text:
    (No. 76-766
    Ann Elizabeth Scofield, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 6, 1977.

    Matthew P. Cicero, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; James O. Stola, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Spivack, J.

Claimant seeks to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of a fall from a bicycle at Lake Le Aqua Na State Park, Lena, Illinois.

A full hearing was conducted before Commissioner John P. Simpson, who heard the testimony of Claimant, received the evidence depositions of two witnesses, and admitted into evidence 11 exhibits. The Commissioner has duly filed his report, together with the transcripts and exhibits which are, together with the briefs and arguments of the parties, now before the Court.

A brief summary of the facts determined at the proceedings before the Commissioner is as follows:

On June 13, 1975, Claimant and members of her family were camping at Lake Le Aqua Na State Park. At about 10:30 a.m., Claimant and her two young daughters rode their bicycles from the camp site to a concession stand. The road in part went down one hill and immediately up another. The day was clear and visibility was good. Claimant was riding a three-speed bicycle, with handbrakes, in good mechanical condition. Claimant and her children completed the trip to the concession stand without incident but on the way back to the camp site, at the foot of the hill leading from the concession stand, Claimant drove into a chuckhole in the road, was thrown from her bike, and injured. She lost 272 hours of work from the accident and sustained sizeable medical expenses, but apparently has recovered in full from her injuries.

Claimant testified as follows:

We were headed back to the campgrounds, as I said, and the girls were in front. .. . We had started down a fairly steep hill, and when I got to the bottom there was a big chuckhole, and I didn’t see it very far ahead before it was right there. And I slammed on the brake and skidded, and the next thing I knew I was conscious with my head on the pavement, and I could hear Dianne my youngest daughter crying by my feet. . . .

The chuckhole was a jagged three foot hole, irregular in shape and one inch deep. It was patched by 4:30 p.m. of the same day.

Claimant testified additionally that you could see a long distance, that it was a clear day, but she didn’t see the hole until she was two or three feet from it. She admitted that in a prior deposition she had testified that she was roughly a foot or so from the hole when she saw it, and that she could have seen far ahead had she been looking.

She further testified that she was not going fast, because the hill was steep and she didn’t want to go too fast.

At the time of the accident, the family’s small dog was riding in the small basket attached to the front of Claimant’s bicycle.

Donald R. Strohecker, a park worker, in his evidence deposition, testified that following the accident Claimant stated in his presence that when she hit the chuckhole, the dog started to bounce out of the basket, and when she tried to catch the dog, she lost control of her bicycle and fell off.

Mrs. Susan Eisenhower, an independent witness, in her evidence deposition, testified that following the accident, Claimant stated that they (the family) had gone for ice cream and that they were going back; that she had the dog in the basket and that he was fussing going down that steep hill; that she was more or less paying attention to it (the dog) and that is all she remembered.

In order for the Claimant to sustain the burden of proof entitling her to recovery, she must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (i) she was free from contributory negligence, (ii) that the State was negligent, (iii) that the negligence was the proximate cause of the occurrence from which her injuries naturally and proximately flowed.

In directing our attention to Claimant’s first burden of proof, i.e., her duty to show due care for her own safety, we are mindful of at least three cases which have been before us on almost identical facts and where we have held that failure to observe a chuckhole which was clearly visible for a reasonable distance was contributory negligence.

In McAbee v. State of Illinois, 24 Ill.Ct.Cl. 374, this Court held that the Claimant therein who was riding a bicycle on a clear day when the pavement was dry and with no obstructions to bar visibility was contributorily negligent in not seeing a hole in the street.

In Schnell v. State of Illinois, 24 Ill.Ct.Cl. 257, Claimant, riding a motorcycle, failed to notice a hole near the center line of the highway. She had been riding in a group with four other motorcyclists.

The Court held:

Two other riders in the same party had passed the hole without difficulty and one who had apparently been riding in about the same position as Mrs. Schnell had noticed the hole and avoided it. We can only conclude that had Claimant been reasonably alert and observant she could have avoided this unfortunate incident. Schnell v. State of Illinois, 24 Ill.Ct.Cl. 257, 260.

In Alm vs. State of Illinois, No. 5268, the Claimant was a minor, riding his bicycle along a three foot median strip in a highway, when he struck an unmarked hole approximately three inches deep and two feet long which caused him to be thrown immediately in front of an oncoming car.

This Court held:

The accident in question occurred during the daylight hours, and the hole in the median strip should have been readily visible to the Claimant riding his bicycle. Had the Claimant been reasonably alert and observant he should have seen the hole and been able to avoid the accident. Alm vs. State of Illinois, No. 5268.

It is to be noted that Mrs. Scofield’s two daughters, riding their bicycles immediately ahead of their mother, each avoided the hole. It is also to be noted that Mrs. Scofield had passed the same spot shortly before the accident on her way to the concession stand. While it is true that on the trip to the concession stand she was riding on the opposite side of the road, nevertheless the hole was relatively in the middle of the road and was visible from both directions.

It is the finding of the Court from the evidence in the record that Claimant has not sustained her burden of proof that she was in the exercise of due care for her own safety. On the contrary, the manifest weight of the evidence is that she was contributorily negligent.

In view of our foregoing opinion, it is not necessary to consider whether the State was negligent in allowing the chuckhole to be present, whether the State had knowledge, express or implied, of the existence of the hole, and like questions.

The claim of Ann Elizabeth Scofield is denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 76-1136
    Charles B. McCree, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 7, 1976.

    Charles B. McCree, Pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; James O. Stola, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This Court finds that this claim is for the refund of a security deposit held by the Illinois Secretary of State, Safety Responsibility Unit pursuant to Illinois Vehicle Code, Ill.Rev.Stats., Ch. 95-1/2, §7-503. An investigation of this claim by the Secretary of State determined that the amount due would have been paid in the regular course of business had the claim been presented to the proper office before the money was transferred to the General Revenue Fund in the State Treasury in accordance with Section 7-503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the same having been confirmed by the Secretary of State, a copy of said report being attached to the Joint Stipulation of the parties.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of Six Hundred Ten Dollars ($610.00) be awarded to Claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.


author: Polos, C. J.

text:
    (No. 76-1200
    Rock Island Franciscan Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 3, 1977.

   Polos, C. J.

This cause coining on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties, and the Court being fully advised in the premises find: that the parties have stipulated that the claims for Manuel Cavazos, Esther Fogel, Ollie Glidewell, John Ingle and Mary Ellen Simeons have been paid. This Court, accordingly, denies those portions of this claim.

This Court further finds that in accordance with the stipulation the Claimant has withdrawn its claim for services rendered to Marjorie Thomas, and this Court accordingly denies that portion of this claim.

Pursuant to the Joint Stipulation of the parties this Court finds that the Department of Public Aid does not contest the claim for services rendered on behalf of Jerry Buker, Jimmy Davis, Pamela Martin or Ruth Mattingley and therefore grants an award for services rendered on behalf of the recipients as follows:

It is therefore ordered the Claimant be advanced an award in the total amount of One Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Five And 17/100 Dollars ($1595.17) as set forth above.


text:
    (No. 76-1310
    Joe J. Gallardo, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 15, 1976.

    Joe J. Gallardo, Pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Peggy Bastas, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This Court finds that this claim is for the refund of a security deposit held by the Illinois Secretary of State, pursuant to Section 7-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, Ill.Rev.Stats., Ch. 95-1/2, §7-204. An investigation of this claim by the Secretary of State determined that the amount due would have been paid in the regular course of business had the claim been presented to the proper office before the money was transferred to the General Revenue Fund in the State Treasury in accordance with Section 7-204 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the same having been confirmed by the Secretary of State, a copy of said report being attached to the Joint Stipulation of the parties.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of Two Hundred Ten Dollars ($210.00) be awarded to Claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned clause.


author: Spivack, J.

text:
    (No. 76-1409
    Joseph Sitka, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 22, 1977.

   Spivack, J.

This cause is now before the Court on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. The Court has examined said motion and Claimant’s answer thereto and the points and authorities cited in the pleadings.

This is an action commenced on March 3, 1976, to recover the sum of $59,555.00 for rent withheld from Claimant by the Illinois Department of Public Aid. The periods of occupancy of the divers tenants commenced on December 15, 1965, and concluded on August 2, 1971. Claimant contends that rental was erroneously withheld because of certain ordinance violations in and about the rental properties which have been in fact corrected or contracted to be corrected. Respondent contends that the violations were not cured and further that the withholding was an administrative penalty permitted under Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 23, §11-23.

In view of the Court’s reaffirmation that the cause is barred by the Court of Claims Act, §22, Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 37, §439.22, it is not necessary to determine the factual issues in contention.

Claimant argues that §22 of the Court of Claims Act, which reads as follows:

Claims cognizable against the State by vendors of goods or services under the Illinois Public Aid Code ... shall have a period of limitation of one year after the accrual of the cause of action. .. .

is inapplicable in that Claimant has not rendered "goods or services,” but has in fact contracted with the tenants (Public Aid recipients), thus triggering the five-year limitation statute applicable to contracts.

The case of Landsman, et al. v. State, 27 Ill.Ct.Cl. 403, is on all fours with the case at bar and is determinative of the arguments and issues herein presented. Precisely the same factual issues were presented in that case as in this. In rejecting Claimant’s argument that the claim was contractual in nature, the Court in Landsman, at 405, stated:

... a landlord is a vendor of services if the landlord purports to furnish a tenant with such necessities as light, water, heat or janitor services. A landlord is also a vendor of an interest in real estate when renting or leasing housing to a tenant, as the term vendor is used in the Public Aid Code.

A landlord, being a vendor within the purview of §22, must file his action within one year from the date upon which it accrues or be forever barred.

The Claimant in this cause, having filed his action some 4-1/2 years after it accrued, is barred by the limitations contained in §22.

Accordingly, Respondent’s motion is granted, and the cause dismissed with prejudice.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 76-1952
    IBM Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 31, 1977.

   Holderman, J.

Claimant filed a claim in the amount of $73.75 for services rendered to Governors State University.

Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss setting forth as grounds for said motion the following:

I. That Claimant’s complaint sounds in contract and alleges the sum of $73.75 due as per a contract between Claimant and the Union for Experimental Colleges and Universities of Yellow Springs, Ohio.

II. That the Union for Experimental Colleges and Universities is not, nor was it ever, an agency of the State of Illinois.

In going over the file in this case, I do not find anything to support the contention of Respondent. The invoice-vouchers indicate the services were rendered to the Governors State University in Park Forest, Illinois. Nowhere on the invoice-vouchers or the material in the file is any reference made to services being provided to the college referred to in the Motion to Dismiss.

Motion to Dismiss is therefore denied, and an award is entered in favor of claimant in the amount of Seventy-Three And 75/100 Dollars ($73.75).


text:
    (No. 76-2238
    Linda L. Leonard, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 3, 1977.

   Polos, C. J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the stipulation of the Respondent, and the Court being fully advised in the premises finds:

1. That the Fair Employment Practices Commission is empowered by statute, Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 48, §858, to approve settlements entered into between the parties to a dispute, said settlements having been entered into as the result of conciliation meetings between the parties to the dispute.

2. The stipulation attached to the complaint, filed in the instant cause, as Exhibit "B” is a settlement entered into between the parties to the dispute as the result of conciliation meetings between the parties to the dispute.

It is therefore ordered that the Claimant (Complainant) be awarded, pursuant to the terms of the stipulation entered into between the Department of Children and Family Services and the Claimant herein, and approved by the Fair Employment Practices Commission pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 48, §858, the sum of Fourteen Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($14,600.00).


text:
    (No. 76-2354
    Elsie E. Smith, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 3, 1977.

    Elsie E. Smith, Pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This Court finds that this claim is for damages sustained by Claimant, Elsie E. Smith, to her eyeglass frames when she was struck by a resident of the Illinois Youth Center, Geneva. That the Department of Corrections in their departmental report of November 10, 1976, verified the foregoing facts as alleged by the exhibit attached to the complaint.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of Twelve Dollars and Fifty Cents ($12.50) be awarded to Claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above-captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 76-2736
    Jeannette Lewis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 6, 1977.

    Goldberg & Murphy, Ltd., by Jerome F. Goldberg, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Paul M. Singpiehl, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Spivack, J.

This matter is before the Court on Claimant’s Complaint, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Claimant’s Response to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and Respondent’s Motion to Strike Claimant’s Response.

Since there appears to be no significant dispute as to the facts giving rise to the claim, but only as to the effect of the law applicable to said facts, we are of the opinion that our ruling on the pending motions is dis-positive of the entire matter.

The facts upon which the parties agree are briefly as follows:

Claimant was an employee of the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities during the period October 15, 1974, to June 16, 1976. During this period, although her job classification was "Administrative Clerk,” she claimed that she was in fact performing services entitling her to the classification "Executive I,” a higher paid classification. The director of the Department of Personnel decided this claim adversely to Claimant, and she appealed to the Illinois Civil Service Commission which, on June 16, 1976, reversed the prior adverse ruling and granted her the relief sought in that proceeding. As a result of and in accordance with those proceedings, the Department of Mental Health paid Claimant the sum of One Thousand Seventeen Dollars ($1,017.00), representing the salary difference between the classifications "Administrative Clerk” and "Executive I” for the period fiscal 1975 — 1976. The Department did not pay Claimant the sum of Five Hundred Fifty-Two Dollars ($552.00) which amount represents the salary difference for the period she was employed during fiscal 1974 — 1975. This non-payment occurred because the funds appropriated for such purpose had lapsed. Claimant here seeks reimbursement for said sum.

The State argues that Claimant’s claim must be denied on two grounds: first, that the Department of Personnel issued a regulation in conformance with the decision of the Civil Service Commission retroactively changing Claimant’s position classification as of July 1, 1975 (and not as of October 15, 1974); second, that Claimant’s proper remedy was a review of the Department of Personnel’s regulation in the Circuit Court; and, having failed to do that, she is statutorily precluded from maintaining her action here since she did not exhaust all of her remedies.

We do not believe that the intent of the regulation of the Department of Personnel was to limit Claimant’s job classification to the period commencing July 1, 1975. On the contrary, we believe that the said regulation was intended simply to give efficacy to the decision of the Civil Service Commission which retroactively changed the classification for the period when Claimant actually performed the services giving rise to the higher classification. Undoubtedly the regulation in question was limited as it was because the Department was aware of the fact that the funds had lapsed. To hold otherwise would be an unequitable distortion of the findings of the Civil Service Commission.

In view of our interpretation of the regulation of the Department of Personnel, it is not necessary to consider the question of Claimant’s exhaustion of other remedies.

Claimant, Jeannette Lewis, is therefore awarded the sum of Five Hundred Fifty-Two Dollars ($552.00) less proper deductions on account of taxes, pension and the like.


text:
    (No. 76-3149
    L & L Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 11, 1977.

   Polos, C. J.

The claim of L & L, Inc. in this case is for repair services to air conditioners at the Criminal Investigation Bureau headquarters of the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement. The building although occupied by the State of Illinois was owned by Carl E. Fielland and A. Walter Hirshberg. Mr. Fielland and Mr. Hirshberg leased the premises to Addressograph-Multigraph Corporation who in turn subleased the premises to the State of Illinois. Prior to the execution of the sublease, the rights of Carl E. Fielland and A. Walter Hirshberg were assigned to C. A. Fielland, Inc., General Contractors, of Tampa, Florida. They in turn consented to the sublease to the State of Illinois. Consequently the air conditioning failed during the occupancy by the State of Illinois, and they entered into a contract with L & L, Inc. to make the immediate emergency repairs to the air conditioning system in order to maintain an appropriate level of operating comfort.

The departmental report establishes that the Department of Law Enforcement had adequate funds appropriated for this expense, but they refused to pay the bill because they felt that the owner of the building was responsible for maintenance of the air conditioners. The issue as to the ultimate liability of the owner of the building is not before this Court.

The provisions contained in the original lease and the subsequent lease are not before this Court. The issue before this Court is the contract entered into by the State of Illinois with L & L, Inc. The Department of Law Enforcement does not deny this contract and admits to having entered into it with L & L, Inc.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant be awarded Three Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-One and 85/100 Dollars ($3,451.85).


text:
    (No. 74-CV-12
    In Re Application of Hamit Jusufi.

      Opinion filed September 8, 1976.

    Martin Cassell, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Peggy Bastas, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an alleged crime that took place on November 5, 1973, at 212 S. LaSalle Street, Aurora. The Claimant seeks compensation under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill. Rev.Stat., 1973, Chapter 70, Section 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The issues in this case are whether (1) the assault on the Claimant was provoked by him, (2) the injuries received were the proximate result of the criminal assault, and (3) whether the Claimant cooperated fully with the law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

The facts were that on the evening of November 5, 1973, the Claimant met two men and two women who were acquaintances of his at a restaurant and was invited to the apartment of one of the men. The entire group went to this person’s apartment. After having some coffee and conversation, the Claimant asked to go home. The group then went to Claimant’s automobile and the Claimant was driven home by one of the acquaintances.

On the way to the Claimant’s home, the automobile occupied by the parties struck a parked car and received minor property damage. No one was injured.

The Claimant was driven home, arriving about 10 p.m. The two men and two women left and the Claimant went to bed and fell asleep.

About one hour later, the Claimant was awakened from his sleep by repeated knocks on the door. Upon opening the door he saw the people with whom he had spent the early part of the evening. One man had a chain in his hand with which he struck the Claimant on the head. The Claimant fell to the floor and was severely beaten into unconsciousness.

The police were called by the owner of the building who heard the noise and the Claimant was taken to a hospital where he stayed overnight.

The Claimant was unable to work for the next three days because of pain in his right side and blood in his urine. On the fourth day, he worked a few hours but after arriving home he collapsed and was taken to the hospital. His condition was diagnosed as a ruptured kidney and an operation was performed removing the kidney.

As to the first issue, that of possible provocation, there was no evidence of such provocation. There were, however, various contradictory statements in police and hospital records. However, this Court is of the opinion that any contradictory statements were the result of the Claimant’s obvious difficulty with the English language. Indeed, his court testimony, even with an interpreter, was difficult to follow.

There being no actual evidence of provocation, this Court finds that the assault on the Claimant was unprovoked.

As to the second issue, that of proximate cause, the evidence was clear. The Claimant’s physician testified that it was her opinion that the removal of the kidney was the proximate result of the beating described. There was no evidence that the automobile accident resulted in any injury whatsoever.

As to the third issue, the facts were that the Claimant talked to the police after he recovered his senses in the hospital but did not sign a complaint. He did however sign a complaint two days later and appeared at the trial of the criminal complaint and the assailants were thereby convicted of disorderly conduct.

The Court therefore finds that the Claimant cooperated fully with the law enforcement officials.

The Court further finds that the Claimant was a victim of a violent crime as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: "Aggravated Battery”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1975, Chapter 38, Section 12-4).

The Court further finds that the Claimant and his assailants were not related nor did they share the same household.

The Claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses in the amount of $3,347.70.

The Claimant worked for the Aurora County Club as a kitchen aid. He earned $2.75 per hour for a 48 hour week. He missed one month of work full time and missed three hours per day for two additional weeks.

Section 4 of the Act provides:

Loss of earnings . . . shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less. . . .

In this case only $500.00 per month may be considered as lost earnings. By this method the victim lost $666.00 in earnings.

The total amount of his loss is therefore $4,013.70.

In determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, the Court must first deduct $200.00 as provided in Section 7 of the Act.

After deducting the statutory deduction of $200.00 the compensation due to the claimant is computed at $3,813.70.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $3,813.70 be awarded to the Claimant, Hamit Jusufi, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-15
    In Re Application of Wayne Bass.

      Opinion filed January 19, 1976.

    Burton Weinstein, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Paul West, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a - criminal offense which occurred on November 23, 1973, at the Five Brothers Liquor Store, 4659 South State Street, Chicago. The Claimant seeks compensation under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the "Act”).

The Court of Claims entered an order on July 15, 1975, dismissing this claim. Pursuant to Section 9 of the Act, the Claimant moved for a hearing and the request was granted.

Evidence was taken at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this Court.

The sole issue presented to the Court is whether the Claimant established any compensable loss of earnings.

It was stipulated by the parties that the Claimant, while a patron of the Five Brothers Liquor Store, 4659 S. State Street, Chicago, on midnight, November 24, 1973, was shot in the right thigh. He was treated for his wounds at Provident Hospital, Chicago, from November 24, 1973, through December 2, 1973. The bullet was imbedded in his leg and the doctors Were unable to remove it.

All hospital and doctor bills were paid by the Illinois Department of Public Aid.

The Claimant testified that at the time of the crime he was 21 years of age and was unemployed. Prior to the shooting, he had been employed since June of 1972 as a custodian for the Chicago Housing Authority. He resigned this position in August, 1973, when it became apparent that the Federal funding which paid his salary was about to be terminated. He earned $545.00 per month from that job. Thereafter he commenced receiving public aid at the rate of $261.00 per month.

During his period of unemployment he registered with the Illinois State Employment Services and was sent by this agency to be interviewed for a job as a janitor for the McDonnell & Miller Division of ITT. The interview took place on the same day as the shooting. The Claimant was hired at a salary of $4.50 per hour for a 40 hour week but was unable to commence the employment due to his injuries.

The Claimant was released from the hospital on December 2, 1973, and required the use of a wheel chair for two months thereafter. During the month of February 1974 he was obliged to use crutches. He became physically able to work on March 1, 1974, at which time he was informed that the janitor’s position at McDonnell & Miller had been filled by another person. He continued to seek employment and became employed on April 1, 1974.

During the time of Claimant’s physical infirmities he continued to receive the same sum from the Illinois Department of Public Aid — $261.00 per month.

Section 4 of the Act provides:

Pecuniary loss to an applicant under this Act resulting from injury or death to a victim includes, in the case of injury, appropriate medical expenses or hospital expenses, loss of earnings, loss of future earnings because of a disability resulting from the injury, and other expenses. . . . Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less . . .

Applying this section to the facts of this case, it appears to this Court that the Claimant did suffer a compensable loss of earnings. Although he had not actually commenced his employment at the time of his injury, he had been hired. Were it not for the crime inflicted upon him, he would have earned far in excess of the $500.00 maximum provided by the Act. Even using his previous job as a basis, his lost earnings would be in excess of the $500.00 maximum allowed by the Act.

Accordingly, it is the finding of this Court that the Claimant suffered lost earnings from November 24,1973, to March 1, 1974, a period of three and one-quarter months. Based on the $500.00 maximum provided by the Act, his gross compensable lost earnings were $1,625.00.

During his period of incapacity he received $848.00 from the Illinois Department of Public Aid.

In determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Section 7d of the Act states that this Court:

Shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act or from local governmental, state or federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).

In the claim before us, the benefits received from the Department of Public Aid of $848.00 plus the statutory-deduction of $200.00 must be deducted from the gross amount of loss, leaving a loss compensable under the Act of $577.00.

The Court further finds that the Claimant cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant; that there is no evidence of any wrongful act or substantial provocation by the Claimant for the crime and the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

The Court further finds that the Claimant was a victim of a violent crime as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit, "Aggravated Battery”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

The Court further finds, pursuant to Section 12 of the Act, that the Claimant was ably represented by Burton Weinstein, an attorney at law, and that, based upon the work done by said attorney and the results accomplished, a reasonable fee for his services is $100.00.

It Is Therefore Ordered that the order of this Court of July 15, 1975, denying compensation to the Claimant is hereby vacated and set aside.

It Is Further Ordered that the total sum of $577.00 be awarded Wayne Bass, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that attorney, Burton Weinstein, may charge as fees for his services in connection with the hearing of this cause the sum of $100.00.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-21
    In Re Application of Marilyn Brown, Admx. of the Estate of Clyde Steele.

      Opinion filed July 22, 1975.

    Spencer W. Schwartz, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on December 16, 1973, at approximately 5:00 p.m. at 7929 South Jeffery, Chicago, Illinois. Marilyn Brown, the administratrix of the estate of the victim, Willie Clyde Steele, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the decedent, Willie Clyde Steele, age 30, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit: "Murder”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on December 16, 1973, at approximately 5:00 p.m., the victim and his wife, Ruth Steele, were both shot in front of their home at 7929 South Jeffery, Chicago, Illinois.

3. That according to statements from eye witnesses taken by the police immediately after the shooting the following events took place. Shortly before 5:00 p.m. on December 16, 1973, the victim left his house, got in his car, and drove away. He returned home about 10 minutes later and got out of his car carrying a shopping bag. The assailant then walked up to the victim and said, "You think you are a bad M.F.” (sic) The assailant then raised his hand which held a gun. The victim then said, "Wait a minute, man, let’s talk about it.” The victim started backing up and the assailant then took his gun and fired it at the victim. The victim’s wife, Ruth Steele, was then seen running across her lawn screaming. When she got to her husband, she dropped to her knees. The assailant then came behind her and said something to her. He then put his gun to her head and fired it.

4. That both the victim and his wife were taken to Jackson Park Hospital in Chicago where they were both pronounced dead.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the Claimant, Marilyn Brown, has been duly appointed as administratrix of the estate of the victim, Clyde Steele, by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Probate Division, c09791, No. 74 P 2372, Docket 792, Page 212.

6. That there was no evidence to indicate that the victim’s death was attributable to his wrongful act or the substantial provocation of his assailant.

7. That there was no indication that the victim was a relative or ever shared the same household as the assailant.

8. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and the Claimant has fully cooperated in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

9. That the assailant has been identified as Harry A. Curtis of 7933 South Jeffery, Chicago, Illinois. The assailant has been indicted on a charge of murder. A trial was held October 8, 1974, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Courtroom of Judge Porter. The assailant was found not guilty by reason of insanity and has been committed to the Department of Mental Health of the State of Illinois.

10. That compensation is sought under the Act for funeral expenses and loss of support for the victim’s two minor children.

11. That funeral and burial expenses paid for the victim were in the amount of $1,825.25.

12. That, at the time of his death, the victim was 30 years old and, according to actuarial tables, had a life expectancy of 40 years. Therefore, we must conclude that the victim’s dependent children lost his financial support for 40 years.

13. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his death were $1,088.36, but only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of support, pursuant to §4 of the Act.

14. That, based on the victim’s normal life expectancy of 40 years, and taking $500 per month as his average earnings, the loss of support to his dependent children is computed to be $240,000.00.

15. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, § 7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) . . . shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death, and deduction of $200.00, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point, this court has adopted an opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth, 296 N.E.2d 477 (1973).

16. That in the claim before us life insurance benefits in the amount of $157,000.00 have been paid to Beulah Thompson of Greenville, Alabama, as guardian of the victim’s two minor children, Veronica Steele, age 9, and Tracey Steele, age 4.

17. That the first $25,000 of life insurance benefits are not to be deducted.

18. That in the claim before us, benefits received from other sources which must be deducted from the loss as contemplated by § 7(d) of the Act were shown to be in the total sum of $132,000. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 111 and If 14, leaves a loss far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded as compensation under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime. Hence, the Claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $10,000.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Dollars and No Cents) be awarded to Marilyn Brown as administratrix of the estate of Clyde Steele, to be held for the use and benefit of the victim’s minor children, Veronica Steele and Tracey Steele, to be distributed in accordance with the Probate Court of Cook County.

[See Opinion in Claim 74-CV-22 finding no compensable loss due to the death of this victim’s wife, Ruth Steele, also a murder victim in the same occurrence.]


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    (No. 74-CV-38
    In Re Application of Ellen Lewis and Mary Ann Scott.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1976.

    Spencer W. Schwartz, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on December 17, 1973, at 5541 South Ada Street, Chicago. Ellen Lewis, wife of the victim on behalf of herself and her son, Massawa Kawana Lewis, and Mary Ann Scott on behalf of her child, Melvin Lewis Williams, all seek compensation under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The contested issues presented to this Court are:

(1) Whether there can be compensable loss of support under the Act where the victim was unemployed at the time of the crime against him but was employed a short time prior to the crime, and
(2) Whether an illegitimate child may be a dependent under the Act.

The facts of the crime were that on December 17, 1973, at approximately 12:45 a.m. the body of the victim, Cleophus Lewis, was discovered on the lawn in front of 5541 S. Ada Street, Chicago.

The person discovering the body reported to the Chicago Police Department and the victim’s body was transported to the Central Community Hospital, Chicago, where it was determined that the victim had died of gun shot wounds by an unknown assailant.

As to the first issue, the evidence was undisputed that the deceased was not employed at the time of his death. He had however been employed by Libby, McNeil & Libby of Chicago from 1967 (except for a 9 month layoff in 1968) to and including December 11, 1973, which was six days prior to his death. On December 11,1973, he had been fired from his job by reason of an unsatisfactory attendance record. His loss of job was the culmination of a series of warnings and suspensions by his employer for this unsatisfactory attendance. His average monthly earnings were slightly in excess of $1,000.00 despite his absences.

Section 4 of the Act provides:

Pecuniary loss to an applicant under this Act resulting from injury or death to a victim includes ... in the case of death, funeral and burial expenses and loss of support to the dependents of the victim. Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less ....

There is nothing in the Act which requires, as a precondition to a claim for loss of support, that the victim be employed on the date of his death. In fact, the contrary seems to be indicated by the language of Section 4.

It is the opinion of this Court that, if it is more likely than not that the victim would have been gainfully employed in the time immediately following crime, his dependents have, in fact, suffered a loss of support. Being employed currently at the time of the crime is but one good indication of the likelihood of future employment and therefore the likelihood of future loss to dependents. Another good indication of the likelihood of future employment and therefore of possible future loss to the victim’s dependents is recent employment and the length of that recent employment.

In this case, the victim had been originally employed by McNeil, Libby & McNeil on August 14, 1967, until he was laid off on May 3, 1968. He was rehired on June 1, 1970, and worked continuously, except for his unsatisfactory absences and suspensions, from that time until he was finally terminated. The absences which caused his termination were on the average 1 day per month and on a few occasions from 2 days to 2 weeks. Suspensions were up to 5 days.

This record of employment to within one week of his death and continuous employment for 3% years indicates to this Court that it is more likely than not that he would have continued to be gainfully employed thereafter. We hold therefore that his dependents suffered a loss of support. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Act, the compensable loss must be computed on the basis of $500.00 per month. Based on the average life expectancy of a 30 year old man, it is apparent that the loss of support to his dependents resulting from his death is computed to be far in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum that can be awarded under the Act.

As to the second issue, the victim’s wife, Claimant Ellen Lewis, testified that she married the victim in 1963. There was born of that marriage one surviving child, namely, Massawa Kawana Lewis, age 4. She further testified that her husband was the father of an illegitimate son, namely, Melvin Lewis Williams. The victim openly regarded Melvin Lewis Williams as his son and supported him on a regular basis.

Claimant Mary Ann Scott testified that she is the mother of Melvin Lewis Williams who was bom on September 4, 1963, and that the victim, Cleophus Lewis, was the father of that child. She was never married to the victim. The victim paid her about $15.00 per week for the child’s support and brought him gifts. At times he would miss a week of paying support but would make up the deficiency at a later date. He orally acknowledged the child as his to her relatives.

The Social Security Administration of the United States Government made a determination that the child was the victim’s son and pays to her for his support the sum of $250.80 per month.

The victim never acknowledged the paternity of Melvin Lewis Williams by any written statement or any statement in open court nor were any proceedings ever instituted to establish paternity. The birth certificate named Mary Scott as mother but did not name a father, although the certificate gave the father’s age as 21 which corresponded to the victim’s age at that time.

Melvin Lewis Williams, age 11, testified that Cleophus Lewis, the victim, was his father. The victim gave his mother $15.00 every week and gave him $1.00 allowance per week. The victim took the boy out and brought him gifts at various times. The victim called him "Melvin,” but at times called him "son.” At times Melvin Lewis Williams stayed at his father’s home.

Kelly Williams, Robert Williams, and Richard Yearby all testified on behalf of Mary Ann Scott that the victim orally acknowledged Melvin Lewis Williams as his son and that they witnessed the payment of support money to Mary Ann Scott.

The evidence, set out above in detail, is clear and convincing that the child, Melvin Lewis Williams, was in fact the illegitimate son of the victim, Cleophus Lewis, and was being supported by the victim at the time of his death. The fact that the victim’s wife, Claimant Ellen Lewis, verified this, in spite of the fact that such verification might lessen the amount of her own award, is most convincing. Her testimony and the testimony of Melvin Lewis Williams and the other corroborating witnesses were most credible and were uncontradicted.

It has long been the law in Illinois that an illegitimate child cannot inherit from his father. The harshness of this doctrine has survived many attacks. The leading case in the country positing this rule is Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). In this case, an illegitimate child was denied the right to inherit from her father because the applicable Louisiana statutes governing inheritance by illegitimates had not been complied with. The reasoning applied by the United States Supreme Court in upholding the pertinent Louisiana statutes could, of course, be modified to apply to the similar statutes in the State of Illinois merely by substituting Illinois for Louisiana in the Court’s opinion. The Court said:

Of course, it may be said that the rules adopted by the Louisiana Legislature discriminate against illegitimates . . . But the power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life as well as to regulate the disposition of property left in Louisiana by a man dying there is committed by the Constitution of the United States and the people of Louisiana to the legislature of that State. Absent a specific constitutional guarantee, it is for that legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this Court, to select from among possible laws. We cannot say that Louisiana’s policy provides a perfect or even a desirable solution or the one we would have provided for the problem of the property rights of illegitimate children. Neither can we say that Louisiana does not have the power to make laws for distribution of property left within the State.

Respondent points out that by virtue of Illinois Revised Statutes, Chap. 106%, Sec. 54, only the Circuit Court of Cook County may hold hearings to establish paternity and that such an action must be brought within two years of the birth of the child unless the person accused has acknowledged the paternity of the child by a written statement or in open court, and that since no paternity action was ever filed, the Court of Claims is without jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue of paternity.

This Court is of the opinion that the concepts enumerated in the Labine case and by the Illinois statutes regarding paternity are not applicable to the situation in the instant case.

The Act provides in Section 3 that:

A person is entitled to compensation under this Act if: (a) he . . . is a person who was dependent on a deceased victim of a crime of violence for his support at the time of the death of that victim. . . . (emphasis added)

Section 2(a) uses the word "person” in defining the applicant. Section 8(b) of the Act also uses the word "person” or "persons” in discussing dependents.

In the case of Yellow Cab Company v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 42 Ill.2d 226 (1969), the Illinois Supreme Court construed the question of whether an illegitimate child of a deceased employee may recover under Section 7(a) of the Workmens Compensation Act. Section 7(a) of the Workmens Compensation Act provides for compensation in fatal cases to "any widow, child or children whom the victim was under legal obligation to support at the time of the accident.” The Court held that in a situation similar to the instant case where there had been no proceedings ever instituted to establish paternity but where the evidence was clear that the employee was the father, the illegitimate child was entitled to an award.

The language of the Crime Victim’s Compensation Act is much broader than the Workmens Compensation Act. The Workmens Compensation Act uses the word "child or children” while the Crime Victims Compensation Act uses the broader word "persons.” The Workmens Compensation Act limits awards to those children whom the victim was "under legal obligation to support.” The Crime Victims Compensation Act does not specifically limit a dependent to one whom the victim was under any legal obligation.

Since the Illinois Supreme Court has decided in the Yellow Cab case that an illegitimate child may recover under the Workmens Compensation Act, a statute that is more narrowly drawn than the Crime Victims Compensation Act, it follows that an illegitimate child may likewise recover as a dependent under the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

The United States Supreme Court in the case of Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), held:

... a State may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally. We therefore hold that once a State posits a judically enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has not married its mother. For a State to do so is illogical and unjust.

This Court further takes note of the recent Illinois Appellate Court case holding in Cessna v Montgomery, 28 Ill.App.3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (1975), which the two year statute of limitations for paternity actions was held unconstitutional and in which case the Court held that natural fathers have the duty of supporting their illegitimate children.

This Court therefore holds that an illegitimate child of a victim of a violent crime may be a dependent under the Crime Victims Compensation Act where the proof of paternity and of dependency is clear and convincing and further holds that the proof in the instant case meets that standard.

Therefore, Melvin Lewis Williams is entitled to share in the award for loss of support.

The Court further finds that Cleophus Lewis was the victim of a violent crime, to wit "Murder”, Illinois Revised Statutes 1973, Chap. 38, Sec. 9-1. The Court further finds that there is no evidence to indicate that the deceased victim provoked the crime nor that he was related to or shared the same household of the assailant and that the Claimants cooperated with law enforcement officials.

The Court further finds that the Claimant Ellen Lewis paid funeral expenses to the Drexel Funeral Home in the amount of $2,230.00.

In determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Section 7(d) of the Act states that this Court:

(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the Workmens Compensation Act or from local governmental, state or federal funds or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death and deduction of $200.00 shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000.00 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point we are adopting a recent opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth, 296 N.E.2d 477, (1973).

In the claim before us, the Claimant Ellen Lewis received $10,000.00 as proceeds of a life insurance policy and all the Claimants are receiving social security benefits, none of which is deductible under the Act. They received no other benefits from other sources. The statutory deduction of $200.00 having been deducted from the total amount of loss, it is apparent that the net loss sustained by the Claimants is far in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum amount that can be awarded under the Act.

Before an award is granted for loss of support the Claimant Ellen Lewis is entitled to an award to compensate her for her pecuniary loss suffered as a result of the funeral expense of $2,230.00. This leaves an amount of $7,770.00 that can be awarded for loss of support.

This Court finds that the following persons were dependent upon the victim Cleophus Lewis for support:

Ellen Lewis, surviving spouse
Massawa Kawana Lewis, son, a minor
Melvin Lewis Williams, son, a minor

Under the circumstances the Court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in Section 8(b):

If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for (her) support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it (the Court) shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled, and (3) order that those amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor, incompetent, to his (her) guardian or conservator, as the case may be.

It would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution of the $7,770.00 in accordance with the rules of distribution stated in Section 11, Sub-Section 1 of the Probate Act. This rule would allow one-third to the victim’s surviving spouse, Ellen Lewis, and the remaining two-thirds divided equally among the victim’s two children, Massawa Kawana Lewis and Melvin Lewis Williams.

To obviate the necessity of the mothers of each of the two minor children being appointed guardian of her child’s estate and considering all other facts in this case, the Court believes that the best interests of the deceased victim’s family would be served by ordering that the award for loss of support be disbursed to the Claimants’ natural guardians, their mothers, in periodic payments as authorized in Section 8, Subparagraph 4 of the Act. As the natural guardians of their minor children, the mothers have a legal obligation to provide for suitable support and education for their children. In fulfilling this obligation, we believe that the mothers would necessarily be required to expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and nurture of her child.

Therefore, It Is Hereby Ordered As Follows:

(1) The sum of $2,230.00 is awarded to the Claimant Ellen Lewis, the wife of the victim of a violent crime, for funeral expenses this Claimant paid for and on behalf of the victim.

(2) The total sum of $5,180.00 is awarded to Ellen Lewis and Massawa Kawana Lewis, her minor child, collectively, as persons who were dependent for their support on Cleophus Lewis, the deceased victim of a violent crime. This award shall be paid to Ellen Lewis in eleven monthly installments, the first ten in equal amounts of $500.00 each and the last installment in the amount of $180.00.

(3) The sum of $2,590.00 is awarded to Mary Ann Scott, natural guardian of Melvin Lewis Williams, a person who was dependent for his support on Cleophus Lewis, the deceased victim of a violent crime. This award shall be paid in eleven monthly installments, the first ten in equal amounts of $250.00 each and the last installment in the amount of $90.00.

It Is Further Ordered that all of the payments above mentioned shall be made from the Court of Claims Appropriation insofar as it is legally possible to do so.

As to the matter of the Petition for attorneys fees filed by attorney, Spencer W. Schwartz, the Court finds that, considering the time spent by said attorney in representing the Claimants at the hearing and preparation for the hearing, the complexity of the issues litigated and the results obtained, said attorney may charge the Claimant, Ellen Lewis, the sum of $1,400.00 and said attorney may charge the Claimant, Mary Ann Scott, the sum of $600.00. This finding and order is pursuant to Section 12 of the Act.


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    (No. 74-CV-51
    In Re Application of Thomas A. Gokey.

      Opinion filed August 28, 1975.

    Theodore Floro, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General for Illinois.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident which occurred on April 26, 1974, at 200 Main Street, Woodstock, Illinois. The Claimant seeks compensation under the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §70, 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The sole issue presented to the Court is whether the Claimant cooperated fully with law enforcement officials.

Evidence was taken by the Court at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this Court.

The Claimant testified that on April 26, 1974, at about 4:00 p.m., while he was at his own apartment he answered a knock on his apartment door and upon his opening the door he was pushed aside by three assailants who demanded the Claimant’s money. The Claimant gave the assailants all of the cash in his wallet. After he gave the money the assailants knocked him to the floor and beat, kicked, and stabbed him. As soon as the assailants left he screamed for help at his window and the police were called by a neighbor.

At the arrival of the police the Claimant told the police that he had been robbed and stabbed by three assailants and wanted to be taken to the hospital. He gave the police a description of the assailants to the best of his knowledge. The description was sketchy at best. The assailants wore dark glasses but during the struggle the Claimant was able to knock the glasses off one of the assailants.

Claimant was taken to the hospital and during his hospital stay was visited by police officers who showed him pictures of suspects. Claimant was unable to identify any of the persons as his assailants.

The day after the Claimant was released from the hospital he went to the Sheriffs Office and looked at more pictures of suspects and from time to time thereafter he was shown more of such pictures but was unable at any time to identify any of them as being his assailants.

On one occasion of the showing of pictures he was shown two pictures of persons whom the police indicated were the actual criminals but the Claimant was unable to recognize them.

The Claimant normally wears glasses but was not wearing them at the time of the crime.

Donald Bosewell testified for the Respondent that he was an officer with the Woodstock Police Department assigned to the case. During his investigation he came across a lead which resulted in his obtaining an admission from a person that such person was one of the assailants. The statement that the police officer took from the admitted assailant also implicated two other persons.

The officer never showed the picture of the party who made the admission to the Claimant because this party was a juvenile. He did however show the Claimant pictures of the two men who were implicated by the statement of the juvenile but the Claimant was unable to identify them.

No one was ever charged with a crime as a result of the incident and subsequent investigation.

The Act provides in Section 2(d) that a person is entitled to compensation if, among other conditions,

Applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

In this case, the police apparently complained that even though they believed, based on good information, that they had apprehended the assailants, the Claimant failed to identify them.

Full cooperation with law enforcement officials means compliance with every reasonable request of law enforcement officials. It obviously does not require a victim to recognize one as his assailant if the victim is sincerely unable to do so, even though the police have good reason to believe they have actually apprehended the assailant. To hold otherwise would be to require the victim to commit perjury.

In this case, the victim complied with all reasonable requests of the police. He provided descriptions as best as he could of the criminals. He viewed pictures of suspects on numerous occasions. There was absolutely no evidence that the Claimant deliberately refused to identify an assailant whom he actually recognized. There is no evidence of any motive on the part of the Claimant to refuse cooperation.

The Court, therefore, finds that the Claimant fully cooperated with the law enforcement officials.

The Court further finds that the Claimant was a victim of a violent crime as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit, "Aggravated Battery,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4; that there is no evidence of any. wrongful act or substantial provocation by the Claimant for the crime and the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

The Court further finds that the Claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1. Hospital $2,299.58
2. Medical 1,115.00
3. Tests and Drugs 15.00
Total: $3,429.58

The Claimant has received benefits from other sources in the amount of $220.00.

In determining the amount of compensation to which - an applicant is entitled, Section 7(d) of the Act states that this Court:

shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workmans Compensation Act or from local governmental, state or federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of ■ the first $25,000.00 of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).

That in the claim before us, the benefits received by the Claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss as contemplated by Section 7(d) of the Act were shown to be in the sum of $220.00. This amount plus the statutory deduction of $200.00 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $3,009.58.

It Is Therefore Ordered that the total sum of $3,009.58 be awarded Thomas A. Gokey, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 74-CV-72
    In Re Application of Rosemary Simone.

      Opinion filed September 5, 1975.

    Michael McArdle, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim is for loss of support and for funeral and burial expenses under the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §70, 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The claim arises out of a criminal offense of murder (Ill.Rev.Stat., Chapter 38, Sec. 9-1). Evidence was taken before Commissioner of this Court, Martin C. Ashman. It was stipulated by the parties that on April 21, 1974, at approximately 10:24 a.m. Frank Korinek of 4144 West 25th, Chicago, Illinois, telephoned the Chicago Police Department, Area 4 Homicide, to report that there was a body in the back seat of a 1967 Chevrolet, parked at 2446 South Kedvale, Chicago, Illinois. Beat Car 1014 was assigned to the scene. The officers discovered a body in the back of the aforementioned automobile. The victim had been gagged, his arms and legs bound behind him, and there were four gun shot wounds in the back of his head. The body was later identified as that of William Simone, age 45, of 4934 West 25th Street, Chicago, Illinois. The report of investigating officers, Jack Stewart, Star No. 13029 and Steve Barnas, Star No. 14103, indicates that a survey of the neighborhood produced several people who indicated that they had heard sounds like shots or firecrackers at approximately 11:30 p.m. on April 20, 1974.

The Claimant is Rosemary Simone, widow of the victim. The victim and the widow were parents of three dependent children, namely, Denise Simone, .age 9, Anthony Simone, age 8 and Michelle Simone, age 4.

Claimant testified that the investigating police officer informed her of her husband’s death and asked if they could look through her husband’s personal effects in order to find any further information about the incidént, and she refused to allow them access to his personal effects because the request was made at the same time as she was informed of the death. The officers never made any further requests of her.

The issue presented to this Court is whether the Claimant cooperated with the authorities to the extent required by this Court.

Section 3(d) of the Act provides that an applicant is entitled to compensation if, among other things:

The applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

This Court feels that the failure to allow the police to inspect the deceased’s personal effects was a lack of full cooperation. The physical facts indicated a premeditated crime had been committed. Certainly, the deceased’s personal effects might have provided a clue or an investigative lead to the officers. It is well known that the sooner an investigation is done the fresher the clues would be. A reasonable person, even though overcome by grief over the brutal murder of a loved one, would want to help the police in the apprehension of the murderer and would have, at least, made an appointment for the investigating officers to go through the personal effects of the decedent. This help to the investigating officers was not given in this case by the applicant.

The Act uses the words "cooperated fully.” Full cooperation means compliance with every reasonable request by law enforcement officials. The request by the police in this case was reasonable and was not complied with. Therefore, the Claimant has not cooperated fully with law enforcement officials as required by the Act.

Having decided that the Claimant is not entitled to the benefits of the Act, it is not necessary for the Court to decide other issues in the case, of dependency and reasonableness of certain bills.

It is therefore the opinion of this Court that the claim of the Claimant be denied.


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    (No. 75-CV-5
    In Re Application of Michael Cibula.

      Opinion filed February 14, 1977.

    Michael Cibula, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

Claimant seeks compensation for alleged medical and hospital bills incurred which claim was submitted pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Chapter 70, Section 70, 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

Evidence was taken by the Court at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this Court.

The only issue presented was whether the Claimant cooperated with the police as required by the Act.

The parties stipulated that on January 17, 1974, at approximately 6 o’clock p.m., the Claimant, Michael J. Cibula, was coming home from work. On his way home, he stopped off at a tavern and had a few drinks. Claimant then left the tavern and began walking home. While walking he was stopped by three men at 700 North Pulaski Road, Chicago, Illinois. The men asked the Claimant for money. When the Claimant told the men he had no money, one of the men shot him the abdomen. Claimant then continued to walk to his home at 3960 W. Ontario, Chicago, Illinois. When he got home, the Claimant’s brother called the police. The police arrived and transported the Claimant to St. Anne’s Hospital, 4950 West Thomas Street, Chicago, Illinois.

Surgery was performed on the Claimant by Dr. R. Gipps. Final diagnosis was gunshot wound of the abdomen, right plural cavity, with right hemothorax and liver injury. Claimant was discharged from the hospital on January 26, 1974, and followup was done on an outpatient basis.

Officer Steven Barnas of Area 4 Homicide, Chicago Police Department, testified that he was assigned to the Cibula case. He went to the hospital and observed the Claimant while the Claimant was in the emergency room. The Claimant was obviously intoxicated. The Claimant gave the officer an oral statement and then was taken to surgery.

About a week or ten days later the officer asked the Claimant to come into the station and view photos of possible suspects and the Claimant said that he didn’t remember anybody and had been intoxicated at the time of the incident and would therefore not go to the police station.

The Claimant testified that just prior to the crime the Claimant had drunk six or eight bottles of beer and "a couple” of shots of whiskey.

He testified that while in intensive care the police asked him to view photos and he told the police that it was no use because he couldn’t recognize anybody by reason of his intoxication, the darkness of the area, and the fact that he had been taken by surprise. He therefore. felt that he would not be able to pick the assailant out of any photos and would not go to the police station to view them.

All the evidence was to the effect that at the time of the crime the Claimant had been intoxicated. The Claimant was consistent in his statements to the police and in his testimony that he was unable to recognize any one of his assailants mostly because of his intoxication.

The law is well settled that no one is required by the law to do a useless act. It is apparent that viewing photos, under the circumstances, would have been a useless act. Therefore, the Claimant’s failure to do so cannot, in the opinion of this Court, be construed as a lack of cooperation.

The Court, therefore, finds as follows:

1. That the Claimant, Michael Cibula, age 54, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: "Aggravated Battery”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Chap. 38, §12-4).

2. That there is no evidence of any provocation by the Claimant for the attack upon him.

3. That the Claimant and his assailants were not related and sharing the same household.

4. That the Claimant cooperated with the police authorities to the extent sufficient under the Act.

5. That the Claimant received sick pay for the period of time that he was out of work and therefore makes no claim for any loss of earnings.

6. That the Claimant incurred hospital and medical expenses as follows:

Hospital $2,055.20
Medical 890.00
TOTAL: $2,945.20

7. That no evidence was presented to indicate that the Claimant has received or will recover any benefits from other sources as a result of his injury.

8. That in determining the amount of compensation to which a Claimant is entitled § 7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the Workmens Compensation Act, or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, . . .

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00 the amount of compensation to which the Claimant is entitled is $2,745.20.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $2,745.20 be awarded to the Claimant, Michael J. Cibula, the innocent victim of a violent crime, and to the extent allowed by law the said sum shall be paid.


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    (No. 75-CV-23
    In Re Application of Karen L. Spencer.

      Opinion filed October 28, 1975.

    Karen L. Spencer, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois, Peggy Bastas, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident which occurred on November 7, 1973, at 434 West Normal Parkway, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant seeks compensation for various expenses and for lost earnings under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The issues presented for hearing were as follows:

(a) Whether bills incurred for baby sitting for Claimant’s children are compensable under the Act.
(b) Whether taxi fares incurred in going to and from medical treatment are compensable under the Act.
(c) The extent of her lost earnings, if any.
(d) Whether the Claimant is in need of plastic surgery which might be compensable under the Act.

Evidence was taken by the Court at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this Court.

The Claimant was on November 7, 1973, on her way to visit her father. She had just left a bus and was walking North on Normal Avenue at 69th Street in Chicago, Illinois, when a group of five male youths came up behind her and forced her into an abandoned building at 434 West Normal Parkway, Chicago, Illinois. They took her purse, watch and ring and forced her to disrobe. All five youths then raped her and one hit her several times with what she believed to be a pipe wrench. Thereafter the Claimant dressed herself and went to the next building where she summoned help. She was bleeding heavily from her head wounds.

The Claimant described her assailants to the police and one of them was subsequently arrested and convicted of aggravated battery and sentenced from 4 to 8 years in a penal institution.

The medical records of the University of Chicago Hospitals and Clinics indicate that the Claimant received multiple lacerations to the forehead and scalp, painful contusions on the head and puffed up eyes. Multiple sutures were applied.

She was treated by Dr. Jose Calub who reported that the Claimant suffered from multiple contusions of the head and body and severe anxiety neuroses.

The doctor reported that the Claimant was incapacitated from work from November 7, 1973, to March 6, 1975, because of these problems.

The Claimant testified that all but $6.00 of her medical expenses were paid by the Illinois Department of Public Aid. In addition, she incurred $50.00 in baby sitting expenses rendered to her children and $6.00 in taxi fares going to and from the hospital for medical treatment.

She sees her doctor approximately three times each month and is still seeing her physician for headaches and pains in her side as a result of the violent crime inflicted upon her. She was employed by Mrs. Tronshaw as a baby sitter (in her own home) and had been earning $10.00 per week in this capacity.

Section 4 of the Act provides as follows:

Pecuniary loss to an applicant under this Act resulting from injury or death to a victim includes, in the case of iiyury, appropriate medical expenses or hospital expenses, loss of earnings, loss of future earnings because of a disability resulting from the injury, and other expenses for treatment by Christian Science Practitioners and nursing care appropriate thereto . . . Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month whichever is less . . .

Although in some cases, such as an emergency requiring an ambulance, transportation to a place for medical treatment could be considered a medical expense, there is no proof in the record here that taxi fares were required medically for transportation to and from the hospital, and therefore the Court finds that reimbursement for taxi fares are not compensable in this case.

It is clear that the Act makes no reference to expenses incurred by victims of crime other than medical, hospital and lost earnings. Baby-sitting charges incurred cannot in any way be considered as a part of any of these three categories. Therefore, this Court finds that baby sitting charges necessarily incurred by reason of a victim’s incapacitation are not compensable under the Act.

As to the Claimant’s own lost earnings, there is no question that they are compensable under the Act, and although the length of time of incapacitation in this case seems unusual, this Court will not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the attending physician and therefore finds that the Claimant lost 19 months of work at the rate of $43.33 per month or a total lost earnings of $823.27.

As to the issue of possible future plastic surgery, her plastic surgeon, Dr. J. Vickers Brown, indicated that "Ms. Spencer was advised that surgical correction will not lead to significant improvement of her scars. Revisional surgery is not advised in this case.”

Inasmuch as her doctor advises no surgery is required, there is, of course, no compensation to be paid in this regard.

Accordingly, the Court finds as follows:

(1) That the Claimant was a victim of a violent crime as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: "Battery”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Chapter 38, §12-4).

(2) That there was no evidence of any wrongful act or substantial provocation by the Claimant for the attack upon her.

(3) That there is no evidence that the victim and her assailants were related or sharing the same household.

(4) That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and the Claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

(5) That the Claimant has received benefits from the Illinois Department of Public Aid which covered all but $6.00 of her medical and hospital expenses.

(6) That the Claimant sustained loss of earnings in the amount of $823.27 which together with her unreimbursed medical expenses gives a total compensable loss to the Claimant in the amount of $829.27.

(7) That the Claimant has not received any other insurance or disability benefits as a result of her injury.

(8) That in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Section 7(d) of the Act states that this Court:

(d) ... shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the Workmans Compensation Act or from local governmental, state or federal funds or from any other source. . . .

That the statutory deduction of $200.00 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the Claimant, in the amount of $629.27.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $629.27 be awarded to the Claimant, Karen L. Spencer, in the amount of $629.27.


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    (No. 75-CV-28
    In Re Application of Rose Steinhauf.

      Opinion filed January 12, 1976.

    Rose Steinhauf, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Paul West, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on May 12, 1974, at the subway stairs at 190 North State Street, Chicago. The Claimant seeks compensation under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Section 70, 71, et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the "Act”).

The sole issue presented to the Court is whether the Claimant was the victim of a violent crime as defined in the Act. The Court entered an order on June 12, 1975, dismissing this claim and the Claimant moved the Court for a hearing in accordance with Section 9 of the Act and said hearing was granted.

The Claimant testified that on May 12, 1974, she was employed at Marina City as a waitress. She left her place of employment at about 9:30 p.m. or 9:45 p.m. and walked to the intersection of State and Lake with the subway entrance at 190 North State and arrived there approximately 10 o’clock p.m. It was fairly crowded on the subway steps and subway entrance area at that time.

While descending the steps leading to the subway the Claimant felt a push in her back. The push was a strong one and felt as if it were done by a fist. Claimant fell down the stairs to the bottom and was rendered unconscious and next remembers waking up in the emergency room of a hospital. The police report indicates that they received a call regarding the incident at 10:33 p.m. on that date.

The Claimant suffered a fractured arm and scarring about her body as a result of the incident.

The Claimant testified that at the time she descended the subway stairs she had money in her purse and a watch, both of which she discovered missing after a few days in the hospital. She reported the missing items to the police but the police did not follow through with any further investigation.

In order for a person to qualify for compensation under the Act, that person must have been killed or injured as a result of a crime of violence perpetrated or attempted against him. An accidental fall down the subway stairs would, of course, not qualify.

A Claimant has the burden of proof in establishing that he or she was the victim of a violent crime. In this case, it is the Court’s opinion that the Claimant failed to meet that burden.

The testimony of the Claimant was totally unsubstantiated by any evidence of a willful assault or battery by an assailant which caused her to fall down the stairs.

There is no way that the Claimant herself can be sure that the pressure upon her back was wilfully administered by an assailant. While this Court has no doubt that the Claimant testified truthfully, the Court cannot assume a willful attempt to push her down the stairs without evidence.

The fact that she discovered some days later that her money and watch were missing does not supply the absent corroboration. The Claimant lay unconscious at the bottom of the stairs of a public subway entrance for a period of time, at least one-half hour. She was taken unconscious to a hospital where she was attended to by various hospital aides. There was adequate time and opportunity for someone other than the party who Claimant maintains pushed her to have taken her possessions. Thus the lost money and watch do not necessarily mean that the Claimant was robbed by an assailant.

While the Court understands that proof of a violent crime can be difficult under the circumstances where the alleged victim did not see the assailant, this Court must base its decision on evidence. In this case it is just as likely that the Claimant’s injuries were caused by accidental means as by a violent crime.

Therefore, this Court finds that the Claimant was not a victim of a crime as defined in Section 2(c) of the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act. Accordingly, this claim is hereby dismissed.


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    (No. 75-CV-29
    In Re Application of Pearl Nails.

      Opinion filed April 5, 1976.

    Aldus S. Mitchell, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Peggy Bastas, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on April 6, 1974, at 2046 Dewey, Evanston. Jeffrey Lewis, Garry Lewis and Lance Lewis, by Pearl Nails, their mother and next friend, seek compensation for loss of support pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

Evidence was taken by the Court at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this Court.

The facts were that the deceased victim, Jesse E. Lewis, was playing poker with others at the home of Billie Bradford, 2046 Dewey, Evanston. The game was a weekly game for money. The stakes are unknown.

The evidence was that at this poker game the deceased victim "checked” on a hand to which the assailant, J.B. Boyd, objected as being against the rules of the game. The victim agreed after an argument that his action was against the rules and acceded to the demands of the assailant. Nevertheless, the assailant pulled a gun and shot the victim who was dead on arrival at Evanston Hospital.

The assailant was charged with and found guilty of murder and sentenced to the penitentiary.

This Court need not comment on the various issues raised by the parties as to the pecuniary losses sustained inasmuch as we find that this claim does not qualify for compensation under the Act.

Section 3(f) of the Act states that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if:

(f) the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to his wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant; . . .

Gambling is a crime in the State of Illinois under the provisions of Chapter 38, Section 28.1 of the Illinois Revised Statutes.

This Court has already decided in the case of In Re Application of Effie Hardy, 76-CV-2, that where a victim was killed as a result of arguments during gambling, such a victim substantially contributed through his illegal acts to his own death.

This Court in the Hardy case said:

Although this court can not ignore this brutal killing, neither can it ignore the evidence before it as to the circumstances leading to it. The Act under which this claim is made is intended to compensate for injuries or death to victims who were innocent of any contribution to their own injury or death. The victim in this case, placed himself in a situation, through his illegal activities, where further illegal activities would be the probable result. Surely, the victim did not expect to be murdered, but just as surely he did place himself in a situation where he can not be considered an innocent victim.

This reasoning is wholly applicable to the case before us.

The Claimant in the case before us argues that, because the victim acceded to the objections of the assailant, the victim did not provoke his assailant within the meaning of the Act. We can not agree. The victim in this case, by engaging in an illegal activity, substantially contributed to his own death for the purposes of the Act.

Therefore the Court finds that compensation is not authorized under the Act and the claim is hereby dismissed.


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    (No. 75-CV-40
    In Re Application of Betty L. Lohr.

      Opinion filed August 22, 1975.

    Richard C. Moenning, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

Claimant seeks compensation for alleged loss of earnings, insurance premiums paid, and attorneys fees expended. She has submitted her claim pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., (1973) Ch. 70, §70, 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The Claimant, Betty L. Lohr, was the only witness presented. She testified that, during the period from February 8, 1974, through March 8, 1974, she was employed as a teacher at Harrison High School, 2840 West 24th Street in Chicago; and that ten incidents occurred during that period which caused her to lose wages, pay insurance premiums, and incur attorneys fees.

The 10 incidents to which she testified can be broken down into two categories: assaults and threats.

1. Assaults by students on the Claimant which necessitated medical attention. There were three such assaults, described as follows:

(a) On February 26,1974, a student, Russell Bolar, pushed her several time causing a "capsule” injury to her left middle finger. The finger remained stiff and painful for several months thereafter, and at the time of the hearing was still slightly stiff. The bandaged finger is shown in Claimant’s photo exhibit #1.

(b) On March 5, 1974, a student at the school, Rodney Lester, closed his locker door upon Claimant’s right leg, bruising her leg.

(c) On March 6, 1974, she bruised her left arm while being pushed by a student, Maria Carillo. The bandaged arm is also shown on Claimant’s exhibit #1. Claimant saw Dr. T. S. Wright for these injuries and made six visits to the doctor for all of the above injuries. Her medical bills were all paid by the Chicago Board of Education.

2. Seven incidents of threats against the life of the Claimant were made orally and in writing. The written threat consisted of a drawing of the Claimant with a skull and cross bones.

All of the above incidents were reported by the Claimant to the security personnel at her school, to her principal, and to the police. She cooperated with the police, and in two instances testified against the assailants in the Juvenile Court.

In some of the incidents no action was taken, nor were proper reports filed by the principal of the school. In some incidents the security personnel of the school failed to come to the Claimant’s aid.

As a result of the assaults and threats, Claimant became greatly fearful of returning to work at that school. For this reason she refused to return to work commencing on March 8, 1974.

Claimant wrote a letter of complaint to Mayor Richard J. Daley and requested an emergency transfer to a different school. The request for an emergency transfer was turned down by the Board of Education on March 26, 1974. On May 15, 1974, an Appeal Hearing was held at the Board of Education. At that hearing the Claimant presented a written statement containing essentially the same incidents to which she testified at the hearing before this Court.

On July 25, 1974, Claimant was notified by the Board of Education that her appeal for transfer was granted, and she was reassigned to a different school on July 30, 1974.

On both direct and cross examination, the Claimant admitted that her physical injuries did not prevent her from going to work, but that it was her apparently well-founded fear of future assaults combined with a lack of security at the school which caused her to voluntarily refuse to return to work. During the time between March 8,1974, and until she was reassigned she sought no other employment.

The Claimant claims loss of earnings for 99 days [from March 8, 1974 to June 15,1974], at a monthly rate of $880.00; plus $132.50 in Blue Cross insurance premiums paid by her which would normally have been paid by her employer; plus attorneys fees of $571.60 for lawyers she was obliged to retain in endeavoring to obtain a transfer.

No medical testimony or medical reports were offered by the Claimant. The Respondent introduced no evidence. The sole issue is a question of law requiring a judicial interpretation of the Act.

Claimant asks this Court to declare, as a matter of law, that a well-founded fear of assault, based on previous assaults and threats, is an "injury” as contemplated by the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

The Claimant contends that the word "injured” under the definition of victim in §2(c) of the Act, and the word "injury” as used in §4, do not preclude psychological injury or mental or nervous shock. Whether those words are limited to physical injury alone need not be decided in this case since the Claimant introduced no evidence of mental or nervous shock. Her claim for loss of earnings, due to her self-imposed absence from work, was based solely on her fear of future assaults.

As authority for her contention, Claimant cites an article in 1973 Ill. Law Forum, Volume 1, entitled "Scope of Programs for Governmental Payment for Crime Compensation”, in which other jurisdictions have allowed compensation for a shopkeeper who closed his shop for fear of assault, a fear based on a past assault, and other such examples referred to in the article. A reading of the article indicates that the cases cited were English cases, based on statutes in England much wider in scope than the Illinois Act, and are therefore not applicable to the case at bar.

This Court is required to carry out the true intent and meaning of the General Assembly as expressed in the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act. We find nothing in the Act that authorizes payment for loss of earnings due to fear. It is readily apparent that a different interpretation would open the State treasury to a plethora of claims for lost earnings by persons afraid to work in high crime areas. If that had been the legislature’s intent, it would have been specifically stated in the Act.

The Court, therefore, finds that no compensation in this claim is authorized under the Act. Accordingly, this matter is closed.