author: Me. Chief Justice Holleeich

text:
    (No. 2577
    Susie Casey, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 11, 1935.

    Habbis B. Gaines, for claimant.
    Otto Kebneb, Attorney General; John ICassebman, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Me. Chief Justice Holleeich

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Susie Casey, is the widow of Sergeant Jesse Casey who, at the time of his death, was a member of Company F, Eighth Infantry, Illinois National Guard. Said Jesse Casey enlisted in said Company F on November 18,1931, and continued to be a member thereof until the time of his death as hereinafter set forth.

In the performance of his duties as a member of said Company F, said Jesse Casey was attending the annual tour of Field Training at Camp Grant, Illinois which commenced on August 4, 1934 and continued to August 18, 1934. About midnight on the night of August 9, 1934, while Casey was asleep in his tent, it was blown down by a violent rainstorm. Casey was unclothed at the time, and on account of his exposure to the inclement weather, became ill. On August 14th he presented himself to the Regimental Dispensary and complained of headache, backache, and general soreness of limbs. He was running a temperature of 101.4, and his condition was diagnosed as acute influenza. He was taken to the Base Hospital and, his condition becoming worse, was removed to St. Anthony’s Hospital at Rockford, where he died on August 20, 1934.

Adjutant General Black in a report on the case, said:

“The record further indicates that the disease was contracted in line of duty.”

Section Eleven (11) of Article Sixteen (16) of The Military Code of Illinois provides as follows:

“In every case where an officer or enlisted man of the National Guard or Naval Reserve shall be injured, wounded or killed while performing his duty as an officer or enlisted man in pursuance of orders from the Commander-in-Chief, said officer or enlisted man, or his heirs or dependents, shall have a claim against the State for financial help or assistance, and the State Court of Claims shall act on and adjust the same as the merits of each case may demand,” etc.

Under this- provision of the statute, and the facts hereinbefore set forth, (which facts are not disputed) the claimant is clearly entitled to an award for financial help or assistance as provided by the statute.

The evidence shows that Casey had been regularly employed by Swift and Company at the Union Stock Yards, Chicago, for more than fifteen years- just prior to his death; that his average annual wages were Eighteen Hundred Dollars ($1,800.00); that he was an able-bodied and healthy man, and the sole support of the claimant.

If the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act were followed in fixing the amount of the award, claimant would be entitled to the sum of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00). In making awards under the Military and Naval Code, we are not bound by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, but in certain cases in which the provisions of such Act seemed to provide a just compensation, we have been guided thereby. In this case we are of the opinion that an award of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) is fair and reasonable and warranted by the evidence.

Award is therefore entered in favor of the claimant, Susie Casey, for the sum of Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.-00).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam:

license: Public Domain

text:
    GENERAL OPINION, IN RE: UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1935.

   Per Curiam:

In compliance with, the request of Hon. Sveinbjorn Johnson, Counsel for the University of Illinois, for an informal opinion by this court as to the right of various employees at the University of Illinois to an award for medical or/and hospital attention furnished such employees, by virtue of any liability under the Illinois “Workmen’s Compensation Act”, the court renders its opinion in the several matters, as follows:

In determining whether the respective claims should be allowed we are mindful of the fact that such claims are not awards in the usual sense in which awards by this court are made and are not payable by appropriation in due course, but that such opinions are for the guidance of the University authorities, and that such claims, if paid, will be paid by the University authorities from funds at the disposal of the University.

Cases of the character here involved are not without their difficulties, and in these particular cases, decisions are made more difficult by reason of the very meager statement of facts submitted to us. In some of the cases submitted, it is necessary to supplement the given facts with the personal knowledge of the court as to the activities of the University and the several departments thereof in order to arrive at a conclusion. Ordinarily this would not be permissible, but inasmuch as this opinion is merely for the guidance of the University authorities, and does not constitute an award, we feel that such action is justified.

Although the several statements of facts do not so allege, we are advised that the University is an Illinois corporation, incorporated under a special charter in 1867, nnder the name of Illinois Industrial University; — the name being-changed to University of Illinois in 1885. The several statements contain no information as to the charter powers of the corporation, but the case of North vs. Board of Education, 201 Ill. App. 449, hereinafter referred to, states that the University was chartered “to furnish instruction to students in various branches of learning.” Gonsidering the several statements of fact as a whole, it appears that the University consists of a number of schools or departments which are practically complete in themselves.

Before setting forth the conclusions at which we have arrived, we will refer briefly to the principles of law involved, as set forth in the statutes and the decisions of the courts.

With reference to the manner in which the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be construed, the Supreme Court, in the case of Chicago Cleaning Co. vs. Ind. Board, 283 Ill. 177-181, said:

“The Act is commendable legislation and should be liberally construed in order to give effect to the purpose and object in adopting such Act.”

In the case of Newman vs. Ind. Com., 353 Ill. 190-193, the court said:

“The Workmen’s Compensation Act is a humane law, of remedial nature, and wherever construction is permissible, its language should be liberally construed.

In the very recent case of Raymond vs. Ind. Com., 354 Ill. 586-591, the court approved the decisions in the Chicago Cleaning Co. case, and said:

“The Compensation Act is remedial in its nature and has always been liberally construed by this court for the purpose of effecting the intended benefits to the employee and of palcing upon the industries affected thereby the burdens incident to such employment.”

Section Three (3) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides:

“The provisions of this Act hereinafter following, shall apply automatically and without election * * * to all employers and all their employees engaged in any department of the following enterprises or businesses which are hereby declared to be extra-hazardous, to-wit:
1. The erection, maintaining, removing, remodeling, altering or demolishing of any structure, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section.
2. Construction, excavating or electrical work, except as provided in. sub-paragraph 8 of this section.
3. Carriage by land, water or aerial service and loading or unloading in connection therewith, including the distribution of any commodity by horse-drawn or motor driven vehicle where the employer employs more than two employees in the enterprise or business, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section.
4. The operation of any warehouse or general or terminal storehouses.
5. Mining, surface mining or quarrying.
6. Any enterprise in which explosive materials are manufactured, handled or used in dangerous quantities.
7. In any enterprise wherein molten metal, or explosive or injurious gases or vapors, or inflammable vapors or fluids, or corrosive acids are manufactured, used, generated, stored or conveyed in ■ dangerous quantities.
7%. Any enterprise in which sharp edged cutting tools, grinders or implements are used, including all enterprises which buy, sell or handle-junk and salvage, demolish or reconstruct machinery, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section.
8. In any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations are now or shall hereafter be imposed for the regulating, guarding, use or the placing of machinery or appliances or for the protection and safeguarding of the employees or the public therein; each of which occupations, enterprises or businesses are hereby declared to be extra-hazardous: Provided, nothing contained herein shall be construed to apply to any work, employment or operations done, had or conducted by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil, or stock raising, or to those who rent, demise or lease land for any such purposes, or to anyone in their employ or to any work done on a farm or country place, no matter- what kind of work or service is being done or rendered.
9. Any enterprise, business or work in connection with the laying out or improvement of subdivisions of tracts of land.
10. Any enterprise for the treatment of cross-ties, switch-ties, telegraph poles, timber or other wood with creosote or other preservatives. (Amended by Act approved June 10, 1929.)

Section Four (4) of the Act defines how the term, “employer” shall be construed, and inasmuch as it covers every “public or private corporation”, the University is clearly an employer within the meaning of the Act.

Section Five (5) defines how the term “employee” shall be construed, and under the second paragraph of said section, the several claimants in question are clearly employees-within the meaning* of the Act".

The "University being an employer, and the several claimants being employees within the meaning of the Compensation Act, the question then arises as to whether the University at the time of the several accidents in question was engaged in any of the enterprises or businesses declared to be extra-hazardous, by such Act.

The question as to what constitutes an enterprise or business has frequently been considered by the Supreme Court. One of the earlier and leading cases upon the question is the case of Uphoff vs. Ind. Com., 271 Ill. 312, which arose under the Act of 1913. In that case the employer was a farmer who constructed a broom-corn shed and the claimant was injured while employed in that work. The court held that the building of such a structure did not constitute an enterprise or business within the meaning of Section Three (3) of the Act, and said:

“An enterprise is an undertaking of hazard; an arduous attempt. Lexicographers define an enterprise as ‘an undertaking; something projected and attempted; an attempt or project, particularly an undertaking of some importance or one requiring boldness, energy or perseverance; an arduous or hazardous attempt, as, a warlike enterprise’. The building of this shed might be classed under the head of something projected or attempted, but hardly as an important undertaking requiring courage or energy or one that was arduous or hazardous.”

In Walsh vs. Ind. Com., 345 Ill. 366-369, the Supreme Court said:

“The term ‘business’ in common parlance, means an employment which occupies a substantial portion of the time and attention of the one engaged in it.”

We appreciate that the Appellate Court in the case of North vs. Board of Trustees, 204 Ill. App. 447, held that the University is not an ‘‘enterprise or business” within the meaning of those words as used in the Compensation Act. However, the Supreme Court, in the case of Board of Education vs. Ind. Com., 301 Ill. 611, held that a high school with a manual training department connected therewith was an enterprise within the meaning of the Compensation Act. In that case it was contended that a high school could not be regarded as an enterprise within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, but the Supreme Court there held to the contrary and brought the case within the rule laid down in the XJphoff case, in the following language:

“The business in which the High School District was engaged was the conducting of a high school, including, among others, a manual training department. It is not unreasonable to regard such an enterprise as a work of some importance, which might even be regarded as arduous.”

Surely, if a high school with a manual training department connected therewith is an “enterprise”, a State University, as well as the several schools and departments included therein, must also be considered as “enterprises”.

Mr. Angerstein, in his work “The Employee and the Workmen’s Compensation Act”, 1930 edition,, (hereinafter referred to as “Angerstein”) on page 33 sums up the rule as to what constitutes an enterprise or business, in the following language:

“It therefore seems clear that in order to constitute engaging in an enterprise or business within the provisions of Section 3 of the Act so that one engaging therein may be said to be within the provisions of the Act, the work being done must in fact be a business or enterprise, as such, an undertaking as a business for profit and not something merely incidental, occasional or merely temporary. Building a broom-corn shed by a farmer as a mere incident of farming was not within Section 3 but obviously if one engaged in the business of erecting such sheds generally for others for profit, it would be a business or enterprise. One having a private residence built or repaired would not be engaged in a business or enterprise, although one engaged in constructing homes for others would be in that business or enterprise. So also, if one was having a business building or apartment building constructed or repaired, and it was intended to rent it out or a part was rented for profit, the owner would be engaged in a business or enterprise. So also the owner of a factory or building used exclusively for his own purposes, would not be engaged in the business or enterprise of erection, maintaining, etc., of a structure.”

From a consideration of these and other anthorities bearing upon the question, it appears that the University is engaged in an enterprise within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; — that is to say, it is engaged through its various schools and departments, in the business or enterprise of furnishing instruction to students in various branches of learning.

Attention is directed to the fact that the provisions of the present Workmen’s Compensation Act, embrace all employees engaged in any department of the various businesses or enterprises declared extra-hazardous by Section Three (3) of the Act, regardless of whether the duties of the injured employee are hazardous or not.

With reference to this question, Anger stein, on page thirty-four (34), Section seventeen (17), says:

“If an employer is engaged in an enterprise or business within Section 3 of the Act, then all his employees engaged in any department of such enterprise or business are under the Act. Such, employees, as well as such employers, have no right of election and no agreement that such employer and employee might enter into could take any such employee from under the Act.
Prior to amendment of Section 3, effective July 1, 1917, it was held in a number of cases that even though the employer was engaged in such extra-hazardous enterprise or business, yet an employee was not under the Act unless his actual duties were in the extra-hazardous part of the employer’s business, or brought him in contact with such hazard, except in cases where the employer had affirmatively elected to come under the Act. However, subsequent to such amendment, and under the Act as now in force, the law is clear that if the employer is engaged in any enterprise or business within the provisions of Section 3, then all his employees in any department of such business or enterprise, are under the Act even though their duties involve no hazards and do not bring them in contract with any of the hazardous parts of any such enterprise or business.”

The rule above set forth is announced in the case of Illinois Printing and Publishing Co. vs. Ind. Com. 299 Ill. 189, and McNaught vs. Hines, 300 Ill. 167.

Attention is also directed to that class of cases where an employer is engaged in two separate businesses, one within the Act, and the other not within the Act. In cases of that kind the provisions of the Act apply to all employees engaged in any department of the business of the employer which is within the Act, but have no application to the employees engaged in the business not within the Act, unless, as to them, the employer has elected to come within the Act.

In the case of Peterson vs. Ind. Com., 315 Ill. 199-202, the employer was engaged in farming, and also operated a sawmill on the same tract of land. The employee was injured while working in the sawmill, and the court held that although the employer was not under the Act as to the work on the farm, yet the operation of the sawmill was an independent enterprise of a hazardous nature, and as to such enterprise the employer was under the Act. In that case the Court said:

“It is not required by the Workmen’s Compensation Act that one shall be exclusively engaged in one of the hazardous occupations enumerated in the Act to make him liable for compensation. A man may engage in two kinds of business, one not within the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the other may be within the Act because it is extra-hazardous. (Vaughn’s Seed Store vs. Simonini, 275 Ill. 477; Davis vs. Ind. Com., 297 Ill. 29). * * * * * * We are of the opinion that plaintiff in error and the deceased at the time of the accident were both under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.”

The same conclusion was reached in the case of Davis vs. Ind. Com., 297 Ill. 29, where the employer owned a hardware business and also owned an apartment building which he rented at a .profit; also in the case of Walsh vs. Ind. Com., 345 Ill. 366, where the employer was in the small loan business, and also owned eight (8) or ten (10) houses which he kept in repair.

Angerstein, on page thirty-nine (39), sets forth the rule as follows:

“The business itself is the determining factor. For illustration, an employer might own a factory containing power-driven machinery, etc., which automatically would bring it under the Act. All the employees of such factory would 'be under the Act regardless of what their duties were, just so long as were engaged in any department of the business, and this would include stenographers, salesmen, clerical help, etc. The same employer might own and operate a clothing store entirely separate and apart from the factory, in which store there were no appliances or machinery of any description. This clothing store, therefore, would not come under the Act automatically, and the employees, therefore, would not be under the Act unless and until the employer had filed his written acceptance of the Act with the “Industrial Commission.”

The question as to whether a business which is extra-hazardous in fact, but not specifically enumerated in Section Three (3) of the Act, comes within the provisions thereof, is also an important question in this connection. The case of Cinofsky vs. Ind. Com., 290 Ill. 522, arose prior to the time Section 7% was added to the Act. The employer was engaged in operating a junk yard which, at that time, was not one of the extra-hazardous businesses enumerated in Section Three (3). The Court in that case, page 523, said:

“Counsel for plaintiffs in error argues that the business or enterprise in which plaintiffs in error were engaged did not bring it within the classification set forth in Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act as extra-hazardous, and that as they had not elected to come under the Act they could not be held liable thereunder, unless it is shown, as a matter of fact, that the business was extra-hazardous. (Hahnemann Hospital vs. Industrial Board, 282 Ill. 316.) This court held in this last case that a hospital conducted under certain conditions might be a hazardous business while it would not be so under others. The mere receiving or buying of junk of a certain character might not be extra-hazardous, but that was not the whole of plaintiffs in error’s business. The evidence shows that they were operating a junk yard, — that is, they were collecting, sorting and preparing junk and metals for market, and that in this work they were sometimes required to use shears driven by electric motor and an acetylene torch. There can be no question that the preparation of this junk for sale was a necessary part of the business and that the work was of such a nature as to bring it within the rule of being extra-hazardous in fact; that plaintiffs in error should be held within the Act on that account under the reasoning of this court in Friebel vs. Chicago City Railway Co., 289 Ill. 76.”

In two cases before the Industrial Commission, both of which involved employees of a detective agency, one acting* as watchman of a building and the other assisting* in patrol work, it was contended by the Respondent that the Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction to enter an award, because detective agencies are not enumerated in Section Three (3) of the Act. In each case the Industrial Commission awarded compensation, and the Circuit Court affirmed the award of the Commission. Petition for writ of error was filed in the Supreme Court in each case, and in each case it was denied. The result of such denial was to affirm the findings of the Industrial Commission, and to hold inferentially that if a business is extra-hazardous in fact, it comes within the provisions of the Act, although not specifically mentioned therein.

The furnishing* of instruction to students is not one of the enterprises or businesses which are enumerated as extra-hazardous in Section Three (3) of the Compensation Act, and before any employee of the University is entitled to recover compensation under the Act, he must show that the University, or if he is engaged in an independent department, then the department in which he is working, is engaged in a business or enterprise which comes within some one of the paragraphs of Section Three (3) of the Act, or that such business or enterprise is extra-hazardous in fact.

A brief consideration of the several paragraphs of Section Three (3) of the Act may help to clarify the situation:

Paragraph 1. The erection, maintaining, removing, remodeling, altering or demolishing of any structure, etc. From what has heretofore been said, it follows that the University is not engaged in the btosiness of erecting, maintaining, removing, remodeling, altering or demolishing of any structure. It may be engaged in the doing of such work from time to time, but if so, such work is merely incidental to the general work of the University, and is not the business in which the University is engaged.

In the case of Jacobi vs. Ind. Com., 342 Ill. 210, the Supreme Court, in passing upon this question, said:

“Where the building is maintained, occupied and used by its owner in conducting a business in which he is engaged, as an incident or adjunct to the business, the relation of his business to the Workmen’s Compensation Act and his relation to his employees is to be determined by the business and not by the maintenance of the building.”

In the case of Walsh vs. Ind. Com., 345 Ill. 366-370, the Supreme Court said:

“The line of demarcation between maintaining a structure as an incident rather than as a business, and the business of maintaining a structure, is not readily defined, but we are of the opinion that a safe rule is, that where one maintains buildings or structures for profit, whether that profit be as compensation for his services or by way of rentals received, and such maintenance requires a substantial portion of his time and attention, he must be said to be engaged in the business of maintaining a structure within the contemplation of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.”

Consequently any employee of the University who sustains an injury while engaged in the erection, removal, remodeling, altering or demolishing of any structure, is not by virtue of paragraph One (1) of Section Three (3) brought under the Compensation Act.

Paragraph 2. The same rule applies to construction, excavating or electrical work as provided in paragraph Two (2) of Section Three (3) of the Act.

Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 9, and 10. The same may be said of paragraph Three (3) with reference to carriage by land, water or aerial service, etc.; paragraph Four (4) with reference to the operation of any warehouse, etc.; paragraph Five (5) with reference to mining, surface mining or quarrying; paragraph Nine (97 with reference to the laying out or improvement of subdivisions, etc.; and paragraph Ten (10) with reference to the treatment of cross-ties, etc.-

Paragraphs Six (6), Seven (7), Seven and one-half (7%) and Bight (8) are somewhat different, however. Such paragraphs provide as follows: •

"6. Any enterprise in which explosive materials are manufactured, handled or used in dangerous quantities.
7. In any enterprise wherein molten metal, or explosive or injurious gases or vapors, or inflammable vapors or fluids, or corrosive acids are manufactured, used, generated, stored or conveyed in dangerous quantities.
7%. Any enterprise in which sharp edged cutting tools, grinders or implements are used, including all enterprises which buy, sell or handle junk and salvage, demolish or reconstruct machinery, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section.
8. In any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations are now or shall hereafter be imposed for the regulating, guarding, use or the placing of machinery or appliances or for the protection and safeguarding of the employees or the public therein; each of which occupations, enterprises or businesses are hereby declared to be extra-hazardous: Provided, nothing contained herein shall be construed to apply to any work, employment or operations done, had or conducted by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil, or stock raising, or to those who rent, demise or lease land for any such purposes, or to any one in their employ or to any work done on a farm or country place, no matter what kind of work or service is being done or rendered.”

Paragraph 6. If, in the course of the performance of its regular business, or the exercise of its charter powers, any school or department of the University manufacturers, handles or uses explosive materials in dangerous quantities, then such school or department is automatically brought under the Act, and every employee of such department, regardless of his or her duties, is entitled to compensation under the Act for any accidental injury sustained by such employe, which arises out of and in the course of his or her employment.

Paragraph 7. If, in the course of its regular business, or the exercise of its charter powers, any school or department of the University manufactures, uses, generates, stores or conveys any molten metal, or explosive or injurious gases or vapors, or inflammable vapors or fluids, or corrosive acids in dangerous quantities, then such school or department is automatically brought under the Act, and every employe of such department, regardless of his or her duties, is entitled to compensation under the Act for any accidental injury sustained by such employe, which arises out of and in the course of his or her employment.

Paragraph 7%. If, in the course of its regular business, or the exercise of its charter powers, any school or department of the University uses sharp-edged cutting tools, grinders, or implements, then such school or department is automatically brought under the Act, and every employe of such department, regardless of his or her duties, is entitled to compensation under the Act for any accidental injury sustained by such employe, which arises out of and in the course of his or her employment.

In this connection it might be well to consider the following quotation from Angerstein, appearing on page Fifty-three (53):

“The mere occasional or incidental use of a sharp-edged cutting tool, grinder or implement, should not be sufficient to bring an enterprise or business, not otherwise under the Act, within the provisions of paragraph 7%, but if such tools, even though hand tools, were customarily or regularly used and there was any hazard or danger in connection with their use, it would constitute an enterprise within the provisions of that paragraph.”

The foregoing quotation is supported by the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Garren vs. Ind. Corn., 340 Ill. 95.

In the case of Therien vs. Ind. Com., 351 Ill. 166, the employer was conducting a nursing home consisting of about forty (40) rooms and having two steam heating plants. It was contended, among other things, that the employer came within the provisions of paragraph 7% of Section Three (3). The Supreme Court, in disposing of that contention said:

“The only sharp edged cutting tools were those knives used for the purpose of cutting roasts which are ordinarily found in a private home. Such tools do not come within the purview of Section Three (3) as sharp edged cutting tools, grinders or implements * * *. No other appliances of the character described in the Act were used in the nursing home.”

The court held in that case that the employer did not come within the provisions of paragraph 7%-

Paragraph 8. By virtue of paragraph eight (8) of Section Three (3), all employers and all their employees engaged in any department of any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations are now or shall hereafter be imposed for the regulating, guarding, use or placing of machinery or appliances or for the protection and safeguarding of the employees or the public therein, come within the Act. Angerstein, in speaking of this paragraph, on page fifty-four (54), says:

“The provisions of this paragraph bring within the provisions of the Act, many enterprises or businesses of many kinds or descriptions. Apparently it was intended as a general provision to bring under the Act practically every business or enterprise of an extra-hazardous nature that might not have been enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of Section 3._ Generally speaking, it brings under the Act every enterprise or business concerning which there are statutory provisions or municipal regulations for the safeguarding of employees or the public against accidental injuries or death. The one definite limitation upon the provisions of this paragraph is that only a statutory or municipal regulation for the protection and safeguarding of the employees or of the public therein against accidental injury or death is sufficient to bring a business or enterprise within the provisions of said Paragraph 8. A statutory or municipal regulation applying to a business or enterprise is not sufficient unless it directly relates to the safeguarding against accidental injury or death of the employees therein or of the public in connection therewith.”

In Dietrich vs. Ind. Com., 286 Ill. 50, the employer was conducting a retail grocery store and butcher shop with no power-driven machinery. It was contended that the business was brought within the provisions of the Compensation Act by virtue of the Child Labor Law, the Women’s Ten Hour Law, the Health, Safety and Comfort Act, and also by a municipal ordinance requiring meat markets to be licensed.

In that case the Supreme Court, on page fifty-two (52), said:

“These statutory and municipal regulations are not of the character referred to in Clause 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The title of that Act is “An Act to promote the general welfare of the people of this State by providing compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of employment within this State”, etc. Compensation for accidental injuries or death is the subject of the Act and its language must be construed with reference to that subject. When it is said that it shall apply in any enterprise in which statutory or municipal ordinance regulations are imposed for the protection and safeguarding of the employee or the public therein, it refers to such regulation for the protection and safeguarding of employees or the public against accidental injuries or death. The ordinance and the statutes upon which the plaintiff in error relies are not imposed upon the business in which the defendant in error was engaged for such purposes.”

In the case of Bowman Dairy Co. vs. Ind. Com., 292 Ill. 284, the employee was a milk wagon driver, and it was contended, among other things, that the employer was under the Act by virtue of an ordinance regulating the width of stalls and stables in which horses were kept and the width of passageways and footways between the stalls. The court, following the Dietrich case, held that the ordinance was not of a character to bring the business under the Compensation Act.

In City of Rock Island vs. Ind. Com., 287 Ill. 76, the employee was working as a street sweeper and it was sought to bring the employer under the Act by reason of certain speed and traffic ordinances, but the Supreme Court held that such ordinances were not of the character contemplated by paragraph eig’ht (8) and that the employer was not under the Act by virtue thereof.

In East St. Louis Board of Education vs. Ind. Com., 298 Ill. 61, the employee was working as a janitor in a two-story, school building with a basement containing a steam boiler for heating purposes, and was injured while washing* windows on the second floor of said building. The boiler was subject to city inspection and it was contended that the employer was thereby brought under the Compensation Act. The Supreme Court, in upholding such contention, said:

“It seems self-evident that the inspecting of a boiler in the basement of a schoolhouse containing many children is certainly the guarding of appliances for their protection, the same as would be true in the requirement of fire escapes. * * * It would seem necessarily to follow by the working of Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act that this statute and the municipal regulations brought this building under the provisions of said section of the Act.”

In Hannemann Hospital vs. Ind. Com., 282 Ill. 316, the evidence showed that the hospital building was a seven-story structure with two power-driven elevators, and was equipped with engines and high-pressure boilers, and a system of electric wiring and apparatus for signals throughout the building. There were city ordinances requiring* elevators in such buildings, also with reference to fire escapes, the inspection of boilers, and the installation of electric wiring and apparatus. The Supreme Court, in holding that such regulations brought the employer under the Act, said:

“The ordinance regulations of Chicago heretofore set forth as applying to buildings of the class to which appellee’s building belong, and to the machinery, equipment and appliances therein and requiring inspection of the same, were unquestionably imposed for the protection and safeguarding of the employees and the public, and bring the business or enterprise in which appellee was engaged within the terms of Clause 8 above set forth.”

In Ascher Bros. Amusement Enterprises vs. Ind. Com., 311 Ill. 258, the employee was working as an usher in a moving picture theatre in which the projecting machine was installed in a fireproof booth. The city ordinances required the booth to be constructed according to certain specifications, and provided for the inspection thereof by the fire marshal;— and the court held that such ordinance was enacted for the safeguarding of the employees and the public and brought the employer within the provisions of Paragraph eight (8).

Some of the statutory regulations which seem to be included within the terms of the classification of Paragraph eight (8) are the following:

The Health, Safety and Comfort Act, Cahill’s Statutes, 1933, Chapter 48, Paragraph 143.

The Building Construction Act, Cahill’s Statutes, 1933, Chapter 48, Paragraph 123.

The Blower Act, Cahill’s Statutes, 1933, Chapter 48, Paragraph 133.

The Fire Escape Act, Cahill’s Statutes, 1933, Chapter 38, Paragraph 248.

In speaking of the Fire Escape Act, Harper, in his “Workmen’s Compensation,” Page ninety-four (94), says:

“This Act requires fire escapes of a specified design, on all buildings four or more stories in height. It is believed that this Act would not operate to bring within the classification of the Compensation Act, any employers except those engaged in the “occupation, enterprise or business," of operating or conducting a building, to which the regulations of the Fire Escape Act are applicable. The compensation law was obviously not intended to apply to mere owners of buildings or to lessees thereof, and unless there is conducted in the building some industry covered by the classification of Section 3 of the Act, or unless the building is subject to the provisions of the fire escape law and is being conducted by the employer (either as owner or lessee) as an “occupation, enterprise or business” it could not be properly included within the classification of hazardous enterprises, to which alone the provisions of Section 3 are applicable.”

With reference to the exception in Sub-paragraph eight (8), as to work done by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil or stock raising, or to any work done on a farm, the opinion of the court is fully set forth in the case of S. E. Bunting, University of Illinois No. 611, and under the very broad terms of the Illinois Compensation Act, any person engaged in farming, tillage of the soil or stock raising, or in the doing of any kind of work which is in its nature a part of farming, on a farm or country place, does not come within the provisions of the Act.

Conclusion.

From a consideration of the foregoing authorities, it seems that the following conclusions logically follow:

1. That the University is an employer within the meaning of the Act.

2. That all employees of the University áre employees within the meaning of the Act.

3. ' That the University is engaged in an “enterprise” within the meaning of the Act.

4. That the University consists of a number of different departments or schools which are practically complete in themselves; that therefore it is in the same position as an individual or corporation which is engaged in several different businesses or enterprises, some of which may be extra-hazardous and some, not; that each department or school must therefore be considered a separate business or enterprise, and the liability of the University in each case depends upon whether that particular school or department comes within any of the provisions of Section three (3) of the Act, or is engaged in a business or enterprise which is extra-hazardous in fact.

5. That the University is not engaged in any business or enterprise which comes within the provisions of Paragraphs one (1), two (2), three (3), four (4), five (5), nine (9), or ten (10) of Section three (3) of the Act.

6. That the business or enterprise in which the University, or the several schools or departments thereof, is engaged, may come within the provisions of Paragraphs six (6), seven (7), seven and one-half (7%), or eight (8); that the question as to whether the University does come within the provisions of any of such paragraphs is a question of fact to be determined by the evidence submitted in each particular case.

7. That under the very broad terms of the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act, all farm work done by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil or stock raising, and all work which is in its nature a part of farming, and which is done on a farm or country place, is excepted from the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 608

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

Because the business of the University of Illinois is not the business of maintaining and operating buildings, it seems that the janitor service performed at the University buildings is not within the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The case of Therien vs. Industrial Commission, 351 Ill. 166, seems directly in point upon the facts submitted. No award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 603

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

In operating a kitchen in the Women’s Residential Hall, the State does not appear to be engaged in one of the enterprises or businesses designated as extra-hazardous by Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The injury in question does not appear to have been occasioned by the operation of any machinery, and upon the facts submitted and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should not be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 611

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

A decision authorizing an award cannot be justified on this claim.

Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides in part as follows:

“Provided, nothing contained herein shall be construed to apply to any work, employment or operations done, had or conducted by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil, or stock raising, or to those who rent, demise or lease land for any such purpose, or to any one in their employ or to any work done on a farm or country place, no matter what kind of work or service is being done or rendered.”

It was the intention of the Legislature that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should not apply in any sense or under any conditions to those engaged in farming, tillage of the soil or stock raising or to any work done on a farm or country place, no matter what kind of work or service is being done or rendered. The fact that the University operates its farm land for the purpose of education and not for profit can not justify an exception being made of employees of the University who are injured while being engaged in any manner in the agricultural work excepted under the Act. No reason appears why an employee of the State should be placed in any other or different or better position than an employee of the individual farmer, if the work is in fact done on the farm land. The fact that the University operates its farms as experimental stations does not make a change in the fact that the work done is in fact work done on a farm.

“A farm means any tract of land used for raising crops or rearing animals.”

257 Southwestern, 220.

“A farm within the meaning of a statute giving the landlord a lien for rent, in standard and common acceptation, means a body of land usually under one ownership, devoted to agriculture, either to raising crops or pasture or both.”

158 Pacific, 608.

People vs. Caldwell, 142 Ill. 434.

Williams vs. C. & N. W. Ry., 228 Ill. 596.

In passing upon a statutory provision similar to that in Illinois, but not so broad in its phrasing’s, the following was held in Indiana:

“An employee of the State Girls School, whose duties were limited to work on a farm operated in connection with the school held to be a farm employee within the Workmen’s Compensation Act.”

Dowery vs. State, 149 N. E. 922.

An examination of Section 3 of the Illinois Compensation Act discloses that Sub-sections 1, 2, 3 and 7% all contain the following words “Except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section.”

Consequently, even if the University was engaged in any business or enterprise within the sub-sections 1, 2, 3, 7% or 8, an injury sustained in any such business or enterprise would not be compensable if the work done came within the exception set forth in Sub-paragraph 8.

In a Michigan case it appeared that a corporation, organized for the manufacture and sale of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, maintained a farm where it raised hay, rye and other farm products, the principal use, however, of the farm being in connection with the laboratory of the corporation, animals (from guinea pigs to horses) being kept on the farm for experimental purposes.

Held: The growing of grain and care of stock are the ordinary uses to which a farm is put, and any man employed to work on a farm and do the work ordinarily done there, regardless of the purpose, is a farm laborer.

Shaeffer vs. Parke Davis & Co., 159 N. W. (Mich.) 304.

The provisions of the Illinois Statute are more comprehensive than any other State to which the attention of the court has been called. In Nebraska the exception relative to farm work covers “employers of farm laborers.” In Iowa the excluding words are “farm or other laborer engaged in agricultural pursuits.” In Minnesota the words used are “farm laborers,” in Utah “agricultural laborers,” in Idaho ‘1 agricultural pursuits,” in Michigan “farm laborers,” in Indiana “farm or agricultural laborers and employers of such persons,” in New York “farm laborers.” In Illinois the exclusion under Sub-section 8 covers not only the employer but the employee, and also any work done, etc. It therefore seems that where the facts show that the work was done on a farm or country place then the injury is not compensable.

Under the provisions of Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Act, and upon the facts submitted and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should not be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury and that under same no award can be properly made.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 612

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

Claimant, at the time of the injury, was working on a metal pattern and in so doing got a particle of aluminum dust in his right eye. His occupation was that of mechanician, and if the machinery used in said department is power driven or subject to the regulations contemplated by Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, then the general duties incident to such work would be within the scope of the Act. Under the facts submitted and the foregoing assumption, and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended under, the provisions of Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Act.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 616

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

Under Sub-section 6. of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and upon the above facts submitted and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 595

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

An injury sustained by one while employed as a machinist in a machine shop, where sharp edged cutting tools, grinders and implements are used as per Sub-section 7% of Section 3 would come within the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and upon the facts submitted, and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 600

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

Under Sub-section 6 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and upon the foregoing facts submitted and from additional facts applying to the employment herein, as evidenced by the Farley claim, No. 616, and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended. In making this recommendation attention is called to Section 8-19-1-2 of the Act, relative to compensation claims.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 594

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

Under Sub-section 6 of Section 3 of the Act, and from the foregoing facts and from additional facts stated in the Farley Claim No. 616, and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 605

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

Because the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, it seems that the service of a brick-layer regularly employed in the maintenance and repair of brick work in the buildings on the University is not within Sub-sections 1 or 2 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The case of Therien vs. Industrial Commission, 351, Ill. 166, seems directly in point. No award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 610

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

From the facts stated, it does not appear that the work of a laborer engaged in the Department of Horticulture in the activities stated comes within any of the Sub-sections of Section 3 of the Act, nor that such work is in fact extra-hazard- » ous and that the University could in any sense be said to be ‘‘engaged in such business.” From a consideration of the cases heretofore cited and the facts stated, the court is of the opinion that no award should be made on this claim.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 607

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

The suggestions made under claim for S. E. Bunting, No. 611, are applicable to this claim. Under Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, no award should be made, as the facts show that the work in which the claimant was engaged was that of general farm work in the Department of Animal Husbandry. No award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 602

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

Because the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, as construed by the courts, it seems that the service of a plumber regularly employed in the maintenance and repair of plumbing work in the buildings of the University is not within the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The case of Therien vs. Industrial Commission, 351 Ill. 166 seems directly in point upon the facts stated. No award is recommended: See Lombard College vs. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 548.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 619

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

Apparently employee Nalley was employed as a general laborer in maintenance work about the buildings of the University. As heretofore stated in the case of Meyers, No. 602, and under the authorities heretofore cited, and the facts herein submitted, no award should be made.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 599

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

Under the facts submitted, it appears that the claimant was engaged in doing general farm work for the Agricultural Experimental Station of the University, and under Subsection 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, no award could be justified. See suggestions under claim of S. E. Bunting No. 611. . An award is not recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 597

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

Under Sub-section 7% of Section 3 of the Compensation Act, claimant would appear to be entitled to an award. Upon the above facts submitted and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 614

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

The claimant, from the above facts, seems to have been employed as a mechanician in the Engineering Shop of the University. Assuming that the machinery used in said shop is power driven, where he does machine work, or subject to the regulations contemplated by Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and under the facts submitted for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Ace should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended under the provisions of Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Act.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 601

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

If the operation of the power plant involves the use of power-driven machinery, an employee therein would seem to come within Paragraph 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act- — -(see Board of Education vs. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 611) — and an award is recommended, in this case, upon the facts submitted.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 604

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

This work is a part of the educational work of the University and is an item in its main business. Under Sub-section 2 of Section 3 and npon the above facts, this case would seem to be analygous to the manual training teacher’s work in Board of Education vs. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 611, and an award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 598

      Opinion submitted March 14, 1934.

   By the Court.

From the foregoing statement it would appear that claimant would come within the Sub-section 7% or 8 or both of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and upon the above facts submitted and for the sole purpose of arriving at a conclusion for the guidance and action of the officials of the University of Illinois, the Court of Claims is of the opinion that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be held applicable to the above named employee with reference to said injury. An award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 634

      Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

   By the Court.

As the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, as construed by the courts, the service of a mechanic regularly employed in the maintenance and repair of the buildings would not bring such employment within the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Upon the facts stated, (see Lombard College vs. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 548). No award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 628

      Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

   By the Court.

As this claim is for an employee who was engaged as a farm laborer, the employment is directly within the proviso of Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which expressly excepts any work done on a farm or country place, and no award can be recommended. (See Bunting vs. the State, U. of I. No. 611. C. of C. Reports.)


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 622

      Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

   By the Court.

As the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, as construed by the courts, the service of a mechanic regularly employed in the maintenance and repair of the buildings would not bring such employment within the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Upon the facts stated, no award is recommended. (See Lombard College vs. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 548.)


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 618

      Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

   By the Court.

Presumably the University Dairy Creamery and the University Pasteurization Plant are one and the same.

In its general opinion relative to the University of Illinois matters, filed in 1934, this court referred to the opinion of the Attorney General rendered March 27, 1928, in file matter No. 1400,- wherein the Attorney General rendered an opinion that the University is conducting its pasteurization plant in the College of Agriculture not as a business, but as a method of teaching the ways and means for proper pasteurization of milk. Being therefore a part of the general educational scheme and the educational work being the business or enterprise in which the University is engaged, and that enterprise being one in which State and municipal regulations are imposed, as stated in Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, an employee therein would be within the provisions of said Act.

However, if the work of such employee came within the further proviso of Sub-section 8 which excepts from the Act employees who perform “any work done on a farm or country place,” such proviso would control and no award should be made. As the facts in the immediate matter do not fully apear, the recommendation for an allowance of the claim is made dependent upon the actual employment not being within the exception against work done on a farm or country place. (See Bunting vs. State, No. 611.)


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 617

      Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

   By the Court.

If the operation of the power plant involved the use of power driven machinery, an employee therein would seem to come within the Sub-section 8 of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. (See Board of Education vs. Industrial Commission, 301 Ill. 611.) And as the facts herein stated show that a part of the duties of the injured employee included the repair of machinery in the power plant, an award is recommended.


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 627

      Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

   By the Court.

As the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, as construed by the courts, the service of a carpenter regularly employed in the maintenance and repair of the buildings would not bring such employment within the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Upon the facts stated, no award is recommended. (See Lombard College vs. The Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 548.)


text:
    University of Illinois,
    No. 633

      Opinion submitted April 26, 1934.

   By the Court.

As the business of the University of Illinois is not that of maintaining and operating buildings, as construed by the courts, the service of a janitor employed regularly in the maintenance and repair of the buildings would not bring such employment within the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The case of Therien vs. Industrial Commission, 351 Ill. 166, seems directly in point upon the facts stated. (See Lombard College vs. Industrial Commission, 294 Ill. 548.) No award is recommended.


text:
    (Nos. 1570-1575-1576-1577, Consolidated
    Robert F. Hunter, No. 1570, Charles A. Townsend, No. 1575, E. M. Sorrells, No. 1576 and Thomas Sweeney, No. 1577, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 8, 1931.

      Rehearing denied, May 12, 1937.

    Claimants, pro se.
    Otto Keener, Attorney General, and John Kasserman, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam:

The above claims are consolidated and the facts in each case are similar. Therefore they can be considered together.

It appears that each claimant was appointed arbitrator for the Illinois Industrial Commission on Nov. 21st, 1927. From the date of their appointment until July 21st, 1929 each claimant received a salary of $5,000.00 per annum. After July 21st, 1929 each claimant received pay at the rate of $4,250.00 per annum until their services as arbitrators were terminated. The claimants contend that they were officers of the State and under the well defined rule their pay could not be altered or changed during their term of office.

The Attorney General comes in and contends that by reason of an amendment approved June 17th, 1929 and in force July 1st, 1929 to the Civil Administrative Code of 1917 that the status of such arbitrators was changed to employees of the State of Illinois and that they were correctly paid.

This court is of the opinion that the salaries of officers of the State cannot be changed during their term of office or until their successors are appointed and qualified. However it is the further opinion of the court that the Legislature has the power of changing the status of such officers from that of officer to employee which we believe the Legislature intended to do in these cases.

Therefore this court is of the opinion that claimants were paid the proper amount under the law and it is ordered that all of said claims be disallowed.

Opinion on Rehearing.

All in this court now pending on petition for rehearing. Petition for rehearing denied. For additional grounds see opinion in cases of Max R. Broderic, No. 2162, Samuel J. Simon, No. 2163, Aaron J. Payne, No. 2164, Sellac G. Graham, No. 2167, William H. Cruden, No. 2670 and Ernest Withall, No. 2671.


author:
      Me. Chief Justice Hollebich
      Per Curiam:

text:
    (No. 2286
    Grover Ewing, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1934.

      Rehearing allowed January 10, 1935.

      Opinion on rehearing filed September 10, 1935.

    O ’Habra, 0 ’Habra & Roeth, for claimants.
    Otto Kerner, Attorney General, and John Kasserman, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Me. Chief Justice Hollebich

delivered the opinion of the court:

On the 24th day of March, A. D. 1933 claimant was employed by the Department of Agriculture, Division of Animal Industry, and was working with Dr. L. Campbell, a licensed veterinarian of said Department in testing cattle for tuberculosis. On said date they were working on the farm of Paul Linkemann in Hancock County, and in the course of the work, the claimant was knocked down by a calf and such calf, as well as another calf, fell upon him and as a result thereof the ligaments of his right leg were torn and the muscles wrenched, resulting thereafter in an arthritic condition of the right ankle and foot.

Notice of the accident was given, and claim for compensation made, in accordance with the requirements of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and under the terms and provisions of such Act, the claimant now seeks to recover sixteen weeks ’ temporary total compensation, and twenty-five weeks ’ specific loss, to-wit, twenty per cent (20%) of the loss of the use of the right foot and ankle, together with $25.00 paid by him for medical services.

In order to entitle the claimant to an award under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it is necessary for him to bring himself within the provisions of such Act, and to prove, among other things, that the respondent, at the time of the accident in question, was engaged in some department of some one or more of the enterprises or businesses which are declared to be extra-hazardous by Section Three (3) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; or to show that the occupation in which he was then engaged was extra-hazardous in fact, and not otherwise excluded from the purview of the Act. No evidence whatsoever was produced by the claimant to meet such requirements.

Furthermore, the proviso contained in Paragraph eight of said Section Three of the Compensation Act is as follows:

“Provided nothing contained herein shall be construed to apply to any work, employment or operations done, had or conducted by farmers and others engaged in farming, tillage of the soil, or stock raising, or to those who rent, demise or lease land for any such purposes, or to anyone in their employ, or to any work done on, a farm or country place, no matter what kind of work or service is being done or rendered.”
Cahill’s Revised Statutes, 1933, Chap. 48, Par. 202.

A somewhat similar question arose in the case of Hill vs. Ind. Com., 346 Ill. 392. In that case the claimant was working for a farmer by the name of Weber who bought a threshing machine and engaged in threshing grain for his neighbors as well as for himself, and afterwards attached a clover hulling device to the separator, and agreed to hull clover for some of his neighbors. Hill assisted in running the threshing machine and operated the separator while hulling clover. While engaged in such work on the farm of a neighbor, Hill was kicked by a horse and sustained injuries for which he claimed compensation. The employer contended that the work in which they were then engaged, being work on a farm, he, as the employer did not automatically come under the Act and that consequently he was not liable to pay compensation. In that case the court, on page 396, said:

"By the usual rule of construction the words ‘any work done on a farm or country place’ must be limited by the context of the Act to mean work which is in its nature a part of farming. It cannot be said that plaintiff in error, while hulling clover for another for hire, was a farmer engaged in farming, tillage of the soil or stock raising, renting, demising or leasing land for any such purpose on his own behalf, and if this were the extent of the exemption we would be constrained to agree with the contention of defendant in error that the operation here were under the Act. The exemption, however, goes further and applies to any work done on a farm or country place, no matter what kind of work is being done or rendered. Even limiting this language to work which is in its nature farm work, it is apparent that the Legislature intended to exclude from the operation of the Act not only the employer and employee who are engaged in general farming operations for such employer but who are doing any farm work on a farm or country place.”

and held that the injury was not compensable.

In the case of Noverio vs. Ind. Com., 348 Ill. 157, the employee undertook a patch-tiling job on a farm, and while engaged at his home, which was a considerable distance from the farm in question, in making screens to cover the tile outlet, a piece of metal struck his eye, whereby the vision thereof was totally destroyed.

The employee contended that inasmuch as sharp-edged cutting tools were used by him in the doing of the work, the employer came under the provisions of Paragraph 7½ of Section 3 of the Act, and the employer contended that the work was within the exception of Paragraph 8 of Section 3 of the Act. In that case the court, on page 139, said:

“Without regard to the question as to whether Corsini’s business could be held to involve excavating or the use of sharp-edged cutting tools within the contemplation of the statute, it clearly was in its nature farm work. No work could be more fundamentally a part of farming than drainage to put the soil in shape for cultivation. That it was being done by one not engaged in general farming himself is immaterial. It is true that the portion of the operation in which the injury actually occurred does not appear to have been performed within the physical boundaries of the particular farm for which the tiling was being done, nor is it definitely shown to have been done on soil in the nature of a farm or country place as distinguished from other types of realty. Such, however, is not here a material consideration. The adjournment to Corsini’s basement was obviously to facilitate the completion of an integral part of the drainage system that was in process of installation on the farm and the character of the work was in no sense altered thereby.”

In that case the court held that the employer and the employee were engaged in work on a farm and that therefore the injury was not compensable.

Under the evidence in the record, and under the law as laid down in the cases cited, there is no liability on the part of the respondent.

Award is therefore denied and the case dismissed.

Opinion on Rehearing.

Per Curiam:

A rehearing having been allowed on the petition of the claimant, he now contends that he is entitled to an award on the following grounds:

(1) The enterprise in which he was engaged at the time of the accident in question is one in which a “sharp-pointed instrument, namely, a hypodermic needle or syringe” is used, and he thereby automatically comes within the provisions of the Act.

(2) The work in which he was engaged at the time of the accident in question was not in its nature farm work.

We will consider the contentions in the order above set forth.

(1) The provisions of the statute upon which claimant relies to bring himself automatically under the Act is Paragraph 7½ of Section 3 of the Workmen.’s Compensation Act, which provides that the Compensation Act shall apply automatically and without election to “any enterprise in which sharp edged cutting tools, grinders or implements are used, including all enterprises which buy, sell or handle junk and salvage, demolish or reconstruct machinery, except as provided in sub-paragraph 8 of this section.”

It will be noted that the paragraph in question refers to “sharp-edged cutting tools” and not to “sharp-pointed instruments ’ ’ as contended by claimant. It cannot be seriously contended that a hypodermic needle or syringe is a “sharp-edged cutting tool,” and consequently claimant has no basis either in law or in fact upon which to base a claim under this paragraph of the statute. Furthermore, said Paragraph 7½, by the terms thereof, has no application to any case which comes within the exception mentioned in sub-paragraph 8, relative to work done on a farm.

(2) This contention was fully considered in the opinion originally filed herein, and our attention has not been called to any matters of fact or law which have caused us to change the views we originally entertained.

Award is therefore denied and the case dismissed.


text:
    (No. 2412
    George Ira Curry, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 10, 1935.

      Rehearing denied October 17, 1935.

    Bryan H. Tivnen, for claimant.
    Otto Keener, Attorney General, and John Kasserman, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Me. Chief Justice Hollebich

delivered the opinion of the court:

Claimant filed his complaint herein on June 21st, 1934, and alleges therein in substance, that prior to and on the 29th day of October, A. D. 1933 one Maurice Brunner was top sergeant of Company I, 130th Infantry, Illinois National Guard, which had its headquarters and armory at Salem, and which said Company was on active duty at Harrisburg on account of disorders in the mining region; that said Maurice Brunner was then the owner of a certain Ford automobile which he rented to the Company from October 5th to October 20th, 1933; that said Company as a part of its equipment had certain tear gas bombs consisting of a detonator and a shield or covering forming a chamber for the gas; that the detonator contained the cap or explosive used to explode the bomb; that such bombs and other equipment of the Company were carried and transported in the Ford car of said Maurice Brunner; that said car was returned to said Maurice Brunner by the officers of said Company on October 20th, 1933, being first unloaded at the Armory in Salem and checked in by the officers of said Company; that the officers of said Company carelessly and negligently failed and neglected to remove one of the detonators of said tear gas bombs from said car before returning the same to Maurice Brunner, and on the contrary, carelessly and negligently left said detonator in said car; that said officers well knew and appreciated the dangerous character of said detonator and the fact that said car was used by said Maurice Brunner for family purposes and for the transportation of invited guests; that on the 29th day of October, A. D. 1933, claimant and his wife were passengers in said car as invited guests of said Maurice Brunner; that while riding in said car claimant saw and found the detonator in question, picked it up, and handled and examined the same, having no knowledge or notice of the dangerous or explosive character thereof; that said detonator then and there exploded without any fault or neglect on the part of the claimant while he was examining the same as aforesaid; that by reason thereof claimant’s thumb and the index finger of his right hand were blown off, and the second finger of his right hand was so shattered and mangled that it became necessary to amputate the same; that he was otherwise painfully and permanently injured; that he has been put to considerable expense for necessary medical and hospital care and attention and was rendered unable to perform his business duties; — and asks for an award of $10,000.00 for the damages so sustained by him as aforesaid.

The Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the case for the reason that the State is not liable for the negligence of the officers and enlisted men in the Illinois National Guard.

Thereafter the claimant amended his complaint by alleging that the tear gas bombs mentioned in the complaint were defective in construction, and by reason of such fact, the detonators became detached therefrom; that said detonators were likewise defective in construction and exploded prematurely by reason of such faulty and defective construction, and that the injuries sustained by the claimant were occasioned by the carelessness or negligence of the officers of said Company as aforesaid and the faulty and defective construction of said bomb and detonator.

Claimant filed suggestions in opposition to the motion to dismiss, and therein admits that there is no legal liability on the part of the respondent under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but maintains that he is entitled to an award under the so-called doctrine of equity and good conscience.

We are aware of the fact that during a certain period in the history of this court, awards were made in cases where the State was not legally liable, and which were sought to be justified on the grounds of what was known as the doctrine of equity and good conscience. However, the court as now constituted, has not seen fit to follow the decisions just referred to, but has followed the earlier decisions of the court to the effect that the provisions of Section 6 of the Court of Claims Act, and particularly Paragraph 4 thereof, which provides that this court shall have power to hear and determine all claims and demands, legal and equitable, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, which the State as a sovereign commonwealth should, in equity and good conscience, discharge and pay; — does not increase or enlarge the liability of the State, but merely provides a forum wherein claims against the State may be adjudicated.

This question was exhaustively considered in the case of Crabtree vs. State, 7 C. C. R. 207, in which the authorities on the question from the time of the creation of the court down to the date of the hearing, were analyzed and considered. After a consideration of the authorities on the question, we reached the following conclusion:

“We conclude, therefore, that Section four (4) of Paragraph six (6) of the Court of Claims Act, which provides as follows, to-wit: The Court of Claims shall have power: ‘to hear and determine all claims and demands, legal and equitable, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, which the State as a sovereign commonweath, should, in equity and good conscience, discharge and pay’; merely defined the jurisdiction of the court, and does not create a new liability against the State, nor increase or enlarge any existing liability; that the jurisdiction of this court is limited to claims in respect of which the claimant would be entitled to redress against the State either at law or in equity, if the State were suable; that this court has no authority to allow any claim unless there is a legal or equitable obligation on the part of the State to pay the same; however much the claim might appeal to the sympathies of the court; that unless the claimant can bring himself within the provisions of a law giving him the right to an award, he cannot invoke the principles of equity and good conscience to secure such an award.
“The claimant having failed to bring himself within the provisions of the law entitling him to an award, there is nothing this court can do but deny the claim.”

The Legislature has not enacted any law making the State liable for the negligence of the officers or enlisted men in the Illinois National Guard, consequently there is no legal liability on the part of the State in this case, and this court has no jurisdiction to enter an award.

It is therefore ordered that an award be denied and the case dismissed.

Opinion on Rehearing.

Per Curiam:

Claimant filed a petition for rehearing herein and contends that the court has entirely overlooked claimant’s amendment to his original complaint alleging in substance that the tear gas bombs or grenades, as well as the detonators in question, were defective in construction and that the injury resulted by reason of such faulty and defective construction.

The amendment was not overlooked in the original opinion, but, on the contrary, is specifically referred 'to and the substance thereof set forth in such opinion.

The State acts only through its officers and agents, and if there were any liability herein, it would be the result of some act of negligence on the part of its said officers or agents. In the exercise of its governmental functions, however, the State is not liable for the negligence of its officers or agents' in the absence of a statute making it so liable.

All of the questions involved in the case were fully considered by the court on the hearing of the motion to dismiss, and the facts set forth in the complaint as amended, if true, do not constitute sufficient grounds for an award against the State.

Petition for rehearing is therefore denied.


author: Mr. Chief Justice Hollerich

text:
    (No. 2077
    Walfred S. Haller, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 12, 1935.

      Rehearing denied October 17, 1935.

    Frederick J. Bertram, for claimant.
    Otto Kerner, Attorney General, and John Kasserman, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Hollerich

delivered the opinion of the court:

Prior to and on the 1st day of August, 1931, claimant was a Private in the 202nd Coast Artillery, Illinois National Guard, and on the last mentioned date sustained certain personal injuries as the result of a collision between an army truck on which he was riding, and a civilian automobile.

The facts in the case are fully set forth in the opinion of this court in the case of Jean A. Mack, Administratrix of the estate of Roland E. Mack, vs. State, No. 1944, decided at this (January, 1935) term, to which reference is made therefor.

Claimant contends that his case differs from the Mack case in the following particulars:

1. That claimant and two other soldiers were instructed by Captain McPhail to assist in the loading and unloading of the supplies being sent from Camp Grant to Coon Creek.

2. The findings of the Military Board applied only to the case of Boland E. Mack and had no application to this case.

3. That claimant was one of the men who were told by Captain McPhail that if there was room for them to get aboard the truck and ride, it would be satisfactory to him;— while Private Boland E. Mack was not one of such men.

The contentions of claimant will be considered in the order above set forth:

1. The contention that claimant was instructed by Captain McPhail to assist in the loading and unloading of the supply truck was first made in the supplemental brief and argument filed herein on January 17th, 1935. No such contention was previously made by claimant and there is nothing in the record to sustain it. Counsel for claimant contends that claimant so testified in open court, but apparently such testimony was not reported, as it does not appear in the record. On the other hand, the stipulation of facts filed herein on July 6th, 1933 states (page 5): “The claimant, Waif red S. Haller, while not a regularly assigned member of the truck detail, assisted in loading the army truck.”

2. It may be conceded that the finding of the Military Board has no application to this case.

3. Claimant contends that he was one of the men who were told by Captain McPhail that if there was room for them to get aboard the truck and ride, it would be satisfactory to him. This may also be conceded.

The sailent facts in this connection are as follows:—

(a) The statement of Captain McPhail was in response to an inquiry by some enlisted men.

(b) The inquiry was made because the men were seeking transportation to Coon Creek to attend a dance.

(c) The statement of Captain McPhail plainly constituted merely a permission and could not be construed as an order.

(d) The permission to go to Coon Creek in the truck was contingent upon “there being room for them to get aboard and ride.”

(e) The stipulation of facts (page 6) shows, “The claimant was compelled to take a position on the left front fender, the body of the truck being filled with provisions cmd other members of the advance detail”; — hence there was no room in the truck.

(f) Just prior to and at the time of the accident, claimant was riding in an exposed position on the left front fender of the truck with his feet upon the bumper.

Upon a careful consideration of the case we fail to find any material distinction between this case and the case of Private Boland E. Mack and the conclusions at which we arrived in that case apply with equal force to this case.

Claimant also contends that an award should be made to him on the grounds of equity and good conscience. The right of any claimant to an award on that ground was exhaustively considered by this court in the case of Crabtree vs. State, 7 C. C. R. 207, in which the court, after a consideration of the authorities on the question from the time of the creation of the court down to the time of such hearing, reached the following conclusion:

“We conclude, therefore, that Section four (4) of Paragraph six (6) of the Court of Claims Act, which provides as follows, to-wit: The Court of Claims shall have power: ‘to hear and determine all claims and demands legal and equitable, liquidated and unliquidated, éx contractu and ex delicto which the State as a sovereign commonwealth, should, in equity and good conscience, discharge and pay’; merely defined the jurisdiction of the court, and does not create a new liability against the State, nor in-increase or enlarge any existing liability; that the jurisdiction of this court is limited to claims in respect of which the claimant would he entitled to redress against the State either at law or in equity, if the State were suable; that this court has no authority to allow any claims unless there is a, legal or equitable obligation on the part of the State to pay the same, however much the claimant might appeal to the sympathies of the court; that unless the claimant can bring himself within the provisions of a law giving him the right to an award, he cannot invoke the principles of equity and good conscience to secure such an award.
“The claimant having failed to bring himself within the provisions of the law entitling him to an award, there is nothing this court can do but deny the claim.”

The decision in the Crabtree case has been followed by this court in numerous cases since that time, and we are not disposed to depart from the same.

Award must therefore be denied. Award denied. Case dismissed.