text:
    (Nos. 83-CC-2586, 83-CC-2603, 83-CC-2701, 83-CC-2702, 84-CC-0113, 84-CC-0368,84-CC-0425 cons. & not cons.
    Marilyn Harris et al., Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 5, 1983.

    Aviva Futorian and Diane Redleaf, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties hereto, the Court being fully advised in the premises, finds;

That the multiple-party group of Claimants listed herein consists of 540 Claimants seeking individual judgments of varying amounts. These claims, in the aggregate amount of five hundred ninety thousand six hundred thirty-four dollars and fifty-two cents ($590,634.52), are for recovery of benefits to which the named Claimants were entitled between April 1980, and March 17, 1982, but did not receive, under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program of the Illinois Department of Public Aid. The joint stipulation is preceded by and predicated upon a U.S. district court decision in litigation entitled Simpson v. Miller, 81 C 2985. This expenditure is authorized in article IV of the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 23, par. 4 — 1 et seq.).

The amount due would have been paid in the regular course of business had the obligation been acknowledged by Respondent at the appropriate time. Such acknowledgment was not then possible because of protracted Federal court litigation, and Claimants could not be timely notified of their right to file claims until recently. By then, the appropriation of funds with which the Department of Public Aid would ordinarily pay such claims had lapsed.

The sole reason said obligation was not previously paid is the present nonavailability of State funds appropriated to the Department for the period in which this debt was incurred. Had this claim been acknowledged while such funds were available, it would normally have been paid extrajudicially. This is confirmed by the written report of the Department, a copy of which is attached to the joint stipulation.

It is therefore ordered that the multiple-party Claimants, Marilyn Harris et al., be and are hereby each awarded the sums specified in the parties’ joint stipulation and exhibit R-l thereto, for an aggregate amount of five hundred ninety thousand six hundred thirty-four dollars and fifty-two cents ($590,634.52).

APPENDIX-EXHIBIT R-l

Harris v. IDPA (Second Amended Complaint)

Adams, Barbara $ 150.00

Adams, Dana 640.00

Alessio, Elaine 210.00

Alfaro, Charlotte 1,174.00

Almore, Thelma 810.00

Alvarez, Betty 275.00

Alwerdt, Brenda 140.00

Ammons, Barbara 123.00

Anderson, Clara 120.00

Anderson, Gloria 300.00

Anderson, Linda 1,612.50

Anderson, Patricia 1,900.00

Applewhite, Lorraine 2,700.00

Ash, Pamela S. 340.59

Ashford, Brenda 420.00

Bahl, Sharon 1,215.00

Bailey, Erma 322.50

Baines, Cynthia 780.00

Barker, Maryanne 720.00

Bartley, Patricia 1,404.00

“Baxter, Eva (Oliver) 115.00 — filed 7/29/83 as Oliver, Edna Baxter, No. 84-CC-364, a separate claim

Beasley, Sharon 920.00

Beck, Sandra R. 2,100.00

Bell, Debra E. 387.00

Benson, Dorothy 3,200.00

Benton, Evey 1,460.00

Benton, Verna 3,070.00

Berger, Mary 3,230.00

Berkley, Deborah Jean 50.00

Bernabei, Barbara 293.50

Berry, Sandra 540.00

Berry, Valerie 1,500.00

Berry, Vicky 1,020.00

Bennett, Janette 465.00

Bickert, Cynthia 428.00

Billingsley, Brenda 105.00

“Bingham, Rochelle 1,020.00 — filed 5/10/83 as No. 83-CC-2333, a separate claim

Birdsley, Cathryn 360.00

Birge, Sherry 1,000.00

Birmingham, Connie 1,440.00

Bizzle, Victoria 338.00

Blair, Gloria 1,200.00

Blakey, Rebecca 1,075.00

Blevins, Yolanda 150.00

Blount, Mary Ann T. 995.00

Bobbitt, Arlene 420.00

Bonds, Essie 210.00

Bones, Janis 1,020.00

Bonney, Janet 1,050.00

Booker, Elizabeth 1,700.00

Bradford, Genola 1,120.00

Bradley, Beverly 2,160.00

Brandon, Thelma 1,920.00

Brantley, Gloria 267.00

Brittnum, Sadie 5,370.00

Brock, Ann 1,140.00

Brooks, Diane 1,780.00

Brooks, Minnie 840.00

Brown, Antionette 362.50

Brown, Brenda 313.00

Brown, Carolyn 435.00

Brown, Cassandra 2,240.00

Brown, Jessie Lee 2,200.00

Brown, Juanita 179.00

*Bruchert, Mary J. 1,210.00 — filed 5/20/83 as No. 83-CC-2414, a separate claim

Burnett, Charletta 366.50

Butler, Olivia 2,709.00

Byrd, Earnestine 135.00

Cadenas, Lynne 310.00

Camarillo, Guandalupe 360.00

Carter, Minnie 1,920.00

Castillo, Sylvia 1,000.00

Castillo, Tonette 1,040.00

Chambers, Ruthye 160.00

Chandler, Gwendolyn 1,800.00

Chatman, Renee 2,226.66

Chavis, Rosemarie 1,204.00

Childress, Barbara 2,520.00

Childs, Dorothy 1,490.00

Churchill, Phyllis 980.00

Clark, Marcia 140.00

Clinton, Willie M. 4,644.00

Close, Patricia A. 2,793.00

Coleman, Elizabeth 600.00

Coleman, Mabelene 1,400.00

Collins, Cuppie 850.00

Combs, Yolanda 420.00

“Compton, Irma J. 650.00 — filed 5/9/83 as No. 83-CC-2328, a separate claim

Connor, Jennifer 600.00 — 83-CC-2549

Connors, Donna 4,500.00 — 83-CC-2464

Cooper, Rosetta 2,451.00

Cooper, Theresa 1,935.00

Copenny, Lavern (Bridges) 200.00

Corral, Maria 840.00

Couch, Terri 1,346.60

Cowans, Linda 1,000.00

Cowger, David 520.00

Cox, Elois 157.50

Crawford, Angela 660.00

“Crockett, Carmen 816.44 — filed 7/6/83 as No. 84-CC-113, a separate claim

Crowell, Diane 1,444.50

Cruz, Maribel 344.00

Currie, Regina 2,580.00

Curtis, Joyce ' 520.00

Cutler, Donna 3,700.00

Dague, Nadine 174.50

Dahlman, Janet 723.28

Dailey, Ruthie 585.00

Darring, Karen 480.00

“Daugherty, Felicia 195.00 — filed 6/16/83 as No. 83-CC-2701, a separate claim

“Davidson, Carolyn 200.00 — filed 6/16/83 as No. 83-CC-2702, a separate claim .

Davis, Annette 75.00

Davis, Deborah (Sandoval) 2,920.00

Davis, Delvona 600.00

Davis, Everdane 1,300.00

Dehart, Dora 360.00

Delaney, Lillie Mae 1,200.00

Dennis, Carol 540.00

Denniston, Lucinda 160.00

Desbiens, Karla M. 3,096.00

Diaz, Alicia 300.00

Dickey, Phillis 650.00

Dobbins, Betty 300.00

Dorsey, Phyllis L. 550.00

Douglas, Brenda 540.00

Drazy, Renee 1,400.00

Darling, Patricia Ann 860.00

Durbin, Kathy 277.90

Durham, Cora 500.00

Dye, Mary 1,892.00

Edmonds, Valerie 345.00

Edmund, Priscilla 242.00

Edwards, Peggy 2,902.50

Elliott, Charlene 1,650.00

Ellis, Maggie J. 3,633.50

Embery, Susan 175.00

Ephriam, Tarry 640.00

Estes, Carolyn 1,600.00

Evans, Joyce 1,935.00

Everts, Karen 1,844.00

Ewings, Diane 4,650.00

Faletti, Virginia 9.40

Farmer, Catherine 1,430.00

Feimster, Karen 575.00

Ferrell, Willa 1,300.00

Fields, Martha Jean 30.00

Finley, Martha A. 1,030.00

Finmara, Giovanna 800.00

Flake, Emma 1,200.00

Fleming, Betty 2,520.00

Flowers, Glen L. 1,180.00

Foster, Rosaline 2,950.00

Frazier, Rebecca 700.00

Freeman, Carrie Mae 148.44

Fulford, Gloria 720.00

Bailey, Delaine 846.00

Gaines, Fannie 750.00

Garcia, Carol 422.00

Gardner, Catherine 3,120.00

Garner, Annie 300.00

Garth, Margo 324.00

Gaston, Eleanor 165.00

Geiss, Ellen 451.50

Genovese, Marian 650.00

Gerord, Mable 360.00

Gibbs, Donna 4,800.00

Gill, Gwendolyn 300.00

Gillespie, Connie 1,083.00

Godinez, Cheryl 840.00

Goehl, Linda C. 161.00

Gomez, Emily 1,400.00

Gomez, Teresa 280.00

Gordon, Dorothy 160.00

Grafreed, Mary L. 1,634.00

Green, Darlene 847.00

Greenfield, Minnie 480.00

Gregory, Mattie 300.00

Griffin, Lovie 2,300.00

Gross, Terrie 430.00

Gulley, Deborah 215.00

“Gustavson, Dennis 1,600.00 — filed 8/15/83 as No. 84-CC-425, a separate claim

Hale, Ella 430.00

Hall, Addie 900.00

Hall, Ernestine 1,440.50

Hall, Lizzie 980.00

Hamilton, Mary 903.00

Harbor, Sherby 150.00

Harding, Diane 1,350.00

Harlan, Patricia 800.00

Harris, Dallas 3,165.00

Harris, Debbie 900.00

Harris, Marilyn 2,161.50

Harris, Teresa 419.00

“Harrison, Brenda 594.00 — filed 9/7/83 as No. 84-CC-551, a separate claim

Hartsock, Teresa G. 860.00

Hawkins, Louise 250.00

Hawrysko, Kathleen 390.00

Headley, Marilyn (Milton) 768.00

Heavlin, Sandra 1,672.52

Helfrich, Karen 270.00

Hemmitt, Janice 3,040.00

Herman, Joanne 3,010.00

Hernandez, Felicita 900.00

Hickmon, Jacqueline 840.00

Hicks, Carol Sue 2,300.00

Hicks, Dorothy 2,835.00

Hinton, Flora 2,050.00

Holman, Patricia 608.00

Holmes, Debra 450.00

Holmes, Diane 360.00

Holmes, Judith 133.62

Holmes, Ora 1,520.00

Holt, Debra 910.00

Horton, Sadie 2,580.00

Hoskins, Donna R. 637.00

Hotchkiss, Gwendolyn 320.00

Hough, Emma 920.00

Houston, Ellen 1,806.00

Houston, Marcian 800.00

Howard, Gwendolyn 420.00

Howlett, Joane 527.00

Hudson, Annie 160.00

Hudson, Deborah 3,780.00

Hughs, Patricia 783.00

Hunter, Karina L. 540.00

Hunter, Karina L. 774.00

Hunter, Ruby 420.00

Isenhart, Sheila 621.80

Ivy, Loretta 1,410.00

Jackson, Alesia 1,935.00

Jackson, Annie 576.00

Jackson, Christine 2,360.00

Jackson, Dave 1,260.00

Jackson, Deborah 900.00

Jackson, Janice 360.00

Jackson, Karen 155.00

Jackson, Ophelia 200.00

James, Julia 2,470.00

Jarrett, Brenda 78.40

Jefferson, Valerie 2,173.15

Jennings, Darlene 380.00

Jimenez, Josephine 1,548.00

Johnson, Alta Marie 300.00

Johnson, Barbara 920.00

Johnson, Claudia 2,400.00

Johnson, Crozelle 280.34

Johnson, Deborah 175.00

Johnson, Doris J. 550.00

Johnson, Dorothy 2,451.00

Johnson, Jacqueline 935.00

Johnson, Mary 1,040.00

Johnson, Maxine 450.00

Johnson, Michelle 232.50

Johnson, Patricia 4,160.00

Johnson, Sandra 229.00

Jones, Bobbie 840.00

Jones, Georgia 3,680.00

Jones, Louise 1,360.00

Jones, Lucy Mae 630.00

Jordan, Juanita 1,500.00

Joseph, Cynthia 600.00

Katich, Deborah 448.00

Keithley, Marcia 670.00

Kennedy, Annie 1,350.00

Kessel, Lori S. 575.00

Kimbrough, Alberta 544.00

King, Barbara 800.00

King, Diane S. 400.00

Kitchen, Nancy 300.00

"Knight, Peggy Ann 300.00 — filed 5/17/83 as No. 83-CC-2399, a separate claim

"Kostecka, Robin 1,260.00 — filed 8/17/83 as No. 84-CC-455, a separate claim

Kowatch, Diane 1,977.00

Kyle, Marie 280.00

Labon, Essie 967.50

Lane, Annie 3,220.00

Lane, Carol 1,920.00

Lannom, Patricia Marie 1,032.00

Large, Georgie 962.28

Lasey, Mary 434.00

Lathion, Mary Alice 800.00

Lawshee, Mary L. 420.00

LeShore, Juanita 2,760.00

Leblanc, Delores 709.50

Lebrón, Margarita 1,000.00

Lee, Irma Jean 265.64

Lewis, Sheila 600.00

Lhotak, Karen 492.50

Lietz, Roberta 99.00

Lindsey, Diane 575.00

Lindsey, Eva 860.00

Livingston, Fannie 285.00

Lodes, Mary K. 462.50

Lopez, Joyce 480.00

Lucas, Brenda 335.00

Lyles, Jacalyn 1,882.28

Lynch, Jeanette 450.00

Mackey, Dorothy 1,050.00

Maddox, Dorothy 2,080.00

Madison, Rhonda 640.00

Majercin, Greta Kay 1,618.00

Maple, Delores 300.00

Marlow, Ollie 250.00

Marlowe, Teresa 300.00

Masa, Claudia 162.35

Mason, Ethel 640.00

Mason, Mary 1,715.00

"Maxie, Wendy Kaye 500.00 — filed 7/29/83 as No. 84-CC-365, a separate claim

McCants, Lorraine 1,207.50

McCaster, Emma 900.00

“McCollough, Patricia 2,700.00 — filed 5/13/83 as No. 83-CC-2383, a separate claim

McConnell, Bonita 280.00

McCord, Evelyn A. 190.00

McCurry, Diane 1,200.00

McDonald, Helen 336.00

McDonald, Ida 2,064.00

"McGary, Janet D. 325.00 — filed 5/16/83 as No. 83-CC-2340, a separate claim

McGee, Terri 924.50

McKee, Janice 2,720.00

McKnight, Aletha 232.00

McPhan, Claudia 1,376.00

McQuillin, Jennifer 720.00

Means, Shirley 2,112.00

Michalek, Norma 552.00

Miller, Carolyn 832.00

Miller, Diana 2,880.00

Miller, Lessie 450.00

Miller, Lou Ada 1,440.00

“Miller, Susanna 1,190.00 — filed 5/17/83 as No. 83-CC-2400, a separate claim

Miller, Virgie 396.00

Millins, Wendy 112.70

Mills, Alice 1,500.00

Minor, Sandra 550.00

Mims, Letha 888.00

Mitchell, Patricia 420.00

Mobley, Judy 1,997.50

Moll, Marcia 537.50

Montgomery, Deloris 645.00

Mooney, Flossie 602.00

Moore, Beverly 540.00

Moore, Willie B. 960.00

Moore, Zernighda 2,064.00

Moriarity, Debra 3,450.00

Morin, Joan 250.00

Morris, Emma J. 500.00

Morrow, Lillie M. 1,218.75

Moss, Pamela 501.15

Moyer, Geneva 1,216.25

Mudd, Navita 200.00

Murphy, Sharon 280.00

Murray, Barbarajean 392.00

Myers, Jean 16.00

“Najera, Mary 1,064.00 — filed 8/16/83 as No. 84-CC-453, a separate claim

Nason, Jacqueline 990.00

Neal, Doris 1,062.50

Neal, Patricia Ann 1,140.00

Nicholas, Gwendolyn 172.00

Noel, Marie A. 536.00

Novakovich, Joann 550.00

Nowels, Cynthia 903.00

O’Brien, Helen 629.70

O’Donnell, Margaret 235.00

Oglesby, Elfrieda 1,520.00

Olivio, Amalia 803.00

Otten, Judy L. 118.22

Page, Patricia 165.00

“Page, Stephanie 1,505.00 — filed 5/16/83 as No. 83-CC-2388, a separate claim

Pate, Dorothy 1,935.00

Payner, Kathy Pople 80.00

Payton, Barbara 600.00

Perez, Aida 490.00

Perry, Betty 1,827.50

Perry, Jeanne 90.00

Peters, Marvalene 1,340.00

Pitts, Shirley 1,200.00

Pizano, Brenda 890.00

Poe, Jacqueline 1,750.00

Porter, Johnnie M. 900.00

Porter, Stella 662.50

Potts, Pamela 105.00

Powell, Albertha 160.00

Powell, Cynthia 2,240.00

Powell, Elizabeth 780.00

Presswood, Willie Mae 900.00

Price, Debra Joann 2,657.00

Pritchett, Doretta 168.00

Quinn, Joan 950.00

Randle, Jennette 2,800.00

Reddick, Kimberley S. 322.50

Reed, Diane 452.50

Reed, Michelle 107.50

Reid, Beatrice 1,140.00

Reid, Clarisy 1,400.00

Rembert, Valerie 200.00

Rhyns, Vernice 200.00

Richard, Bernice 400.00

Richardson, Gwenette 774.00

Riezinger, Lois 600.00

Riggleman, Karen 56.00

Rios, Lourdes 2,280.00

Rivera, Luz 375.00

Rivera, Sylvia 1,200.00

Robinson, Agnes 600.00

Robinson, Euzette 140.00

Robinson, Ruby 2,600.00

Rogers, Joyce 205.00

Root, Tammy Feemster 600.00

Rosado, Blanca 1,200.00

Routh, Nancy 432.00

Rush, Charlean 790.00

Rutledge, Luella 1,485.00

Ryan, Joan Tracy 550.00

Saddler, Syrena 2,025.00

“Sample, Robin E. 5,462.70-filed 8/15/83 as No. 84-CC-437, a separate claim

Samuels, Alicia 2,100.00

Sanders, Vera 2,720.00

“Sandifer, Beverly Ann 300.00 — filed 5/17/83 as No. 83-CC-2401, a separate claim

Scales, Beatrice 1,120.00

Scales, Fredia 3,050.00

Scott, Florida 880.00

Scott, Rose 210.00

Seamon, Jacqueline 225.00

Ser oka, Janice 1,080.00

Shahbaz, Sarah 1,741.50

Shack, Amanda 860.00

Shade, Cynthia 1,376.00

“Shaffer, Angela 150.00 — filed 6/8/83 as No. 83-CC-2603, a separate claim

Shamley, Lula 390.00

Sharon, Yolanda 2,400.00

Shelby, Freda 2,365.00

Shelvy, Patricia 700.00

Shelwood, Willie C. 3,880.00

Sheppard, Carlotta 1,720.00

Sherrill, Linda 4,085.00

Shirley, Brenda 397.50

Simpson, Deborah 1,080.00

Simpson, Doris 2,660.00

Simpson, Karen 2,546.00

“Sims, Charles L. 600.00 — filed 8/3/83 as No. 84-CC-368, a separate claim

Sisney, Willetta 1,000.00

Slaughter, Cora 150.00

Smith, Frankie ] ,000.00

Smith, Freddie 2,000.00

Smith, Glenda 2,520.00

Smith, Gwendolyn 480.00

Smith, Inell 4,800.00

Smith, Joe Ann 1,150.00

Smith, Vanessa 94.00

Sorini, Georgette 220.00

Spaulding, Eugene 184.50

Stamps, Lois 1,075.00

Standberry, Shirley 838.50

Stanton, Sharon 1,365.00

Starks, Bertha 4,730.00

Stinson, Essie 1,600.00

Stokes, Diane 3,266.50

Strother, Ruthie 1,440.00

Stroube, Carol J. 1,380.00

Sullen, Amanda 483.75

Sutherland, Nancy 3,710.00

Swington, Sharon 1,440.00

Tate, Shirley 2,915.00

Taylor, Janice Lockhart 2,408.00

Taylor, Jermaine (Dorothy) 1,368.00

Taylor, Joyce Denice 710.00

Taylor, Minnie 250.00

Taylor, Pamela 900.00

Taylor, Sharnese 330.00

Taylor-Goodman, Shelene 301.00

Terrell, Pamela 750.00

Theard, Marie 1,600.00

Thomas, Diane 1,450.00

Thomas, Karla Nadi 1,440.00

Thomas, Paulette Moss 462.50

Thompson, Mallie 1,956.50

Thompson, Sharon 480.00

Thurmond, Letitia 840.00

Tibbs, Sherial 1,239.25

Titus, Sandra 1,182.50

Townsend, Alfreda 390.00

Trippel, Rosine Andre 1,152.00

Turner, Edythe L. 65.00

Turner, Ora Lee 400.00

Turner, Yolanda 640.00

Valentine, Diane 344.00

Vancleve, Beth Liechty 494.58

Vanlandingham, Clara 384.00

Vega, Iris 240.00

Virzint, Sandra 636.00

Wagner, Juli 450.00

Wakeman, Judy Lynn 600.00

Waligoski, Cheryl 709.50

Walker, Edna 2,459.38

Ward, Delia 1,649.00

Ward, Mamie C. 1,354.50

Wardlow, Leslie 160.00

Ware, Rosie Mae 840.00

Warlock, Pamela 1,920.00

Washington, Deborah 2,100.00

"Washington, Leona 1,860.00 — filed 8/15/83 as No. 84-CC-424, a separate claim

Wallers, Linda 420.00

Watson, Charlotte 588.15

Watson, Katie 1,320.00

Watts, Janet 1,700.00

Weathersby, Constance 903.00

Weaver, Rebecca 1,440.50

Weaver, Sherryl 189.20

Webster, Paulette 280.00

Welcher, Hattie 2,300.00

West, Fredricka 315.00

West, Rosemary 1,230.05

West, Sheila 450.00

White, Bernadette 1,080.00

White, Deborah 1,845.00

Whitehead, Marla 3,500.00

William, Hattie M. 3,612.00

Williams, Bertha 400.00

Williams, Bonnie 1,225.00

Williams, Brenda 350.00

Williams, Chlorine 1,100.00

Williams, Demper 280.00

Williams, Dorothy 1,520.00

Williams, Emma 2,362.50

Williams, Linda 300.00

Williams, Mae 320.00

Williams, Sandra 1,397.50

Williams, Sunday 322.50

Willingham, Lynette 650.00

Willis, Annette 150.00

Wilson, Deanna Sue 477.00

Wilson, Lucille 645.00

Wilson, Marie 1,835.00

Wilson, Mary 3,784.00

Winslow, Hope L. 208.00

Witcher, Gloria 1,120.00

Withers, Essie 1,450.00

Withrow, Elizabeth 54.00

Wooley, Cynthia 1,200.00

Wright, Mildred 1,000.00

Wright, Sharon 960.00

Yates, Josephine 420.00

Total of individual Simpson claims recommended for Court award and State payment in Marilyn Harris etal. v. Ill. Dept, of Public Aid, Court of Claims No. 83-CC-2586 $590,634.52


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Holderman, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 83-CC-2716
    G. Bros. Roofing, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 6, 1983.

    G. Bros. Roofing, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

The record in this cause indicates that this is a lapsed appropriation claim to which the Attorney General has stipulated based upon a report forwarded to his office by the Department of Public Aid.

This Court finds that this was a properly authorized expenditure of which $675.00 remains unpaid. The purpose of the expenditure for which this claim was filed was for roof repairs for homestead property, IDPA case No. 06-226-07-279641.

Although the balance remaining in the appropriation out of which this claim should have been paid was insufficient to pay this obligation, there were funds available for transfer to have paid the obligation as authorized by section 13.2 of “An Act in relation to State finance” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 149.2) and Hall v. State, 78-CC-0895, unpublished.

Money was appropriated under line item 001-47801-4400-03-00. (’81) Claimant’s social security or Federal tax I.D. number is [ XXX-XX-XXXX ].

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be awarded in full satisfaction of this claim the sum of $675.00.


author: Roe, C.J.

text:
    (No. 83-CC-2737
    Britt Office Systems, Inc., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Stipulation filed July 28, 1983.

      Order filed August 18, 1983.

    Britt Office Systems, Inc., pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   STIPULATION

Roe, C.J.

This is a lapsed appropriation claim. The State agrees to an entry of an award based on the report filed in this matter which provides the following information:

Agency: Department of Law Enforcement

Purpose: For duplicating and microfilming the card files for the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, division of support services, at Joliet laboratory.

Fund No. 001-45402-1200-00 Fiscal Year: FY81

Amount: $24,787,00

Claimant’s social security or tax No__

Sufficient funds lapsed to cover this claim.

ORDER

Roe, C.J.

The record in this cause indicates that this is a standard lapsed appropriation claim which should be paid in accordance with the above stipulation. It is so ordered.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-2756
    Lena McGlennon, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 24, 1983.

    Lena McGlennon, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This claim comes before the Court on a joint stipulation of the parties which states as follows:

Claimant’s clothing was damaged when she brushed up against two exposed electrical wires while going about her duties as an employee of the Illinois Department of Revenue. Claimant was in due care for her clothing at the time the incident occurred. The Respondent has conceded liability for the damage of the property to the extent agreed upon in the joint stipulation. Both parties agree that the value of the Claimant’s clothing amounts to $65.50.

No other evidence, oral or written, was presented to the Court, and both parties waived briefs. Both parties agree to the granting of an award to the Claimant for $65.50.

Furthermore, the Claimant and the Respondent agree that this award will constitute full and final satisfaction of the claim herein or any other claim arising from this same occurrence.

While this Court is not necessarily bound by a stipulation such as this, it has no desire to interpose a controversy where none appears to exist. The stipulation submitted by the parties appears to have been entered into freely and fairly, and its contents appear to be reasonable. The Court, therefore, finds no reason not to accept it and follow its recommendation of an award for $65.50.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant, Lena McGlennon, be awarded the amount of $65.50 in full and final satisfaction of this claim.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-2770
    Lutheran General & Deaconess Hospitals School of Nursing, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed November 9, 1983.

    Lutheran General & Deaconess Hospitals School of Nursing, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This matter coming to be heard on the motion of the Respondent to dismiss the claim herein, due notice having been given and the Court being fully advised;

Claimant is seeking tuition reimbursement from the Illinois State Scholarship Commission for Donna Ferrari for the summer term(s) during the 1980-81 school year. The Respondent’s motion is based upon a departmental report from the Illinois State Scholarship Commission. The report is prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. However, the facts are not entirely clear to us.

It appears from the departmental report that the Respondent refused to make payment to the Claimant because according to Respondent’s records the student, Ms. Ferrari, was enrolled full-time during the fall term at a different school, Concordia College. The report states that Concordia College is the appropriate entity to bring this claim and not the Claimant herein. Apparently someone was supposed to have submitted a transfer from Concordia College to the Claimant but that did not occur.

This version is somewhat corroborated by the letter from the Claimant’s financial aid coordinator to the Respondent commission. The letter, dated October 4, 1980 (i.e. during the fall term), stated that the student was then enrolled full-time at Concordia College but as “a nursing student under the auspices of . . . (the Claimant)”. We are unsure of what that means. The letter does note however that the student was instructed to transfer her award to the Claimant but that the transfer apparently did not occur. The letter goes on to state that the director of financial aid at Concordia College had agreed to make the request for the fall term payment on behalf of the student.

Thus, it seems clear to us that both parties are in agreement that Concordia College would be the appropriate party to seek payment on behalf of the student for the fall term of the 1980-81 school year. This raises the question of why was this claim filed by this Claimant in the first place. The letter referred to above appears to have been written for the purpose of effecting a transfer of the student’s tuition payments to the Claimant for the winter and spring terms of the school year. Are those the terms for which the claim was made? The complaint provides no indication. In addition to the letter referred to above, a “Notification of Status” form was attached to the complaint which further confuses the sitution. It relates to the fall term.

Claimant has not responded to the motion to dismiss or sought leave to file an amended complaint or otherwise attempted to prosecute this claim. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the Respondent’s position is correct and we will grant the motion at bar. However, we will allow the Claimant an opportunity to file an amended complaint.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered:

1. That Respondent’s motion be, and hereby is, granted;

2. That Claimant is granted 21 days from the date of this order within which to file an amended complaint;

3. That by this order, Claimant’s complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice if Claimant does not so file within the time set forth above.


author: POCH, J.

text:
    (No. 84-CC-0166
    David Goodrich, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 25, 1984.

    David Goodrich, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This is a claim by David Goodrich, an inmate of Joliet Correctional Center, for injuries he sustained on Sunday, May 29,1983, while riding on a truck, driven by an employee of Servomation Corporation, an independent contractor.

On Sunday, May 29,1983, the inmates of the correction center had a picnic on the institution grounds.

The caterer, Servomation Corporation, used its own employees and also some inmates for catering food.

On Sunday, May 29, 1983, the Claimant and other inmates were assigned to the institution kitchen. When the picnic was over it was necessary for the inmates assigned to the kitchen to help return unused beverages, foodstuff, picnic tables, etc., to the kitchen.

At the direction of an employee of the caterer, Claimant and other inmates loaded the excess food, etc., on the caterer’s truck.

Six or seven persons, including an employee of the caterer, then got on the truck. Three persons including the caterer’s employee sat on the tail gate, while Claimant sat on the spare tire inside the body of the truck holding a 55-gallon drum of ice with one hand and a table with the other. The driver, an employee of the caterer, had to drive about a block and a half on a black top road from the picnic site to the door of the kitchen. He slowed for a curve, let out the clutch, accelerated, and four people, including the Claimant, fell from the truck along with the 55-gallon drum of ice, fracturing his right wrist. Claimant did not suffer any permanent injury to his wrist.

Prior to the accident, Claimant rode with the driver of the truck when deliveries were made to and from the picnic site to the kitchen.

At the time of the accident he was ordered to ride in the body of the truck to hold the stuff back there.

Claimant, an inmate, was required to take orders and carry them out. To refuse to do so would subject him to disciplinary action. Thus he did not occupy a position of independence which a person outside a penitentiary occupies. His choice of action being limited he kept silent and did as he was ordered. Moore v. State (1951), 21 Ill. Ct. Cl. 282.

When the State assigned the Claimant for kitchen duty under the direction and control of the State, the State made the truck driver its agent to the extent of its functions.

The Court finds from the evidence that the State through its agent was negligent and that Claimant is entitled to an award.

An award is, therefore, entered in favor of Claimant in the amount of one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars,


author: Montana, J.

text:
    (No. 84-CC-0306
    Leon Blackwell, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.
    Leon Blackwell, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Glen P. Larner, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, J.

The commissioner having filed his report in this matter, and the Court being advised in the premises, this Court finds as follows:

In paragraph No. 1 of his complaint, Claimant states his cause of action as follows:

“1. This is a claim sounding in tort, is for the conversion of Claimant’s property, monies received by the Illinois Department of Correction, and the unlawful Accounting Practices of the Stateville Correctional Center, inmate Trust Funds Business Office, of not documenting cash received between individual trust fund balances for inmates account and control account, and errors of $1,340.00 for the fiscal years ending June 30,1981 and 1982, and is filed pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, § 489.8(d).”

Claimant asks for an award in the amount of $4,020.00.

On August 4, 1983, Respondent filed with the Court a motion for a 90-day continuance setting forth that prior to filing his claim in the Court of Claims, Claimant had failed to file a grievance with the Department of Corrections, and that, therefore, Claimant had failed to exhaust all of his remedies before filing his claim in this Court.

On September 2, 1983, Claimant filed a motion to strike Respondent’s motion.

On December 17, 1983, the undersigned entered an order making no ruling on Respondent’s motion or Claimant’s motion to strike, but directing that Claimant within 30 days from December 17, 1983, file a bill of particulars as required by Court of Claims Rule 5(A)9., stating in detail each item of Claimant’s alleged damages, and the amount claimed on account thereof. Without such bill of particulars Claimant’s complaint as drawn is unintelligible.

On reading the complaint it is not clear whether Claimant is grieving a specific personal loss of funds, or whether he is merely complaining about inmate trust fund accounting practices at Stateville Correctional Center in general. He does not allege specific errors with reference to his own account, and no errors appear on the face of the ledger sheets of his personal trust fund account which he has filed in the record. The complaint is totally lacking in details.

Moreover, Claimant has failed to supply these details by not filing his bill of particulars, pursuant to Rule 5(A)9 as directed by the commissioner.

Finally, it appears from the face of the record that Claimant did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his complaint.

It is hereby ordered that Claimant’s complaint be and is hereby dismissed.


text:
    (No. 84-CC-0407
    Bernadette Perham and Terry Yale Feiertag, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1984.

    Minsky & Feiertag, P.C. (Terry Yale Feiertag, pro se, of counsel), for Claimants.
    Dunn, Goebel, Ulbrich, Morel & Hundman (Richard T. Dunn, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This claim is before the Court of Claims following the filing of a joint stipulation whereby the parties agreed as follows:

1. Respondent Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities is a body corporate and an agency of the State of Illinois. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 144, par. 1001 et seq.

2. The claim in this cause is made against Respondent in its capacity as an agency of the State of Illinois and is brought under sections 8(a) and (b) of the Court of Claims Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, pars. 439.8(a), (b).

3. The claim in this cause is not made under “An Act to Provide for Representation and Indemnification.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 1301 et seq.

4. Claimant Bernadette Perham was employed by the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities as an assistant professor in the mathematics department at Chicago State University.

5. Chicago State University is an institution of higher education established by the State of Illinois, and operated, managed, controlled and maintained by the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, the Respondent. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 144, par. 1001 et seq.

6. During her employment as an assistant professor in the mathematics department at Chicago State University, Claimant Bernadette Perham was allegedly discriminated against by reason of her sex in violation of Federal statutory and constitutional rights and prohibitions, viz: 42 U.S.C. secs. 1983, 1985(3), 1988, and 2000(e) et seq., and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.

7. As a result of the alleged discrimination, Claimant Bernadette Perham filed charges with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission having duly certified that it was unable to complete its investigation within 180 days from the date said charges were filed, the United States Department of Justice issued a right to sue letter to Claimant Bernadette Perham, who thereupon, individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, filed her complaint for equitable, declaratory, monetary and other relief as a civil action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, in Cause No. 75 C 259, naming the Respondent Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities et ah, as defendants. Exhibit A to the claim in this cause is a true and correct copy of said complaint.

8. On April 6, 1978, said United States District Court granted Perham’s motion for class certification and ordered that her complaint be maintained as a class action. Exhibit B to the claim in this cause is a true and correct copy of said court’s memorandum opinion and the docket entry as to the granting of plaintiff’s motion for class certification.

9. Following extensive discovery and the deposing of expert witnesses, the parties submitted a proposed consent settlement order to the United States District Court on November 1, 1982, after due notice to all persons concerned, and said court held a fairness hearing on the proposed order. Exhibit C to the claim in this cause is a true and correct copy of said consent settlement order.

10. On December 21, 1982, after careful consideration of the evidence, arguments, and pleadings submitted in support of and in opposition to the proposed settlement, the District Court entered the consent settlement order and its final approval of the class settlement. Exhibit D to the claim in this cause is a true and correct copy of said Court’s approval of the consent settlement order and docket entry with respect thereto.

11. All periods within which any person could appeal from said consent settlement order have expired and no appeal has been filed. Said consent settlement order is final.

12. Throughout the proceedings hereinbefore described Claimant Bernadette Perham was represented by her attorney, Claimant Terry Vale Feiertag, who appeared upon behalf of the certified class.

13. Among other things, said consent settlement order provided for:

(a) Payment of $55,000.00 to Claimant Bernadette Perham, upon her execution of a release of her claims and those of said class;

(b) Payment of $30,000.00 to Claimant Terry Yale Feiertag, as attorney for Claimant Perham and the class, as reasonable attorney fees, properly documented by contemporaneous time records which reflected at least 2,000 hours expended upon behalf of Perham and the class and properly allowed by said court.

(c) Payment of $35,000.00 to Claimant Terry Yale Feiertag, as attorney for Claimant Perham and the class, for out-of-pocket litigation costs and expenses, properly documented by receipts for disbursements upon behalf of Perham and the class and properly allowed by the court.

14. The payments provided for in said consent settlement order and set forth in paragraph No. 13 above should be made and an award of said sums should be made by this Court.

We have reviewed the record. The stipulation is corroborated by the record. There is nothing more for us to consider. In matters such as the one at bar this Court is but a vehicle for payment. Actually, whether or not this Court concurs with the parties’ stipulation and enters an award is inmaterial because if the Federal court has jurisdiction to enter the order which is the subject of this claim (and it unquestionably does) the Federal court can enforce its order and require the State to pay regardless of any action by this Court and/or any action by the legislature.

Accordingly, an award is hereby made to the Claimants according to the terms of the stipulation quoted hereinabove.


text:
    (No. 84-CC-0696
    Laura Harrelson, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1984.

    William R. Ford, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Erin O’Connell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion of Respondent to dismiss, Claimant’s response to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and Respondent’s reply to said response.

On October 3, 1983, Claimant filed with the clerk and the Attorney General a document purporting to be a “Notice,” a copy of which was attached to Respondent’s motion to dismiss as Exhibit A.

Respondent’s motion to dismiss sets forth that under section 22 — 1 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 1) the Claimant in a personal injury action is required to give notice. The contents of that notice as required by statute must include “the date and about the hour of the accident. . .” Respondent’s motion states that Claimant has failed to comply with these requirements as required by the statute.

Respondent’s motion further sets forth that section 22 — 2 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 2) states that:

“if the notice provided for by Section 22 — 1 is not filed as provided in that section, any such action. . .shall be dismissed and the person to whom any such cause of action accrued for any personal injury shall be forever barred from further action in the Court of Claims for such personal injury.”

Claimant, in its answer to the motion to dismiss, sets forth that there was another personal injury action arising out of the same accident, that another individual filed suit in the Court of Claims, and proper notice having been given in that case, the State of Illinois had actual notice of the accident complained of.

It is the Court’s opinion that a proper notice by another party entirely separate and distinct from the present cause of action did not relieve Claimant of filing a notice as required by the statute above set forth. To hold otherwise, the Court would impose upon Respondent in every personal injury case the burden of checking every personal injury case pending against Respondent to see whether proper notice had been filed in another case arising out of the same accident.

It is the Court’s opinion that the statutory notice required was enacted to expedite the hearing of matters of this kind and not to impose any additional burdens upon Respondent.

Motion to dismiss is granted and this cause is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 84-CC-0697
    Raymond Vela, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1984.

    William R. Ford, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Erin O’Connell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion of Respondent to dismiss, Claimant’s response to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and Respondent’s reply to said response.

On October 3, 1982, Claimant filed with the clerk and the Attorney General a document purporting to be a “Notice,” a copy of which was attached to Respondent’s motion to dismiss as Exhibit A.

Respondent’s motion to dismiss sets forth that under section 22 — 1 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 1) the Claimant in a personal injury action is required to give notice. The contents of that notice as required by statute must include “the date and about the hour of the accident. . .” Respondent’s motion states that Claimant has failed to comply with these requirements as required by the statute.

Respondent’s motion further sets forth that section 22 — 2 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 2) states that:

“if the notice provided for by Section 22 — 1 is not filed as provided in that section, any such action. . .shall be dismissed and the person to whom any such cause of action accrued for any personal injury shall be forever barred from further action in the Court of Claims for such personal injury.”

Claimant, in its answer to the motion to dismiss, sets forth that there was another personal injury action arising out of the same accident, that another individual filed suit in the Court of Claims, and proper notice having been given in that case, the State of Illinois had actual notice of the accident complained of.

It is the Court’s opinion that a proper notice by another party entirely separate and distinct from the present cause of action did not relieve Claimant of filing a notice as required by the statute above set forth. To hold otherwise, the Court would impose upon Respondent in every personal injury case the burden of checking every personal injury case pending against Respondent to see whether proper notice had been filed in another case arising out of the same accident.

It is the Court’s opinion that the statutory notice required was enacted to expedite the hearing of matters of this kind and not to impose any additional burdens upon Respondent.

Motion to dismiss is granted and this cause is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 84-CC-1013
    James Barton, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order on motion to dismiss filed January 23, 1984.

      Order filed March 6, 1984.

    Carponelli, Drug, Adamski & Goodstein, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Erin O’Connell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion of Respondent to dismiss said cause filed November 18, 1983.

Respondent’s motion sets forth that Claimant failed to file the necessary notice within the time set forth by statute. Sections 22 — 1 and 22 — 2 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, pars. 439.22 — 1,439.22—2), provide that Claimant shall file notice within six months from the date such injury was received or such cause of action accrued.

Claimant having failed to file notice as required by said statute, motion is granted and this cause is dismissed.

ORDER

Holderman, J.

The Court entered an order of dismissal in this cause in January 1984, which order stated that Claimant has failed to file notice as required by Section 22 — 1 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 1).

On January 6, 1984, Claimant filed his response to Respondent’s motion to dismiss. Attached to said response was an affidavit of Richard B. Edelman, attorney for Claimant, to the effect that on April 30, 1982, he attempted to hand deliver the notice of claim for personal injuries to the Secretary of State at 188 West Randolph, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois, at 4:25 p.m. and that the doors were locked. Said affidavit further set forth that Richard B. Edelman then delivered the notice of claim for personal injuries to the post office located at Adams and Dearborn and mailed the same to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General via certified mail, return receipt requested. Copies of the receipts for certified mail were attached to said affidavit.

On January 24, 1984, Respondent filed a reply to Claimant’s response to motion to dismiss. Attached to said reply was an affidavit of Jane E. Schroeder, docket clerk of the Court of Claims, to the effect that the Secretary of State’s Office at 188 W. Randolph, Suite 500, Chicago, Illinois, was open until 5:00 p.m. on April 30, 1982.

The Court is therefore confronted with a situation of two affidavits, each in direct contradiction of the other. The statute in question made it incumbent upon Claimant to file notice as set forth in the statute and the Court cannot find in the present record that this statute was complied with.

It is interesting to note that Claimant did not provide copies of the sender’s receipts for certified mail which would have shown the date the notices of claim for personal injuries were mailed at the post office. The copies of the receipts attached to Claimant’s response showed that the notice was delivered to the Attorney General’s office on May 3, 1982, and the notice to the Secretary of State’s Office was delivered on May 4,1982.

The accident for which the notices were filed occurred on October 30, 1981, which meant that the last day for service was April 30,1982. It is also interesting to note that the record is silent as to what efforts were made to file the proper notice with the Attorney General’s office on April 30, 1982. The statute requires notice be served upon the Attorney General and the Court of Claims and that said notice should be filed within six months of the date of injury or the cause of action accrued.

The Court’s granting of Respondent’s motion to dismiss is affirmed and this cause remains dismissed.


text:
    (No. 84-CC-1304
    Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 25, 1984.

    F. Anne Zemek, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This claim has been brought by the Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 for reimbursement of an Illinois MIA/POW scholarship on behalf of one Angela Lockridge in the amount of $204.00. The Claimant alleged that demand for payment from the Respondent’s Department of Veterans’ Affairs was made but that its demand was refused on the grounds that the appropriation from which payment was to have been made had lapsed.

The claim is before the Court on the Respondent’s motion to dismiss and the Claimant’s motion for summary judgment.

The motion to dismiss states that previous claims have exhausted the lapsed balance in the appropriation from which this claim should have been paid and that the Court of Claims has no authority to grant an award in cases where the balance of the appropriation remaining is insufficient to pay the claim. Attached to the motion as Exhibit A was a departmental report compiled by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs which, pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Court of Claims, is prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. The departmental report states that the claim was not paid because it was received by the department after the lapse period. It supports the Respondent’s position that insufficient funds lapsed from which payment could have been made. Seventy-five dollars lapsed against which a prior claim for $51.00 has been made. It does appear from the report, and we so find, that $24.00 of lapsed money could be applied toward payment of this claim.

The Claimant’s motion for summary judgment asserted the following:

“3. POW/MIA Scholarships are granted to the eligible children of Illinois’ Veterans pursuant to Chapter 122 Paragraph 30 — 14.2 of the Illinois Revised Statutes without regard to the amount appropriated for such purposes, because such scholarships are awarded according to eligibility and qualification. A qualified individual must begin using the scholarship prior to his or her twenty-sixth birthday, and then has a maximum period of twelve years after the first initial use to complete his or her education. Because POW/MIA scholarships remain open for such an extended period of time, the State is unable to anticipate the amount necessary to appropriate for this expense. Appropriations are therefore based on the amounts used over the previous fiscal year, with the consequence that occasionally insufficient funds are appropriated and a shortfall occurs.
4. The statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, par. 30 — 14.2) which awards MIA/POW scholarships states in part:
‘Any (person) shall, upon application and proper proof, be awarded a POW/MIA scholarship. . . The holder of an MIA/POW Scholarship. . .shall not be required to pay any. . .fees. The amounts that become due to any state supported Illinois institution of higher learning shall be payable by the Comptroller to such institution. . .’
5. The statute awarding MIA/POW Scholarships is a statute which categorically commands the performance of an act (i.e., the granting and payment of scholarships) because the scholarship holder cannot be held liable (Illinois Attorney General’s Opinion S — 1333 issued January 26, 1978) and the statute provides that the Comptroller must reimburse the school.
6. Where a statute ‘categorically commands the performance of an act, so much money as is necessary to pay the command may be disbursed without explicit appropriation’ Tutle v. Tuchbreiter (1953), 414 Ill. 571, 581.
7. Illinois Court of Claims case law supports the proposition that where the state is unable to anticipate the amount necessary to appropriate for an expense, and such an expenditure is one required of the state by statute, the Court must make an award to Claimant even if the appropriation for the expenditure has already been expended. Higgins v. Illinois (1973), 28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 392, 393.
8. Claimant respectfully submits that because the statute awarding the scholarship is a categorical command for payment, Section 30 of the Act in Relation to State Finance (Ill. Rev. Stat. (1981), ch. 127, par. 166) as cited by Respondent is inapplicable.
9. There are no factual disputes with regard to matters contained in the complaint. The Department of Veterans’ Affairs report indicated that were it not for the lapsed appropriation, Claimant would be paid in full.
10. The State Finance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 166) states in part:
‘§30 No officer, institution, department, board, or commission shall contract any indebtedness on behalf of the State, nor assume to bind the State in an amount in excess of the money appropriated, unless expressly authorized by law.’
11. Claimant respectfully submits that its claim is one which is expressly authorized by law as set forth in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Motion, and should therefore be paid in full, regardless of the lapsed appropriation.”

We are of the opinion that section 30 — 14.2 of the School Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 122, par. 30 — 14.2) does not “categorically command” and “expressly authorize” the payment by the Respondent for the scholarships. The first sentence of the last paragraph of that section provides that “The benefits . . . (described in that section) . . . shall be administered by and paid for out of funds available to the Illinois Department of Veterans’ Affairs.” Thus the program is limited by law to the extent of funds available to the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. As previously pointed out, only $24.00 was available for payment of this claim.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of $24.00.


text:
    (No. 84-CC-1754
    Foretravel, Inc., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 4, 1984.

    Foretravel, Inc., pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This cause coming before the Court upon the joint stipulation of the parties and the Court being duly advised in the premises:

Finds, that the Claimant’s property was damaged when an employee of the State of Illinois backed a snowplow into it. The amount of the damages was $320.58. This information was supported by a motorist’s report of Illinois vehicle accident, and several affidavits.

Respondent concedes liability for the damage of this property to the extent agreed upon in the joint stipulation.

Both parties agreed that the damage to the property was $320.58. Both parties agree that this award would constitute full and final satisfaction of the claim herein or any other claim arising out of the same occurrence.

No other evidence oral or written was presented to the Court, and both parties waived briefs.

While the Court is not necessarily bound by a stipulation such as this, it has no desire to interpose a controversy where none appears to exist. The stipulation submitted by the parties appears to have been entered into freely and fairly, and its contents appear to be reasonable. The Court, therefore, finds no reason not to accept it and follow its recommendations for an award in the amount of $320.58.

It is hereby ordered, that the Claimant be awarded the amount of $320.58 in full and final satisfaction of the instant claim.


author: Raucci, J.

text:
    (No. 84-CC-1949
    Georgia Hale, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 27, 1984.

    Brown, Hay & Stephens, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

This cause having come for consideration on the Respondent’s stipulation and the Court being duly advised in the premises:

Finds, that a departmental report was issued by the Illinois Department of Revenue, State department or agency, on March 22, 1984, pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Court of Claims, and is considered prima facie evidence of the facts set forth therein. This departmental report establishes that the Department of Revenue concurs in the facts as set forth in the Claimant’s complaint, to wit: that the Claimant’s 1975 Lincoln automobile, license number 5Y82A — 842400, was improperly seized and sold by the Department of Revenue through its agents, the Sangamon County Sheriff’s Office. The Claimant, Georgia Hale, was required to expend $1,600.00 in her own funds to retrieve this automobile.

The departmental report also informs that there exists within the department no procedure by which the Claimant can make a claim for a refund of the monies she used to retrieve her automobile.

It appears to this Court that the Department of Revenue improperly seized and sold Georgia Hale’s automobile and that she should be reimbursed for her cost for retrieving this automobile.

It is hereby ordered, that Georgia Hale be awarded in complete satisfaction of the above captioned claim and any other claim arising out of this occurrence, $1,600.00.


text:
    (No. 84-CC-2714
    Lenny Crosby, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 28, 1984.

    Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (George Bell, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This claim is before the Court on the Respondent’s stipulation of facts. The Respondent has stipulated that the facts as alleged in the Claimant’s complaint are true and correct. Briefly, those facts are as follows. On June 10, 1981, judgment in the amount of $19,423.85 was entered for the Claimant and against the directors of the Illinois Department of Public Aid and the Illinois Department of Labor in their official capacities in a cause filed in the U.S. District Court, Central District of Illinois, No. 78 — 3067. The nature of the complaint was that the Claimant’s constitutional statutory rights were infringed by the directors, acting under color of State law in violation of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 1961 there is due and payable on that judgment interest at 14.000 percent compounded daily on this judgment. In addition to the aforesaid judgment amount and interest thereon, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988 the Claimant also is entitled to receive from the directors all reasonable attorney fees and expenses incurred subsequent to May 21, 1981, in defending the judgment upon appeal and in enforcing the judgment. Through April 19,1983, those fees and expenses amounted to $3,920.68. This claim has not been satisfied by either the Department of Public Aid or the Department of Labor. These facts were confirmed by an affidavit by the assistant attorney general of record in the Federal matter, which affidavit was attached to the stipulation and incorporated therein.

The Respondent asserts in the stipulation that this is a good and legitimate claim against the State of Illinois, and that the Court of Claims is the only recourse for payment available to the Claimant and her attorneys. The affidavit adds that because the action underlying this claim was filed against the directors of the Departments of Public Aid and Labor, and because the Court made no determination of respective liability for each, there was no single department having any budget or appropriation for the payment of this claim. Respondent observed that the obligations under this action do not appear to rest with either individual department but seem to be an obligation of the State of Illinois generally.

We have reviewed the record and find that we do not concur with the Respondent. Upon careful examination we are of the opinion that the State of Illinois is not liable for the judgment, interest, fees, and expenses. The Federal action out of which this claim arose was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983, 42 U.S.C. sec. 1988, and 28 U.S.C. sec. 1961, and was against directors of two State agencies and not the State itself. The various states of this country are immune from liability for monetary damages under those statutes pursuant to the eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution. (Edelman v. Jordan (1974), 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S. Ct. 1347.) Contrary to the Respondent’s observation, it seems clear to us that the alleged obligations here are not of the State of Illinois generally nor either of the departments but apparently those of the directors.

Claimant alleged in his complaint that jurisdiction of this Court lies pursuant to section 3(a) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 439.8(a)). Said statute reads as follows:

“Sec. 8. The court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters:
(a) All claims against the state founded upon any law of the State of Illinois, or upon any regulation thereunder by an executive or administrative officer or agency, other than claims arising under the Workers’ Compensation Act or the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act, or claims for expenses in civil litigation.”

The Claimant in his complaint failed to allege any law or regulation of the State of Illinois upon which this claim is founded, and based on the pleadings we are unable to locate any. The facts alleged do not appear to bring this matter within the Court’s jurisdiction because expenses in civil litigation are being claimed. (Dewoskin v. State (1981), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 934.) The claim also does not appear to have to have been brought pursuant to “An Act to provide for representation and indemnification” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 1301 et seq.), for the claim was not made by a person covered by that Act and even if it were (brought by such a person) our decision in Norman v. State (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 895, would seem to be controlling.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.


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    (No. 81-CC-2191

      In re Application of Sandra Gidley.

      Opinion filed July 7, 1983.

    Eugene F. Keefe, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This is a claim based on the provision of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act, by a widow of a Chicago police officer.

The question presented is whether the decedent was killed in the line of duty. The facts are undisputed. Claimant is the widow of Chicago police officer Vernon Gidley who died while on duty at 4:55 a.m., on March 26, 1981, of cardiac arrest.

Officer Gidley, at the time of his death, was on duty as a police dispatcher at a 911 emergency dispatch console. The job consisted of handling numerous emergency calls from the public and forwarding dispatch tickets to a fellow dispatcher for routing to officers or emergency personnel on the street. He was required to screen nuisance calls and to record every call.

The nature of the job is more stressful than would appear. Private citizens calling on emergencies require experienced police officers to respond. Many times the callers are argumentative. Some are screaming and some are crying. Sometimes one can hear gun shots in the background. The dispatcher must make decisions as to the proper emergency personnel to dispatch. The center or primary position of a three-man dispatch console is considered so stressful that the job is rotated so that no one person stays at that position more than IJ2 to 2 hours. Dispatchers are ranked as detectives.

Officer Gidley experienced chest pains approximately 18 months prior to his death. He was hospitalized on two occasions but no firm diagnosis of coronary artery disease was made. In March 1981 he began to note pain while at work but continued to work.

He started work on March 25, 1981, at about 11:00 p.m. During the course of his shift he worked for some unknown period at the primary position. At about 5:00 a.m. he collapsed. CPR was administered for about 45 minutes and thereafter he was removed to the hospital where he died.

Dr. Nathaniel Greenberg reviewed the records of Officer Gidley. It was his expert opinion that it was likely that Officer Gidley’s sudden death was a direct consequence of his occupational tension.

The Act states:

“(e) Killed in line of duty means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer or fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental causes.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e).

There was no evidence produced of an injury arising from violence or other accidental cause. The cases of Wierciak v. State (1981), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 302, and Mclnerney v. State (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 300, are dispositive of the issues in this case. Nothing unusual occurred to Officer Gidley except the stress that the job normally produces. Under the circumstances, the facts do not show compliance with the statutory definition of “killed in the line of duty” and it is the opinion of this Court that the claim is hereby denied.


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    (No. 82-CC-0209

      In re Application of Peggy L. Sparling.

      Opinion filed August 4, 1983.

    John J. Blake, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Edward C. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This is a claim brought by Peggy L. Sparling who seeks an award, pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.), by reason of the death of her husband, Galesburg police Lt. Ralph E. Sparling. Lieutenant Sparling died while off duty on June 19, 1981, after suffering a heart attack. The parties have submitted the matter for determination upon the evidence depositions taken on October 13, 1982. All briefs have been submitted and the matter now comes on for the Court’s decision.

The decedent held the position of second watch commander in the Galesburg Police Department at the time of his death. He was a member of that department for over 20 years. For most of the one-year period preceding his death, Lt. Sparling was placed in charge of two eight-hour shifts due to a shortage of supervisory personnel. Because of the additional responsibilities he took on, as well as the additional time spent on the job, Lt. Sparling had experienced considerable stress and anxiety.

On June 17, 1981, two days before the fatal heart attack, Lt. Sparling was in charge of the City’s canine tracking operation as it attempted to track several stolen vehicle suspects. The operation took place sometime around 11:00 p.m., the time that Lt. Sparling was scheduled to get off duty. The operation lasted for over an hour, covered almost three miles of rough terrain at a brisk pace, and weather conditions were hot and humid.

On June 18, 1981, the day prior to the fatal heart attack, and on two occasions during his eight-hour shift, the decedent was required to lift and carry a fire hydrant with a weight somewhere between 200 and 300 pounds.

After his shift was over, Lt. Sparling arrived at his home sometime after midnight and immediately began complaining that he was not feeling well. The next morning, June 19,1981, he continued to complain and at approximately 3:00 p.m., he went to the office of Dr. Jeffrey Hill, where he subsequently died due to myocardial infarction, secondary to coronary artery occlusion.

It was the opinion of Dr. Hill, who examined Lt. Sparling immediately prior to his death, that the overall work-related stress and anxiety as well as the hydrant and tracking incidents could have indeed caused Lt. Sparling’s death. It was Dr. Hill’s testimony that Lt. Sparling suffered from coronary artery disease and that the stress as well as the hydrant and tracking incidents could easily have precipitated the actual attack. It was clearly Dr. Hill’s opinion that these items were causally connected to the heart attack.

The issue in this case is whether Lt. Sparling was killed in the line of duty as stated in subsection 2(3) of the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e).) The test has been whether the decedent lost his life as a result of injury arising from an accidental cause received in the active performance of his duties. In re Application of Woodworth (1981), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 298.

The resolution of this case on its facts is a difficult one. The State cites several cases in its brief which, according to the State, require that this claim be denied. In Wierciak v. State (1981), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 302, (death due to a heart attack), and McInerney v. State (1981), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 300, (death due to cerebral hemorrhage), the Court denied benefits where there was evidence of general work-related stress and anxiety. In these two cases, however, there was no incident or combination of incidents occurring that could have been considered “an injury”. Similarly, the facts in In re Application of Rivers (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 921, and In re Application of McNamara (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 932, indicate that, while the officers suffered from general stress in each case, there was no injury preceding the heart attack.

The facts of the case at bar include identifiable incidents, specifically the lifting of the fire hydrant and the tracking of the stolen vehicle suspects, which coupled with the ongoing general stress and anxiety, precipitated the fatal heart attack. The specific incidents, therefore, distinguish the facts of this case from the facts of those cases cited by the State. The question then is whether the facts and circumstances leading to the heart attack constitute physical activity, job related, and sufficient to be classified as an injury. In re Application of Marousek (1981), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 309.

The Court is of the opinion that the application for benefits should be allowed. While a compensable heart attack must be triggered by an injury it is not required that the injury be one that is obvious and sudden. The Court has recognized that heart attacks can be the result of a single incident or a combination of many things. The cumulative effect of recent exigent circumstances contributing to a heart attack has been held to constitute injury. In re Application of Feehan (1981), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 293.

Dr. Hill’s testimony is unrefuted. The series of job-related exigent circumstances preceding Lt. Sparling’s death had the cumulative effect of causing or contributing to the heart attack. Taken together, the job stress, the long hours, and the fire hydrant and tracking incidents are an “injury” within the meaning of the Act. While it is true that Lt. Sparling suffered from underlying coronary artery disease, coverage under the Act is not limited to healthy persons. In re Application of Parchert (1980), 33 Ill. Ct. Cl. 312.

It is therefore ordered the application for benefits herein be granted and the applicant is hereby awarded the sum of $20,000.00.


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    (No. 82-CC-0987

      In re Application of Alfretta Alford.

      Opinion filed January 5, 1984.

    Stobbs & Sinclair (James S. Sinclair, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This claim arises out of the death of Myron A. Alford. The decedent’s widow, Alfretta Alford, seeks compensation on behalf of herself and her daughter, Susan E. Alford, as the designated beneficiaries of the decedent pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, a report of the Attorney General of Illinois, briefs filed by both parties, and evidence adduced at a hearing held before Commissioner Robert J. Hillebrand.

The issue in this case is whether the decedent was killed in the line of duty as defined in section 2(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. (1981), ch. 48, par. 282(e)), which provides, in relevant part, that “killed in the line of duty means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer ... or fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if the injury arose from violence or other accidental cause”.

The record indicates that at the time of his death, Myron Alford was employed as a full-time fireman for the Godfrey Fire Protection District, Godfrey, Illinois. Alford had been a fireman for 22 years and held the rank of captain. At 7:00 a.m. on the morning of September 21, 1981, Alford began his regular 24-hour shift. At approximately 5:30 p.m., Alford and other members of the Godfrey Fire Department responded to a fire alarm at a children’s day care center. Alford, in full firefighting paraphernalia, drove a fire truck from the station where he was on duty to the scene of the alarm. Upon their arrival at the scene, the members of the fire department determined that the call was a false alarm. Alford then returned to his truck and drove back to the fire station. Immediately upon his return to the fire station, the other firefighters noticed that Alford was pale, shaky, and sweating. Alford stated that he was having severe pains in his chest and around his shoulders. He was taken home and then to St. Joseph’s Hospital in Alton, Illinois, where it was determined he had suffered a severe heart attack. He remained in the hospital from September 21 to October 2, 1981, when he died as a result of the heart attack suffered on September 21, 1981. Testimony indicated that Alford had no history of heart disease and that he had a normal checkup approximately one week before he suffered the heart attack. Further testimony by the firefighters indicated that any fire alarm creates a stressful situation, but that an alarm at a day care center is extremely stressful.

Although it is true that cases involving heart attacks do comprise the most difficult claims made, this Court has awarded compensation in cases where a fireman has died of a heart attack while he was on duty and engaged in the performance of activities that are unique to that profession which could induce a heart attack. For example, in In re Application of Klein (1977), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 370, a case which is similar to the one at hand, a volunteer fireman answered an alarm from his home by driving his automobile to the location of a fire call, a distance of approximately one block. He then walked the remainder of the distance to the front door of the residence where he learned the call was a false alarm. The decedent thereafter alerted other firemen of this fact and returned to his automobile to drive to the fire station to file a report. As he was returning to the fire station, decedent was stricken with a heart attack, and his automobile crashed into the front of a building. This Court found that the decedent died of a heart attack in the line of duty and awarded benefits.

Similarly, in In re Application of Dickey (1980), 33 Ill. Ct. Cl. 341, a volunteer fireman sustained a heart attack after receiving a fire call, going to the fire station, unlocking the door, turning on the lights and sirens and starting toward the fire truck. He was found slumped over the driver’s seat when other firemen arrived at the station. A later investigation determined that he had died of a heart attack. This Court determined that he had died of a heart attack in the line of duty and awarded benefits.

Finally, in In re Application of Friddle (1978), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1050, this Court awarded compensation where the evidence established that the decedent, a volunteer fireman, suffered a fatal heart attack while driving the fire department ambulance to the scene of an automobile accident.

The Court therefore finds that, given the fact that Myron Alford was on duty and engaged in the activity of responding to a false alarm at a day care center at the time he suffered the heart attack, he was within the coverage of the Act as intended by the legislature of the State of Illinois.

It is hereby ordered that $20,000.00 be, and the same hereby is, awarded to the following persons in the amounts indicated pursuant to the Act and the expressed wishes of the decedent:

Alfretta Alford $10,000.00

Susan E. Alford $10,000.00

Total award $20,000.00


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    (No. 82-CC-2352

      In re Application of Irene Soens.

      Opinion filed August 4, 1983.

    Irene Soens, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

Irene Soens, Claimant, filed a timely application for benefits under the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, pars. 281-285) as a result of the death of her husband, Orville J. Soens, on January 20, 1982. An investigation was made by the Attorney General pursuant to section 4 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 284), and the Attorney General then filed his report stating that he was unable to determine whether the decedent was killed in the line of duty and requesting a hearing on that issue. All other requirements have been satisfied.

Decedent was a firefighter for the Olive Fire Protection District in Livingston, Illinois, which is a volunteer fire department. At the time of his death he held the rank of captain. His duties included maintenance of the department’s trucks and the evidence indicated he was performing this duty at the time of his death.

Robert Pollett, a firefighter for the Olive Fire Protection District, testified that when he visited the fire station at 4:55 p.m., on January 20, 1982, decedent was working in the garage area of the station. There were two trucks in the station, a tanker and a pumper. Decedent was working on the engine of the tanker. The engine was idling, and the doors and windows of the station were closed. Pollett remained in the station conversing with decedent for about 10 minutes. He did not notice any accumulation of exhaust fumes, although there was no device attached to the truck to vent the fumes to the outside and no exhaust fan. There was no one else in the station.

Decedent’s body was discovered about 6:10 p.m. by Loren Linn, who resides in Bridgeton, Missouri, and had stopped at the station to get directions to a residence in Livingston, Illinois. Linn entered the station by the front door and noticed the tanker’s engine running. He smelled fumes and called out to see if anyone was present. He saw decedent lying on his back under the pumper truck and left the station to summon help.

When the body was found, the hood to the tanker was still open, and the tools decedent had been using were lying around near the engine where Pollett had seen them earlier.

It was determined the decedent died as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning.

There was no indication that decedent had been depressed in any way or had suffered from any health problems. Decedent had in fact planned to meet his son, Terry Soens, at 4:30 that afternoon at home so that Terry could go with him to the station and help him with the work on the truck’s engine. Terry had been unable to get home in time to meet his father, and decedent had gone to the station without him. The Act places the burden of proving wilful misconduct on the Attorney General. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 282(e).) No such evidence was offered.

The Act defines “killed in the line of duty” as “losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a . . . fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from . . . accidental cause”. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 48, par. 282(e).) It is the opinion of this Court that the preponderance of evidence indicates that Orville Soens’ death was accidental and within the meaning of the Act. The Court therefore orders that compensation under the Act be paid to Claimant in the amount of $20,000.00.


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    (No. 83-CC-1779

      In re Application of Beverly Blunt.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1983.

    Beverly Blunt, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (James A. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This claim arises out of the death of Kenneth L. Blunt, an internal investigator in the Office of the Secretary of State. The decedent’s widow seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281, et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act. The. verified application for benefits shows that Beverly Blunt was the wife and designated beneficiary of the decedent at the time of his death.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application.

Based upon the record in this matter we find the circumstances surrounding the death to have been as follows. On January 31, 1983, the decedent was driving to work in Springfield, Illinois, from Vandalia, Illinois, on Interstate 55 when he stopped near the Divernon exit to assist motorists whose car had slipped off the roadway onto the grass median area. While standing near the disabled vehicle, the decedent was struck by another car which slid off the roadway onto the median. He died instantly due to brain hemorrhage as a consequence of fractures of the base of the skull.

The Attorney General’s investigation report states that the issue in this claim is whether the decedent was a law enforcement officer as contemplated by the Act. However, the report does not indicate what position the Attorney General takes concerning the issue.

The Act states:

“Section 2(a). ‘Law Enforcement officer’ or ‘officer’ means any person employed by the State or a local governmental entity as a policeman, peace officer, auxiliary policeman or in some like position involving the enforcement of the law and protection of the public interest at the risk of that person’s life.”

The record indicates that the decedent was an investigator for the Secretary of State who had achieved the rank of deputy director of internal affairs. He was sworn pursuant to the Illinois Vehicle Code and charged with enforcing the Vehicle Code in his capacity as an internal investigator at all times. His duties as an investigator included being subject to call to duty 24 hours of the day, every day of the year, and being bound to respond immediately, day or night, in any emergency, whether on or off duty, on notice that his services were needed.

In this case it appears that the decedent perceived what he thought to be an emergency when he saw the motorists and their car which had slipped onto the grass median. He responded on notice that his services were needed. While performing his duty to respond to an emergency he was exposed to the risk which caused him to lose his life.

By reason of the foregoing, this Court finds that the decedent was a law enforcement officer within the meaning of the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 (twenty thousand dollars and no cents) be, and hereby is, awarded to Beverly Blunt, the surviving spouse and designated beneficiary of Kenneth L. Blunt.


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    (No. 84-CC-0445

      In re Application of Barbara Klacza.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1983.

    Barbara Klacza, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Hans G. Fladung, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This claim is before this Court by reason of the death of Wayne Klacza, a police officer for the city of Chicago. Barbara Klacza, the widow and sole designated beneficiary of the decedent, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer along with documents submitted with that statement, and a report prepared by the Illinois Attorney General’s office.

The record indicates that on June 28, 1983, the decedent reported for duty at the Area Center 4 Headquarters in Chicago at 5:00 p.m. At approximately 5:55 p.m. he was walking toward his assigned police vehicle from the south curb at 3148 W. Harrison Street to the north curb when an eastbound vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed suddenly swerved from the eastbound lane and struck the decedent in the westbound lane. After striking the decedent, the vehicle continued eastbound and struck parked vehicles further down the street. The decedent was taken to Mt. Sinai Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 6:56 p.m. The medical examiner’s certificate of death lists the immediate cause of death as multiple injuries due to blunt trauma. The driver of the vehicle which struck the decedent was apprehended and charged with reckless homicide, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana.

The report by the Attorney General’s office states that the Attorney General is unable to determine whether the decedent’s death meets the requisite of being killed in the line of duty as defined in the Act.

Section 2(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e)), provides, in relevant part, that “ ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer ... if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.” (Emphasis added.)

This Court has previously dealt with that part of section 2(e) concerning the phrase “other accidental cause” and its applicability to cases involving traffic accidents which result in the deaths of law enforcement officers while on duty. In Carr v. State (1974), 29 Ill. Ct. Cl. 540, and Allen v. State (1947), 29 Ill. Ct. Cl. 540, we found that “other accidental cause” included the situation where two game wardens on patrol duty were killed when the car in which they were riding collided with a car driven by a civilian which crossed over the center line.

Although the decedent was not riding in a car when the fatal accident occurred, his situation is substantially similar to that of the officers in the cases cited above. We find, therefore, that Officer Klacza’s death arose from an accidental cause covered by section 2(e) of the Act and that his death meets the requisite of being “killed in the line of duty” as defined in the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and hereby is, awarded to Barbara Klacza, as the widow and sole designated beneficiary of Wayne Klacza.


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    (No. 84-CC-0517

      In re Application of Mercedes C. O’Brien.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1983.

    Mercedes C. O’Brien, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This claim is before this Court by reason of the death of William Patrick O’Brien, a captain in the State of Illinois Department of Law Enforcement. The decedent’s widow seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office.

The record shows that on November 13, 1982, the decedent suffered a fatal heart attack while en route to represent the State of Illinois Department of Law Enforcement at the International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference in Atlanta, Georgia. The attack occurred while the decedent was preparing to leave Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for Atlanta after a night’s lodging. The certificate of death issued by the Department of Public Health of Rutherford County, Tennessee, states that the cause of death was cardiac arrest due to coronary artery disease.

Section 2(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e)) provides, in relevant part, that “ ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer ... if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause”.

There is nothing in the record indicating that the decedent’s death arose from violence or other accidental cause. No injury, or other unusual force, has been shown which might have caused the heart attack.

We find therefore: (a) that Captain O’Brien was not killed in the line of duty as defined by section 2(e) of the Act; and (b) that the proof submitted in support of this claim does not satisfy the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore not compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of Mercedes C. O’Brien, as widow of William Patrick O’Brien, be, and hereby is, denied.


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    (No. 84-CC-1384

      In re Application of Lana Berg.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1984.

    Frew & Gilbert, Ltd., for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

Claimant seeks an award as the widow and statutory beneficiary of firefighter Terry K. Berg, pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (hereinafter, the Act). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

The Court has reviewed the Claimant’s application for benefits together with the written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, the police reports, the coroner’s certificate of death and the report of the Attorney General. From its consideration of these documents, the Court finds:

Firefighter Terry K. Berg was involved in a traffic accident while responding to a fire alarm on July 14, 1981. He never recovered from the injuries received and subsequently died on June 3, 1983, due to a coronary arrest as a consequence of brain damage.

In order for an award to be granted pursuant to the Act it must be shown that the law enforcement officer or fireman was killed in the line of duty as defined in the Act. Section 2(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e)) provides, in relevant part, that “ ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer ... or fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.”

While it has been shown that the decedent’s death was accidentally caused by an injury received in the active performance of his duties as a fireman, the record indicates that his death did not occur within one year after the date the injury was received as required by the Act. Therefore, we find, regretfully, that this claim must be denied.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied.


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      In re Petition of Sharon F. Beene.

      Order filed May 9, 1984.

    Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago (Devereux Bowley, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This matter is before the Court on the petition of Sharon Beene for an extension of time within which to file documents to claim compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act.

On October 1, 1982, we ruled that we were constrained by operation of law to deny the petition on the grounds that so much time had lapsed since the date of the alleged crime that we no longer had authority to grant the petition. The petitioner asked for a hearing and the case was assigned to a commissioner of the Court. At the suggestion of the commissioner, the parties elected to file memoranda in lieu of holding the hearing.

The facts as stated in the Petitioner’s memoranda are as follows.

The Petitioner, Sharon F. Beene, was the victim of a crime on December 6,1979. She was sitting in a car with a friend in Garfield Park in Chicago when three men unknown to them went up to the car and one of them shot the Petitioner in the chest. The bullet went through her left lung and lodged in her spine. The men were never apprehended, and it is presumed the motive for the crime was robbery. No notice of intent or application were filed at that time by Petitioner, because she did not suffer monetary loss compensable under the Crime Victims Compensation Act. Her medical bills and sick leave were covered by her employer and insurance, and she was able to return to work about four months after the crime. She worked steadily until February of 1982, at which time the bullet which had been lodged in her body since 1979, migrated to a nerve causing severe back and muscle pain. As of that time she was unable to work, and thus suffered monetary damages necessary to seek compensation under the Act. On May 3, 1982, Claimant contacted attorney Devereux Bowly, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, to represent her in this matter. He consulted Mr. Ron Gastan, of the Chicago Crime Victims Compensation Act office, of the Attorney General of Illinois. Mr. Gastan informed him that the current practice in regard to situations such as this was for the Claimant to submit a petition for extension of time, but not a notice of intent nor claim. Mr. Gastan said that if the petition for extension of time was granted by the Court, the notice of intent and claim could then be filed. On May 4, 1982, the petition and supporting documents were sent to Mr. Gastan.

The statute in effect at the time of the crime was not the current statutory provision, which became effective on September 22, 1979. When the crime occurred, on September 6, 1979, the applicable statute was Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 70, par. 73(g). It provided:

“Right to compensation-Conditions-Limitations-Notice. § 3. A person is entitled to compensation under this Act if:
(g) his application for compensation under this Act is filed with the Court of Claims within 2 years of the date of the injury to the victim or within such further extension of time as the Court of Claims for good cause shown, allows, provided that notice of intent to file a claim is filed in the Office of the Attorney General within 6 months of the date of the injury, or within such further extension as the Court of Claims, for good cause shown, allows.” (Emphasis added.)

The above-cited provision, unlike the current one, does not set any limit on how long an extension of time can be granted in regard to the application or notice of intent, provided the Claimant shows good cause for the extension. It is the petitioner’s contention that the Court erred in the October 1, 1982, order in quoting and applying the current version of the section of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 76.1), which, as previously stated, did not go into effect until September 22, 1979, after the alleged crime in the instant case. Petitioner argues that statutes of limitation are given prospective effect, not retroactive operation, citing a case decided in 1875. It is unnecessary for us to recount the history of case law on this subject which developed since that time. This is a situation where a limitation on the bringing of an action was decreased. The type of action was legislatively created (as opposed to existing under common law). We find the cases of Orlick v. McCarthy (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 342, 122 N.E.2d 513, and Stanley v. Denning (1970), 264 N.E.2d 521, controlling and that the current version of the statute should be applied retroactively.

The Petitioner also filed a reply brief which addressed several arguments. However, we find that our decision above makes it unnecessary for us to address them. The fact that the Attorney General failed to file with the Court any brief or memorandum at all would make it very difficult to address those arguments made in the Petitioner’s reply brief had we found it necessary or helpful to do so.

Petition denied.