author: FORD, J,

text:
    Nunez v. Dept. of Transportation

      C.P. of Lehigh County,
    no. 2008-C-1369.

      Timothy Peter Wile, for appellants.

      Joel West Williams, for appellee.
    October 22, 2010
   FORD, J,

— By two administrative orders, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”), indicated it permanently suspended Nunez Auto, Inc.’s license as an emission inspection station and imposed fines totaling $15,000 on that corporation for improperly furnishing emission inspection certificates and for inspection record keeping violations. By two additional administrative orders, PennDOT indicated it permanently suspended Larry Nunez’s license as an official emission inspector for the same acts and omissions. Nunez Auto and Mr. Nunez appealed these suspensions to this court. By order entered on June 16, 2010,1 granted the appeal in part and denied it in part. Nunez Auto and Mr. Nunez then filed the present notice of appeal challenging the order of June 16, 2010. As I explain in this opinion prepared pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.

Procedural History

This litigation arose from two audits of Nunez Auto, Inc. conducted by PennDOT in April and September of 2006. These audits focused on three separate vehicle emission inspections performed by appellants in 2006. PennDOT contends that, based on model year of these vehicles, appellants should have performed” on board diagnostic (OBD) tests” on them, rather than the visual emission tests that were actually performed.

On August 21, 2007, a hearing examiner for the Pennsylvania Emissions Team conducted two administrative hearings on the two audits of Nunez Auto, Inc., For the convenience of Mr. Nunez, both hearings were conducted on the same day, one immediately after the other.

On March 19, 2008, PennDOT sent appellants a set of administrative orders which specified the sanctions imposed on them as a result of an audit performed in April of 2006. As to Nunez Auto, its certificate of appointment as an official emission inspection station was suspended for a period of one year for improper certificates of emission inspection on two of the vehicles. PennDOT also imposed $2,500 in fines on Nunez Auto for these violations. Additionally, it imposed another one year suspension and a $2,500 fine on Nunez Auto for improper record keeping. As to Mr. Nunez, PennDOT suspended his license as an official emission inspector for one year for improper certificates of emission inspection on the same two vehicles. It also suspended his license for a second year for improper record keeping.

On March 20, 2008, PennDOT sent another set of administrative orders to appellants regarding a third vehicle. These orders announced the sanctions imposed on appellants as a result of an audit performed in September of 2006. In the order addressed to Nunez Auto, PennDOT permanently suspended the corporation’s certificate of appointment as an official emission inspection station and imposed a $5,000 fine for furnishing a fraudulent certificate of emission inspection. PennDOT also imposed an additional $5,000 fine on Nunez Auto for fraudulent record keeping. In the order sent to Mr. Nunez, PennDOT permanently suspended his license as an official emission inspector for furnishing the inspection certificate for the third vehicle. Mr. Nunez’s suspension was also based on his committing an improper record keeping violation.

On March 26, 2008, Nunez Auto and Mr. Nunez filed statutory appeals from PennDOT’s administrative orders of March 19, 2008, and March 20, 2008. By statute, the suspension and fine imposed against the station had to be appealed to the court of common pleas. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 933(a)(1)(h). The suspension and fine imposed against Mr. Nunez, personally, required a direct appeal to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. See Mihadas v. Department of Transportation, 741 A.2d 249, 250 n.1. (Pa.Cmwlth. 1999). The penalties were appealed to the proper courts. The commonwealth court, acting on a motion by Mr. Nunez, transferred his appeal to this court to be heard with the Nunez Auto appeal.

PennDOT orally moved to quash Nunez Auto and Mr. Nunez’s single appeal during a hearing on this issue conducted on June 1, 2009. PennDOT made a jurisdictional argument that appellants erred in filing one appeal from the two separate sets of administrative orders issued to both Mr. Nunez and Nunez Auto. By order dated September 10, 2009, I denied the motion to quash the appeal.

A hearing on the merits of the appeal was conducted on March 1, 2010. Counsel for PennDOT presented as a witness John Griscom who conducted the audits of Nunez Auto in April and September of 2006. Mr. Nunez also testified at the hearing.

On June 16, 2010, I entered an order granting the appeal in part and denying it in part. As PennDOT did, I found that appellants improperly furnished emission inspection certificates and that appellants committed improper record keeping. For these, I imposed the same sanctions as PennDOT previously did. PennDOT, in its brief submitted after the March 1, 2010, hearing, stated that it was no longer attempting to prove fraudulent record keeping. Therefore, by what was in essence an agreement, I reversed PennDOT’s finding that appellants committed fraudulent record keeping and vacated all sanctions imposed on appellants as a result of that finding.

On July 14, 2010, appellants filed this appeal to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Appellants challenge the order I entered on June 16,2010, granting in part and denying in part their appeal from PennDOT’s administrative orders.

In response to an earlier order, appellants filed their “concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)” (concise statement) on August 6, 2010.

Findings of Fact

The following findings of fact were ascertained from the evidence presented at the hearing conducted on March 1, 2010. I based the order of June 16, 2010, and the accompanying opinion on these findings.

1. Larry Nunez worked at Nunez Auto, Inc., in 2006 as an official emission inspector certified by PennDOT.

2. Mr. Nunez conducted business through Nunez Auto, Inc., his Pennsylvania Corporation located at 826 Hanover Avenue, Allentown, Pennsylvania. Nunez Auto was also certified by PennDOT as an official emission inspection station.

3. Mr. Nunez knew that all vehicles with model years of 1996 or newer were required to undergo an OBD test.

4. A PennDOT licensed state emission inspector receives training as to the meaning of a vehicle identification number (VIN).

5. From reviewing a VIN, a PennDOT licensed state emission inspector can discern the model year of a vehicle. The tenth item in a VIN indicates a vehicle’s model year.

6. When he was working for Nunez Auto, Inc., in 2006, Mr. Nunez knew that the tenth item of a VIN indicated that vehicle’s model year.

7. On March 18, 2006, Mr. Nunez performed an emission inspection on a 1996 Honda Accord, VIN 1HGCD5632TA216478. As part of the inspection, Mr. Nunez scanned the bar code from the PennDOT issued registration card for the vehicle into his computer system, which was connected to the PennDOT controlled Vehicle Inspection Information Database. Mr. Nunez claimed that the computer inaccurately indicated that the model year for the vehicle was 1995. Additionally, Mr. Nunez reviewed the VIN for this vehicle. From the VIN, he knew or should have known that the correct model year for the vehicle was 1996. Although Mr. Nunez knew or should have known that he was required to perform an OBD test on this vehicle based on its model year, he instead performed a visual emission inspection and gas cap emission test. After conducting these tests, he issued a certificate of emission inspection for the vehicle.

8. On March 30, 2006, Mr. Nunez performed an emission inspection on a 1997 Ford Aerostar, VIN 1FMCA11U4VZA03757. Mr. Nunez scanned the bar code from the PennDOT-issued registration card for the vehicle into his computer system, which was connected to the PennDOT controlled vehicle inspection information database. Mr. Nunez claimedthatthe computer inaccurately indicated that the model year for the vehicle was 1995. Mr. Nunez also examined the VIN for the Ford and thereby knew or should have known that the correct model year for the vehicle was 1996. Although he knew or should have known that he was required to perform an OBD test on this vehicle based on its model year, he performed only a visual emission inspection and gas cap emission test. Following these tests, Mr. Nunez issued a certificate of emission inspection for the vehicle.

9. On August 7, 2006, Mr. Nunez performed an emission inspection on a 1997 Cadillac Brougham, VIN 1G6ET1290VU616766. Mr. Nunez scanned the bar code from the PennDOT issued registration card for the vehicle into his computer system, which was connected to the PennDOT controlled vehicle inspection information database. Mr. Nunez claimedthatthe computer inaccurately indicated that the model year for the vehicle was 1995. During the inspection, Mr. Nunez also reviewed the VIN for this vehicle. From the VIN, Mr. Nunez knew or should have known that the actual model year for the vehicle was 1997. Mr. Nunez knew or should have known that the Cadillac had to undergo an OBD test based on its model year. However, he performed only a visual emission inspection and gas cap emission test on the vehicle. After these tests, Mr. Nunez issued a certificate of emission inspection for the vehicle.

10. On April 24,2006, John Griscom, a quality assurance officer with the Pennsylvania Emissions Team, performed an audit of Nunez Auto, Inc.. He determined that the corporation, acting through Mr. Nunez, had fraudulently entered a lower model year for the Honda Accord and the Ford Aerostar when inspecting those vehicles in March of 2006.

11. Mr. Griscom performed a second audit of Nunez Auto, Inc., on September 21,2006. Through this audit, Mr. Griscom concluded that Nunez Auto fraudulently entered a lower model year for the Cadillac Brougham when Mr. Nunez inspected that vehicle in August of 2006.

Discussion and Conclusions of Law

In their Concise Statement, appellants make the following contentions: (1) the court’s finding that Mr. Nunez had actual knowledge of the correct model years of the vehicles in question is not supported by evidence of record; (2) the court erred in concluding that appellants improperly furnished certificates of emission inspection to the vehicles in question; (3) the court erred in not finding that PennDOT improperly imposed “recidivist” (appellants’ word) punishments (permanent license suspensions) on appellants; (4) the court’s finding that appellants committed improper record keeping is not supported by evidence of record; and (5) the court erred in ruling that “75 Pa.C.S. § 4706(b.l)(v) provided statutory authorization to PennDOT to promulgate administrative regulations imposing civil monetary fines upon emission stations for violations ofPennDOT’s emission regulations.” All of these contentions lack merit.

Evidence of Mr. Nunez’s Actual Knowledge

Appellants contend that the evidence of record does not support my finding as to Mr. Nunez’s actual knowledge. Specifically, appellants challenge my conclusion that Mr. Nunez actually knew that the Honda Accord was a model year 1996, the Ford Aerostar was a model year 1997, and the Cadillac Brougham was a model year 1997. Because the evidence presented at the hearing conducted on March 1, 2010, supports my findings, this contention should be rejected.

During the hearing, PennDOT called Mr. John Griscom, the quality assurance officer from the Pennsylvania Emissions Team. Mr. Griscom was the inspector who actually performed the two audits of Nunez Auto. On direct examination, he testified that, like Mr. Nunez, he was a licensed state emissions inspector. (N.T.,3/1/10, p. 16.) He further explained that state emission inspectors receive training with regard to the meaning of an automobile’s VIN. Id. Mr. Griscom testified that the tenth item of a VIN indicates a vehicle’s model year. (N.T., 3/1/10, p. 13.) Specifically, he testified that a tenth item that is a “T” indicates a model year of 1996, and that a tenth item of “V” indicates a model year of 1997. As noted above, the VIN for the Honda Accord was 1HGCD5632TA216478; the VIN for the Ford Aerostar was 1FMCA11U4VZA03757; and the VIN for the Cadillac Brougham was 1G6ET1290VU616766. I found the testimony of Mr. Griscom to be credible and accurate.

Mr. Nunez testified at the March 1, 2010, hearing. He stated that he inspected the 1996 Honda, the 1997 Ford and the 1997 Cadillac and checked the VIN for each of these vehicles. (N.T., 3/1/10, pp.33-34.) Mr. Nunez claimed that he obtained model year information for the three vehicles by scanning the bar code from the PennDOT issued registration card for each vehicle in his computer system, which is connected to PennDOT’s network. He testified that he did not use the model year information provided in the VINs to check the accuracy of the model year information provided by the computer. (N.T., 3/1/10, pp. 47-48.) Mr. Nunez stated that he never received any training on the meaning of a VIN and that he did not know that information concerning a vehicle’s model year could be ascertained from a VIN. Mr. Nunez admitted that he reviewed the VIN for each of the three vehicles in question.

Mr. Nunez’s initials appear on page 8 of exhibit C-3 introduced at the March 1, 2010 hearing, an inspection record that includes the 1997 Cadillac. On the seventh vehicle inspection report from the top of the page, it expressly lists the VIN for the Cadillac and labels it as a “97 Cadillac CP.”

In my fact-finding role, I assessed Mr. Nunez’s credibility. His claim that he could not tell a vehicle’s year from its VIN is unbelievable. He also was not credible when he testified he did not know the years of these vehicles.

The record supports my finding about Mr. Nunez’s actual knowledge of the years of the vehicles. Credibility assessment was a factor in making this finding.

Finding of improper furnishing of an inspection certificate

Appellants next challenge my finding that appellants improperly furnished emission inspection certificates for the three vehicles. The evidence presented at the hearing established the violations.

A court of common pleas hears appeals from an agency adjudication de novo. See Rutkowski v. Department of Transportation, 780 A.2d 860 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001); and Department of Transportation v. Hays, 36 Pa.Cmwlth. 522, 388 A.2d 1126 (1978). PennDOT has the burden of proving violations of the Motor Vehicle Code and its regulations by a preponderance of the evidence. Firestone Tire & Service Center, O.I.S. No. 798 v. Department of Transportation, 871 A.2d 863, 867 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2005).

Under 67 Pa.Code § 177.427, Subsection (3), “[a] person may not. . . furnish, loan, give or sell certificates of emission inspection and approval to any...other person except upon an emission inspection performed in accordance with this chapter.” 67 Pa.Code § 177.427(3) (emphasis added). Vehicles with a model year of 1996 or newer are required to undergo an OBD test. 67 Pa.Code § 177.51(f)(2).

Mr. Nunez testified that he only tested all three vehicles with visual emission inspections. (N.T., 3/1/10, pp. 34-35.) It is undisputed that the Honda Accord was a 1996 model year vehicle, and the Ford Aerostar and Cadillac Brougham were 1997 model year vehicles. The required test under the Pennsylvania Code for these three vehicles was the OBD test. 67 Pa.Code § 177.51(f)(2). Mr. Nunez did not perform OBD tests on them.

Appellants contend that performing the wrong tests was an understandable mistake. This argument is based upon Mr. Nunez’s repeated assertion that his computer, connected to the PennDOT controlled vehicle inspection information database, incorrectly indicated that these three vehicles were all model year 1995. Even if that statement were true, it does not change the outcome. Under 67 Pa.Code § 177.38(a)(7), “[i]t is the responsibility of the owner of an emission inspection station...to assume full responsibility, with or without actual knowledge, for...[e]very emission inspection conducted at the emission inspection station.” 67 Pa.Code § 177.38(a)(7); see Strickland v. Department of Transportation, 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 605, 609, 574 A.2d 110, 113 (1990) (discussing the strict liability nature of the statute).

Whether there was a scienter requirement or not, Mr. Nunez was not credible in his claim of a mistake in determining the model years of the vehicles.

Because PennDOT presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the appellants furnished emission inspection certificates to the three cars without performing the required tests, I acted properly in affirming PennDOT’s findings.

Application of “Recidivist” Punishments to Appellants

Appellants next argue that this court erred in upholding PennDOT’s decision to treat appellants as repeat offenders and impose permanent revocations of their inspection licenses where appellants were never previously found to have violated PennDOT regulations prior to the issuance of the administrative orders of March 19, 2008, and March 20, 2008. In support of this argument, appellants generally state that “[pjursuant to the recidivist philosophy that is encompassed in PennDOT’s emission inspection regulations, an inspection station or inspector must first be sanctioned for a prior offense before either the station or inspector can be sanctioned as a second offender.” Contrary to the appellants’ contentions, this is not an issue of “recidivist” sanctions, but of PennDOT’s interpretation of its own regulation.

Through 75 Pa.C.S. § 4706(b. l)(l)(v), the Pennsylvania legislature granted PennDOT the power to promulgate regulations governing emission testing “which shall include a schedule of offenses.” Pursuant to this statutory authorization, PennDOT enacted regulations outlining a schedule of offenses relating to improper emission testing. These regulations are codified at 67 Pa.Code § 177.602(a). Under the regulations, PennDOT is authorized to impose a “1 year [suspension] and $2,500 fine” for a first offense of furnishing an emission inspection certificate without inspection, and a “permanent [suspension] and $5,000 fine” for a second offense. 67 Pa.Code § 177.602(a).

At its discretion, PennDOT treated appellants’ offenses pertaining to the Honda Accord and the Ford Aerostar as a single “first offense” and addressed this offense at the first of two hearings conducted on August 21, 2007, before the Pennsylvania Emissions Team. PennDOT imposed a penalty for this first offense through the administrative order of March 19, 2008. PennDOT elected to treat the appellants’ offenses relating to the Cadillac Brougham as a “second offense.” The Pennsylvania Emissions Team conducted a second, separate hearing on August 21, 2007, albeit right after the first hearing, to address this offense. Through the administrative order of March 20, 2008, PennDOT imposed a penalty on appellants for the second offense.

In deciding to treat the conduct pertaining to the Cadillac Brougham as a “second offense,” PennDOT interpreted the language of its own regulation, 67 Pa.Code § 177.602(a). Administrative agencies, such as PennDOT, have broad discretion with respect to interpretations of their own regulations. Spicer v. Department of Public Welfare, 58 Pa.Cmwlth. 558, 560-61, 428 A.2d 1008, 1009 (1981). An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations and regulatory scheme is entitled to deference by the courts. Mathies Coal Co. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 522 Pa. 7, 18, 559 A.2d 506, 512 (1989); and Groce v. Department of Environmental Protection, 921 A.2d 567, 573 n.7 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007). Further, PennDOT’s interpretation of 67 Pa.Code § 177.602(a) was reasonable. Nowhere in that regulation does it state that an emission inspector can be found to have committed a “second offense” only if there is an administrative or judicial finding of committing an offense prior to committing the subsequent offense. For this reason, PennDOT acted within its discretion in treating the conduct pertaining to the Cadillac Brougham as a second offense.

Finding of Improper Record Keeping

Appellants next challenge my determination that appellants engaged in improper record keeping. Contrary to appellants’ assertion, PennDOT successfully demonstrated that appellants engaged in improper record keeping. (As was previously explained in the procedural history, PennDOT conceded that it was not attempting to prove that appellants committed fraudulent keeping.)

The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court defined improper record keeping as “not in accordant with fact, truth, or right procedure, i.e., incorrect [or] inaccurate.” Tropeck v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 847 A.2d 208, 212-13 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2004).

Mr. Nunez claimed that the PennDOT controlled Vehicle Inspection Information Database gave him incorrect model year information for the vehicles. As discussed previously, Mr. Nunez was able to and did obtain accurate model year information on the three vehicles from the VINs. Additionally, the MV-431 for the Cadillac entered into evidence bears Mr. Nunez’s initials next to the information concerning the vehicle indicating that it was a 1997 model. Although Mr. Nunez knew or should have known that the three vehicles had to undergo OBD testing, he performed only visual emission inspections and gas cap emission tests on the vehicles. By documenting these improper inspections, Mr. Nunez committed improper record keeping.

PennDOT’s Authority to Impose Monetary Sanctions

Finally, appellants contend that I erred in finding that PennDOT possessed the authority to impose monetary sanctions for these violations.

Administrative agency regulations, such as those authorizing the imposition of sanctions, are afforded a presumption of validity and reasonableness. Northampton, Bucks County, Municipal Authority v. Department of Environmental Resources, 114 Pa.Cmwlth. 339, 345, 547 A.2d 802, 804 (1988) (citing Department of Environmental Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Company, 490 Pa. 399, 416 A.2d 995 (1980)). Administrative agencies have wide discretion in the performance of their duties. Id. at 344, 547 A.2d at 804 (citing Haycock Township v. Department of Environmental Resources, 108 Pa.Cmwlth. 466, 530 A.2d 514 (1987)).

Appellate courts will only interfere in agencies’ exercise of discretion on proof of fraud, bad faith or blatant abuse of discretion. Id. To determine the validity of an administrative agency regulation, Pennsylvania courts apply a three-pronged test: “(1) the promulgation of the regulation must have been within the granted power of the administrative agency, (2) the regulation was issued pursuant to proper procedure, and (3) the regulation is reasonable.” Id. at 344-45, 547 A.2d at 805 (citing Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Uniontown Area School District, 455 Pa. 52, 313 A.2d 156 (1973)).

This test is satisfied here. First, the issuing of the emission inspection regulations, including the penalty provisions, was a proper exercise of authority. Under 75 Pa.C.S. § 4724(a), PennDOT is authorized to suspend emission inspector certificates for violations of any regulations governing the inspectors. Also, PennDOT was authorized by statute to promulgate regulations governing emission testing “which shall include ■ a schedule of offenses punishable by fine of up to $20,000.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 4706(b.l)(l)(v). A schedule of penalties is set forth in 67 Pa.Code § 177.602(a), which provides for a “1 year [suspension] and $2,500 fine” for a first offense of furnishing an emission inspection certificate without inspection, and a “permanent [suspension] and $5,000 fine” for a second offense. 67 Pa.Code § 177.602(a). These administrative regulations are afforded a presumption of reasonableness and they read as logical and necessary for PennDOT to regulate the emission control program.

Appellants have not demonstrated anything improper about the regulations. From the evidence presented, PennDOT demonstrated that its application of the regulations to the appellants was justified.

For all of the above reasons, the appellants’ appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author:
MOMJIAN, Member,
     PER CURIAM

license: Public Domain

text:
    Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Rentschler

      Disciplinary Board Docket nos. 33 and 127 DB 2009.
    June 30, 2010
   To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:

MOMJIAN, Member,

Pursuant to rule 208(d)(2)(iii) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, the Disciplinaiy Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (“board”) herewith submits its findings and recommendations to your Honorable Court with respect to the above-captioned petition for discipline.

I. HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS

On March 17, 2009, Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition for discipline at No. 33 DB 2009 against Michael D. Rentschler. The petition charged respondent with violations of the rules of professional conduct arising out of two complaints filed by his client, Raymond Tibbens. Respondent filed an answer to petition for discipline on April 7,2009.

On August 19, 2009, Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a second petition for discipline at No. 127 DB 2009 against respondent. The petition charged respondent with violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct arising out of a complaint filed by his client, Dennis Franco. Respondent filed an Answer to petition on September 4, 2009. On September 9, 2009, the petitions for discipline were consolidated for hearing.

A disciplinary hearing was held on October 14, 2009 before a District III Hearing Committee comprised of Chair Mark J. Powell, Esquire, and Members Joseph M. Cosgrove, Esquire, and Brian J. Cali, Esquire. Respondent was represented by Samuel C. Stretton, Esquire.

Following the submission of briefs by the parties, the Hearing Committee filed a Report on February 1, 2010, and concluded that respondent violated the rues of professional conduct as contained in the petitions for discipline. The committee recommended that respondent be suspended for six months, the suspension be stayed, and respondent be placed on probation for a period of two years with conditions.

Petitioner filed a Brief on Exceptions on February 17, 2010. Respondent filed a Brief Opposing Exceptions on March 10, 2010 and requested oral argument.

Oral argument was held on March 26, 2010 before a three member panel of the Disciplinary Board .

This matter was adjudicated by the Disciplinary Board at the meeting on April 14, 2010.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The board makes the following findings of fact:

1. Petitioner, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, located at Pennsylvania Judicial Center, 601 Commonwealth Ave., Suite 2700, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, is invested, pursuant to Rule 207 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, with the power and duty to investigate all matters involving alleged misconduct of an attorney admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and to prosecute all disciplinary proceedings brought in accordance with the rules.

2. Respondent is Michael D. Rentschler. He was born in 1954 and was admitted to the practice of law in this commonwealth in 1986. His registered office address is 28 N. 32nd Street, Camp Hill PA 17011. He is subject to the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

3. Respondent has a record of prior discipline in Pennsylvania. He received an Informal Admonition in 2005 for neglecting clients who were applying for permanent residence in the United States. He failed to file applications and failed to respond to requests from the clients. He failed to return papers and property to clients after his representation was terminated and failed to refund unearned fees until he was notified by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the complaints against him.

4. Respondent received a Private Reprimand in 2008 for his misconduct in two client matters. This misconduct consisted of neglecting his clients’ matters and failing to communicate.

5. On September 12, 2007, respondent met with Raymond Tibbens for the purpose of representing Mr. Tibbens’ wife in becoming a lawful permanent resident of the United States.

6. Respondent took possession of legal documents (birth certificates, marriage license, entry documents, etc.) and agreed to begin work on the case.

7. Mr. Tibbens entered into a non-refundable fee agreement of $ 1500.

8. Although respondent began to fill out various immigration forms, he never completed them.

9. In March of 2008, Tabitha Tanner, Esquire, began representing Mr. and Mrs. Tibbens concerning the immigration matter. She asked respondent to refund the $1500 retainer. Respondent agreed to refund part of the retainer, but did not do so at the time.

10. Respondent sent a bank check for $1500 on June 17, 2008, after receiving a DB-7 Letter from Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

11. In November of 2007, respondent agreed to a flat fee of $800 to represent Mr. Tibbens in a harassment claim against his employer, ECI Group.

12. On November 7, 2007, respondent wrote a letter to William P. Eichelberger of ECI Group. The letter indicated that respondent represented Mr. Tibbens and that he wanted to discuss harassment allegations. Respondent followed the letter with a telephone call to an unknown person at ECI, but was unable to resolve anything.

13. Respondent told Mr. Tibbens that he had earned the $800 and would not return any portion to his client.

14. Respondent was court-appointed to represent Dennis Franco in a Dauphin County criminal case. This matter arose out of respondent’s employment as conflicts counsel. This required respondent to assume representation of assigned cases, with no limit on caseload, for a flat fee. Respondent did not have staff or secretarial assistance.

15. Respondent timely filed an appeal of Mr. Franco’s conviction.

16. Respondent failed to file a timely 1925 (b) statement of matters complained of on Appeal. It was due on August 1, 2008, but respondent filed it late on August 25, 2008. The trial court had already filed its memorandum opinion on August 12, 2008.

17. Respondent’s brief to the Superior Court was due on October 20, 2008. He requested an extension of time on October 23, 2008.

18. The Superior Court granted an extension to file until November 19, 2008; however, respondent failed to timely file the brief or request another extension of time.

19. On February 17, 2009, respondent filed his second request for an extension of time on the basis that he did not have the transcripts.

20. On February 27,2009, the Superior Court remanded the case to Dauphin County for the appointment of new counsel and directed that respondent not be paid further fees due to his failure to timely file a 1925(b) Statement, as well as his extension of time requests.

21. Respondent testified at the disciplinary hearing.

22. Respondent accepted full responsibility for his misconduct. He admits that he did not properly handle the matters for his clients.

23. Respondent was extremely remorseful during the hearing and was clearly embarrassed by his misconduct.

24. Respondent cooperated with office of disciplinary counsel.

25. Respondent has been a sole practitioner since 1994 and is also employed as a conflicts counsel in Dauphin and Cumberland Counties. Prior to 1994, he was employed at several different law firms and as in-house counsel for an insurance company.

26. During the time period of 2006 through early 2009, respondent began using alcohol more frequently, sometimes every day. He was having personal financial difficulties, was anxious and upset, and felt depressed.

27. On July 24, 2009, respondent sought counseling with Deborah Salem, a professional certified addictions counsel with a degree in psychology and sociology. Ms. Salem has 38 years of experience as an out-patient therapist providing mental health and substance abuse treatment services.

28. As of the date of the hearing, respondent had seen Ms. Salem in her professional capacity on three occasions and was planning to continue therapy sessions on a weekly basis.

29. Respondent was placed on Lexapro by a medical doctor, William Bahoney. He began almost immediately to see a significant difference and an improvement in his depressive state.

30. Respondent addressed his alcohol abuse through a self-imposed period of abstinence. At the time of the hearing, respondent admitted he drank an occasional glass of wine but agreed to cease alcohol use as part of his disciplinary sanction.

31. Ms. Salem opined that respondent suffered from depression during the time frame in question and was abusing alcohol as a method of medicating himself.

32. Ms. Salem opined that there is a direct link between respondent’s depression and alcohol abuse and his misconduct.

33.'Ms. Salem’s testimony is credible and persuasive.

34. Respondent introduced the testimony of two character witnesses.

35. Dan Kraft is a friend and neighbor of respondent and has known him for 12 years.

36. Mr. Kraft testified credibly that among the people in the community who know respondent, his reputation is good as a peaceful and law-abiding person

37. David Dyson has known respondent for 18 years as a friend and neighbor. Among the people in the community who know respondent, his reputation is good as a peaceful and law-abiding person.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

By his actions as set forth above, respondent violated the following rules of professional conduct:

1.RPC 1.3 -Alawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

2. RPC 1.4(a)(3) - A lawyer shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.

3. RPC 1.4(a)(4) - A lawyer shall promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.

4. RPC 1.15(a) - A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with a client-lawyer relationship separate from the lawyer’s own property. Such property shall be identified and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of the receipt, maintenance and disposition of such property shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the client-lawyer relationship or after distribution or disposition of the property, whichever is later.

5. RPC 1.15(b)- A lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.

6. RPC 1.15(e) - A lawyer shall deposit into a Trust Account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred, unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the handling of fees and expenses in a different manner.

7. RPC 1.15(g) - All qualified funds shall be placed in an IOLTA account.

8. RPC 8.4(a) - It is professional misconduct for lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.

9. Respondent met his burden of proof by clear and satisfactory evidence that his mental disorder caused his misconduct. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Braun, 553 A.2d 895 (Pa. 1989).

10. Respondent did not violate rules of professional conduct 1.1, 1.5(a), 1.16(d), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).

IV. DISCUSSION

This matter is before the Disciplinary Board for consideration of charges against respondent that he violated the rules of professional conduct in the representation of two clients. Respondent admitted many of the facts and violations of the rules. Respondent testified on his own behalf and introduced expert testimony of a certified addictions counselor. He also introduced the testimony of two character witnesses.

Respondent was initially retained by Mr. Tibbens to secure permanent resident status for his wife. Respondent met with Mr. and Mrs. Tibbens on two occasions, obtained some information from them, and had them sign blank copies of the required immigration forms. Respondent then failed to complete the forms, have his client review them, or file them with the immigration service. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Tibbens retained respondent regarding a harassment claim. Respondent met with Mr. Tibbens on one occasion, wrote a letter to Mr. Tibbens’ employer, and made a telephone call. Nothing else was done with regard to this matter. Respondent testified that he “failed miserably” in his representation of Mr. Tibbens and that he “didn’t do anything for him [Mr. Tibbens].”

In the Franco matter, respondent failed to timely file a 1925(b) statement of matters of complained of on appeal which had been due on August 1, 2008, but which was not filed until August 25, 2008. At that point in time, the trial court had already filed its memorandum opinion. Respondent’s brief to the Superior Court was due on October 20, 2008. He did not file it on time, and instead, made a request for extension of time on October 23,2008, which was granted. Respondent then failed to timely file the brief. Eventually, the Superior Court remanded the case for the appointment of new counsel.

The facts of record support the conclusion that respondent violated rules of professional conduct 1.3, 1.4(a)(3) and (a)(4), 1.15(a)(b)(e) and (g), and 8.4(a). These rules go to the essence of respondent’s misconduct and support a recommendation of discipline. The board further concludes, as did the hearing committee, that respondent did not violate rules of professional conduct 1.1, 1.5(a), 1.16(d), 8.4(c) and 8.4(d). Petitioner made an argument that respondent violated these rules; however, support for finding these violations is not as strongly made out in the facts.

Respondent presented expert testimony from his certified addictions counselor that he suffered from depression and abused alcohol, which caused his misconduct. The board has previously accepted the testimony of a certified addictions counselor as appropriate expert testimony. In re Anonymous No. 56 DB 94, 28 Pa. D. & C. 4th 398 (1995). Respondent sought treatment with Deborah Salem following his feelings of depression and his increased use of alcohol. Ms. Salem credibly testified that respondent suffered from depression and alcohol abuse. She further credibly testified that these conditions were a causal factor in his misconduct. Currently, respondent takes Lexapro and continues cognitive therapy sessions with Ms. Salem to address his depression. His mental health situation is currently stable. The record supports the conclusion that respondent met the Braun standard and is entitled to mitigation. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Braun, 553 A.2d 895 (1989) (a psychiatric disorder that is a causal factor in producing professional misconduct can be considered a mitigating factor.)

The hearing committee has recommended that Respondent be suspended for a period of six months, the suspension stayed in its entirety, and probation imposed for a period of two years with the conditions of psychological counseling and treatment; quarterly reports to the board; a time/practice management course for CLE; and alcohol abstinence with participation in Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers.

Petitioner proposes that the length of the stayed suspension be increased to one year and one day, based on its contention that if respondent should violate his probation, he would be suspended for a year and a day and would be required to go through a formal reinstatement process wherein he would have the burden to prove that he was fit to resume the practice of law. Petitioner’s argument is persuasive, as a longer period of suspension provides a stiffer penalty to respondent in the event of a probation violation and more protection for the public.

Considering respondent’s misconduct in the instant case involving three legal matters, his record of prior discipline for similar misconduct, his depression and abuse of alcohol which was a contributing factor in causing the instant misconduct, and respondent taking medication and obtaining therapy, it is recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one year and one day, the suspension stayed in its entirety and probation of two years with conditions.

V. RECOMMENDATION

The Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania unanimously recommends that the respondent, Michael D. Rentschler, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year and one day, that the suspension be stayed in its entirety and that he be placed on probation for a period of two years, subject to the following conditions:

1. Respondent shall abstain from using alcohol or any other mind altering chemical;
2. Respondent shall regularly attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings on a weekly basis;
3. Respondent shall obtain a sponsor in Alcoholics Anonymous and maintain weekly contact with that sponsor;
4. A sobriety monitor shall be appointed to monitor Respondent in accordance with Disciplinary Board Rule §89.293(c);
5. Respondent shall furnish his sobriety monitor with his Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor’s name, address and telephone number;
6. Respondent shall establish his weekly attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings by providing written verification to the board on a board approved form;
7. Respondent shall undergo any counseling, out-patient or in-patient treatment, prescribed by a physician or alcohol counselor;
8. Respondent shall file with the Secretary of the board quarterly written reports;
9. With the sobriety monitor, respondent shall:
a) meet at least twice a month;
b) maintain weekly telephone contact;
c) provide the necessary properly executed written authorizations to verify his compliance with the required substance abuse treatment; and
d) cooperate fully.
10. The appointed sobriety monitor shall:
a) monitor respondent’s compliance with the terms and conditions of the order imposing probation;
b) assist respondent in arranging any necessary professional or substance abuse treatment;
c) meet with respondent at least twice a month, and maintain weekly telephone contact with respondent;
d) maintain direct monthly contact with the Alcoholics Anonymous chapter attended by the respondent;
e) file with the secretary of the board quarterly written reports; and
f) immediately report to the secretary of the board any violations by the respondent of the terms and conditions of the probation.
11. Respondent shall take a time management course during the first year of his probation and submit proof of completion of the course to the secretary of the board within ten days.
12. Respondent shall not commit any violations of the rules of professional conduct in this or any other jurisdiction where he is admitted to practice, must not commit any criminal violations, and must make quarterly sworn certifications to the board that he is in compliance with this condition.

It is further recommended that the expenses incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter are to be paid by the respondent.

Expenses Incurred in the Investigation and
Prosecution of the above-captioned proceedings*
03/17/2009 12 Copies of Petition for Discipline (33 DB 2009) $48.00
04/07/2009 12 Copies of Answer to 66.00 Petition for Discipline (33 DB 2009)
08/19/2009 12 Copies of Petition for 24.00 Discipline (127 DB 2009)
09/04/2009 12 Copies of Answer to 36.00 Petition for Discipline (127 DB 2009)
02/01/2010 12 Copies of Hearing 114.00 Committee Report
02/17/2010 16 Copies of Office of 138.00 Disciplinary Counsel Brief on Exceptions
05/28/2009 Transcripts of Prehearing 90.00 Conference held 05/12/2009
11/16/2009 Transcripts of Hearing held 505.40 10/14/2009
06/30/2010 Administration Fee 250.00
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE $ 1,271.40

ORDER

PER CURIAM

And now, this August 27, 2010, upon consideration of the report and recommendations of the Disciplinary Board dated June 30, 2010, it is hereby

Ordered that Michael D. Rentschler is suspended from the practice of law in this commonwealth for a period of one year and one day, the suspension is stayed in its entirety and he is placed on probation for a period of two years, subject to the following conditions:

1. Respondent shall abstain from using alcohol or any other mind-altering chemical;
2. Respondent shall attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings on a weekly basis;
3. Respondent shall obtain a sponsor in Alcoholics Anonymous and maintain weekly contact with that sponsor;
4. A sobriety monitor shall be appointed to monitor respondent in accordance with Disciplinary Board rule §89.293(c);
5. Respondent shall furnish his sobriety monitor with his Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor’s name, address and telephone number;
6. Respondent shall establish his weekly attendance at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings by providing written verification to the board on a board-approved form;
7. Respondent shall undergo any counseling, outpatient treatment or in-patient treatment, as prescribed by a physician or alcohol counselor;
8. Respondent shall file with the secretary of the board quarterly written reports;
9. With the sobriety monitor, respondent shall:
a) meet at least twice a month;
b) maintain weekly telephone contact;
c) provide the necessary properly executed written authorizations to verify his compliance with the required substance abuse treatment; and
d)cooperate fully.
10. The appointed sobriety monitor shall:
a) monitor respondent’s compliance with the terms and conditions of the order imposing probation;
b) assist respondent in arranging any necessary professional or substance abuse treatment;
c) meet with respondent at least twice a month and maintain weekly telephone contact with him;
d) maintain direct monthly contact with the Alcoholics Anonymous chapter attended by respondent;
e) file with the secretary of the board quarterly written reports; and
f) immediately report to the secretary of the board any violations by respondent of the terms and conditions of the probation.
11. Respondent shall take a time management course during the first year of his probation and submit proof of completion of the course to the secretary of the board within ten days thereafter.
12. Respondent shall not commit any violations of the rules of professional conduct in this or any other Jurisdiction where he is admitted to practice, shall not commit any criminal violations and shall submit quarterly sworn certifications to the board that he is in compliance with this condition.

It is further ordered that respondent shall pay costs to the Disciplinary Board pursuant to rule 208(g), Pa.R.D.E.


author: MOTTO, P.J.,

text:
    Commonwealth v. Brothers

      C.P. of Lawrence County,
    nos. 1257 and 1258 of 2008, C.R.

      Kathleen Fee-Baird, assistant district attorney, for Commonwealth.

      Bradley G. Olson Jr., for defendant.
    September 23, 2010
   OPINION

MOTTO, P.J.,

— Before the court for disposition is the Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate two pending indictments against defendant Ronald Brothers, docket numbers 1257 and 1258 of2008. The charges filed against defendant Brothers at docket number 1257 are as follows:

I. Rape by Forcible Compulsion, 18 Pa. C.S.A. Section 3121(a)(1);
II. Rape by Threat of Forcible Compulsion, 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3121(a)(2);
III. Robbery, 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3701 (a)( 1 )(iii);
IV. Burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3502(a); and
V. Terroristic Threats, 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 2706.

The charges filed against defendant Brothers at docket number 1258 are as follows:

I. Rape by Forcible Compulsion, 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3121(a)(1);
II. Rape by Threat of Forcible Compulsion, 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3121(a)(2); and
III. Burglary, 18 Pa.C.S.A. Section 3502(a).

The commonwealth currently seeks to consolidate the two indictments in the interest of furthering judicial economy and convenience. The relevant background of the case and the arguments made by the Commonwealth and defendant follows.

I. Factual Background

Case 1257 — On March 31, 1998 at approximately 11:00 P.M. victim Michelle Wills fell asleep in the living room of her 203 Park Ave. apartment with her son. At or around approximately 5:00 A.M. Wills awoke to find an African-American male standing over her brandishing a knife against her throat. The assailant told Wills to remain quiet and to “get rid of her kid.” Wills attempted to cover her throat, and the assailant ran his knife over her hand causing small marks and cuts. Wills instructed her son to go into the other room and when the child left the assailant used the knife to cut off Wills’ clothing.

The assailant attempted to rape Wills but was unable to achieve a full erection. Eventually the assailant was able to achieve penetration, and raped Wills for a short period of time. When the assailant was finished he took Wills’ purse from the end table and removed several items. The assailant then left through the open window through which he had gained his initial entry. Wills called the police and when they arrived she described her attacker as a “black male...kind of heavy set but he was tall.” She was taken to St. Francis Hospital (now Jameson South) where a rape kit was performed. DNA evidence was recovered that would eventually be linked to defendant Ronald Brothers through the use of the CODIS system.

Case 1258 — on August 5, 1998, approximately .5 miles and only a few blocks from the residence of Ms. Wills, a second rape occurred in the late night/early morning. Victim Victoria Potts was asleep in the bedroom of her Lincoln Ave. apartment when she was awoken by a her bed shaking at approximately 3:00 a.m.. At first Potts believed that her cats were the cause, but after the shaking continued Potts rolled over to find an African-American male at the foot of her bed. The man was entirely nude other than a ski-mask/cap and white cloth he had covering his face. The man was holding a knife to Potts’ eyes and repeatedly told her “don’t say a word.” Potts purposefully did not get a good look at her attacker out of fear for her life.

The assailant told her to take down her panties, Potts complied and the assailant put down his knife. The assailant then attempted intercourse with Potts. Unable to achieve an erection, the assailant became agitated and began searching for his knife. Potts could feel the knife next to her head, handed it to the assailant and then fearful of what might happen, helped him achieve an erection. The assailant raped Potts for a short period of time and then got off the bed.

After a few minutes Potts glanced down to see if the male had left the room yet, and witnessed him standing near a post of her bed. Based on this quick glance she estimated that he was between 5’6” and 5’8”, had medium to dark mocha colored skin, and looked relatively fit. Potts immediately returned her gaze to the ceiling where it remained for several more minutes. Eventually she looked down and the male was gone. Potts then called the police. When the police arrived and questioned Potts, she realized that a window and screen that had been previously closed were raised. It was determined that this was the point of entry through which the male gained access to her apartment. Potts was taken to St. Francis hospital were a rape kit was performed. Eventually the DNA from the rape kit was matched to Ronald Brothers through the CODIS system.

On October 26, 2007 it was determined by the Greensburg Laboratory that the seminal fluid taken from both crime scenes and victims belonged to the same individual. When the DNA was run through the CODIS system, the defendant Ronald Brothers came up as a match. A DNA profile of Mr. Brothers was created from a blood sample and two buccal swabs taken from the defendant on November 7, 2007, and on December 12, 2007 each sample was found to be identical to the DNA left at each crime scene. The chances of the DNA profile being a random match for Mr. Brothers is approximately 1 in 19 quadrillion.

The Commonwealth is now seeking to consolidate case No. 1257 and case No. 1258 in the interest of judicial economy. For consolidation to be proper the commonwealth must prove that the evidence of each of the offenses is such that it would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and that the evidence is capable of separation by the jury with no danger of confusion. Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 582(a). It is an established rule in the commonwealth that evidence of separate offenses cannot be introduced at trial for a different offense solely for the purpose of demonstrating the defendant’s criminal predilection, but such evidence can be introduced if it is for the purposes of showing a common plan, scheme, or design in the commission of multiple crimes or for the purposes of establishing the identity of the perpetrator of a set of crimes. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Morris, 493 Pa. 164, 175, 425 A.2d 715, 720 (1981).

The basis of the arguments made by both the commonwealth and the defendant rest on the determination of whether or not sufficient similarities exist between the two crimes to allow the evidence of one to be admitted at trial as evidence of the other. Both the commonwealth and the defendant have cited the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rush, 538 Pa. 104, 646 A.2d 557 (1994) to establish the factors the court must consider in deciding whether consolidation is proper. In Rush, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the elapsed time between the crimes, the geographical proximity of the crime scenes, and the manner in which the crimes were committed must all be considered. Id. at 113, 646 A.2d at 561.

The commonwealth argues that the close proximity of the crimes (mere blocks apart) and the closeness of time between the incidents (only five months), weigh in favor of consolidation. The defendant concedes that the crimes took place in close proximity of one another, but argues that the five month time period is too remote for consolidation to be proper.

Both the commonwealth and the defendant rely on the case of Commonwealth v. Keaton, 556 Pa. 442, 729 A.2d 529 (1999), to make their arguments for and against consolidation. In Keaton, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania allowed the consolidation of three separate sexual assaults and a murder charge stemming from one of the assaults, based on the shared similarities between the three crimes. The Supreme Court identified eight distinct similarities, and based on these similarities held that consolidation of the cases was proper. Id. at 457, 729 A.2d at 537.

In support of consolidation, the commonwealth points out that both victims were single white females living on the north side of New Castle only blocks from each other. The crimes too place within a five month period. The two crimes were committed by an African-American using a knife, the sexual assaults both took place in the middle of the night, and both occurred after the perpetrator broke into the residences. In both assaults the perpetrator told the victims to stay quiet and held a knife to the general area of the victims’ head. The commonwealth’s strongest cited similarity between the two sexual assaults was that in both incidents the perpetrator was unable to achieve a full erection. Finally, the commonwealth argues that because the crimes charged occurred at two different dates and the victims were two different people, and the facts of the crimes are different enough to allow them to be distinguishable by the jury, no undue prejudice to the defendant will occur from the consolidation of the cases.

In arguing against consolidation, the defendant first concedes the close geographical proximity of the crimes. The defendant however argues that the five month time span is remote enough to weigh against consolidation. Additionally, the defendant relies on the testimony given by the victims to prove there is no common plan, scheme, or design. First, the victims identified two different sized knives used by the assailant in the two crimes, and in the commission of the first sexual assault the knife was used to remove the victims clothing and to cut her hands; the knife was only present in the second assault, it was never used and the perpetrator removed the victim’s clothing by hand. Second, in the first assault the assailant was completely clothed and when finished with the assault stole several items from the victim’s purse. During the second assault the assailant was completely nude and did not remove anything from the apartment after the assault had ended.

The defendant next argues that the physical characteristics, specifically the ages of the victims, were not consistent. There is a 16-year age difference between the victims that was not present in Keaton. In Keaton the victims were all of a consistent age (late 20’s to 30’s). Finally, the defendant argues that the descriptions given by the victims of their respective assailant suggest that the acts were committed by a different perpetrator. Specifically the first victim described her actor as a tall, large framed, dark skinned African-American. The second victim described her assailant as a relatively short, toned, dark mocha colored African-American male.

The last argument put forth by defendant is that assuming a common plan, scheme or design is found, consolidation of the charges will create an undue prejudice in his trial. The defendant argues that unlike in Keaton, the evidence linking defendant to the crimes is not short and simple, but complicated scientific evidence based on comparisons of DNA. The defendant argues that such complex scientific evidence is not easily separated by the jury, and will likely lead them to reach a conclusion based solely on the DNA evidence and not the investigation conducted by the New Castle Police Department or testimony provided by the victims. Because the jury will not easily be able to separate the evidence of the two crimes, the defendant argues that he will face undue prejudice if the charges are consolidated.

II. Legal Discussion

The commonwealth seeks to consolidate the two sexual assaults in the interest of judicial economy. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 582 provides the standard for consolidating offenses. Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 582(a) states:

Rule 582. Joinder-Trial of separate indictments or informations
(A) Standards
(1) Offenses charged in separate indictments or informations may be tried together if:
(a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion; or
(b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction.

The decision whether or not to consolidate indictments for trial rests solely with the discretion of the trial court, and such discretion will be reversed only for manifest abuse of discretion or prejudice and clear injustice to the defendant. Commonwealth v. Newman, 528 Pa.393, 397, 598 A.2d 275, 277 (1991); also see Commonwealth v. Morris, 493 Pa. 169, 171, 425 A.2d 715, 718 (1981).

To determine whether or not consolidation is proper, a three-pronged test was developed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of Commonwealth v. Lark, 518 Pa. 290, 543 A.2d 491 (1988). The Supreme Court held that trial courts must consider the following factors:

whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other; whether such evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger of confusion; and if the answers to these inquiries are in the affirmative, whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses. Id. at 302, 543 A.2d at 497.

To determine whether or not consolidation of the charges against defendant Brothers is proper each prong of the Lark test must be examined in turn.

11(a). Will the evidence of one crime be admissible at trial for the second?

The first part of the three-pronged test is to determine whether or not the offenses are of such a nature that they would be admissible in a separate trial for the other.

It is a well established principle in the commonwealth that evidence of one distinct crime cannot be admitted against a defendant being tried for another crime because the commission of one similar crime is not proof that a defendant participated in the commission of another. Morris, 493 Pa. 164, 175, 425 A.2d 715, 720 (1981). However, the general rule does provide several exceptions to the Prohibition of admissions of separate crimes. Evidence of other crimes may be used to prove (1) intent; (2) motive; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common plan, scheme, or design embracing commission of multiple crimes; or (5) to establish the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. Id. at 175, 425 A.2d at 720. Of the exceptions, the fourth and fifth exceptions are at issue in the case before the court. In Morris, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania interpreted these exceptions to mean that:

The commonwealth must show more than the other crimes are of the same class as the one for which the defendant is being tried. Rather, there must be such a high correlation in the details of the crime that proof that the defendant committed one makes it very unlikely that anyone else but the defendant committed the others. Id. at 176, 425 A.2d at 721; see also Commonwealth v. Fortune, 464 Pa. 367, 372-73, 346 A.2d 783, 786 (1971).

Essentially the crimes must be so distinctive or unusual that the commission of the crimes could be identified as a “signature” of the defendant. Morris, at 176, 425 A.2d at 720.

In determining whether crimes are so similar as to be considered the “signature” of the defendant, several factors to be considered have been identified. The time elapsed between the crimes, the geographical proximity of the crime scenes and the similarity in manner in which the crimes were committed must all betaken into consideration. Commonwealth v. Rush, 538 Pa. 104, 113, 646 A.2d 557, 561 (1994). Of these factors, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has repeatedly held that the remoteness in time between the commission of crimes is inversely proportional to the degree of similarity between the crimes at issue. In other words, the more similar the commission of the crimes, the less the remoteness of time between the commission of the crimes matters. Commonwealth v. Clayton, 506 Pa. 24, 33, 483 A.2d 1345, 1350 (1984); see also Commonwealth v. Miller, 541 Pa. 531, 549, 664 A.2d 1310, 1319 (1995); see also Commonwealth v. Shively, 492 Pa. 411, 415, 424 A.2d 1257, 1259 (1989).

A review of Pennsylvania case law lends guidance in determining whether consolidation of the cases before the court today is proper. In Commonwealth v. Robinson, 581 Pa. 154, 864 A.2d 460 (2004) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed the consolidation of four separate informations based on the similarities between the four crimes. In Robinson, an assailant committed a string of brutal and savage sexual assaults over the course of 11 months on four women in the Allentown area whose ages ranged from 15 to 47. Appellant argued that spatially and temporally the crimes were too remote to consolidate and that even if they were spatially and temporally sufficient, there was no real connection between the ways the crimes were committed and therefore consolidation of the charges was improper. Id. at 190, 864 A.2d at 481.

The Supreme Court held that spatially the crimes were not too remote. All the crimes took place in the same general locale of the east side of Allentown, within blocks of where the appellant lived or used to live. In addition, the 11-month time span was not so remote as to make consolidation improper. Citing several cases that had temporal spans from three years to 18 months to 10 months, the court found that 11 months was not too remote a time. Id. at 192, 864 A.2d at 482; citing Commonwealth v. Newman, 528 Pa. at 399, 598 A.2d at 278 (1991); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 459, 555 A.2d 1264, 1282-83 (1989); and Commonwealth v. Donahue, 519 Pa. 532, 545, 549 A.2d 121, 127-28 (1988).

Regarding the appellant’s final argument that joinder was improper because no “real relationship” existed amongst the crimes, the Supreme Court had this to say:

Nothing can be further from the truth, however. None of the victims knew or had any prior contact with appellant. All were savagely beaten and raped within two months of appellant leaving the Allentown area and two and one-half months of his return to that locale. Each of the victims was brutally murdered at close range by hand or a hand-held instrument. In each case, appellant left behind virtually no incriminating physical evidence, with the exception of what was subsequently discovered through microscopic scientific examination. In all three cases, samples of appellant’s DNA were recovered from the crime scenes. Each attack was committed at night or in the early morning hours. Finally, all victims shared the same personal characteristics-they were overweight, white females, who lived in and around the East Allentown area. Robinson at 192-93, 864 A.2d at 482-83.

The shared similarities between the crimes were enough for the Supreme Court to find that consolidation of the indictments was proper. In regards to potential prejudice to the appellant, the court held that the evidence of the crimes could be easily separated by the jury. The crimes were perpetrated against different victims and no overlap of physical evidence amongst the crimes was present. Id. at 193, 864 A.2d at 483.

Factually similar to the case currently before the court, is the case of Commonwealth v. Laurenson, 470 A.2d 122 (1983). At issue in Laurenson was the consolidation of two rapes that had taken place in the same general neighborhood over a span of five months. The appellant argued that consolidation of the rapes would unduly prejudice him, and that beyond any undue prejudice the sexual assaults were not similar enough for consolidation to be proper. Id. at 124. The Supreme Court found no undue prejudice resulted from the consolidation. The evidence of the two crimes was easily separable by the jury and there were no complicated fact patterns that could have led to jury confusion. Id. at 125.

The Supreme Court found that the similarities between the two incidents were more than sufficient to justify consolidation of the charges. The court stated that evidence of the defendant’s modus operandi is admissible to prove identification when there is such a high correlation between the crimes that proof of one makes it unlikely that anyone but the defendant committed the other. Id. at 125 (citing Commonwealth v. Morris, 425 A.2d at 721). Regarding the characteristics of the crimes the court stated:

The offenses were committed approximately three months apart in homes approximately five blocks apart; both were committed between approximately 6:30 and 7:00 a.m.; both were committed in the victim’s home; in both cases a screen was slit and entry made or attempted through a window: in both cases the victim was threatened verbally and with a knife; in both cases the assailant covered the victim’s face; both victims were forced to engage in oral sex; in both cases the assailant spoke in a strange voice that was difficult to understand; and the boot prints found in both cases were similar. Given the variety of circumstances in which rape is committed, the similarities in these two cases make it very unlikely that the rapes were committed by different persons. Id. at 125.

There were enough distinctive similarities between the two sexual assaults for the Court to find consolidation of the cases proper. Id. at 125.

Commonwealth v. Keaton, 556 Pa. 442, 729 A.2d 529 (1999), has been cited by both the commonwealth and the defendant in support of their respective positions. Keaton involved a string of sexual assaults and a murder that took place over the course of a six month span in the same general neighborhood. The appellant challenged the consolidation of the charges as not being similar enough to demonstrate a common plan, scheme, or design. Id. at 458, 729 A.2d at 537. The Supreme Court found that enough distinctive similarities existed between the charges for consolidation to be proper. The court specifically named the following similarities:

1) the offenses were committed over a period of less than six months; 2) each was committed at night; 3) in each case, Keaton forced his victim into an abandoned house; 4) the abandoned houses were all in the same neighborhood in which Keaton and the victims lived; 5) the abandoned houses were within a two-block radius of each other; 6) each offense involved a combination of bondage or strangulation of the victim; 7) each offense involved the rape of the victim; and 8) all victims shared similar personal characteristics: all were black females in their late twenties or thirties, all were acquainted with Keaton, and all were crack cocaine addicts. Id. at 458, 729 A.2d at 537.

Taken together, these eight characteristics were distinct and similar enough to separate the chain of sexual assaults from what would ordinarily have occurred in regular street crime. Addressing any undue prejudice that the appellant may have faced, the court held that the evidence of the crimes was easily separable by the jury. Each crime was perpetrated against a different victim, there was no overlap of physical evidence, and the evidence of each offense was short and simple. Id. at 458, 729 A.2d at 538.

In Commonwealth v. Bryant, 515 Pa. 473, 530 A.2d 83 (1987), the Supreme Court found that a lack of sufficient similaritiesbetweentwoincidentsmandatedtheexclusionof testimony regarding a prior assault at the defendant’s current trial. The court acknowledged that there were similarities between the two crimes, but those similarities were “confined to relatively insignificant details that would likely be common regardless of who had committed the crimes.” Id. at 479, 530 A.2d at 86. The commonalities between the crimes included that 1) both crimes took place shortly after midnight only two months apart; 2) in the homes of elderly individuals; 3) both victims were severely beaten; 4) both homes were ransacked; 5) the perpetrator of both crimes was seen wearing a dark jacket; and 5) both crimes took place in the Germantown section of Philadelphia. Id. at 479, 530 A.2d at 86.

The Supreme Court founds these commonalities to be insufficient in so far as it is common for burglaries to occur at night and homes are generally ransacked during home invasions. Bryant at 479, 530 A.2d at 86. In regards to the similarity between the victims (location and physical characteristics), the court stated that elderly victims in major urban areas are often targeted for crimes of this nature. Id. That both perpetrators were seen wearing a dark jacket was also insignificant because it is not unusual for individuals to be wearing dark colored jackets. Id. Further, the court stated that there were many differences between the two crimes, not the least of which was the fact that the perpetrator of the first home invasion defecated on the floor of the house he invaded. Id. The court declined to address any further differences as the lack of distinct commonalities beyond a normal criminal enterprise was enough to find the inclusion of testimony regarding the first home invasion improper in the defendant’s trial for the second home invasion. Id. at 479, 530 A.2d at 86.

In Commonwealth v. Patterson, 484 Pa. 374, 399 A.2d 123 (1979), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that evidence of an earlier rape was improperly admitted into the defendant’s trial for the purpose of proving identity and common plan, scheme, or design. At the appellant’s earlier trial, the Superior Court found that introduction of evidence of the first rape was proper in the defendant’s trial for the second rape. The Superior Court based its holding on the following similarities:

The prosecutrix was accosted approximately the same time of night as the other rape victim, the two crimes were only five days apart and occurred in the same two-block area, and the attacker of both women wore sunglasses even though it was nighttime. The prosecutrix was taken into a garage in an alley; the other victim was being taken into an alley at gunpoint when she managed to talk her assailant into taking her indoors. Id. at 378, 399 A.2d at 126.

Examining the circumstances of the two sexual assaults the Supreme Court disagreed with the conclusion reached by the Superior Court. In reaching its decision, the court relied on the lack of distinctive similarities between the two sexual assaults that could have separated the crimes from other ordinary street crime and no the dissimilarities between the crimes. Id. at 380, 399 A.2d at 127.

The dissimilarities between the crimes included that the victims were of totally different ages and sexual attractiveness; different weapons were used in each incident (a gun and an ice-pick); one incident occurred in a garage while the other occurred in the defendant’s apartment; in one incident the perpetrator was wearing rose-colored sunglasses, in the other the perpetrator was wearing dark sunglasses; and the first rape involved a Robbery and choking the victim until she passed out then tying her up, no such incident occurred with the second rape. Patterson, Id. at 380, 399 A.2d at 127. These dissimilarities and the lack of any distinctive traits that separated the assaults at issue from other street crimes made introduction of the testimony of the earlier assault improper. Id. at 380, 399 A.2d at 127.

The five cases discussed above reveal that the number of similarities between the charges sought to be consolidated is not the dispositive factor in determining whether consolidation is proper. Instead, what has mattered most to the rationale of the Supreme Court was whether the similarities between the crimes were so distinct that one could logically conclude that is highly unlikely anyone but the same individual committed the crimes. Put another way, the inquiry is whether there are enough distinct similarities in the commission of the crimes charged to separate the commission of those crimes from that of normal street crime of a similar nature. See Laurenson at 53, 470 A.2d at 125; Bryant at 478, 530 A.2d at 86; and Patterson at 380, 399 A.2d at 127.

Applying this standard to the case sub judice, the distinct similarities needed for consolidation of the charges to be proper are present. Looking at the similarities between the sexual assault on Ms. Wills and the sexual assault on Ms. Potts, a logical connection between the two crimes is discernible. 1) Both victims were single Caucasian women living on the north hill of New Castle; 2) the attacks occurred mere blocks from each other; 3) the attacks both occurred in the late evening/early morning hours; 4) the attacks took place within a five-month span; 5) the assailant of both victims broke into the apartment through a window; 6) the assailant was identified by both women as an African-American; 7) the assailant threatened both victims verbally and with a knife; 8) both victims awoke to find a man standing over them; and 9) in both cases the assailant was unable to achieve a full erection. When the wide variety of ways in which rape can be committed is considered, the distinct similarities between the two crimes charged against defendant Brothers make it very unlikely that the rapes were committed by different actors. Laurenson at 53, 470 A.2d at 125.

Further separating the two sexual assaults from common street crime is the evidence that defendant Brothers’ DNA was recovered from both crime scenes. The presence of defendant’s DNA at both crime scenes is similar to the situation in Robinson where the only physical evidence linking Robinson to his crimes was the DNA found at the crime scenes. Robinson at 193, 864 A.2d at 483. The Supreme Court used the presence of Robinson’s DNA to help strengthen the establishment of a “real relationship” between the crimes Robinson was accused of; and likewise the presence of defendant Brother’s DNA at the crime scenes in the case sub judice can be used similarly. Id. at 483. The similarities between the crimes defendant Brothers is charged with and the presence of his DNA at both crime scenes are more than just insignificant details common to any street crime. These facts create a logical connection that makes it highly unlikely anyone but defendant Brothers could have perpetrated the acts.

Before the court can conclude that consolidation is proper, the dissimilarities between the two crimes, as pointed out by defendant, must be addressed. Defendant points out that in each assault a different knife was used. In the first assault the knife was used on the victim whereas in the second assault it was only used to threaten. Further, in the first assault the victim had her clothes cut from her body, in the second the assailant removed them by hand. Additionally, in the first assault the assailant remained completely clothed during the assault, whereas in the second assault the assailant was naked when the victim awoke. In the first assault the victim was also robbed, which did not occur in the second assault. The descriptions provided by the victims were not identical. Finally, the physical characteristics of the victims, namely the sixteen year age disparity between them, are not consistent.

Addressing the dissimilarities pointed out by defendant, first the difference in size and use of the weapons is not so great as to make consolidation of the indictments improper. In Robinson, where consolidation was found proper, the assailant used a variety of weapons on his victims. He used a small cylindrical metallic object on his first victim, a knife with a four-inch blade on the second, a butcher knife and his fists on the third, and finally only his fists on the fourth victim. Robinson at 175-78,864 A.2d at 472-74. The difference in the weapons used in Robinson greatly exceeds the difference in blade size that defendant argues weighs against consolidation. As such this dissimilarity should not cause consolidation to be improper.

The age disparity between the victims is another dissimilarity that does not weigh against a finding of consolidation, while it is true that the victims in Keaton all were in their late 20’s or 30’s, the victims in Robinson ranged in age from 15 to 47. Keaton at 457, 729 A.2d at 537; Robinson at 175-78, 864 A.2d at 472-74; also see Commonwealth v. Newman, 528 Pa. 393, 399, 598 A.2d 275, 278 (consolidation of two rapes proper despite 14 year age gap between victims). Considering the wide age disparity in cases in which the Supreme Court has held consolidation proper, the fact that the victims in the current case have an age gap of 16 years does not weigh against a finding that consolidation is proper.

The remaining dissimilarities referenced by the defendant, namely that Ms. Wills was also robbed, that the assailant of Ms. Potts was totally nude while Ms. Wills assailant remained clothed, and the difference in physical descriptions given by the victims of their attacker cannot be dismissed through case law. However, when contrasted with the similarities between the two assaults and with the fact that defendant’s DNA was recovered from both the crime scenes and the victims, the necessary logical connection that separates the two assaults from other street crime can be formed.

In both incidents the assailant was an African-American male who broke into the victims’ apartments through a window, both apartments were within blocks of each other, the attacks occurred during roughly the same time of night, both victims were threatened verbally and with a knife, and in both instances the assailant was unable to achieve a full erection. Finally, the DNA of defendant was recovered from both victims. These similarities establish a logical connection between the crimes such that it seems highly unlikely that anyone but the same assailant could have committed both acts. Therefore, the evidence of one crime could be properly admitted at the trial of the other. See Laurenson at 53, 470 A.2d at 125; Bryant at 478, 530 A.2d at 86; and Patterson at 380, 399 A.2d at 127.

11(b). Is the evidence capable of separation by the jury?

Having established that evidence of either crime alleged to have been committed by defendant could be introduced at the trial for the other, the court must now address the second part of the Lark test. The second prong of the Lark test asks whether the evidence of the crimes is of such a nature that it can be easily separated by the jury so as to prevent a melding of the relevant evidence of each crime. Commonwealth v. Lark, at 302, 543 A.2d at 497. In deciphering a standard from which to test this prong, Pennsylvania courts have found guidance in a case decided by Judge Learned Hand. Commonwealth v. Keaton, at 459, 729 A.2d at 538; Commonwealth v. Peterson, 453 Pa. 187, 200, 307 A.2d at 264, 271. In US. v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35 (1939), Judge Learned Hand stated:

When the accused’s conduct on several separate occasions can properly be examined in detail...the only consideration is whether the trial as a whole may not become too confused for the jury... Here we can see no prejudice from joining the three charges: the evidence to each was short and simple; there was no reasonable ground for thinking that the jury could not keep separate what was relevant to each. The joinder was therefore proper. Lotsch, 102 F.2d at 36.

The courts have used this opinion to find consolidation proper when the evidence of the crimes sought to be consolidated is short and simple, and no reasonable grounds for believing that the jury could not keep the information separate exists. Keaton at 458, 729 A.2d at 538; Peterson at 200, 307 A.2d at 271.

The defendant has argued that the presence of DNA in both crimes necessarily means that the evidence is not short and simple and cannot be easily separated by the jury. This is an issue that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has already ruled on. In Commonwealth v. Robinson, one ofthemainpieces of evidence tyingRobinson to his crimes was the presence of his DNA at the crime scenes. Robinson at 193, 864 A.2d at 483. In assessing the similarities between the crimes, the Supreme Courtheldthat the presence of Robinson’s DNA was another contributing factor in finding that a relationship existed among the crimes the commonwealth was seeking to consolidate. Id. at 193, 864 A.2d at 483. The court never expressed concerns over the possibility that the nature of DNA evidence would so confuse the jury as to make separation of the charges impossible.

The Supreme Court went on to state that because each crime was committed against a different victim and there was no overlap of physical evidence between the crimes, the evidence concerning each incident (including the DNA evidence) was readily separable by the jury. Id. at 193, 864 A.2d at 483. Defendant’s main argument against the ability of the jury to separate the evidence is the fact that DNA evidence links defendant Brothers to both crime scenes. But as was the case in Robinson, the crimes defendant is accused of committing are against different victims and no overlap of physical evidence exists between the incidents. In this regard, the holding of Robinson is directly on point and its precedential value strongly weighs against defendant’s contention that the DNA evidence will not be easily separable by the jury. Id. at 193, 864 A.2d at 483.

Apart from the issue of possible jury confusion over DNA evidence, the rest of the evidence in the two cases is short, simple and so distinguishable that the two crimes can be easily separated by the jury. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when evidence is easily distinguishable, short, simple, and there is no overlap of physical evidence, then no reasonable belief exists that the jury will be unable to keep relevant facts of each crime separate. Commonwealth v. Keaton at 459, 729 A.2d at 538; Commonwealth v. Peterson at 200, 307 A.2d at 271; Commonwealth v. Laurenson at 53, 470 A.2d at 125.

In the case before the court, both crimes were committed against different victims over a five-month time span, and there is no overlap of physical evidence between the two crimes. The victims lived at separate addresses; one victim had a son who was present during the assault; in one assault the assailant cut the clothes from the victim, in the other he removed them by hand; the assailant was fully clothed in one assault and nude for the other; and only the first victim was robbed by her assailant. These differences are distinct enough that the jury will be able to easily separate the two incidents, and therefore no reasonable grounds for believing that the jury will be unable to keep relevant evidence separated exists.

A matter of final interest regarding this prong of the Lark test is the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Peterson, 453 Pa. 187, 307 A.2d 264 (1973). In Peterson, the Supreme Court held that a proper and explicit jury instruction will help to prevent any confusion or commingling of relevant evidence of the two crimes. Id. at 200, 307 A.2d at 271. Initially at the beginning of trial, the judge informed the jury that they were actually trying two distinct cases at once and for that reason would need to pay “especially close attention to the evidence so as to properly segment it.” Id. at 201, 307 A.2d at 271. And then at the close of trial, the j udge gave an extensive cautionary instruction to the j ury which directed them to confine the relevant evidence of each offense to that offense and that offense only. Id. at 201,307 A.2d at 271. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, these jury instructions helped to ensure that the jury would keep all the relevant evidence separate and weighed in favor of finding consolidation of the indictments at issue proper. Id.

Based on the distinguishable nature of the two crimes, the short and simple evidence for both crimes, the Supreme Court’s holding in Robinson that DNA evidence is separable by a jury, and the court’s ability to give proper and explicit instructions to the jury, the consolidation of the two cases before the court today will pass the second prong of the Lark test.

II(c). Will the consolidation of the cases create undue prejudice against the defendant?

The third prong of the Lark test states that if the first two prongs are answered in the affirmative then the court must consider whether or not consolidation will unduly prejudice the defendant. Lark, 543 A.2d at 496. The Supreme Court defined the type of prejudice that could possibly arise from consolidation as:

The “prejudice” of which Rule 1128 (now Rule 582) speaks is not simply prejudice in the sense that appellant will be linked to the crimes for which he is being prosecuted, for that sort of prejudice is ostensibly the purpose of all commonwealth evidence. The prejudice of which Rule 1128 (now Rule 582) speaks is, rather, that which would occur if the evidence tended to convict appellant only by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid cumulating the evidence. Lark, 543 A.2d at 499.

As has been established in section 11(a), it would be proper to admit the evidence of either of the two crimes charged against defendant Brothers into a separate trial for the other on the basis of showing the defendant’s modus operandi and to prove identity. The evidence is not being presented to show that defendant has a propensity to commit crime, but rather to show that because of the distinct similarities between the two crimes, they could not have logically been committed by any other individual. The evidence will show defendant’s signature, not that he is the type of person who has predilection towards committing crime.

The second type of potential prejudice that concerned the Supreme Court in Lark, whether or not the jury can separate the evidence, has also been fully addressed. The evidence for both of the crimes is short and simple, there is no overlap of physical evidence between the two crimes, and there are enough distinguishing features that with proper jury instructions the jury should be able to fully separate the relevant evidence of each crime.

The last type of potential prejudice, whether or not the jury will be able to avoid cumulating the evidence was addressed by Judge Hand in U.S. v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35. Judge Hand acknowledged that when several crimes are tried together there is always a distinct danger that the jury may use the evidence cumulatively. This danger, however, can be dissipated when the separate conduct of the accused can be properly examined in detail. Id. at 53. If the evidence is short and simple, and reasonable grounds for believing that the jury will not be able to keep relevant evidence separate do not exist, then the danger of the jury cumulating evidence is eliminated or greatly reduced. Id. at 53. It is up to the discretion of the trial court to examine the evidence and determine if it such that jury will be able to keep the relevant evidence separate. Id. at 53. In the instant case, the evidence is short and simple and there are enough distinguishing characteristics that the jury should have no problem keeping relevant evidence separate. Therefore, the defendant will not face undue prejudice from the jury potentially cumulating the evidence.

The evidence in the crimes sought to be consolidated before the court today is such that the third and final prong of the Lark test, whether consolidation will unduly prejudice the defendant, is satisfied. The evidence is short, simple, and easily separable by the jury and consolidation of the charges will not result in undue prejudice towards defendant Brothers.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, the facts of the two crimes defendant Brothers is accused of are sufficiently similar to establish the logical connection required by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for consolidation to be proper. There are enough distinctive similarities between the two crimes to separate them from regular street crime, and the facts of the cases are short and simple enough that the relevant evidence for each individual crime will be easily separable by the jury. Therefore, the court should approve the commonwealth’s motion to consolidate the cases.

ORDER OF COURT

And now, this September 23, 2010, for the reasons set forth in the accompanying opinion of even date herewith it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the Commonwealth’s Motion to Consolidate is granted, and the above captioned cases are hereby consolidated for trial.