text:
    (No. 78-CC-1920
    Nellie Thompson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Y ear to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, Nellie Thompson, was employed by the Department of Public Aid. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a prorata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $240.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 78-CC-1953
    Kathy Kuntzi, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31,1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard u. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Year to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, Kathy Kuntzi, was employed by the Department of Administrative, but resigned from that Department, effective following the last day of May, 1978, in order that she might assume a position with the Office of the Governor on the first day of June, 1978. The collective bargaining agreement in question provided that terminated employees must file by September 5, 1978. However, this filing date, as pointed out in the John J. Beard Stipulation, was unilaterally extended to October 14, 1978. However, this Claimant did not file within those dates but rather, having been informed by the Department of Administrative Services that they did not include her in their payroll for the increase, that she would have to file in the Court of Claims, filed her case in the Court of Claims on November 29,1978. Although the collective bargaining agreement provided that “any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the fiscal year to the employer”, this employee was on the active payroll of the employer, vis-a-vis the State of Illinois, on June 30,1978, (the end of the fiscal year). We, therefore hold that the deadline for this benefit does no apply to this Claimant.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $440.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1977
    John H. Finn, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed January 10, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1992
    Helen Larison, Widow of George Larison, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Year to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate IIl. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, Helen Larison, Widow of George Larison, was employed by the Department of Corrections. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a prorata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $260.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-2035
    Raymond C. Maier, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent

      Opinion filed May 17,1979.

   Per Curiam.

This claim coming on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises:

This Court Finds that this claim is for a retroactive pay increase granted in accordance with the revenue receipts provision of the collective bargaining agreements. An investigation of this claim by Personal Services 001-42662-1120-0000 determined that money was appropriated for this expenditure by appropriation No. State Contribution Retirement System 001-42662-1161-000 and that a total of $646.32 and none, respectively (funds available for transfer) was remaining in this appropriation at the time of the lapsing of said appropriation. The amount of $344.80 which was due would have been paid in the regular course of business had the claim been presented to the proper office at the appropriate time. The sole reason said claim was not previously paid is due to the lapse of the appropriation for the period during which the debt was incurred, the same having been confirmed by the written report of the Department of Corrections a copy of said report being attached to the joint stipulation of the parties.

We find that Claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $320.00 plus employer contributions of $24.80 for a total employe benefit of $344.80.

It is, therefore, ordered that Claimant, Raymond C. Maier, be and is hereby awarded the total employee benefit of $344.80 to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-2039
    Cathy Granderson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31,1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Year to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employe of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, Cathy Grander-son, was employed by the Department of Administrative Services. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a prorata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $180.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-2075
    Darrold Allen, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed January 10, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-2092
    Helen L. Doran, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31,1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Year to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20,1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, Helen L. Doran, was employed by the Department of Corrections. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a prorata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $240.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-2145
    Steven Chinn, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed January 10,1979.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-2191
    Ressie Jeanette West, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31,1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Year to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate Il. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, Ressie Jeanette West, was employed by the Department of Corrections. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a prorata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $40.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-2266
    Ryg & Stahly Implements, Claimants, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 18,1979.

   This cause is before the Court on the motion of Respondent to withdraw a motion to dismiss heretofore filed. In support of its motion, Respondent states that the motion to dismiss was filed through inadvertance, and that a departmental report received from the Department of Conservation shows that the claim herein should be allowed.

As departmental reports are prima facie evidence of the matter set forth therein, the Court finds that there is no disputed issue of material fact, and that Claimant is entitled to judgment.

It is therefore ordered that Respondent be, and hereby is, granted leave to withdraw its motion to dismiss.

It is further ordered that Claimant be, and hereby awarded the sum of $905.88 in full satisfaction of its claim.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0036
    Lowell M. Lee, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Y ear to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, Lowell M. Lee, was employed by the Department of Labor. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a prorata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $460.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0131
    James E. O’Grady, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31,1979.

   Per Curiam.

This claim coming on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This Court finds that this claim is for the costs incurred by Claimant for the apprehension of fugitives pursuant to the extradition process authorized by the Governor of the State of Illinois. An investigation of this claim by the Department of Law Enforcement determined that money was appropriated for this expenditure by appropriation No. 011-45402-1200-02-00 and that a total of $32.07 was remaining in this appropriation at the time of the lapsing of said appropriation. Although the balance of the above appropriation is less than the amount claimed, sufficient funds existed at all other times when the individual obligations comprising the total claim were incurred. The following figures show that the Department of Law Enforcement was able to pay these obligations had bills been submitted at the time the obligations arose:

Amount of Claims Submitted For: Fund Balance at the End of:
September, 1977 - $ 745.72 September, 1977 - $187,993.18
October, 1977 - $ 543.76 October, 1977 - $167,273.42
December, 1977 - $1,459.27 December, 1977 - $136,625.94
January, 1978 - $1,061.13 January, 1978 - $128,898.77
March, 1978 - $2,060.20 March, 1978 - $ 85,405.02
April, 1978 - $ 636.27 April, 1978 - $ 50,295.96
May, 1978 - $ 991.24 May, 1978 - $ 40,199.67
June, 1978 - $4,332.00 June, 1978 - $ 17,794.90
Total Claim -$11,819.59

The amount due of $11,819.59 would have been paid in the regular course of business had the claim been presented to the proper office at the appropriate time, as shown in the written report of the Department of Law Enforcement, a copy of said report being attached to the joint stipulation of the parties. The $17,794.90 remaining at the end of the fiscal year, except for $32.07, was expended on other obligations the bills for which were presented to the Department before Claimant submitted its vouchers for the instant claim.

While it appears that the Department has incurred obligations in excess of its appropriation, the Court is cognizant of the fact that it is not feasible for the Department to accurately estimate the amount of money that will be required during the course of a fiscal year for the apprehension and return of fugitives. This is due to the fact that the number of fugitives varies every year and the fact that no predictable pattern of frequency can be formulated. Similarly, the time and effort, and therefore the cost to apprehend a fugitive, varies with each fugitive and depends upon the location involved. This is evidenced by the attachments to the complaint indicating destinations as close as Indiana and as far as Los Angeles, California.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $11,819.59 be and is hereby awarded to Claimant, J ames E. O’Grady, in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-186
    Kay Marie Grillot, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Y ear to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, Kay Marie Grillot, was employed by the Department of Labor. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a prorata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $178.70 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0209
    Russell Clark, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed February 23, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0210
    Gordon A. Mueller by Irene Gustafson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed February 23, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling u. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0259
    Paul Thedford, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 2,1979.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0260
    Garry E. Byus, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31,1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC .14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1,.1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘AH employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Year to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, Gary E. Byus, was employed by the Department of Mental Health. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a prorata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $40.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0265
    William Edward Shatto, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 2, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-580
    Kathryn L. Jones, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31,1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Year to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, Kathryn L. J ones, was employed by the D epartment of Public Aid. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a prorata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $240.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0623
    John E. McDowell, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, the Respondent stipulated, in part, as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:

‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 ‘excess’ of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1, 1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during Fiscal Year 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Year to the Employer.’

Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the Eightieth General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.

The issues before this Court are as follows:

1. Does Ch. 127, para. 145 prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?

2. May the Director of Personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?

Chapter 127, para. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State,* * *, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * * which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’

In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 127, para. 145.

As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the Personnel Code is the Director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequest legislation the actions of the Director of Personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.

The Claimant in the instant case, John Beard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977, to January 31, 1978, as a Clerk II, a classification on the RC 14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all 12 months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII, Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.

This Claimant filed his claim on October 6, 1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the Director of Personnel extended the filing date to October 14, 1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above stipulation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in the instant case, John E. McDowell, was employed by the Department of Labor. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a prorata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $440.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employee’s Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s Federal and State income tax withholding and amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0631
    Raymond J. Francheshini, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 9, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0772
    Mary C. Fortin, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 27,1979.

   Per Curiam.

This cause comes before this Court as a result of a reconsideration of a job audit by the Director of Personnel. This claim is for retroactive pay as a result of the reallocation of the Claimant’s job reclassification.

The Respondent, represented before this Court by the Office of the Attorney General, submitted a stipulation which is as follows:

“Now comes the Respondent by William J. Scott, Illinois Attorney General, William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General of Record and stipulates in the above captioned matter as follows:
1. This case arises as a result of a reconsideration of a job audit. The reallocation was approved by the Director of Personnel and pursuant to Rule 1-30 was held to be effective on March 16,1976.
2. The issue before this Court in this case is whether the awarding of retroactive salary as a result of a reallocation of job classification violates the prohibitions set forth in Ch. 127, para. 145 which in part provides as follows:
‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State . . ., shall be considered a full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll... and no additional sum shall be paid... which payments would constitute in fact and additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made,.. .’
3. The above issues were dealt with fully in the case of Claire Crawford, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, and is dispositive of the issues presented by this case.
4. The Court in Claire Crawford, supra, decided that the miselassification amounted to an administrative error and that an award should be granted consistent with the Department of Personnel’s application of Rule 1-30.
5. Wherefore, Respondent consents to an award in the amount of $50.16 subject to appropriate added benefits and deductions and withholdings as required by law and the rules and regulations of the State of Illinois for retirement, F.I.C.A. and income tax withholdings.”

This Court concurs with the Attorney General and hereby grants an award to Mary C. Fortin in the amount of $50.16 subject to the appropriate added benefits and deductions and withholdings as required by laws, rules and regulations of the State of Illinois for retirement, F.I.C.A. and income tax withholdings.


text:
    (Case No. 00092
    In Re Application of George Redman, Sr.

      Opinion filed April 2,1979.

   Per Curiam.

This claim allegedly arising out of the death of a Deputy Sheriff seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” hereafter, the Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.)

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office pertaining to matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at hearings before the Court on May 11,1976 and March 15,1979, the Court finds that:

1. George Redman, Jr. died August 12,1974, at the age of 34 years;

2. The coroner’s certificate of death recites the immediate cause of death as “unknown”, due to or as a consequence of “hit by train,” death “instant;”

3. Deputy Redman had completed his regular duty assignment on August 11, 1974, at 3:22 a.m.; and he was “off duty” on August 12, 1974;

4. To date, there is no evidence that the decedent lost his life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer;

5. Accordingly, Deputy Redman was not killed in the line of duty as defined in the Act.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the claim for benefits by George Redman, Sr., pertaining to the death of his son, George Redman, Jr., be, and the same, is hereby denied.


text:
    (Case No. 00111
    In Re Application of Rose M. Heck.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1979.

      Knuppell, Grossboll, Becker And Tice, by John L. Knupplel and Jeffrey L. Fehrenbacker, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Vincent J. Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arising out of the death of a national guardsman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Illinois National Guardsman’s and Naval Militiaman’s Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 129, Sec. 401, et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General’s Office; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at hearings before the full Court on September 21, 1976, May 11, 1977, and March 15, 1979, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Rose M. Heck, is the mother of the decedent, as stated in the application for benefits; and, in the absence of a designated beneficiary and by reason of the prior death of guardsman Tribbett’s father, Section 3 (c) of the Act provides that any award shall be paid to the surviving parent;

2. The decedent, Wilfred Tribbett, age 20, was an Illinois National Guardsman, a member of the Military and Naval Department, State of Illinois, and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 401 (b) of the Act, on June 26, 1976;

3. On said date, at aproximately 9:45 a.m., within his regular duty hours and pursuant to his assignment, guardsman Tribbett was driving an Illinois National Guard truck during a 15 day duty training assignment. The truck overturned in an accident, and Tribbett was trapped beneath the vehicle. Tribbett was pronounced dead at 10:30 a.m. on June 26,1976, and the certificate of death submitted recited the immediate cause of death as “multiple trauma,” due to or as a consequence of “automobile accident;”

4. At the time of his death, guardsman Tribbett was on duty pursuant to an order entered November 10, 1975, by the Adjutant General of the State of Illinois Military and Naval Department; and Tribbett was not on active military service pursuant to an order of the President of the United States;

5. Guardsman Tribbett was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 401 (b) of the Act;

6. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to Rose M. Heck, as sole surviving parent of the deceased guardsman, Wilfred Tribbett.


text:
    (Case No. 00124
    In Re Application of Eva Mae Craggs.

      Opinion filed July 25, 1978.

    William H. Knuppel, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Vincent J. Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arising out of the death of an officer allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at hearings before the full Court on November 8, 1977 and March 15,1978, and reviewed on June 15,1978, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Eva Mae Graggs, is the widow of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in the application for benefits;

2. The decedent, George D. Craggs, was a corporal, employed by the Illinois State Police and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on November 6,1977. He was 51 years of age;

3. On said date, at approximately 9:45 a.m., during regularly assigned duty hours, Corporal Craggs was stricken with a heart attack while issuing a traffic citation to a motorist; this traffic citation was the fifth citation by Corporal Craggs during a state police airplane to ground traffic surveillance that began at 8:00 a.m. said date. After being stricken, Officer Craggs was taken to a hospital in Havana; and, thereafter, he was transported to, and treated in, St. Francis Hospital and Methodist Medical Center, Peoria, Illinois. He died at Methodist Medical Center on November 10, 1977, after surgery. The medical certificate of death recited the cause of death as “cardiac arrest secondary to acute myocardial infarction and rupture of the interventricular septum.” The evidence presented indicates that Corporal Gragg’s death was caused and precipitated by his active performance of the duties required by him as a law enforcement officer for the State of Illinois;

4. Corporal Craggs was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to Eva Mae Craggs, as widow and designated beneficiary of the deceased officer, George D. Craggs.


text:
    (Case No. 00126
    In Re Application of Edna Perisho.

      Opinion filed March 15, 1979.

    Zollie O. Arbogast, Jr., Attorney for Claimant..

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Vincent J. Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arising out of the death of a law enforcement officer allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s widow, pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on November 14, 1978, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Edna Perisho, is the widow of the decedent, as stated in the application for benefits; and, in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3 (a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow;

2. The decedent, Joseph Perisho, age 51, was a “Youth Supervisor (Grade) III,” and an employee of the State of Illinois Department of Corrections, on March 2,1976, at the Illinois Youth Center, Geneva, Illinois;

3. On said date, in uniform and during regularly assigned duty hours, Perisho was within the Youth Center, in the active performance of his duties, and responded to a call for assistance to restrain a female “student,” the “student” being an inmate and person subject to confinement within the Youth Center. The subject resisted, fighting, shoving, and kicking Perisho; and, immediately after handcuffing her, while trying to fasten the cuffs to the subject’s bed, Perisho collapsed with a heart attack. He died at the scene, without regaining consciousness, within ten minutes of the attack. The coroner’s certificate of death recites, “recent trombosis circumflex branch of left coronary artery, due to or as a consequence of, severe coronary atherosclerosis;”

4. Perisho was a “law enforcement officer;” his death resulted from the direct willful act of the confined subject as described; and he was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to Edna Perisho, as widow of the deceased law enforcement officer, Joseph Perisho.


text:
    (Case No. 00128
    In Re Application of Andrew J. Hartell.

      Opinion filed November 14,1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim allegedly arising out of the death of a fire chief killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1977.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at hearings before the Court on June 15,1978 and October 24,1978, the Court finds that:

1. Burbank Fire Department Chief, Andrew J. Kartell, died March 6,1977, at the age of 42 years;

2. Chief Kartell was stricken with a heart attack, in his home, at approximately 9:00 p.m. on March 5, 1977, hospitalized, and died at 1:00 a.m. on March 6, 1977, in Palos Community Hospital;

3. The medical certificate of death recited the cause of his death as “acute myocardial infarction,” due to or as a consequence of “arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease;”

4. Chief Kartell’s death was not as a result of the active performance of his duties as a fireman and did not result from injury arising from violence or other accidental cause as provided in, and required by, the Act;

5. Accordingly, Chief Kartell was not killed in the line of duty as defined in the Act.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the claim for benefits by Mary J. Kartell, widow and designated beneficiary of Andrew J. Kartell, be, and the same is hereby denied.


text:
    (Case No. 00134
    In Re Application of Delores Riley.

      Order filed October 28,1978.

    Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban and Fuller, by Kenneth W. Olson and Joseph Camarra, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Vincent J. Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

A claim for death benefits under the “Law Enforceent Officers and Firemen Compensation Act” was filed by the Claimant on August 10,1977, alleging the death of Christopher F. Riley on January 21,1977;

Kenneth W. Olson stating in writing on October 10,1978, that the Claimant “has decided not to pursue this matter at this time,” and the attorney for Respondent moving for an order allowing the withdrawal of said claim from consideration by this Court, without prejudice; and

The Court being fully advised in the premises;

It is hereby ordered that:

1. The motion by the attorney for Respondent is granted;

2. Leave is granted to the Claimant to withdraw said claim from the records of this Court instanter, without prejudice;

3. The Clerk of this Court is directed to record said claim as “withdrawn without prejudice,” by reason of the motion aforesaid and upon entry of this order.


text:
    (Case No. 00135
    In Re Application of Jane I. De Ment.

      Opinion filed July 25,1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing on April 19,1978, and upon review on June 15,1978, the Court finds that;

1. Brookfield Fire Department Lt. Richard De Ment died June 19, 1977, at the age of 49;

2. He was stricken with a heart attack in the Brookfield fire station at 2:41 p.m., on June 19, 1977, while on duty. Resuscitation efforts were begun, and he was transported at 2:44 p.m. to a hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 3:27 p.m. the same date;

3. The death certificate, signed by the doctor who attended him since August, 1974, recites the immediate cause of death as “acute myocardial infarction,” of “minutes” duration, due to or as a consequence of “coronary atherosclerosis,” of “years” duration, with “hypertensive cardiovascular disease” stated as another significant condition causing death.

4. Section 2, sub-paragraph (e) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that “killed in the line of duty” means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date of the injury received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause;”

5. Lieutenant DeMent had not responded to any fire calls or alarms and had not actively engaged in any firefighting activities prior to the time he was stricken with his heart attack; there is no evidence that his death was caused or precipitated by the active performance of any duties as a fireman;

6. Lieutenant DeMent was not killed in the line of duty as defined in the Act.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the claim for benefits by Jane I. De Ment, pertaining to the death of her husband, Richard De Ment, be, and the same is hereby denied.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (Case No. 00137
    In Re Application of Karen Koumoundouros.

      Opinion filed June 27, 1979.

   Holderman, J.

Claimant in this matter is the widow of a police officer who was killed on September 7, 1977, while employed as a bank guard for the 1st National Bank of Lincoln wood, Lincolnwood, Illinois.

On October 23,1972, the deceased provided a beneficiary form in which Claimant’s widow was designated the sum of $5,000.00 and his two sons were designated the sum of $5,000.00. At the time the deceased provided the beneficiary form, the total benefit was $10,000.00 and provision was made for this amount.

On January 1, 1974, benefits to survivors (beneficiaries) were substantially increased from $10,000.00 to $20,000.00.

The deceased did not make any change in his beneficiary form and the question now before the Court is who is entitled to the additional $10,000.00 provided for by the increase in the death benefit.

In the amendment, effective August 31, 1976, Ch. 48, Sec. 283(a), the following language appears:

“(a) When there is a surviving spouse, the entire sum shall be paid to the spouse. ..” .

The facts available show that Karen Koumoundouros is the surviving spouse of the deceased officer, James Koumoundouros.

By reason of the statutory increase, there remains $10,000.00 to be awarded by the Court, and that $10,000.00 could not have been subject to the beneficiary form above noted. The statute is clear in providing that the “entire sum shall be paid to the spouse.” Here, under the facts, the “entire sum” of necessity refers to any portion of the statutory amount not designated by the officer in the beneficiary form.

It is fundamental and does not require the citation of authority that in construing a statute the words used will be given their plain meaning and, if possible, will be so construed as to give effect to the legislative intent. In short, with this enactment, there is no ambiguity, and there is no need to construe, or to search the language used by the General Assembly in an effort to give effect to the legislative intent.

It is hereby ordered that Claimant, Karen Koumoundouros, be awarded the sum of $15,000.00, and the deceased’s sons, James Koumoundouros II and Mark Koumoundouros, be awarded the sum of $2,500.00 each.