text:
    (No. 738
    Claim denied.)
    John Lewson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    State officers — cannot admit away rights of State by stipulation. No officer or agent of the State can by stipulation or otherwise admit away the interest or rights of the State in any suit, and that is specially true where claimant brings his suit for services rendered for the officer or agent who enters into such stipulation.

      Same — appropriation for officers — no right to contract indebtedness against State. No officer has the legal right to contract any indebtedness on behalf of the State, nor assume to bind the State in any amount in excess of the moneys appropriated for his office, unless authorized by law.

      Same — officer cannot enter into contract when. No officer or agent of the ' State can contract to bind the State, directly or indirectly, for the payment of money, unless expressly authorized by law.

      Same — cannot ignore limitation of appropriation for their office. State officers cannot ignore the limitations of appropriations made by the Legislature for their respective offices or departments and' rely on the Court of Claims to take care of all claims made in excess of such appropriations.

      Same — no equitable relief against statutory prohibition. Where the statute forbids the doing of a thing equity will not afford relief.
    Rules op court — must be complied with. Where claimant fails to comply with Rule 5 of the court, the court may dismiss the claim.
    Fred L. Loyda, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed November, 1923, by John Lewson of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, in the sum of $4,000.00 on- a contract awarded to him by the Attorney General to compile and digest the report of the Attorney General, 1921-1922, for which he and the Attorney General had an understanding that he would pay claimant a reasonable compensation. The claimant, after a statement of his qualifications to do such work as that alleged in this declaration, says that in May, 1917, the Honorable Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General of Illinois, appointed claimant his Assistant Attorney General, at an- annual salary of $3,600.00 per annum. After doing quite a lot of work in such capacity, claimant was to undertake the digesting and compiling the opinions and reports of the Attorney General, providing the claimant with a special stenographer at an annual salary of $1,400.00, and with a well furnished office, stationery and supplies. Claimant had edited and compiled several reports, for which we presume he was paid, or that such duties constituted a part of the duties of his office while on salary as stated. That in due time, we can’t tell when, he entered upon the digesting and compiling of the report of 1921-1922, when, on account of vetoes of certain appropriations to the Attorney General, said officer deemed it advisable to discontinue the office services of claimant, and assigned his stenographer to other work; that in July, 1922, the Attorney General again engaged him to resume his work of making the bi-ennium report of 1921-1922, and that said report was prepared and published and distributed.

That at the time, July, 1922, there existed and were available funds which had been appropriated to the use of the Attorney General out of which this claim might have been paid; that by the time claimant completed the work the said funds out of which he might have been paid were either exhausted or were urgently needed by the Attorney General for other purposes, such as carrying on the routine business of his office and necessary litigation, and he refused to pay claimant on account of compiling and digesting the said report of 1921-1922, including stenographer fees and other expenses, the said sum of $4,000.00.

Attached to the declaration appears this stipulation, to-wit:

“In the Court of Claims of the State of Illinois, September Session, 1923.
John Lewson vs. State of Illinois; claim for compensation for services rendered Attorney General.
STIPULATION:
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties to the above entitled cause that the facts in statement of claim are true in substance and in fact, and that $4000.00 is reasonable compensation for the services performed by said claimant as alleged.
(Signed) John Lewson, Claimant.
(Signed) Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General."

Rule 5, adopted by this court, requires that every claimant • shall state whether or not any other person has any interest in his claim, and if so who and how much, etc.; whether presented to any state department or state officers, tribunal, etc.; and a bill of particulars, stating in detail each and every item and the amount claimed on account thereof, and the same shall be attached to claimant’s declaration.

Claimant entirely ignores this rule. It has been repeatedly held by this court that said rule must be complied with, especially in important and unusual cases like the one at bar. While this case is more in nature'of a case in equity than a suit at law, still the rule makes no distinction between the two in the requirement set forth in Eule 5.

A bill of particulars should always be filed for the information of the court.

The* claim was brought and filed by claimant on the 9th day of November, 1923. His attorney entered his appearance as attorney in said claim January 8, 1924; and neither claimant or his attorney has ever filed a brief or presented an argument in the case; or offered evidence of other witnesses familiar with .such work, as claimant claims he has done, as to its reasonable value.

It is true the Attorney General admits by stipulation that claimant did the work as alleged and that the price charged by him is reasonable.

The Attorney General cannot, nor can any other state officer or agent of the State, by stipulation, or otherwise, admit away the interests and rights of the State in any suit. This is especially true in cases wherein the claimant, bringing ' the suit, is bringing it for services rendered by claimant for the officer confessing the right of action against the State. Such procedure is contrary to public policy.

The State legislature biennially makes appropriations for ordinary and contingent expenses, etc., for the operation, maintenance and the administration of the several offices, departments, institutions, boards, commissions and agencies of the State government.

The appropriation bill specifies for what purpose or purposes the appropriation is made.

The elective State officers and the various State institutions know the amount or amounts appropriated for them respectively, and that it is intended to be sufficient to conduct the duties of such offices or departments for two years after July 1st, succeeding the appropriation. It is unnecessary to cite the statute on this point.

Again, the statute of Illinois provides that “No officer, institution, department, board or commission shall contract any indebtedness on behalf of the State; nor assume to bind the State in any amount in excess of the money appropriated, unless expressly authorized by law to do so.” Cahill-Callagan, Illinois Revised Statute, 1923, Chap. 127b, Sec. 30, page 3246.

This would seem to preclude claimant from right of recovery, but he claims that equity should aid him in his predicament. Where the statute prohibits the doing of a thing,. equity will afford no relief. Good conscience, without the aid of law or equity, can do nothing for claimant, except to sympathize with Mm, a feeling which this court entertains for this claimant. Again, the claimant knew before he enlisted in the work the last time he went at it that it might be doubtful about his pay, and he should have thus been a little more cautious in doing the work. It is not right clear whether or not claimant was still getting a salary as an assistant to the Attorney General when he did this work. We are inclined to think his salary has ceased. This was another danger signal for him in contracting with his former employer. No officer or agent of the State can contract to bind the State directly or indirectly for the payment of money for any purpose, unless expressly authorized by law. If he has any common law powers that conflict with the statute, the statute governs. The legislature, through its committees, ascertains biennially what is a reasonable and proper amount to be appropriated for each officer and department. It is a vital part of the duties of the legislature, in its wisdpm and deliberations, to carefully ascertain what amount of money our State should expend in the succeeding two years ,• and we believe that the legislature and the governors of Illinois have always been very liberal in the allowances in the appropriation bills.

To allow this claim ivould be to establish a most dangerous precedent. It would open up the avenues for all State officers and State departments to ignore the limitation of the appropriation for their respective offices of departments, if they saw fit so to do, and rely on the Court of Claims to take care of all claims made in excess of such appropriations.

We believe the legislature and Governor are much better informed on matters of appropriations than the Court of Claims is or ever will be, and that that subject is exclusively within their powers and duties, and we will not usurp it. We could cite several Illinois Supreme Court decisions in support of our views; but we feel it is unnecessary to do so.

For the reasons above stated, the case will be dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Leech

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 748
    Claimant awarded $3750.00.)
    Erma C. Crosby, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Respondeat superior — doctrine of not applicable to State. The doctrine of Respondeat Superior is not applicable to the State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the discharge of their duty.
    Social justice and equity — award may be made. While there may be no legal liability existing against the State for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty, the court may as ,an act of social justice and equity enter an award in favor of claimant.
    Bowe & Bowe, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court :

This case comes before the court by declaration filed by Erma C. Crosby, by Bowe & Bowe, her attorneys, setting forth that on the 26th day of February, A; D. 1922, the State of Illinois and trustees of the University of Illinois maintained, managed and operated a certain school, to-wit: Urbana, in Champaign County, Illinois, known as the University of Illinois; that as a part of said university of the said State of Illinois, the said State of Illinois and trustees thereof maintained certain shops and foundries in which dangerous power driven machinery was used, and concerning which there were statutory regulation, for the protection of employees ; that on, to-wit, February 26, 1922, Glen M. Crosby, husband of petitioner, was employed as an instructor in one of said workshops or foundries by the said trustees of the University of Illinois; that the said Glen M. Crosby was then and there injured by reason of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his said employment; that- said Glen M. Crosby was killed by reason of the said injuries; that his wage's during the year preceding his death were, to-wit, . $200.00' a month; that the deceased left him surviving a widow, Erma C. Crosby, the petitioner herein, who was dependent on the deceased and whom he was. under legal obligation to support at the time of his death, which was on the 31st day of March, 1922; that claimant resides at 246 South Fifteenth avenue, Maywood, Illinois.

The Attorney General filed a demurrer, which, as a matter of law, is sustained.

From the stipulation of facts agreed upon between the parties hereto, by their respective attorneys, it appears that the Illinois State University at Urbana, Illinois, is a large educational institution conducted by the State of Illinois; that its grounds comprise many acres; that it has large and expensive buildings, some of which are several stories in height; that in some of the buildings are high pressure boilers for heating, power and other purposes; that said University of Illinois has departments devoted to the study of engineering in its various forms and that in some of these departments there are rooms filled with power driven machinery and dangerous appliances, required by law to be guarded in special manner, which said machinery and appliances are used in the general work of instruction and demonstration in the said branches of science; that the State of Illinois employed Glen M. Crosby, the deceased, as an instructor in one of the engineering departments, and that his work required him to be in a certain foundry conducted by the said university as a part of its school; that on or about the 26th day of February, A. D. 1922, the said Glen M. Crosby, while so employed in the foundry of the University of Illinois, as assistant superintendent, or in some similar capacity, was assisting in the lifting of some heavy metal object which was suspended from a beam by means of a chain; that spme part of the arrangement which held the metal object suspended broke and that the chain, or some other part of the contrivance, fell and struck Glen M. Crosby on the cheek, causing a wound to his jaw; that the wound to the jaw became infected and that Glen M. Crosby died five weeks subsequent thereto from a strepticoccic infection; that said Glen M. Crosby was employed at a monthly rate of pay of One Hundred Eighty Dollars for ten months, or Eighteen Hundred Dollars a year.

It is further stipulated that the trustees of the university be dismissed as parties respondent, and the court finds that an award should be allowed in this case in equity and good conscience, and we do therefore award the claimant the sum of. $3,750.00.


author: Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

text:
    (No. 766
    Claimant awarded $500.00.)
    Oliver Clark, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Governmental function — state not liadle. This case is controlled bj the decision of the court in Denny v. State, supra.

    J. Fred Gilster, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; S. S. DuHamel, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant was employed by the State of Illinois as a guard of the Chester State Hospital, and while in the performance of his duties as such guard it appears that he was beaten and badly ill-treated by being assaulted and bitten by a great number of the inmates of said institution in their endeavor to escape. It has been the custom of this court in handling these claims to take into consideration the Workmen’s Compensation Act, but it further appears that since his injury he has been receiving his full pay from the State, which would have been more than he would have received if he was receiving allowance under the compensation Act. However, to do the claimant substantial justice and having in mind the possibility of his losing his present employment, and' in view of the testimony of a physician in the case that the loss of efficiency in the arm of the claimant is not more than 40% at this- time and that it will eventually recover. It is therefore considered by the court that the claimant be allowed the sum of $500.00.


text:
    (No. 767
    Claimant awarded $2000.00.)
    Edgar Collard, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Military service — when State liable for injury sustained by soldier. Claimant was injured while in the discharge of his duty, as a corporal of the Illinois National Guard, under orders of his superior officer, Seld — He is entitled to an award.
    Workman’s compensation act — award may be fixed under provisions of. The provisions of the Workman’s Compensation Act may be taken into consideration by the court in fixing an award in cases of this character.
    McLaughlin & Billman, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant is a young man 21 years old, unmarried, and it appears that there is dependent upon him for support his widowed mother and four minor brothers and sisters, and that the family is in needy circumstances.

Prior to and on September 2, 1923, the claimant'was a member of the service company, 130th Infantry, Illinois National Guard, with the rank of corporal.

On the date mentioned he was a member on the detail of six men who were directed to engage in collecting in a truck dry garbage about the camp.

As Corporal Collard was climbing upon the step of the truck, it moved forward, crushing him between the truck and a telephone pole, and caused injury, which is the base of his claim.

There appears to be no contention on behalf of the State as to the fact of the occurrence of the accident or the fact that it occurred while the claimant was in line of duty, the only contention being the extent of the damages of injury sustained by the claimant.

It appears that the claimant suffered a fracture of the left femur at the junction of the middle and upper third, and it is further claimed that the fractured bones made a union in malposition, with .an overriding of the fragments, causing an anterior-posterior deformity, causing, it is claimed, a shortening of the left leg and impairment of function characterized in a limp.

It appears that the injury caused the claimant and is causing him considerable pain and discomfort.

In making allowance in this case, the court, in following its precedent in other cases of this character where employees were injured while in various employment in behalf of the State, and that considering the Workmen’s Compensation Act, it appears to the court that there is not more than 50% disability, but -the court wishes to also consider the medical requirements that might be necessary for the aid of the claimant and will have that in mind in malting an allowance.

It is considered by the court that an allowance of $2000.00 be recommended.


text:
    (No. 784
    Claimant awarded $1500.00.)
    Guido Mattei, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

      Contract — when State is not liable. The State is not liable for supplies, articles or musical instruments furnished by an employee, of its institution, out of his own funds for use in such institution, or for loss of same.
    Social justice and equity — award may be made — reimbursement. While there may be no legal liability against the State for the loss of instruments used by its employees in its institution, yet as an act of social justice and equity an award may be made to reimburse claimant for such loss.
    John L. Walker, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a case commenced by plaintiff, Guido Mattei, by John L. Walker, his attorney, setting forth that on to-wit: September 20, 1914, the plaintiff was engaged by defendant as bandmaster at its institution, located at No. 1900 Collins street, in the City of Joliet, in the county and State aforesaid; that said plaintiff -has been employed as said defendant’s bandmaster at its said institution continuously since that date and has had under his charge the supervision and teaching of music there; that the musical library of said defendant’s institution became inadequate, and there being extreme difficulty in replenishing same in order to keep it in first class condition, for the progress of those in said institution band,, said plaintiff as bandmaster purchased from time to time, out of his own salary, music and musical instruments, with the knowledge, consent and acquiescense of said defendant, to-wit:

A musical library valued at approximately........................$1500.00
One Pathe talking machine ...................................... 102.00
75 double faced records .......................................... 225.00
One snare drum ................................................. 35.00
One silver clarinet mouth piece .................................. 15.00
One rubber clarinet mouth piece.................................. 5.00
One Oliver typewriter ........................................... 49.50
One music brief case............................................. 7.50
Total .......................................................$1940.50

That it became necessary to increase the music library in order to properly teach and supervise music for the benefit of the inmates of defendant’s institution, on account of the band at said institution being divided by the transferring of part of it to the new prison of said defendant in Lockport township, in county and State aforesaid; which was also placed under the care and supervision of plaintiff as bandmaster; that no additional State appropriation having been provided for this purpose, said plaintiff kept adding to and augmenting his own said library at his own expense and out of his own salary, in order to keep the bands in the two said defendant’s institutions from falling into arrears and depreciating as bandmen, and to keep them foremost in the United States of America, as the greatest of their kind; that defendant’s duly authorized agents were in possession and control of said institution at Joliet, and it was mutually agreed between defendant’s agents and plaintiff that said plaintiff’s musical library as augmented from time to time and said plaintiff’s instruments that he had also purchased should be kept, stored and sheltered in said institution as they were in daily use, and said plaintiff then and there permitted his said library and his said musical instruments aforesaid, and the said defendant’s agents had the possession, care, custody, control and complete supervision of it, and said plaintiff’s library was burned at said institution at Joliet, when fire broke out there on January 31,1924, which completely destroyed said library and musical instruments. ■

The Attorney General filed a demurrer in this case, which, as a matter of law, is sustained.

It is stipulated and agreed by and between the parties in above entitled cause that the affidavits of Dio Moreno, Newton H. Gerhardt, and Guido Mattei may be considered as evidence on behalf of plaintiff, as fully as if affiants had appeared and testified and their testimony had been taken in the form of depositions. It is further stipulated and agreed between the parties as follows: It is hereby stipulated and agreed, by and between the claimant above named, by John L. Walker, his attorney, and the State of Illinois, by Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, that the evidence to be taken on behalf of the claimant herein in support of and of said claim shall be taken before Herbert P. Folkers, a notary public, at room 506, James G. Heggie building, in the City of Joliet, Illinois, on July 7, 1924, at 1:30 P. M., and continuing from day to day until completed. It is further stipulated and agreed that said deposition when completed shall be returned by said Herbert P. Folkers, notary public, to Louis L. Emmerson, Secretary of State, and ex-officio secretary of the Court of Claims, by mail, in a sealed envelope bearing his endorsement and the title of the case, and reciting that it contains the said deposi- , tion. It is further stipulated that all statutory requirements with references to notice of the taking of said deposition herein in said order are waived and that said deposition shall be taken pursuant to this stipulation and may be read in evidence on behalf of the claimant in the above entitled cause with the same effect as though taken with all statutory requirements complied with, subject only to such objections as go to the materiality and competence of the evidence.

The evidence shows that the claimant, Guido Mattei, is a resident of the City of Joliet, and that he was employed as bandmaster in the Illinois State Prison at Joliet and had been so employed for twelve years past; that he had charge of the musical library at this penitentiary and that he purchased out of his own wages the musical library which, was destroyed by fire, as shown by the evidence, together with other personal property; that said musical library was of great value.

While the State of Illinois is not liable, still we believe that as a matter of equity and good conscience, the claimant should • be awarded a sum sufficient to repay him for the musical library destroyed.

We therefore award the claimant the sum of" $1,500.00.


author: Mr. Justice Phillips

text:
    (No. 796
    Claimant awarded $727.44.)
    Luna B. Thompson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Property loss — when award may he made to State employee for. This case is similar to that of Underwood v. State, supra, and the decision of the court there announced governs this claim.
    R. O. Clarida, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought by Luna B. Thompson, claimant, for loss of goods in the fire which occurred in Chicago State Hospital December 16, 1923, and may be- called a companion case with No. 152 of George B. Underwood, in which opinion was filed April, 1925, along with this opinion.

The facts are identical in the two and other cases. Claimant was in the employ of the State in said hospital at time aforesaid when the annex was burnt, in which claimant, without fault on her part, lost all her wearing apparel, trunk, goods and chattels, which form the list filed, seem to be a reasonable amount for an employ to have on hand under the contract of her employment. The prices seem reasonable, and a full bill of particulars, with prices are filed, amounting to $727.44.

The facts seem, in equity and good conscience, to justify the claim. We accordingly award claimant the sum of $727.44.


text:
    (No. 808
    Claimant awarded $300.00.)
    David Marcelius Upchurch, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed, April 16, 1925.

    Respondeat superior — doctrine not applicable to the State. Under the doctrine of Respondeat Superior the State is not liable for injuries sustained by its employees while in the performance of their duty.
    Social justice and equity — award may be made. While the State is not liable, an award may be made to an injured employee, as a matter of social justice and equity.
    K. C. Ronalds, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim brought to recover compensation for injuries to the claimant while employed as a gardner for the Watertown State Hospital. It appears that while in the course of his employment he jumped from a wagon and broke his left leg above the ankle.

As a matter of law, the demurrer filed by the defendant should be sustained, but as a matter of social justice and according to the position heretofore taken by this court, that employees of the State should have the same benefits that would accrue to them under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, were they employed by private corporations.

It appears from the record that the injury occurred on October 9, 1922, and that, according to the custom of the department under which he was working, he was allowed a month’s salary. Therefore, his compensation should only begin November 9,1922. He was paid $75.00 per month, with room and board, by the State, and before he was employed by the State he received not to exceed $1200.00 per year. It appears to the court that he ought to be allowed a compensation for about six months.

It is therefore ordered that the claimant be allowed the sum of $300.00.


text:
    (No. 815
    Claim denied.)
    Elton C. Armitage, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.
    Fees and salaries — when state not liable — reinstatement of employee. The State is not liable for the salary of an employee, who upon leave of absence without pay, is refused reinstatement by the authorities under whom he previously worked.

      Jurisdiction — when court will not take. The court will not take jurisdiction in oases that effect the discretion of authorities in other branches of the Government.
    Earl W. Wiley, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

In the statement of claimant it appears that he was appointed to a position as deputy state fire marshal about November 1, 1920, and passed a civil service examination for that position. The claimant further states that about February 1, 1923, claimant applied for a leave of absence without pay for six weeks on account of alleged physical ailments, and same was granted, and about March 15, 1923, he asked for an extension of such leave for six months longer, expiring September 15, 1923, and at about that time he applied for reinstatement, which was apparently refused, and claimant presents his claim to this court for two months’ salary.

The Attorney General comes in behalf of the State and files a demurrer, and as a matter of law it is the opinion of the court "the demurrer should be sustained. In a further discussion of the facts in the case, it appears that the claimant sought redress to the State’s Civil Service Commission and also to the State Fire Marshal, and it is evident to the court that these authorities, having full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances, did not consider it proper to reinstate claimant, and it appears to this court that this court should not take jurisdiction in questions that would effect the discretion of the authorities of any particular branch of the State government, and from all the facts before the court it is of the opinion that even considering the case on its merits, relief should not be granted to the claimant in this case.

Therefore it is considered by this court that said claim be denied and dismissed.


text:
    (No. 820
    Claimant awarded $792.00.)
    George Temple & Arthur R. Temple, Partners, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

      Sales — when State liable. The State is liable to refund the purchase of hogs sold by it to claimant when the animals are infected with contagious and infectious disease.
    Iungerich & Chapman, for claimant.
    • Oscar E.- Carlstrom, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for a loss arising out of a purchase of hogs from the University of Illinois by the claimants.

It appears that the defendant maintains and operates a department of animal husbandry as a part of Agricultural Experiment Station in connection with the University of Illinois, situated in Urbana, in Champaign County.

It appears that said institution carried on experiment matters and kept hogs for experimental purposes or otherwise.

It is claimed that a.lot of twenty-five hogs were sold to the claimants by the authorities of such university, paying therefor $160.00; that claimants afterwards purchased eighty-one hogs, paying therefor $792.00; that this latter lot.of hogs were infected with “flu,” a contagious and infectious disease of swine.

It is further alleged that agents at such university knew of the diseased condition of the hogs.

The defendant appears and objects to the allowance of this claim.

■ The claimant also claims damages on account of loss of other hogs, feed, etc.

The court is of the opinion that to go beyond the question of eighty-one hogs sold, that, would get into the realm of speculative damages.

However, from all the evidence, the court is of the opinion that the hogs were not well, that is, the bunch of eighty-one last sold to claimants were sick and should not have been sold. Therefore, the court recommends an allowance of the sum of $792.00, which is an allowance on account of the eighty-one ' hogs last sold.


text:
    (No. 829
    Claimant awarded $2500.00.)
    Roy E. Sedewarft, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Military service — when claimant entitled to award. Where a member of the Illinois State Militia is injured while in the performance of his duty, under orders from his superior officer, an award may be made to him for the injuries sustained.
    Roy E. Sedewarft, for claimant.
    ° Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a case filed by Boy E. Sedewarft, a private in Battery “E,” 202nd Artillery (Anti-Air Craft), stationed and encamped at Camp Custer, Michigan, to recover damages for injury sustained while on duty, and in his declaration claimant avers that on July 13, 1923, he, together with other members of the Hlinois State Militia, was engaged in practice firing of a certain machine gun under the command of Major Kenneth C. Seibert; that at 11:15 A. M. the order was given to cease firing and to dismount the gun; that claimant and one Alexander A. Branski were engaged in dismounting the gun; that Major Seibert heard an explosion, turned around and saw that claimant had been injured in the right hand; that his hand was over the muzzle of the gun, which was not locked, and that Branski grasped the handle of the gun and ■ pulled it upwards, causing its discharge and his resultant injury; that injury resulted in amputation of the index finger and part of the palm of the right hand, necessitating the drawing of the thumb over against the palm and fastening same there, the injury being permanent and seriously interferring with the ability of claimant to earn a living; that at the time of the- injury he was employed in a clerical capacity in a railroad office, his duties requiring writing by hand; that he has since lost his position, as he was unable to write a reasonably legible hand; that claimant- was confined for a time in a hospital at Battle Creek, Michigan, and thereafter was treated by Dr. L. C. Dubois, of 202 A. A. A., I. N. Gf., whose address is 5875 Broadway, Chicago; that claimant is assisting in the support of his mother, so far as he is able to; that he has only been able to secure temporary positions since his injury; that his injury has seriously handicapped him for manual or clerical labor; that he has no profession and is probably not educated or equipped to undertake one even if he had the means to pursue an education, and claimant avers that the injury resulted while he was under order given to claimant and others to dismount the machine gun, and that said machine gun in some manner was accidentally discharged, whereby the injuries above set forth resulted.

The demurrer filed by the Attorney General is allowed as a matter of law.

Stipulation agreed upon by and between the parties recites ° that the transcripts of all testimony given before the board of officers at Camp Custer, Michigan, on July 13, 1923, and' subsequent dates, touching the injury to Boy E. Sedewarft, and which includes the testimony given by Major Kenneth C. Seibert, Captain George F. Mundt, First Lieutenant Arthur Hoag, Sergeant Charles F. Harrell, witnesses Gaffney, Lafquist, Branski, Wolfe, Burt, Hoag, Block, claimant, Boy E. Sedewarft, and others may be considered in evidence before the Court of Claims in lieu of depositions, together with all other documents, findings, date and information now contained in the files of the adjutant general .of the State of Illinois, in so far as the same, or any part of it, may pertain to the injury'sustained by said claimant and to a correct and just disposition of the claim of the said Boy E. Sedewarft against the State of Illinois.

It appears from an amended declaration filed herein that claimant has been paid $30.00, and that an additional sum of .$180.00 has been paid to claimant on September 4, 1924.

The court further finds that the board of officers who considered the case recommended that claimant be paid the sum of fifty dollars per month for a period of fifty months, and found the degree of disability suffered by claimant to be 50%; that subsequently the board amended their report and recommended that claimant be paid the sum of two hundred dollars in cash and the further sum of fifty dollars per month until the matter could be considered by the Court of Claims, and we find that said sums of $30.00 'and $180.00, respectively, have been paid claimant.

We accordingly award to the claimant the sum of $2,500.00.


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    (No. 831
    Claimant awarded $801.15.)
    George B. Underwood and Leah Underwood, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Property loss — award may 6e made to State employee. Where the property oí a State employee is lost by fire at a State Institution, such employee may be awarded compensation for the loss, as a matter of social justice and equity, although no liability exists against the State for the loss.
    George B. Underwood, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimants, George B. Underwood and Leah Underwood, his wife, file their claim for damages in the sum of $801.15 for loss of their clothing, wearing apparel and household goods and chattels, burned and destroyed by fire at the Chicago State Hospital December 26, 1923.

Claimants were in the employ of the State at said hospital at and a long time before the fire, and occupied quarters in the said building. The goods lost were necessary for a proper equipment of their rooms so occupied by them. The origin of the fire, so far as the evidence discloses, is unknown to claimants or defendant, and without fault on part of any of the parties. It was a very disastrous fire, destroying a number of lives of the inmates, much personal property and partially destroying the building. Claimants were not in the room containing their goods at time of the fire, but were about the premises engaged in their usual daily duties for the State, and it was impossible to save the goods, as disclosed by the evidence. The claimants had no attorney to present their claims, and taking evidence was conducted by Mr. George W. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General.

A bill of particulars was filed, itemizing all the articles lost, their original cost prices and a fair cash present value at time of their destruction by fire. The claim is verified by the oaths of claimants, and corroborated by the evidence of other witnesses.

While it has been often held by this court that the State is not legally liable in such cases, yet in the interest of social justice and equity, we are of the opinion that the entire demand should be allowed.

We accordingly award claimants the sum of $801.15.


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    (No. 840
    Claim denied.)
    Earl M. Hoaglin, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Governmental function — division of highways — state not liable. The State in the construction, maintenance and patrolling of its State Highways, exercises a governmental function and is not liable for the negligence of its agents or employees.
    Paul W. Gordon, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes before the court on a declaration filed by Earl M. Hoaglin, claimant, by Paul W. Gordon, his attorney, and makes a claim against the State of Illinois for the sum of $5600.00; and for cause for his claim, shows that some time prior to July 12, 1924, the State of Illinois had constructed a certain highway, commonly known as a hard road, through Henderson county, Illinois, which said highway was designated, by the Division of Highways of the Department of Public Works and Buildings of the State of Illinois, as Route Eight of the hard roads system of Illinois; that in the construction of said highway it was necessary to -construct certain culverts under the same for the purpose of carrying off surface waters; that one of said culverts was constructed at a point south of the Village of Gladstone, Illinois, and at a distance of approximately two miles from said Village of Gladstone; that in constructing said culvert the said Highway Division did not' make allowance for flood waters, or for any surface waters in excess of the normal flow, and said culvert was not of adequate size to carry off any unusual flow of such surface waters; that, during the first part of said month of July, there had been heavy rains, in consequence of which large amounts of surface waters were discharged from the hills surrounding said culvert, and said culvert was inadequate to carry off said waters; that in consequence of the inadequate size of said culvert a large part of said highway was washed out and carried away by the said waters, leaving a gap in said highway of approximately ninety feet in width; that said gap in said highway constituted a dangerous condition, and that such dangerous coiidition continued for a long space of time, to-wit: until August 1, 1924; that the State of Illinois, recognizing the dangerous condition of said highway, and the peril in which persons using said highway were placed by reason thereof, hired a watchman to patrol the west end of said gap and to warn all travelers on said highway of the danger; that on, to-wit: July 12, A. D. 1924, at to-wit, 11 o’clock P. M., claimant was driving a certain Studebaker touring car east on said highway, traveling at a reasonable rate of speed, to-wit: twenty miles per hour, and that he was entirely unaware of the dangerous condition of said highway; that, as he approached the west end of said gap or break, no warning was given him, and there were no signs or lights to warn him of the defective condition of said highway; that no watchman was on duty; that the night was dark and claimant could not see said break in the pavement on said highway until his automobile had approached so near to the same that it was impossible to stop said automobile, and that same plunged over the embankment and crashed into the flood waters below; that said automobile was almost completely wrecked, and that the actual cost of having automobile repaired was $700.00; that claimant’s head was cut open to such an extent that the doctor was required to place 18 stitches in the wound thus caused; that his ear was partially torn from his head; that one of his ribs was broken and his lung punctured by said broken rib; that his leg was injured and wearing apparel ruined; that he lost two months’ time and was forced to discontinue work for two months because of said injuries, that the actual pecuniary loss suffered by claimant amounts to $5600.00.

Demurrer filed by Attorney General is allowed as a matter of law.

Stipulation agreed to by and between the parties hereto, by their respective attorneys, provides that evidence be taken on behalf of claimant before Martha E. McCullough, a notary public, at room 103, in the First National Bank building, in Galesburg, Illinois, on February 9, 1925, at 10 o’clock A. M., and continuing from day to day until completed; that such depositions be returned to Louis L. Emmerson, Secretary of State and ex-officio clerk of the Court of Claims, by mail iñ a . sealed envelope, bearing the endorsement of the title of the case and reciting that it contains said depositions; that evidence need not be subscribed by the witnesses, and that the certificate of the notary public and her notarial seal when placed on said depositions will be sufficient to admit them in evidence.

It appears from the evidence that at the place of this washout a barricade had been placed by the State, and was located there at the time of the accident; that on each side of the washout at a distance of approximately five hundred feet were erected and in place warning signs, cautioning users of the road of the danger existing. There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether a red lantern, lighted, was in place on the barricade; the three occupants of the car in which claimant was riding testifying that no such lantern was placed on the barricade, and there being an affidavit of one Louis Hoffman, .who states that he passed said washout between the hour of 11:30 and 10 P. M., on the night of the accident, and that at the time he passed this washout a lighted red lantern was in place on the barricade.

The demurrer filed on behalf of the State of Illinois, the defendant, sets up the fact that the State is not liable because the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to the State, and this rule has been upheld in previous decisions of this court. In an action to recover for personal injury on the ground of- negligence in the defendant, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish either that he himself was in the exercise of due care or that the injury was in no degree attributable to any want of any ordinary care on his part. Testimony showing that claimant’s car skidded about sixty feet from the place where the accident occurred, tends to show that he was not in the exercise of due care and caution. The testimony of one Ward Gibson, who testified that he passed the washout in question about- 7 o ’clock that same evening and repassed the same place again the same evening about 11 or 12 o’clock P. M., and that a lantern showing a red light was hanging on this barricade, visible for about a quarter of a mile; the testimony given by John Stevens, and Theodore Bonderer, both employees of the State, to the effect that all ncessary precaution had been taken to warn people from danger who might be using the highway at this place, all tend to show that the State had used due care and caution in guarding against danger at this point.

We do not feel that this is a case which justifies the granting of an award, and the claim is disallowed.


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    (No. 847
    Claimant awarded $1790.93.)
    Pauline Dohn Rudolph, Executrix of the Estate of Franklin Rudolph, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Inheritance tax — when claimant entitled to refund. Where an inheritance tax has been assessed and paid under protest, and upon appeal and hearing thereon, and the tax is re-assessed and a lesser amount is found to be due the State, claimant is entitled to a refund' of the difference between the amount of the tax paid under the original order of the court and the amount found to be due upon appeal.
    Miller, Gorham, Wales & Noxon, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Pauline Dohn Rudolph, is executrix of the last will and testament of Franklin Rudolph, late of Cook County, deceased. On June 27, 1923, an order was entered by the county judge, of said county fixing the total tax due the State from said estate at the sum of $51,981.73, less 5% statutory deduction — $2599.08—or a net total of $39,724.62. Claimant thereupon appealed from said order of the county judge of the county court, from the order appraising the taxable share of claimant individually at said sum.

On June 28, 1923, claimant!, under protest, paid the said net sum, being the total tax assessed against all the legatees. The Union Trust Company also appealed from an order assessing a tax of $10,032.98 against the interest of the Union Trust Company as trustee for the will of Franklin Rudolph, deceased, to-wit: Pauline Dohn Rudolph, Frank Dohn Rudolph and Charles Dohn Rudolph, under certain trusts executed by decedent in Ms lifetime, which the State of Illinois claimed were gifts in contemplation of death, etc. These appeals were perfected July 17,1923, and heard in court July 29,1924; and thereupon the court entered an order re-appraising the total tax due the State at $39,930.21, minus 5% discount of $1996.51, or a net tax of $37,933.70, showing that claimant had thus overpaid tax to the amount of $1790.93, and the judge entered an order that she was entitled to a refund of said sum.

The Attorney General, after examining the evidence submitted by claimant, says that she was entitled to the amount claimed as refund. The court finds that the evidence on file supports claimant’s declaration and claim, and accordingly mitted by claimant, says that she was entitled to the amount awards claimant the sum of $1,790.93.


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    (No. 849
    Claim denied.)
    Elta M. Carter, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Non-liability of state — not liable for injury sustained by attendant at State Fair. The State is not liable for an injury sustained by an attendant or visitor at its State Fair, notwithstanding such attendant or visitor paid an entrance or admission fee.
    LeForgee, Black & Samuels, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; S. S. DuHamel, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit brought against the State of Illinois where the claimant, a resident of Decatur, Illinois, alleges that she attended the Illinois State Fair at Springfield on September 16, 1924, and that she paid the usual admission fee for entrance to the grounds and buildings of said Fair. That on the morning of said day, while she was walking from the Fine Arts building into an adjoining hall known as Machinery Hall, she tripped and fell off of a step-off to the floor, thereby breaking the surgical neck of the right femur, commonly called the hip, and as a result of such accident the claimant alleges that she was permanently injured and compelled to lay out large sums for hospital expenses, bills, etc., and that she was exercising due care for her safety when the accident . occurred. It does not appear in the evidence any denial as to the happening of the accident, but there, is considerable difference as to whether or not the claimant was exercising proper caution at the time and whether or not there was proper and sufficient light to permit the claimant to view the hazards of the situation. -It does, however, appear to the court that at a place like the State Fair, which is described in the records and otherwise well known, that it would be incumbent upon any person on going ont of the building or going into another, that they would watch their step more particularly than if they were passing over the floor inside a building, and, as stated by defendant in their brief and argument, “that a step in the doorway leading from one building to another having a height of about four inches, is certainly not a dangerous agency in itself.” The court, in viewing the defendant’s exhibit “I,” purporting to be a photograph of ‘the door from the Fine Arts Building in the Machinery Hall, is of the impression that the situation at the door in question must be similar to other steps and entrances throughout the State Fair grounds over which hundreds of thousands of people must travel while the fair is in session, and while an .accident of this kind is regrettable, this court feels that to establish a precedent in making allowance in a claim of this kind that the bars would be let down to permit the entrance of a vast number of claims, against the State of Illinois that would mean a heavy burden upon the taxpayers.

It is further the opinion of this court that there is a grave question whether or not' this court would have the power under the law to make allowance in a case of this kind even if the facts justified such an allowance' in a case between individuals or private corporations. However, it is the opinion of the court that, taking all the facts under consideration and after consideration of the brief and argument of both parties, an award should not be made in this case.

Therefore it is considered by the court that claim be denied.


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    (No. 852
    Claimant awarded $3250.00.)
    Illinois Power & Light Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Franchise tax — when claimant entitled to refund. Where there has been a consolidation of corporations, and a franchise tax is afterwards levied and assessment made upon each corporation consolidated, and' paid, and at the time of payment one of the corporations was not in existence, claimant is entitled to a refund of the tax paid on the non-existent corporation.
    Henry I. Green, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, the Illinois Power & Light Corporation, a corporation, by Henry I. (Green, its general solicitor, files its declaration herein, setting forth that it has a lawful claim against the State of Illinois; that the claimant is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois; that claimant is engaged in the ownership and operation, among other things, of divers and sundry public utility properties in the State of Illinois, and was formerly organized as a merger or consolidation of eighteen predecessor Illinois public utility corporations, among which was a public utility corporation known and designated as Southern Illinois Light & Power Company; that pursuant to the annual report, filed in the month of February, 1923, with the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, by said Southern Illinois Light & Power Company, there was levied and assessed the sum of $3,250.00 as and for franchise tax for the year 1923, against said Southern Illinois Light & Power Company, based upon an authorized capital stock of said corporation of six million five hundred thousand dollars; that on the 25th of May, 1923, being the date of the consolidation of the above mentioned eighteen public utility corporations into the Illinois Light & Power Corporation, the claimant herein issued its voucher No. 54149 to Louis L. Emmerson, Secretary of State, as follows:

Organization fee.................................$30,937.65
Advance franchise tax........................... 41,250.20
Total
$72,187.85

Claimant further says that said payment of franchise tax on said date by said claimant herein, as above stated, was in payment of the unexpired part of the year 1923, as outlined in the statutes of the State of Illinois, and was inclusive of any and all franchise taxes which might be due from the consolidating corporations, among which was the Southern Illinois Light & Power Company; it would therefore appear that the consolidated corporations should not have paid their individual annual franchise tax for the year 1923 to the State of Illinois, in view of the fact that the consolidation and merger of the above mentioned public utility corporations into the Illinois Power & Light Corporation took place prior to July 1, 1923, being the due date for payment of annual franchise taxes to the State of Illinois.

The amount of $3250.00 was paid to the State of Illinois by said Southern Illinois Light & Power Company, erroneously, to the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois files a statement wherein he advises the court that the Secretary of State has informed him that there was not in existence a Southern Illinois Power & Light Company at the time said fee was paid, arid that the State is not entitled to said sum of $3250.00, said statement being signed by Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General.

It is evident that the State of Illinois was erroneously paid the sum of $3250.00, which, as a matter of law, it was not entitled to receive.

As a matter of equity and good conscience, the court finds that said claimant is entitled to an award or refund of the amount of $3250.00.

The court therefore awards the claimant the sum of $3,250.00. '


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    (No. 857
    Claimant awarded $597.07.)
    Illinois State Journal Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

      Contract — when State liable for supplies furnished. The State is liable for printing, supplies and work furnished it at the request of an authorized Department of State.
    Will H. McConnell, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration filed by the Illinois State Journal, claimant, sets forth that on April 5,1923, the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Printing, State of Illinois, issued order No. 85581, to the Illinois State Journal for the following: Print and Bind: 1000 copies annual report of the ' Illinois Beekeepers’ Association, 22nd Annual Report, 32nd Annual Meeting, size 6x9, bind in red cloth, English finish; order signed by the Superintendent of Printing, H. L. Williamson; that above work was finished and delivered to the State of Illinois, Division of Beekeepers’ Association during the month of June, 1923; bill for this work made in triplicate and delivered to the department for payment; that the Bee- . keepers’ Association overlooked paying this account and that the funds available were turned back to the treasury; that the price for said work was at the regular contract price and that the State of Illinois on account thereof is justly indebted to claimant in the sum of $597.07.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois filed herein his consent to the payment of award as follows: The Attorney General has had this case investigated by the Superintendent of the Division of Printing, in the Department of Public Works and Buildings. The information furnished the Attorney General is that on April 5,1923, an order was given, No. 85581, directed to the claimant, authorizing the printing and binding of one thousand copies of said report; said report ' was printed and delivered to A. C. Baxter, president of said association on or about July 12, 1923, and on July 19, 1923, the Superintendent of the Division of Printing approved the invoice of the claimant and forwarded same to the Illinois Beekeepers’ Association to be vouchered and on August 21, 1923, the Superintendent of the Division of Printing received voucher No. 69 from said Beekeepers’ Association and same was forwarded to the Department of Finance for payment but through an error the said bill was not paid and the appropriation therefor lapsed. The facts show the claimant to be entitled to the amount alleged in the declaration and the Superintendent of the Division of Printing assures the court that the bill is correct and-that an award should be made.

The court therefore awards the claimant the sum of $597.07.


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    (No. 862
    Claimant awarded $14,476.22 with interest.)
    Lucile Hirsch Hilborn and Milton S. Hirsch, Executors and Trustees of the Estate of Isaac Hirsch, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Inheritance tax — when refund will be made, Sec. 25. Where upon proper proceeding an estate is re-appraised and the tax re-assessed and the tax reduced, claimant is entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount of the tax paid under the original order and the amount found due upon the re-assessment.
    Simeon Straus and Ira E Straus, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit is brought by Lucile Hirsch Hilborn and Milton S. Hirsch, executors of the last will and testament of Isaac Hirsch, deceased, to recover $14,476.22 refund of inheritance taxes under provisions of Sec. 25, Inheritance Tax Laws of Illinois.

The evidence is clear and undisputed in this case and admitted by the Attorney General, who consents to an award of the amount claimed, and our statement will be brief.

September 5,1923, claimants paid the assessed inheritance tax assessed, to amount of $51,187.23.

On 31st day of December, 1924, the county court, on proper petition, entered an order for re-appraisement and re-assessment as to the one-third of the residuary estate held for the benefit of Lncile Hirsck Hilborn, the petitioner therein, and on a proper hearing, the court entered its order assessing the same in sum of $39,405.07 and found that the petitioner was entitled to have returned the difference between the original assessment and the last order re-assessing same, to-wit: the sum of $14,476.22 with interest at 3% per annum from September 5, 1923.

The Attorney General was notified of this procedure and made no objection to the re-assessment, etc. It is never necessary in deciding these inheritance tax cases to go further back of the orders and findings of the court on the petition for re-appraisement and re-assessment. Certified copies of the orders and findings of the county court are filed in evidence and the Attorney General admits that upon an examination of the evidence, the claimants are entitled to the sum of $14,476.22.


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    (No. 864
    Claimant awarded $766.85.)
    Florence H. Clough, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Pbopebty loss — award may be made to State employee. This case is similar to that of Underwood v. State, supra, and the decision of the court in that case governs this claim.
    Florence H. Clough, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by Florence Clough against the State for household goods, wares and clothing, lost by her while in line of duty as an employee of the State, by fire on the 16th day of December, 1923, when the Annex of Chicago Hospital at Dunning was destroyed by fire. The facts and evidence are identical with that in case No. 831 of Underwood vs. State, opinion filed in April, 1925, and it is unnecessary to reiterate them.

The articles lost are minutely itemized, and prices seem fairly reasonable. The State is at disadvantage in getting-evidence in its defense in cases of this character, and we must depend largely on the credibility of claimants and the apparent reasonableness of the prices shown.

Claimant’s proven losses amount to $766.85, which sum we award to her for same reasons stated in the Underwood case.


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    (No. 869
    Claimant awarded $138.84 with interest.)
    William N. Johnson, Jr., Executor of the Estate of William N. Johnson, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Inheritance tax — claimant entitled to refund. Bee. 25. Where upon proper proceedings an order of court is made directing a re-assessment of the tax under Sec. 25, Inheritance Tax Law, and it appeared upon the hearing in such proceeding that the estate is not subject to the tax, claimant is entitled to a refund of the tax paid.
    H. Ward Heidenrich, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit by William Johnson, executor of the estate of William N. Johnson, deceased, for refund of inheritance taxes under Section 25 of the inheritance tax laws of Illinois, in the sum of $138.84. The deceased, domiciled in Chicago, Illinois, died January 3, 1918, leaving a last will and testament, and William N. Johnson, Jr., was appointed executor, who, with his sister, Margaret Blackman, were the only children and his only heirs-at-law left surviving. November 27, 1918, the county judge of Cook County entered an order fixing the amount of inheritance taxes in said estate at $138.84, which was paid February 19,1919, and was the correct amount under the assumption that prevailed at the time.

January 13, 1925, on proper petition to the county court, an order was entered directing a re-assessment and re-distribution. The Attorney General had notice of this proceeding and consented to the last order. Amongst other things, the court found that claimant herein was entitled to a refund of the said sum of $138.84. Certified copies of executor’s letters of executorship and orders of the county court all filed as evidence.

The Attorney General consents to the award claimed. Ordered by this court that claimant be paid a refund of $138.84, with 3% interest per annum from February 19, 1919.


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    (No. 870
    Claimant awarded $832.25 with interest.)
    Emanuel Buxbaum, Henry Kuh and Myra C. Ellenbogen, Trustees Under the Last Will and Testament of Abraham Kuh, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Inheritance tax — when claimant entitled to refund. Sec. 25. Where an order of court has been made, in a proper proceeding, re-assessing the tax under Sec. 25, Inheritance Tax Law, upon the happening of certain contingencies provided for in the will, claimant is entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount of the tax originally assessed and the amount found due under the order of the court re-assessing the tax.
    Merwin M. Hart, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; S. S. DuHamel, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

Emanuel Buxbaum, Henry Kuh and Myra 0. Ellenbogen, trustees under the last will and testament of Abraham Kuh, deceased, bring this action for refund of inheritance taxes paid on account of the operation of Section 25 of the inheritance tax laws of Illinois.

It appears from the declaration and the statement and consent of the Attorney General that in this estate there was paid to the State of Illinois, on account of the property, subject to the operation of said Section 25 of the inheritance tax laws of Illinois, a net tax of $9886.67, whereas, under an order re-assessing said property after the happening of the contingencies provided for by said will, it was found that the net tax should be $9054.42, thereby leaving, as found by order oi the court, the sum of $832.25 to which claimants are entitled to have refunded, with 3% interest per annum from the 16th day of April, 1917. The Attorney General consents to an allowance of the amount claimed, which is proven by the evidence in the case.

The court accordingly awards the claimant the said sum of $832.25 with interest.


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    (No. 871
    Claimant awarded $5,808.10 with interest.).
    Adele V. Harris Whiting, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Inheritance tax — when claimant entitled to refund. Sec. 25. Appeal. Where an appeal has been taken'from an order of court assessing the tax under Sec. 25, Inheritance Tax Law, and upon a re-hearing of the appeal the court finds that the tax should he reduced by reason of the termination of the trust provided for in the will, claimant is entitled to a refund of the difference between the tax paid under the order of court on appeal and the amount found due upon the re-hearing of the appeal.
    Continental and Commercial Trust and Savings Bank, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; S. S. DuHamel, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Adele V. Harris Whiting, files this claim for refund of inheritance tax under Section 25 of the Inheritance Tax laws of Illinois.

Elinor S. Harris, a resident of Cook County, Illinois, died in Chicago September 25, 1916, leaving a last will and testament, which was duly probated in said county, and Graham H. Harris and Bradford Whiting were appointed and qualified as executors.

January 2, 1917, the county judge entered an order fixing the inheritance tax at $43,530.89, from which order an appeal was taken to the county court, and on hearing the court found that the report of appraisers and the order entered thereon were erroneous in the deductions allowed to the appellant, the sum of $40,811.30 had been paid under the original assessment and order so erroneously made and entered March 20, 1917. On the re-hearing the court found that by reason of the termination of the trust provided' for in said will, that the correct amount of inheritance tax as shown by the re-assessment was $35,003.20, leaving the sum of $5808.10, with inter-' est thereon at the rate of 3% per annum.from March 20,1917, to which the claimant is entitled to have refunded.

The Attorney General consents, in writing, to a claim for claimant in the said sum of $5808.10, and the court accordingly, from the evidence and such consent, awards to claimant the said sum of $5808.10, with 3% interest from March 20, 1917.


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    (No. 872
    Claimant awarded $825.28.)
    First Trust & Savings Bank of Peoria as Trustee of the Estate of Alexander S. Payson, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Inheritance tax — when claimant entitled to refund. Bee. 25. There being no dispute as to the facts in this case, and no objection by the State, the court enters an award to claimant for the difference between the amount of the tax paid by legatees, under Sec. 25, Inheritance Tax Law, and the tax assessed against them under the supplemental order entered by the county court.
    Irwin & Jack, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; S. S. DuHamel, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, First Trust and Savings Bank of Peoria, as trustee of the estate of Alexander S. Payson, deceased, filed this claim, seeking a refund on account a finding on a reassessment of the inheritance tax under Sec. 25 of the Inheritance Tax Laws of the State of Illinois. It appears from the evidence that Alexander S. Payson, late a resident of Peoria county, State of Illinois, departed this life about November 7,1914, testate, and on the 16th day of February, 1915, the will of deceased was duly admitted to probate. The will is quite lengthy and duly certified copies of same, and all orders, appraisements, etc., are filed in evidence herein.

The court deems it unnecessary to set out in its opinion in detail the provisions of the will, but to simply show the finding and order of the county court on petition for re-assessment and refund of inheritance taxes.

It happens that the tax upon the bequests of Benjamin Sewel Blake and Agnes Blake Fitzgerald was upon bequests which were conditional in their nature, and which would lapse and become a part of the residuary estate of said deceased on certain contingencies.

The total amount of inheritance taxes so assessed against the interests of these two legatees was $1213.43.

A supplemental order was subsequently made in which the county court found that the amount of such taxes against the said last named legatees should only be -$388.15, thus leaving the sum of $825.28 refund to which claimant in its official capacity with interest thereon at 3% per annum from April 16, 1915, was entitled.

The Attorney General consents to an award to claimant in the sum claimed. The court accordingly awards claimant the sum of $825.28.


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    (No. 873
    Claimant awarded $249.70.)
    Jacob Schrepfer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

      Re-imbubsement- — when award may he made to State employee. There exist no liability against the State to re-imburse its employees for moneys expended by them in the defense of a suit brought against them for a tort or wrong committed by them in the performance of their duty.

      Same — award may he made on grounds of social justice and equity. An award may be made to a State employee to re-imburse them for moneys expended in their defense of a proceeding brought against them for an alleged tort or wrong, as a matter of social justice and equity.
    Jacob Schrepfer, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; Frank E. Eagleton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

Claimant, Jacob Schrepfer, who was an appointee of the State as game warden in the Fish and Game Division of the Department of Agriculture, in April, 1921, learning that one Harry Sanford was violating the Fish and Game Laws of the State by having out and in use nets after the expiration of the time for so catching fish, took ten of Sanford’s nets and carried them out on land and never disturbed the nets further. He prosecuted Sanford, who was found not guilty. Sanford claimed that claimant took other nets not above stated and sued him for value of same in county court.

The suit terminated in the jury giving a judgment against claimant in sum of $562.50, which on motion of defendant’s counsel was set aside.

It being a jury case, it was thought very doubtful, in view of the action of the jury in the foregoing case, whether the State officers could ever succeed in the case; and under the advice of claimant’s attorney and the officer representing the Fish and Game Department the suit was settled by claimant paying the plaintiff in the said suit the sum of $150.00, and Francis C. Vouacher $50.00 attorney’s fees for his services in looking after the interests of the State’s officers in the suit; court costé in the case $44.70 and Grace E. Sweney for stenographic work $5.00, making a total of $249.70. Claimant thus settled the suit, on advice of his and his associate’s attorney, and on advice of an officer legally representing the Fish and Game Department.

.While the finding of the jury might, at first blush, be taken as proof that the claimant had taken other nets other than those accounted for, yet the idea is dispelled from the fact that the court set aside the verdict and gave a new trial.

It is thus evident that the jury was wrong and claimant was sustained in his contention in the defense. But counsel and the officer representing the Fish and Game Department thought it would be much more expensive to further litigate the case than it would be to pay a small sum and thus end the matter. The jury, they saw, was evidently prejudiced against the State. ■

Claimant acted under the advice of his attorney and his superior officer and paid it; and from all the facts and evidence in the case, we are inclined to think it was about the best settlement that could be made under the circumstances.

The Attorney General submitted the matter to the Warden of Fish and Game Department and he replied recommending the payment of the claim as equitable. He exonerates claimant, as he was acting under advice "of his attorney and his superior officer.

From the evidence there is no legal claim made out against the State; but in the interest of social justice 'and equity, we will and do award claimant the sum of $249.70.


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    (No. 876
    Claimant awarded $244.26.)
    Frank Schmania, Executor of the Estate of Lorenz Schmania, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Inheritance tax — when claimant entitled to refund. Bee. 10. Where an inheritance tax has been erroneously paid under an order of the county judge, and an appeal is taken to the county court and upon a hearing thereon, it is shown that the tax was paid under an erroneous order of the county judge: Held, claimant entitled to a refund of the tax erroneously paid, under Sec. 10, Inheritance Tax Law.
    E. H. Wegener, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; S. S. DuHamel, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Frank Schmania, executor of the estate of Lorenz Schmania, deceased, brings this suit for a refund of inheritance tax erroneously paid under Section 10 of the inheritance tax law in the sum of $244.26, which amount was paid by an erroneous order of the county judge.

An appeal was in due time taken to the county court, and on proper hearing at which the Attorney General was represented the county court revérsed the order and ordered the said sum, so erroneously paid, refunded.

The evidence supports the claim, which is likewise admitted by the Attorney General in this case, who consents to an award for the sum so erroneously paid.

An award in the sum of $244.26 to claimant.


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    (No. 882
    Claimant awarded $177.60 with interest.)
    Alice May Warner and Clifford R. French, Executors of Last Will and Testament of Mary M. Warner, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Inheritance tax — ¡Claimant entitled to refund. Sec. 25. When an inheritance tax has been assessed and paid under Sec. 25, Inheritance Tax Law by reason of the happening of certain contingencies mentioned in the will, and the estate is re-assessed upon a proper proceeding and upon a hearing it appears by the removal of the contingencies the estate is not liable to the tax: Held, Claimant entitled to a refund of the tax paid.
    Burke, Jackson & Burke, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion, of the court:

This action is brought by the executors of the last will and testament of Mary M. Warner, deceased, who died testate in Cook County, Illinois, December 16, 1915, and her will admitted to probate in said county February 1, 1916.

May 20, 1916, paid the inheritance taxes in said estate in the sum of $439.28 net, and on March 31, 1917, the said estate was declared settled, the executrix discharged.

By reason of the happening of certain contingencies named in will and shown in the proof herein, it became necessary to make a re-assessment under Section 25 of inheritance tax laws of Illinois. By removal of certain contingencies, the estate became freed from liabilities to pay such tax, as was found by order entered by the county court, and claimants are therefore entitled to recover such taxes so paid, under Section 25 aforesaid.

The Attorney General consents to the same. We accordingly award claimants the sum of $177.60, with 3% interest per annum from the 20th day of May, 1916.


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    (No. 890
    Claimant awarded 82,604.37.)
    Peninsular Stove Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

    Franchise tax — Refund when paid under mistake of fact. No liability. Where the franchise tax has been paid through a mistake made by claimant in its annual report, the State is not liable for a refund of the tax paid, although paid under protest.
    Social justice and equity — award may be made. An award may be made to claimant for refund of a franchise tax paid under a mistake of fact, on grounds of equity and social justice.
    Pringle & Terwilliger, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Peninsular Stove Company, a corporation, files its declaration herein setting forth that the State of Illinois is indebted to said claimant in the sum of $2,604.37, same being for refund of franchise tax, due to mistake of fact in said claimant’s annual report for 1923. The State of . Illinois, by Oscar E. Carlstrom, demurs to the declaration, which, as a matter of law, is sustained.

From the stipulation of facts agreed upon, between the parties hereto, by their respective attorneys, it appears that the following shall be taken and considered by the court as ' the facts of the case, to the same extent as if proved by evidence produced before the' court:

1. The claimant, the Peninsular Stove Co., is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Michigan, and has its principal office and factory in the City of Detroit, in the State of Michigan; the said corporation, during and previous to the year 1922, and continuously since that time, has complied with all the laws of the State of Illinois in relation to the right of a foreign corporation to transact business in the State of Illinois, and was and is authorized to transact business in the State of Illinois; on and subsequent to June 1, 1922, it maintained and operated in the City of Chicago, in the said State, a warehouse for the distribution of its prod-nets in the City of Chicago and adjacent territory.

2. On or about the 27th day of February, 1923, the claimant filed with the Secretary of State of Illinois its annual report as a foreign corporation, in accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois, relating to the determination and assessment of annual franchise taxes; in its said annual report, through the inadvertence and mistake of fact of the employee of the claimant in preparing said report, it was stated erroneously in answer to interrogatory 6 of said report, that the authorized capital stock of the claimant was 300,000 shares of stock of no par valúe, but the truth is that said claimant did not at said time, and never has had any shares of capital stock of no par value. The authorized capital stock of the said claimant in 1922, and at all other times since, was $3,000,000.00, divided into 300,000 shares of the par value of $10.00 each.

3. By reason of the mistake of fact of the claimant’s employee in making up the said annual report, the Secretary of State of Illinois, in determining and assessing the claimant’s annual franchise tax for the year 1923, found and considered from the said annual report‘that the total authorized capital stock of the claimant, computing the said 300,000 shares of stock of no par value at $100.00 per share, amounted to $33,-000,000.00, and on the basis of such erroneous authorized capitalization, fixed and assessed claimant’s annual franchise tax at the sum of $1686.46,.and further fixed and assessed an additional initial incorporation fee on an alleged additional $2,193,-110.00 of its capital stock employed in the State of Illinois, such additional fee amounting to $1,086.55.

4. The claimant never in fact employed in the State of Illinois more than $1,199,820 of its authorized capital stock. It. had previous to 1922 duly paid to the Secretary of the State of Illinois the proper initial incorporation fee on the said portion of its authorized capital stock employed in the State of Illinois. The finding of the Secretary of State of Illinois of an additional. $2,173,110.00 of the capital stock of the claimant employed in Illinois was due to the mistake of fact of the claimant’s employee hereinabove mentioned; the claimant was not in fact indebted to the State of Illinois in any further sum on account of initial fees on its capital stock employed in the State of Illinois.

5. The correct and legal annual franchise tax of the claimant for the year 1923, based on its actual authorized capital stock of $3,000,000.00 and upon the proportion thereof .actually employed in the State of Illinois was $168.64.

6. .The claimant filed correct annual reports for the years 1920, 1921 and 1922, and the franchise taxes assessed thereon in said years, respectively, were $369.31, $316.03, $316.03.

7. The claimant did not discover the said mistake of fact in its annual report until on or about the 26th day of July, 1923,- on which date it made complaint to the honorable Secretary of the State of Illinois against annual franchise tax and additional initial fee assessed against it by the Secretary of State under and on the said report, and requested the said Secretary of State to review and correct the said taxes and fees, but the said Secretary of State was at that time without authority in law to review and make any change in the said assessments, and the said Secretary of State so advised the said claimant, and thereupon the said Secretary of State demanded of the claimant the immediate payment of the said entire tax and initial fee so erroneously assessed and determined against the claimant, and threatened that if the same were not paid by July 31, 1923, the penalties provided by the laws of the State of Illinois for non-payment of such taxes and fees would be inflicted upon and collected from the claimant.

8. The claimant had reason to believe, and did believe, that the Secretary of State would inflict or cause to be inflicted upon claimant the penalties provided by law for nonpayment of such taxes and fees, if it did not pay the same on or before July 1, 1923, and thereon on the 31st day of July, 1923, in order to escape the said threatened penalties, the claimant paid, under protest, to the Secretary of State of Illinois, the amount of said annual franchise taxes and additional initial fee, amounting together to the sum of $2,773.01.

9. The said sum of $2,773.01 so paid under protest by the claimant to the said Secretary of said State of Illinois was by him afterwards duly paid into the treasury of the State of Illinois.

10. The claim of the claimant herein has never been presented to any other State department or State officer, or to any person, corporation or tribunal, and the claimant has never received any payment on account of its claim for such overpayment of said annual franchise taxes and additional initial fee; no other person or corporation has any interest in its said claim.

11. The sum so paid by the claimant to the Secretary of State of Illinois for said annual franchise tax and additional initial fee, due to the mistake of fact in its said annual report for 1923, amounted to the sum of $2604.37 over and above the correct and legal annual franchise tax of the claimant for the said year of 1923.

The court finds that, as a matter of equity and social justice, an award should be made in this case, and it therefore awards the claimant the sum of $2,604.37.


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    (No. 897
    Claimant awarded $119.08.)
    Merchants Transfer and Storage Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

      Contract — when State, liable. Where work has been performed for the benefit of the State, and is accepted by the State, claimant is entitled to an award for the amount of its claim.
    Merchants Transfer and Storage Co., for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for the handling of the statues of ex-Governors Palmer and Tates from a spot south of the Centennial ■ building to their present permanent site. It appears that the work has been done and that the balance claimed by claimant is just as the defendant, through its Attorney General comes into court and consents to its allowance.

It is therefore' considered by the court that the claim amounting to $119.08 be allowed.


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    (No. 899
    Claimant awarded $7,500.00.)
    Illinois Central Railroad Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1925.

      Services — when State liable. Where services have been rendered for the State at the request of its authorized Department, an award may he made to claimant for such services.
    J. G. Drennan, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General ; S. S. DuHamel, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by the Illinois Central Railroad Company on account of the failure of the State to pay claimant the sum of $7,500.00, according to the terms and conditions of a certain opinion and order of the Illinois Commerce Commission of the State of Illinois. It appears to this court that the matter has been fully adjudicated by the said Commission, and it further appears that the defendant, by its Attorney General, comes into this court on his own motion and admits that said demand is justified; that said sum should be paid the claimant.

Now therefore it is considered by this court that said claim be allowed and it is recommended that the claimant be allowed the sum of $7,500.00.


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    (No. 24
    Claimant awarded $10,009.39.)
    Morris & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1925.

      Quarantine — re-hearing. Claim allowed. Social justice and equity. The court upon reconsideration of the case enters an award in favor of claimant on the ground of social justice and equity.
    Morris & Company, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case comes before the court again, on a motion to reopen above captioned case, and reconsider the former decision rendered as of September 17,1923, in which the court held that the Statute of Limitations had run against said Morris and Company as of November 18, 1924, and that as a matter of fact, the Statute of Limitations started to run as of December 19,1921, the company received $10,009.39 from the Federal November 18, 1914, Morris and Company a corporation, owned 8,714 range feeder cattle at their distillery barns at Peoria, Illinois, which cattle were, on that day, quarantined by Dr. O. E. Dyson, State Veterinarian, pursuant to an Act in relation to the suppression and prevention of contagious or infectious diseases among domestic animals, approved June 14, 1909, in force July 1, 1909, L. 1909, page 8; that 952 of these cattle were slaughtered and tanked, and the company by an appropriation of the 49th General Assembly, Laws of 1915, page 131, received $38,032.40, after a similar amount had been paid to the company by the Federal Government; on December 19,1921, the company received $10,009.39 from the Federal Government, being one-half of the loss as determined by the Federal Government on the 7762 remaining cattle ordered slaughtered, and that on September 13, 1922, the company filed its petition in the Court of Claims in the State of Illinois, asking that its claim of $10,009.39 be approved.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois has filed an „ answer stating that the Statute of Limitations began to run against claimant on December 19, 1921.

In view of the stand taken by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, and upon reconsideration of the facts in the case and the law, we believe that claimant is entitled to recover from the State of Illinois the amount claimed, and ' we, on the grounds of equity and social justice, award claimant the sum of $10,009.39.


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    (No. 28
    Claimant awarded $1,921.87.)
    Mudge & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1925.

    Franchise tax — refund when erroneously paj,d. Where a franchise tax has been erroneously paid the court may upon grounds of social justice and equity award a refund.
    Sims, Welch, Godman & Stranksy, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; Floyd E. Britton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for the recovery of franchise tax, erroneously paid to the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, by claimant, in the years 1920, 1921 and 1922, amounting in all to $1,921.87.

Demurrer filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, is, as a matter of law, sustained.

On the grounds of equity and social justice, we award claimant the sum of $1,921.87.


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    (No. 29
    Claimant awarded $1,210.09.)
    John W. McDowell, Trustee in Bankruptcy of Avery Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1925.

    Franchise tax — refund when erroneously paid. The court may as an act of social justice and equity award claimant a refund of a franchise tax erroneously paid.
    Hunter, Page & Kavanaugh, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; Floyd E. Britton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for refund of franchise tax erroneously paid the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, by claimant, amounting to $1,210.09.

The demurrer filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois is, as a matter of law, sustained.

On the grounds of equity and social justice, we award claimant the sum of $1,210.09.


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    (No. 32
    Claimant awarded $350.00.)
    Askin & Marine Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1925.

    Franchise tax — when refund may he made. Where there was an error in the payment of the franchise tax and fees, and no objection is made by the State, the court may recommend an allowance of a refund.
    Noah Gullett, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Edward C. Fitch, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for refund on account of payment made in error of franchise tax and fees to the Secretary of State. The Attorney General making no objections to the allowance of the claim and it appearing to the court that the claim is just and equitable, it is recommended that an allowance of $350.00 be made to the claimant.


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    (No. 700
    Claimant awarded $22,635.05.)
    Western Electric Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1925.

    Franchise tax — tax erroneously paid, when refunded. Upon review of the evidence the court upon the grounds of social justice and' equity awards a refund to. claimant the amount of the tax erroneously paid.
    Cutting, Moore & Sidley, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; Floyd L. Britton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for the refund of franchise taxes erroneously paid to the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois, by above claimant, in the amount of $22,635.05.

The demurrer filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois is, as a matter of law, sustained.

On the grounds of equity and social justice, we award claimant the sum of $22,635.05.


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    (No. 711
    Claimant awarded $8,787.50.)
    Herendeen Milling Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1925.

    Franchise tax — when refund may be awarded. Although there may be no legal liability on behalf of the State, the court may as an act of social justice and equity award a refund of the tax erroneously paid.
    Johnson, Moran, Paltzer & O’Donnell, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Edward C. Fitch, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim to refund certain portions of franchise taxes paid erroneously to the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois by above claimant, in the years 1921, 1922 and 1923, total excess tax paid amounting to $8,787.50.

The demurrer filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois is, as a matter of law, sustained.

On the grounds of social justice and equity, we award claimant the sum of $8,787.50.