text:
    (No. 74-CC-179
    Cannonball, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Health Care Licensure Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Cannonball, Inc., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 74-CC-259
    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Health Care Licensure Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-480
    Air Illinois, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Health Care Licensure Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Air Illinois, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-501
    Mobil Oil Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    J. F. Murray, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-702
    Dennis Passis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Health Care Licensure Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Dennis Passis, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-781
    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Giffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk, Cohen, Bodewes, and Narmont, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-850
    Charles L. McKinney, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Charles L. McKinney, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-884
    Ohio Casualty Group, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Ohio Casualty Group, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-11
    City Waste System, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    City Waste System, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-22
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-25
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Business and Economic Development, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-29
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-45
    Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-77
    Louis Peters, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-100
    Midwest Air Service Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-107
    Evergreen Cemetery, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-120
    Munksgaards Boghandel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 14, 1974.

    Munksgaards Boghandel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Perlin, C. J.

text:
    (No. 73-CC-458
    Estey Corporation, Claimant, vs. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, Northeastern Illinois University, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1974.

      Richard C. Bollow, and Jenner & Block, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Dunn, Brady, Goebel, Ulbrich, Hayes & Morel, Attorney for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-756
    Sun Electric Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1974.

    Sun Electric Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-830
    Benck Turf Nursery, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1974.

    Benck Turf Nursery, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-865
    Eugene C. Anandappa, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1974.

    Eugene C. Anandappa, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-9
    Abbott Laboratories, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1974.

    Abbott Laboratories, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-37
    Material Service Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1974.

    Material Service Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-38
    Material Services Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1974.

    Material Services Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-67
    Vernon Henry, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1974.

    Vernon Henry, Inc., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-486
    Minnie Morris, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 9, 1974.

    Minnie Morris, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-835
    Kenneth Trump, d/b/a, Oglesby Construction Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 9, 1974.

    Weiland and Potthoff, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-20
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 9, 1974.

    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-26
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 9, 1974.

    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-30
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Registration & Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 9, 1974.

      Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-162
    Lewis Building, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 9, 1974.

    Lewis Building, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-165
    Robert A. Roe, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 9, 1974.

    Robert A. Roe, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-166
    Jack Rampley, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 9, 1974.

    Jack Rampley, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-314
    Standard Oil Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 17, 1974.

    Standard Oil Division, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 6753
    Terry Parr, by William Parr, Sr., His Father and Next Friend, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 20, 1974.

    Winstein, Kavensky & Wallace, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This is a cause of action brought pursuant to Section 8, Paragraph (d) of the Court of Claims Act for personal injuries sustained by claimant when he was injured as a result of diving into the Hennepin Canal, Rock Island County, Illinois, on June 4, 1971.

The State of Illinois, sometime prior to the accident in question, had taken over the Hennepin Canal. This canal is approximately 96.8 miles long and runs between the Illinois River and the Mississippi River. The canal at one time was used for barge transportation, but at the present time is used primarily for recreational purposes. This area was taken over by the State by deed from the Federal Government on, or about, August 12, 1970.

The evidence shows there was one ranger assigned to the canal.

The Izaak Walton League had had a lease on a portion of the canal for some time which included the area where the unfortunate accident happened.

The injured party, Terry Parr, was 16 years old and a sophomore in high school.

On the day in question, he went with his mother and various other members of his family to swim in the Hennepin Canal where it borders a public recreational area maintained by the Izaak Walton League. A small deposit was made by claimant’s mother in the Izaak Walton League collection box where such donations are accepted.

Claimant knew how to swim and had been swimming in the canal perhaps fifteen times in the past years.

The first time claimant had been to swim in the canal in 1971, was on the date of the accident, which was also the last day of school.

There were two docks there which had been put in by boaters.

There were other people swimming in the canal at the time of the accident. Some of these people were claimant’s schoolmates who were engaged in horseplay and began throwing mud at one another.

One of these individuals was Jimmy Stotlet, who was in the canal at the place where claimant dove in. When claimant saw him, Jimmy Stotler was in the water up to his neck; but he was apparently on his knees, as the water was quite shallow where the incident occurred.

Claimant thought the canal was approximately six feet deep where he dove, although the evidence is that he had previously dived there several times prior to the accident and had personal knowledge as to the depth of the canal and the grade of the bottom of the canal. The bottom of the canal at the place of the accident was hard sand and as a result of the diving, he evidently struck his head on the bottom, fracturing a certain vertebra.

He lay motionless in the water until rescued by other members of the group who were present.

Claimant was paralyzed from the neck down, and was removed to the hospital. He has remained in a very critical condition since that time. Although he is slowly regaining the use of part of his body, it is apparent that he will always suffer a very severe limitation in the use of his body.

The record shows that there has been a very considerable amount expended by his parents in an effort to restore him to a normal condition so that he can have normal use of all his members.

The Izaak Walton League had maintained a recreational camp site and picnic area at the site of the accident since 1955, leasing the property from the Corps of Engineers of the United States Department of the Army. The general public had been using the canal, both before and after the Izaak Walton League lease, and there had always been swimming and swimming activities in the area surrounding the place where the accident occurred.

At the time of the accident, there were no "No Swimming” signs. At one time, there had been a "No Swimming” sign on the dock, but it was not there on the date of the accident. There were no signs warning about the depth of the water, and there were no lifeguards present.

The State Ranger indicated that he had seen swimmers at the Izaak Walton League leasehold but had not ordered them out because of the Izaak Walton lease.

There was some evidence to the effect that "No Swimming” signs had been posted at various times, but they had been removed by vandals. It is clear there were no such signs on the date of the accident.

It is clear from the record that in the Fall of 1970, shortly after the State took over the jurisdiction from the Federal Government of the Hennepin Canal and bordering land, the Department of Conservation posted 75 park rules and regulations signs along the length of the canal, posting approximately 25 in the Western Section. These were printed on canvas and attached to wooden poles. At the same time, the Department also began posting "No Swimming” signs in the same area. These signs were subject to almost immediate vandalism, and at the date of the hearing, there were no such signs in existence the entire length of the canal.

There are several issues involved here.

I. Was claimant an invitee of the State of Illinois or a licensee?

Jodlowski v. State of Illinois, 26 CCR 66, which involved drownings from wading in Wolf Lake State Park, makes it clear that claimant should be treated as an invitee rather than a licensee. Although there were "No Swimming” signs posted in a few places in Wolf Lake State Park, this Court found that the Jodlowski brothers, who met their death while wading in the Lake, were invitees. In other words, entering the water contrary to park regulations did not change the status of the Jodlowski brothers from that of invitee to that of licensee or trespasser. Therefore, Terry Parr did not lose his status as an invitee and become a licensee because he swam in the Hennepin Canal contrary to the regulations of the Department of Conservation.

This is particularly true because prior to claimant’s accident, the State expressly refrained from posting "No Swimming” signs on the Izaak Walton League property, but posted them after the accident.

II. Did the State breach its duty toward the claimant?

The question here as to whether the swimming was the cause of the accident in question is relatively unimportant because swimming, per se, was not the cause of the claimant’s injury. There was nothing dangerous about pool number 25 as a site for swimming, if we consider only the act of swimming and exclude the related act of diving. The injury in question came about not from swimming but from diving into shallow water, and arose either because he failed to consider the depth of the water, misjudged the depth of the water, or knowing the depth of the water failed to control his dive. All three possibilities can be found in claimant’s testimony. He did not hit his head on any hidden object in the canal, and no positive act of the State misled him as to the depth of the water.

There are three cases that deal with situations such as this:

Jodlowski v. State, 26 CCR 66
Skaggs v. Junis, 27 Ill. App. 2d 251, 169 N.E.2d 684
Hendricks v. Peabody Coal Company, 115 Ill. App. 2d 35, 253 N.E. 2d 56

In the Jodlowski case, several boys waded in shallow water from the shore of Wolf Lake, Cook County, Illinois, to a sand bar. The State had actual notice that on the east side of the sand bar there was a precipitous drop off to a depth of 20 feet. The boys in question did not know this. One Jodlowski brother, undertaking to wade from the east side of the sand bar, dropped into the deep water. His brother tried to rescue him and both were drowned.

In passing upon this case, the Court held:

"Respondent failed to adopt and provide the requisite safety measures and procedures to warn visitors to the park of the dangerous condition of the lake bottom, and to protect them from it. The drownings of the Jodlowski brothers were the direct and proximate result of this failure.”

In Skaggs v. Junis, 27 Ill. App. 2d 251, 169 N.E. 2d 684, a 16-year-old boy, diving into a privately owned pond, struck his head on a submerged stump, the existence of which stump was unknown to the boy but known to the person who owned the pond. Following the accident, the pond owner marked the stump with iron pipes and wire. The Appellate Court reversed a directed verdict on a negligence count, and held that the issues of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury.

In Hendricks v. Peabody Coal Co., 115 Ill. App. 2d 35, 253 N.E. 2d 56, a 16-year-old boy dove into a water-filled strip mine, striking his head on a sandy ledge, the existence of which was known to the land owner but not known to the boy because previous swimmers had muddied the water and made the ledge invisible. The jury found for the plaintiff and the Appellate Court refused to reverse, stating that the issues were factual.

In the present case, we have no sudden drop off, no submerged stump, no sandy ledge, and no hidden dangers.

The test is, should the State have foreseen that an invitee, especially a person of the age of 16, would dive off the bank into the shallow water to his injury, unless warned or otherwise prevented from doing so?

This seems to be more a question of fact, not of law.

III. Was the claimant in the exercise of due care for his own safety?

It is clear from the two Appellate Court cases cited above, that the question of claimant’s contributory negligence is a fact question and cannot be resolved as a matter of law. The evidence that would prejudice the claimant’s case in this instance, is the fact that he had been swimming in the canal in previous years, was generally aware of the depth of the canal and its sloping bottom, and did not investigate the depth of the canal before diving, but ran "full blast” to the bank and dove in.

This act from a 16-year-old boy who was enjoying himself at a pool was not unusual, but that in itself does not make the State responsible for the unfortunate situation that arose.

Cases of this nature, dealing with the recreational areas of the State, pose a problem as to just how far does the State have to go after providing recreational facilities to protect the general public.

In this case, there are approximately 97 miles of canal which would mean 194 miles of shore line. It would be completely impossible for the State to patrol or provide lifeguards or personnel along thie entire length, and this would be the only way in which the public would be prevented from using it in a manner that might be detrimental to themselves. If such a strict rule applied, the State would be forced to abandon any, and all, recreational facilities of this type.

This Court has held many times that the State is not an insurer of everyone who uses State property.

This Court has also held that the State has a duty to warn the public of danger in any hidden area; but it cannot be charged with the duty of protecting the public from every possible danger that might arise where they furnish the public with various recreational areas.

In the case of Pulizzano v. State, 22 Ill. CCR 234, the Court laid down the rule that "an invitation to use the parks is not absolute but an invitation to use particular facilities in the manner in which, and for the purpose for which, they were designed and intended” and further stated that "the State is not obligated to warn of every dangerous place in a park.”

Volume 33A of the Illinois Law & Practice, Section 114, dealing with injuries in State Parks, makes the following statement:

"With respect to liability in tort under the Court of Claims Act the State owes a duty to the public to exercise reasonable care in establishing, maintaining and supervising its parks, and it has a duty to warn of a danger that exists along a nature trail which could not be discovered by the public.” Citing 24 Ill. Ct.Cl. 1, Martin vs. State.

This Court passed upon a similar situation in the case of Thomas Mooneyham, Administrator of the Estate of Ronald Scott Mooneyham, Deceased vs. State of Illinois, No. 6412, where a 12-year-old boy drowned at Starved Rock State Park. In this case, the death occurred when the boy left the regular paths, attempted to climb a rock and fell into the river. The Court held that it was the result of the positive act of the unfortunate victim that caused the tragedy rather than any negligence on the part of the State.

In the present case, it appears that the State furnished a recreational area for the public to use, and that there were docks extending into the water from which individuals could dive, but that they were not used in this particular case.

The evidence is uncontradicted in that the claimant who was familiar with the area dove into the shallow water from the bank, and it was this act, that caused the unfortunate accident.

For claimant to recover, he must prove:

1. That he was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety.

2. That the State of Illinois was negligent as charged in the complaint.

3. That the negligence of the State of Illinois was the proximate cause of his injuries.

It is well settled that one who owns or is in control of property is not an insurer of the safety of an invitee, and that this particular rule applies to premises to which the public is invited. Thoele vs. Mazel, 8 Ill. App. 2d 237; Dietz vs. Belleville Co-op Grain Co., 273 Ill. App. 164.

Claimant has failed to sustain the burden of proof, and an award is, therefore, denied.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-446
    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    D. K. Mc Intosh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-167
    Industrial Park Maintenance, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Industrial Park Maintenance, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-307
    Grove Storage, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Rappaport and Meyer, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-371
    Bob Neal Ford, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Robert Neal, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-639
    Park Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Park Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-711
    Stetson Hat Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Utz, Litvak, Thackery, Utz & Taylor, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-738
    Edgar Hainline, Heir of Ann Hainline, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Woods & Bates, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-785
    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Giffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk, Cohen, Bodewes, and Narmont, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-864
    Earl Jones Funeral Home, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

      Earl Jones Funeral Home, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-877
    The Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Board of Vocational Rehabilitation and Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Sharon Savens, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-17
    Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    John Maryley, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-28
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-32
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-65
    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Business and Economic Development, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-74
    Checker Express Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Checker Express, Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-125
    Acoustech, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Acoustech, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-135
    Veratex Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Veratex Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-139
    Jack Henderson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    Jack Henderson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-158
    William M. Freivogel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1974.

    William M. Freivogel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6983
    Judith Hawkins, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Speaker of the House, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Judith Hawkins, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-460
    Danny N. Michel, Sheriff, Fayette County, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Danny N. Michel, Sheriff, Fayette County, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-416
    Illinois Bell Telephone Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    L. Bow Pritchett, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-577
    Howard Uniform Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Jerome H. Pumpian, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-709
    Margaret D. Snow, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Margaret D. Snow, Claimant, pro se.

    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-121
    Munksgaards Boghandel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Munksgaards Boghandel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-126
    R. W. Bradley Supply Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Daniel C. Chapin, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-130
    Allied Van Lines, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Allied Van Lines, Inc., Claimant pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-136
    Cities Service Oil Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Cities Service Oil Co., Claimant pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-155
    Wayne W. Whalen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Wayne W. Whalen, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-159
    Harry D. Lavery, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Harry D. Lavery, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-160
    Charles D. Stein, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Charles D. Stein, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-161
    Ray E. Breen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    Ray F. Breen, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-195
    James M. Sexton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 26, 1974.

    James M. Sexton, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6270
    Kenneth D. Headlee, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 3, 1974.

    John J. Lawless, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant seeks to recover the sum of $25,000.00 for damages to a commercial fish pond in an area owned by him in Champaign County, Illinois.

Complaint alleges that by the construction of Route 74 in Champaign County, the natural flow of water was diverted and impeded, and that as a result of said construction, his pond became so silted that it was unusable for the purpose of a commercial fish pond.

Claimant owns approximately 28 acres of land in Champaign County, on which he constructed two fish ponds in 1956. These ponds were fed primarily by springs with some run-off, and in extremely dry weather, well water was used to maintain the level. These two ponds were originally divided and the level of one pond was approximately 30 inches higher than the other.

After the construction of the highway, which was started in 1966, the ditch, which originally flowed from the east side of the highway area, was diverted to the west ditch by a 36 inch culvert under said highway.

It was also alleged in said complaint that the highway itself was constructed over some of the springs in the area which had previously flowed into the ponds in question.

The complaint alleges that prior to the existence of the highway, very little silting existed in the pond and the water was pure and clear but that after the highway was constructed, a great deal of sediment had washed into the pond which resulted in the water becoming very shallow.

With the sediment in the water and the change in depth to a comparatively shallow pond, the water, instead of being clear and cool, became impregnated with clay and other silt which would not settle. The temperature of the pond was increased considerably, due to the shallow water; and the quantity of sedimentation became so high that it became untenable for fishing with the result, that the commercial fishing he had carried on for several years in the pond was destroyed.

The claimant alleges that the pond was originally excavated to a depth of between 14 and 16 feet but that because of the highway, there was from 4 to 7 feet of sedimentation accumulated in the pond.

Claimant also alleges, that in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s when the air temperature was 95° to 100°, the water temperature remained at 65° to 70° but after the silting to said pond, the temperature ran about 75°.

There is a direct conflict in the testimony of the witnesses as to the amount of sediment that accumulated in the pond. The claimant alleges that there was a large amount of sediment and in detailing as to how he arrived at the figures, he stated he used oars, a rake, and a marked fishing pole.

The State used a much more scientific and, undoubtedly, a much more accurate method of measuring the sedimentation of the pond and consequently came up with a considerably less amount of sediment than was claimed by Mr. Headlee.

The respondent’s measure would indicate that the pond was never over 8 feet in depth, instead of the 16 feet as claimant stated. From the record, it appears that the respondent’s method of measuring the depth of the pond and the amount of sediment that accumulated is decidedly more accurate than that of the claimant. Therefore, the claim that there was 7 feet of sediment, must be rejected.

In the Bill of Particulars, claimant asked damages of $37,450.00, with the foremost item in the Bill being a request for removal of 40,000 cubic yards of silt at 75¿ per cubic yard at a cost of $30,000.00.

The respondent’s witness testified that 40,000 cubic yards of dirt on 2.7 acres would be in excess of 10 feet in depth, and had 40,000 cubic yards eroded during the construction, the embankment would have lowered 2 feet in depth of soil for a distance of 1500 feet in length, and that the sediment would be 2 feet above the water level.

It appears that these ponds were relatively shallow to begin with, that they did suffer some sedimentation prior to the construction of 1-74, and that claimant did suffer the following damages: Sedimentation, causing a change in depth of the water; a change in the type of water from clear, cool water to one with a much higher temperature and carrying a greater degree of sedimentation; and a change in the temperature of the water because of the shallowness of the pond.

The Department of Conservation, in their booklet entitled POND FISH AND FISHING IN ILLINOIS, Page 38, in speaking of pond problems calls attention to the fact that where there is considerable soil erosion from clay particles, problems will arise, and it further states:

"The clay suspensions require a special approach, for they are composed of very fine particles which have similar electrical charges and therefore repel each other and do not settle.”

This is evidently what has happened in this particular pond. As a result of the change in temperature and the change in the type of water, fish were unable to live.

It is apparent there was a permanent loss of spring water as a result of the construction, so unless another source of water is acquired, it is extremely doubtful whether these ponds will ever be of value as far as commercial fishing is concerned. This evidently is a continuing situation resulting in a permanent loss of use for the area for which it was originally built.

The evidence discloses that after the road was put through, it was necessary to remove the dam between Pond No. 1 and Pond No. 2, which was done at a cost of $1,950.00.

The record shows that in 1965, claimant took in from $4,000.00 to $5,000.00 in receipts from individuals who paid to fish in his ponds; and this income dropped to $2,100.00 in 1971, due, claimant alleges, to the condition of the water and poor fishing resulting from high temperatures and silted water.

It would be impossible, of course, to restore the premises to the way they were originally.

Although the claimant is entitled to the benefit of the rule of law, "that valuation should be adopted, which will be most beneficial to the injured party, as he is entitled to the benefit of his premises intact,” Richards vs. Gundlach, 245 Ill. App. 264, 267, no measure of damages can be applied, which would give him a profit from damages suffered.

Certain Illinois cases hold that the rule to apply in a case of this type is to permit the measure of damages to be the cost of the restoration, if such can be done readily and at a relatively modest expense. Clark vs. Public Service Co., 278 Ill. App. 426, 447, and cases sited therein; Cooper vs. Kankakee Elec. Light Co., 164 Ill. App. 581, 586, and 21 C.C.R., Page 281.

The rule that applies when the cost of restoration exceeds the value of the property, the value of the property becomes the ceiling on the amount of damages recoverable, especially when the property is old. McCormick on Damages, (Hornbook Series) 1935, Sec. 126, pp. 482-484.

In the present case, restoration of the premises would be impossible and the cost of restoring them would undoubtedly be more than the property is worth.

The rule regarding proof is that the burden of proving the element of damages is upon the claimant. "The proof required to establish damages must not be remote, speculative nor uncertain.” Frega vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 399, 400.

The only evidence regarding the permanent damage, was a real estate agent who testified that in his opinion the property was worth $25,000.00 before the road was put in, and was worth $9,000.00 afterwards, a difference of $16,000.00.

It is clear, that claimant is entitled to the sum of $1,950.00 for the bulldozing to take out the dam; and it is also clear, that there is approximately 1,800 yards of dirt to be removed at 75d per yard, or $1,350.00.

It is also the opinion of this Court, that claimant suffered $3,000.00 permanent damages from loss of revenue from his ponds and for permanent injuries.

An award, therefore, is made to claimant in the amount of $6,300.00.


text:
    (No. 6173
    Robert E. Poleet, George H. Poleet, William N. Poleet and Donald D. Poleet, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Youth Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Keith H. Fitzgerald, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This is an action brought by Robert E. Poleet, George H. Poleet, William N. Poleet and Donald D. Poleet for damages to a home in which Robert E. Poleet has a life interest and George H. Poleet, William N. Poleet and Donald D. Poleet have the remainder interest.

On November 18, 1970, a car being driven by a sixteen-year-old escapee from the Illinois Youth Commission assigned to Grafton, Illinois, accompanied by two other youths from the same camp, crashed into the home. The three youths involved were Michael Kleszewski, Patrick Doherty, and Michael Skuris.

In a report written by Mr. John Platt, Superintendent of Pere Marquette School Camp, he cited the dangers involved in referring youngsters with a history of runaways and auto thefts to open settings. The report also stated that all three boys had a history of runaways and auto thefts. The record further discloses that all three had been charged with various other types of illegal activities.

The car was being driven by Michael Kleszewski, who had been charged with stealing an auto on a previous occasion, violation of parole, and runaway.

The State did not introduce any evidence in its defense of this action.

The applicable law in this instance is stated in the case of Redebaugh vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 306, 308 (1956), where the Court said: "Since respondent did not offer any evidence in rebuttal that would show that reasonable efforts were made to prevent the escape of the inmates or any other facts of circumstances surrounding their escape, the Court must conclude there were no such facts or circumstances to justify respondent’s action.” Therefore, a prima facie case was established, based on the complaint, departmental reports and stipulations, in favor of claimant.

It is further supported by the statements of the Court in Finch vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 376 (1956), where the Court said: "In fact, we have nothing to govern ourselves as to whether or not the State was negligent in allowing this patient the freedom, which he apparently had, so that the truck in question was stolen and consequently damaged. In the absence of such a showing, we think claimant was correct in his advancement of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that the burden would be upon respondent to make some showing as to this patient, i.e., whether or not he was one who could be trusted in the manner in which he was in this particular case to work out in the field.” The Court went on to say, "There being nothing in the record pertaining to this patient, other than the fact that the truck was stolen by him and damaged, we have no alternative but to find in favor of claimant.”

In 26 C.C.R 278, the Court, in discussing a situation where the State failed to produce any evidence, referred to the case of U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company, a Corporation vs. State of Illinois, 23 C.C.R. 188, and stated, "that it was incumbent upon the State to come forward with evidence to show that they were not negligent in a situation such as this. Without such showing it will be presumed that the State was negligent based upon the inferences to be drawn from the fact of the escape.”

The Court believes the same cause and rule should be applied in this case, and that the State of Illinois was negligent in allowing the escape of the individual who caused the damage.

It appears that in view of the past records of all three of the escapees, and particularly the driver of the car, they should have been kept under greater surveillance than the ordinary inmate. The evidence clearly indicates that the respondent did not take any special steps to prevent the escape of the youth who drove the car, even though his record indicated prior escapes.

As to the question of damages, claimants allege that replacement costs would be $15,454.00.

It is the opinion of this Court, that the measure of, damages applied in cases such as this should be the difference between the market value of the house prior to the incident and the market value after. The only evidence as to market value was furnished by the witness, Mr. Oiler, who appraised the property at $9,200.00 and the lot on which the property is located at $5,000.00. The repair cost was shown to be $6,485.58.

It is the opinion of the Court, that $6,485.58 is the proper amount and an award is hereby made in said amount.


text:
    (No. 6425
    Arlene Sperindeo and Robert Paul, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Sheldon N. Reibman, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

This is an action for personal injuries suffered by claimants in the Illinois Beach State Park when a motorcycle on which they were riding, collided with a metal cable strung across a park road. The park, and all roads therein, were under the jurisdiction of the respondent.

Claimants arrived at Illinois Beach State Park at approximately 8:30 p.m. on July 10, 1971, intending to camp overnight. On entering the park, they passed an unoccupied ranger station and proceeded to set up their camp without obtaining a permit. Claimant Paul, who had previously camped overnight in the park on at least six prior occasions, testified that a sign at the station directed campers to report to the ranger station the next morning if no one was present. However, a park ranger testified that a sign on the booth directed campers to await the return of the ranger before proceeding into the park.

Claimants testified that at approximately 11:00 p.m. that evening, Claimant Paul left the park to repair a leak in the tire of his motorcycle. They said he returned at about 11:20 p.m., and that at about 11:45 p.m., they left their campsite on the motorcycle to drive to a beachhouse on the opposite side of the park in order to wash for the night.

Claimants testified that they used the same road to the beachhouse as Claimant Paul had earlier used to leave and re-enter the park after fixing his flat tire. This road was one of several which radiated in various directions from the park’s main parking lot to the interior of the park. To get to the beachhouse from their campsite, it was necessary for claimants to ride to the main parking lot and there get on another road leading to the beachhouse. Although the road from their campsite to the parking lot was designated a "fire lane,” it was open to vehicular traffic prior to the time the park closed for the night.

When the park closed, in an effort to keep vehicular traffic out of the camping area, employees of the State Department of Conservation placed a white, wood barricade in the center of this road, and strung a steel cable across the entire width of the road about three feet off the ground. The barricade and cable were erected near a point where the road fed into the main parking lot. Of the several roads which led into the park from the parking lot, this was the only road shut to traffic.

At the point of the barricade, the road was approximately twenty feet wide. The wood barricade was sixteen feet wide, thus leaving a gap of two feet between the edge of the road and the barricade on each side of the barricade. The steel cable extended over the entire width of the road and was secured to posts on each side of the road.

The weather was clear on the night of the accident, but the road was unlighted. The approach to the barricade from claimants’ campsite was straight and unobstructed. Claimants testified that the headlight on their motorcycle was operating.

Claimants said that as they rode toward the parking lot from the interior of the park at about five miles per hour, they drove into the cable and were thrown from the motorcycle. Claimant Paul said he never saw a wood barricade in the center of the road.

Robert Boone, a park employee stationed at the permit booth on the night in question, witnessed the accident. He said it appeared that claimants were attempting to ride around the barricade when their motorcycle struck the cable. Boone said he noticed scrapes on the right side of the barricade where it was struck by the motorcycle.

Boone said he erected the cable across the road on the night in question at 10:00 p.m. when the camping area closed for the night. He also said that at 11:00 p.m. an announcement was made over the loudspeaker that the park was closed.

This Court has previously determined that visitors to a State park are invitees to whom the state owes a duty of reasonable care in the maintenance of its parks. Damermuth v. State, 25 C.C.R. 353, 356; Kamin v. State, 221 C.C.R. 467. Claimants contend that respondent breached its duty in erecting the steel cable across an unlighted road without providing an adequate warning of the existence of the cable. Respondent urges that the barricade provided adequate warning of the existence of the cable, and that claimants’ injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of Claimant Paul.

A review of the pertinent Illinois authorities compels a finding that in erecting the steel cable across a dark road, over a barricade which did not extend across the full width of the road, the respondent was negligent. In Moore v. Ohio Oil Co., 241 Ill. App. 388 (1962), the court held that a landowner who stretches a wire across a roadway without giving warning of the change in condition of the roadway, is liable to one injured as a result thereby. The Court said:

"Where the public has been accustomed to travel a well-defined road across one’s land, he is liable to a licensee for personal injuries occasioned by a wire or rope stretched across the road if he has given no warning of the changed conditions.”

In Wrigley v. Electric and Machine Company, 419 F. 2d 972 (7th Cir. 1969), the defendant stretched a steel wire across a private road about three feet off the ground. Attached to the wire were two flags, six to seven inches wide and approximately a foot and one-half long. Wrigley, who was riding his motorcycle along the road during daylight hours, collided with the cable and was killed. The trial court set aside a jury verdict that found the defendant guilty of wilfull and wanton misconduct. After reviewing the Illinois authorities on point, the court of appeals reversed and remanded with directions to reinstáte the verdict. The Court found the defendant’s actions "not sufficient to effectively warn travelers of the danger created by the cable,” and held that the facts would support a finding of wilfull and wanton conduct.

While we find respondent negligent in erecting the cable barricade, the facts of the case at bar unlike those in Wrigley v. Electric and Machine Company, supra., will not support a finding of wanton and wilfull misconduct. In Wrigley, the approach to the portion of the road across which the cable was strung was not in plain view, but was at the end of a sharp curve in the road. Further, the only warning of the existence of the wire was two grey rags. Here, the wire was strung at a point where the approach to the barricade was straight and unobstructed and a 16-foot wide white barricade covered most of the road and provided some warning of an obstruction.

Having determined that respondent was negligent but not guilty of wanton and wilfull misconduct, we next consider whether claimants have established their freedom from contributory negligence. Claimant Paul testified that he was traveling about 5 miles per hour when his motorcycle struck the wire, and that the headlight on his motorcycle was operating. Yet, he said he never saw the 16-foot wide, white barricade which blocked the road at the point of the accident. Chapter 95Vz, Illinois Revised Statutes, Section 12-201, requires a motorcycle to be equipped with a headlight of sufficient power to project a beam over a minimum distance of 500 feet. Had Claimant Paul been acting with reasonable regard for his own safety, he certainly would have seen the white barricade as he approached along a straight road at 5 miles per hour with his motorcycle’s headlight operating. We, therefore, find that Claimant Paul has failed to establish his freedom from contributory negligence, and his claim must be denied.

Claimant Sperindeo had no control over the operation of the motorcycle, and respondent concedes that she was free of contributory negligence.

Claimant Sperindeo was taken by ambulance to a hospital following the accident, where she remained for one week. Her teeth were driven through her lip in the collision, and her mouth required stitches. She suffered a cerebral concussion and bruises of the face, back, and head. She testified that her right eye was swollen shut for three weeks and alleged a loss of vision in the eye. However, an optometrist examined Miss Sperindeo at respondent’s request and reported that her vision was within normal limits. Her medical expenses totalled $807.35, and she lost approximately $450.00 in wages.

The Court finds that her injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of the respondent.

The claim of Claimant Paul is hereby denied.

Claimant Sperindeo is hereby awarded the sum of $3,600.00.


text:
    (No. 6702
    Manfred Kydan, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Manfred Kydan, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6703
    Manfred Kydan, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Manfred Kydan, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6704
    Manfred Kydan, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Manfred Kydan, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6705
    Manfred Kydan, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Manfred Kydan, M.D., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-220
    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-8
    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    D. K. McIntosh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-671
    Stone Exterminating Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Milton N. Shaffner, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-733
    Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1
    Washington University, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Institute for Environmental Quality, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Washington University, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-23
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-57
    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-89
    Lewis University Campus Shop, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Lewis University Campus Shop, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-91
    G. F. Stout, Mech. Contr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    G. F. Stout, Mech. Contr., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-98
    Gunthorp-Warren Printing Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Attorney General, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Gunthorp-Warren Printing Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-105
    Morehouse Wells Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 4, 1974.

    Morehouse Wells Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Per Curiam.*

text:
    (No. 74-CC-797
    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 11, 1974.

    James M. Lestikow, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.*


text:
    (No. 75-CC-54
    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 11, 1974.

    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-56
    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 11, 1974.

    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-61
    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 11, 1974.

    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-610
    Central Office Equip. Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1974.

    Robert H. Goldman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-656
    Amoco Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1974.

    Amoco Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-811
    Beverly Farm Foundation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1974.

    John C. Mueller, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-896
    Royal Typewriter Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1974.

    Royal Typewriter Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-104
    Psychiatric Evaluation and Treatment Center Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1974.

    Psychiatric Evaluation and Treatment Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-118
    John J. Holland, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1974.

    John J. Holland, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-156
    Anne Willer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1974.

    Anne Willer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-222
    Naomi Boles, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1974.

      Naomi Boles, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-240
    R. K. Petroleum Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1974.

    R. K. Petroleum Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-292
    Christian Welfare Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1974.

    Christian Welfare Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-414
    James E. Holder, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1974.

    James E. Holder, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-789
    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1974.

    James M. Lestikow, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-817
    Passavant Memorial Area Hospital Association, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1974.

    Passavant Memorial Area Hospital Association, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-66
    Gulf Oil Company, U.S., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1974.

    Gulf Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-151
    Richard T. Dunn, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1974.

    Richard T. Dunn, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-154
    Gordon F. Moore, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1974.

    Gordon F. Moore, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-157
    Arthur L. Woods, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1974.

    Arthur L. Woods, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-217
    Exxon Company, U.S.A., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1974.

    James M. Lestikow, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-269
    Margaret B. Cowdin, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1974.

    Margaret B. Cowdin, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-570
    Touche Ross & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Bell, Boyd, Lloyd, Haddad & Burns, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-595
    Oakley Furniture Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Oakley Furniture Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-727
    L. J. Keefe Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    L. J. Keefe Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-6
    Barney Schwartz, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Barney Schwartz, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-10
    Clarence N. Quitno, and Jessie L. Quitno, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Clarence N. Quitno, and Jessie L. Quitno, Claimants, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-39
    Sharon Wheelock, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

      Sharon Wheelock, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-43
    Wooters Lumber Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Wooters Lumber Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-46
    A-OK Products, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    A-OK Products, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-52
    Howard Freedman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Howard Freedman, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-69
    Feldott Brothers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Feldott Brothers, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-81
    John F. McCarthy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    John F. McCarthy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-82
    Hewitt Lamer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Hewitt Lamer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-101
    Great Lakes Solvents Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Great Lakes Solvents Division, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-153
    Dr. Charles G. Hurst, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Dr. Charles G. Hurst, Jr., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-181
    Harold L. Fath d/b/a Key Rexall Drugs, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Harold L. Path d/b/a Key Rexall Drugs, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-193
    Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Ravenswood Hospital Medical Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-211
    Laurence I. Chapman, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Laurence I. Chapman, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-248
    Lincoln Transfer Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Lincoln Transfer Company, Inc., Claimant pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-249
    Lincoln Transfer Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Lincoln Transfer Company, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-250
    Lincoln Transfer Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Lincoln Transfer Company, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-251
    Lincoln Transfer Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Lincoln Transfer Company, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-270
    Grove Press, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1974.

    Grove Press, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 5805
    George Hood and Myrtle Hood, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 7, 1974.

    Gregory Tumbarello, Attorney for Claimants.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

Claimant, George Hood, seeks damages for injuries suffered by him while a patient at Chicago State Hospital, a facility operated by respondent for the detention, care, and treatment of the mentally ill. Claimant Myrtle Hood, his wife, claims damages for loss of the support, services, care, and companionship of her husband as a result of those injuries.

George Hood was admitted to Chicago State Hospital on December 4, 1969, pursuant to a finding of a judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, that he was in need of mental treatment. On January 18, 1970, George Hood escaped from Ward Six, a locked section of the hospital. Subsequent investigation placed the time of his escape at approximately 5:30 p.m. The average temperature on the day in question was eight degrees above zero. George Hood was found by hospital security guards about one and one-half hours after his escape on the hospital grounds in waist-high snow, with his frostbitten hands clutching a wire fence which surrounded the hospital.

George Hood did not testify at the hearing in this cause, and the record is indefinite as to how he effected his escape. Lawrence Atkins, a security officer at the hospital who conducted an investigation into the incident, testified that he had been told by LeRoy Robinson, the aide in charge of Hood’s ward, that the west door to the tract had been unlocked by an unknown party, and that it was also possible that a set of keys to the ward had been stolen. A report prepared by Atkins following his investigation stated that personnel in Ward Six had found the west door to the ward open following Hood’s escape.

A report of the Illinois Department of Mental Health which was introduced into evidence by respondent stated in part:

"George Hood did not have permission to leave the unit at any time. However, investigation has brought out that garbage was removed from the unit sometime between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., and it is believed at this time the west door was left unsecured for a short time while the garbage was being emptied. This permitted time for Mr. Hood to leave the unit without anyone’s knowledge * *

LeRoy Robinson, the psychiatric aide in charge of Ward Six at the time of the incident, testified that the ward contained a mixture of both passive and violent patients. He said that Ward Six was a locked building, but that the lock on the west door was defective. He had reported the defective lock to employees on the shift following his work shift a number of times prior to the occurrence, but the lock had not been repaired.

Robinson further testified that there was a "high rate” of patients escaping from Ward Six. He said that patients had removed the handles from the front door of the building, and could get out the door by simply pushing it open.

Hospital records introduced into evidence, established that on December 7, 1969, George Hood had been placed in restraints after he wandered into rooms of other patients. On January 11, 1970, seven days prior to the incident, George Hood became disturbed and broke two windows. Robinson said that prior to the incident, Hood was strong, robust, and very active and was "always trying to get out-of-doors.”

In Karulski v. Board of Trustees, 25 C.C.R. 295, at 299, this Court described the duty owed a patient by a hospital in these terms:

"A hospital is not an insurer of a patient’s safety, but owes the patient the duty of protection, and must exercise reasonable care as the patient’s known condition may require . .

See also, Peterson v. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 381.

To recover for the damages alleged, therefore, claimants must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent breached the duty of protection owed George Hood; that George Hood was himself free of contributory negligence; and that the breach of duty by the respondent was the proximate cause of the damages alleged by claimants.

While claimants have been unable to prove the exact manner in which Hood left Ward Six, there is ample evidence in the record from which to conclude that his escape was occasioned by the negligence of employees of Chicago State Hospital. Hood had a history of creating disturbances, and the aide in charge of Hood’s ward said he "was always trying to get out-of-doors.” Yet, Ward Six was a "locked” ward in name only. The lock on the west door of the ward was defective, and this condition had been reported to employees of respondent on several occasions prior to the incident. Although the ward contained a mixture of active and passive patients, patients were apparently permitted to go outside the ward to dispose of garbage without supervision. Patients had removed the handles from the front door of the ward, which allowed them to open the door by simply applying pressure to it. Again, this condition was known to employees of Chicago State Hospital, but never remedied.

As a result of these conditions, patients escaped from Ward Six at a "high rate.” The Court therefore finds that respondent breached the duty of protection owed George Hood, in failing to maintain proper security in Ward Six.

Respondent concedes that given George Hood’s mental condition on January 18, 1970, he was incapable of contributory negligence.

Claimants have established that the physical injuries to George Hood were proximately caused by the negligence of employees of Chicago State Hospital. Hood was taken to Cook County Hospital for treatment of his frostbitten extremities. He remained hospitalized there from January 2, 1970, to March 13, 1970, and part of his left index finger and middle finger were amputated. The other fingers of both hands and both forearms are scarred from frostbite, and he has suffered a permanent, partial loss of use of his left arm, right hand, and both feet. Cook County Hospital claims a lien against claimant for services rendered him in the amount of $4,886.85.

Upon his release from Cook County Hospital, George Hood received further treatment for his injuries as an outpatient at the Fantus Clinic for four months. Hood, who was 57 years old at the time of the incident, thereafter attempted to return to work, but was rejected by his former employer.

Claimant’s wife, Myrtle Hood, seeks damages for loss of support, services, care, and companionship caused by claimant’s injuries. We have carefully considered the voluminous evidence introduced with respect to George Hood’s earning capacity, and his physical and mental condition prior to the incident. While he was a steady worker all of his life, George Hood last worked in October, of 1969. In November, 1969, he was admitted to Garfield Park Hospital in a "confused and tremulous state” and had to be placed in arm and leg restraints. He was transferred to Cook County Hospital on November 29, 1960; and hospital records indicate that he was "hearing things and seeing things”. Cook County Hospital records state that on his admission he was "very confused”; and by December 11, 1969, he was placed in restraints.

The court finds that the physical and mental condition of George Hood had seriously deteriorated prior to January 18, 1970, the date of his escape from Ward Six. His inability to work and support Myrtle Hood was not caused by the incident of January 18, 1970, but rather is the result of a condition which already existed at the time of his escape from Chicago State Hospital.

Therefore, the separate claim of Myrtle Hood, George’s wife, must be and is hereby denied.

We find that the claimant, George Hood, is entitled to an award in damages for his physical injuries in the total sum of $17,500.00.

However, we are required by statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, Ch. 82, §98, quoted in part below, to honor the lien filed in this case by the Cook County Hospital for services rendered in the treatment and care of this claimant. The said statute concerning certain hospital liens reads in pertinent part as follows:

"98. Lien to attach to verdict, judgment or decree, etc.] §2. The lien of any such nonprofit hospital, or hospital maintained and operated entirely by a county, shall, from and after the time of service of the aforesaid notice, attach to any verdict, judgment or decree secured in any suit or action by the injured party based on the negligent or wrongful act, and to any money or property which may be recovered by compromise settlement, or in any suit or action brought by such injured person on account of such claim or right of action.”

Since the lien of $4,886.85, filed herein by Cook County Hospital, does not exceed one-third of the amount due the claimant in this decree, the limit on such liens imposed by §97 of the said Act does not apply, and the full amount of the hospital lien must be deducted from claimant’s award, and the said amount awarded to the hospital.

1. The claimant, George Hood, is hereby awarded the nét sum of $12,613.15 in damages.

2. Cook County Hospital is hereby awarded the sum of $4,886.85 in satisfaction of its lien duly filed in this cause.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-145
    Gerber-Barthel Truck and Tractor Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 7, 1974.

    William D. Stiehl, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 5620
    Barbara L. Baren, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 12, 1974.

    Garbutt & Jacobson, by Thomas Lee, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

Claimant, Barbara Baren, seeks damages for injuries sustained on July 17, 1967, when she fractured a bone in her left foot as she stepped into a depression in a street maintained by respondent. Claimant contends that respondent was negligent in maintaining the street in that it had constructive notice of the defect, but failed to take remedial action. Respondent contends that claimant has failed to establish either that the State of Illinois had constructive notice of the defect, or that she was free of contributory negligence.

On July 17, 1967, at approximately noon, claimant, a twenty-four-year-old woman, parked her car in front of a cleaning store located at 2127 South 17th Avenue, Broadview, Illinois. She had previously visited the store on several occasions, parking in approximately the same place. She got out of her car on the driver’s side with a load of laundry clutched to her chest, and walked around to the rear of the automobile. Claimant denied that her vision was in any way obstructed by the laundry bundle.

As she walked around the car and approached the curb separating the street from the sidewalk, she stepped into a depression in the street with her left foot and fell to the ground. Claimant testified that she was looking straight ahead at the time, and never saw the hole into which she stepped until after she fell.

Claimant was taken by ambulance to Oak Park Hospital, where it was determined that she sustained a fracture of the fifth metatarsal bone in her left foot. The foot was placed in a walking cast, which claimant wore for four weeks. For several weeks thereafter the foot was bandaged, and claimant walked with the aid of a cane. She was treated by Dr. Albert E. Rodriguez, an orthopedic surgeon, whose medical report was introduced into evidence.

Claimant, who earned $76 net per week at the time of the occurrence, did not return to work for four days. When she did return, she allegedly suffered pains in the foot and elected to take her paid vacation at that time. At the hearing herein, claimant alleged that she was still experiencing a throbbing pain at the fracture site, and that she was unable to continue participation in certain activities such as bowling and skating. A report of an examination of claimant on November 18, 1972, by Dr. Donald S. Miller was introduced into evidence and states that there is a deformity at the site of the healed fracture. However, a report of Dr. Carl Scuderi, who examined Claimant on August 31, 1973, at the request of respondent, states that the fracture had healed well.

Photographs of the hole into which claimant stepped were introduced into evidence by claimant, and show a depression in the street adjacent to the curb measuring approximately 3 feet long, 2 feet wide, and 3 to 4 inches deep. These photographs were authenticated by Lt. Robert Markey of the Broadview Police Department, who was called to the accident site and was present when they were taken.

William Saunders, the owner of the cleaning store at 2127 South 17th Street, witnessed the accident. He said that he happened to be looking out the window of his store when he saw claimant step into the hole and fall to the ground. Saunders said that the hole was visible from his store. On direct examination, Saunders said that the hole had existed for from three to four months prior to the incident. On cross-examination Saunders was less certain as to the length of time it had existed, but was sure that it was over one month.

This Court has repeatedly held that the State is not an insurer of the safety of all persons upon its streets and highways, and the State’s duty is limited to using reasonable care in the maintenance and repair of its streets. (Weygandt v. State, 22 C.C.R. 498) To recover for her injuries therefore, claimant bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent was negligent; that she herself was free of contributory negligence; and that the negligence of the respondent was the proximate cause of her injuries.

Claimant does not contend that the respondent had actual knowledge of the defect in 17th Street, but rather seeks to charge the respondent with constructive knowledge of the depression. Constructive notice of a dangerous condition may be charged to a party when, considering all the circumstances of a case, it is determined that in the exercise of reasonable care the party should have known of the existence of the condition. In Joyner v. State, 22 C.C.R. 213, 217, we said:

"Notice of the existence of a defect or obstruction in a municipal street may be implied, if the condition existed for such a length of time that the corporate authorities should have ascertained its existence and effected a remedy. This is always a question to be determined under the circumstances of the evidence in each case.”
"We * * * must require strong and convincing proof to establish this element.”

The primary factor to be considered in determining whether the respondent may properly be charged with constructive notice of the existence of the hole in the street, is the length of time the defect existed. The only evidence offered on this issue was the testimony of William Saunders, the owner of the cleaning store adjacent to the accident site, who said that the hole was present for over one month, and possibly as long as three to four months.

While Saunders’s testimony was somewhat less than precise as to the length of time the defect existed, claimant has established by a preponderance of the evidence, that the hole had existed for a sufficient period to have put the respondent on notice of its existence, and to enable respondent to either make repairs or erect a warning to pedestrian and vehicular traffic. See, Gillespie v. State, 25 C.C.R. 309.

Respondent claims that it was under no duty to maintain the road where the accident occurred for pedestrian traffic, because claimant was not walking in a designated pedestrian cross-walk. However, respondent owes a duty to maintain its roads in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose to which the portion in question is devoted. Vanda v. State of Illinois, 25 C.C.R. 213, 218. Here claimant had parked her car in a lawful manner, and was simply walking from her car to the sidewalk when the accident occurred. Her use of the portion of the pavement in question was entirely reasonable.

Nothing in claimant’s actions, either immediately before, or at the time of the occurrence, gives rise to any question as to her exercise of due care for her own safety, and we find that she has established her freedom from contributory negligence.

We conclude that the claimant has established that respondent had constructive notice of the existence of the hole in the pavement, and was negligent in failing to repair the defect. We further find, that the negligence of the respondent proximately caused claimant’s injuries, and that claimant was free of contributory negligence.

Claimant’s medical bills incurred as a result of the accident total $367.75 and she lost four days from work. We have considered the testimony as to the alleged permanency of claimant’s injury, and find that she has made a normal recovery.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $1,200.