text:
    (No. 83-CC-1524
    The County of Randolph, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 13, 1983.

    William A. Schuwerk, Jr., for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This cause coming to be heard on the Respondent’s motion to dismiss and the Court being duly advised in the premises:

Finds, that the record in this cause establishes that this is a claim by Randolph County for reimbursement for numerous petitions for writs of habeas corpus by inmates of institutions located in Randolph County, Illinois, which petitions were presented to the circuit court of Randolph County, Illinois, and that these petitions are filed by inmates who are not residents of Randolph County, State of Illinois, at the time of their commitment and were not committed by any court of the County of Randolph.

The County of Randolph, Illinois, has situated within its borders the Chester Mental Health Center and the Menard Correctional Center. Section 27.1 of the Clerks of Courts Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 25, par. 27.1) provides that the fee for the clerk of the circuit court shall be $40.00 as to each petition for writ of habeas corpus filed with such clerk. There were 34 of such writs filed on or subsequent to March 17, 1982. Section 8 of “An Act concerning fees and salaries” (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 53, par. 8) provides that the fee of the State’s attorney shall be $25.00 for each day actually employed in the hearing of a case of habeas corpus in which the People of the State of Illinois are interested. The total number of days was 34. Section 1 of “An Act in relation to . . . county law libraries” (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 81, par. 81) provides that a fee of $2.00 shall be charged for each civil case when a pleading is filed to defray the cost of the law library. The total number of such filings was 34.

Section 1 of “An Act to provide for (re)imbursement of counties . . . for expenses . . . incurred in habeas corpus proceedings” (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 65, par. 37) provides that the State of Illinois, through the Court of Claims, shall assume and pay to each county the necessary expenses incurred by it and its officers, either by means of service rendered or otherwise, by reason of court proceedings in such county involving petitions for writs of habeas corpus by such inmates as above alleged; that this claim is presented in accordance with said section of said statutes.

The claim of County of Randolph against the State of Illinois for. these necessary expenses as set forth above amounts to the sum of $1,357.00.

It is hereby ordered, that the Claimant, County of Randolph, bé awarded, in full accord and satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause, the sum of $1,357.00 (one thousand three hundred fifty seven and 00 dollars).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Roe, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 83-CC-2059
    Gordon Baker, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 9, 1983.

      Edward T. Graney, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (James A. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This matter is before the Court on the Respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this claim. The Claimant having filed no objection to said motion, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, finds as follows:

Claimant contends that the driver, Tommie Craft, of the National Guard truck was an agent of the State of Illinois at the time of the accident. This Court in McRaven v. State (1972), 23 Ill. Ct. Cl. 5, stated this was essential if the Court was to have jurisdiction over this cause of action.

The Claimant and the driver of the truck were Illinois National Guardsmen en route to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, for summer training. The truck went out of control and crashed in Columbia County, Caledonia Township, Wisconsin. Both the driver and the Claimant were participating in Federally required and funded annual training pursuant to 32 U.S.C. 503.

In Porter v. State (1975), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 51, the Court denied the claim and held that the driver was performing Federally funded annual training pursuant to 32 U.S.C. 503, and therefore was on a Federal mission and not performing a State function. Hence, the driver was not an agent of the State at the time of the incident and the State was not liable.

Since the National Guard unit to which the driver was attached was not performing a State function or in State service at the time of the accident, the driver could not have been an agent or an employee of the State of Illinois. The Respondent cannot be held responsible for the driver’s acts because of this fact, and therefore the Court does not have jurisdiction over the matter.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-2445
    William J. Harte, Ltd., a professional corporation, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 9, 1983.

    Kevin M. Forde, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (William R. Wallin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This is a claim for payment of attorney fees awarded to the Claimant in a case styled In re Illinois Congressional District Reapportionment Cases, Master File No. 81-C-3915. Actions were brought in both the circuit court of Cook County and the United States District Courts for both the Southern and Northern Districts in Illinois contesting the constitutionality of the Illinois congressional redistricting which was done after the 1980 census. The Claimant here represented one of the plaintiffs, Earl Neal Otto.

The State Board of Elections conceded the unconstitutionality of the reapportionment plan. The issue for the trial court was the determination as to which reapportionment plan was to be adopted and the issue on appeal was the amount of attorney fees.

The question for the Court of Claims to decide is whether it has the authority to make an award in this claim. The State Board of Elections has insufficient funds to pay this claim, and there is no other appropriate agency which would have the funds. Although the Federal suit arose under the Civil Rights Act, this is not a claim under the Indemnification Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 1301 et seq.). This is a claim directly against the State, not a claim to indemnify any State employee.

There is no doubt that under the current Federal law that the State is liable. 42 U.S.C. 1988 provides that attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party in a civil rights suit. In his orders of May 25, 1982, and May 19, 1983, the U.S. district judge ordered that the attorney fees be paid. Interest is due on such awards under 26 U.S.C. 1961.

We view this claim similar to those in which we make awards because the indebtedness was expressly authorized by law. In a distinct, but similar, situation, this Court, in Butterfield v. State (1961), 24 Ill. Ct. Cl. 85, determined that the fees of a private attorney hired by the State Treasurer to defend his official actions when the Attorney General was unable to defend him could be paid by this Court even though there were insufficient funds available for the State Treasurer to pay them directly. We said there that “neither Mr. Wright [the State Treasurer] nor the Legislature could anticipate the necessity of his defending an action brought against him in his official capacity by the Attorney General, who ordinarily would represent him.” (24 Ill. Ct. Cl. 85, 97.) Likewise here, neither the State Board of Elections nor the General Assembly could be expected to anticipate either the award or its size. In general the State cannot forecast either the frequency or size of awards that may be made against the State in Federal court, especially since the Federal laws and court decisions are relatively new and represent an erosion of sovereign immunity and the eleventh amendment, on which the State has previously relied.

We therefore determine that an award of $183,420.67 plus interest at the rate of 12.194% from the date of the original judgment, May 25, 1982, until the date the voucher is prepared should be made. Since this claim will have to be paid through a special awards bill, it will be paid by November 1, 1983, at the latest. At that time, interest will amount to $32,906.48. Thus, we make a total award not to exceed $216,327.15, the exact amount to be calculated on the date the voucher is prepared.


author: Roe, C. J.

text:
    (No. 82-CC-1086

      In re Application of Elizabeth J. Randall.

      Opinion filed October 6, 1982.

    Doggett & Foran (Richard M. Doggett, of counsel), for Claimant.

      Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General (Edward C. Hurley III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C. J.

Claimant brought this claim as the designated beneficiary seeking compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 48 par. 281 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Pursuant to an order of this Court her claim was assigned to a commissioner for hearing and a hearing was held July 29, 1982, at the Court of Claims courtroom in Springfield, Illinois.

It appears from the evidence presented that Herbert W. Randall was married to the Applicant. She was his designated beneficiary under the Act. He was employed as an investigator for the Vermilion County Sheriffs Department, and also worked part-time for the village of Gatlin as a patrolman. The evidence further showed that a condition of his employment as investigator for Vermilion County was that he was subject to 24-hour call, and that in the event that an incident or an investigation required his presence, this would take precedence over his duties as a patrolman for the village of Gatlin.

It was further shown by the exhibits, affidavits, and testimony that on August 11, 1981, the decedent left his duties with the sheriff’s department at 4:00 p.m. and went to his home in Georgetown, Illinois, for dinner. At that time he changed into a uniform of the Gatlin Police Department, ate dinner and left in the family automobile at approximately 4:45 p.m. for the village of Gatlin. The Applicant testified that she assumed he would stop for gasoline in the family car because she had used the car that day. There was testimony that the decedent was taking the most direct route to the village of Gatlin. Further, there was testimony that had he arrived at the home of the chief of police of the village of Gatlin, he would have changed vehicles and proceeded upon routine patrol in a marked squad car for the village of Gatlin. The tour of duty was to commence at 5:00 p.m. and conclude at 9:00 p.m.

The investigative reports indicate that when the decedent approached the village of Westfield, an automobile operated by a Steven R. Neal appeared at the intersection of Route 150 and Virginia Street at a high rate of speed and was being operated in a reckless manner. In an attempt to overtake another vehicle, Neal was said to have sides wiped and forced said vehicle off the roadway at which point the Neal vehicle proceeded into the northbound lane and hit the decedent’s vehicle head on. This evidence was not objected to, not corroborated, and not refuted. The death certificate recites that the decedent was killed immediately from a basal skull fracture as a result of the accident.

Counsel for Applicant and Respondent both seeni to agree, and we concur, that the only issue in this case is whether or not the decedent was “killed in the line of duty” as provided by sections 2(e) and 3 of the Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 48, pars. 282(e), 283.) Both counsel waived the filing of briefs and asked the Court to decide the case on the record. Neither party could cite a previous Court of Claims decision directly on point.

In general, this Court’s decisions on the issue have closely paralleled workmen’s compensation rules. The rule which has evolved in the field of workmen’s compensation and generally applied by this Court is to determine whether the employee, when injured, was at a place where by reason of his employment, he was required to be, or whether he was subject, by reason of his employment, to a hazard to which the general public is not exposed or to which he, by reason of his employment, is exposed peculiarly to a greater degree than the public. We believe this test is within the spirit and intent of the Act and closely summarizes our analysis of all of the prior claims. Even in cases where the decedent died of a heart attack we have tried to discern a direct causal link between the heart attack and some official activity. The statute states in part: “ ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer.” (Emphasis added). (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e)). Webster’s Dictionary defines the word “active” as “characterized by action rather than contemplation” and “produced of or involving action or movement”. Therefore we have looked into what exactly the person was doing at the time of his death.

Under workmen’s compensation case law it has been held that simply because a law enforcement officer is on call 24 hours a day, any injuries sustained-must still be in some way dependent on the claimant’s status as a police officer. Siens v. Industrial Commission (1981), 84 Ill.2d 361, 481 N.E.2d 749.

Turning to the facts in the case at bar in light of the discussion above, we have a police officer in uniform, in his personal vehicle driving to his place of employment, with certain conjecture that he may have stopped for gasoline for his personal vehicle. His personal vehicle was not equipped with any radio equipment nor had he been contacted for any police work or activity. It is our opinion that the decedent would not have commenced in the “active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer” until he would have arrived at the residence of the chief of police of the village of Gatlin, changed vehicles from his own car to the marked squad car, and begun to patrol or gone about assigned duties from the chief of. police. Although there was much testimony concerning the period of time for which he was in fact paid and the exact time of death, we do not find it persuasive, for benefits under the Act are not limited to paid persons. Even though a person may be paid for working certain hours, if he is not actually on the job in the active performance of his duties, he is not within coverage of the Act.

The unfortunate death of Mr. Randall came as a result, in our opinion, of a hazard to which all of the general public is subjected and cannot be linked or related to his employment as a law. enforcement officer other than by commuting to his secondary place of employment.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied.


text:
    (No. 82-CC-1921

      In re Application of Eunice J. Rivers.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1983.

    Eunice J. Rivers, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Edward C. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

The Claimant herein, Eunice J. Rivers, seeks an award based upon the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.), by reason of the death of her husband, Allen Albert Rivers, Jr., who died on December 29, 1981, while on duty at the University of Illinois police department.

The decedent was a 51-year-old male employed as a field supervisor on the University of Illinois police department. His duties required him to work both inside at a desk and outside in good weather and bad. During the one-year period immediately preceding the date of his death he suffered from diabetes, hypertension, poor circulation, swelling of the feet and legs, and chronic lung disease. The decedent was overweight, had difficulty controlling his weight and ate when he was nervous or upset from his job. During the three weeks immediately preceding his death, Mr. Rivers showed signs of fatigue, had difficulty sleeping, and would nod off during the day, even while engaged in conversation. Additionally, Mr. Rivers was suffering from an ulcer on his leg, swelling of his legs and the residual effects of severe frostbite which occurred while he was on duty, but not within the one-year period preceding his death. On December 18, 1981, he was advised by his physician, Victor S. Wojnar, M.D., to enter the hospital, which the decedent refused to do.

Mr. Rivers, in the performance of his duties as an officer, worked 40 hours per week and additionally, he was required to work mandatory overtime. During the 10 days immediately preceding his death he worked a 40-hour week and, in addition to his regular duties on December 19, 1981, worked 3.8 hours of overtime; on December 22, 1981, he worked 3.8 hours of overtime; on December 25, 1981, he worked 3.8 hours of overtime.

On the morning of December 29, 1981, he arose from bed, stated that he was not feeling well and vomited prior to leaving for work. He drove to the police station in near zero temperatures and arrived sometime prior to 7:00 a.m. While on duty he was seen by his fellow officers to be gasping for breath. He collapsed and was taken by ambulance to Burnham City Hospital and at 7:58 a.m. was pronounced dead. The cause of death was massive myocardial infarction due to or as a consequence of hypertension.

The issue is whether Claimant’s decedent was killed in the line of duty, as defined in section 2(e) of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e).

Although coverage of the Act is not limited to healthy persons, the preponderance of the evidence shows that Claimant’s decedent was not killed in the line of duty, as defined under section 2(e) of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e)) and the guidelines set forth by the Court of Claims, as his death did not arise from “violence or other accidental cause.” See Wierciak v. State (1982), No. 00192; McInerny v. State (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 300; Hedge v. State (1982), No. 00195; Balcer v. State (1980), 34 Ill.Ct.Cl. 311, and McNamara v. State (1982), No. 81-CC-2814.

The Act provides for payment of compensation only in cases in which an officer is killed in the line of duty as stated in section 2(e) of the Act. To recover under the Act, Claimant must prove that decedent lost his life as a result of injury which arose from violence or other accidental cause. It is not disputed that the decedent was on duty at the time of his death. However, the circumstances under which the decedent died in no way satisfy the requirements of the Act, allowing compensation.

In all of the above cited cases, the Court denied an award because the claimant was unable to prove a violent or accidental cause leading to the heart attack. In the McNamara case, the Court said:

“Clearly there can be no recovery under the statute if Captain McNamara was not first injured. Death alone is not sufficient. It must be preceded by an injury. In all cases involving death by heart attack an effort is made to pin-point an injury which triggered the fatal attack.”

Applying the above to the facts, it is clear that Mr. Rivers, in arriving at work, was not engaged in any activity which posed risks inherent in the job of law enforcement.

The Court must also consider its decision in light of the precedent it creates. By granting recovery the Court would adopt a position which essentially would allow compensation merely where an officer dies while at work. This position is inconsistent with the intent of the legislature.

It is therefore ordered that the claim of Eunice J. Rivers be, and hereby is, denied.


text:
    (No. 82-CC-2788

      In re Application of George Redman, Sr.

      Opinion on denial of section 2-1401 petition filed October 7, 1982.

    George Redman, Sr., pro se, for Claimant.
    Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General (Francis Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION ON DENIAL OF SECTION 2-1401 PETITION

Roe, C. J.

This is a claim allegedly arising out of the death of a deputy sheriff seeking payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

The date of Applicant’s decedent’s death was alleged to have been August 12, 1974. According to section 3 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 283), in order for compensation to be awarded by this Court, a claim therefor must be made within a year of the death of the law enforcement officer. The instant claim was filed on June 28, 1982, nearly eight years after the decedent’s death. This alone is sufficient to mandate our denial of an award.

A claim based upon the same incident involving the same decedent and filed by the same Applicant herein was previously presented to this Court which claim was entitled George Redman, Sr. v. State of Illinois (1979), 32 Ill.Ct.Cl. 1031. A claim for benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.) was also filed. (See 32 Ill.Ct.Cl. 1005.) Both claims were determined to be noncompensable primarily due to the failure of the Applicant to sustain his burden of proving that the decedent lost his life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer and/or that he lost his life as a result of a crime. In such a situation the doctrine of res judicata applies and therefore this claim would be barred on a second ground.

However, attached to the application in the case at bar is an affidavit by the Applicant stating that new evidence has been discovered which allegedly shows that the decedent was killed in the line of duty. Several pages of testimony of a witness in an unidentifiable type of hearing entitled “Partial Transcript of Proceedings” was filed along with the application. Applicant apparently filed this second application as a “Section 72 request” as he refers to it in his affidavit. We infer that he is referring to section 72 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 72), which was renumbered section 2-1401 of the same chapter by amendment effective July 1, 1982.

According to section 2-1401 (c) (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par.2-1401(c)), petitions for relief in the nature of that which the Applicant is seeking must be filed not later than two years after the entry of the order of judgment. The final order in case No. 00092, Applicant’s previous claim, was entered on April 2, 1979, a point in time more than three years prior to the filing of the petition at bar. Therefore, construing the application as a petition for relief under the above cited provision of the Civil Practice Act,, we are constrained by law to deny it as being untimely.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-1879

      In re Application of Kimberly Sobbe.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1983.

    Kimberly Sobbe, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C. J.

Claimant seeks an award pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

The Court has reviewed Claimant’s application for benefits together with the written statement of decedent’s supervisor and has also reviewed the medical examiner’s certificate of death, the designation of beneficiary and the report of the Attorney General. From its consideration of these documents the Court finds:

1. A claim was filed herein by Kimberly Sobbe, widow of Kenneth J. Sobbe, who died on January 21, 1983, while on duty as a firefighter for the New Lenox Fire Protection District.

2. Kimberly Sobbe is entitled to any award authorized by this Court as beneficiary designated by the decedent, Kenneth J. Sobbe.

3. The decedent was on duty on the date of his death and was riding on a fire tanker which was involved in a traffic accident while responding to a call to the scene of a fire. Decedent was taken to a hospital where he was pronounced dead.

4. The medical examiner’s certificate of death lists the cause of death as extreme multiple injuries.

5. There is nothing in the circumstances to suggest that decedent’s death resulted from the wilful misconduct or intoxication of the decedent.

6. The facts as herein reported are in compliance with the requirements of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

By reason of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that an award of $20,000.00 be, and is hereby made to Kimberly Sobbe, as designated beneficiary of Kenneth J. Sobbe, as is required by the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-1914

      In re Application of Elizabeth T. Herrick.

      Opinion filed May 4, 1983.

    Johnson, Frank & Frederick, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (James A. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C. J.

Elizabeth Herrick, surviving spouse, brings this claim as widow and beneficiary of Kenneth Herrick, deceased, pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois National Guardsman’s and Naval Militiaman’s Compensation Act, hereinafter ‘the Act’. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 129, par. 401 et seq.) Claimant seeks to recover under the Act for the death of her husband, Captain Kenneth Herrick, who died as the result of an air-craft mishap in the performance of his duty for the Illinois National Guard. On March 19, 1982, the decedent was on duty for the Illinois National Guard. On March 19, 1982, the decedent was on duty as a navigator. His death resulted from a mid-air explosion of the aircraft at Greenwood Township, McHenry County, Illinois. On March 19, 1982, the decedent died, the cause of death being mechanical injuries, multiple, severe, as a consequence of an airplane explosion. His death was concurrent with the explosion.

It is clear that the decedent died within one year of injuries sustained from an accidental cause, while on duty as an Illinois National Guardsman. Further the death was not a result of the wilful misconduct or intoxication of the decedent.

This Court in Gaspar v. State of Illinois (1965), 25 Ill.Ct.Cl. 186, held that a guardsman who dies on duty while classified under inactive duty training status (38 U.S.C. 101 (23) and 32 U.S.C. 502) was entitled to recovery.

The Court, after reviewing this claim and the report of the Attorney General, finds sufficient evidence to determine that this claim is compensable under the Act accordingly.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 (twenty thousand dollars and no cents) be, and hereby is, awarded Elizabeth T. Herrick, widow and beneficiary of Kenneth Herrick, deceased.


text:
    (No. 83-CC-2244

      In re Application of Victoria P. Waliczek.

      Opinion filed June 9, 1983.

      Victoria P. Waliczek, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C. J.

Claimant seeks an award as the widow and sole designated beneficiary of firefighter Theodore E. Waliczek, pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

The Court has reviewed Claimant’s application for benefits together with the written statement of decedent’s supervisor, and has also reviewed the coroner’s certificate of death, the designation of beneficiary and the report of the Attorney General. From its consideration of these documents the Court finds:

1. A claim was filed herein by Victoria P. Waliczek, widow of Theodore E. Waliczek, who was a firefighter for the Chicago Fire Department and who died on May 10, 1982.

2. That Victoria P. Waliczek, as widow and sole beneficiary designated by decedent, is entitled to any award authorized by this Court.

3. That the statement of Peter Cunningham, decedent’s supervising officer, demonstrates that decedent suffered severe smoke inhalation on March 24, 1981, while asssigned to and attending a fire at 6211 South Cicero in Chicago.

4. That the certificate of death issued by the coroner of the State of Wisconsin states that the cause of decedent’s death was acute myocardial infarction resulting from coronary artery disease, and that decedent died on May 10,1982.

5. That there is nothing in the circumstances to suggest that decedent’s death resulted from the wilful misconduct or intoxication of the decedent.

6. That the foregoing does not fall within the terms and provisions of section 2 of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(e)), which defines “killed in the line of duty”. Specifically, decedent’s death did not occur within one year from the date the injury was received.

By reason of the foregoing it is hereby ordered that Claimant’s application for benefits under the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act herein be, and the same is, denied.


author: Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 76-CV-1240

      In re Application of Virginia Korneder.

      Order filed March 28, 1983.

    Holstein, Mach & Associates (Bruce Wolf, of counsel, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Lynn Rosenthal Mayer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This cause was heard on oral argument at the request of Claimant, to deny the motion of the Attorney General to dismiss the claim for the reason that claim has failed to show a pecuniary loss of $200 or more as required by section 3(b) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 73(b).

The thrust of Claimant’s argument is that because of the representation of the Attorney General’s office to Claimant’s attorney that there would be no exclusion to the compensation received by Claimant under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the State is estopped by such representations, and that this cause was filed on behalf of the minor children of the deceased victim, Louis Korneder, because under the award no direct payment was made to them.

The Court finds:

1. That the Attorney General is subject to the general rule that State officers can neither waive substantive rights of the State without explicit authority nor create estoppel which would operate against public policy. Pro v. Brophy, 120 P.2d 946, Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Commission, 2 Ill. 2d 374, 118 N.E.2d 14, Isko Co. v. State, 4 Ill. Ct. Cl. 171, Lord & Bushnell v. State, 13 Ill. Ct. Cl. 189, Harbech v. State, 13 Ill. Ct. Cl. 70.

2. The decision of the arbitrator stated, “It is hereby ordered that this award and each of the installments thereof shall be paid to said widow, for her use and benefit and for the care, education, and maintenance of said minor children”.

Based upon the above the State is not estopped by the representations of the Attorney General and the minor children were compensated under the decision of the arbitrator in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The Court finds that as a result of the Claimants collateral benefits, she has failed to show a pecuniary loss of $200 or more as required by section 3(b) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 73(b).

It is therefore hereby ordered, that the claim of Virginia Korneder, be and is hereby dismissed.


text:
    (No. 80-CV-0519

      In re Application of Peter and Margaret Moreno, Claimants, and Mildred Moreno, Claimant on behalf of Cynthia Moreno, minor child of Peter Moreno, deceased victim.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1983.

    Terence Tyksinski, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant' Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an- incident that occurred on March 7, 1978. Peter and Margaret Moreno, and Mildred Moreno, seek compensation 'pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on February 11, 1980, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the deceased, Peter Moreno, age 34, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1.

2. That on March 7, 1978, the victim was shot during an attempted robbery by an unknown offender. The incident occurred while the victim was driving his cab at Chatham and Harrison Roads, Elmhurst, Illinois. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at Memorial Hospital.

The offender was apprehended, convicted on the charge of murder and sentenced to natural life in prison.

3. That the Claimants, Peter and Margaret Moreno, seek compensation for funeral expenses. The Claimant, Mildred Moreno, seeks compensation for loss of support on behalf of the victim’s minor child, Cynthia Moreno.

4. That the Claimants, Peter and Margaret Moreno, incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $3,870.00, of which the Claimants have paid. $3,870.00.

5. That Cynthia Moreno, the minor child of the Claimant and the victim, was dependent upon the victim for. support.

6. That the victim was employed by the Autoride Cab Company, Inc., prior to his death and his average monthly earnings were $812.50.

7. That section 4 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 74) states “. . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.”

8. That Cynthia Moreno was born on October 16, 1964, and attained the age of majority on October 16, 1982, or 4 years and 7 months from the date of the incident.

On October 30, 1967, in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, divorce order No. 67 D 1594, the victim was ordered to pay support and maintenance for his minor child in the amount of $80.00 per month.

Based upon the court’s order, the maximum amount compensable under section 7(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 77(e)) for loss of support for the 4 years 7 months for which Cynthia Moreno is eligible is $4,400.00.

9. That pursuant to section 7(d) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 77(d)), this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.), from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

10. That the Claimants, Peter and Margaret Moreno, have received $1,750.00 as a result of a Workmen’s Compensation settlement. Additionally, under this settlement, the Claimant, Mildred Moreno, will receive $250.00 per month for the use and benefit of Cynthia Moreno, for the 4-year and 7-month period before she obtained the age of majority. These amounts can be considered applicable deductions pertinent to the respective Claimant.

11. That the Claimants, Peter and Margaret Moreno, comply with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualify for compensation thereunder.

12. That the Claimants, Peter and Margaret Moreno, are entitled to an award based upon the following:

Funeral expenses $3,870.00
Less Workmen’s Compensation -1,750.00
Less $200.00 deductible - 200.00
Net Loss $1,920.00

13. That the Claimant Mildred Moreno’s net loss can be computed as follows:

Loss of support $ 4,400.00
Less Workmen’s Compensation $13,750.00
Total ' —0—

14. That pursuant to section 6.1(b) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 76.1(b)), the right of compensation is limited to persons who have suffered a pecuniary loss of $200.00 or more attributable to a violent crime resulting in the injury or death of the victim.

15. That the Claimant, Mildred Moreno, has not sustained a pecuniary loss of over $200.00 and therefore does not meet, the requirement of section 6.1(b) of the Act for compensation.

It is therefore hereby ordered that the sum of $1,920.00 (one thousand nine hundred twenty dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Peter and Margaret Moreno, parents of Peter Moreno, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that Mildred Moreno does not meet required conditions precedent for compensation, and her claim for loss of support be and is hereby denied.


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    (No. 81-CV-0339

      In re Application of Adeline Weinstein, Executor of the Estate of Louis Cassel.

      Order filed January 24, 1983.

    Adeline Weinstein, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Lynn Rosenthal Mayer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on • February 24, 1980. Adeline Weinstein, executor of the estate of the deceased victim, Louis Casselj seeks compensation. pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch, 70, par. 71 et seq.

This claim was filed on or about October 24, 1980. Thereafter, based upon the investigatory report submitted by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois and the other documentary evidence, the Court on May 7, 1981, entered an order denying the application for compensation on the grounds that an estate is not eligible under the Act. Claimant filed her objections to said order and requested a hearing.

The hearing was conducted by commissioner Dennis M. Fleming, on the 30th day of August 1982, at Chicago, Illinois. As a result of said hearing, the following facts were stipulated:

Claimant is the daughter and executor of Louis Cassel, who was the innocent victim of a murder on the 24th day of February 1980.

The only issue before the Court is whether or not the estate can be reimbursed for the expenses; there is no question that all the other requirements for compensation have been met. As the victim’s daughter, the Claimant could have been reimbursed for reasonable funeral and medical expenses for the victim had she paid them herself. As sole heir of the decedent her inheritance was reduced by the amount of these expenses when they were paid by the estate.

In In re Daill, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1022, the Court held that, although estates are not specifically included among the class of potential beneficiaries under the Act, an estate may be eligible for benefits if it is shown that the person who would inherit the estate had a portion of their inheritance reduced by an amount they could have been reimbursed or compensated under the Act had they paid the amount themselves.

In the instant case, Adeline Weinstein, as the daughter of the deceased victim, would have been eligible for compensation for the funeral and medical expenses, and thus her inheritance has been reduced accordingly.

Based on the reasoning in the Daill case, the order of May 7, 1981, is vacated and the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Funeral expenses $2,000.00
Medical expenses 269.76
Total $2,269.76

It is hereby ordered that the sum of two thousand two hundred sixty nine and 76/100 ($2,269.76) dollars be and is awarded to Adeline Weinstein, executor of the estate of Louis Cassel, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 81-CV-0378

      In re Application of Victor Schrishuhn and Doris Bissey, Guardian, Claimants.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1981.

      Amended opinion on motion for reconsideration filed September 24, 1982.

    Gerald G. Dehner, for Claimants.
    Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General (Sue Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 14, 1980, in Sangamon County, Illinois. Victor Schrishuhn, brother of the deceased victim, Donald H. Schrishuhn, Jr., and Doris Bissey, guardian of the victim’s minor children, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat, 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the deceased, Donald H. Schrishuhn, Jr., age 43, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1.

2. That on July 14, 1980, the body of Donald H. Schrishuhn, Jr., was found on a country road near Route 97 in Sangamon County, Illinois. The victim had been shot several times and was pronounced dead at the scene. It is believed that the victim was killed at an unknown location and then taken to where he was found.

3. That the Claimant Victor Schrishuhn seeks compensation for funeral and medical expenses and Claimant Doris Bissey, as legal guardian, for loss of support for Leta Mae, age 7, and Marguerete, age 5, minor children of the victim.

4. That the Claimant Victor Schrishuhn incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $2,805.53 and an ambulance charge of $122.70. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h)), funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum award of $2,000.00.

5. The Claimant’s minor children were totally dependent upon the victim for support.

6. That prior to his death, the victim was employed by Logan Correctional Center and his average monthly earnings were $580.00.

7. That section 2(h) of the Act states “. . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.”

8. That the victim was 43 years of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1976, Life Tables, Vol. II, his life expectancy would, have been 33 more years. The projected loss of support for 33 years is in excess of $15,000.00 which is the maximum amount compensable under section 80.1(f) of the Act.

9. That this claim complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

10. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(e)), this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims, (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older) and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

11. That the Claimants have received no reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as an applicable deduction under section 7.1(a) (7) of. the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 77.1(a)(7).

12. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss resulting from the victim’s death is in excess of the $15,000.00 maximum allowed in section 10.1(f) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(f).

13. That the Claimants’ interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 11.1 of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 81.1.

It is therefore hereby ordered that the sum of $15,000.00 (fifteen thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Victor Schrishuhn and Doris Bissey, guardian, Claimants of Donald H. Schrishuhn, Jr., deceased, an innocent victim of a violent crime to be paid and disbursed as follows:

(a) $2,122.70 (two thousand one hundred twenty-two dollars and seventy cents) to be paid to Victor Schrishuhn for funeral and medical expenses incurred;
(b) Sixteen equal monthly payments of $750.00 (seven hundred fifty dollars) each with a final seventeenth payment in the amount of $877.30 (eight hundred seventy seven dollars and thirty cents) to be paid to Doris Bissey, as guardian, for the use and benefit of Leta Mae and Margarete Schrishuhn;.
(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the victim’s children, it is the duty of the personal representative of the victim to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.

AMENDED OPINION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Poch, J.

This cause came for reconsideration on the Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The Court has received a response to that motion from the Respondent, and having been duly advised:

Finds, that in the opinion filed April 27, 1981, the Court found that the deceased, Donald H. Schrishuhn, was the victim of a violent crime under section 2(c) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), in that he was murdered. Originally this Court ordered that the Claimant, Victor Schrishuhn, receive $2,122.70, a reimbursement for Donald Schrishuhn’s funeral and burial expenses and an ambulance charge. The remainder of the $15,000.00 award went to the children of Donald Schrishuhn and his wife, Marjorie Schrishuhn.

Since the time of that award, there has been a significant change in the legal status of the Petitioner, Marjorie Schrishuhn. It is undisputed that Ms. Schrishuhn, at the present time, has been declared incompetent, and is unable to provide for her existence. At the time of her husband’s demise, she was completely dependent upon him for support. Ms. Schrishuhn was not included in the award made on April 27, 1981.

It appears from the record that the Respondent, State of Illinois, has no objection to including the Petitioner in this award. It also appears from the record that the guardian for the Schrishuhn children has no objections to the change in the award.

Since the order of April 27, 1981, $9,622.70 has been paid out of the award to the children of Donald and Marjorie Schrishuhn and to Victor Schrishuhn. This leaves an amount in the award of $5,377.30. Once the Court subtracts $2,122.70 from the $15,000.00 award for Victor Schrishuhn’s expenses, the remaining sum is $12,877.30. When this sum is divided by thirds, each of the remaining Petitioners, Mr. and Ms. Schrishuhn’s two daughters and Ms. Schrishuhn would receive $4,292.43 apiece. Subtracting Ms. Schrishuhn’s award of $4,292.43 from the remaining $5,377.30 leaves $1,084.87 to be distributed between the Schrishuhn daughters.

It is hereby ordered that the Petitioner, Marjorie Schrishuhn, be paid $4,292.43 and the daughters of Marjorie and Donald Schrishuhn be paid the remaining amount.


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    (No. 81-CV-0689

      In re Application of David Price.

      Order filed August 5, 1982.

    David Price, pro se, for Claimant.
    Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on

October 25, 1980. David Price seeks compenstion pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on February 23, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based on these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on October 25, 1980, during the course of a verbal dispute, the Claimant was stabbed by the offender, who was known to him. The incident occurred on the street at 7556 South Seeley, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was taken to Little Company of Mary Hospital for treatment. The offender was apprehended, convicted on the charge of aggravated battery and sentenced to 2% years felony probation.

2. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses and loss of earnings.

3. That the Claimant filed employers reports with the Attorney General’s office to authenticate his loss of earnings. An investigation by that office revealed that the Claimant had submitted false employers reports, in that he was not employed by said company, nor had the alleged employer completed the report as required by the Crime Victims statute.

4. That section 20(a) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 90(a)), states that in addition to any other civil liability or criminal penalties provided by law, a person who the Court of Claims finds has wilfully misstated or omitted facts relevant to the determination of whether compensation is due under this Act or of the amount of that compensation, whether in making application for compensation or in the further proceedings provided for in this Act, shall be denied compensation under this Act.

5. That without addressing the merits of other issues raised in the investigatory report, the Claimant’s action of wilfully misstating facts warrants that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


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    (No. 81-CV-0783

      In re Application of Beulah Hodge.

      Opinion filed January 24, 1983.

    Beulah Hodge, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 3, 1980. Beulah Hodge, mother of the deceased victim, Donald Hodge, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on March 23, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased son, Donald Hodge, age 20, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1.

2. That on July. 3, 1980, the victim was shot by an offender known to him. The incident occurred on the back porch landing of the offender’s apartment, located at 4022 North Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois. The incident stemmed from a dispute between the victim and the offender’s brother, whom the victim believed stole his brother’s car radio the night prior to the incident. This dispute resulted in a fight between the victim and the offender’s brother. During the course of this fight, the offender came out of the apartment and shot the victim. The victim was taken to Weiss Memorial Hospital where he was later pronounced dead.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation under the Act for funeral and medical expenses only. The Claimant was not dependent upon the victim for support.

4. That funeral and burial expenses were paid by the Claimant in the amount of $3,495.56. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h)), funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum amount of $2,000.00.

5. That pursuant to section 10.1(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(c)), any person related to the vietim may be compensated for reasonable funeral, medical and hospital expenses of the victim to the extent to which he has paid such expenses.

6. That the Claimant incurred hospital expenses of the victim in the amount of $600.00, $575.00 of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $25.00. The Claimant has paid this balance in full.

7. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(e)), this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims, (except in the case of an applicant 65. years of age or older) and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

8. That the Claimant has not received any reimbursements as. a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

9. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the Claimant incurred funeral expenses in excess of the $2,000.00 maximum award deemed compensable under the Act for funeral benefits.

10. That section 10.1 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1) indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced according to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

11. That it appears from the investigatory report and police investigation that the victim’s conduct directly contributed to his death, in that the victim engaged in a fight with the offender’s brother. The Court finds that this conduct of the victim contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant a 25% reduction of the award pursuant to section 10.1(d) of the Act.

12. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Compensable funeral expenses $2,000.00
Paid medical expenses + 25.00
Total $2,025.00
Less 25% reduction of award - 506.25
Total $1,518.75

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $1,518.75 (one thousand five hundred eighteen dollars and seventy-five cents) be and is hereby awarded to Beulah Hodge, mother of Donald Hodge, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 81-CV-0814

      In re Application of Leah Jean Gruenert and Helen A. McCoy.

      Opinion filed March 28, 1983.

    Leah Jean Gruenert and Helen A. McCoy, pro se, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on December 29, 1980. Leah Jean Gruenert and Helen A. McCoy, former wife and mother, respectively, of. the deceased victim, Jesse Floyd McCoy, Jr., seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on April 1, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Jesse Floyd McCoy, age 37, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70. par. 72(c)), to wit: voluntary manslaughter. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1.

2. That on December 29, 1980, the victim was shot during a verbal dispute with the offender, who was known to him. The incident occurred on the street at 5th and Vermont, Quincy, Illinois. The victim was pronounced dead at the scene of the incident.

3. That the Claimant, Helen A. McCoy, seeks compensation for funeral expenses only. The Claimant, Leah Jean Gruenert, seeks compensation for loss of support for her minor children Leah Jzannette McCoy, age 10, and Maria Ellana McCoy, age 8.

4. That the Claimant, Helen A. McCoy, incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $2,354.95.

5. That pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h)), if a divorced or legally separated applicant is claiming loss of support for a minor child of the deceased, the amount of support for each child shall be based upon the amount of support the minor child received pursuant to the decree for the six months prior to the date of the victim’s death. Additionally, loss of support is determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months prior to the incident.

6. That under the divorce decree in McCoy v. McCoy, No. 74 D 1204, filed in the circuit court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Illinois, the victim was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $40.00 per week. The victim was employed at the time of the incident and the Claimant has submitted records from the circuit court clerk’s office of Adams County, Illinois, which show that the victim was providing his support obligation during the six months prior to the incident.

7. That the victim’s youngest minor child, Maria Ellana McCoy, born July 17, 1972, was 8 years of age at the time of the incident and will attain the age of majority on July 17, 1990, which is 9.5 years after the incident.

8. That, based on the age of her youngest minor child, the Claimant, Leah Jean Gruenert, would have received support payments from the victim in the amount of $40.00 per week for 9.5 years until the child attained the age of majority. The projected loss of support amounts to $19,760.00, which is in excess of $15,000.00, which is the maximum compensable award under section 10.1(f) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(f).

9. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims, (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older) and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

10. That the Claimant, Helen A. McCoy, has received $255.00 from the Social Security Administration and $450.00 from the Veteran’s Administration as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions undér section 7.1(a)(7) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 77.1(a) (7).

11. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss of the Claimants resulting from the victim’s death is in excess of the $15,000.00 maximum allowed in section 10.1(f) of the Act.

12. That the Claimant, Helen A. McCoy, is entitled to an award based on the following:

Funeral expenses $2,354.95
Less Social Security benefits - 255.00
Less Veteran’s Administration Reimbursement - 450.00
Total $1,649.95

13. That the Claimant, Leah Jean Gruenert, is entitled to an award on behalf of her children based on their projected loss of support in .the amount of $19,760.00. As there is a $15,000.00 maximum compensable amount, the Claimant’s children are entitled to an award in the amount of $13,350.05.

14. That the Claimant, Leah Jean Gruenert’s, interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 11.1 of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 81.1.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $1,649.95 (one thousand six hundred forty-nine dollars and ninety-five cents) be-and is hereby awarded to Helen A. McCoy, mother of Jesse Floyd McCoy, Jr., an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that the sum of $13,350.05 (thirteen thousand three hundred fifty dollars and five cents) be and is hereby awarded to Leah Jean Gruenert, former wife of Jesse Floyd McCoy, Jr., an innocent victim of a violent crime to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $5,350.05 (five thousand three hundred and fifty dollars and five cents) to be paid to Leah Jean Gruenert in a lump sum;
(b) Fifty (50) equal monthly payments of $160.00 (one hundred sixty dollars) each to be paid to Leah Jean Gruenert for the use and benefit of Leah Jzannette McCoy and Maria Ellana McCoy;
(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimant or the Claimant’s children, it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.


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    (No. 81-CV-0889

      In re Application of Wanda K. Hamilton.

      Opinion filed January 6, 1983.

    Mark Weber, for Claimant.
    Tyrone C. Fahner, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on January 2, 1981. Wanda K. Hamilton, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on April 28, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Wanda K. Hamilton, age 20, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: aggravated battery. 111. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4.

2. That on January 2, 1981, the Claimant was stabbed by one of four unknown offenders during the course of an armed robbery. The incident occurred on the street at 1549 West Ogden Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant and her husband were walking home when they were approached by four unknown offenders who demanded the couple’s money. When the Claimant resisted, one of the offenders stabbed her, took the couple’s money, and all four offenders fled the scene. The Claimant was taken to University of Illinois Hospital for treatment of her injuries.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses and for loss of earnings.

4. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $9,781.05, none of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $9,781.05. At the time of the incident, the Claimant was entitled to medical assistance through the Illinois Department of Public Aid, under case identification No. 7-200-K18805; however, the Claimant neglected to inform her medical providers of this fact. The University of Illinois Hospital subsequently applied for public aid medical assistance on behalf of the Claimant on January 8, 1981, and the Claimant was denied on February 9, 1981, due to her failure to keep an appointment necessary to determine her eligibility.

One of the Claimant’s medical bills was covered by public aid after the medical provider billed its charges to the Illinois Department of Public Aid. This bill was covered in the amount of $363.00, leaving the Claimant responsible for $9,418.05.

5. That pursuant to section 10.1(g) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(g)), compensation under this Act is a secondary source of compensation, and the applicant must show that she has exhausted the benefits reasonably available under governmental or health insurance programs, including the State public aid program.

6. That the Claimant has failed to exhaust other remedies and sources of recovery available to her, in that she failed to inform her medical providers that she was a public aid recipient. Therefore in accordance with section 10.1(g) of the Act, the Claimant’s failure to exhaust the remedies available to her through the Illinois Department of Public Aid must result in the dismissal of that portion of her claim.

7. That the Claimant was employed by Rival Manufacturing Company and Szabo Foods prior to the injury and her average monthly earnings were $232.23. Claimant was disabled and unable to work from January 5, 1981, to February 5, 1981, a period of one month and two working days.

8. That section 2(b) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h)) states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

9. That based on $232.23 per month, the maximum compensation for loss of earnings for one month and two working days is $253.35.

10. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(e)), this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older) and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents, of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

11. That the Claimant has not received any reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

12. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Compensable loss of earnings $253.35
Less $200.00 deductible -200.00
Total $ 53.35

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $53.35 (fifty-three dollars and thirty-five cents) be and is hereby awarded to Wanda K. Hamilton, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that the claim for compensation for medical/hospital expenses of the Claimant be and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 82-CV-0006

      In re Application of John Mates.

      Order filed March 28, 1983.

    John Mates, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on May 15, 1981. John Mates, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 2, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinios. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on May 16, 1981, the Claimant was shot by an unknown offender during the course of a verbal dispute. The incident occurred on the street at 2327 South Sawyer, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant was taken to St. Anthony Hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound to his thigh.

During the course of the police investigation, the Claimant positively identified the offender. However, he refused to prosecute and the offender was released with-Tout being charged. .. , "' "...

2. That sections 6.1(c) and (d) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, pars. 76.1(c), (d)), state that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime and the applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the police report that the Claimant declined to cooperate fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension of the assailant, in that he knew who the offender was but declined to press charges against him.

4. By reason of the Claimant’s refusal to fully cooperate with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant as required by the Act, he is not eligible for compensation thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 82-CV-0268

      In re Application of Jacinta Martinez.

      Order filed March 28, 1983.

    Jacinta Martinez, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 29, 1981. Jacinta Martinez, wife of the victim, Zenon Martinez, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on September 23, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based on these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on March 29, 1981, the victim was shot during an exchange of gunfire with an individual who was known to him. The incident occurred at 1634 North Artesian. Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital.

Police investigation revealed that the victim was engaged in an argument with another individual when both produced handguns and began shooting at each other. The victim was fatally wounded in the exchange and the other individual was also shot. The weapon of the victim was recovered by the police at the scene. Based on the circumstances of the incident, the State’s Attorney office refused to charge the surviving individual.

2. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and loss of support.

3. That section 10.1 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1) indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced according to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

4. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s death was substantially attributable to the fact that he was armed at the time of the incident and engaged in an exchange of gunfire with another individual.

5. That without addressing the merits of other issues raised in the investigatory report, the victim’s conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 82-CV-0428

      In re Application of Dora Mae Tatum and Schlintha Lindsey.

      Opinion filed May 28, 1982.

      Amended opinion filed June 6, 1983.

    F. John Cushing II, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 15, 1981. Dora Mae Tatum and Schlintha Lindsey, mother of the deceased victim and mother of the victim’s minor child, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on November 17, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Frederick Saulter, age 34, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1.

2. That on August 15, 1981, the victim was stabbed by three offenders, who were neighbors of the victim. The incident occurred on the street at 5139 South Carpenter, Chicago, Illinois. The incident occurred when the victim confronted the three offenders in the alley behind his apartment building, in the process of stealing the victim’s television set. One of the offenders then attacked and stabbed the victim several times, and all three offenders fled the scene. The victim was pronounced dead at Englewood Hospital.

3. That the Claimant, Dora Mae Tatum, seeks compensation for funeral expenses only. She was not dependent upon the victim for support.

4. That the Claimant, Dora Mae Tatum, incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $1,898.00.

5. That the Claimant, Schlintha Lindsey, seeks compensation for loss of support for the deceased victim’s minor child, Frederica Lindsey, born on February 16, 1982, six months after the death of the victim.

6. That the Claimant, Schlintha Lindsey, has submitted a copy of a Social Security award certificate, which indicates that the child born after the victim’s death, Frederica Lindsey, is entitled to Social Security benefits on the victim’s account. However, this Claimant has not submitted any evidence that the victim was providing support for the Claimant in reasonable expectation that he would support the child.

7. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(e)), this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older) and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

8. That the Claimant, Dora Mae Tatum, has received $255.00 in reimbursements from the Social Security Administration as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

9. That the Claimant, Dora Mae Tatum, has complied with all pertinent, provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

10. That the Claimant, Dora Mae Tatum, is entitled to an award based on the following:

Funeral expenses $1,898.00
Less Social Security benefit - 255.00
Less $200.00 deductible - 200.00
Total $1,443.00

11. That the Claimant, Schlintha Lindsey, having not submitted the necessary evidence needed to support her claim for loss of support, has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $1,443.00 (one thousand four hundred forty-three dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Dora Mae Tatum, mother of Frederick Saulter, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that the claim of Schlintha Lindsey be and is hereby denied.

AMENDED OPINION

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 15, 1981. Schlintha Lindsey, mother of the deceased victim’s minor child, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the deceased victim, Frederick Saulter, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, .ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1.

2. That earlier', this Court awarded Claimant Dora Mae Tatum, mother of the deceased victim, $1,443.00 for funeral expenses.

3. That the Claimant Schlintha Lindsey seeks compensation for loss of support for her minor child, Frederica,. age 14 months, born six months after the victim’s death.

4. That subsequent to the initial investigation by the office of the Attorney General, the Claimant has submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the victim, Frederick Saulter, was the father of the minor child, Frederica, born after his death.

5. That further, the Claimant has demonstrated that she was dependent on the victim for support at the time of his death and that had the victim lived, he would have assumed responsibility for the support of their minor child.

6. That prior to his death, the victim was employed by Zenith Controls, Inc., and his average monthly earnings were $523.39.

7. That section 2(h) of the Act states “. . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h).

8. That Claimant Schlintha Lindsey’s claim for loss of support is in excess of the $15,000.00 maximum award compensable under the Act.

9. That this claim complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

10. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older) and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(e).

11. That the Claimant Dora Mae Tatum has received $1,443.00 for funeral expenses as a result of the victim’s death that must be deducted from the $15,000.00 award.

12. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss resulting from the victim’s death is $13,557.00.

13. That the Claimant’s interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 11.1 of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 81.1.

It is therefore hereby ordered that the sum of $13,557.00 (thirteen thousand five hundred fifty-seven dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Schlintha Lindsey, on behalf of Frederica Lindsey, daughter of Frederick Saulter, an innocent victim of a violent crime to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $3,557.00 (three thousand five hundred fifty-seven dollars) in a lump • sum to be paid to Schlintha Lindsey for the use and benefit of her minor child, Frederica Lindsey;
(b) Twenty (20) equal monthly payments of $500.00 (five hundred dollars) each to be paid to Schlintha Lindsey for the use and benefit of her minor child, Frederica Lindsey;
(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimant or the Claimant’s child, it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.


text:
    (No. 82-CV-0770

      In re Application of Aidan Monahan.

      Opinion filed January 24, 1983.

    Aidan Monahan, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 2, 1981. Aidan Monahan, husband of the deceased victim, Kathleen Monahan, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on March 2, 1982, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased wife, Kathleen Monahan, age 29, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — !.

2. That on September 2, 1981, the victim was stabbed to death by an unknown offender for no apparent reason. The incident occurred in a parking lot at 4729 North Central, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was taken to Northwest Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival. .

The offender was apprehended, prosecuted and convicted on the charges of murder, attempted rape and armed violence.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and for loss of support for Joseph Monahan, age 7, born February 22, 1974, and Patrick Monahan, age 6, born January 20, 1975.

4. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $5,287.00. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum award of $2,000.00. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(h).

5. The Claimant and his children Joseph and Patrick were partially dependent upon the victim for support.

6. That prior to her death, the victim was employed by Monahan Landscaping and her average monthly earnings were in excess of $750.00.

7. That section 2(h) of the Act states “. . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.”

8. That the victim was 29 years of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1978, Life Tables, Vol. II, her life expectancy would have been 79 years. The projected loss of support for 50 years is in excess of the $15,000.00 which is the maximum amount compensable under section 10.1(f) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(f).

9. That this claim complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

10. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of bénefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

11. That the Claimant has received $255.00 from the Social Security Administration as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as an applicable deduction under section 7.1(a)(7) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 77.1(a)(7).

12. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss resulting from the victim’s death is in excess of the $15,000.00 maximum allowed in section 10.1(f) of the Act.

13. That the Claimant’s interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 11.1 of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 81.1.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $15,000.00 (fifteen thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Aidan Monahan, husband of Kathleen Monahan, an innocent victim of a violent crime to be paid and disbursed to him as follows:

(a) $2,250.00 (two thousand two hundred fifty dollars) to be paid to Aidan Monahan;
(b) Seventeen (17) equal monthly payments of $750.00 (seven hundred fifty dollars) each to be paid to Aidan Monahan for the use and benefit of Joseph Monahan and Patrick Monahan;
(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimant or the Claimant’s children, it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.


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    (No. 83-CV-0757

      In re Application of Barbara Lulkowski.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1983.

    Barbara Lulkowski, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on January 20, 1983. Barbara Lulkowski, mother of the deceased victim, Teresa Lulkowski, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on February 16, 1983, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased daughter, Teresa Lulkowski, age 21, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 72(c)), to wit: reckless homicide. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9—3.

2. That on January 20, 1983, the victim was struck by. a motor vehicle driven by an unknown offender. The incident occurred as the victim was walking along the road at 13300 South Western Avenue, Blue Island, Illinois. The driver of the motor vehicle fled the scene of the incident and has not been apprehended. The victim was taken to St. Francis Hospital where she was pronounced dead on arrival.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation under the Act for funeral expenses only. The Claimant was not dependent upon the victim for support.

4. That funeral and burial expenses were paid by the Claimant in the amount of $3,332.00. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum amount of $2,000.00.

5. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

6. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 80.1(e).

7. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

8. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the Claimant’s loss is in excess of the $2,000.00 maximum award deemed compensable under the Act for funeral benefits.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $2,000.00 (two thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Barbara Lulkowski, mother of Teresa Lulkowski, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (Nos. 73-CC-0205, 73-CC-0206 cons.
    L. E. Alport & Company and Dolan Landscaping, Inc., Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 22, 1983.

    Collins &: Amos, for Claimant L. E. Alport & Co.
    Kornfeld & Caplan, for Claimant Dolan Landscaping, Inc.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Saul Wexler, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This consolidated cause arises out of a series of lawn-mowing contracts which the Claimants entered into with the Illinois Department of Transportation for the year 1972, which contracts were terminated at the request of the then Attorney General. Claimants thereupon filed the instant actions which were consolidated and to which the Respondent filed a counterclaim and affirmative defense. Thereafter, the Court gave leave to the United States of America acting through the Internal Revenue Service, Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, Illinois State Bank of Chicago, J. H. Slattery Co., and All Work, Inc., to intervene in this cause pursuant to section 26.1 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 26.1), now codified as section 2 — 408 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 — 408).

After extensive pretrial discovery the parties entered into a series of negotiations which culminated in a stipulation executed and tendered to the Honorable Joseph P. Griffin, commissioner of this Court, on August 22, 1983. The commissioner has recommended that the stipulation settling the case be adopted, and after a thorough review of the record herein, we agree. Accordingly, the following awards are hereby entered:

1. $64,459.04 in favor of Claimants, L. E. Alport & Company and Dolan Landscaping, Inc., and their attorneys, in full satisfaction of the claims presented herein.

2. $48,128.50 in favor of the United States of America, provided that the funds for this award are disbursed prior to January 1,1984. If disbursement occurs after that date, then the United States will be entitled to interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum, which interest will be deducted pro rata from the other awards herein, or otherwise as this Court may direct.

3. $6,480.00 in favor of Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland and its attorneys.

4. $28,732.00 in favor of Illinois State Bank of Chicago and its attorneys.

5. $5,647.00 in favor of J. H. Slattery d/b/a J. H. Slattery Company, and its attorneys.

6. $1,220.00 in favor of All Work, Inc., and its attorney.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-0623
    Robert E. Schroeder and James C. Schroeder, d/b/a Schroeder Sign Company, a Co-Partnership, and Pearl Irene Schroeder and The First National Bank of Elgin, Illinois, as Co-Trustees of the Estate of Ernest F. Schroeder, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 16, 1984.

    Gromer, Wittenstrom & Strom (Warren Strom, of counsel), for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (James A. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon the joint stipulation of the parties, which states as follows:

1. That instant claim was brought as a tort under section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 37, par. 439.8(d)).

2. That instant claim arose from a fire set by Francis J. Osewski, resident at Elgin State Hospital, to the Claimants’ real estate and damaging property belonging to the Claimants’ business after he escaped from the Respondent’s custody.

3. The Claimants sought the statutory limit for tort claims of $100,000.00.

4. The Respondent admits that Francis J. Osewski was an inmate at Elgin State Hospital and did in fact escape from said mental institution while in the custody of the Respondent.

5. The Respondent admits that the fire to the Claimants’ business was started by Francis J. Osewski during his escape.

6. That after careful consideration of the issues and facts pertaining to the instant claim, as well as the potential time, preparation and expense of litigation and its possible outcome, the parties have agreed to settle the claim for the sum of $30,000.00.

7. That this amount is offered by Respondent and accepted by Claimants as full, complete and final satisfaction of the instant claim or any other claim arising out of the incident in question.

8. That there are no disputes of fact or law between the parties.

9. That both parties waive hearing, the submission of evidence and the filing of briefs.

10. That both parties have entered into this stipulation with full knowledge of all facts and law relating to the claim, and feel that an award in the amount agreed upon is a fair and reasonable sum, and that the granting of such an award would be in the best interest of all concerned.

Although the Court is not bound by a stipulation such as this, it is also not desirous of interposing a controversy where none appears to exist. As long as the stipulation appears reasonable and fair, we see no reason to question its validity or to force the parties to take the time and expense of proving facts which are not in dispute.

We find the stipulated facts to be sufficient to sustain a finding of liability on the part of Respondent and an award in the agreed amount.

Claimants are hereby awarded the amount of $30,000.00 (thirty thousand dollars and no cents).