text:
    The Grange Mill Company v. The Western Assurance Company et al.

      Filed at Mt. Vernon November 10, 1886.

    1. Insurance—insu/rable interest—in a purchaser. One in the possession of property under a contract of purchase, who has made a partial payment thereon, has such an equitable interest therein as to uphold an insurance of the same against loss by fire.
    2. Same—who entitled to insurance money—as between vendor and purchaser, or mortgagor and mortgagee. As between the vendee and vendor, the insurance money, in case of the destruction of the property, represents the property itself, and in equity the insurance money should b'e appropriated to the vendor, to the -extent of the unpaid purchase money, in case óf the insolvency of the vendee.
    3. Where a mortgagor or vendee agrees to insure for the benefit of the mortgagee or vendor, in equity such mortgagee or vendor will be entitled to the insurance money in case of a loss, to the extent, at least, of the interest of the mortgagor or vendee in the property insured; and after notice to the insurance company having the risk, it can not pay the loss to the assured, except at its peril, until the rights of such mortgagee or vendor shall have been adjusted.
    4. Same—proof of loss—waiver, by putting defence on other grounds. Proof of loss under a policy of insurance is waived when the company places its refusal to pay on the sole ground that the assured had no title or insurable interest in the property destroyed.
    5. Same—breach of warranty—false representations. If material representations made in an application for-an insurance are untrue and false, there will be a breach of the warranty implied in every application, and the policy will be void.
    6. Same—burden of proof as to breach of warranty. The party seeking to recover for a loss under a policy of insurance need not produce the application, and prove that the representations therein contained were correct. If any material representation by the assured was false, this is a matter for the defence to show.
    7. Evidence—as to matters admitted. A complainant in chancery is not required to prove any fact or facts alleged in his bill, and distinctly admitted by the defendants in their answers.

      Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Union county; the Hon. Daniel M. Browning, Judge, presiding.
    Mr. John M. Lansden, for the plaintiff in error:
    Where a vendee, who has agreed to insure for the benefit of the vendor, insures for his own benefit alone, the vendor, in the event of loss, may, upon giving notice to the insurance company, compel it to pay the insurance money to him. Cromwell v. Insurance Co. 44 N. Y. 52; Ames v. Richardson, 29 Minn. 330; Wheeler v. Insurance Co. 101 U. S. 439; Miller v. Aldrich, 31 Mich. 408; Nichols v. Baxter, 5 R. I. 491; In re Sands Ale Brewing Co. 3 Biss. 175; Wood on Insurance, sec. 134, p. 266; Insurance Co. v. Mitchell, 67 Ill. 43.
    The assured is not bound to set out and prove the truth of his representations. They are subject to attack by the defendant. Herron v. Insurance Co. 28 Ill. 238; Insurance Co. v. Folson, 18 Wall. 253.
    Notice to the agent of the insurance company is notice to the company. Insurance Co. v. Wells, 89 Ill. 82; Insurance Co. v. Wright, 22 id. 463.
    Placing refusal to pay upon the sole ground of a want of title, is a waiver of proof of loss. Wood on Insurance, sec. 417, p. 714; Insurance Co. v. Dunmon, 75 Ill. 14; Norwich Co. v. Insurance Co. 34 Conn. 561; Insurance Co. v. Tucker, 92 Ill. 64; Insurance Co. v. Meyer, 93 id. 271; Insurance Co. v. Grunert, 112 id. 68.
    It was not necessary to prove the facts alleged, and admitted to be true by the answers of the defendants.
    Mr. W. S. Day, and Messrs. Crawford & Bussey, for the defendants in error.
   Mr. Chief Justice Scott

delivered the opinion of the Court:

The original bill in this case was brought by the Grange-Mill Company, in the circuit court of Union county, against, certain insurance companies and John T. Emison and LeeMusselman. It is alleged, complainant sold its mill property to defendant Emison at a certain price, a part of which was paid in cash, and the remainder was to be secured to be paid by his promissory note, with interest. The negotiations for the sale of the property seem to have been conducted by areal estate agent, and the contract agreed upon, whatever it. may have been, was never fully complied with by Emison. It seems he refused to execute his note for the unpaid balance of the purchase money, and refused to accept the bond for a deed, that was drawn up for delivery. Notwithstanding his refusal to execute the papers prepared, Emison did take immediate- and exclusive possession of the mill property, which was surrendered to him by the company, under the alleged contract, and, perhaps, commenced to operate it. Afterwards, Emison associated with himself one Lee Musselman, and thereafter carried on business under the name of John T. Emison. & Co. The alleged contract of sale was made in October, 1880.. Shortly after Emison & Co. began to operate the mill, they procured insurance upon it, for their own benefit, from the-defendant insurance companies, amounting in the aggregate-to the sum of $5000. In June, 1881, the mill property was-totally destroyed by fire. No further sum had then been paid on the purchase price of the property. Suits had been commenced by Emison & Co. against the several insurance companies, to recover for the losses sustained. Pending those-suits, this bill -was filed, in which the insolvency of Emison & Co. was alleged, and by which complainant claimed the-benefit of the insurance, under an alleged contract made with Emison, at the time of the sale of the property to him, to have-it insured for its benefit. To the bill the several insurance-companies were made defendants, with Bmison and Mussel-man. A summons was issued for the defendant companies on the 7th day of November, 1881, and an effort was made to-obtain service. Other process was subsequently issued, and such service was had that the defendant companies came into court and defended. An amended bill was filed, in which it was alleged that Bmison & Co. recovered judgments in the-actions on the policies against the several companies, which judgments, while appeals were pending in the Appellate Court, were in some way settled by the payment to Bmison & Co, of the sum of $2500, each company paying a sum in proportion to the amount of its risk. On the answers filed by the several defendant companies, and the replication thereto, and; upon the evidence, both documentary and oral, the cause was-heard in the circuit court, and the bill was dismissed for want of equity. That decree was afterwards affirmed in the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, and complainant brings, the case to this court.

The bill is framed on the theory, Bmison agreed at the time of the sale, and as a part of the contract, that he would have the property insured for the benefit of complainant. The evidence contained in this record has been subjected to a careful consideration, and it is thought it fully sustains the position taken, that Bmison did agree to have the mill property insured for the benefit of his vendor. It is so expressed in a written memorandum made at the time, and that memorandum was given in evidence, by plaintiffs, in the trial of the case of Emison & Co. v. Traders’ Ins. Co. That was evidence tending to show there was a contract that insurance should be procured. But aside from the written memorandum, the agreement to procure insurance upon the property for the benefit of complainant is fully established by other testimony. Undoubtedly, the law is, that, as between the vendee and the vendor, the insurance money, in case of the destruction of the property, represents the property itself, and in equity the insurance money should be appropriated to the vendor in case of the insolvency of the vendee. The principle is of frequent application, where a mortgagor or vendee agrees to insure for the benefit of the mortgagee or vendor, in ease of loss, in equity, such party is. entitled to the insurance money, to the extent, at least, of his interest in the property which was the subject of insurance. After notice to the insurance company having the risk, such company can not pay the loss to the assured named in the policy, except at its peril, until the rights of the parties claiming the fund shall have been adjusted. Cases in this State, and elsewhere, recognize this equitable doctrine. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 67 Ill. 43; Cromwell v. B. F. Ins. Co. 44 N. Y. 42; Wheeler v. Insurance Co. 101 U. S. 439.

The general doctrine on this subject is not questioned, but the defence is rested mainly on two grounds: First, that prior to making the compromise or settlement, as was done with the assured, the insurance companies had no notice of the claim now insisted upon by complainant; and second, that the policies were, for some reason, not obligatory on the companies issuing them, and 'for that reason they were under no legal liability to pay the losses to the assured. It follows, as a matter of course, if the companies were under no obligation to pay the losses to the assured, there could be no obligation to pay complainant.

It appears from the acquittance taken from Bmison & Co., on payment of the sums agreed upon, by way of compromise or otherwise, that the companies each had actual notice, before anything was paid to Bmison & Co., of the equities of complainant, for in it they provided, in the “event of any further litigation by the Grange Mill Company, ” neither company was to be affected by the payment of the sums of money paid, or otherwise. To what “further litigation” is the reference? Obviously, to “further litigation” on the present bill, then pending. There was then no other litigation pending anywhere, or in any court, that could affect the parties in regard to the matters they were contracting about it. In case the litigation then pending should be continued by complainant in this suit, it was agreed neither defendant should be affected by what was done by the parties to the settlement they were making. If it had no reference to complainant’s bill, then there was nothing to which it could, by any possibility, refer. Conceding then, as must be done, the reference is to the present bill, it is conclusive as to the actual knowledge of defendants of the equities of complainant. The fact of notice is therefore fully proved, and if they paid anything to Emison & Co. on the policies, it was wrongful, and at the risk of the companies paying it.

Passing now to consider the second question made on the defence, it is seen it is the most important question discussed. It is, whether the evidence contained in this record shows a prima facie right tó relief in favor of complainant. It is thought it does. It is made a ground of objection, the policies issued by the insurance companies were not introduced in evidence. Under the pleadings that was not necessary. The making of the policies by the several companies, the amount of the risk carried by each, and for whose benefit made, were all facts distinctly admitted by defendant insurance companies in their joint and several answers. It was wholly unnecessary, therefore, to prove that which was solemnly admitted by the answer, and the practice does not require it. The destruction of the mill property by fire, is also admitted in the answer of defendants, and proof of that fact was unnecessary.

It is said there is no proof of loss given by the assured. That fact was waived by the companies placing their refusal to pay the losses, on the sole ground the assured had no title to the property destroyed. The evidence in this record shows the refusal to pay the loss was for the reason the assured had no insurable interest in the property. That they had such an interest appears, past all doubt, from the evidence in this record. Emison had bought the property, had made partial payment, and was in possession, under his contract, at the time the policies were written. He, and his partner that he had taken in with him, were the equitable owners of the property insured, at the time, and had they paid the balance of the purchase money they would have been entitled to a deed. These facts, when established, either by admission or proof, were prima facie sufficient to warrant the relief demanded by complainant. Of course the prima facie case thus made is liable to be defeated. If the representations made in the application were untrue and false, then there would be a breach of the warranty implied in every application for insurance, and the policies would be void. That, however, is a matter of defence. It was not necessary for complainant to introduce the application, and prove the representations it contained were correct. That proof should come from defendants, if they, or either of them, insisted they had been overreached in writing the policies. The defendants made no such proof, nor did they ever charge the assured with any actual fraud in obtaining the policies. The insistence by defendants has all the time been, that the policies were void because the assured had no title to the property. It may be, when the companies come to make their defence, it will appear the assured represented their insurable interest in the property correctly. How that may be, can not be known until the defence shall be unfolded.

The judgment of the Appellate and the decree of the circuit courts will be reversed, and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Judgment reversed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Mulkey

license: Public Domain

text:
    Harry G. McCartney v. Franklin Osburn et al.

      Filed at Mt. Vernon November 22, 1886.

    1. Will—effect of the expression of a wish. A wish of the testator, j clearly expressed in his will, is equivalent to a positive direction or command.
    2. Same—time of distribution—and herein, of the vesting of an estate, in interest, and in possession. Where a will contemplates distribution at a period subsequent to the death of the testator, the time must be fixed by the will itself. It can not be left open, to be determined by the executors.
    3. Where there is a simple devise to a class, and the will does not, expressly or by necessary implication, fix the time when the objects of the gift are to be ascertained or when distribution is to be made, the law will fix it at the testator’s death, that being the time when the will first speaks. In such case, the gift vests, both in interest and in possession, at the same time, and after-born children will be excluded.
    4. A devise vests in interest when the right of property first attaches, without regard to whether there is a present right of possession or not. When the right of possession accrues, the gift or devise is said to vest in possession, or the time of payment or distribution has arrived.
    5. A gift by will always takes effect, both in interest and possession, at the death of the testator, when limited per verba de presentí, unless such vesting is expressly, or by necessary implication, deferred to a future period.
    6. Where the gift is limited to take effect, both in interest and possession, upon some contingency or event which may or may not happen until after the testator’s death, if the contingency or event happens after his death the gift will then vest absolutely, and if before his death, it will then vest at his death.
    7. A gift of personal estate at a specified future time, or upon the happening of a certain contingency, will not vest until the time specified has arrjved or the contingency has happened; but if the gift is general, and there is merely a simple direction that it be paid, or that the fund be distributed or divided, at a specified time or upon the happening of a like contingency, it will vest on the testator’s death, and the payment or distribution, only, will be postponed. This rule, however, has no application to a devise of real estate.
    8. Where there is a simple gift to a class, to be paid at a fixed time or upon an event -which may happen after the testator’s death, and nothing appears to show a contrary intention, the gift will vest in interest at the testator’s death, and the time of distribution, only, will be deferred.
    9. But if the element of futurity is annexed to the gift itself, and is not merely indicative of the time of payment, or if the time of payment is made descriptive of the class that is to take, the gift "will not vest in interest until the time so fixed for payment or distribution has arrived.
    10. When there is a simple direction to divide at a specified time, the gift will not vest until the time of division; but where there is an express gift, accompanied with a direction to divide at such specified time, it vests at the testator’s death, and the division, only, is postponed.
    11. Same—executors taking the fee, in trust—when the equitable title mil vest—awaiting the happening of a contingency. Where a testator gives Ms executors discretionary power to sell, and convert all his estate into money, to be put at interest until the happening of a contingency, at which time it is to be divided among a designated class, the executors will take, by implication, a fee in the legal estate, for the purposes of the trust created by the will, and the equitable title will not vest until the happening of the contingency.
    , 12. Same—when a legacy will lapse on the death of a beneficiary, and when it will inure to a survivor. In case the devisees or legatees are specifically named or designated in the will, if one of them dies before the testator, his share will lapse; but where the devise is to an indeterminate class liable to change, as, where it is to the children of a person, the shares of those dying before the testator will not lapse, but will inure to the benefit of the survivors.
    13. Same—talcing per capita, or per stirpes. If a testamentary gift be made to one person and the children of another person, as, for instance, to A and the children of B, A and the children of B, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention, will take per capita, and not per stirpes; yet the opposite construction will prevail when the intention to that effect can be gathered from the context.
    14. Same—devise to a class—who may take. Where a gift or devise is to a class, none will take except such as are in esse at the time appointed for distribution. But, where the devise is to a class as tenants in common, with no provision for survivorship, and one or more of the class die after the gift or devise has taken effect in interest, and before the time for distribution has arrived, the shares of those so dying will go to their devisees or heirs.
    15. And in case a gift or devise is limited to such of the children of a particular person as shall attain the age of twenty-one years, it has been held that the first child attaining that age is entitled to his share of the estate in proportion to the number of children in esse at that time, and that an after-born child will be excluded.
    16. Same—the particular case—as to meaning of the word “heirs"— period of distribution—devise, whether per capita or per stirpes—interest of executors. A testator, after making equal specific bequests and devises to his daughter A, then living, and 0, the only son and heir of his deceased daughter B, authorized his executors to convert the residue of his estate into money, to be put at interest until the final distribution thereof, and expressed the wish that such estate be divided equally between “the heirs of the said A” that might be living at the time of such division, and the said 0, and that such division should not be until the youngest child of A should arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and then provided, that “if any of the heirs, ” after attaining that age, should wish to engage in business, etc., his executors might make advances to them, taking their notes therefor, bearing interest, to be deducted from their portions of the estate on final division. A had seven children living at the death of the testator, and one born after that event: Held, (a) That the words, “the heirs of the said A,” meant the “children of the said A.” (6) That the word “heirs,” in the clause “should any of the heirs, etc., wish to engage in business,” etc., was used to include the children of both A and B, as a common class, (c) That the devise to “the heirs of A” and to 0, was unaffected by the specific legacies to A and 0, but was an original devise or absolute gift to those entitled at the time the will took effect in interest, which was not until the youngest child of A arrived at the age of twenty-one years, (d) That the period for the distribution of such residue was not the death of the testator, but when the youngest child of A attained the age of twenty-one years, (e) That only such of the children as might be living at the period of distribution were entitled to share in such residue of the estate, and that children of A, bom after the testator’s death, might take, if living at the time of distribution. (/) That such residuum of the estate was to be divided between C and the children of A living at the time of the final division, per capita, and not per stirpes. (g) That the executors, by implication, took a fee in the legal estate for the purposes of the trust created by the will.
    17. Heibship—when it becomes fixed. The law does not determine who shall be the heirs of any person, until his death; and one, to be an heir of another, must survive that other.
    18. PabtitioN'—interest or estate necessary. A party claiming an interest in land can not maintain a bill for its partition, unless he has, at the commencement of the suit, a present, vested interest or estate in the same, or soine part thereof.
    19. Fobmeb adjudication—when conclusive in a subsequent suit. Before a former decision can be successfully invoked as an estoppel in another suit between the same parties, it must appear that the question is the same in both cases, and that the court, in the former suit, had power and jurisdiction to determine it.
    20. Sam®—conflict of laws—construction of will in foreign jurisdiction—as to title to real estate in this State. A decree of a court of another State, giving a construction to a will as to the nature and extent of the interests given the several devisees in real estate in such State, is not binding upon the courts of this State as to the interests of the same devisees, under the same will, in lands in this State. As to the lands in this State, our courts will construe the will for themselves. This case distinguished from Hanna et al. v. Read et al. 102 111. 596.

      Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.
    Messrs. Williams & Thompson, for the appellant:
    The will should be construed by the laws of the domicile of the testator, and hence the construction put upon the will by the courts of Pennsylvania should control. .Story on Conflict of Laws, 479 h; Trotter v. Trotter, 4 Bligh, 502; Enohin v. Wylie, 10 H. L. Cas. 1; Harrison v. Nixon, 9 Pet. 483; Richards v. Miller, 62 Ill. 417; Hanna v. Read, 102 id. 596; Wharton on Conflict of Laws, secs. 592, 597, 528.
    That the law of the domicile prevails in the interpretation of wills of real estate, see Crusoe v. Butler, 36 Miss. 150; Danelli v. Danelli, 4 Bush, 51; Bible Society v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 79; Stewart v. Garnett, 3 Sim. 398; Atkinson v. Staig, 13 R. I. 725.
    The primary rule of construction is the intention of the testator. Richards v. Miller, 62 Ill. 424; Brownfield v. Wilson, 78 id. 472; Heslop v. Gatton, 71 id. 528; Mason v. Ely, 38 id. 141; Doebly’s Appeal, 64 Pa. St. 9.
    That the devise is per stirpes, and not per capita, see 2 Jarman on Wills, (5th Am. ed.) *194, 195; Pitney v. Brown, 44 Ill. 363; Kelley v. Vigas, 112 id. 242; Balcolm v. Haynes, 14 Allen, 204; Risk’s Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 273; Lyon v. Acker, 33 Conn. 222; Lachlan v. Downer, 11 B. Mon. 32.
    The word “heirs, ” will be taken in its literal meaning, unless the context clearly indicates a different intention. Richards v. Miller, 62 Ill. 417; Rawson v. Rawson, 52 id. 62; Williamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Mon. 330.
    As to when a devise takes effect in interest, and as to the period of distribution, see Ridgway v. Underwood, 62 Ill. 424; Duryea v. Duryea, 85 id. 48; Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 id. 11; Hempstead v. Dickson, 20 id. 193; Nicoll v. Scott, 99 id. 529; Cheney v. Teese, 108 id. 473.

      Mr. D. T. Watson, also for the appellant:
    When an estate is granted to a class of persons described as survivors, such estate does not usually vest until the time designated for the beginning of the enjoyment of the estate for that class of persons. Cheney v. Teese, 108 Ill. 482; Ridgway v. Underwood, 62 id. 424; Duryea v. Duryea, 85 id. 48.
    The legacy being to Harry Gr. McCartney by name, his interest vested at the testator’s death. Provenchen’s Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 466; Seibert’s Appeal, 1 Harris, 502.
    That the will contemplated a division per stirpes, see Archer v. Legg, 30 Beav. 192; Clark v. Lynch, 46 Barb. 83; Risk’s Appeal, 2 P. F. Smith, 273; Balcolm v. Haynes, 14 Allen, 204; Fissel’s Appeal, 3 Casey, 55; Alder v. Beall, 11 G. & J. 123.
    The first great rule is the intention of the testator. Thompson’s Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 36; Koppenhaufer’s Appeal, 87 id. 196.
    This intention prevails over all minor rules of construction. Harris Estate, 74 Pa. St. 453; Wright’s Appeal, 89 id. 67; Bainbridge’s Appeal, 97 id. 482.
    If the will leaves the question doubtful, the court should follow the intestate law, and give to Mrs. Osburn the one-half, and to Harry Gr. McCartney, as “only heir” of his mother, the other half. Lipman’s Appeal, 6 Casey, 180; Grim’s Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 333; Harris’ Estate, 74 id. 453.
    As showing that a per stirpes division was intended, see Minter’s Appeal, 4 Wright, 114; Raymond v. Millhouse, 45 Conn. 473; Clark v. Lynch, 46 Barb. 82; Arth’s Appeal, 7 Casey, 267; Gring’s Appeal, 7 id. 292; Young’s Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 92; Hamlet v. Hamlet, 12 Leigh, 350; Witmer v. Ebersole, 5 Barr, 458; Baskin’s Appeal, 3 id. 304.
    If an action be brought, and the merits of the question be discussed between the parties, and there is a final judgment for either, they will be concluded. Greatly v. Bromley, 7 T. R. 456 ; Broom’s Legal Maxims, *229-231.

      Mr. 1ST. M. Jones, for the appellees:
    When the law of the domicile conflicts with the law of the situs, as to the construction of wills in regard to realty, the law of the situs will prevail. 1 Redfield on Law of Wills, 298, sec. 8; Wharton on Conflict of Law, secs. 273, 278, 288, 597; Rorer on Inter-State Laws, 4, 44, 168, 204, 207, 209, 210; West v. Fitz, 109 Ill. 425.
    The signification of the word “heirs, ” in all cases, is a question of intention. Williamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Mon. 330.
    A devise to the heirs of a living person will be construed as being to the children of such person. 2 Jarman on Wills, 615; Butler v. Huestis, 68 Ill. 594; Nicoll v. Scott, 99 id. 529; Bland v. Bland, 103 id. 11; Morton v. Barrett, 22 Me. 262; Bailey v. Patterson, 3 Rich. (S. C.) 157; Ingram v. Smith, 1 Head, 411.
    The intention governs in the construction of wills. Peter v. Beverly, 10 Pet. 566; Funk v. Eggleston, 92 Ill. 519; Peoria v. Darst, 101 id. 610.
    All parts of the will must be construed together. Bland v. Bland, 103 Ill. 11; Friedman v. Steiner, 107 id. 125; Emit v. Lunt, 108 id. 307; Hamlin v. Express Co. 107 id. 443.
    That the division should be per capita, see Kelley v. Vigas, 112 Ill. 242; Huston v. Crook, 38 Ohio St. 328; Kean v. Roe, 2 Harr. 103; Lugar v. Harmon, 1 Cox, 258; Ingram v. Smith, 1 Head, 411; Bryant v. Scott, 1 Dev. & B. Eq. 155; Lee v. Lee, 39 Barb. 172; Burnett v. Burnett, 30 N. J. 595; Brittain v. Carson, 46 Md. 186; Richards v. Miller, 62 Ill. 420; Rawson v. Rawson, 52 id. 62; Pitney v. Brown, 44 id. 363.
   Mr. Justice Mulkey

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This is a controversy between the appellant, Harry GL McCartney, an only child of Jennie W. McCartney, deceased, on the one hand, and the children of Henrietta W. Osburn, a sister of the said Jennie W. McCartney, on the other, about the extent of their respective interests in certain valuable real estate in Cook county, the object of the bill being to have the lands in question partitioned and divided between them.

The parties all claim under the will of their grandfather, Griswold E. Warner, who died at Sewickley, his residence and domicile, in the State of Pennsylvania, on the 7th day of March, 1873, where he had previously, on the 1st of January of the same year, made and published his last will and testament. The estate of the testator, exclusive of debts, amounted, at his decease, to some $400,000. About one-half of said amount consists of lands lying in this State, being the same involved in this suit. The testator also, at his decease, owned lands in the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio and Nebraska. The bill also seeks a partition and division of some sixty-seven lots in said Cook county, which the executors' acquired in the settlement of certain claims due the estate; but as the correctness of the decree below as to these lots is not questioned, no further notice need be taken of them. At the time of making the will, Henrietta Osburn had seven children, and another was born after the testator’s death.

Appellees insist that the residuum of the estate given by the third clause of the will must be equally divided between the nine grandchildren,—or, in other words, that each grandchild, Harry included, is entitled to one-ninth of the estate, and no more. On the other hand, it is contended by appellant that the will contemplates a division of the estate per stirpes, and not per capita, as is claimed by appellees, and that he is therefore entitled to one-half, instead of one-ninth. The court below sustained the view of appellees, and entered a decree accordingly. It appears, however, that before the commencement of this suit a like controversy arose between the parties, in the State of Pennsylvania, as to the proper construction of the will in the respect stated, and the matter having been brought before the Supreme Court of that State, a conclusion was reached there directly opposite that arrived at by the lower court in this case, and counsel for appellant contend that the Pennsylvania decision is not only correct on principle, but that it is absolutely conclusive upon appellees as an estoppel, upon the general principle announced in the Hanna-Read case, 102 Ill. 596. However this may be as to the first branch of the contention, we have no hesitancy in holding that the second is not tenable. A moment’s recurrence to a few of the admitted principles upon which the doctrine of estoppel rests, we think, will fully demonstrate the correctness of this conclusion.

Before a former decision can be successfully invoked as an estoppel in another suit between the same parties, it must appear that the question is the same in both eases, and that the court in the former suit had power and jurisdiction to ■determine it. The controversy, here, is about the quantum or extent of interest -which the parties, respectively, have in certain lands in the State of Illinois, and the question to be determined, as respects the appellant, is, whether he has a half interest or merely one-ninth. As respects the appellees, the question is, whether they are each entitled to a ninth interest, or to a sixteenth, only. It is manifest the courts of Pennsylvania had no power or jurisdiction to pass upon either of these questions, nor did they attempt to do so. It is true, they passed upon a question like these, and the decision upon them, as an expression of opinion by that court, is entitled to the highest respect, but that is all. While the decision of that court is persuasive, it is not imperative. Nor does the fact that this court, in passing upon these questions, may place a construction upon the will different from that adopted hy the Pennsylvania courts, which will lead to a diversity of interests between the devisees in the two States in respect to the same kind of property, make any difference. Such a contingency is the inevitable result of the complete independence of the courts of the two States in mattéfs within their exclusive jurisdiction. The will, through which all the parties claim, is the written evidence of their respective titles and interests in and to the land sought to be partitioned, and the construction to be placed upon it presents a question of law which this court must determine for itself. While it was entirely competent for the Pennsylvania courts to construe the will, and determine the rights of the parties to the property there, yet they could make no order, decree or ruling with respect to the legal effect of the will, that would deprive -this court of the right to construe that instrument for itself, so far as it relates to lands in this State. Where a testator, by a single will, devises lands lying in two or more States, -the courts of such States will respectively construe it as to -the lands situated in them, respectively, in the same manner as if they had been devised by separate wills.

We think it clear, the circumstances in this case materially •differ from those in the Hanna-Read case, and call for the application of quite a different principle. If, in the litigation in Pennsylvania, the question of the testator’s insanity at the time of making the will had been put in issue, and determined by the courts there, and the same question had afterwards been raised in this suit, then the two cases would have been analogous, and the principle laid down in the Read-Hanna case would apply to this. But such is not the case. The difference is radical and fundamental. In the ease suggested, the Pennsylvania court would have the power to pass upon the question of insanity, but not upon the rights of the parties to land lying in this State.

Since we are unable to concur in the view that the decision of the Pennsylvania courts is conclusive upon this, it becomes necessary to examine the will for ourselves, and give it that •construction which, in the light of the authorities, we believe will best effectuate the testator’s intentions in disposing of his property.

The following clauses of the will are conceded to be the only ones that' throw any light upon the question to be considered :

“First—After' all my debts due at my decease are fully paid, and after all donations for either charitable or religious purposes I may hereafter make are also paid, I give, devise and bequeath to my daughter, Henrietta W. Osburn, wife of Franklin Osburn, the house she now occujdíbs in the borough of Sewickley, aforesaid, together with one and one-half acres of ground attached to the same; also, all the furniture, bedding, library, etc., now in the house I now occupy, or may occupy at the time of my decease.
“Secondly—I give, devise and bequeath to Harry G. McCartney, minor, and only heir of my late daughter, Jennie W. McCartney, wife of the late John G. McCartney, deceased, in addition to such other bequests hereinafter made, $30,000, which my executors are requested to pay over to him, the said Harry, when he arrives at the age of twenty-one years, together with the interest on the same, to be paid said Harry after my decease, yearly, and every year, or so much of said interest as he may require for his support and education, and the balance, if any, to be loaned, on interest, for his benefit.
“Thirdly—The remainder of my estate, both real and personal, that I may possess at the time of decease, my executors, if they should think it advisable to sell any or all of my real estate, they are authorized to do so, and all moneys received from such sales, and all other money that may from time to time come into the hands of my executors, I wish put at interest until there is a final division made of ■ my estate, which I wish to be equally divided between the heirs of the said Henrietta that may be living at the time of said division, and the said Harry G. McCartney, each to share and share alike.
“Fourth—I would rather prefer not to have a division made of my estate until the youngest child of Henrietta arrives at the age of twenty-one years; but should any of the heirs, after arriving to that age, wish to engage in business, and wish to realize any portion of their interest in said estate, my executors can give them such an amount as they may think proper, and take their individual note or notes, bearing interest, to be added thereto, and deducted from their respective portions of said estate on the finjtl division of the same; and should any of said heirs aforesaid, at the time of the final division of said estate, be considered by my executors'to be incompetent or incapacitated, either in mind or body, or from intemperance, to take charge or manage their respective interests in said estate, my executors are hereby requested to pay such, nothing more than the interest, annually, on their respective portions of said estate, until said incapacity does no longer exist. For the purpose of carrying out the foregoing will and testament, I hereby designate and appoint Franklin Osburn and David N. White my lawful executors. ”

The first question to be considered is, what is meant by the word “heirs, ” as it occurs in the third clause of the will. The lower court, in an able and elaborate opinion, reaches the conclusion that it means children, and' that the will should receive the same construction as if the word “children” was substituted for the word “heirs.” On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania hold, that the word “heirs, ” in the connection stated, is used, in its more general and technical sense, to signify all such relations of Mrs. Osburn, whether lineal or collateral, as would, under the law, be entitled to succeed to Mrs. Osburn’s estate upon her dying intestate before the dispositions of Warner’s will take effect in interest. We can readily conceive of a state of facts that might well have happened, under the will, in which this difference of construction would have become important; yet, under the circumstances as they have actually transpired, it can be of little importance, if we assume, as both parties seem to do, that the time has already arrived when the objects of the testator’s bounty are to be determined, for whether the one or the other construction prevails, the same parties, in either case, will take. The utmost that can be claimed is, that the use of the word “heirs, ” in the extended sense indicated, favors the theory that a division per stirpes was intended, and this we do not regard of sufficient importance to-require special notice here. The general discussion further on must suffice for an answer to whatever there is in the claim suggested.

All of the provisions of the will considered, we • have no-doubt of the correctness of the conclusion of the court below in holding that the expression, “heirs of Henrietta, ” means-simply .the children of Mrs. Osburn. In the very next sentence following the one in which those words occur, the testator expresses a wish that the division of the estate,, which is. referred to in connection with the expression “heirs of Henrietta, ” be deferred until the youngest child of Henrietta arrives-at the age of twenty-one years. That the words, “child of Henrietta,” are here used in the same sense as “heirs of Henrietta,” in the preceding sentence, can not seriously be doubted. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania admit this. It is true, the force of the admission 'is sought to be-qualified by limiting it to what is said in reference to the time--’ of division; yet it is not apparent, at least to the writer, how the word “heirs,” when used in the same place, in the same-instrument, can mean a given class of persons for one purpose, and yet a different class of persons for another purpose. The testator having, in the second clause of the will, spoken, of Harry Gr. McCartney as the only heir of his deceased, daughter, Jennie W. McCartney, and of the children of Mrs. Osburn as “heirs of Henrietta, ” in the third clause then proceeds : “But should any of the heirs, after arriving at that-age, (twrenty-one years) wish to go into business, ” etc. Here the testator, by the expression, “the heirs, ” evidently means to include the children of both of his daughters, thus bringing-all his grandchildren, the remaining objects of his bounty, into a common class, and clearly placing them on a common. footing, at least so far as that particular provision of the will is concerned.

It is a matter worthy of note, that the testator, at the time of making his will, was fully cognizant of the circumstances and surroundings of his family, none of whom were forgotten in the distribution of his property. One of his daughters was dead. She had left surviving her, a son and only child. The other daughter was alive, having a living husband and seven living children around her. All this, with the exception of the number of Mrs. Osburn’s children, appears upon the face of the will itself. His children, both living and dead, were clearly in his mind when drawing his will. Their issue equally occupied his attention. To Harry McCartney he refers by-name, and also characterizes him as the heir of his deceased mother. The others, he refers to by the title and description of “heirs of Henrietta, ” though their mother was then living, and, consequently, could have no heirs, in the technical sense of that term. Again, as we have just seen, he groups both sets of children together under the common designation, “the heirs. ” Keeping all this in view, the conclusion would seem irresistible that the testator, in using the expression, “heirs of Henrietta, ” must have meant simply the children of Mrs; Osburn. This view seems to be strongly confirmed by the use of the qualifying expression, “living at the time of said division,” in connection with the words, “heirs of Henrietta.” Had the testator, by the latter expression, meant merely that indefinite class of relations entitled to take under the Statute of Descents, there would have been no occasion for using the qualifying words in question. Children are always liable to-die, but the law never determines, in any case, who the heirs are till the ancestor dies,—consequently they are always, at that time, a living class. Dead persons never take. If, therefore, the testator, in using the words, “heirs of Henrietta,” meant nothing more than that indefinite and then unknoVn class of persons whom the law, at the designated period, would point out as her heirs, it is manifest the use of the words, “living at the time of division, ” was wholly superfluous.

Following the line of argument pursued by counsel, we come now to the main question discussed in the briefs, namely, whether the rule per capita or per stirpes is to be applied in the division of the land in controversy. There is a question, however, underlying this, barely referred to in the argument, that first demands attention. If it should be conceded, for the purposes of the argument, that appellant, under the limitations of the will, is entitled to one-half the land in controversy, the important question would still remain, whether the children of Mrs. Osburn, now living, have, under the limitations of the will, a present vested interest in the other half, for if they have not, it is very clear they can not maintain a bill for its partition. Both parties agree that the devise in question is to a class, so far as the heirs or children of Mrs. Osburn are concerned, and of this there can be no question. The only thing about which they differ is, whether, by the terms of the will, Harry McCartney is made a member of that class.

Waiving this matter, and leaving him, for the present, altogether out of view, the question recurs, does the record before us show a present'vested interest in the Osburn children. It is believed to be universally true that where there is a simple devise to a class, and the will does not expressly, or by necessary implication, fix the time when the objects of the gift are to be ascertained or when distribution is to be made, the law itself will fix it at the testator’s death, that being the time when the will first speaks. In such eases the gift to the devisees vests, both in interest and possession, at the same time, and after-born children will be excluded. This will fully appear from authorities hereafter cited. Every testamentary disposition is either to a specifically designated person or persons, or to an indefinite class, which is liable to fluctuate, from the births or deaths of such as come within the description of the class. When the devise is to the children of a living parent, the class is liable to fluctuate, from both causes, up to the time the gift takes effect in interest, which is most frequently at the death of the testator, but not always so. In the former case,—that is, where the devisees are specifically pointed out, whether by name or otherwise,— if one or more of them die before the testator, the shares of those so dying will lapse; yet, in the latter case, the shares of those dying before the testator, or, indeed, at any time before they vest in interest, will not lapse, but will inure to the benefit of the survivors. Strictly speaking, in contemplation of law the class to whom a gift or devise is limited, consists, in all cases, exclusively of such persons coming within the description of the class as are in esse at the time the gift or devise, by its own limitation, takes effect in interest, and such as are born before distribution, where distribution is deferred to a subsequent period. Those that die before the gift takes effect in interest, are not regarded as having ever belonged to the class.

It is hardly necessary to remark that a gift or devise is said to vest in interest when the right of property first attaches, without regard to whether there is a present right of possession or not. When the right of possession accrues, the gift or devise is then said to vest in possession,—in other words, the time of payment or distribution has then arrived. Most of the cases to be met with in the books relating to the vesting of testamentary dispositions, will be found to fall within one or the other of the following classes: First, where the gift takes effect, both in interest and possession, at the death of the testator,—and this is always the case when limited per verba de presentí, unless such vesting is expressly, or by necessary implication, deferred to a future period; second, where the gift is so limited as to take effect, both in interest and possession, at a specified time subsequent to the testator’s death; third, where it is limited to take effect in interest at the testator’s death, but the vesting in possession is deferred to a future period; and fourth, where the gift is limited in such a manner as to take effect, both in interest and possession, upon some contingency or event which may or may not happen till after the testator’s death. If the event or contingency happens after his death, the gift will, of course, then vest absolutely; if before, it will then so vest at the testator’s death. These several kinds of limitations are applicable alike to classes and individuals.

With respect to cases falling within the first and second classes above mentioned, nothing special need be said, except, perhaps, to remark, that where the gift or devise is to a class, none will be permitted to take except such as are in esse at the time of distribution. This principle, however, applies to all gifts to classes, with the qualification, that where the gift or devise is to a class, as tenants in common, with no provision for survivorship, and one or more of the class die after the gift or devise has taken effect in interest, and before the time of distribution, the shares or portions of those so dying will go to their devisees, or, in case of intestacy, to their heirs or next of kin, as the case may be. Even where a gift or devise is limited to such of the children of a particular person as shall attain a given age,—twenty-one years, for instance,—it is held, the first child attaining the required age is entitled to have allotted to him his portion of the estate, and since his share must necessarily be determined upon the basis of the number of children composing the class at that time, it is well established in such cases that after-born children, who would otherwise be entitled to take, are excluded, (Gimblett v. Purton, 12 L. R. Eq. 427,) while a gift to a class falling within either the third or fourth divisions above mentioned will open to let in after-born children, subject to the limitation, they must be in esse at the time of distribution. " Yet, after the estate has once vested in interest,- except in cases of joint tenancy, or where the right of survivorship is expressly, or by necessary implication, given, the shares of such as die before distribution will not inure to the benefit of the survivors, as they would do if the estate had not vested in interest before their decease, but will devolve upon the legal representatives of those so dying. Middleton v. Messenger, 5 Ves. 136; Evans v. Jones, 2 Coll. Ch. 516; Watson v. Watson, 11 Sim. 73; Walker v. Shore, 15 Ves. 121. Cases falling within the third and fourth classes mentioned, most frequently occur where a limited estate in the property bequeathed has been first carved out, with a gift over, to take effect at a specified time, or upon the happening of some contingency, or the occurring of some event, such as the death of the tenant of the particular estate, or of some other designated person.

In ascertaining the period at which a gift vests in interest, the cases last mentioned are to be carefully distinguished from those in which no preceding estate or subordinate interest has been first carved out of the property devised, otherwise there will sometimes be an apparent conflict between cases, when, in fact, there is none at all. The property involved in this case, however, is unaffected by the specific legacies to Harry McCartney, Mrs. Osburn, or to others. No preceding estate or subordinate interest is carved out of it. The devise is an original, absolute gift to those entitled at the time the will takes effect in interest. This being so, the inquiry arises, is the limitation in the present case a simple devise to the children, to take effect in interest and possession at the death of the testator, or does the gift vest in interest at his death, but not in possession till some future period? Or, again, does the gift take effect, both in interest and possession, at a period subsequent to his death.

The rule is well settled, that a gift of personal estate at a specified future time or upon the happening of a certain contingency, will not vest till the time specified has arrived, or until the contingency has happened, as the case may be. But if the gift is general, and there is merely a simple direction that it be paid, or that the fund be distributed or divided, at a specified time, or upon the happening of a like contingency, it will vest at the testator’s death, and the payment or distribution only will be postponed. Chaffers v. Hill, 3 Jur. 577; Wadley v. North, 3 Ves. 364; Hixon v. Oliver, 13 id. 113; Mackell v. Winter, 3 id. 236. This distinction, however, by the current of authority, has no application to a devise of real estate. The rule was borrowed from the civil law by the ecclesiastical courts, and was followed by the other courts of England in ¡respect to gifts of personal property only. As to real property, the courts went in the opposite direction, rather, even ¡so far as to hold that a legacy, charged upon real estate, and payable at a future day, sinks, as to the real estate, by the death of the legatee before the time of payment, and in such case the assets could not be marshaled. (Pearce v. Loman, 3 Ves. 135.) But since, with us, all debts are, by statute, made a charge upon real estate as well as personal estate, the rule or distinction in question has become practically of but little importance.

Becurring now to the more vital points in the case, we will say, in general terms, that, all the provisions of the will considered, we do not think it was the intention of the testator that the residue of his estate in question, including the property now in dispute, should be divided at his death. The language of the fourth clause is: “I would rather prefer not to have a division made of my estate until the youngest child of Henrietta arrives at the age of twenty-one years.” These words leave no doubt as to what the testator’s intentions and wishes were with respect to the time of distribution. Nor does the fact that his intentions are expressed in the form of a wish, make them any the less imperative. It is a familiar doctrine in the law of wills, that a clearly expressed wish by the testator is equivalent to a positive direction or command. But the testator does not stop at this. In the following sentence he proceeds to authorize his executors to make advances to such of the children as should attain the age of twenty-one, and should be desirous of going into business. These provisions of the will are wholly inconsistent with the theory that the persons entitled to take are to be ascertained, and the property distributed, at the death of the testator. Indeed, the whole scheme of the will forbids the adoption of such a theory.

In this connection', it is proper to remark, that where a will, as in this case, contemplates distribution at a period subsequent to the death of the testator, the time must be fixed by the will itself. It can not be left open, to be determined by the executors, as whim or caprice may suggest. A will, therefore, should not be so construed as to confer such a power on the executors'. Hill v. Chapman, 1 Ves. 405, (Seemnes ed.) note b; Jenkins v. Freyer, 4 Paige, 47; Butler v. Ommancy, 4 Russ. 70. By the English chancery rule, executors are given twelve months from the death of the testator in which to pay vested legacies, where a different period is not fixed by the will itself.

As we construe the will, the time of distribution is fixed when the youngest child of Mrs. Osburn attains the age of twenty-one years,—a period which has not yet arrived. While, as we have just seen, a gift to a class may be so limited as to take effect in interest at the testator’s death, and yet not vest in possession till a future period, still we do not think this is a case of that kind. As already seen, the general rule is, that when there is a simple gift to a class, to be paid at a fixed time, or upon an event or contingency which may happen after the death of the testator, and nothing appears to show a contrary intention, the gift will vest in interest at the testator’s death, and the time of distribution, only, will be deferred. If, however, the element of futurity is annexed to the gift, itself, and is not merely indicative of the time of payment, or if the time of payment is made descriptive of the class that is to take, the gift will not vest in interest till the time so fixed for payment or distribution has arrived. Williams v. Williams, 6 L. R. Ch. 782; Festing v. Allen, 5 Hare, 572; Vawdry v. Geddes, 1 R. & M. 203 ; Bull v. Pritchard, 5 Hare, 572; Taylor v. Gould, 10 Barb. 388; Burrows v. Sherm, 22 How. Pr. 169; Snow v Snow, 49 Me. 159; Moore v. Smith, 9 Watts, 403; Illinois Land and Loan Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315; Collier v. Slaughter, 20 Ala. 263; Butler v. Butler, 3 Barb. Ch. 304; Radcliff v. Bagshaw, 6 Tenn. 512.

Waiving the consideration that the distinction between a gift at a specified time, and a gift generally, to Z>e pah? at a like specified time, has. no application to a devise of real property, and applying to the limitation under consideration the most liberal rule in favor of vesting, still we do not think the property in controversy has yet vested in interest. It will be observed, that no direct gift to the devisees is to be found in the will, but only such as is implied from the testator’s expressed wish that the estate should be divided between them ; yet we regard this as equivalent to a direct gift. The devise, as we construe it, is an original, absolute gift, at a particular time, to such of the children of Mrs. Osburn as shall be living at the designated time. By the terms of the limitation the element of futurity is clearly annexed to the gift itself, and is descriptive of those who are to take. It is only those who are living at that time that come within the description of the class, and to say that parties may take a vested interest under a devise to a class who do not answer all the marks by which the class is to be ascertained, is to confound all distinctions, and disregard the plain requirements of the will. The only thing in the will that affords the slightest foundation for the construction that would give the children of Mrs. Osburn a vested interest in the estate, at the testator’s death, is found in the following language, occurring in the fourth clause of the will, namely: “But should any of the heirs, after arriving at' that age, wish to engage in business, and wish to realize any portion of their interest in said estate, my executors can give them such an amount as they may think proper, and take their individual note or notes, hearing' interest, to be added thereto, and deducted from their respective portions of said estate on the final division of the' same. ”

We are of opinion no special significance is to be attached to the fact that the testator in this connection speaks of the heirs’ “interest in” or “portion of” the estate. In the connection in which these expressions occur, the testator doubtless means nothing more than the presumptive or prospective interests or portions of the children. (Ring v. Hardwick, 2 Beav. 352; Lake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 381, 384; Eccles v. Berkett, 4 DeG. & S. 105.) This view, we think, is clearly strengthened by the reference to the final division of the estate in the conclusion of the citation. At any rate, the expressions in question can not, on any principle of recognized construction, be permitted to control a clear and unequivocal limitation like the present, defining the time of distribution, and the class who are to take. This is expressly ruled in Bull v. Pritchard, 5 Hare, 567, and Vawdry v. Geddes; 1 Russ. & Mylne, 203. In addition to this, we think the fact that the testator required his executors to take notes for the amount of the advances, is a circumstance tending strongly to show that it was not his intention that the estate should vest in interest till the period of distribution,—or, in other words, till the youngest child of Mrs. Osburn attained the age of twenty-one years. The same distinction which is taken between a gift on a particular day, and a gift to be paid on such day, is also taken between a case like the present, where there is a simple direction to divide at a specified time, and where there is an express gift, accompanied with a direction to divide at such specified time. In the first case, the gift does not vest till the time of division; in the second, it vests at the testator’s death, and the division only is postponed. (2 Jarman on Wills, 455, et seq.) On page 457, the author expressly says: “Where the only gift is in the direction to pay or distribute at a future age, the ease is not to be ranked with those in which the payment or distribution, only, is deferred, but is one in which time is of the essence of the gift.” That is exactly the case here. In short, we hold the executors take, by implication, a' fee in the legal estate, for the purposes of the trust created by the will, and that the equitable interest does not vest till the youngest child of Mrs. Osburn attains the age of twenty-one years.

It necessarily follows, from this conclusion, that the present suit, in so far as it seeks a division of the land in question, is prematurely brought. It is manifest, that if the time of distribution is not fixed as stated, the will does not determine the time at all, and hence it is fixed, as matter of law, at the death of the testator; for, as we have already seen, it is not a matter which can be left open, to be determined in the discretion of the executors. So, if we concede the will does not fix the time of distribution, and that consequently the estate vested, both in interest and possession, at the testator’s death, then it is very clear, under the authorities, Mrs. Osburn’s youngest child would not be entitled to take at all, as she was born more than a year after that time. This, of course, would lead to a reversal of the decree of the court below, as the decree places the youngest child upon the same footing with the other children.

Having reached this conclusion, we should feel inclined to withhold the expression of any opinion upon the question mainly discussed by counsel, namely, whether the property is to be divided per capita or per stirpes, but for the fact the will, as already seen, authorizes the executors, in certain contingencies, to make advances to the devisees on account of their prospective interests in the estate when they shall have attained the age of twenty-one years; and as it is manifest the executors could not so intelligently exercise the discretion with which they are clothed by the will in respect to such advances, without knowing the proportions in which they would be entitled to take, it is clearly important that the question should be now determined. Keeping in view what has already been said, a few words will suffice to present what we have to say on this subject.

It is conceded, and such is unquestionably the law, that if a testamentary gift be made to one person and the children of another person, as, for instance, to A and the children of B, A and the children of B, in such case, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention, will take per capita, and not per stirpes. (2 Jarman on Wills, 756.) Yet it is equally well settled, that the opposite construction will prevail when the intention to that effect can be gathered from the context,—or, in the somewhat quaint language of Jarman, “this mode of construction will yield to a very faint glimpse of a different intention in the context. ” Id. 757.

The question for determination, then, is, what is there in the context to take the present case out of the general rule above stated, and-which both parties fully recognize? After a very careful consideration of the various provisions of the will, we have been unable to discover anything which, in our judgment, affords even “a faint glimpse of an intention” on the part of the testator that the usual construction should be departed from in this case. Two facts are disclosed by the will which are supposed by counsel to afford such evidence, namely, first, that appellant is characterized in the will as heir of his deceased mother; and second, that the testator recognizes his rights and claims, as such, in the legacy to him of $30,000, and the giving of an equal amount to Mrs. Os-burn, the sister of his deceased mother. These facts, par. ticularly the last, are pressed with great earnestness. They will be considered together.

As to the first, we regard it as of no special significance, except that it is one, among others, which tends to show, as we have already seen, the testator, in disposing of his property, clearly had in mind the objects of his affections, both living and dead, and their relations to one another, as well as to himself. Thus viewing them, the appellant was presented to him in the two-fold character of sole representative of his deceased daughter, and also as a grandchild. That he should have intended, as we believe he did, to recognize him,' in the ■disposition of his estate, in both these characters, was, to say the least of it, but natural. Having a living daughter, she was to be provided for, and the testator was the proper one to determine the amount necessary for that purpose. This was ■done by giving her, in her own right, a valuable property, worth ■about $30,000. Mrs. McCartney, her deceased sister, though dead, was equally an object of the testator’s affection, and the ■only way he could make her equal with the living daughter, and thereby give effect to what may be supposed the promptings of affection, was through the appellant, her son and only heir. How could this be done ? Manifestly, in but one way,—that is, by giving to him an amount equal to that given to the living daughter,—the very thing that was done. The testator alone had the right to determine what would be a reasonable and proper provision for the living daughter, and for the appellant, as the sole representative of his deceased daughter. This he did, and we perceive no ground for questioning its liberality or, sufficiency, even if we had the right to do so, which we have not. In all this we see nothing to justify a departure from the general rule requiring a per capita division of the estate. On the contrary, we think it affords additional reasons why the rule should be adhered to in this •case. After having made this equal and liberal provision for the living daughter, and the heir and sole representative of "the dead one, there was yet a large residuum of the estate to be disposed of. That, as we construe the will, he gave to such •of his grandchildren, Harry McCartney included, as should be living at the time of distribution,—or, in other words, when the youngest child of Mrs. Osburn should attain the age of twenty-one years. Those of the grandchildren who are living at that time, and take at all, will take as the will provides,— share and share alike. As it is a gift or devise to take effect at a future time, it follows that it will fail as to such of the grandchildren who happen to die before that time.

For the reasons stated, the decree of the court below, except in so far as it relates to the sixty-seven lots above mentioned, is reversed, and the cause remanded, for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Decree reversed in part and in part affirmed.

Mr. Justice Magruder, having been of counsel in the court below, took no part in the decision of this case.


text:
    Adam Sholl v. German Coal Company.

      Filed at Ottawa January 25, 1887.

    1. Eminent domain—as an attribute of sovereignty—its nature. The Tight of eminent domain, being an inherent attribute of sovereignty, exists independently of written constitutions or statutory laws, though its exercise is usually regulated by appropriate legislation.
    2. The right is founded on public utility and necessity, and its exercise is a strictly legislative function, and, subject to the right of the courts to determine whether the use for which property is sought to be taken is a public one, and whether the proceedings have been conducted according to the law made on the subject, but the legislature is the exclusive judge of the necessity or emergency justifying the exercise of the power.
    3. Same—whether the use to which it is proposed to appropriate the land of another, is public or merely private. The business proposed to be done, and the manner of doing it, must be looked at in determining whether the use to which property is to be devoted will be a public or a private one. If, from the nature of the business and the way in which it is to be conducted, it is clear no obligation will -be assumed to the public or liability incurred other than such as pertains to all strictly private enterprises, then the use is private, and not public.
    4. The use of a strip of latid by a coal company, upon which to construct a tramway leading from the coal works to a railroad track, is a private use, and such strip can not be condemned, under the Eminent Domain act, for such use.
    Appeal from the County Court of Peoria county; the Hon. L. W. James, Judge, presiding.
    Mr. B. S. Pbettyman, for the appellant:
    The petition does not allege, nor does the evidence show, that the proposed condemnation is for a public use, so as to give the court jurisdiction. Const. of 1870, art. 2, sec. 13; art. 4, sec. 30; art. 2, sec. 2; Mills on Eminent Domain, sec. 22; Nesbit v. Trumbo, 39 Ill. 116; East St. Louis v. St. John, 47 id. 466; Smith v. Railroad Co. 105 id. 518; Durham v. Hyde Park, 75 id. 377; Railway Co. v. Pence, 68 id. 529; Railroad Co. v. Town of Lake, 71 id. 336.
    A private switch from a railroad to coal lands or a coal bank, which is not owned by the railroad company, but by individuals, for their own private use, is not a public highway, in the meaning of section 12, article 11, of the constitution. That section applies to public roads, and if this tramway was attached as a switch to the railroad, and was so laid as to be capable of being operated by or from the railroad, with its cars and engines, the railroad company having no title to it, it is not affected by section 12, article 11, of the constitution. It is private property, and for private use. Koelle v. Knecht, 99 Ill. 397; Truesdale v. Grape Sugar Co. 101 id. 568. See, also, Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 338,
    Statutes authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent domain are subject to strict construction. The State has no right to take one man’s property and give it to another.
      Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerg. 40; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140; Embry v. Conner, 3 N. Y. 511; Railroad Co. v. McComb, 60 Me. 290; Crear v. Crosby, 40 id. 175; Mills on Eminent Domain, secs. 22, 24.
    Messrs. Muckle & Whiting, Messrs. McCulloch & McCulloch, and Messrs. Puterbaugh & Puterbaugh, for the appellee :
    The important question to be considered and determined in cases of this character is, what constitutes a public use, within the meaning of the constitution. There is a conflict in the decisions of the different States as to what is a public use, which renders it difficult to define it in the light of precedent. As bearing on this question, see Beekman v. Railroad Co. 3 Paige, 73; Wilson v. Railroad Co. 2 Pet. 251; Bloodgood v. Railroad Co. 18 Wend. 9; Anderson v. Kerns D. Co. 14 Ind. 199; Reeves v. Wood Co. 8 Ohio, (N. S.) 344; Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 550; Railroad Co. v. Brainard, 5 Seld. 109; Gaslight Co. v. Richardson, 63 N. Y. 000; Cooley’s Const. Lim. 533.
    A private corporation may be empowered to exercise the right of eminent domain to obtain a way along which to lay pipe for the transportation of oil to a railroad or navigable river. Transportation Co. v. Oil and Coal Co. 5 W. Va. 382.
    In view of the large logging and lumber interests of some of the States, it has been held that land might be condemned for the erection of booms. Patterson v. Boom Co. 3 Dillon, 465; Lancaster v. Kennebec Co. 62 Me. 272; Lawler v. Boom Co. 56 id. 443; Cottom v. Boom Co. 22 Minn. 372.
    In respect to condemnation for mills and mill purposes, see French v. Manufacturing Co. 23 Pick. 220; Woolen Mill Co. v. Upham, 5 id. 294; Hazen v. Essex Co. 12 Cush. 475; Andover v. Sutton, 12 Metc. 182; Boston Mill Dam v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467; Tyler v. Beecher, 44 Vt. 648; Scudder v. Trenton Falls Co. 1 N. J. Eq. 694; Fiske v. Manufacturing Co. 12 Pick. 68; Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Todd v. Austin, 34 id. 78; Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerg. 41; Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 365; Harding v. Funk, 8 Kan. 315; Mills on Eminent Domain, sec. 15; Cooley’s Const. Lim. 534; Holyoke Co. v. Hyman, 15 Wall. 500.
    Within the meaning of the law of eminent domain, land is-taken for the public use whenever its taking is for the general public advantage. Cooley on Taxation, 77; Ash v. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591; Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317; Burgess v. Clark, 13 Ired. 109; Trabue v. Macklin, 4 B. Mon. 497; County Court v. Greenwood, 58 Mo. 175.
    The expediency or necessity of exercising the right of eminent domain is a political question, and not a judicial one. Courts can not inquire into the necessity or propriety of the exercise of the right. Railroad Co. v. Toion of Lake, 71 Ill. 333; Railway Co. v. Railroad Co. 97 id. 506; Chicago v. Wright, 69 id. 318; Smith v. Chicago, 105 id. 511; Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa, 545; Spring v. Russell, 7 Greenlf. 292; Sedgwick on Const. Law, 511-514; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige, 160; Mills on Eminent Domain, sec. 11.
   Mr. Justice Mulkey

delivered the opinion of the Court:

The German Coal Company, a domestic corporation organized under the general Incorporation act, for the purpose of “mining and selling coal, ” filed a petition under the Eminent Domain act, in the county court of Peoria county, for the-purpose of acquiring, by condemnation, the right of way over a narrow strip of land belonging to the appellant, Adam Sholl, and lying between the company’s coal works and the Peoria and Pekin Union railroad. The piece of land sought to be condemned was wanted for an extension of a tramway belonging to the company, so as to connect it with the railway, and thus secure to the company railroad facilities for the transportation of its coal. The right to condemn the property for such purpose was resisted by the defendant from the outset, as violative of the constitution of the State. The objection, however, was overruled, and after a very vigorous and somewhat protracted contest, the court entered an order of condemnation, upon the 'payment of $500 to defendant,—the-amount of compensation and damages awarded by the jury. From that order the defendant appealed to this court, and has assigned, upon the record, various errors as grounds for reversal.

Most of the general principles constituting the law of Eminent Domain are well settled. The right to take private property for public use is generally conceded to be an attribute of sovereignty, and being such, it is not within the power of the State, by legislative grant, or otherwise, to surrender or barter it away. Being inherent, it exists independently of written constitutions or statutory laws; yet, in free governments like our own, where private rights are secured by wholesome laws and constitutional restrictions, the power to-take private property for the common welfare remains dormant until the terms and conditions upon which it is to be-exercised have been prescribed by appropriate legislation. The power or right in question is by some referred to the feudal theory of tenure—by others to the implied compact theory; but the better opinion, perhaps, is, that it is founded upon public utility and necessity. The exercise of the power is a strictly legislative function, and, subject to the right of the courts to determine whether the use for which property proposed to be taken is a public one, and whether the condemnation proceedings have been conducted according to-law, the legislature is made the exclusive judge of the necessity or emergency justifying the exercise of the power. So-far there is little or no contrariety of opinion. The chief difficulty, and the one which has led to an irreconcilable conflict in the cases, is, to discover some satisfactory test by which a public use may, in all kinds of cases, be distinguished from a private one. Such is the difficulty here. The parties in this case are agreed, that if the use for which the property sought to be taken is a private one, there is no power or authority, under the constitution, to take it, and that, consequently, the order of the court below was without authority of law, and void. On the other hand, if the use, under the facts disclosed, is a public one, it is clear the court below had power and jurisdiction to make the order, however many errors may have intervened in the proceeding.

The question, then, whether the use in the present case is a private or public one, is not only directly presented, but it is of controlling importance in the event it should be determined against the petitioner, for whatever our views might be on the other questions discussed by counsel, the judgment below would have to be reversed. As before stated, the decided cases furnish no universal test by which it may be described or defined, and the attempts to.do so have resulted in more or less conflict.

Without attempting to define a public use, or to give such a test, a few general observations on the subject may not be inappropriate. The expression “public use,” ex vi termini, implies an interest or right of some kind in the public, and as the public can have no existence separate and apart from the people, of which it consists, it follows, that this interest or right, whatever it is, belongs to and is vested in the people. This being so, it is the duty of the State to see that it is properly protected. Without attempting, as we might if the question were an original one, to determine the nature and extent of this interest or right, we have no hesitancy in saying, that if the use is a continuing one, as it is in all cases where property is taken for the purposes of a public ferry, railway, or the like, the right or interest of the public is co-extensive with the use to which it is annexed, and that it is not within the power of those exercising the franchise to deprive the people of the benefits resulting therefrom. Persons or corporations condemning property for such purposes, assume certain obligations and duties to the public, which they can not -disregard without forfeiting their franchises, and otherwise rendering themselves liable. In all such eases, the character -of the business proposed to be done, and the manner of' doing it, must be looked to in determining whether the use will be a public or private one. If, from the nature of the business and the way in which it is to be conducted, it is •clear no obligations will be assumed to the public, or liability incurred, other than such as pertain to all strictly private ■enterprises, it may safely be concluded the use is private, •and not public. It is also believed to be generally, if not nniversally, true, that benefits resulting from a public use, capable of individual appropriation, are open to all alike, ■upon the same terms and conditions.

Viewing the question before us in the light of the general principles here stated, it is clear, the use for which the land is proposed to be taken in this case is not a public one. The coal, the coal works, and the present tramway, are, in the ■strictest sense, private property, and the public, generally, bave no more interest in them or in the operation of the "works, including the tramway, than they have in any other ■strictly private business. The same would be equally true after the proposed extension of the tramway. The extending •of it to the railroad would not change its character, or the obligations of the company to the public, in the slightest degree. Without the consent of the owners of it, there is not a person in the State, outside of themselves, who would have the right to ride upon it on any terms that might be proposed, or to have carried upon it a single pound of freight. Indeed, nothing of the kind is contemplated or intended. It is manifest, the company now has, and after such extension of its track would still have, the right to use it for its own private business, exclusively. It could run it or cease to use it altogether, without violating any right in the public, or any duty which it owes to the people. Clearly, this could not be so if the use were public, in the sense of the constitution.

This question, however, is not a new one in this court. It incidentally arose in Millett v. The People, 117 Ill. 294. The plaintiff in error in that case had been indicted, as the operator of a coal mine, for a failure to provide scales, and to weigh all coal taken out of the mine, as a basis for computing the wages of the miners, as required by an act of the legislature, approved June 14, 1883. It was urged, by way of defence, that the act was unconstitutional, in this, that it singled out owners of coal mines as a distinct class, and imposed upon them burdens not imposed on other owners of property and employers of laborers. To this it was replied, that the business of mining coal, like that of railways, public warehouses, etc., was of a public character, and that, therefore, the legislature had the right, for the protection of the public, to adopt such special regulations as were deemed necessary for that purpose, and that the act in question was-nothing more than a. reasonable exercise of that right. The question, therefore, it will be perceived, was directly presented, whether the use in the operation of a coal mine is a public one, and it was held that it was not. To the same effect is Edgewood Railroad Co.’s Appeal, 79 Pa. St. 257.

Upon the authority of these cases, and fqr the reasons-stated, we are clearly of opinion that the úse for which it is-proposed to take appellant’s property is a private and not a public one. Having reached this conclusion, it is not necessary to consider other questions discussed in the briefs.

The judgment below is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the petition.

Judgment reversed.


author: Per Curiam :

text:
    Eli Frank v. Adolph Moses et al.

      Filed at Ottawa October 5, 1886.

    Appeals and writs op error—writ of error to a county court—whether it will lie. Pending a writ of error in this court, which was sued out to a county court, it was decided, in a proceeding by mandamus, that an appeal would lie in the case, from the county court to the circuit court. It was held, that therefore the writ of error from this court to the county court would not lie.*
    *Upon the question whether a writ of error to a county court will lie, see Kingsbury v. Sperry et al. 119 Ill. 279, Holden et al. v. Herkimer, 53 id. 258, Horner v. Goe, 54 id. 285, Frans v. The People, 59 id. 427, Ennis v. Ennis, 103 id. 95, and Hobson v. Paine, 40 id. 25, which is distinguished from Unknown Heirs of Langworthy v. Baker, 23 Ill. 487.
    Writ of Error to the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard Peendergast, Judge, presiding.
    Mr. George W. Smith, and Messrs. Kraus Mayer, for the plaintiff in error.
    Mr. É. A. Otis, and Messrs. Moses & Newman, for the defendants in error.
   Per Curiam :

The writ of error in this case was sued out of this court to the county court of Cook county. Since then this court has decided an appeal will lie in this case from the county court to the circuit court of Cook county, and has awarded a writ of mandamus to compel the county court to allow an appeal in the cause. (People ex rel. v. Prendergast, 117 Ill. 588.) It follows, therefore, that a writ of error will not lie from this court to the county court, in the cause, while an appeal is or may be pending in the circuit court of Cook county, and where a trial de novo of the cause may be had.

The writ of error must be dismissed.

Writ of error dismissed.


author: Mr. Justice Cbaig

text:
    Charles S. Bales et al. v. Harriet Elder et al.

      Filed at Springfield March 23, 1887.

    1. Descents—by what law governed. The laws of descents in force at the time of a person’s death, will control in the distribution of his estate.
    2. Same—as to illegitimate persons—from whom they may inherit. Under the legislation of 1845 and 1853, relating to the descent of property, etc., an illegitimate person is recognized as the child of its mother, as regards the descent of property, and is made capable of inheriting her property to the exclusion of all persons, when she died unmarried; and he was enabled to transmit, by descent, his own property to her and her children.
    3. The act of 1872, relating to descents, confers upon illegitimates and their lawful issue, as respects the mother and any maternal ancestor, and any person from whom the mother might have inherited, if living, inheritable blood, and, as such, in the respects mentioned, they have the right of inheritance as fully as legitimate children.
    4. The object of the framers of such act seems to have been to remove the common law disability of inheritance by illegitimates, through the maternal line, and in that regard place such persons upon the same footing as legitimate persons.
    5. Same—the particular case. The mother of an illegitimate son, married, and there was issue of the marriage. The illegitimate son died, leaving children who were born in lawful wedlock. The mother also died, leaving her surviving several children, the issue of her marriage, one of whom, a son, afterwards died, intestate, leaving no widow, no child or descendants of a child, nor parents, but leaving surviving him one sister, and the descendants of other sisters. Had the mother been living at the time of the death of this son, she would have inherited a portion of his estate, and because the mother would, if living, have inherited from him, her illegitimate son, had he survived, would have been one of his heirs, and so, the children of such illegitimate, born in lawful wedlock, representing their father, became invested with the same heirship.
    6. This results under the act of 1872, notwithstanding the illegitimate son and his mother both died before that act took effect.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. Jesse J. Phillips, Judge, presiding.

      Messrs. Patton & Hamilton, for the appellants:
    The presumption is in favor of legitimacy. Wharton on Evidence, sec. 1298; Sullivan v. Kelly, 3 Allen, 148; Canjolle v. Ferre, 26 Barb. 177; Morris v. Davis, 5 Cl. & Fin. 163; Land Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315; Whitman v. State, 34 Ind. 360.
    As having some bearing on our Statute of Descents, we refer to Alexander v. Alexander, 31 Ala. 241; Opdyke’s Appeal, 49 Pa. St. 373; Neil’s Appeal, 92 id. 193; Meguire v. Brown, 41 Iowa, 650; Reeve on Descents, 96; 4 Ired. 480.
    Messrs. Tipton & Beaver, for the appellees :
    Assuming that Hampton D. Bales was the illegitimate son of Sarah Walker, and that Hiram Walker and his sisters were the legitimate children of Sarah Walker, the mother of Hampton D. Bales, for the purpose of inheritance, in law, they were not half brothers, or of the half blood. Woodward v. Duncan, 1 Coldw. 562; Stevenson’s Heirs v. Sullivant, 5 Wheat. 207; Bacon v. McBride, 32 Vt. 585.
    By the common law, a bastard, being mdlius fillius, had no inheritable blood, and was incapable of inheriting as heir either of his father or his mother, or to any one else, nor could he have heirs of his own body; and, consequently, for the purpose of inheritance, he could, in law, have no half brothers, nor inherit from the legitimate children of the same mother. Blackstone’s Com. 459 ; 2 Kent’s Com. 212, 213; Brown v. Kirby, 9 Humph. 463; Woodward v. Duncan, 1 Coldw. 562; Stoltz v. Doering, 112 Ill. 234; Blacklaws v. Milne, 82 id. 505.
    The mother having died before her son, her illegitimate son, or his heirs, could take nothing. Waltemote’s Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 220; Pico’s case, 52 Cal. 86; Allen v. Ramsey’s Heirs, 1 Metc. 637; Berry v. Owen’s Heirs, 5 Bush, 452; Jackson v. Jackson, 78 Ky. 390; Remington v. Lewis, 8 B. Mon. 606.
   Mr. Justice Cbaig

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a bill in equity, brought by appellants, who are children of Hampton D. Bales, deceased, to partition certain real estate of which Hiram Walker died seized on the 29th day of April, 1885. The complainants were sons and daughters of Hampton D. Bales, who was a son of Sarah Walker, and she was the mother of Hiram Walker. The clear preponderance of the evidence shows that Hampton D. Bales was an illegitimate son of Sarah Walker, born out of lawful wedlock, before she was married. In the consideration of the ease that fact will be regarded as established by the evidence. Hiram Walker died intestate, leaving no child or descendants of a child, nor parents, but he left surviving him one sister, and the descendants of four other sisters. His mother’s maiden name was Sarah Bales, who married Daniel Walker. Sarah Walker, the mother, died in 1854, and the father died in 1840. Hampton Bales, the illegitimate son, died in 1852.

Whether appellants, who were children of Hampton D. Bales, are entitled to inherit a portion of the estate of Hiram Walker, deceased, involves a construction of our Statute of Descents, enacted in 1872. At the common law, which is in force in" this State, except so far as it has been changed by the statute, a bastard could not inherit. Blackstone (vol. 1, page 459,) says: “The incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he can not be heir to any one, neither can he have heirs but of his own body, for, being nullius fillius, he is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be derived.” Kent (vol. 2, page 211,) says: “A bastard, being in the eyes of the law nullius fillius, * * * has no inheritable blood, and is incapable of inheriting as heir, either to his putative father, or his mother, or to any one else. Nor can he have heirs but of his own body.” The common law, excluding a bastard from inheritance from any person, remained the law of this State until section 53, chapter 109, entitled “Wills,” of the Revised Statutes of 1845, was enacted, which provided that a bastard might inherit the estate of a mother, where she died unmarried, leaving an estate. In 1853 the legislature passed another act, which provides that when a bastard or illegitimate person dies intestate, the property of such person shall descend to the widow, or surviving husband, and children, in a certain specified manner. The act also provided that the property of an illegitimate, dying intestate, should not escheat to the State, except in default of heirs, as in the act provided. In speaking in regard to these statutes, in Miller v. Williams, 66 Ill. 93, we said: “Under these statutes, an illegitimate person is recognized as the child of its mother, as regards the descent of property, and made capable of inheriting her property to the exclusion of all persons, where she was unmarried; and he is enabled to transmit, by descent, his own property to her and her children.” In 1857 another act was passed in regard to the property of an illegitimate, but it did not enlarge his right of inheritance, and has no bearing on the question involved in this case.

Thus, the law, as we have stated it, in relation to illegitimate persons, and their property and rights of inheritance, remained until 1872, when our Statute of Descents was revised by the legislature, and several radical changes were made in the law. Section 1 of the act, as originally passed, relates to estates of legitimate persons, while section 2 relates solely to illegitimate persons. (Laws of 1871-2, page 352.) Under this revision, for the first time in the history of our State legislation, the law of descents, both as to legitimate persons and illegitimate, was incorporated into one act. Under section 1 it is provided that estates of resident or non-resident proprietors, dying intestate, shall descend, first, to his or her children and their descendants, in equal parts, etc.; second, “When there is no child of the intestate, nor descendant of such child, and no widow or surviving husband, then to the parents, brothers and sisters of the deceased, and their descendants, in equal parts among them, allowing to each of the parents, if living, a child’s part, or to the survivor of them, if one be dead, a double portion. And if there is no parent living, then to the brothers and sisters of the intestate, and their descendants.” Section 2 provides, that “an illegitimate child shall be heir of his mother and any maternal ancestor, and of any person from whom its mother might have inherited, if living; and the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such, and take, by descent, any estate which the parent would have taken if living. ”

This is the section of the statute under which appellants claim to inherit a portion of the estate of Hiram Walker, deceased. They are the lawful issue of Hampton D. Bales, who was an illegitimate son of Sarah Walker, the mother of Hiram Walker.

We are free to concede that it is somewhat difficult to determine, from the language used in section 2, what the real intention of the legislature was; but one thing is quite apparent, and that is, that the legislature did intend to still further remove the common law disabilities of illegitimate persons, and enlarge their rights to take property under our laws of descent. Indeed, since 1845 the tendency of the legislation in the State, from time to time, down to 1812, has been to remove the rigors of the common law in relation to illegitimate persons, and place them more nearly on a level with legitimates. The language of the act, “an illegitimate child shall be heir of his mother and any maternal ancestor, and of any person from w'horn its mother might have inherited if living, ” fixes the relative status of the illegitimate. It makes him an heir, and, as such, he is vested with all the rights, powers and privileges of a legitimate person wdio may be an heir standing in the same degree of relationship. An heñís one who, after his ancestor’s death, has a right to inherit the intestate estate. An illegitimate, therefore, as heir of his mother, would be entitled to inherit from her, in ease of her death, in the same manner as her legitimate children. As. heir of any maternal ancestor, and of any person from whom its mother might have inherited, if living, a like position is. occupied. The statute, as we understand it, confers upon illegitimates and their lawful issue, as respects the mother and any maternal ancestor, and any person from whom the mother-might have inherited, if living, inheritable blood, and as such they have the right of inheritance as fully as legitimate children. There is nothing in the,statute that will allow an illegitimate to inherit from the father of such person, but the object of the framers of the statute seems to have been to-remove the common law disability of inheritance through the-maternal line, and, in that regard, place such persons upon the same footing as legitimate persons. We see no other construction that can he placed on the act, without disregarding the plain and emphatic language used in the statute,, which the rules of construction will not allow. Had Sarah Walker been living at the time of the death of her son, Hiram Walker, under the second clause of section 1 she would have-inherited a portion of his estate; hut she was dead, and section 2 declares that her illegitimate son, Hampton D. Bales, shall be her heir, and not only her heir, but an heir of any person from whom she might have inherited, if living. This, if Hampton D. Bales had been living, would have made him one of the heirs of the estate of Hiram Walker, hut as he-was dead, the statute goes further, and provides that the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall take, by descent, any estate which the parent would have taken, if living. This last clause confers upon appellants, children of Hampton D. Bales, the right to inherit a portion of the estate of Hiram Walker,—that portion which Bales might have inherited had he been living when Walker died.

It is claimed by appellees, that under the construction of the statute contended for by appellants, there will he a conflict between the second clause of section 1 and section 2. We perceive no conflict between the two sections. Appellees take under the second clause of section 1, while appellants are entitled to take a portion of the same estate under section 2. Two classes of persons are provided for,—one under the one section, and the other under the other section. Where there are no persons to claim under section 2, as would ordinarily be the case where a man dies intestate, leaving no •children, descendants of children, or widow, then the entire ■estate would pass and be distributed under section 1; but in case there were persons who were heirs under section 2, then the estate would descend and have to be distributed under both sections.

It is also claimed that appellants can not claim under the act of 1872, for the reason that Sarah Walker and Hampton D. Bales both died before the act of 1872 was passed. There is no provision of the act under which its application is limited and confined to a case where the mother and illegitimate may be living at the time the act took effect, as there probable would have been had the legislature intended so to limit it, .and in the absence of such limitation we see no reason why ihe act may not as well apply where the mother and illegitimate may be dead, as living, when the act took effect. The act is one prescribing a rule of descent of property. All other .acts relating to descents were repealed, leaving the act of 1872 as the only one under which real estate belonging to an intestate estate could descend. The appellants do not claim a part of this estate as heirs of Sarah Walker or Hampton D. Bales, but they claim as heirs of Hiram Walker; and as he died after the act of 1872 was adopted, his estate must descend and be distributed according to that act, as there is no other law of descent under which it can descend;

From what has been said, it follows that the judgment of ihe circuit court was erroneous, and it will be reversed, and ■the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

Mr. Justice Shore, dissenting.


text:
    George W. Miller v. Victor K. Glass.

      Filed at Ottawa November 13, 1886.

    Bill of exceptions—when necessary—presumption from its absence. Where the record contains no bill of exceptions showing the evidence heard on the trial of a cause, it will be presumed that the evidence was ample to sustain the judgment of the court below. It devolves on the party alleging error to make it appear.
    Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on writ of error to the Superior Court of Cook county.
    Mr. George W. Miller, pro se.

    Mr. William Garnett, Jr., for the appellee.
   Per Curiam :

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court, affirming a judgment of the Superior Court of Cook county. It is claimed that the debt upon which the judgment was founded was paid and discharged before the judgment was rendered. The record contains no bill of exceptions, and we have no means of knowing what the proof was in the Superior Court, where the judgment was rendered. We will, however, in the absence of a bill of exceptions showing what the evidence was, presume that the evidence was ample to sustain the judgment. It always devolves upon a party alleging error, to make it appear.

No error whatever appears upon this record, and the judgment will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.