author: Burke, J.

text:
    (No. 88-CC-0374
    James Schrup, Sr., Claimant, v. Southern Illinois University, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 22, 1990.

    Metnick & Barewin (Robert Barewin, of counsel), for Claimant.

      Southern Illinois University Legal Clinic (Shari Rhode, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Burke, J.

Claimant’s complaint arose from an incident on August 16, 1985. On that date Claimant pushed on a window causing it to shatter in an attempt to exit what he believed to be a door located in Schneider Hall on the campus of Southern Illinois University.

The case proceeded to trial on January 25, 1989. The evidence consisted of testimony, documents and photographs. Both parties have filed briefs. A motion for directed finding was made by Respondent at the close of Claimant’s evidence and was taken with the case. Respondent’s motion for directed finding is denied.

At the time of the incident in question, Claimant, James Schrup, Sr., was a 55-year-old stockbroker who drove his son to school at Southern Illinois University from Rock Island, Illinois. Claimant’s son was a student at the University residing at Schneider Hall. The Claimant was in Schneider Hall approximately one year prior to the occurrence, but entered through another entrance. On the day of the occurrence, Claimant’s son went into Schneider Hall to obtain a key and room assignment. After waiting some time, Claimant entered the residence hall to locate his son. He took the elevator to the fifth floor, found his son and decided to unload the car. Claimant followed his son through a steel door and down a stairwell because a long queue was at the elevator. His son walked a distance ahead of him.

Claimant went down to the first floor and observed a steel door. He opened the door and saw what he believed to be a door exiting outside. However, the door was actually a window. There were no signs on the window. He saw an exit sign, a bar across the window that he perceived to be a door handle and stairs which he thought led away from the door. Claimant pushed hard with his left hand on what he believed was a door and the glass shattered causing a loud noise. Claimant fell to the ground on his back. He was taken to Carbondale Hospital by ambulance. Claimant sustained cuts on his forehead and left hand. He received stitches in his left index and ring fingers and was given a splint for his fingers which were heavily bandaged. He spent the night at a motel and the next morning drove one-handed 360 miles home. Upon returning home, Claimant had swelling in his hand and severe pain. He went to the Moline Public Hospital because of pain and new bleeding. He was treated and released. Claimant also took pain pills.

At the time of the hearing, a Uz-inch scar existed from the first joint of the ring finger to the back of Claimant’s hand and there was also a M-inch scar on the bottom of his index finger. The injury to his forehead was treated by a flapper band-aid and left no scar.

Claimant seeks damages of $10,000 for pain, suffering and lost wages. At the time of the accident, he was a stockbroker, and worked five days a week, nine to five on straight commission. He received a percentage of each sales charge which varied on each sale. Claimant earned his income by calling clients to solicit purchases of stocks, bonds and other investments. In 90% of his sales, he would initiate the call and recommend the purchase. He called 40 to 60 people a day. His gross commissions were approximately $4,300 less in August of 1985 than July of 1985. Of the $4,300, he would receive 40% to 42% commissions. His income for September 1985 was $5,000 more than August 1985.

After the August 1985 incident, Claimant did not go into the office as he had previously done. He worked only 1/2 hours per day. It was difficult to work because of pain and he was unable to work the phone or quote machine with his left hand. The pain lasted two weeks as did his loss of work time. Claimant’s lost wages were approximately $860. Claimant testified that his hand was no longer painful, but was a little tight when he bends his finger.

Claimant admitted than an 18-inch radiator or convection grate was in front of the window that he walked through, but did not remember seeing it at the time of the incident. The Claimant’s son corroborated Claimant’s testimony as to the occurrence.

The son further stated that on the ground floor of the stairwell there is a heavy metal fire door leading outside; however, the door his father opened led into an inside hallway. The exit to the outside is down the hall and away from the window Claimant attempted to walk through and is located in the center of the building. The sidewalk that is visible through the window actually leads to the fire door. Claimant’s son recalled the convection or radiator cover in front of the window in question as being in place prior to the incident. The grate of the radiator went across the entire window and was about 10 inches off the ground.

Donald M. Ballestro, assistant director of housing at SIU since 1965, testified to the following:

1. That Schneider Hall was opened in 1968.

2. The heating cover in front of the window in question was 11 inches in width and seven to nine inches off the floor and went wall-to-wall.

3. The original window in question had an aluminum bar several inches wide that ran the width of the window.

4. Since Schneider Hall has been in existence, he was never made aware of anyone walking through or into a window as Claimant.

5. He never heard of anyone walking through similar windows in similar halls at SIU.

6. That he would be advised of such an occurrence. Small windows in residence halls could have been broken without his knowledge, but he would have been advised of major breakage.

7. The exit sign by the door had no direction arrows.

The State is not an insurer against accidents occurring to invitees. The State has a duty to exercise reasonable care to invitees. (Lyons v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 192.) The State has an obligation to use reasonable care and caution to keep its premises reasonably safe for the use of invitees, but such persons assume the normal, obvious or ordinary risks attendant on the use of the premises. (Thornburg v. Northern Illinois University (1986), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 139.) The State’s duty extends to invitees to use reasonable and ordinary care against known or foreseeable damages. Stewart v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 200.

To show negligence, the Claimant must prove that the State was negligent in its maintenance of the building, in that it had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition. (Samuelson v. State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 257; Noonen v. State (1983), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 200; Nolan v. State (1983), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 194.) Claimant has failed to show a dangerous condition of which the State had knowledge or should have had knowledge. Illinois law has consistently held that the State is not liable unless it has actual or constructive notice of the defect that caused the injury. (Sewell v. Southern Illinois University (1979), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 430.) In the instant case, there is no evidence that the State had actual or constructive knowledge or notice that the window could appear to be a door to Claimant and such window would be pushed hard, shatter and injure him. (Crile v. State (1984), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 176.) Claimant failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence. Claimant did not prove that the State was negligent, and had actual or constructive notice of a defective condition. Claimant’s claim is denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Dillard, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 88-CC-0665
    Eddie Lee Flowers, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 11, 1989.

    Eddie Lee Flowers, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Greg Riddle and Carol Barlow, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Dillard, J.

This cause comes on to be heard following a Commissioner’s report. Claimant, a prisoner in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, filed his complaint in the Court of Claims seeking $400 for the loss of a gold chain. The cause was tried before the Commissioner. The evidence consists of the departmental report and the transcript of trial in two volumes. Neither the Claimant nor the Respondent filed a brief.

The Facts

Claimant seeks $400 for a $221 gold chain he alleges was sent to him in prison on September 9, 1986, by his wife, and for his legal work, paper, xeroxing, and “agitation.” Mr. Flowers testified that his wife sent him an insured gold chain by mail. According to the Claimant, the postal service advised him that the prison chaplain had received the gold chain. Allegedly, the prison chaplain told Claimant that the gold was not “important” and he could “wait.” After four or five months, Claimant was advised by prison authorities that they had received no gold chain sent to Claimant. According to Claimant, a tracer indicated the package was received at the prison institution by Chaplain Henderson who subsequently was fired. Claimant had attached to his complaint a copy of a jeweler’s receipt for a $117.50 chain and a postal receipt indicating insurance coverage on a package sent to the Menard Correctional Center on September 16, 1986, for $150.

Claimant presented no tracer and no other documentation that the gold chain was received at the State institution. The only evidence was his own hearsay testimony. Flowers said he had lost a piece of paper from the postmaster for Menard, Illinois, indicating the gold chain was delivered to the prison mailroom. Claimant further testified that he sought $400 because that was the original price of the chain but his wife got a 40% to 60% discount. Claimant alleged the gold chain was sent, received by the institution, and then stolen.

The Commissioner continued the hearing to give Claimant time to obtain documentation as to receipt by the institution of the gold chain from the postal authorities, his wife, or any other source. At the continued hearing, the Claimant presented no new documentation or a postal tracer to support his claim. The State indicated that they had learned that on September 19, 1986, the prison did receive a letter for Inmate Flowers but there was no record as to what it contained.

Finally, Claimant testified at the second hearing that he really had purchased two items of jewelry, a chain and a medallion that cost $160.53 in total. One chain was purchased at “Zayles” in November of 1985, and the medallion at “Carson’s” on September 10,1986. However, the cancellation marked postal receipt attached to Claimant’s complaint was stamped “Champaign, Illinois,” November, 1986, well after the September 16, 1986, date of claimed loss. It was further brought out that in Claimant’s grievance to the prison authorities, he only claimed the loss of a chain and not the loss of a medallion. Claimant testified that under Department of Corrections rules, every chain must have a medallion or it would be sent back.

The Law

The court has held in Doubling v. State (1976), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1, that the State has a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard and return an inmate’s property when it takes actual physical possession of such property or when the institution receipts for such property. (Lewis v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 254.) Such actual physical possession creates a bailment. The loss of bailed property while in the possession of a bailee raises a presumption of negligence which the bailee must rebut by evidence of due care. (Catenacci v. State (1978), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 669.) However, this Court has repeatedly held that before a recovery can be made by an inmate, it must be shown by positive proof that Claimant’s property was in the exclusive possession of the Respondent. Talley v. State (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 828.

As in Talley, a similar lost-mail case, Claimant unfortunately herein has failed to present positive proof that his property was in the exclusive possession of the State. The Claimant was given chances at two separate hearings to present proof of the tracer to show just what property the U.S. Postal Service delivered to the prison on September 16, 1986, and who signed for it. This he did not do even though the Commissioner admonished Claimant to do so. The only proof was the Claimant’s own hearsay statements. With the inconsistencies as to the claim for a chain and then also a medallion, and the November 1986 stamp on the postal receipt, Claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof.

Therefore, it is ordered that this claim be denied.


author: Raucci, J.

text:
    (Nos. 88-CC-3791, 88-CC-3792
    State Employees’ Retirement System, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 12, 1990.

    Winston & Strawn (Stephen S. Morrill, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Terence J. Corrigan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

Claimant State Employees’ Retirement System (SERS) filed two claims and motions for summary judgment. We herewith consolidate these cases and render our judgment.

SERS filed complaints against the Department of Labor (88-CC-3792) which will sometimes be referred to as the “rate case” and the Department of Financial Institutions (88-CC-3791) hereinafter sometimes referred to as the “amount case.” Contemporaneously, SERS filed motions for summary judgment in each case. Briefs have been filed by the parties and oral argument was held. Because we find that there are no factual issues, we treat the Respondent’s brief in opposition in the two cases as countermotions for summary judgment, and decide these cases on the opposing motions for summary judgment.

In 1985, SERS, pursuant to the Illinois Pension Code (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1088, pars. 14 — 135,14—135.08), established a 7.532% retirement contribution rate for State agencies employing its members during Fiscal Year 1986. The rate represented the determination of the SERS Board that 7.532% of the State payroll was necessary for SERS to meet its obligations in Fiscal Year 1986. 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 1088, pars. 14 — 131, 14— 132.

In making appropriations for Fiscal Year 1986, the General Assembly, by line appropriation, appropriated an amount equal to 5.6% of the amounts appropriated for anticipated personal services expenditures for each State agency. It is not disputed that the General Assembly did not expressly state that the retirement contribution rate was 5.6% for retirement purposes, but in debate on various appropriation bills the rate was stated as 5.6%.

Pursuant to transfer authority, the Department of Labor (rate case) transferred funds into its personal services line. It did not transfer an amount equal to 5.6% (or any amount) to cover retirement. If it had done so, the amount of $2,377.47 would have been available to pay SERS.

The Department of Financial Institutions (amount case) did not expend all of its personal services line or all of its retirement line. Applying the rate of 5.6%, the Department of Financial Institutions withheld the amount of $3,297.57.

SERS seeks in these cases to have us hold that they are entitled either to an amount equal to the rate, an amount equal to the total retirement line, or both. Taking a contrary position, the Respondent urges that SERS is not entitled to the rate since the appropriation does not specify a rate but an amount and is not entitled to the amount since the personal services were not rendered and not subject to the rate intended by the General Assembly.

We conclude that the Respondent’s view is correct. Our holding is footed upon our analysis of the appropriations process of the General Assembly. As stated previously, the debates established the intent of the General Assembly to appropriate retirement funds in the amount equal to 5.6% of expenditures for personal services (salaries). We also believe it was the legislative intent that if those salary lines were not totally expended that the retirement lines not be expended in excess of 5.6% of the expended personal services lines.

The State Finance Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 149.2) provides for the transfer of funds into the personal services line. It does not require either a “rate” or “amount” transfer for retirement purposes.

We conclude that the General Assembly intended that the rate not exceed 5.6%; the amount not exceed the amount appropriated; and by not requiring in section 13.2 of the State Finance Act a corresponding transfer to retirement lines of an amount equal to the rate to cover the additional personal services amount transferred, that no funds be paid to SERS for such transferred funds. 111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 149.2.

We would, however, respectfully recommend that the General Assembly consider passage of legislation that expressly states its intent so that SERS, agencies and ourselves could implement that intent.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that

1. Claimant’s motions for summary judgment are denied.

2. Respondent’s crossmotions for summary judgments are granted.

3. Claimant’s claims are denied and forever barred.


author: Sommer, J.

text:
    (No. 88-CC-4548
    Raj Gupta, M.D., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 24, 1990.

    Raj Gupta, M.D., pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Steven Schmall, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Sommer, J.

Dr. Gupta, a physician, filed this action on June 22, 1988, as a lapsed-appropriation claim in which he names the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as responding agency. He is seeking payment for medical services which he had rendered during the period December 1 through 8,1986, to a child who was then a foster-care ward of DCFS. Respondent has moved to dismiss the claim pursuant to Section 790.90 of the Court of Claims Rules (74 111. Adm. Code 790.90), subsections (1) and (5) of section 2 — 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2 — 619(1), (5)), section 22(b) of the Court of Claims Act (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22(b)), and section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 13). Respondent contends that, as Claimant Gupta’s patient was a recipient under the Medical Assistance Program (MAP) administered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) when these services were rendered, and as IDPA has sole vendor payment responsibility for recipients’ medical care, the validity of this claim must be assessed against vendor-payment requirements, e.g., those recognized in Canlas v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 150, and Krakora v. State (1987), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 233. Respondent cites, in this instance, Claimant’s failure to commence this action within the limitation period prescribed by the above-referenced statutes.

Claimant having received due notice of Respondent’s motion, the Court makes the following findings.

In its report herein, IDPA describes the unique situation of foster-care children within the overall class of those individuals who receive Aid To Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) assistance. The basic needs of children in foster care (AFDC-F) and certain special needs of children receiving adoption assistance are provided by DCFS, in accordance with applicable State law and with Title IV-E of the Federal Social Security Act (sections 670 et seq., of Title 42, U.S.C.). The medical needs of AFDC-F and adoption-assistance children are, however, paid for by IDPA under its Medical Assistance Program (MAP), in the same manner that such care is provided, under Article V of the Public Aid Code, to other AFDC children. See sections 118, 222, and 308, part 435, 42 C.F.R.; and see IDPA Rules 112.306, 120.324 (89 111. Adm. Code 112.306, 120.324), and DCFS Rules 302.360, 359.9 (89 111. Adm. Code 302.360, 359.9).

In this case, Claimant’s AFDC-F patient had been “removed from the home of the parent * * *, placed under the guardianship of [DCFS] * # and under such guardianship, placed in a foster family home” (section 4 — 1.2 of the Public Aid Code), and had thereby become qualified for AFDC recipient status under IDPA’s MAP, prior to Claimant’s rendition of the subject services. Throughout the child’s foster-care placement (May 1985 through November 1987), IDPA had issued its medical eligibility cards to her foster parent, thereby enabling that parent to identify the child’s AFDC-F (or “category 98”) eligibility status to vendors such as Claimant, from whom medical care for the child might be required. See Topics 130 and 131 of the MAP Handbook For Physicians and other MAP handbooks which IDPA issues to all MAP-participating vendors. In that IDPA, not DCFS, administers the Medical Assistance Program to which Claimant was obliged to invoice his charges for the subject services, and only IDPA possessed the funds appropriated for payment of Claimant’s services, the statutory authority and payment mechanism to effect such payment, Claimant should appropriately have named IDPA as responding agency in this matter.

IDPA reports that the hospital in which this AFDC-F child was a patient had timely invoiced its charges for care during this inpatient stay (Nov. 21 through Dec. 9, 1986), and had been paid by the Department on January 8, 1987. Invoices were also timely received from four other physicians involved in the child’s treatment during this stay, and all MAP-covered services charged in those invoices had also been paid by IDPA, during the period January 8 through March 4, 1987. Each of said medical vendors’ invoices had accurately identified the child whom they had treated, by listing the recipient identification number, or “RIN,” which IDPA had assigned to the child.

Respondent also contends that Claimant’s cause of action had already been barred by the time limitation imposed by section 22(b) of the Court of Claims Act and section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code. We agree. The record in this case shows that Dr. Gupta invoiced his charges for the subject services to IDPA on December 23, 1986; that his DPA-form 2360 invoice listed an incorrect recipient identification number, or “RIN.” By voucher-response dated January 16,1987, IDPA notified Claimant that it was refusing to pay the invoiced service charges, because the “Recipient (as misidentified by the incorrect RIN listed on the invoice), was Not Eligible on Date(s) Of Service.” A vendor’s invoice to IDPA, charging for services to a named patient, must correctly list the RIN which has been assigned to that patient. See Rock Island Franciscan Hospital v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 100; Simon v. State (1987), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 246, 249; Mercy Hospital and Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 269, and prior decisions therein cited; Franciscan Medical Center v. State (1988), 84 CC 118; and Riverside Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 274, 275.

Claimant does not allege that he rebilled these services, with a corrected RIN, to IDPA, within the one-year period prescribed by IDPA Rule 140.20 (89 111. Adm. Code 140.20). Instead, he filed this Court action on June 22, 1988, more than one year following IDPA’s notice of payment refusal. By that time, his cause of action in respect to these services had already been barred, as provided by the above-referenced statutes.

It is therefore hereby ordered that Respondent’s motion to dismiss Dr. Gupta’s complaint and underlying cause, on the grounds addressed above in this opinion, is hereby granted; and this claim is dismissed.


author: Raucci, J. Raucci, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CC-0764
    William R. Hazard, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed November 30, 1989.

      Order on petition for rehearing filed May 9, 1990.

    Caldwell, Berner & Caldwell (Jeffrey A. Rouhandeh, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Arla Rosenthal, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of Respondent to dismiss the claim herein, due notice having been given the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises:

The court finds that the Claimant is seeking recovery for a breach of an oral agreement between Claimant, William Hazard, and the Illinois State Board of Education. On or about the first week of February 1, 1986, McHenry County Region Reorganization Committee, through its agent, Dixie O’Hara, Regional Superintendent of Schools, solicited a proposal from the Claimant to conduct research concerning two reorganization studies of certain school districts in McHenry County. Claimant agreed to perform said studies and submitted a proposal on March 6,1986, to Dixie O’Hara. On March 6, 1986, McHenry County Reorganization Committee through its agent Dixie O’Hara instructed Claimant to begin work on said reorganization studies.

McHenry County Reorganization Committee is not a part of the Illinois State Board of Education. McHenry County Reorganization Committee was created by section 3 of the 1985 School District Reorganization Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 1502 — 3), and charged with the responsibility of developing a plan to reorganize the McHenry County Region’s school districts. Each educational service region had the responsibility of creating a reorganization committee and therefore the McHenry County Region Reorganization Committee is the agent for McHenry Educational Service Region as stated in section 3(a). “Within 60 days of the effective date of this act, each educational service region of the State with a population of 1,000,000 or fewer inhabitants shall create a committee for the reorganization of school districts consisting of not less than 7 public members and the regional superintendent of schools.” 111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 1502 — 3a.

There is a regional board of school trustees for that territory in each educational service region exclusive of any school district organized under Article 34 and exclusive of any school district whose school board has been given the powers of school trustees. (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 6 — 2.) Since McHenry County Reorganization Committee was created by McHenry Educational Service Region it is therefore its agent. (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 1502 — 3.) McHenry Educational Service Region is managed by the regional board of school trustees, a body politic which has the perpetual existence to sue or be sued. 111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 6 — 2.

McHenry County Reorganization Committee contracted with Claimant to pay him for his services when he completed his research. The State Board of Education or the State of Illinois is not a party to the contract between McHenry County Reorganization Committee and the Claimant. Claimant’s contract action, if any, is against the Regional Board of School Trustees of McHenry County, Illinois, since it is the body politic which governs the educational service region and has the power to. sue or be sued.

The Illinois School Board of Education is designated as the State Committee which generally sets up rules that the Reorganization Committee must follow and also distributes funds to the local committees to offset the costs of reorganization studies. (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 122, par. 1502 — 5.) The McHenry County Region Reorganization Committee had the authority to use the money allocated from the State for committee member expenses, stenographic expenses, as well as other reasonable expenses incurred by the reorganization committees. (23 111. Adm. Code Subtitle A, 550.300(b)(1).) The State committee has no principal-agent relationship with the negotiations between a reorganization committee and a third party who contracted to provide services to the reorganization committee in order to complete its own study. There is also no principal-agent relationship between the State of Illinois and the reorganization committee or the State of Illinois and McHenry Educational Service Region.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the claim of the Claimant is dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on Claimant’s petition for rehearing, it is ordered that the petition for rehearing is denied.


text:
    (No. 89-CC-0884
    University of Chicago Professional Services Offices, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1990.

    Burton A. Brown, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Steven Schmall, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Sommer, J.

This vendor-payment action identifies Claimant as University of Chicago Professional Services Offices, apparently a physician group practice, and Department of Public Aid (IDPA) as responding agency. The claim seeks payment of medical services rendered to patient Waicosky, an IDPA recipient, during the period October 23 through November 20, 1986. The complaint lists the patient’s name and IDPA-assigned recipient ID number (RIN); however, there is no verifiable allegation that Claimant’s physicians’ charges for any of the subject services had been invoiced to IDPA for payment.

No Disclosure of Proper Claimant

IDPA’s department report challenges Claimant group practice’s standing to bring this action, and Claimant’s failure adequately to identify the physician or physicians who actually rendered the services here at issue. Enrollment as a participant in IDPA’s Medical Assistance Program {MAP) is a condition precedent to a physician’s right to claim payment for services rendered to IDPA recipients. (Canlas v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 150; Krakora v. State (1987), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 233; Simon v. State (1987), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 246.) As IDPA permits enroUment only of individual physicians, not their group practices, and as ownership of the right to receive a vendor payment ordinarily may not be assigned (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 3; Atherton v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 387), only the physician or physicians who rendered the subject services would have standing to be Claimants in this action. Pinckneyville Medical Group v. State (1988), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 176.

As the complaint fails to identify the actual vendor^) of these services, IDPA is unable to investigate each vendor’s MAP-enrollment status as of the dates on which the services were rendered; nor can it determine whether any of such vendors’ specific services may previously have been invoiced and paid.

No Allegations of Previous Claim Presentation and of Responding IDPA Action

A second deficiency concerns the absence of any verifiable allegation that charges for these services had been invoiced to IDPA, prior to Claimant’s filing of this Court action. Although Claimant’s medical vendor-form complaint alleges that

“ o o o tjje amounts invoiced to the Department for such services, the dates and sequence of Claimant’s invoices to the Department, and the actions of the Department in response to those invoices (and the dates of such actions)”

were as itemized in its attached bill of particulars, neither the bill of particulars nor any of the complaint exhibits identify specific DPA-form invoices, containing charges for specifically identified medical procedures or other services as rendered by specifically identified vendors. According to IDPA’s report, the prescribed IDPA invoice form and related MAP Handbook For Physicians instructions require that the physician identify each procedure or service performed by the date thereof and by specific numerical procedure code (see Simon, at 248; Methodist Medical Center v. State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 208, 210; Memorial Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 73, 75), and that the invoice identify the physician who performed the procedure. The complaint here fails to supply any IDPA invoice form or any other description of the medical procedures for which payment is sought.

Our requirement in section 790.50(a)(3), (a)(9) of the Court of Claims Rules (74 111. Adm. Code 790.50(a)(3), (a)(9)), and section 11 of the Court of Claims Act (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.11), that Claimants plead, fully and in detail, both their prior presentations of claims to a State department and the department’s responding actions, is especially appropriate when applied to complaints filed pursuant to section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code by vendors of medical services and goods furnished to recipients of public aid. (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 13.) United Cab Driveurself, Inc. v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 91; Barnes Hospital v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 434; Rock Island Franciscan Hospital v. State (1982), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 377; Convalescent Home of the First Church of Deliverance v. State (1988), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 39.) A vendor’s obligation specifically to plead its prior invoices submitted to IDPA, and the Department’s voucher-responses, is directly related to the requirement, in IDPA Rule 140.20 (89 111. Adm. Code 140.20), that such invoices be timely submitted to and received by IDPA.

The significance of IDPA Rule 140.20 is that it obligates medical vendors to present their service charges to the Department in a prescribed manner and within a prescribed time, if a vendor expects to be paid by the State for services rendered to IDPA recipients. As noted here in the Department’s report, IDPA staff typically receive no advance notice, from either vendor or patient, that specific medical services are to be performed or have been performed other than the vendor’s charges for services as presented to IDPA on IDPA invoice forms. The use of such forms is mandated by subsections (a) and (b) of the Rule. The requirements for completion of these forms, and the provisions of Rule 140.20 itself, are contained in IDPA’s MAP Handbook, a copy of which has been issued to each vendor upon enrolling as a MAP-participant. Accordingly, each participating vendor has received notice that only IDPA-form invoices are to be used in presenting charges for such services, that services are to be identified, and the invoice-forms completed and certified in accordance with Handbook instructions, and that properly completed invoices must be received by IDPA within the time prescribed in Rule 140.20, in order for the State to have any liability for payment.

In a series of decisions, this Court has given recognition to IDPA’s regulatory requirement that vendors’ initial invoices, charging for goods and services supplied to recipients, must be received by the Department within six months following the date services were rendered or goods supplied, in order for Respondent to be liable for paying such charges. Weissman v. State (1977), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 506; Rush Anesthesiology Group v. State (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 851; St. Joseph’s Hospital v. State (1984), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 340; St. Anthony Hospital v. State (1984), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 342; Mercy Hospital v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 389; Mercy Hospital v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 388; Bethesda Hospital v. State (1986), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 299; Louis A. Weiss Memorial Hospital v. State (1986), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 299; Riverside Medical Center v. State (1986), no. 84-CC-1671; St. Bernard Hospital v. State (1986), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 300; Rock Island Franciscan Hospital v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 100; Canlas, Krakora, Simon and Pinckneyville Medical Group, all cited above; and Passavant Area Hospital v. State (1988), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 222. We have also considered exceptions to the six month invoicing deadline, available in certain circumstances under subsection (c) of IDPA Rule 140.20. Rock Island Franciscan Hospital v. State (1984), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 343; Franciscan Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 274; Riverside Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 275; Pilapil v. State (1988), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 217; Pilapil v. State (1988), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 223; and Treister & Wilcox v. State (1989), no. 85-CC-2097.

IDPA further reports that five physicians had submitted their IDPA-form invoices to the Department for services to Waicosky, rendered during the same time span as the services for which Claimant here seeks payment, and that said invoices were timely received and were paid by IDPA. These vendor payments establish that Claimant’s physicians could have invoiced the subject services for MAP adjudication prior to the deadline set in Rule 140.20.

Respondent has moved for summary judgment on this claim, in accordance with section 2 — 1005 of the Illinois Civil Practice Law (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2 — 1005), based upon Claimant’s failure to allege or establish that any of the subject services had been invoiced to IDPA in the manner and within the time prescribed by subsections (a), (b) and (c) of IDPA Rule 140.20. Compliance with such requirements is an essential element of a section 11 — 13 (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 13) vendor-payment action; see Canias, at 152; Krakora, at 237, 238; Simon, at 249. On or about January 12, 1990, the Claimant was granted 28 days to respond to the Respondent’s motion. The Claimant did not respond. We grant Respondent’s motion.

It is therefore hereby ordered and adjudged that Respondent’s motion for summary judgment on the complaint and respective underlying causes, on the grounds addressed above in this opinion, is hereby granted; judgment as to all issues is entered against Claimant and its vendors and in favor of Respondent herein; and this claim is dismissed with prejudice.


author: Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 89-CC-1221
    Mansfield Electric Co., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 2, 1989.

    WOLFSON AND PaPUSHKEWYCH (GeRRI PaPUSHKEwych, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Lance T. Jones, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the parties’ stipulation of judgment and joint motion for entry of judgment, due notice having been given, and the Court being advised;

On October 31, 1988, the Claimant, Mansfield Electric Company, commenced this action by filing its complaint against the Respondent’s Capital Development Board (hereinafter referred to as the CDB) seeking $14,635.82 plus interest. In May of the following year the Respondent filed a departmental report compiled by the CDB and offered as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein pursuant to section 790.140 of the rules of the Court of Claims (74 111. Adm. Code 790.140.) In relevant part the report stated as follows:

1. The CDB entered into a contract with Mansfield Electric Co., on April 12, 1984, in the amount of $50,129.00 for electrical work, rehab, of vocational & dietary buildings, Illinois School for the Deaf, Jacksonville, Illinois, CDB Project No. 765-160-012, CDB Contract No. 84-0665-85.
2. CDB issued change order no. 1 dated November 1,1984, in the amount of +$2,875.90 to revise electric outlets and lighting in three rooms and install electric panel as described on architect’s field order. Relocate electrical conduits at girls’ restroom in dietary building. The adjusted contract amount was $53,004.90.
3. CDB issued change order no. 2 dated November 1,1984, in the amount of +1,099.82 to extend power to compressor as defined by equipment requirements in southeast corner of automotive shop. Connect equipment to power. Original location of welder was changed. Add two additional F-l fixtures adjacent to existing F-l fixtures. Switch with existing fixtures. The adjusted contract amount was $54,104.72.
4. On or about November 21,1984, Mansfield (sic) Electric Co., submitted a final payment application for payment in the amount of $15,760.22.
5. On or about February 19, 1985, CDB accounting section processed the final payment application for payment in the amount of $15,760.22.
6. On or about February 25, 1985, CDB issued a certificate of final acceptance certifying that the work contained in the contract had been inspected, that all punch list items had been completed, and Mansfield Electric Co. had fulfilled all his contractual obligations, guarantees and was hereby authorized to receive final payment in full, including all retainage.
7. On or about July 14,1988, CDB received a letter from Mansfield Electric Co. detailing subsequent information regarding the plans and specifications for this project which required the replacement of three single phase, oil filled, 75 KVA transformers. The replacement was made and the transformers removed from the site during the contract term. However, upon attempting to dispose of these units, it was brought to Mansfield’s attention by salvage dealers that the transformers contained Pyranol which is a PCB based material.
Mansfield Electric Company contacted several hazardous waste disposal companies. Mansfield Electric contracted with Rose Chemicals of Kansas City, Missouri, who operated a hazardous waste disposal facility in Holden, Missouri, for the disposal of these materials. Rose Chemicals was paid and Mansfield believed that they had fully discharged their responsibilities with respect to the contract and hazardous waste.
On or about April 17,1986, Mansfield was advised by a representative of Illinois Power Company acting in behalf of the potentially responsible parties that Rose Chemicals had not disposed of the hazardous waste for which it was responsible. Further, Rose Chemicals was in violation of Environmental Protection Agency rules and regulations, also, was in the process of seeking bankruptcy.
On or about May 8, 1986, at Rose Chemicals PRP’s meeting, it was determined that each PRP would contribute $200 to cover initial costs of investigating the magnitude and severity of the problems. The steering committee contracted with Clean Sites, Inc., to direct the cleanup effort.
On or about April 25,1988, the steering committee notified Mansfield Electric- Co. of a buy-out offer which represented the cleanup of the Rose site to the extent of the agreement in exchange for a payment of $2.60 per pound of material sent to Rose, which amounts to $12,324.
8. The remaining balance of the line item appropriation was insufficient to cover the costs of Mansfield Electric Co., incurred under this contract. The remaining unobligated balance of line item appropriation number: 141-51198-6600-14-82 was $11,752.62.
9. On or about December 13,1988, CDB was only able to issue change order no. 3 in the amount of $11,752.60 which is the remaining unobligated balance of the line item appropriation which covers a portion of the expense incurred by Mansfield Electric Company.
CONCLUSION
Capital Development Board agrees that Mansfield Electric Company is due the $14,635.82 as there was no mention of PCB contamination in the contract documents and the transformers were not labeled. Due to the unobligated balance of the line item appropriation being only $11,752.62, which the CDB issued change order no. 3 in the amount, would leave a contract balance of $11,752.62 which would have lapsed as of September 30, 1985. Therefore, CDB agrees that $11,752.62 is due and owing to Mansfield Electric Company.

The pleading now before the Court was filed on July 21, 1989. Therein at paragraph three they stated: “3. Mansfield and the CDB agree that the court should enter judgment forthwith in favor of Mansfield and against the CDB in the total amount of Fourteen Thousand, Six Hundred Thirty-Five and 82/100ths Dollars ($14,635.82). This stipulated judgment amount is in full settlement of all claims made by Mansfield in its complaint herein.” This Court is not bound by such stipulations and we cannot acquiesce in approving this one. In effect the parties are asking us to award $2,883.20 in excess of the funds appropriated for the project. To award that money would be tantamount to making a deficiency appropriation. Appropriating funds is the prerogative of the legislature. For purposes of possible future consideration of this issue by the legislature, we point out that, other than the agreement of the parties and the conclusion of the CDB, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Claimant suffered any more damages than the $200 investigation cost and the $12,324 cost stated in the bid for cleanup of the Rose site which, after the award we will enter, would leave uncompensated damages of $801.38. The departmental report does indicate that Rose was paid an unspecified sum prior to seeking bankruptcy. No bill of particulars itemizing the damages sought was filed with the complaint as required by section 790.50a(9) of the rules of this Court (74 111. Adm. Code 790.50a(9)).

For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ordered that the Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of $11,752.62. Because of the lack of sufficient funds appropriated and the amount of the award, we need not comment on the issue of there not being a change order in an amount sufficient to cover the agreed settlement. Evans Construction v. State, No. 88-CC-0017.


text:
    (No. 89-CC-1450
    William Hicks, Claimant, v. Northeastern Illinois University, Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, Northeastern Illinois University Print, Respondents.

      Order filed February 6, 1990.

    Calvita J. Frederick & Associates, P.C. (Calvita J. Frederick, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, and Dunn, Goebel, Ulbrich, Morel & Hundman (Helen Ogar, of counsel), for Respondents.
   Dillard, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Respondent’s motion to dismiss and following oral argument, due notice having been given and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

The Court finds that pursuant to section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act, this Court has exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims only against the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities. (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.8(d).) The student newspaper, the Northeastern University Print, a/k/a the Uni Print is not an agent of the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities or Northeastern Illinois University. Furthermore, the newspaper receives no direct State general revenue funds. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction over the university or Uni Print and the Board of Governors is an improper party to this suit since no agency relationship exists.

Thus it is hereby ordered that the claim herein is dismissed with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 89-CC-2060
    Albert W. Cook, Claimant, v. The Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Order on motion for summary judgment filed October 11, 1989.

    Smith, Larson, Pitts, Walters & Metz, Ltd. (Mark G. Spencer, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Charles R. Schmadeke, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Claimant’s motion for summary judgment and the verified complaint being the only record before us, the Court finds that the Respondent withheld Claimant’s Illinois income tax refunds for 1984,1985, 1986 and 1987 in the total amount of $3,274.99 because Claimant was allegedly delinquent in maintenance payments to his former wife. On April 21, 1986, the circuit court of Madison County found all payments to be current and Claimant has submitted evidence (cancelled checks) showing payment to his former wife until her death on September 28,1986.

The Department of Public Aid paid Claimant the sum of $888.62 by check dated February 6,1989, leaving a balance of $2,386.37 due to Claimant.

There is no genuine issue of material fact and Claimant is entitled to summary judgment.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed that Claimant’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and Claimant is awarded two thousand three hundred eighty-six and 37/100 dollars ($2,386.37) in full and complete satisfaction of this claim.


text:
    (No. 90-CC-0206
    Kaufman Grain Co., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 11, 1989.

    Deffenbaugh, Lowenstein, Hagen, Oehlert & Smith (Gary Smith, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Frank A. Hess, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, C.J.

This cause comes before the Court on the parties’ joint stipulation for settlement which states:

This claim arises from an attorney fee dispute pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 1014.1), which was settled, and by consent decree, reduced to judgment in the Sangamon County Circuit Court.

The parties have investigated this claim, and have knowledge of the facts and law applicable to the claim, and are desirous of settling this claim in the interest of peace and economy.

Both parties agree than an award of $10,200, pursuant to the circuit court order, is both fair and reasonable.

Claimant agrees to accept, and Respondent agrees to pay Claimant $10,200, plus statutory interest, in full and final satisfaction of this claim and any other claims against Respondent arising from the events which gave rise to this claim.

The parties hereby agree to waive hearing, the taking of evidence, and the submission of briefs.

This Court is not bound by such an agreement, but it is also not desirous of creating or prolonging a controversy between parties who wish to settle and end their dispute. Where, as in the instant claim, the agreement appears to have been entered into with full knowledge of the facts and law and is for a just and reasonable amount, we have no reason to question or deny the suggested award.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be awarded $10,200.00 plus statutory interest, in full and final satisfaction of this claim.


author: Montana, C.J. Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 90-CC-2004
    Cornfield & Feldman, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 7, 1990.

      Order on motion to reconsider filed June 4, 1990.

    Cornfield & Feldman, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

Claimant, the law firm of Cornfield and Feldman, brought this claim on January 29,1990, seeking payment of $7,750 for legal services. In relevant part their complaint alleges as follows:

“1. That Claimant defended Illinois Department of Corrections employee Wilson Hoof in a cause entitled Edward Buchannan v. Michael O’Leary, Warden at Stateville Correctional Center, Sergeant Wilson Hoof, prison guard at Stateville Correctional Center, and Various Unnamed Employees of Stateville Correctional Center, No. 85 C 8883, such action having been brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
2. That the Attorney General had declined to represent defendant Wilson Hoof in said lawsuit after determining that the acts allegedly giving rise to same, if proven to be true, would not have been within the scope of defendant Hoof’s State employment, or would constitute intentional, willful or wanton misconduct, as prescribed Section 2(c) of the Representation and Indemnification of State Employees Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 127, §1302(c)). Defendant Hoof thereupon retained the services of the Claimant herein.
3. That the Attorney General did notify Claimant herein that if the above-referenced litigation concluded with a finding that Wilson Hoof is a prevailing party, his attorneys’ fees due to Claimant would be reimbursed by the State of Illinois. (See letter to Jacob Pomeranz from Office of Attorney General, dated December 8,1986, attached hereto as Exhibit 1).
4. That the cause against defendant Hoof was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, and defendant Hoof was deemed to be the prevailing party in that action. (A copy of the District Court’s dismissal Order is attached hereto as Exhibit 2).
5. That since the Attorney General declined to appear on behalf of. defendant Hoof in the subject lawsuit, and defendant Hoof was deemed to be the prevailing party in that action, he is entitled to indemnification by the State for reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in that legislation.
6. That the Claimant herein rendered services in the amount of $7,750.00 in defending Wilson Hoof as described above, such sum being reasonable for said representation, and the Respondent should reimburse the Claimant therefor. (Documentation supporting the time expended by the Claimant is attached hereto as Exhibit 3).”

On February 5, 1990, the Respondent filed a stipulation agreeing to our entering the award in the amount claimed. In relevant part the stipulation provided as follows:

1. That the Claimant is a law firm which defended Illinois Department of Corrections employee Wilson Hoof in a cause entitled, Edward Buchannan v. Michael O’Leary, Warden at Stateville Correctional Center, Sergeant Wilson Hoof, prison guard at Stateville Correctional Center, and Various Unnamed Employees of Stateville Correctional Center, No. 85 C 8883, such action having been brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
2. That the Attorney General had declined to represent defendant Wilson Hoof in said lawsuit in accordance with section 2(c) of the Representation and Indemnification of State Employees Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 127, par. 1302(c)). Defendant Hoof thereupon retained the services of the Claimant herein.
3. That the cause against defendant Hoof was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, and defendant Hoof was deemed to be the prevailing party in that action.
4. That since the Attorney General declined to appear on behalf of defendant Hoof in the subject lawsuit, and defendant Hoof was deemed to be the prevailing party in that action, he is entitled under the Act to indemnification by the State for reasonable attorneys fees incurred in that litigation.
5. That the Claimant herein rendered services in the amount of $7,750.00 in defending Wilson Hoof as described above, such sum being reasonable for said representation, and the Respondent should reimburse the Claimant therefor.
6. That Respondent therefore agrees to the entry of an award in favor of Claimant, Cornfield and Feldman, in the amount of $7,750.00 (seven thousand, seven hundred fifty dollars and no/cents), in full and final satisfaction of the claim herein.

This Court is not bound by such stipulations and we cannot acquiesce in approving the one at bar based on the following reason. The Claimant, if entitled to be paid for the services rendered, is only so entitled based on “An Act to provide for representation and indemnification in certain civil law suits.” (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 1301 et seq.) This Court has previously decided that payments made pursuant to that Act are to be paid “from the State Treasury on the warrant of the Comptroller out of appropriations made to the Department of Central Management Services specifically designed for the payment of * * * (such claims).” (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 1302(e)(i).) No action by the Court of Claims is required to effect payment. See Norman v. State (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 895-908, a series of decisions, and, in particular, the Court’s decisions in Lin v. State (1988), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 80 and Lin v. State (1989), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 80.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, dismissed.

ORDER ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER

Montana, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Respondent’s motion to reconsider, due notice having been given, and the Court being advised;

On March 7,1990, the Court entered an order which dismissed this claim. Respondent’s motion states in pertinent part as follows:

1. That this Court denied this claim for attorney fees on March 7,1990, on the grounds that Claimant’s entitlement to an award, if any, would be based on the Representation and Indemnification of State Employees Act (III. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 1301 et seq.), and that payment made pursuant to the Act is to be made “out of appropriations made to the Department of Central Management Services specifically designed for the payments of' " * (such claims).”
2. That the claim herein was brought only because of the depletion of the said fund, such that Claimant’s only recourse is the instant claim before this Court.

The Court takes judicial notice that the fund is often depleted. However, we do not find that to be sufficient grounds for overturning our March 7, 1990, decision. The Court of Claims is not the forum to turn to when appropriations have been exhausted. There was no money in the fund when Lin v. State (1988), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 80 and Lin v. State (1989), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 80, were decided. The Claimant had to wait.

Claimant does have recourse. New funds will in all likelihood be appropriated. Had Claimant made application to the Department of Central Management Services at the time this action was filed, Claimant would likely have been paid, if entitled to be paid, sooner than it would by collecting through the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims is not authorized by section 24 of the Court of Claims Act (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.24) to pay such an award directly and could not pay the award sought without seeking and obtaining an appropriation from the legislature. Funding of “An Act to provide for representation and indemnification in certain civil lawsuits” is the prerogative of the General Assembly.

It is hereby ordered that the motion at bar be, and hereby is, denied.


text:
    (No. Unassigned

      In re Application of John M. Geraghty

      Opinion filed November 28, 1989.

    John M. Geraghty, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Daniel Brennan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Sommer, J.

On July 21, 1988, this Court entered an order denying the Claimant’s request to extend the time to file a claim pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act. 111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

The crime occurred on December 23, 1985, while the petition to extend was filed on May 17, 1988. The Crime Victims Compensation Act states that notice of a claim must be filed within six months of the crime and the claim must be filed within one year of the crime. (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 76.1(a).) The same section states that the Court “may extend the time for filing the notice of intent to file a claim and application for a period not exceeding one year.”

In this matter, a notice was filed in time but no claim was filed. Approximately 28 months after the date of the crime, a petition to extend the time for filing was submitted to this Court. This Court’s original order denied the petition for extension on the grounds that the Crime Victims Compensation Act allows an extension of one year beyond the filing of the notice, or a total period of 18 months from the date of the crime.

The Claimant requested a hearing on the order of denial, and such was held on June 7, 1989, and, additionally, on July 7, 1989. The Claimant represented himself and defended his failure to file his application within the time limits stated by the Act by his assertion that an investigator of the Attorney General’s office told him not to file until after the completion of his Workers’ Compensation Act claim arising from the same incident. The Attorney General’s office testified that it was not their policy to give such advice.

This Court has discussed the issue of late filing in a claim entitled In re Application of Linda Hutcheson (1985), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 491, 492-93.

“The Crime Victims Compensation Act was enacted by the legislature to aid and assist crime victims under certain circumstances to receive compensation to help pay for the damage they sustained. The legislature also provided the rules under which proceedings must be had to claim the benefit. The legislature further provided that the hearing agency in crimes of this nature was the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims is bound by the acts of the legislature and all procedures set forth by the legislature must be followed by the Court before benefits can be awarded.
o o o
Claimant, having failed to abide by the rules provided in the Crime Victims Compensation Act, is not entitled to an award ° *

We see no reason that the logic of Hutcheson does not apply to this claim. It is therefore ordered that this Court’s order of July 21, 1988, is reaffirmed and the Claimant’s petition is denied.


text:
    (No. 87-CV-0124

      In re Application of John Lavorini

      Order filed October 11, 1989.

    Kielian & Walther, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (James Maher, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Sommer, J.

This cause coming to be heard on the Claimant’s motion for waiver or reduction of lien, due notice having been given and this Court being fully advised in the premises, finds that on December 1, 1986, the Claimant was awarded by this Court the amount of $1,144 under the Crime Victims Compensation Act. (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.) The Claimant also received $2,652.80 from a private insurer. The Claimant had medical bills of approximately $3,700 with some possible future expenditures. The Claimant also has been awarded a judgment of $7,460 against his assailant. Of this judgment, $3,200 has been paid. The insurer has reduced its lien by one-half, and the Claimant asks that the State do likewise or give up its lien altogether so that the Claimant might have some funds over and above his medical bills.

Section 10.1(g) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act states that # compensation under this act is a secondary source of compensation * * (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 80.1.) Under this Act, recoveries from various sources are required to be deducted from awards under the Act, while a lien is established on any possible recoveries from the perpetrator.

In summary, the purpose of the Act is to aid innocent victims of crime in stated ways where aid is forthcoming from no other source. When aid is forthcoming from another source, the taxpayers have no statutory obligation to the victim. In the present claim, a waiver or reduction of the lien would, in effect, make an award where one has been previously made from another source, as the award made in the circuit court against the perpetrator would have compensated the total damages. Such a deviation from the scheme of the Act would require statutory authorization. As there is no statutory authorization to waive or reduce liens, this Court has no power to do so. Therefore it is ordered that the motion of the Claimant for waiver or reduction of liens is denied.


text:
    (No. 89-CV-0968

      In re Application of Rosia Fort

      Opinion filed January 19, 1990.

    Rosia Fort, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Daniel Brennan and James Maher, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Burke, J.

This cause coming to be heard upon the report of the Commissioner, after hearing before said Commissioner and this Court being fully advised in the premises.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on December 4, 1988. Rosia Fort, aunt of the deceased victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.). This matter is before the Court on a rehearing after Claimant’s claim was denied.

The aforesaid order denying the claim was based upon information contained in the investigatory report of the Attorney General’s office and the police report, which disclosed that the victim had 18 packets of illegal narcotics in his possession at the time of the shooting, which were found on his body. The police had interviewed tenants in the building at 5041 South Federal Street, in Chicago, where the shooting occurred and no one could contribute any information as to the cause of the shooting. However, the aforesaid building and the surrounding area appear to be continuously involved in narcotics trafficking and this Court determined that the victim’s conduct contributed to his death. No other conclusion may be reached under the circumstances and the information contained in the police report.

In view of the aforesaid circumstances, possession of 18 packets of narcotics found on the person of the victim, and the reputation of the building as to previous similar incidents, all of which strongly point to narcotics activities in the area and victim’s involvement in same, this Court denied the claim, relying on the provisions of section 10.1(d) of the Act, which provides:

“an award shall be reduced according to the extent to which * 0 “ conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.” 111. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 80.1(d).

The Claimant denies that the decedent was involved in drug trafficking and contends that the 18 packets of narcotics were planted on his person by the unknown assailant, which contentions are entirely unsubstantiated. The Claimant was advised of statements of witnesses who were interviewed by the police and the information disclosed by them at the time of the shooting, indicating that the conduct of the victim contributed to his death. However, the identity of said witnesses interviewed by the police was not disclosed to Claimant, but Claimant was advised and furnished with a subpoena form which she could file with the police department for production of their files on the incident.

At this hearing, Claimant was granted the opportunity to furnish witnesses which would have, any knowledge of the incident involved and possibly offer any evidence contrary to the findings hereinabove described and as of that date, Claimant cannot furnish any such evidence.

Wherefore, having been offered no evidence by Claimant contrary to the record herein, which supports the conclusion that the victim’s conduct contributed to his death, as previously determined by this Court, this claim is denied.


author: Patchett, J. Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 90-CV-0198

      In re Application of Lourdene E. Johnson

      Order filed July 28, 1989.

      Opinion filed March 27, 1990.

    Lourdene E. Johnson, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (James Maher, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Patchett, J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the petition of Lourdene Johnson for an extension of time to file documents to claim compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (111. Rev. Stat., ch.70, par. 71 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Due notice of the filing of the petition has been given, no objection has been filed, and the Court, being advised, finds as follows:

Pursuant to section 6.1 of the Act, a person seeking compensation must file a notice of intent to seek compensation with the Office of the Attorney General within six months of the occurrence. (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 76.1.) An application must be filed with the Court of Claims within one year of the date of the occurrence. The Court may extend each deadline for a period not to exceed one year.

In the petition at bar, the incident was said to have occurred on August 29, 1987. The victim died on September 22, 1988. A notice of intent was filed thereafter. Funeral and burial expenses are sought. The petitioner is the mother of the victim. The victim was 21 years old on the day of the incident. As an explanation for late filing, the petitioner stated her time had been consumed with seeking medical care for her son.

It is apparent that neither the notice of intent nor the petition was filed within six months of the date of the incident. The decedent survived longer than that. What is not clear is the date that the petitioner gave the notice to the Office of the Attorney General. This Court is authorized to extend the time for providing the notice for a period not to exceed 18 months from the date of the incident. The file-stamp date of the Office of the Attorney General is totally illegible. We are unable to read whether or not the notice was provided within 18 months of the incident.

We hold, under such circumstances where we are unable to read the file-stamp date, that the notice has been filed within the period in which we are authorized to grant an extension.

It is hereby ordered that the petition at bar be, and hereby is, granted; it is further ordered that the petitioner file an application within 60 days of the date of this order.

OPINION

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 29, 1987. Lourdene E. Johnson, mother of the deceased victim, John Michael Johnson, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on August 7, 1989, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased son, John Michael Johnson, age 21, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: reckless homicide (III. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3). The victim was injured on August 27,1987, and expired from his injuries on September 22,1988.

2. That the crime occurred in Orland Park, Illinois, and all of the eligibility requirements of section 6.1 of the Act have been met.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral and burial expenses.

4. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $5,726.52, all of which has been paid. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum amount of $3,000.

5. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as an applicable deduction under section 10.1(e) of the Act.

6. That the Claimant, Lourdene E. Johnson, has filed a civil action, Johnson v. Galvin, No. 87 L 24761, in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois, as a result of the incident. The Claimant, by informing the Attorney General’s office of her pending civil suit, has acknowledged her responsibility to further notify the Attorney General of the final disposition of the civil action, pursuant to section 17 of the Act.

7. That the Claimant has complied with pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) be and is hereby awarded to Lourdene E. Johnson, mother of John Michael Johnson, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0756
    First National Bank of Springfield, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 20, 1990.

    Gibbs & Green (Edward R. Green, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (William Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Montana, C.J.

Facts

The facts in this cause appear as follows:

On August 17, 1970, Respondent entered into a general contract with Tal Rauhoff, Inc. (Rauhoff) for construction on the State Capitol Building in Springfield, Illinois (Exhibit A). On September 10, 1970, Rauhoff entered into a subcontract agreement with the Rhodes & Rodier Co., Claimant, for lathing and plastering work (Exhibit C). As work progressed, Rauhoff submitted periodic applications for payment to Respondent. Twenty-five applications were submitted between January 15, 1971, and December 18, 1973. These are Exhibits El through E25 herein. Each application was a request for payment for a portion of work which according to Rauhoff, had been completed since the last application; each application listed the amount of a subcontractor’s work, the total of previous pay requests pertaining to work performed by the subcontractor and the amount of the present pay request. The Respondent would pay the amount requested to Rauhoff less a percentage retainage (15% for Exhibits El to E21 and 10% for applications E22 to E25) which was held back by the Respondent.

Rauhoff had the responsibility to pay Claimant and other subcontractors as required by the general contract. Each of the subcontractors was requested to submit a statement for forwarding to the Respondent stating that all prior statements had been paid when new statements were issued.

The last two applications (Exhibits 24 and 25) made by Rauhoff to Respondent made no application for work done by Claimant. (Subsequently, the Sangamon County Court in No. 246-74 held that in fact $26,000.00 of work had been done by Claimant that should have been included in these applications.) The last application by Rauhoff for work done by Claimant was dated May 30, 1973. Claimant contends that it worked on the project between September 26,1973, and January 12,1974.

Commencing on October 25, 1973, Claimant made written requests to Rauhoff for work done from September 25, 1973, to December 26, 1973. (Exhibits “G”, “H”, and “I”). The total sum was $119,485.76. When Claimant received no payment from Rauhoff, it filed a notice of lien in accordance with section 23 of the Illinois Mechanics Lien Act for $136,563.17. This lien was filed in the Illinois Secretary of State’s Office on February 26, 1974 (Exhibit J). The amount of lien exceeded the pay request of Claimant because it contends it worked on the project until January 12, 1974. Respondent then terminated its contract with Rauhoff. One of the grounds for termination was Claimant’s filing of a lien (Exhibit L).

On April 29,1974, Claimant filed suit in Sangamon County Circuit Court (No. 246-74) against Rauhoff and its bonding company, the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland for $136,563.00. The First National Bank of Springfield was assignee of the Claimant. Rauhoff replied that it was not liable to a subcontractor until payment had been made by Respondent and that none of the sums requested by Claimant had been paid to it by Respondent (Exhibit N). Claimant filed a motion for partial summary judgment and on January 14, 1975, the Court granted it in the sum of $23,400.00. Payment was received by Claimant on January 30,1975. Rauhoff never appealed this order (Exhibit “O”).

On March 21, 1975, Claimant filed another motion for summary judgment against Rauhoff (Exhibit “P”) and retained an independent architect to verify that it had performed additional work on the project.

Initially, on April 21,1975, the Court granted Claimant’s motion for summary judgment against Rauhoff (Exhibit “S”). A motion for reconsideration was filed by Rauhoff on April 25, 1975. On that same day, the Sangamon County Court entered an order which held:

“That the unpaid amount of work done by [Plaintiff] under its contract with [Rauhoff] is One Hundred Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred and Thirty-Nine and 7/16 Dollars ($116,539.17). (Exhibit T.)”

The court then held that Rauhoff was not liable for this sum. This was because Rauhoff had not received payment from Respondent for the work which the court determined was done by Claimant. Under the terms of the subcontract Rauhoff was not liable for payment to Claimant until Rauhoff was paid by Respondent.

On January 27, 1976, the Secretary of State for Illinois filed a complaint in interpleader in the Sangamon County Circuit Court, No. 41-76 (Exhibit “U”). Rauhoff, Claimant and other subcontractors were named as defendants. The State (Respondent) prayed for permission to deposit $258,191.89 with the court so it could determine the amount of money which should be distributed to Rauhoff and each of its subcontractors. This sum consisted primarily of retainage from the general contract, i.e., sums held back by Respondent when it paid Rauhoff. The Respondent stated that it retained an architect to authorize the “completion status” of the $2,437,000.00 project. The architect analyzed the project as a whole and did not break it down as to values of work performed by individual subcontractors. The retainage plus a finding by the architect that $42,854.00 was unpaid on the project resulted in a sum of $258,191.89 which the Respondent sought to have distributed by the interpleader court.

Thereafter, Claimant filed a motion for summary judgment in the interpleader action alleging priority because of the order of the court of April 21,1975, in the original suit (246-74) which found that Claimant had done $116,537.17 worth of work. Objections were filed by other defendants to this motion and it was never granted. (This is apparently so because most of the interpleader fund was retainage.)

On May 28, 1976, Claimant filed a motion for summary judgment in the original suit, 246-74, while the interpleader cause was pending, stating that Rauhoff had admitted that it had been paid certain sums by Respondent for work done by Claimant. On June 10,1976, the court in 246-74 partially granted Claimant’s motion and awarded it $10,297.00; Rauhoff paid this sum to Claimant within two months.

On the same day, June 10, 1976, the interpleader court, in cause 41-76, entered an order allowing Respondent to deposit the sum of $258,191.89 as an interpleader fund.

The order also provided:

«That, Plaintiff, MICHAEL J. HOWLETT, Secretary of State, State of Illinois, is herewith discharged from any and all liability with respect to the FUND detailed hereinabove in this Order, but in no event is any Party-Defendant herein precluded by this ORDER from prosecuting in the Court of Claims of the State of Illinois any action which may of right be brought in that Court relative to matters arising out of the contract specified herein. (See Exhibit ‘X’).”

On September 20, 1976, the interpleader court entered a partial distribution order (Exhibit Z) on behalf of Claimant in the amount of $22,932.71. This amount reflected work performed by Claimant that Rauhoff had previously included in its applications and change order request to Respondent. On January 24, 1977, in disposition of the interpleader action, the court entered a memorandum opinion. The court found that Claimant could not recover further from the interpleader fund for the following reasons:

“The Court e 0 e finds that of the sums deposited with this Court these are the only monies approved by the Architect and therefore any additional claims made by these defendants can not be considered in this lawsuit and as to these funds. (Emphasis added.) (Paragraph three of page two of Memorandum of Opinion.).”

The court then ordered the remainder of the fund to be distributed to Rauhoff. On May 4, 1977, Claimant filed its complaint in this court. Thereafter, the parties to cause No. 246 — 74 executed a stipulation and motion for dismissal dated November 12, 1977; and filed with the Sangamon County clerk on January 25, 1978. (Exhibit BBB). The stipulation stated in part that the final adjudication in the interpleader cause No. 41 — 76 determined that Claimant had no further cause of action against Rauhoff or its bonding company in cause No. 246 — 74. The stipulation included the dismissal of cause No. 246 — 74 with prejudice to Claimant.

On January 25,1978, the Court, as a result of this filing, entered an order stating in part as follows:

“This cause coming on to be heard upon the written Stipulation and Motion of the parties hereto, by their respective attorneys; and it appearing to the Court that final adjudication by the Court in the Interpleader case of Michael J. Howlett, Secretary of State, State of Illinois plaintiff, vs. Tal Rauhoff, Inc., et al, including Rhodes & Rodier Company, No. 41 — 76, in this Court, are such that the plaintiff in this action No. 246 — 74 has no claim or cause of action against said defendants herein, FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND and TAL RAUHOFF, INC., or either of them, for or in respect to any of the matter or things alleged in plaintiff’s complaint in this action No. 246 — 74."

Respondent was never a party to No. 246 — 74. In addition to the above facts, the Claimant by this Court’s subpoena, obtained a letter from the Attorney General’s office, dated November 19,1975, which was a request to the Secretary of State for his determination as to how much money should be deposited in a proposed interpleader fund. Also under our subpoena is a letter from Peat, Marwick Mitchell and Company, dated October 1, 1975, in answer to the Secretary of State’s request for an outside opinion as to how much was due and owing on this contract. This letter states that the procedures used were not in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and therefore Peat, Marwick Mitchell and Co. could express no opinion.

The issue now before us is whether or not the State is liable to the Claimant for the unpaid lathing and plastering work done by the Rhodes and Rodier Company on the State Capitol Building as a subcontractor and third-party beneficiary of the contract.

Decision

From the above it is of record that Respondent’s architect never made any determination of the amount owed to Claimant or any other subcontractor, that Claimant’s architect did verify the work, that Respondent did not know how much was owed to Claimant, and that the Sangamon County court did make a finding of fact that Claimant was owed the sum of $116,539.00. Subsequent to that finding the Claimant, through litigation, reduced this amount to $79,932.00. While not agreeing that this sum is due Claimant should Claimant prevail, the Respondent did not actually dispute that figure and offered nothing from which we determine any lesser amount may be due. This Court is not bound by the finding of the Sangamon County Circuit Court. However, we find that the preponderance of the evidence in the record here is that this is the sum which Claimant is owed if Claimant prevails.

The Respondent’s primary argument at law is that the order of the interpleader court was dispositive of any claim that this subcontractor might have against the State. However, the authorities hold that an interpleader action cannot be used to “freeze” the rights of the parties who have causes of action which are in excess of funds deposited. (Jefferson Standard Insurance Co. v. Craven (1973), 365 F. Supp. 861, citing State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire (1967), 386 U.S. 523.) These cases interpret Federal Rule 22(1); the Illinois interpleader statute (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 26(2)) is based on Federal Rule 22(1) and is virtually the same. The current Illinois statute is Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2 — 408. In Amalgamated Trust and Savings Bank v. Silha (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 460 N.E.2d 372, the court held that in an interpleader action a court’s task is not to determine the sum total of. a party’s liability nor claims independent of the fund but rather to determine rights to the fund.

The interpleader court made no specific finding as to the total sum due to Claimant. The interpleader fund was primarily a retainage fund which was owed to many subcontractors. Clearly, Claimant would not be entitled to another subcontractor’s retainage. The court itself stated that the order in interpleader was not dispositive of the rights of any party to any sum. (See Order in Interpleader, No. 41 — 76 of June 10, 1976.) Further the interpleader court in a pretrial order of August 13,1976, stated the sum proposed for each subcontractor and a notation whether the sum was retainage. Significantly, no such notation appears after the Claimant’s name. This was also so for several other subcontractors. It therefore appears that the court declined to give an opinion as to what Claimant’s award pertained to.

From all of the above we conclude that the Claimant’s right to proceed in this court was not barred by the order in interpleader.

The Respondent also argues that Claimant is a subcontractor of the State with no right to a recovery and cites R. D. Lawrence Construction Co. v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 514, from the Illinois Court of Claims.

However, Lawrence stated that a subcontractor cannot generally proceed against an owner outside the Mechanics Lien Act “in the absence of any allegation that [the subcontractors] are third-party beneficiaries under the principal contract.”

Claimant alleged that it is a third-party beneficiary of the contract and to meet the Lawrence test cites O’Keefe v. State (1939), 10 Ill. Ct. Cl. 480, which cites Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett (1932), 346 Ill. 252. The standard in Carson Pirie Scott is stated as follows:

“The rule is settled in this state that, if a contract is entered into for the direct benefit of a third person not a party thereto, such third person may sue for breach thereof. The test is whether the benefit to the third person is direct to him or is but an incidental benefit to him arising from the contract. If direct, he may sue on the contract; if incidental he has no right of recovery thereon. This rule has been announced without variation in numerous cases decided by this court.”

This doctrine has been affirmed many times. (See, e.g., Town & Country Bank v. Canfield (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 91, 370 N.E.2d 630.) It is considered settled doctrine. The clauses of the general contract which are presented to support the Claimant’s assertion that it is a third-party beneficiary within the Carson doctrine are stated as follows:

“This Contractor shall submit to the Architect, in five copies an application in a form prescribed for each payment, and a sworn statement of all amounts due, or to become due for services, labor, material, or contracts, and receipt of other vouchers shotoing his payments for materials and labor including payments to subcontractors. (Emphasis added.) Such applications shall be submitted at least 10 days before each payment falls due, and the Contractor shall, before the first application, submit to the Architect a schedule of values of the various parts of the work, including quantities, aggregating the total payment to subcontractors, made out in such form, and if required, supported by such evidence, as to its correctness, as the Architect may direct. This schedule, when approved by the Architect, shall be used as a basis for Certificate of Payment, unless it is found to be in error.” (Emphasis added.)
General conditions of the Contract between Tal Rauhoff and the State of Illinois, page E/10 (See Exhibit “B”).

The above clauses appear sufficient to establish the Claimant’s right to be considered by the court as a third-party beneficiary of the general contract.

Our finding that the Claimant is properly before this Court does not end the case. That the Sangamon County Circuit Court found that Claimant had not been paid a sum of money for work performed does not mean that Claimant is now entitled to an award of that sum here. The Respondent was not a party to that suit nor is this Court bound by the findings of fact. Even though we have accepted that sum does not mean Claimant is entitled to be awarded it.

As a third-party beneficiary, the Claimant has rights under the contract. Under the contract Rauhoff was to have billed the Respondent for work performed by the Claimant. There is no dispute that Rauhoff did not do so. It also appears that the Respondent paid out during the course of the performance of the contract and later in the interpleader action all that appeared to be due under the contract. We are unable to determine why Rauhoff did not bill the Respondent for Claimant’s work. It is not entirely clear to us whether the Claimant, as a third-party beneficiary, is due payment for the work. On this issue Respondent has not made clear a defense based on the contract either. Much about this case is unclear. Although the record is lengthy, neither party has made it complete.

Regardless, now necessary to any award in the Court of Claims based on a breach of contract theory is information, as part of the record, showing that sufficient funds were appropriated to have covered the breach. See discussion in Loewenberg/Fitch Partnership v. State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 227, 252-54 and Ude, Inc. v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 384. Nowhere in the record are we able to find this information and, therefore, we will be unable to make an award. Necessary for payment of any award by the Court in the amount sought by the Claimant in this type of claim is approval by the General Assembly as evidenced by the appropriation of funds. For purposes of possible further consideration of this case by the General Assembly, we find that the State has received the benefit of the work performed by the Claimant, that the value of the work performed by the Claimant is $79,932.00, and that the Claimant has not received compensation for its work. Any appropriation, if made, should be for First National Bank of Springfield as assignee of Rhodes & Rodier Co.

Claim denied.