in Illinois is approximately $100. The total business of claimant everywhere in 1919 was $2,-810,964.00, and its total business in Illinois for 1919 was $190,089.00. Upon these figures the claimant should have been assessed a franchise tax for the period from July 1, 1920, to June 30, 1921, of only $22.50, and should have been xequiied to pay an additional fee for its certificate of authority to do business in Illinois of not more than $2.50, it having previously in 1919, paid an initial fee for such certificate of $20.00. Claimant asks for a refund of $960, the excess paid by it over the amount which should have been assessed, in franchise tax and additional fee.

The State makes no defense to this claim, and consents that judgment may be entered against the State for the amount claimed. It is clear that under the principles of law announced by the Supreme Court of this State in Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Utilities Commission, 292 c. 427, the State of Illinois could not collect a tax based upon the business and property of a corporation admitted to do business in this State, which is transacted or located elsewhere than in this State. And further in the opinion of this Court it was in no sense the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the General Corporation Act that such a tax should be collected or attempt made to collect such a tax. The money paid by claimant was paid under protest and under circumstances arising from a mistake of fact, and it is the judgment of this Court that the claim should be allowed. We accordingly award the claimant the sum of nine hundred sixty dollars ($960).


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    Morna Kruger, Administratrix of the Estate of Charles A. Kruger, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Governmental Function — when State is not liable. The State in conducting the Illinois State Reformatory exercises a governmental function and is not liable for the death or injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty. (Morrisey v. State, Yol. 2, O. C. 267, followed.)
    Social Justice and Equity — when award will be made. Although no legal liability exist against the State as a matter of social justice and equity the Court recommends to the Legislature an appropriation to claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The claimant, Morna Kruger, is the widow of Charles A. Kruger, deceased, and is administratrix of his estate under appointment by the County Court of Livingston County, Illinois. They were married August 8, 1911. The deceased did not leave any descendants surviving him.

Charles A. Kruger entered the employment of the Illinois State "Reformatory as a civil service employee in 1909 and continued until the spring of 1919. He then entered the employment of the shoe factory in Pontiac where he worked until in July, 1919, when he re-entered the employ of the Illinois State Reformatory as a civil service employee.

During the afternoon of September 7, 1919, Charles A. Kruger was captain of the watch at the reformatory and as such was in complete charge of the institution. During that afternoon, two inmates, John Frederico and John Kelly, who occupied cell 32 in gallery 5 of the Forth cell house, were detected in sawing the cell bars. One of the bars was nearly sawed through and another one partly. The two officers who detected it, namely, Hancock and Donovan, were alone in the cell house and immediately sent a call to Mr. Krueger, who secured the. keys and came to the cell house and to said cell with the intention' of taking said two inmates therefrom and placing them in another cell.

As soon as the cell door was unlocked, the inmate, Kelly, produced a revolver and shot Mr. Kruger in the head, resulting in immediate death. The other inmate shot Hancock. Said two inmates then secured possession of the keys to said cell house, liberated another inmate and started a desperate and determined effort to escape from the institution. The attempt terminated in the death of one of them and the mortal wounding of the other.

These inmates, Kelly and Frederieo, were supplied with two hack saws, with twelve extra blades each and with two revolvers, one an army special and the other a Colt’s automatic, and with at least fifty cartridges each. Edward Wheeler, who was an employee of the State of Illinois at the said reformatory, was bribed by John Frederieo to secure the saws, guns and ammunition. Said Wheeler brought said articles in at different times and placed them in control of said Frederieo. Wheeler was sent money to buy said articles and was also paid $500.00, and was to receive an additional $500.00 after said inmates had escaped. This money was sent to him by a brother of Frederieo from Chicago.

Wheeler’s connection with the crime was traced through the serial number on the revolvers, which he had purchased at different' places in Springfield, Illinois. He was indicted for murder in the Circuit Court of Livingston County, pleaded guilty, was sentenced under a charge of manslaughter and is now confined to the Joliet State prison. He caused to be delivered to the sheriff practically all of the said $500.00.

Charles A. Kruger was six feet and two inches tall, weighed one hundred and eighty pounds and was about forty-nine years of age, and appears to have been an efficient and trusted official of this institution. He came to his death in the courageous performance of his duty.

Under the law of this State and the decisions of this Court, we are of the opinion that the State is not technically liable for the death of claimant’s intestate. The State is not liable for injuries received by its employees in the performance of their duty, as The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State.’

Hedges v. County of Madison, 1 Gilm., 567.

Elmore v. Drainage Commissioners. 135 Il., 269.

The State, in conducting the Reformatory at Pontiac, is exercising a governmental function, and is not liable for the death and injury of those it employs.

“Morrisey v. State, Vol. 2, Court of Claims, 267.

“Taylor v. State, Vol. 2, Court of Claims, 243, and other cases passed upon by this Court.

The claim is therefore rejected.

However, we feel that as an act of social justice and equity, a substantial allowance should he made to claimant, even though we cannot make an award in this case.

We therefore recommend to the Legislature an appropriation to the claimant of the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).


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    Wappello Savings Bank and Sue C. Hackworth, Executors of the Last Will of J. T. Hackworth, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Inheritance Tax — ichen refund will he made. In this claim there being no dispute as to the facts and law governing the case, the Court enters an award in favor of claimant for the amount of the claim.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   J. T. Hackworth died April 11, 1918, a resident of Wapello County, State of Iowa, and by his last will transferred certain property, taxable under the inheritance tax laws of Illinois.

On October 10, 1919, an order was entered, the County Judge of Cook County, Illinois assessing a total tax of $14,848.88. On the same day, said tax less 5% discount to-wit: $14,107.39, was paid to County Treasurer of Cook County, and by him to State Treasurer. This was in due time appealed from by claimant to the County Court. Upon a hearing in the County Court, in which all proper parties were represented, the County Court entered an order, assessing a total tax in said estate of $3,798.03, from which order, the State never appealed, or any person interested in the estate.

It was ordered by the County Court that claimants have a refund of $10,508.37.

It is clear from record of the proceedings, copies of which are on file herein, that claimants are entitled to the above amount as refund. The Attorney General admits the correctness and justice of the claim, and consents to its allowance. We therefore award claimants $10,508.37.


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    Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Franchise Tax — foreign corporations. When entitled to recover franchise tax paid. Under the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. The Public Utilities Commission, 292 111. 427, the facts herein being stated, the claimant is entitled to recover from the State the amount of franchise tax paid with interest.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim by the Missouri Pacific Eailroad Company, a foreign corporation, to recover from the State of Illinois, sixty-two hundred dollars ($6,200.00) paid as a fee or franchise tax for permission from the Public Utilities Commission to issue $6,200,000.00 of bonds of its railway company, under section 31 of the Public Utilities Act (Hurd's Statutes, 1917, page 2288).

The permission to issue said bonds was granted on condition that claimant pay to the State Treasury the sum of $6,200.00. Claimant paid said amount under protest in order to receive the authority from said Commission, and then appealed' from that part of the order of the Commission requiring it to pay said fee, to the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, which sustained the Commission, and claimant then appealed to the Supreme Court of this State, which reversed the decision of the Circuit Court and the Commission, in an opinion rendered on April 21st, 1920, in which - opinion it- declares that said fee was unlawfully collected and declares said Section 31 void when applied to a foreign corporation.

The Attorney General has entered his appearance admitting the liability of the State, for said amount of $6,200.00, and under the decision of the Supreme Court in said case, it is clear that claimant is entitled to a-refund of said sum of $6,200.00 with interest from March 19, 1919.

Claimant is therefore awarded the sum of $6,200.00 with interest thereon at five per cent per annum from March 19, 1919, to date of payment.


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    Carl Hancock and John Hancock v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1921.

    Governmental Function — ivhen State is not liable. The State in conducting the Illinois State Reformatory exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty. (Morna Kruger v. State, Supra, followed.)
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   The same opinion will cover both the above cases, as claimants have the same counsel, and the testimony was taken in both cases at the same time and is covered by the same record.

The facts in these eases are similar to those set out in the opinion of this Court in the case of Morna Kruger, Administratrix, v. The State, Number 56, and it is not necessary to set same out in full.

The claimant, Carl Hancock, on September 7, 1919, was stationed as an officer on duty as cell house keeper in the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac. At said time, two inmates of said institution, John Frederico and John Kelly, were confined in a cell, and unknown to said Carl Hancock, had in their possession certain saws, revolvers and cartridges for the purpose of attempting to make their escape from said institution. Claimant, while on guard, detected said two inmates in the attempt to saw the iron bars of their cell door, and reported to his superior officer, Charles A. Kruger. Said Kruger then came, and with the assistance of claimant, unlocked the door of said cell, for the purpose of taking said inmates out and confining them in other cells. As soon as said cell door was unlocked, said inmate John Kelly produced a revolver and shot said Kruger in the head which resulted in his immediate death. The other inmate, John Frederico shot the claimant, Carl Hancock with a revolver and severely and dangerously wounded him. Said inmates then secured possession of the keys of said cell house and liberated another inmate, and attempted to escape from the institution, but were prevented from so doing by guards and other attendants and the attempt to escape -terminated in the death of one of them and the mortal wounding of the other.

After the shooting of said Kruger and said Carl Hancock by said inmates the claimant, John Hancock, armed with an automatic rifle, attempted to prevent their escape from the yard, and in an exchange of shots with said Kelly, was shot in the left foot.

The testimony shows that both said John Hancock and Carl Hancock received their injuries in the performance of their duty as guards, and that the bones in the foot of said claimant, John Hancock, were broken and injured, and that such lameness and injuries still exist.

The testimony further shows that the bullet from the revolver fired by said John Frederico at the claimant, Carl Hancock, entered the right side of the head of said Carl Hancock and penetrated the brain and came out at the rear of the head; that claimant, Card Hancock became seriously ill and that the injury caused paralysis of liis left side, and that his injury is a permanent one. The testimony further shows that the shock of said injury caused the Avife of said Carl Hancock to lose her mind and that she has, since said time, been insane, and is hoav confined in a private sanitarium at Jacksonville, Illinois.

The Attorney General, on behalf of the State, has filed a demurrer to both of said claims, setting forth that the State is not liable for the injuries to claimants, received in the performance of their duty, as the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State, and also setting forth that the State, in conducting the reformatory at Pontiac is exercising a governmental function and is not liable for the death and injuries of those it employs.

These contentions have been heretofore sustained by this Court in preA'ious decisions, and the authorities in support thereof are fully set forth in the opinion in the case of Morna Kruger, administratrix, against the State, above mentioned.

Under these authorities, the Court therefore rejects both of these claims.

The Court is of the opinion, hoAvever, that as an act of social justice and equity, an alloAA'ance should be made to both of these claimants, as the evidence sIioaa's that they Avere both injured in the performance of their duty.

After carefully considering the evidence in both of these cases, the Court recommends to the Legislature an appropriation to the claimant, Carl Hancock, of the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), and an appropriation to the claimant, John Hancock, of the sum of fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500.00).


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    Emma Coughenour, Administratrix of the Estate of R. E. Coughenour, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion, filed January 19, 1921.

    Respondeat Superior — not applicable to State. The doctrine of Re spondeat Superior is not applicable to the State, and it is not liable for in juries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty.
    Social Justice and Equity — when claimant entitled to an award. While as a matter of law the State is not liable for the injuries sustained by claimant’s intestate while he was in the performance of his duty, as a matter of social justice and equity the Court recommends to the Legislature an appropriation to claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   Claimant’s intestate was employed by the State as a guard at the penitentiary at Joliet, and was in the course of his employment required to work at the new prison in Lockport Township, near Joliet. He was transported each morning from the old penitentiary to the new prison, and back in the evening by means of a certain truck belonging to 'the State and driven by one of the convicts of the penitentiary. On one of the routes from the old penitentiary to the new prison, there was a steep hill known as Bluff hill. On February 4, 1930, this roadway was very slippery, and on said day while said truck, loaded with, prisoners under charge of said guard, was being driven up said hill, the engine of said truck died. The driver applied the brakes but they were out of order and would not hold and the truck which weighed about 4,-600 pounds began to run backwards down the hill. There was a. man in the front of the truck with the driver, and the driver, after putting on the brake, directed this man to jump. The back part of the truck was closed in front and at the sides, and the only exit was from the rear. Of the eighteen to twenty men in the rear part of the truck, five or six jumped and then claimant’s intestate jumped. He attempted to jump towards the left and off the back end of the truck, but just about the time he jumped, the truck swered to the left and ran over him, breaking one of his legs and injuring him internally. As a. result of these injuries he died the day following, February 5th.

The evidence shows that the brake on this truck had been out of order for several months, and that the deputy warden of the penitentiary knew of this condition two weeks prior to the accident.

Claimant’s intestate was 47 years old, earned from $90.00 to $100.00 per month and his board, lodging and laundry, and the evidence shows that he contributed at least $50.00 per month to the support of his family.

The Attorney General has filed a demurrer on behalf of the State, in which he admits that the facts are substantially true as set forth in the brief and argument of claimant, but sets up that claimant is not entitled to recover, on the ground that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State, and that the State is not liable for injuries received by those- it employs, because the conducting of the Illinois State penitentiary at Joliet is a governmental function.

These contentions must be sustained.

The claim is therefore rejected.

While as a matter of law, the State is not liable to claimant, we „ feel that as an act of social justice and equity the Legislature should make an appropriation for the relief of claimant. In the brief and argument of claimant, counsel for claimant states that under no circumstances can this court allow damages of less than sixty four hundred and ninety-two dollars ($6,49.2.00). If the State were liable, this argument might be used, but as the State is not liable, any appropriation that is made will be allowed as an act of social justice instead of being computed according to the strict rules of law.

The Court therefore recommends to the Legislature that an appropriation be made to claimant of the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000.00).


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    American National Bank of Lincoln, Illinois v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed February 11, 1921.

    State Warrant — when illegal State Warrant will be paid. Where a warrant is issued by the State Auditor is cashed by a Bank, in good faith in due course, although the warrant is illegal, and no liability exist against the State on the warrant for its payment, the Court to preserve the credit of the State will recommend to the Legislature an appropriation to pay the same.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for State.
   This claim is based upon a certain warrant issued by the Auditor of Public Accounts, July 2, 1915, to E. C. Perkins in the sum of $500.00, which warrant was countersigned by the State Treasurer and on the third day of July, 1915, the said warrant which was issued to E. C. Perkins was presented to the claimant and by it cashed and forwarded in due course to the State Treasurer for collection. Payment was refused by the State Treasurer.

It appears to this Court that refusal was made by the State Treasurer upon reasonings set forth in the case of Fergus, et al v. Andrew Russel, et al, 270 Ill. 304.

It is the opinion of this Court that under said decision 'there is no legal liability on the part of the State; however, as it appears that this warrant was cashed in good faith when presented to the claimant bank, that claimant had no reason to believe that there was anything unusual about the transaction and with the desire on the part of the Court to preserve full faith and credit so far as practical as to vouchers and the warrants of the State of Illinois, the Court recommends an appropriation by the Legislature in behalf of the claimant in the sum of $500.00, the amount of the face of the warrant in question.