text:
    (No. 75-CV-62
    Amelia Kline, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 15, 1975.

    Amelia Kline, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred at 12:10 a.m., May 26, 1974, near 658 North St. Clair, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Amelia Kline, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Amelia Kline, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Assault”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-2.)

2. That on May 26,1974, claimant was threatened to be killed by a Negro male. Prior to the threat, the assailant had beaten claimant’s companion and taken his wallet.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any wrongful act or provocation by the claimant for the assault upon her.

4. That the claimant went to Henrotin Hospital, 111 West Oak Street, Chicago, Illinois, in her own car where she was treated in the emergency room. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and her assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. However, the assailants have not been identified at this time.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation for medical expenses and loss of earnings.

8. That the claimant was unable to work for a period of 6 weeks following the assault due to a general anxiety state and a specific fear of all black men, which kept her in her apartment for 6 weeks.

9. That the claimant has proved to the court’s satisfaction that her loss of earnings compensable under the statute was $689.88.

10. That in addition to loss of earnings, claimant incurred expenses for psychological counseling, dental work, hospital and other medical expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Psychological counseling......................... $200.00
2) Dental Work.................................. 365.00
3) Hospital ..................................... 20.30
4) Medical...................................... 97.30
$597.30

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .)”.

12. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $20.30. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in ¶9 and 10, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $1,066.88. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $1,066.88.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,066.88 be awarded the claimant, Amelia Kline, the victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars And Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund to Amelia Kline, as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $66.89 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 75-CV-137
    Elizbieta Pomianowska, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 15, 1975.

    Elizbieta Pomianowska, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on July 11, 1974, at Ashland and Chicago Avenues, Chicago, Illinois. Elizbieta Pomianowska seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Elizbieta Pomianowska, age 30, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-3).

2. That on July 11, 1974, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the claimant got off a CTA bus at the corner of Ashland and Chicago. As she proceeded down Ashland Ave., she was struck from behind on the head by an unknown assailant. The claimant fell to the ground and the assailant grabbed a small change purse that she was carrying and fled in an unknown direction.

The claimant got to her feet and walked home. Later that evening, the claimant began to feel dizzy and a friend drove her to Illinois Research Hospital. The hospital officials called the police and reported the crime.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

4. That the criminal offense was reported to law enforcement officials, as soon as possible under the circumstances, and claimant has cooperated with their requests for assistance, but has had difficulty in understanding police requests, as she does not speak or understand the English language. The claimant could not identify her assailant and no arrests have been made in connection with this criminal offense.

5. That the claimant and her assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That claimant seeks compensation under the Act for medical expenses and lost wages.

7. That as the result of this incident, the claimant was hospitalized on two occasions: Illinois Research Hospital: July 1,1974, to July 6,1974. St. Mary’s Hospital: July 30,1974, to August 16,1974. She was treated for a severe cervical spine sprain.

That as the result of this medical treatment, the claimant incurred hospital and medical expenses, as follows:

Hospital.........................................$3,091.73
Doctors ......................................... 604.40
$3,696.13

8. That claimant was unable to work from July 1, 1974, until July 14, 1974, and from July 30, 1974, to September 29, 1974, (104 days). That claimant was employed at the Commonwealth Edison Company in Chicago, where she earned $439.16 per month before her injury. That claimant’s loss of earnings during her disability was $1,502.80, less disability benefits of $970.20, or $532.60. That claimant’s loss is less than the statutory maximum and therefore compensable.

9. That based upon the calculations set forth in §7 & 8, claimant’s pecuniary loss is:

Medical.........................................$3,696.13
Loss of Earnings.................................. 532.60
$4,228.73

10. That the claimant received insurance benefits from Commonwealth Edison’s group policy in the amount of $3,008.54 and is not entitled to additional compensation therefrom.

That in determining the amount of compensation to which a claimant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) . . . shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source . .

That after the statutory deduction of $200, plus the insurance benefits of $3,008.54, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $1,020.19.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,020.19 be awarded the claimant Elizbieta Pomianowska, the victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund to Elizbieta Pomianowska as partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $20.20 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-169
    Vernon J. Pizano, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 15, 1975.

    Vernon J. Pizano, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on July 13,1974, at 12:00 midnight, at 925 West Carmen, Chicago, Illinois. Vernon J. Pizano, a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Vernon J. Pizano, age 20, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Battery,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-3).

2. That on July 13, 1974, claimant was injured by the janitor of an apartment building where claimant was looking for a friend. The janitor struck the claimant on the mouth with a board. The offender, James H. Espy, was convicted of battery in Branch 5 of the Cook County Criminal Court on September 17, 1974. (Case #1192427)

3. That statements, taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the victim for the attack upon him by James Espy, the janitor of the apartment building where the attack occurred.

4. That the victim was treated by a dentist as a result of the injuries he received in the attack. The claimant refused hospitalization. A further and more detailed summary of the facts considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

7. That the claimant was employed at the time of his injury, but that since no work was missed as a result of the injury, no claim was made for loss of income.

8. That the claimant incurred dental expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits. The total amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

Dentist Fees — Dr. Stephen A. Meier (Oak Brook, Illinois) . . . .$1,515.00

9. That there is no evidence that claimant has received or will receive any compensation from local, state or federal funds, insurance of any kind, or from any other source.

10. Pursuant to §7(d) of the Act, the Court must deduct the first $200.00 of expenses.

11. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of this Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $1,315.00 be awarded to the claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred and Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of the award, and that the balance of the award due to the claimant in the sum of $315.01 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-66
    Lois R. Boyd, on behalf of Melvin C. Boyd, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Max J. Becker, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on June 3, 1974, at 7723 South Yates, Chicago, Illinois. Lois F. Boyd, wife of the deceased victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband, Melvin C. Boyd, age 48, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on June 3, 1974, the claimant’s husband was first held up by one of his two assailants, then later shot by the other assailant, after the victim’s return to his truck following a dry cleaning delivery to 7723 South Yates.

3. That the statements of two eye-witnesses, taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the decedent for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim died on June 3, 1974, as a result of the wound he received in the shooting of June 3, 1974. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the two assailants, Glenn Addison and Angelo Jones, were indicted by the Cook County Grand Jury on charges of murder. They are presently awaiting trial.

6. That the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of support to herself and her four children: Karen Boyd, age 22; Carole Boyd, age 20; James Boyd, age 16; and Douglas Boyd, age 15.

9. That at the time of Melvin C. Boyd’s death, he was 48 years old and had a life expectancy of age 73 according to Vital Statistics of the U.S. 1970, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare Public Health Service mortality table for the U.S. population. Therefore, we must conclude that the decedent’s family has lost his financial support for the remainder of his normal life expectancy, computed to be 25 years.

10. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his death were $1,150.88 but earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of support, pursuant to the following provision in §4 of the Act:

"... loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

11. That, based on the victim’s normal life expectancy of 25 years, and taking $500 per month as his average earnings, the loss of support to his family is computed to be an amount far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded as compensation under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

12. That, in addition to loss of support, the claimant incurred coroner’s costs and funeral expenses for the victim which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and Veteran’s Administration benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Coroner’s costs.................................$ 30.60
2) Funeral costs.................................. 1,607.00
$1,637.60

13. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .)”.

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death, and deduction of $200, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point, we are adopting a recent opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth (1973) 296 N.E. 2d 477.

14. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $39,991.47. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in If 11 and 1112, leaves the amount of actual loss sustained by the claimant and her four children far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime. Hence, the claimant and her four children are entitled to an award in the maximum amount payable under the Act, $10,000.

The Court takes notice of the fact that the four children of the deceased victim, who are named in 118 of this opinion, were also dependent on Melvin C. Boyd, as was his surviving spouse, Lois F. Boyd, the claimant, and the mother of decedent’s said four children.

Under these circumstances the Court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in §8(b):

"(b) If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for (her) support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it (the court) shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled, and (3) order that those amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor incompetent, to his (her) guardian or conservator, as the case may be.”

To comply strictly with the above legislative directive, it would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution of the $10,000 award in accordance with the rule of distribution stated in §11(1) of the Probate Act. This rule would allow one-third ($3,333.33) to the victim’s surviving spouse, and the remaining two-thirds ($6,666.66) divided equally among the victim’s four children. This would create four separate estates in the amount of $1,666.66 each for Karen Boyd, age 22; Carole Boyd, age 20; James Boyd, age 16; and Douglas Boyd, age 15.

However, to make distribution in this manner, we believe would impose an undue hardship on the mother. If the $10,000 award were paid to her in a lump sum, she would be holding $6,666.66 in trust for her four children. Although she is guardian for their person, she would have no power to administer their estates nor use their funds unless she is duly appointed guardian of each minor’s estate as provided by law. Perry v. Carmichael (1880) 95 Ill. 519. After such appointment she would be required to manage her children’s funds frugally under the direction of the appointing court and present periodic accounts of her guardianship to such Court. She would also be responsible for Court costs and any legal expenses required in filing her petition for appointment, oath, surety bond and accounts.

To obviate the necessity of the claimant being appointed guardian of her children’s estates, and considering all other facts in this case, the Court believes that the best interest of the victim’s family would be served by our ordering that this award be disbursed to the claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized in §8(a) (4) of the Act. As the natural guardian of her four children, the mother has legal obligation to provide for their suitable support and education. In fulfilling this obligation, we believe she would necessarily be required to expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and nurture of all four of her children as well as for her own necessities.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $10,000 be awarded to the claimant and her four children, collectively, as persons who were all dependent for their support on Melvin C. Boyd, the deceased victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the aforesaid award be paid to the claimant, Lois F. Boyd, in twenty (20) equal monthly installments of $500 each. The Court directs that said monthly payments shall be made from the Court of Claims Fund insofar as it is legally possible to do so.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-70
    Steve Nagy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 23, 1975.

      Steve Nagy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on May 13, 1974, at the Elevated Station at Morse Avenue in Chicago. Steve Nagy seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Steve Nagy, age 50, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on May 13, 1974 at 2:00 a.m., the claimant was on his way home from work at Arnie’s Restaurant. As he got off the "El” at Morse Avenue, he was accosted by three men who demanded his money. He offered them some change. One of the assailants kicked the money out of his hand and the other two began delivering punches to his back and face. One of the assailants used a gun to beat the claimant’s head. The claimant was pushed down the "El” steps and the assailants fled with his wallet. The ticket seller at the "El” stop telephoned the police. They arrived in a matter of moments and the claimant was rushed to Edgewater Hospital.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance by viewing suspect photos. That claimant was unable to make an identification of his assailants and that no arrests have been made in connection with this criminal offense.

5. That the claimant and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That as the result of the attack upon him, the claimant was hospitalized from May 13,1974, to May 21, 1974, at Edgewater Hospital where he was treated for a brain concussion, forehead laceration, and loss of teeth.

7. That all of the claimant’s medical expenses were paid by Public Aid with the exception of a bill submitted by Dr. Samuel Berger for $93.00. This bill was for follow-up care covering the period of June 24, 1974, to October 5, 1974. Dr. Berger refused to take the Public Aid green card.

8. That the claimant has been unemployed since the date of his injury. He and his family lived on their savings the first few months. After the savings had been exhausted, the claimant applied for and received Public Aid assistance. This assistance began four months after the injury and continues at this time. The claimant receives $385.00 a month from Public Aid.

9. That claimant’s loss of earnings is computed as follows:

May 13, 1974, to Sept. 22, 1974 .......................$2,000.00
(4 months at $500/month)
Sept. 22, 1974 to May 22, 1974 ....................... 920.00
(8 months at $115/month — $500-$385 from Public Aid)
$2,920.00

10. That based upon the calculations set forth in 117 and 9, claimant’s pecuniary loss is:

Medical......................................... 93.00
Loss of Earnings.................................. 2,920.00
$3,013.00

11. That the claimant has received no benefits or reimbursements, directly or indirectly, from any other source, nor is he entitled to such benefits from any other source, as the result of his injuries, with the exception of Public Aid benefits referred to in ¶7, 8 and 9. These Public Aid benefits have been set off against the expenses that the claimant incurred. The calculation of pecuniary loss is based upon expenses that the claimant has incurred which are in excess of the Public Aid Assistance.

12. That in determining the amount of compensation to which the applicant is entitled, the Act states that this Court shall deduct $200.

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $2,813.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $2,813.00 be awarded the claimant, Steve Nagy, the victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars And Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund to Steve Nagy as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $1,813.01 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-14
    Celia Spivak, on behalf of Lewis B. Spivak, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 23, 1975.

    Celia Spivak, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on June 20, 1974, at 3801 West Cermak Road, Chicago, Illinois. Celia Spivak, wife of the deceased victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "The Act.”)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband, Lewis B. Spivak, age 55, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder,” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 9-1).

2. That on June 20, 1974, the claimant’s husband was found shot and lying on the office floor of the Standard Automotive Warehouse Company building at 3801 West Cermak Road, Chicago, Illinois.

3. That the statements taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of any provocation or wrongful act on the part of the decedent.

4. That the victim died on June 20, 1974, as a result of the wounds he received in the shooting of the same day. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That a Coroner’s Inquest upon the body of the victim was held on August 9, 1974. That the verdict of the Coroner’s Jury found this incident to have been murder.

6. That the assailant(s) remain unknown at this time, and police investigation into the case still continues.

7. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant(s) were related or sharing the same household.

9. That the criminal offense was reported promptly to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

9. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of support to herself and her child, Susan, age 16.

10. That at the time of his death, Lewis B. Spivak was 55 years old, and had a life expectancy to age 74.6 according to Vital Statistics of the U.S. 1970, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Public Health Service mortality table for the U.S. population. Therefore, we must conclude that the decedent’s family has lost his financial support for the remainder of his normal life expectancy, computed to be 19.6 years.

11. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding his death" were $2,650.00, but earnings of only $500.00 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of support, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

"... loss of support shall he determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.”

12. That, based upon the victim’s normal life expectancy of 19.6 years, and taking $500.00 per month as his average monthly earnings, the loss of support to his family is computed to be an amount far in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum amount that can be awarded as compensation under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

13. That, in addition to loss of support, the claimant incurred funeral expeneses and numerous coroner’s costs which were covered by insurance benefits and other compensation programs, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

Coroner’s Reports .................................$ 22.50
Coroner’s Inquest Fee.................•............. 30.60
Death Certificates................................. 13.00
Funeral......................................... 1,797.25
$1,863.35

14. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000.00) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death, and deduction of $200.00, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000.00 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point, we are adopting a recent opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth (1973) 296 N.E. 2d 477.

.15. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by §7 (d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $54,184.87. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in paragraph 12 and 13, leaves the amount of the actual loss sustained by the claimant and her child far in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum amount that can be awarded under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime. Hence, the claimant and her child are entitled to an award in the maximum amount payable under the Act, $10,000.00.

The Court takes notice of the fact that the daughter of the deceased victim, who is named in paragraph 9 of this opinion, was also dependent on Lewis B. Spivak, as was his surviving spouse, Celia Spivak, the claimant, and the mother of the decedent’s said child.

Under the circumstances the Court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in §8(b):

"(b) If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for (her) support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it (the court) shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled, and (3) order that those amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor incompetent, to his (her) guardian or conservator, as the case may be.”

To comply strictly with the above legislative directive, it would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution of the $10,000.00 award in accordance with the rule of distribution stated in §11(1) of the Probate Act. This rule would allow cine-third ($3;333.33) to the victim’s surviving spouse, and the remaining two-thirds to the victim’s child. This would create a separate estate in the amount of $6,666.66 for Susan Spivak, age 16.

However, to make distribution in this matter, we believe would impose an undue hardship on the mother. If the $10,000.00 award were paid to her in a lump sum, she would be holding $6,666.66 in trust for her child. Although she is guardian of her daughter’s person, she would have no power to administer her child’s estate, nor use her child’s funds unless she is duly appointed guardian of the daughter’s estate as provided by law. Perry v. Carmichael (1880) 95 Ill. 519. After such appointment she would be required to manage her child’s funds frugally under the direction of the appointing Court and present periodic accounts of her guardianship to such court. She would also be responsible for Court costs and any legal expenses required in filing her petition for appointment, oath, surety bonds and accounts.

To obviate the necessity of the claimant being appointed guardian of her daughter’s estate and considering all facts in this case, the court believes that the best interest of the victim’s family would be served by our ordering that this award be disbursed to the claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized in §8(a) (4) of the Act. As the natural guardian of her daughter, the mother has a legal obligation to provide for the child’s suitable support and education. In fulfilling, this obligation, we believe she would necessarily be required to expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and nurture of her daughter well as for her own necessities.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $10,000.00 be awarded to the claimant and her daughter, collectively, as persons who were all dependent for their support on Lewis B. Spivak, the deceased victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the aforesaid award be paid to the claimant, Celia Spivak, in twenty (20) equal monthly installments of $500.00 each. The Court directs that said monthly payments shall be made from the Court of Claims Fund insofar as it is legally possible to do so.


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    (No. 75-CV-54
    Dolly S. Colemen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 23, 1975.

    Dolly S. Coleman, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 29, 1974, at approximately 2:30 p.m., on Lake Street near Austin Boulevard, Oak Park, Illinois. Dolly Coleman, claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on June 29, 1974, the claimant was struck and knocked down by a bicycle ridden by an 11-year-old boy. Both her wrists were fractured. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court.

4. There was no indication whatsoever that the claimant was a relative or ever shared the same household with the assailant.

5. There was no evidence to indicate that the claimant’s injuries were attributable to her wrongful act or substantial provocation of her assailant.

6. All claimant’s medical and hospital bills were paid by Public Aid.

7. Claimant was unemployed and, therefore, suffered no loss of earnings as a result of her injury.

8. The only pecuniary loss sustained by the claimant was $12/day for 75 days or $900 she paid a woman to take care of her by cooking, shopping, cleaning, and other household help.

9. Claimant has met the statutory filing time for all necessary documents.

10. The Attorney General’s office has verified the facts of this case and submits that the requirements of the Act have not been met and the claim is, therefore, not compensable thereunder.


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    (No. 75-CV-71
    Larry Starling, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 23, 1975.

    Larry Starling, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on October 27, 1973, at 7927 South Crandon, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Larry Starling a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70 Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "fZte Act.”)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Larry Starling, age 23, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery,” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 28, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on October 27, 1973, claimant was shot during a robbery in front of the home of his girlfriend.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the victim for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from October 28,1973, to December 15,1973, as a result of the injuries he received in the shooting of October 27, 1973. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

7. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding his death were $479.36. The claimant missed three months and 14.5 days as a result of his injury. Using the Court accepted method of calculating compensable lost earnings, one month’s earnings is divided by 30.4, the average days in a month, and multiplied by 14.5, the days lost beyond full months. This total of $228.64 is added to the total of $497.36 multiplied by three months, or $1,438.08. The sum of these figures is $1,666.72.

8. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical, and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) South Shore Hospital...........................$13,782.41
2) Medical..................................... 2,470.00
$16,252.41

9. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefits of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $15,885.58. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in paragraphs 7 and 8, leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the claimant of $1,833.55.

10. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all requirements of this Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $1,833.55 be awarded to claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred and Ninety Nine Dollars and Ninety Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $833.56 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 75-CV-77
    Edith Lopez, on behalf of Octavio Lopez, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 23, 1975.

    Edith Lopez, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occured on March 18, 1974, at 4501 West Sixteenth Street, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Edith Lopez, wife of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband Octavio Lopez, age 28, was a victim of a violent crims, as defined in §2(c) of the Act to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 38, §9-1.)

2. That on March 18,1974, claimant’s husband was shot as he boarded a C.T.A. Bus at 16th and Kilbourn. Prior to the shooting, Octavio Lopez had been leaving his place of employment, Brock & Rankin, 4501 West 16th Street, Chicago, Illinois.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation or wrongful act by the decedent for the shooting of him at the C.T.A. bus stop.

4. That the victim died on March 18, 1974, as a result of the injuries he received in the shooting of March 18, 1974. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the three suspects were charged with the murder of the victim. However, there were no eye witnesses and the three were discharged for lack of probable cause.

6. That the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of support to herself and her son, Octavio, Jr., infant.

9. That the claimant has proved to the Court’s satisfaction that her loss of support as a result of the victim’s death was well over $10,000 which is the maximum amount compensable under the Act.

10. That, in addition to loss of support, the claimant incurred funeral expenses for the victim and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for this item is as follows:

Funeral.........................................$1,291.00

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d). shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death, and deduction of $200, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point, we are adopting a recent opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth (1973) 296 N.E.2d 477.

12. That in the claim before us, the only benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were Public Aid benefits of $117/month. This amount has been deducted in determining the amount of loss of support in ¶9. The statutory deducting of $200, having been deducted from the amount of loss as calculated in ¶9 and 10 leaves the amount of loss sustained by the claimant and her son far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime. Hence, the claimant and her son are entitled to an award in the maximum amount payable under the Act, $10,000.

The Court takes note of the fact that the minor son of the deceased victim, who is named in 1Í8 of this opinion, was also dependent on Octavio Lopez as was his surviving spouse, Edith Lopez, the claimant, and the mother of decedent’s minor son who is an infant.

Under these circumstances the Court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in §8(b):

"(b) ... If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made a person dependent for (her) support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it (the court) shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled, and (3) order that those amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor or incompetent, to his (her) guardian or conservator, as the case may be.”

To comply strictly with the above legislative directive, it would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution of the $10,000 award in accordance with the rule of distribution stated in §11(1) of the Probate Act. This rule would allow one-third ($3,333.33) to the victim’s surviving spouse, and the remaining two-thirds ($6,666.66) to the victim’s minor son.

However, to make distribution in this manner, we believe would impose an undue hardship on the mother. If the $10,000 award were paid to her in a lump sum, she would be holding $6,666.66 in trust for her minor son. Although she is guardian of his person, she would have no power to administer his estate nor use his funds unless she is duly appointed guardian of her minor son’s estate as provided by law. Perry v. Carmichael (1880) 95 Ill. 519. After such appointment she would be required to manage her son’s funds frugally under the direction of the appointing Court and present periodic accounts of her guardianship to such Court. She would also be responsible for court costs and any legal expenses required in filing her petition for appointment, oath, surety bond and accounts.

To obviate the necessity of the claimant being appointed guardian of her son’s estate, and considering all other facts in this case, the Court believes that the best interest of the victim’s family would be served by our ordering that this award be disbursed to the claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized in §8(a) (4) of the Act. As the natural guardian of her minor son, the mother has a legal obligation to provide for his suitable support and education. In fulfilling this obligation, we believe she would necessarily be required to expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and nurture of her son as well as for her own necessities.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $10,000 be awarded to the claimant and her minor son, collectively, as persons who were both dependent for their support on Octavio Lopez, the deceased victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the aforesaid award be paid to the claimant, Edith Lopez, in twenty (20) equal monthly installments of $500 each. The court directs that said monthly payments shall be made from the Court Of Claims Fund insofar as it is legally possible to do so.


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    (No. 75-CV-82
    Veola Adams, on behalf of Bernard Romel Adams, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 23, 1975.

    Veola Adams, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on May 18, 1974, at 5266 South State Street, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Veola Adams, mother of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased son, Bernard Romel Adams, age 22, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on May 18, 1974, the claimant’s son was found shot on a stairwell of the Robert Taylor Public Housing Project, 5266 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois.

3. That the victim died on May 18, 1974, as a result of the injuries he received in the shooting of that date. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

4. That the two alleged assailants, Jimmie Edward Armstrong of 5450 S. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, and Sherman Harris, were indicted in Cook County on charges of murder.

5. That the Chicago Police Department investigation of this case has revealed that the victim was a reported member of the Black Stone Rangers street gang. The police investigation has also stated that one of the assailants has gang affiliations with the Cobra Stones, a rival street gang. That these investigations, however, have not shown any connection between the victim’s reported gang membership and his murder, and therefore that there is no evidence of any substantial direct provocation or wrongful act on the part of the victim.

6. That the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for funeral expenses incurred by her as a result of the victim’s death. That these expenses were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

Funeral......................................... $850.00

9. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

We interpret this provision to mean that the deduction of $200 shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act.

10. That the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in §8, leaves the amount of actual loss sustained by the claimant as $650.00. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award totaling $650.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $650.00 be awarded to the claimant, Veola Adams, as a relative who incurred funeral expenses as a result of the death of her son, Bernard Romel Adams, the deceased victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-95
    Coresia Washington, on behalf of Cornell Washington, a minor, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 23, 1975.

    Coresia Washington, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on June 3, 1974, at the vicinity of 112 North Lotus, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Coresia Washington, the claimant, seeks payment of compensation for injuries incurred by her dependent son, Cornell Washington, pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, §70 et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Aci”.)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s dependent son, Cornell Washington, age 18, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on June 3, 1974, the claimant’s son was shot by Charles Keesee after the victim had refused to participate in robberies planned by the assailant. Prior to the shooting, the victim was sitting with his girlfriend on the porch of her home.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries for which he was hospitalized and received surgery. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in the opinion by reference.

5. The assailant, Charles Keesee, Indictment No. 74-1810, was convicted of aggravated battery in Cook County Criminal Court on August 12, 1974.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim at the time of his injury was unemployed and not contributing to the support of the claimant.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses for the victim which were not covered by insurance or other compensation, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital (Loretto) ..............................$4,739.50
2) Medical...................................... 998.00
$5,737.50

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this court —

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, no benefits were received by the claimant, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in H9, leaves an amount of $5,537.00 as the actual compensable loss sustained by the claimant.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $5,537.50 be awarded to the claimant, Coresia Washington, as a relative who assumed the hospital and medical expenses for Cornell Washington, her dependent son and the victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-nine Dollars and Ninety-nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $4,537.51 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 75-CV-113
    Ronald M. Reed, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 23, 1975.

    Ronald M. Reed, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on July 30, 1974, at 1504 East 84th Place, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Ronald M. Reed, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims’ Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Ronald M. Reed, age 23, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery.” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on July 30,1974, claimant was shot during a robbery attempt by a man in the vestibule of the claimant’s home.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no substantial evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries for which he was hospitalized and received surgery. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant has not yet been identified.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. No evidence was presented to indicate that the claimant’s injuries were attributable to claimant’s "wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant.”

9. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding his injury were $1,296.00 per month, but earnings of only $500.00 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of earnings, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

". . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.”

That, based on the Court accepted method of calculating salary losses over a portion of a month average monthly income ($500.00) divided by the average number of days in a month (30.4) multiplied by the number of days out of work (seven months, three days) the claimant’s compensable losses due to lost work days may be determined to total $3,549.34.

10. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital $9,331.00
2) Medical 325.00

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000.00) Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $9,466.00. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in §9, leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the claimant of $3,539.34.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $3,449.34 be awarded to the claimant, Ronald M. Reed, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred-ninety-nine Dollars and ninety-nine cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $2,449.35, be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 75-CV-154
    Ray Fentress, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 23, 1975.

    Ray Fentress, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on October 27, 1974, at 6537 South Western, Chicago, Illinois. Ray Fentress, a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat, 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application’ Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Ray Fentress, age 21, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on October 27, 1974, the claimant was stabbed in the abdomen while fighting outside the Proud Mary Lounge on 6537 South Western, Chicago, Illinois.

3. That the victim was hospitalized from October 27, 1974, to November 6, 1974, and from December 9, 1974, to December 16, 1974, as a result of the incident. A further and more detailed investigation considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

4. That statements taken by police investigators shortly after the crime present substantial evidence that the victim provoked the attack. Statements of claimant to the Attorney General further verify evidence of provocation; that the claimant had been drinking to the point of intoxication immediately prior to the incident; that the claimant on at least four separate occasions admitted starting the fight that led to the injury claimed herein. According to §3(f) of the Act, "A person is entitled to compensation under this Act if the injury to or the death of the victim was not substantially attributable to his wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant.”

It is therefore the finding of this Court that the claimant has failed to meet a required condition precedent to his right to compensation under the Act.

Therefore, the Court finds that no compensation in this claim is authorized under the aforesaid Act. Accordingly, this matter is closed.


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    (No. 75-CV-157
    Howard Roy Weitzman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 23, 1975.

    Howard Roy Weitzman, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred December 4, 1974, at the 12th Street Beach, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Howard Roy Weitzman, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, §70, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Howard Roy Weitzman, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on July 7, 1974, at approximately 6:30 p.m., the claimant was visiting the beach area of the 12th Street Beach with his wife, Harriet Weitzman, daughter, Ardin Weitzman, and his daughter’s friend, Julie Orlensky. The claimant stated that a group of male Latinos were creating a disturbance on the beach. Several of the youths appeared to attack a couple who were sitting near the rocks. Then the group began to flee. Claimant further stated that as they passed his family, one of the Latinos knocked his daughter and his daughter’s friend to the ground. Claimant then grabbed the youth who had attacked his daughter and began to punch him about the face and body. The claimant, in defense of his daughter, was on top of the Latino punching him in the face when several of the Latino friends came back. One of the youths struck the victim in and about the head and shoulder area with a baseball bat. The Latinos then fled the area on foot.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any wrbngful act or provocation by the claimant, substantial enough to bar his claim.

4. That claimant was taken to the first aid station at the beach and then transported to Mercy Hospital by police car where he was treated for his injuries by Dr. Edwin S. Sinaiko. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. However, the assailants have not been identified at this time.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation for medical expenses and loss of earnings.

8. That the claimant was unable to work from July 7, 1974 to July 23, 1974, as a result of his injury, a total of 16 days.

9. That the claimant has proved to the Court’s satisfaction that his loss of earnings compensable under the statute was $263.15.

10. That in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital ...................................... $205.00
2) Medical....................................... $300.00
$505.00

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) "shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the ‘Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

12. That, in the claim before us, the claimant has not received any benefits from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in paragraphs 9 and 10, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $568.15. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $568.15. i.e.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $568.15 be awarded to Howard Roy Weitzman, as an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-98
    Guy Gettis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Guy Gettis, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of a criminal aggravated assault on July 13, 1974, in Centreville, St. Clair County, Illinois. Guy Gettis seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the Act).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant was a victim of a violent crime, as covered under the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Assault”, (Ill. Rev. Stats., 1973, ch. 38, sec. 12-2).

2. That on July 13, 1974, claimant answered a knock at the door of his home at or about 10:00 p.m. at 6030 Laura Street, Centreville, Illinois, at which time claimant was shot twice in the abdomen. As a result of these gunshot wounds, claimant was hospitalized for a period from July 13, 1974, to July 23, 1974.

3. That said crime was promptly reported to the Centreville Police Department and that claimant at all times has cooperated with law enforcement officials, but that the assailant is unidentified and the investigation is continuing.

4. Claimant, as indicated by the report of the Attorney General, did not provoke the incident nor is the incident a result of any wrongful act of the claimant.

5. No evidence indicates that claimant is related to or a member of the same household as the assailant.

6. Claimant has suffered pecuniary loss in excess of $200 compensable under the Act as follows:

Hospital.........................................$1,897.75
Doctor.......................................... 265.00

7. Claimant was self-employed at the time of this incident but has been able to establish prior earnings in excess of $500 per month. Claimant was unable to work for a period of 22 days subsequent to this incident. Section 74 of the Act states loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the injury or $500 per month, whichever is less. Based upon the figure of $500 per month and claimant’s inability to work the 22 days, claimant’s pecuniary loss of earnings is $311.84.

8. Claimant has not received nor is he entitled to receive any benefits as a result of this incident.

9. Pursuant to Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973, chap. 70, par. 71, this Court must deduct the first $200 of pecuniary loss.

10. A Supplemental Investigatory Report filed by the Attorney General in this matter indicates that Mr. Guy Gettis presently has an outstanding obligation to the State of Illinois for license plate fees in the amount of $654. Although the Court shall not recognize any liens on awards to applicants, except as provided under section 80d of the Act, this Court shall be guided by all the statutes of the State of Illinois, Chapter 15, Sec. 210.05 of Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973, provides that:

"Whenever any person shall he entitled to a warrant on the treasury or on other funds held by the State Treasurer or any account whatever, against whom there shall be any account or claim in favor of the state, then due and payable, the Comptroller, upon notification thereof, shall ascertain the amount due and payable to the State, as aforesaid, and draw a warrant on the treasury or on other funds held by the State Treasurer, stating the amount for which the party was entitled to a warrant, the amount deducted therefrom, and on what account, directing the payment of the balance; . .

The award due Mr. Gettis shall be reduced by the indebtedness to the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois for license plate fees as evidenced by the Supplemental Investigatory Report.

11. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,620.59 (One Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Dollars And Fifty Nine Cents) be awarded Guy Gettis as a victim of a violent crime and that the indebtedness to the Secretary of State in the sum of $654 is hereby satisfied.


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    (No. 75-CV-101
    Donald L. Doty, Sr., Administrator, and Dee Ann Doty, Charles L. Doty, Jr. and Rhonda Doty, on behalf of Charles L. Doty, Sr., Deceased, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Donald L. Doty, Sr., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 12, 1974, at 5th & Martin Luther King Drive, East St. Louis, St. Clair County, Illinois. Donald L. Doty, Sr., brother of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973, Ch. 70, Par. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased brother, Charles L. Doty, age 42, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on March 12, 1974, claimant’s brother was shot by three men in the process of robbing Guccion’s Market where the deceased was employed as a security guard.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the decedent for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim died on March 12, 1974, as a result of gunshot wounds he received on that date. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the three assailants, George Macklin, Darnell Carpenter, and Aaron Donald, were arrested and are pending trial for murder in St. Clair County.

6. That the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the application of Donald L. Doty, Sr. has been amended to include the children of Charles L. Doty, deceased, being Charles L. Doty, Jr. [age 9], Dee Ann Doty [age 12] and Rhonda Sue Doty [age 7],

9. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the two months immediately preceding his death were $400.

10. Based upon the victim’s normal life expectancy of 31 years and taking $400 per month as his average earnings, the loss of support to his family is computed to be an amount far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded as compensation under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

11. Donald L. Doty, Sr., has paid reasonable funeral expenses for the deceased victim in the amount of $1,862.20.

12. That the claimants did not receive, nor are they entitled to any benefits as a result of this incident. The claimants’ petition for compensation under the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act was denied.

13. That this Court recognizes that Donald L. Doty, Sr., is due $1,862.20 for monies expended for the funeral of the deceased victim. The children of the deceased are due $8,137.80 to be distributed to them equally after appointment of a legal guardian.

14. That, in compliance with the statutory requirement, $200 must be deducted from the total loss sustained. This Court intends that the statutory $200 be deducted from the award to Donald L. Doty, Sr.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $1,662.20 (One Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Two Dollars And Twenty Cents) be awarded Donald L. Doty, Sr., and that $8,137.80 (Eight Thousand One Hundred Thirty Seven Dollars And Eighty Cents) be awarded the children of Charles L. Doty named in 1Í8, the said amounts to be divided equally among the 3 of them so that Dee Ann Doty, Charles L. Doty, Jr., and Rhonda Sue Doty will each receive the sum of $2,712.60.


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    (No. 75-CV-402
    Diane L. Swift, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Schooley and Hartman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on July 11, 1974, at 3015 Marshall Street, Granite City, Illinois. Diane L. Swift, claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, par. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act’).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Diane L. Swift, age 26, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Par. 12-4).

2. That on July 11, 1974, claimant was stabbed by a juvenile when she discovered him inside her home.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the decedent for the attack upon her by the juvenile.

4. That a further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant, a minor, was charged with aggravated battery and robbery and was given one year of probation by the Madison County Circuit Court, Juvenile Division.

6. That the victim and the assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for pecuniary loss in the amount of $451.45, as follows:

Hospital . $338.20
Doctor . . . . . .60.00
Medicine . . .28.25
Ambulance . . .25.00

9. That claimant does not claim any loss of income.

10. That this claimant is not entitled to nor has she received any benefits as a result of this criminal offense.

11. That the claimant did not provoke the incident.

12. That this Court must deduct the first $200 in pecuniary loss from any award that this claimant might be entitled to.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $251.45 (Two Hundred Fifty One Dollars And Forty Five Cents) be awarded claimant, Diane L. Swift, as a victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-22
    June Tanaka, on behalf of Laura Tanaka, a minor, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on December 12, 1973, at the vicinity of the 2000 block of Church Street, Evanston, Cook County, Illinois. June Tanaka, the claimant, seeks payment of compensation for injuries incurred by her dependent daughter, Laura Tanaka, pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, §71 et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”.)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s dependent daughter, Laura Tanaka, age 15, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2 (c) of the Act, to wit:

"Rape” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §11-1); and "Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on December 12, 1973, the claimant’s daughter sustained a knife wound to her hand and was subsequently raped. Prior to the incident, the victim was walking home from school.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries for which she was hospitalized and received surgery. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of the said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in the opinion by reference.

5. The assailants, Walter Leroy Palmer and Bryon Turner, stood trial for rape and aggravated battery. Palmer was committed to the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Turner was convicted and given five (5) years probation.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and her assailants were related or sharing the same household.

8. That the victim at the time of her injury was unemployed and not contributing to the support of the claimant

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses for the victim which were not covered by insurance or other compensation, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital (Skokie)...............................$2,295.55
2) Medical......................................$1,245.00
$3,540.55

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7 (d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

That, in the claim before us, no benefits were received by the claimant, as contemplated by §7 (d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in f 9, leaves an amount of $3,340.55 as the actual compensable loss sustained by the claimant.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $3,340.55 be awarded to the claimant, June Tanaka, mother of the victim, who assumed the hospital and medical expenses for Laura Tanaka, her dependent daughter and the victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-74
    Donald E. Stebbing, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    Donald E. Stebbing, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on April 1, 1974, at the corner of Chicago Avenue and Sedgwick Street, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Donald E. Stebbing, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70 §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Donald Stebbing, age 63, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2 (c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on April 1, 1974, the claimant was beaten while being robbed by two assailants.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from April 1, 1974, to April 1974, and received treatment for injuries sustained in the beating. In addition, the claimant remained under the care of his private doctor, J. C. Adrian, from April 2, 1974, to June 7, 1974. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the two assailants have not been identified or apprehended. The case remains under investigation by the Chicago Police Department.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and the claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his injury were $750.00, but earnings of only $500.00 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of earnings, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act.

". . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

That based on the Court accepted method of calculating salary losses over a portion of a month — average days in a month (30.4) multiplied by the number of days out of work (16) — the claimant’s compensable losses due to lost work days may be determined to total $263.04.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital ..................................... $552.00
2) Medical...................................... $110.00
3) Loss of Salary................................. $263.04
$925.04

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7 (d) of the Act states that this Court:

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State, or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”

That, in the claim before us, the claimant received no benefits from other sources, as contemplated by Sec. 7 (d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 119, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant, as $725.04.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $725.04 be awarded to the claimant, Donald E. Stebbing, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-140
    William J. Fandl, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    William J. Fandl, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on April 12, 1974, at 5258 S. Laflin, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, William J. Fandl, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70 & 71 et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, William J. Fandl, age 27, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of, the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery.” (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on April 12, 1974, claimant was stabbed while walking home with a friend.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no substantial evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries for which he was hospitalized and received surgery. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailants has been identified and indicated and the case is still pending.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. No evidence was presented to indicate that the claimant’s injuries were attributable to claimant’s "wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant.”

9. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding his injury were $584.13 per month, but earnings of only $500.00 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of earnings, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act.

. . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceeding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.”

That, based on the Court accepted method of calculating salary losses over a portion of a month — average monthly income ($500) divided by the average number of days in a month (30.4) multiplied by the number of days out of work (2 months and 11 days) the claimant’s compensable losses due to lost work days may be determined to total of $1,180.92.

10. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1. Hospital......................................$2,948.25
2. Medical...................................... 523.16

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the "Workmen’s Compensation Act,” or from the local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by Sec. 7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $3,505.46. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in Sec. 9, leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the claimant of $946.87.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $946.87 be awarded to the claimant, William J. Fandl, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-161
    Douglas Poindexter, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    Douglas Poindexter, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the application of the claimant together with the Investigative Report of the Attorney General and Court being fully advised in the premises finds that although the victim incurred expenses for which compensation is sought, these expenses were entirely reimbursed by Public Aid. Pursuant to the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, §71 et seq.), Public Aid benefits are deductible from the loss sustained by the claimant. Because a minimum of $200 must be incurred pursuant to the act, the claimant is unfortunately not eligible for compensation under the Act. Accordingly, this claim must be and is hereby dismissed.