text:
    (No. 91-CC-1857
    William Holland, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 21, 1992.

    William Holland, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (“Kay” Christine M. Giacomini, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Montana, C.J.

Claimant, William Holland, filed his complaint in the Court of Claims on January 2, 1991. The complaint seeks $3,700 in damages against the State. Claimant alleges that the State took possession of his personal property and did not return it.

The case was tried before the commissioner assigned to the case. The evidence consists of the transcript of testimony taken August 29, 1991, Claimants exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6; Respondents exhibit 1; and the departmental report.

The Claimant filed his brief. The Respondent has failed to file a brief.

The Facts

On or before October 18, 1989, Claimant was a prisoner in the Illinois Department of Corrections at the Pontiac Correctional Center. On October 18, 1989, Claimant was transferred to Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois. Prior to the transfer, the State, through its agents, took exclusive possession of the Claimants personal property and inventoried it. There were eight boxes. When Claimant arrived at Hill Correctional Center, certain personal property was not returned. The State only returned seven boxes. Additionally, on the bus used for the transfer, a guard took Claimant’s gold wedding band and gave Claimant a confiscation slip for same.

Before Claimant left Pontiac, Officer Sullivan inventoried the Claimant’s possessions. Claimant placed the inventory into evidence. The items that Claimant proved are missing are a trial court transcript, a post-conviction transcript, one dictionary, one blue Big Ben shirt, a pair of blue jeans, two hooded sweatshirts, scotch tape dispenser, two blankets, one sweatshirt, 20 hardcover books, and his wedding ring.

The wedding ring was a gift from his former wife in 1975. It came in a set that his former wife said cost about $900. He did not know the exact value of the ring. He never received it back from the State. The dictionaiy was an American Heritage College Second Edition dictionaiy. It was $11.95 new in June of 1986. The Big Ben shirt cost $8 new in 1987. The two blankets were purchased at the Pontiac commissary for $9.95 each in 1986 or 1987. The blue jeans were Wrangler jeans and were purchased through the Lifers organization in 1986. Claimant did not know the price. The two hooded sweatshirts came from the Jaycees. They cost $22 new. One of the lost transcripts was about 1000 pages. Claimant did not know how many pages were in the other transcript. The transcripts cost $1.80 per page. Claimant also did not receive about 18 hardcover books. He gave no value for the books. All of the property had been used by Claimant.

The departmental report shows the inventory for October 18, 1989, when Claimant left Pontiac and the inventory of October 19, 1989, when he arrived at Hill Correctional Center. The inventories acknowledge that two court transcripts, one dictionary, the sweatshirt, the hooded sweatshirts, the jeans, the Big Ben shirt, the blankets, some books and the wedding ring were not returned to Claimant. Claimant made a personal property grievance. A September 19, 1990, review letter indicates the State agreed the Claimants personal property was not handled properly for his transfer from Pontiac to Gales-burg. The State tried to pay Claimant $40 for the wedding band. The Claimant refused the $40 as inadequate.

The Law

The State has a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard and return an inmate’s property when that property is taken into the State’s actual physical possession during transfer from one institution to another or when the institution issues a receipt for certain property. Doubling v. State (1976), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1.

The loss or damage of bailed property while in the possession of a bailee raises a presumption of negligence which the bailee must rebut by evidence of due care. Moore v. State (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 114.

The facts in this case indicate clearly that the State took the property of Claimant, inventoried it, gave him a receipt for the wedding band, and did not return the property testified to. Clearly a presumption of negligence has arisen which the State has failed to rebut in any way, shape or form. The Claimant has proven the State was negligent by a preponderance of the evidence in not returning the personal property.

The issue of value is more difficult. The Claimant has the burden of proving his damages. Claimant has failed to establish proof as to the fair market value of his lost property, other than in some instances his opinion. Therefore, the Court must place a value on the lost property. (Wilson v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 135.) Depreciation is given consideration in determining value. (Black v. State (1981), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 292.) Therefore, the Court finds the following value for the property of Claimant lost by the State and finds same to be the fair market value based on the evidence.

(a) Transcript: The evidence is that one transcript was about 1000 pages and the size of the other transcript was not known. Claimant presented evidence that transcript reproduction costs are $1.80 per page or about $250 per day on the average. Transcripts do not depreciate. Respondent offered no evidence as to size of the transcripts or their value. Placing a value on this loss is very difficult. The court finds that the loss was worth $2,000 which is approximately 1000 pages and a day.

(b) Dictionary: $11.95

(c) Used Big Ben Shirt: $2.00

(d) Used Blue Jeans: $4.00

(e) Two used hooded sweatshirts: $6.00

(f) Two used blankets: $8.00

(g) Sweatshirt: No value.

(h) 18 used hardcover books: $13.50

(i) Wedding ring: $150.00

(j) Scotch tape dispenser: $1.00

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of $2,196.45 in full and final satisfaction of this claim.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Sommer, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 91-CC-1914
    Roy L. Bryant, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 4, 1993.

    Roy L. Bryant, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   ORDER

Sommer, C.J.

This claim is before the Court on a motion by the Claimant for entry of default judgment, due notice having been given, and this Court being fully advised, finds that the Claimants television set was shipped from the Joliet Correctional Center to the Dixon Correctional Center. When the set arrived at Dixon, it was broken and could not be repaired. The set had been working when delivered to the Joliet authorities for shipment.

The Claimant went through the prison administrative procedures and was awarded $71.25.

This claim is similar to Hamilton v. State (91-CC-630). In Hamilton, supra, a claim also involving a television set, this Court stated that “The prison administrative procedure may not make low awards and claim such to be binding, thereby depriving the prisoner of his property.”

The Claimant has responded by affidavit to an order of this Court asking the cost of comparable television set and the whereabouts of the $71.25.

This Court finds that the Claimant in his affidavit stated that a comparable television set would cost $350. We also find that the Claimant requested $300 total in his administrative proceeding and in his complaint to this Court. The Claimant has been paid the $71.25.

We will award the Claimant $228.50. This amount, in addition to the $71.25 already received, will give the Claimant a total award of $300. As in the Hamilton claim, this Court will deduct an amount for depreciation. In this claim, the depreciation will be considered the difference between the $350 which the Claimant stated under oath that a comparable set cost and the $300 total he previously requested. It is therefore ordered that the Claimant is awarded $228.50.


author: Montana, C.J. Patchett, J.

text:
    (No. 91-CC-3235
    John C. Taylor Law Office, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed December 18, 1992.

      Order filed April 1, 1993.

    Phebus, Tummelson, Bryan & Knox, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Lawrence C. Rippe, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Claimants motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, judgment on the pleadings, and the Respondents motion to dismiss, due notice having been given, and the Court being advised, finds:

The underlying facts of this case are reported in Taylor v. State Universities Retirement System, 203 Ill. App. 3d 513, and need not be reiterated here. Claimant filed the action at bar to recover based on the liability found by the circuit court of the county of Champaign and affirmed by the appellate court of the fourth district.

The Respondent moved for dismissal on the grounds that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. It is the Respondents position that the cause of action accrued no later than August 23, 1985, when the Respondent was tendered the repayment of disability benefits.

For the reasons stated in Claimants objection to the motion, the motion to dismiss will be denied. The cause of action at bar sounds in enforcement of decisions on administrative review by the circuit and appellate courts and the mandate did not issue until March 5, 1991. The complaint in the case here was filed April 26, 1991. To argue otherwise, that the cause of action accrued on August 23, 1985, is to argue in effect that the other court system had no jurisdiction. This issue was fully litigated and decided in the Claimants favor.

As for the Claimants motion, we find that there are no material issues of fact and that Claimant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability. As for the amount of liability, the record is insufficient for the Court to make a determination. The appellate court decision did not affirm liability for a specific amount. The record only shows what the Claimants demand was. If, after this decision, the parties are unable to agree on an amount, the Court will hold a hearing and order the Respondent to pay the amount the Court finds due.

It is hereby ordered that the motion to dismiss is denied and the Claimants motion is granted as to liability only.

ORDER

Patchett, J.

This cause comes before the Court on the parties’ joint stipulation for settlement which states:

This claim arises from Claimant’s representation of Jess Burwell against the University of Illinois in which the State Universities Retirement System claimed subrogation in the amount of $6,954.66.

The parties have investigated this claim, and have knowledge of the facts and law applicable to the claim, and are desirous of settling this claim in the interest of peace and economy.

Both parties agree that an award of $1,390.93 is both fair and reasonable. This sum represents 20% of $6,954.66.

Claimant agrees to accept, and Respondent agrees to pay Claimant, $1,390.93 in full and final satisfaction of this claim and any other claims against Respondent arising from the events which gave rise to this claim.

The parties hereby agree to waive hearing the taking of evidence and the submission of briefs.

This Court is not bound by such an agreement but it is also not desirous of creating or prolonging a controversy between parties who wish to settle and end their dispute. Where, as in the instant claim, the agreement appears to have been entered into with full knowledge of the facts and law and is for a just and reasonable amount, we have no reason to question or deny the suggested award.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be awarded $1,390.93, in full and final satisfaction of this claim.


author: JANN, J.

text:
    (No. 91-CC-3394
    Helen Zellers, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed November 6, 1992.

    Louis E. Olivero, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Vanessa V. Alexander, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

JANN, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on Respondents motion to dismiss, due notice having been given, Claimant having failed to respond, and the Court being fully advised in the premises finds:

Claimant herein seeks damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in a whirlpool at Illinois Beach Resort and Conference Center, Zion, Lake County, Illinois, on April 29 and 30, 1990. Claimant alleges injuries due to improper maintenance and chemical testing of the whirlpool.

On April 29 and 30, 1990, there was in effect a concession lease between the State of Illinois Department of Conservation and Lotteo S. Balaco for premises commonly known as the Illinois Beach Lodge at the Illinois Beach State Park Resort and Conference Center. The lease provides that:

“lessee has the right, privilege and duty to equip, operate and maintain the 0 0 0 entire lodge, including public lobby/lounge and restrooms, restaurant, meeting rooms, covered pool, tennis courts, and lodge guest parking lot and paved delivery areas, together with die land areas surrounding die physical perimeter of diese facilities 4 ° (Concession Lease, page 1).

Nowhere in the lease is the whirlpool excepted from lessees responsibilities.

Section 25 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 439.24 — 5) and section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations (Ill. Adm. Code 790.60) require that any person who files a claim before the Court of Claims shall, before seeking final determination of his claim by this Court, exhaust all other remedies and sources of recovery whether administrative, legal or equitable.

Claimant has failed to file suit against the lessee, Lotteo S. Balaco. By not pursuing any remedy which may have been derived from Lotteo S. Balaco, Claimant has failed to comply with section 25 of the Court of Claims Act and section 790.60 of the regulations of this Court. Section 790.90 of the Court of Claims Regulations provides that failure to comply with the provisions of section 790.60 shall be grounds for dismissal. See Patton v. State (1988), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 78, 79.

The motion of Respondent is hereby granted, and the claim herein is dismissed with prejudice.


author: Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 91-CC-3926
    Midwest Construction Co., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Agreed Order filed December 14, 1992.

    Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Paul G. Arvites, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   AGREED ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard pursuant to the agreed motion for the entry of judgment of the parties for the entry of a consent judgment and the Court having been apprised of the parties’ liquidating agreement dated September 25,1992, filed herein with the agreed motion, the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises, and the Court not being obligated to recognize the agreement of the parties but finding their agreement to be appropriate and based upon Respondent’s representation that such agreement is fair and reasonable and is in the best interest of the State of Illinois and based upon Claimants representation that it understands it is the intention of the parties to the agreement that in the event of the dismissal of the A/E action, as defined in the agreement, based upon a determination and adjudication on the merits of the State’s and Epstein Civil Engineering, Inc.’s, respective rights and obligations under the A/E agreement, as defined in the agreement, then Claimant may not reinstate the A/E action against the State;

Now therefore, it is hereby ordered that judgment is entered against the Respondent and in favor of the Claimant in the amount of $6,002,615.13, subject to the terms and conditions of the liquidating agreement.


author: Sommer, C.J. Sommer, C.J.

text:
    (No. 92-CC-2412
    Geraldine G. Thomas, Claimant, v. The Board of Trustees of the State Community College of East St. Louis, Respondent.

      Order filed October 2, 1992.

      Opinion filed March 4, 1993.

    Harry J. Sterling, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Lawrence C. Rippe, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Sommer, C.J.

This cause coming to be heard on the stipulation of the parties, due notice having been given, and this Court being fully advised, finds that this Court, though encouraging amicable settlements of disputes, is not bound by the stipulation of the parties. Additionally, this Court finds that the stipulation before us contains a claim for interest which does not appear to be calculated according to the statutes and precedents of this Court. (O.K Electric Co. v. State (1984), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 155.) It is therefore, ordered that the Claimant be paid $6,905.89, the amount of the principal, from fund 001-68501-1800-00-00-91, sufficient funds having lapsed, and the Claimant may petition the Court for interest owed, if any, in accordance with the statutes and precedents of this Court.

OPINION

Sommer, C.J.

This claim arises from a dispute between the Claimant, Geraldine Thomas, and her employer, the State Community College of East St. Louis, over salary due to the Claimant.

The parties settled the dispute by an agreement dated June 12, 1991. This agreement, because it required a funds transfer, had to be approved by the Illinois Community College Board. Approval was not secured before the end of the lapse period, September 30, 1991.

The Claimant then filed a lapsed appropriation claim in this Court, requesting interest in addition to the amount of the back salary owed. The parties then stipulated to an award for back salary and interest. On October 2, 1992, this court approved the stipulation for the back salary owed in the amount of $6,905.89, but withheld approval of the interest of $487.

This Court had previously cited the case of O.K. Electric Co. v. State (1984), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 155, to the parties to illustrate the proposition that interest is assessable only so long as the contracting State agency has the ability to pay; i.e., until the end of the lapse period of the fiscal year in which the contract was made. The Claimant rightly points out that the O.K. Electric Co. claim involved failure to submit a bill on time. However, in the case of Branch-Nicoloff v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 252, the General Assembly failed to pay a claim previously approved by this Court. The Claimant requested interest for the period until the next General Assembly could pay the claim. This Court again held that interest is assessable only until the end of the lapse period when the contracting State agency could have paid.

In this claim, underpayments occurred throughout the period used to calculate the award — July 1, 1990, to August 15, 1991. This period is wholly within F.Y. 91 and the lapse period. A technical argument could be made that the underpayments from July 1, 1991, to August 15, 1991, were within F.Y. 92, but in this case this Court finds that the agreement created an F.Y. 91 obligation. Additionally, this Court takes the view that in this claim interest would begin to run after each underpayment, as the settlement simply reflected the underpayments. We recognize that the date interest begins to accrue must be determined on a case by case basis.

The amended complaint filed on August 4, 1992, requests interest until August 15, 1992. As we have shown, interest can only be paid up to August 15, 1991. It was the 1992 date, which cannot be used, that occasioned this Courts inquiry into the interest. Interest on a differential monthly progression is a cumbersome calculation, but a rough approximation by this Court of the interest due up to August 15, 1991, yields a figure similar to the amount stipulated by the parties. In the interest of amicable settlement of dispute, this Court will award the amount stipulated. It is therefore ordered that the Claimant be paid $487 for interest pursuant to the stipulation entered by the parties.


author: Montana, C.J. •

text:
    (No. 92-CC-2601
    Ficek Electric & Communication Systems, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 1, 1992.

    John Balestri, for Claimant.
    .Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Cynthia Wood, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Montana, C.J. •

Claimant Ficek Electric and Communication Systems (Ficek) brought this claim seeking payment of $13,225.70 for service, material, and interest pursuant to a contract with the Respondents Department of Central Management Services (CMS) to relocate a telephone system. In its standard lapsed appropriation form complaint, Ficek alleged that it made demand for payment but its demand was refused on the grounds that the funds appropriated for such payments had lapsed. The Respondent filed a stipulation agreeing to our making an award in the full amount sought. The stipulation is now before us for approval.

This Court is not bound by such stipulations and it cannot acquiesce in approving in toto the one at bar insofar as it would have us make an award for interest.

The facts, as they relate to the interest issue, are found to be as follows. The contract giving rise to this claim was entered into on June 28,1991, the last business day of the States fiscal year. Payment was not due until the work was performed or the invoice was received, whichever occurred later. The departmental report which was compiled by CMS and offered as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein in support of the stipulation, pursuant to 74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.14, states át paragraph 8 that the work was completed sometime in August of 1991. The invoice attached to Ficek s complaint bears a date of August 28, 1991. Also attached to Ficek’s complaint was a separate invoice for an interest penalty. On that invoice interest was sought at the rate of 2% per month, compounded monthly, for the period of December 1,1991, through the end of March 1992.

Although not specifically stated in the complaint, stipulation, or departmental report, it appears from the percentage rate of interest charged that the interest is claimed pursuant to the State Prompt Payment Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 132.401 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Section 3 — 1 of the Act was amended effective January 1,1988, so as to provide that

“The Court of Claims shall, in its investigation of payments due claimants, provide for interest penalties as prescribed in this Act.”

The procedures set forth in the Act as to how the interest penalty is triggered are complicated and are particularly directed at agencies entering into purchase agreements. The statutory scheme is not easily transferred to the procedures of litigation in the Court of Claims. No specific guidance was provided in the 1988 amendment to the Act as to when interest is to begin to accrue or stop on claims in this Court. Therefore, the Court will interpret the amendment strictly. The Court will provide for interest in its awards to the extent that the Act would require the respondent agencies to pay interest. The issue in each case, therefore, is whether and to what extent the agency may pay the interest.

In general, the Act provides a time period within which a bill must be paid or disapproved by the purchasing agency and if not paid or disapproved within that period, the interest penalty is potentially triggered. In the case at bar, the record shows that such period started no earlier than August 28, 1991, the date of the invoice for the principal. The bill was payable from the Communications Revolving Fund, appropriation line item No. 312-41655-1700-0000, as shown in paragraph 8 of the CMS report. The earliest date that the interest penalty could be triggered would be 45 days after August 28, 1991, pursuant to section 3 of the Act. This point in time would be beyond the ability of CMS to make the payment. The Act at section 3 — 1 requires that interest shall be paid by separate warrant from the same appropriation line item as that from which the principal is paid. CMS’ authority to expend from that line item appropriation expired on September 30, 1991, less than 45 days from August 28, 1991. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 161.) Recause CMS could not have been required to pay interest on the bill under the terms of the Act, this Court will not make such an award.

To hold otherwise would potentially enable nearly any provider of goods or services to the State to simply wait until the statute of limitations (which on contracts in the Court of Claims is five years) was about to run while interest was accruing at 24% per annum before filing the claim here and then obtain an exorbitant windfall. While not an extreme case, the Ficek claim is illustrative of the potential. Ficek claims interest accruing from December 1, 1991, and did not file its claim until the end of March, 1992. There was no way payment could have been made during that time and the interest it would have the State pay would amount to approximately $1,000.

Moreover, the principal is payable from the Communications Revolving Fund. The Court of Claims does not have access to such money and could pay neither awards of principal nor interest as required by section 3 — 1 of the Act until such later time as money from that fund is appropriated to fund such awards in what is known as the Court of Claims special awards bill.

The clear purpose of the Act is to provide for prompt payment by the States agencies. That purpose will not be furthered by providing awards of interest after the ability to make the payment no longer exists and we do not read anything in the Act to require otherwise.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of $12,218.53, and no interest, in full and final satisfaction of this claim.


author: Rurke, J.

text:
    (No. 93-CC-0101
    DRF Realty, Inc., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 6, 1993.

    DRF Realty, Inc., pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Sebastian Danziger, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Rurke, J.

Claimant DRF Realty, Incorporated (DRF) brought these claims seeking money due pursuant to a tax escalation clause in a rental agreement for property utilized by the Respondent’s Department of Employment Security (DES). In its standard lapsed appropriation form complaints, DRF alleged that it made demands for payment but the demands were refused on the grounds that the funds appropriated for such payments had lapsed. The Respondent filed stipulations agreeing to entry of awards in the full amount sought. The stipulations are now before us for approval.

The Court of Claims is not bound by such stipulations. In these cases we are unable to approve all of the stipulations for the following reason.

In La Salle National Bank v. State (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 266, we held that payments due pursuant to tax escalation clauses in leases were current obligations of the fiscal year in which they became due. Neither party filed a copy of the lease agreement in this case so we do not know exactly when payments were due. We do know from the copies of the tax bills attached to the complaints that the bills were not payable in the fiscal years for which the Respondent provided data in its departmental reports, e.g., in 93-CC-0099, the tax bills indicate that payment was to be made in the first installment during fiscal year 1990 and the second installment was due in fiscal year 1991, but the report contains information relating to fiscal year 1989.

We are, however, able to approve the stipulation in 93-CC-0101. The bills in that case were payable by the Claimant in fiscal years 1988 and 1989 and the Respondent would have owed pursuant to the tax escalation clause during one or both of those years. From the reports in 93-CC-0099 and 0100 we see that sufficient funds lapsed to cover the obligation.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded $629.26 in claim No. 93-CC-0101; it is further ordered that the Respondent review the lease agreement to determine in which fiscal year the obligation to pay arose in 93-CC-0099 and 93-CC-0100 and file amended reports in those cases. The parties are advised that payment of any awards made in these claims will require legislative approval, so Respondent is to provide the information at the earliest possible date.


author: Montana, C.J. Frederick, J.

text:
    (No. 93-CC-0147
    Dewey C. Dennington, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed, November 17, 1992.

      Stipulation filed December 1, 1992.

      Order filed February 19, 1993.

    Dewey C. Dennington, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Lawrence C. Rippe, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Respondents motion to dismiss, due notice having been given, and the Court being advised, finds:

On October 24, 1986, the Claimant was involved in a motor vehicle accident and was subsequently required to post $300 for deposit with the Secretary of State as evidence of financial responsibility in accordance with Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. Q5Vz, par. 7 — 204. His deposit was accepted on July 1,1987. On July 24,1992, he filed this claim seeking a refund of the deposit.

The Respondent filed the motion at bar seeking dismissal on the grounds that the applicable statute of limitations has expired. In support of its motion, Respondent filed several documents from Claimants file with the Secretary of State s Office as a departmental report under 74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.140. The documents show that the Claimant was mailed notice of eligibility for return of the deposit on November 22, 1988. This notice, Respondent argues, began the running of the statute of limitations. The applicable statute of limitations is the two-year period provided in section 22(h) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22(h)). Respondent concludes that the two years expired on November 22, 1990, and thus the claim is barred.

We disagree. The Secretaiy of State documents also show that the Claimant was mailed another notice on July 1, 1991. This notice stated that he had 30 days within which to perfect a claim for the refund with the Office of the Secretary of State. The notice on its face states that it wás made pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 95%, par. 7 — 503. That statute reads as follows:

7- — 503. Unclaimed security deposits
“§ 7 — 503. Unclaimed security deposits. During July, annually, the Secretary shall compile a list of all securities on deposit, pursuant to this Article, for more than 3 years and concerning which he has received no notice as to the pendency of any judicial proceeding that could affect the disposition thereof. Thereupon, he shall promptly send a notice by certified mail to the last known address of each depositor advising him that his deposit will be subject to escheat to the State of Illinois if not claimed within 30 days after the mailing date of such notice. At the expiration of such time, the Secretary of State shall file with the State Treasurer an order directing the transfer of such deposit to the general revenue fund in the State Treasury. Upon receipt of such order, the State Treasurer shall make such transfer, after converting to cash any other type of security. Thereafter any person having a legal claim against such deposit may enforce it by appropriate proceedings in the Court of Claims subject to the limitations prescribed for such Court. At the expiration of such limitation period such deposit shall escheat to the State of Illinois.”

According to Respondents position, the statute of limitations would have run before this notice was sent and the language of the quoted statute is a nullity.

We agree that the statute of limitations on this type of claim is two years, but we hold that it does not begin to run until 30 days after the section 7 — 503 notice is sent. Until that time the Secretary of State can make the refund. Prior to that time, any claim in the Court of Claims would be premature. This statute provides the Courts jurisdiction over such claims and it expressly gives the Court jurisdiction only after the expiration of the 30-day notice period.

It is hereby ordered that the motion to dismiss be, and hereby is, denied.

STIPULATION

This is a lapsed appropriation claim. The State agrees to an entry of an award based on the report filed in this matter which provides the following information:

Agency: Secretary of State

Purpose: Refund Safety Responsibility Deposit

Fund No.: General Revenue Amount: $300.00

Claimants social security or tax No.: [ XXX-XX-XXXX ]

Sufficient funds lapsed to cover this claim.

ROLAND W. RURRIS

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS

ORDER

Frederick, J.

The record in this cause indicates that this is a standard lapsed appropriation claim which should be paid in accordance with the above stipulation. This payment is made in full and final satisfaction of this claim. It is so ordered.


author: Frederick, J.

text:
    (No. 93-CC-2667
    In re Application of Linda A. (Daniels) Reininger

      Opinion filed June 29, 1993.

    Linda A. (Daniels) Reininger, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Frederick, J.

This claim is before the Court by reason of the death of Roy E. Reininger, who was a detective with the Village of Schaumburg Police Department. Detective Reininger s widow, Linda A. (Daniels) Reininger, seeks compensation pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.).

The Court has carefully considered the claim for death benefits submitted herein, together with the written statement of Detective Reininger s supervising officer and documentation submitted therewith, the medical examiners certificate of death, autopsy report, case report, the decedents designation of beneficiary form, and the report of the Attorney General.

The instant claim was filed herein on April 9, 1993, by Linda A. (Daniels) Reininger, widow of Roy E. Reininger, who died on December 31, 1992, while a detective with the Village of Schaumburg Police Department.

The record reveals that Detective Reininger was killed on December 31, 1992, when he drove an unmarked police car into the rear of a truck on Schaumburg Road at its intersection with Branchwood Drive in the Village of Schaumburg, Illinois. Detective Reininger was pronounced dead on December 31, 1992, at Humana Hospital of Hoffman Estates. The certificate of death indicates that the cause of death was multiple injuries due to an automobile-truck collision.

Detective Reininger is survived by his wife, Linda A. (Daniels) Reininger, the Claimant herein, and she was named as the sole beneficiary of any benefits payable under the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.).

A precondition to the granting of compensation under the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act, supra, is that the law enforcement officer have been “killed in the fine of duty.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 48, par. 282(e).) The Act further dictates that, “The term (killed in the line of duty) excludes death resulting from willful misconduct or intoxication of the officer # * * »

According to Captain Casler s statement of supervising officer and the toxicology analysis attached to the autopsy report, Detective Reininger had a blood-alcohol concentration of .207 at the time of his death. Since this exceeds the limit for the legal definition of intoxication, it appears that Detective Reininger was not “killed in the line of duty” as required by the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act.

It is therefore ordered that the claim of Linda A. (Daniels) Reininger for compensation under the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act, supra, be, and hereby is, denied.


author: Sommer, J.

text:
    (Nos. 92-CC-3321 through 92-CC-3328; 92-CC-3342
    St. Therese Medical Center, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 24, 1992.

    St. Therese Medical Center, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Cynthia J. Wood, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Sommer, J.

These nine Court actions were filed pursuant to the “law or regulation” provisions of section 439.8(a) of the Court of Claims Act (or “CCA”) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 37, par. 439.8(a)) and section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code (or “PAC”) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 23, par. 11 — 13). The common issue presented in these vendor-payment actions is whether Claimant hospital’s complaints have established a prima facie right to receive payment, under the Medical Assistance Program (MAP) administered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA), of charges relating to any of nine patient accounts. Respondent has moved for judgment on the pleadings in each of these actions (pursuant to section 2 — 615(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 110, par. 2 — 615(e))), contending that none of the complaints establishes a prima facie right to payment, because in none of these instances does Claimant show that it had complied with the one-year invoice submittal deadline imposed upon medical vendors by IDPA Rule 140.20 (89 Ill. Adm. Code §140.20, reprinted in Topic 141 of IDPA’s MAP Handbook For Hospitals) and by Federal Medicaid regulation (42 C.F.R. §447.45(d)). Respondent also contends that Claimant’s causes of action as to two accounts (Nos. 92 CC 3328 & 92 CC 3342) had previously been barred from prosecution in this Court at the time said claims were filed herein. For reasons explained in this opinion, the Court agrees with Respondent’s contentions.

The patient names and related dates of service comprising these eight outpatient (OP) and single inpatient (IP) accounts, the dates on which Claimant submitted its related form UB-82 invoices (presenting its account charges) to IDPA, the dates on which the Department received those invoices, and the dates of IDPAs refusal-to-pay notices to Claimant, were as follows:

In each instance, Claimant alleges a single invoice in support of its Court claim. And in each case, that invoice (a) had been received by the Department more than one year following the date on which the services had been rendered; and (b) was refused payment with the rejection-notice message advising Claimant that IDPA “will not consider for payment any UB 82 received for charges more than 12 months from the date of service.” (Handbook For Hospitals, App. H-15.)

Subsections (c) and (d) of IDPA Rule 140.20 provide as follows:

“(c) To be eligible for payment consideration, a [medical vendor’s] vendor-payment [administrative] claim or bill [i.e., invoice], either as an initial or resubmitted [invoice] following prior rejection, must be received by [IDPA], or its fiscal intermediary, no later than twelve (12) months from the date on which medical goods or services are provided.
(d) [Invoices] which are not submitted and received in compliance with the foregoing requirements will not be eligible for payment under [IDPA’s MAP], and tire State shall have no liability for payment thereof.”
(89 Ill. Adm. Code §140.20, as amended at 13 Ill. Reg. 7799 through 7801, effective May 20, 1989; and see Topic 141.2 of IDPA’s MAP vendor Handbooks as amended on June 15,1989.)

The Federal regulation (42 C.F.R. §447.45) imposes a similar deadline, viz., IDPA as Illinois’ Medicaid agency “must require [medical vendors] to submit all [invoices] no later than 12 months from the date of service.” (Id., §447.45(d), originally published in 44 FR 30344 on May 25, 1979.) Respondent risks its entitlement to Federal Medicaid funding of IDPA’s MAP, if compliance with this one-year deadline is not routinely enforced. (See Peterson v. State (1990), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 347; Forutan v. State (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 377; Kim v. State (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 286, and Lawrie v. Illinois Department of Public Aid (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 335, 343-44.) Accordingly, this Court has consistently determined that a vendor-claimant’s claim does not merit an award, if the vendor has failed to submit a “clean claim” invoice (42 C.F.R. §447.45(b)) — or, as here, any invoice — to IDPA, within one year following the date on which the charged services were rendered. (Good Samaritan Hospital v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 379; Barnes Hospital v. State, No. 82 CC 708 (order filed Mar. 1, 1982); Rock Island Franciscan Hospital v. State, No. 82 CC 899 (order filed May 3, 1982); St. Joseph Hospital v. State, No. 82 CC 2440 (order filed Oct. 22, 1984); Methodist Medical Center v. State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 208; Rock Island Franciscan Hospital v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 100; Franciscan Medical Center v. State, No. 84 CC 118 (opinion filed Feb. 26, 1988); Pinckneyville Medical Group v. State (1988) , 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 176; Treister & Wilcox v. State (1989) , 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 185; Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center v. State (1989), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 303; Ryan v. State (1990), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 213; Ramabrahmam v. State (1990), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 351; Peterson, Forutan & Kim, cited supra; St. Francis Hospital v. State (1992), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 157; and Christ Hospital v. State, No. 92 CC 18 (opinion filed March 24, 1992).) Applying the provisions of IDPA Rule 140.20(d) to the facts here pleaded in support of these nine accounts, the Court concludes that no State liability exists for paying these accounts.

IDPA records show that Claimant had initially submitted a timely invoice, for patient Fords September 12-16, 1990 inpatient stay (UB-82 submitted Oct. 19, 1990, received on Oct. 26, 1990), which was not here alleged in Claimants complaint (No. 92 CC 3328). At the time this initial invoice was submitted, Claimant had not previously forwarded a copy of its private-pay charges to IDPA’s local office for adjudication of Ford’s September 1990 spenddown obligation, as required (Handbook for Hospitals, Topics 105 and H-214.2). As a result, Ford’s MAP eligibility during September 1990 had not been established; and Claimant had not received a Split Billing Transmittal (DPA form 2432) from the local office, to submit with its invoice as verification that Ford’s September spenddown obligation had been “met.” (See St. Anthony Hospital Medical Center v. State (1991), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 98.) Further, although Claimant’s “10-19-90” invoice had designated these, by the code used, as outpatient services — all performed on “09-12-90,” the invoice included charges for surgical and medical procedures reportedly performed on “09-13” and “09-14” as well as “09-12.” IDPA cited these deficiencies and inconsistencies in its December 4, 1990 notice, which refused payment of this invoice; and the record here shows that Claimant had not remedied these problems by submitting a corrected rebill-invoice of its charges for Fords services by September 16, 1991, as required by IDPA Rule 140.20.

Respondent further asserts that, under subsection (1) of PAC section 11 — 13, the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim for patient Kirbys services as of June 26, 1992, when that claim (No. 92 CC 3342) was filed herein, because IDPA had issued its payment-refusal notice (in response to Claimants invoice charging for said services) more than one year prior thereto, on May 28, 1991. Moreover, Claimant was obliged to file its court action as to Kirby’s services no later than December 14, 1991 (i.e., within two years following its rendition of those services on December 14, 1989), in order to avoid the jurisdictional bar imposed by subsection (2) of PAC section 11 — 13 and CCA section 439.22(b). We conclude that the cause of action presented in No. 92 CC 3342 had previously been barred from prosecution, under both subsections (1) and (2) of PAC section 11 — 13 and CCA section 439.22, when that claim was commenced. (See Villalona v. State, No. 91 CC 644 (Opinion filed Feb. 19, 1991) and Forutan, Kim; Franciscan Medical Center; and Pinckneyville Medical Group; all cited supra. Claimant’s cause of action as to patient Ford was also barred, by PAC section 11 — 13 subsection (1), because Claimant filed the related court action (No. 92 CC 3328) on June 26, 1992, more than one year following the date (Dec. 4, 1990) of the payment-refusal notice in which IDPA had responded to Claimant’s initial invoice of charges for Ford’s September 12-16,1990 inpatient services.

It is hereby ordered and adjudged: that Nos. 92 CC 3328 and 92 CC 3342 are dismissed as a result of Claimant’s failure to commence those two actions within the time prescribed by statute; and judgment on the pleadings as to all issues presented in Nos. 92 CC 3321 through 92 CC 3327 inclusive is entered against Claimant, St. Therese Medical Center, and in favor of Respondent, and said seven claims are also dismissed.


author: Burke, J.

text:
    (No. 86-CC-3040
    Rockford Urology Associates, Ltd., et al., Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 4, 1993.

    Daniel L. Swift, M.D., pro se, for Claimants.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Steven Schmall, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Burke, J.

Dr. Swift served as surgeon, and Dr. Taylor as assistant surgeon, in performing a surgical procedure upon a six-year-old patient, who was then a foster-care (AFDC-F) ward of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and a recipient eligible for State-paid medical benefits under the Medical Assistance Program (MAP) administered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA). The child also had health coverage available under a group plan with a commercial, “private insurer.” (42 C.F.R. §433.136.) The Claimant physicians are here seeking payment from Respondent of the $660 difference between their charges for said surgery and the amounts paid them by the “third party” liability (TPL) insurer (Id.). For reasons discussed in our May 24, 1990 decision in Gupta v. State, 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 269, IDPA is the appropriate State agency to respond to this claim. IDPA denies all liability for Claimants’ residual charges, contending that the dollar amounts already paid Claimants by the TPL insurer were in excess of the amounts which would have been payable under its MAP if the patient had not had said TPL coverage available.

As described in the Public Aid Code (or PAC (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, par. 1 — 1 et seq.)), the purposes of IDPA’s MAP include those: of providing “a program of essential medical care and rehabilitative services for * * * persons who are unable, because of inadequate resources, to meet their essential medical needs” (Id., par. 5 — 1, emphasis supplied); and of providing “for the development, use and coordination of all resources in this State, governmental and private” (Id., par. 1 — 1) in promoting the health and welfare of all Illinois citizens. In determining the “amount and nature of [State-paid] financial aid [including medical assistance]” which a recipient is to receive, IDPA is to give due regard “to the income, money contributions and other support and resources available [to the recipient], from whatever source.” Id., par. 4 — 2, emphasis supplied; see also the supreme courts reference to a similar requirement in Lawrie v. Illinois Department of Public Aid (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 335 at 346.

In accordance with these statutory guidelines, Topic 122 of IDPA’s medical vendor Handbooks provides that the MAP is “payor of last resort” as to all services for which a third party has primaiy payment liability. (Treister & Wilcox v. State (1989), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 185.) Thus, Claimants here properly sought and obtained payment from the recipients insurer before pursuing payment of their residual charges from IDPA. See Social Security Act, Title XIX, §1902(a)(25) (42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(25)) and 42 C.F.R. §§433.135 through 433.154.

The fallacy in Claimants’ claim lies in the fact that the amounts paid them by the insurer for their respective services exceeded the amounts (as determined by the MAP’s payment rates) which IDPA would have paid for said services, in the absence of such TPL coverage. This Court’s opinion in Ryan v. State (1990), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 213, outlines the process followed by IDPA in establishing the rate which it pays for each service performed by physicians. Such rates determine the amounts which IDPA pays when the recipient has no insurance or other resources with which to compensate the vendor.

If, as the supreme court concluded in Lawrie v. Illinois Department of Public Aid, the PAC does not authorize payment by IDPA “which would result in payment [from all sources] to the vendor * * * of an amount in excess of [IDPAs] approved rate” (72 Ill. 2d 347), then no IDPA payment is due once Claimants have received more, from the TPL resource, than the Departments rate alone would have produced. Respondent contends that the same limitation, on IDPAs MAP-payment liability, would result here by applying the payment restrictions imposed by a Federal Medicaid statute. (Subsection (a)(25)(C) of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a) and implementing regulations (§§433.139(b)(l) and 447.15 of 42 C.F.R., and 89 Ill. Adm. Code §140.12(h).) We conclude that IDPA has no supplemental payment obligation in this case.

It is therefore hereby ordered and adjudged that Respondent s motion for summary judgment is granted; judgment as to all issues is entered against Claimants Swift and Taylor and in favor of Respondent; and this claim is dismissed with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 92-CC-1559
    Lake-Cook Psychologists, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 24, 1993.

    John Jochem, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Cynthia Wood, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Sommer, J.

Claimant, Dr. Jochem, a clinical psychologist, is here seeking a vendor-payment, pursuant to section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code (or “PAC”) (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 23, par. 11 — 13), for psychotherapy services which he had rendered in April 1991, to patient Flores, a recipient under the Medical Assistance Program (MAP) administered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA). Respondent has moved for summary judgment, contending: that Claimants treatment of recipient Flores did not qualify as MAP-covered services, and thus that Respondent is not obligated to pay Claimant for these services. Claimant having received notice of Respondent s motion, the Court makes the following findings:

The scope of the MAP s coverage is limited to those medical services described in the PAC, in IDPAs Rules (89 Ill. Adm. Code, Parts 140, et seq.) and in the Departments vendor Handbooks. (See Brokaw Hospital v. State (1992), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 307; University of Illinois at Chicago v. State, No. 90 CC 307 (Opinion filed Mar. 24, 1992); Tennant v. State (1991), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 182; and Memorial Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 73.) In its report herein, IDPA advises that MAP coverage of “psychological services,” as rendered by licensed psychologists, is restricted to diagnostic examinations, evaluations and tests which had been authorized in advance, for specified purposes, by either Illinois Department of Children & Family Services (DCFS) or IDPA staff. See IDPA Rule 140.495(b), (89 Ill. Adm. Code § 140.495(b)), which provides:

“payment shall be made for the provision of diagnostic psychological examinations and tests only when the services are requested by the Department [IDPA or DCFS] for one of the following reasons:
(1) to determine permanent and total disability or incapacity (see 89 Ill. Adm. Code 112.62 and 89 Ill. Adm. Code 120.314);
(2) to determine the suitability of a home for a child; or
(3) for planning or arranging for foster care for a child.”

(Cass County Mental Health Association v. State, No. 91 CC 1582. (Opinion filed Feb. 6, 1992)). The Department reports that the coverage provisions of the PAC and IDPA Rules do not extend to or include psychotherapy or other treatment services rendered by psychologists.

MAP coverage does exist for certain psychiatric diagnostic and treatment services, when rendered by MAP-enrolled physicians to Medicaid-eligible recipients, provided that medical necessity for such services is established. (See IDPA Rule 140.413(a)(5), (89 Ill. Adm. Code §140.413(a)(5).) IDPA’s MAP Handbook for Physicians specifies that:

“[t]he provision of psychiatric services is limited to those services and associated procedure codes [as listed or referred to therein] and must be personally provided by the physician who submits charges. Services provided by a psychologist, social worker, etc. are not reimbursable.” (Id., Topic A-210.7, emphasis in original; and see Topics A-240 et seq., concerning psychiatric consultations.)

These provisions make it clear that coverage of psychotherapy and similar treatment modalities are restricted to physicians’ services.

Dr. Jochem fails to establish that the subject services to recipient Flores were in furtherance of one of IDPA Rule 140.495(b)’s three purposes, or that said services had been requested by DCFS or IDPA. (Cass County Mental Health Association v. State, cited supra.) Moreover, said services consisted of treatment, rather than diagnostic, services; and as such, they were not MAP-covered services.

It is therefore hereby ordered and adjudged that Respondent’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and this claim is dismissed.


text:
    (Nos. Unassigned

      In re Petitions of Cynthia Larry

      Order filed December 21, 1992.

    Cynthia Larry, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (James Maher III and Andrew Levine, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

These causes come on to be heard on petitions for extensions of time to file applications to claim benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Cynthia Larry filed both, one arising out of an alleged incident wherein she was the victim and the other arising out of a separate alleged incident wherein her daughter was the victim.

Section 6.1(a) of the Act requires that applications for compensation be filed within one year of the date of the crime. Upon good cause shown, the time for filing applications may be extended one year by the Court. Pursuant to General Order No. 3, all petitions for extensions of time to file applications which are filed with the clerk’s office within 24 months of the date of the crime are granted. Ms. Larry’s petitions were filed on August 6, 1990. They allege that she was a victim of a crime which occurred on October 25, 1986, and her daughter was a victim of a crime which occurred on August 3,1988. Thus both petitions were filed beyond the period allowed by General Order No. 3.

The Act does, however, provide an exception to the time limits described above. Section 6.1(a) allows a person “under legal disability at the time of the occurrence or (who) becomes legally disabled as a result of the occurrence” to file the application within one year after the disability is removed. Both petitions included statements that indicated Claimant may have been suffering from mental stress, was under the care of a psychiatrist, and had been incapable of handling matters after her daughters death. On March 25, 1991, the Court ordered that a hearing be conducted on the issue of Petitioner’s legal disability.

The cases were assigned to a commissioner who scheduled a hearing for June 11, 1991. Petitioner appeared at the hearing and was advised of the nature of the proceeding. The hearing was continued to allow her to obtain documentation or witnesses to support the claimed incapacity. A second hearing was conducted on September 20,1991. Ms. Larry appeared and testified.

At the hearing, Petitioner did not provide any medical opinions, diagnoses, other documents, or any witnesses to corroborate a claim of incapacity. She testified she was not able to handle her personal or financial affairs. She stated she was receiving treatment for alcoholism at Ingalls Hospital in Harvey, Illinois. She provided the name of her treating physician, and her counselor at Echoes, an alcohol treatment center. Petitioner was advised by the commissioner that the Court does not conduct independent investigations and that the burden was on her to prove her case.

Additional information pertaining to the petition relating to the daughter was elicited. Petitioner stated that her daughter, Dionne Stanford, 25 years old, filed an application on her own behalf after the August 3, 1988, attack. Dionne Stanford was not Petitioner’s dependent. Petitioner did not pay any medical expenses incurred by her daughter as a result of the crime. According to Claimant, Dionne Stanford died of an overdose of alcohol, cocaine and opiate intoxication on December 10, 1988. The death was not related to injuries sustained in the August 3, 1988, incident. Petitioner presented a physician’s report dated July 31, 1991, and three copies of health insurance claim forms. The physician’s report referenced an injury that occurred on July 19, 1988, two weeks prior to the date of the crime. The Assistant Attorney General stated that his office did not have any documents showing that a Dionne Stanford filed an application for compensation on her own behalf. The clerk’s office has no record of such an application either.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Petitioner was given 60 days to mail to the commissioner any additional documents she wanted the Court to consider, or to request an additional hearing date to provide testimony of a witness. No documents or requests were received.

The Act does not define “legal disability” nor does it state when or how a person “becomes legally disabled.” The term “disabled person” is defined in the Probate Act of 1975. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110Ü, par. 11a — 2.) The term is defined to include a person not fully able to manage her person or her estate because of mental deterioration, physical incapacity, mental illness, developmental disability or being a spendthrift. The Probate Act provides for a procedure whereby a person is adjudged to be disabled. There is no evidence Petitioner was the subject of any such proceeding and there is not sufficient evidence to support a ruling that Petitioner was, or is, under a legal disability.

It is therefore ordered that the petitions at bar be, and hereby are, denied.


text:
    (No. Unassigned

      In re Petition of Louia McDonald

      Opinion filed December 21, 1992.

    Louia McDonald, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (James Maher III and Andrew Levine, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Montana, C.J.

This claim is before the Court on the petition for extension of time to file necessary documents to claim compensation under the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Section 6.1(a) of the Act requires that an application be filed within one year of the date of the crime upon which the claim is based. This Court can extend that period up to another year. In an order dated April 4, 1991, this Court determined that Claimant’s petition was not timely. The Claimant then sent a letter to the Court indicating he disagreed with the Courts decision. Pursuant to the Act, Claimant was granted a hearing before Commissioner Phillip A. Turner. Commissioner Turner has duly filed his report with the Court.

The issue in this matter is whether Mr. McDonalds claim which was filed on December 31, 1991, more than two years after the crime occurred on June 23, 1987, is timely. The record shows that Mr. McDonald stated he filed his claim when he did because he was not aware of the time limits and because he was under emotional stress caused by the death of his wife, the victim of the crime. Mr. McDonald further stated he was not hospitalized during the period in which he was to file the claim. However, he did see a counselor whom he believed to be a psychiatrist. He also was not taking any drugs which affected his mind. After the death of his wife in 1987 until March 15, 1990, he was working for Coca Cola Bottling Company as a forklift operator. He paid his rent in a timely fashion and generally did not exhibit any behavior from which one could draw the inference that he was insane or had lost his mental capacity.

Section 6.1 of the Act was amended in 1990. The amendments pertinent to this matter state that a person may file a claim within one year of the removal of any legal disability. The historical and statutory notes to the amended section state that the amendments apply to all claims pending or filed after July 1, 1990. However, even if this case were reviewed under the 1990 amendments, Mr. McDonald would nevertheless be barred from proceeding. Mr. McDonald has not provided any evidence that he was under any legal disability, such as being declared a disabled person pursuant to the Illinois Probate Act, or anything of that nature. As a result, his claim must be viewed as having been filed more than two years after the occurrence of the crime and is, therefore, untimely.

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that Claimants petition for extension of time be, and is, hereby denied.


author: PocH, J. Patchett, J.

text:
    (No. 83-CV-0536

      In re Application of Frederick Dymon

      Order filed September 25, 1985.

      Order filed October 16, 1992.

    Jonah Roseberg, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (Alison R Breslauer and James Maher III, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

PocH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on December 13, 1981. Frederick Dymon, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on December 13, 1982, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on December 13, 1981, the Claimant was stabbed by an unknown offender. The incident occurred in an apartment located at 1512 West Huron, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that prior to the incident, the Claimant and the offender were involved in a verbal dispute. During this dispute, the offender produced a handgun and a knife. The Claimant attempted to grab the handgun from the offender but was stabbed in the wrist and forearm. The Claimant was taken to Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital for treatment of his injuries. On January 17, 1982, the Claimant was contacted by investigators from the Chicago Police Department who were seeking information regarding this incident. The Claimant refused to cooperate with the police in their investigation. The Claimant did agree that he had been injured but refused to identify anyone as his assailant or comment further on the incident. As a result the police classified this incident as unfounded.

2. That sections 76.1(c) and (d) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime and the applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the police report that the Claimant declined to cooperate fully with law enforcement officials, in the apprehension of the assailant, in that he refused to identify his assailant or cooperate in any way with the follow-up police investigation.

4. That by reason of the Claimants refusal to fully cooperate with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant as required by the Act, he is not eligible for compensation thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Patchett, J.

Claimant, Frederick Dymon, filed an application with this Court seeking compensation under the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act for injuries he sustained as a victim of a violent crime on December 13, 1981.

An order was entered by this Court on September 25, 1985, denying this claim based upon the failure of the Claimant to cooperate fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of his assailant, as required by section 76.1(c) of the Act. Claimants attorney advised this Court in writing that the Claimant wished a hearing on the matter.

The sole issue in this case involves whether the Claimant cooperated fully with law enforcement officials.

An evidentiary hearing was conducted before a commissioner of this Court on January 26, 1987. The evidence showed that the Claimant was a victim of a violent crime on December 13, 1981, as defined by the Act. Police were summoned to the scene, and the victim was transported to St. Marys Hospital. The Claimant testified at the hearing that the police only substantially attempted to speak to him one time, and that was at 3:00 a.m. on the day of the incident. He further testified that he had attempted to cooperate with the police, and did so by telling the police what happened to the best of his ability.

The Respondent offered the testimony of Detective Harrington, who was assigned to the case. He testified that he went to the home of the victim and attempted to question the Claimant. It became clear that the Claimant, who was present, did not speak English. A woman who identified herself as the Claimant s daughter was present. She acted as an interpreter. Detective Harrington further testified that he told the woman the purpose of his visit. At all times relevant to this conversation, the Claimant was present and able to cooperate. Detective Harrington testified unequivocally that the Claimant refused to identify his attacker or to cooperate in any way with the investigation. The Claimant stated that he did not want to have any contact with the police. The conversation ended, and a follow-up report was prepared.

In rebuttal to Detective Harringtons testimony, the Claimant testified that he had no daughter living in the United States at the time of the incident. The Claimant also testified that he had never seen Detective Harrington prior to the date of the hearing.

Obviously this case hinges on the credibility of the parties involved. It is reasonable to believe that Detective Harrington did not fabricate the incident. It is reasonable to believe that the conversation did take place as testified to by Detective Harrington. There is absolutely no reason to believe that the Claimant at any time had any difficülty understanding English, or required an interpreter. Had the Claimant offered the testimony of any witness who could have testified to his living arrangements at the time, his testimony might have been more credible. In weighing the testimony of the two individuals who testified, this Court can only conclude that Detective Harrington acted reasonably at all times and that his testimony is credible. Therefore, we deny this claim.


author: POCH, J. Patchett, J.

text:
    (No. 84-CV-1157

      In re Application of Lee Cain

      Order filed April 1, 1985.

      Opinion filed May 17, 1993.

    Lee Cain, pro se, and Jerome J. Zelden, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (Alison R Breslauer and Charles Davis, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 14, 1983. Lee Cain, father of the victim, Michael Cain, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on May 21, 1984, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based on these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on September 14, 1983, the victim was shot by a policeman during an attempted arrest of the victim for a previous crime. The incident occurred in an alley located at 6119 South Peoria, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that as the police officer approached the victim’s car, the victim produced a gun and shot him. The police officer returned fire, fatally wounding the victim. The victim was taken to St. Bernard’s Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. No charges were placed against the police officer by the State’s Attorney’s Office, as this incident was classified a justifiable homicide.

2. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses only. The Claimant was not dependent upon the victim for support.

3. That section 80.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 80.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced according to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

4. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victims death was substantially attributable to his shooting of a police officer who was attempting to arrest him. The police officer then returned fire, fatally wounding the victim. Thus the conduct of the victim directly contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That in order for a claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act there must be evidence that one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act occurred.

6. That the actions of the police officer did not constitute a crime specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act.

7. That the Claimant has not met required conditions precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby, denied.

OPINION

Patchett, J.

Claimant, Lee Cain, is seeking to be compensated for the costs of his sons funeral expenses. His son was shot to death by Chicago police officers on September 14, 1983. The shooting took place in an alley located close to 6119 South Peoria, Chicago, Illinois.

At the hearing of this cause, the three Chicago police officers involved all testified that they had left their station that morning in an unmarked police vehicle with a specific intent to arrest Michael Cain, who was wanted for two outstanding warrants. These warrants include'7 aggravated battery and unlawful use of a weapon. tT mately, they found Mr. Cain in his automobile in the in question.

According to their testimony, they annc they were police officers and drew their ' officers testified that Mr. Cain then fire they returned the fire which resulted h Their testimony further suggests tír bullet was recovered from Office that he was also struck with a f left hand.

Three witnesses appe Each of these witnesse witnessed the shoot)’ tions were not pre' seen Mr. Cain r?’ witnesses saw Claimants r sive fore' thereb’

Viet)’ tributed to Mr. Cains death.

It is the opinion of this Court that the Claimant has failed to carry his burden of proof. Based on the facts before us, it is probable that Mr. Cain was involved in illegal activity at the time of his death. In addition, if the officers were performing their duty, even in the case of excessive force, their actions cannot under law be considered a crime absent the showing of some criminal mental state. There is totally no proof of such criminal intent or other mental state sufficient to establish a crime for which compensation could be granted in this case.

We therefore deny this claim.


author: Montana, C.J. Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 86-CV-1228

      In re Application of Diana Clifford

      Order filed October 30, 1990.

      Order filed November 6, 1992.

    Diana Clifford, pro se, and Edmund F. Land-berg, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (James Maher III, and Charles Davis, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on October 17, 1985. Diana Clifford, mother of the deceased victim, Robert Thomas Clifford, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on May 13, 1986, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on October 17, 1985, the victim was shot during the course of a drug transaction with an unknown offender. The incident occurred in a parking lot at the intersection of Fifth Street and Chicago Street, Joliet, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the victim went to this location to purchase heroin. During this transaction, the victim was shot in the back. The victim was found to have a small quantity of marijuana in his possession at the time of the incident. The alleged offender was apprehended and charged with two counts of murder. He was later found to be not guilty of these charges.

2. That section 80.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 80.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim was attempting to purchase heroin and was in the possession of marijuana at the time he was shot. Thus, the conduct of the victim directly contributed to his death.

4. That the victim s conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

ORDER

Montana, C.J.

On October 17, 1985, Robert Thomas Clifford, the son of the applicant, was shot at the intersection of Fifth Street and Chicago Street, Joliet, Illinois.

On May 13, 1986, the applicant filed a claim seeking funeral and burial expenses and loss of support for the victims children pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

On October 30, 1990, the Court of Claims issued an order denying the claim, finding that the victim was shot during the course of a drug transaction with an unknown offender. The Court relied on the police report which revealed that the victim went to the location to purchase heroin and was subsequently killed. The victim was found to have a small quantity of marijuana in his possession at the time of the incident.

Section 80.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim’s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim. The Court found that the victim’s death was substantially due to his attempting to purchase heroin at the time of the incident and such conduct warrants that any compensation for his death be denied.

On November 29, 1990, the applicant requested a hearing and on November 7, 1991, a hearing was held before Commissioner Michael E. Fiyzel. Testifying at the hearing was the applicant, Diana Clifford, the mother of the victim.

The applicant recounted the night the incident occurred and repeated conversations she had with various individuals. Each of the individuals spoke to her about the alleged purchase of drugs.

Under cross-examination, the applicant admitted to having discussions with police who told her that the incident was drug related. In addition, a female companion of the victim also told the applicant about an alleged attempt to purchase drugs.

The police report, marked as Respondent’s exhibit No. 1, states that the victim went to the location of the crime to purchase drugs. During the transaction he was shot in the back. A small quantity of marijuana was also found on the victim at the time of the incident. The alleged offender was apprehended and charged with two counts of murder. However, he was later found not guilty of those charges.

The police report and the testimony of the applicant indicate that the victim was attempting to purchase drugs and was in possession of marijuana at the time he was shot. Therefore, the conduct of the victim clearly contributed to his death.

It is the finding of this Court that the victims conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant the claim be, and hereby is, denied.


author: POCH, J. Frederick, J.

text:
    (No. 87-CV-0653

      In re Application of Shahid Hussain

      Opinion filed February 24, 1987.

      Order filed March 30, 1993.

    Fred M. Caplan and Edward R. Davis, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (Sallie Manley and James Maher III, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 18, 1986. Shahid Hussain, cousin of the deceased victim, Syed K. Shah, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on December 8, 1986, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Syed K. Shah, age 28, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit, murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1).

2. That on June 18,1986, the victim was stabbed by an offender who was allegedly known to him. The incident occurred on the street located at 1109 West Granville, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the victim and the alleged offender were in a tavern when they became involved in a verbal dispute. After this dispute, the alleged offender left the tavern. When the victim left the tavern a short time later, the alleged offender attacked him with a knife, stabbing him repeatedly. The victim was taken to Louis Weiss Memorial Hospital where he expired. The alleged offender has been apprehended and charged with murder. Criminal proceedings against him are currently pending.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation under the Act for funeral expenses only. The Claimant was not dependent upon the victim for support.

4. That funeral and burial expenses were incurred as a result of the victims death in the amount of $2,532.

5. That according to section 80.1(c) of the Act, a person related to the victim is eligible for compensation for funeral expenses for the victim provided that such expenses were paid by him.

6. That pursuant to section 72(f), a relative is defined as a spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, half-brother, half-sister, spouses parent, nephew, niece, uncle or aunt.

7. That the Claimant, Shahid Hussain, is the cousin of the deceased victim, Syed K. Shah. Therefore, the Claimant does not meet the definition of a relative under section 72(f) of the Act and is not eligible for compensation pursuant to section 80.1(c) of the Act.

8. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby, denied.

ORDER

Frederick, J.

This cause coming on for hearing on the stipulation of the Claimant, Shahid Hussain, and the Respondent, and the Claimant, Syed M. Shah, in cause No. 89-CV-0139, and the Court having reviewed the stipulation, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds:

1. That Claimant, Syed M. Shah, is the brother of the decedent.

2. That Claimant, Shahid Hussain, is the cousin of the decedent.

3. That the victim, Syed K. Shah, was murdered on June 18,1986.

4. That Claimant, Shahid Hussain, originally filed his application pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act on December 8,1986.

5. The claim of Shahid Hussain was denied by the Court on February 24, 1987, on the grounds that Mr. Hussain was not a relative of the victim within the meaning of the Act and therefore not eligible for compensation.

6. Claimant, Syed M. Shah, filed his application for the same funeral expenses on August 5, 1988.

7. The claim of Syed M. Shah was denied by the Court on jurisdictional grounds in that the crime occurred more than 18 months prior to the filing of the application.

8. That the parties are requesting that Claimant, Syed M. Shah, be substituted for Claimant, Shahid Hussain, in cause No. 87-CV-0653 so that he can recover. It is stipulated that Mr. Hussain has been reimbursed by Mr. Shah for the funeral costs and Mr. Hussain assigns his rights to Mr. Shah.

9. The Court of Claims is not bound by stipulations. Schroeder v. State (1984), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 3; Goodwill v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 303.

10. Claimant Syed Shahs claim was filed more than two years after the crime and there is before us no evidence of disability or other possible legal exception to the filing requirements. Schenck v. State (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 437.

11. That the parties seek the Court to substitute Mr. Shah for Mr. Hussain in the case that was denied on February 24,1987.

12. That even liberally construing Claimant Shahs application of August 5, 1988, as a motion to substitute for Mr. Hussain, such motion was not timely.

13. To make an award to Mr. Shah would be to find jurisdiction where the claim is barred.

Therefore, it is ordered:

A. That the stipulation of the parties filed March 30, 1990, is rejected.

B. That the cause is dismissed and stricken.


text:
    (No. 88-CV-0044

      In re Application of Lillie Barbara Brown

      Opinion filed May 23, 1988.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1992.

    Lillie Barbara Brown, pro se, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (James A. Tyson, Jr., Steve Schmall and James Maher III, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on October 17, 1986. Lillie Barbara Brown, wife of the deceased victim, Lee E. Brown, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 14, 1987, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased husband, Lee E. Brown, age 54, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit, murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1).

2. That on October 17,1986, the victim was stabbed, several times, allegedly by his son. The incident occurred in a store located at 1705 West 79th Street, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that during an argument between them, the alleged offender obtained a pair of scissors and stabbed the victim repeatedly. The victim was pronounced dead at the scene. The alleged offender has been apprehended and charged with murder. The criminal proceedings against him are currently pending.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and for loss of support for herself.

4. That section 72(h) of the Act states that loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750 per month, whichever is less.

5. That the Claimant alleges that the victim was self-employed as a hosiery seller prior to the incident. However, the Claimant has not submitted any documentation to substantiate the victim’s earnings during the six months prior to the crime. Therefore, the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation for loss of support under the Act.

6. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $4,622. Pursuant to section 72(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum amount of $2,000.

7. That pursuant to section 80.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct from all claims the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dramshop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000 of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

8. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements as a result of the victim s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

9. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Compensable Funeral Expenses $2,000

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $2,000 be and is hereby awarded to Lillie Barbara Brown, wife of Lee E. Brown, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that the claim for loss of support be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

Claimant, Lillie Brown, brings this action pursuant to the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 72 et seq.) to recover for loss of support as a result of the death of her husband, Lee Brown, on October 17,1986.

On May 23, 1988, this Court originally found that said Lee Brown was the victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to-wit, murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1). This Court awarded Claimant $2,000 for funeral expenses but denied her claim for loss of support for failure to substantiate the loss as required by sections 77(b) and 78 of the Act. Claimant requested a hearing on her claim for loss of support and the case was tried before Commissioner Kane who has dutifully filed his report.

Section 72(a) of the Act provides that an applicant is a person who was a dependent of the deceased victim of a crime of violence for her support at the time of death of that victim. Section 72(h) of the Act further provides that the loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of injury or $1,000 per month, whichever is less. The Act and this Courts prior decisions require that the Claimant produce material which substantiates both, that she was a dependent upon the victim for support and that indicates what the victim’s net earnings were in the six-month period prior to his death.

The Claimants evidence consists of her testimony and of a stack of papers and order forms. Claimant testified that the decedent was self-employed for several years prior to his death as a distributor of hosiery. The decedents business was called Brenbar Hosiery and Beauty Supply. The invoices and other papers introduced by Claimant were introduced to show that decedent sold hosiery to stores. Claimant was specifically asked, “Can you tell us how much your husband made on average for a month in the six months prior to his death?” Claimant responded, “I can’t give you * * * I can, you know, give you a number from figuring the invoices. I haven’t done that.” Claimant did not have a figure for the Court as to what she believed was the loss of support. The closest she came to an answer was that she believed that one time her husband had told her he made fifty cents on each pair of pantyhose he sold. Claimant had not figured out how many pairs of pantyhose the decedent sold each month.

The Court has meticulously reviewed die letters and order forms provided by Claimant. Many of the order forms are undated or are for a time not within the six months prior to his death or are unsigned. Those signed documents relating to the proper six-month period are also not helpful in that, while they may relate to orders, they fail to answer the crucial question before, the Court, namely: what did he earn? The documentation provided by Claimant fails to establish decedents actual income or profits based on those sales.

The Attorney General of Illinois has taken the position that a Federal income tax return which covers the six-month period prior to the victim s death is an essential document since it serves to document which persons were dependent upon the victim at the time of death as well as the net earnings of the victim in the relevant six-month period. On February 28, 1987, the Attorney Generals Office advised the Claimant in writing that they would need a copy of the victims Federal income tax return for either 1985 or 1986 in order to recommend an award. The Claimant has never provided the Court or the Attorney General with relevant Federal tax returns, State tax returns, bank records, or any other documents which adequately reflect the net earnings of the victim for the relevant six-month period. Claimant testified that the victim took care of all the income taxes but she did not know whether or not he filed returns. Claimant had on one occasion asked the Internal Revenue Service for the 1985 and 1986 tax returns but they could not find such a return. She made no other attempts to secure tax returns.

The Law

To prevail, Claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable loss. In re Application of Goff (1989), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 320; In re Application of Thanasouras (1984), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 456.

In Thanasouras, the claimant was unable to produce any witness or documentary evidence other than his own testimony to show that his father had any earnings upon which loss of support could be based. In addition, the claimant offered only his own unsubstantiated testimony to show that he received actual support from the victim. The Court found that claimant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he incurred a compensable loss under the Act and denied the claim. The burden of proof is on the claimant to prove the loss of support by a preponderance of the evidence. There must be evidence of the amount of money that the victim earned during the six-month period prior to his death to serve as a basis for determining the amount of support lost. (In re Application of DeBartolo (1984), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 442.) From the evidence produced by Claimant, this Court cannot say that it is more probably true than not true that the victim had earnings during the six-month period preceding his death and that from those earnings he contributed a significant amount per month toward the support of Claimant. While this finding may seem harsh, it is the correct finding based on the evidence before the Court. While we may have sympathy for the Claimant, her evidence falls far below the standard by which we must decide these cases. Since the Claimant has proven no loss, we must deny the claim. (In re Application of Coreas (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 319.) While a Federal tax return is not absolutely necessary, it would be the better evidence. A claimant, to prevail, must present a tax return or some alternative evidence which proves actual earnings.

The Court of Claims is not a court of general jurisdiction. The cases show consistently that we have no authority to allow claims based on quantum meruit, that estoppel is no defense, that we are not a court of equity, and that we cannot allow claims based on the equities. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. State (1983), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 265.

The Court cannot award damages on the basis of conjecture. (In re Application of Lopez (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 315.) The general rule in Illinois is that a party seeking damages has the burden of establishing a reasonable basis for determining the money value of the injury and with a reasonable degree of certainty. On the present state of evidence, we are unable to calculate damages in a reasonable manner without conjecture. (In re Application of Reges (1979), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 498.) In deciding our cases, we must decide them within the authority granted to us regardless of any harshness involved. Were we authorized to consider equities, our holdings might be different in some cases but it is beyond our authority to do so. The legislature has limited us in that regard. National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. State (1983), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 265.

For the foregoing reason that Claimant has failed to prove a loss of support by a preponderance of the evidence, we hereby deny this claim.