text:
    (No. 77-CC-1494
    Robert Brady, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Polos, C.J.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois correctional facility, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of property, of which Claimant alleges he is being deprived by officials of the Illinois Department of Corrections. The complaint herein alleges that when Claimant was transferred to a new institution he “was then told by prison officials that certain items in his property (sic) was not allowed in this institution, and that it would be stored in the personal property room and returned to me upon my release from the institution.”

Claimant does not allege that Respondent converted his property, or was negligent in safeguarding it. Rather, Claimant complains about an administrative regulation of the institution in which he is incarcerated, and this Court clearly is without jurisdiction to interfere in such matters.

The Court therefore finds that the complaint herein fails to state a cause upon which relief can be granted, and is accordingly dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 77-CC-1504
    Chester L. Grizzle, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling u. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1511
    Robert K. Shelton, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1537
    Rice (Benney) Gibson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1538
    James Jones, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1582
    Stanley J. Hicks, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1602
    Charles Washington, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas u. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1636
    Stephan A. Johnson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1642
    Earl Robinson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 14, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1653
    Steve Morris, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 5, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1602
    Charles Washington, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 28, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1689
    Juan A. Carrasquillo, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 5, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1691
    Donald D. Buttram, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 27, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1696
    Kenneth Shannon, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 27, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover, the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1697
    Erick Jamers Jelinek, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed. October 27, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling u. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


author: Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 77-CC-1719
    Alberta Rogers, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 20, 1978.

   Poch, J.

This cause coming to be heard on the motion of the Respondent for summary judgment, due notice being given and the Court being fully advised:

Finds that complaint seeks recovery for damages caused by minor wards placed with the Claimant by the Department of Children and Family Services. Such recovery is barred because the Department of Children and Family Services is not subject to the provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, Sec. 52(1), 1975, excluding liability under the Parental Responsibility Law where the minor is under custody order under the “Juvenile Court Act.” See, Vallery v. State, 31 Ill.Ct.Cl. 187.

Based on this, it is hereby ordered that the motion of the Respondent for summary judgment, be and the same is hereby granted.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1742
    James G. Brown, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 27, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession property of the of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1749
    Terrence Moore, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 27, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling u. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-l773
    Robert Browley, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 27, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl., we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1809
    Lora J. Svaniga, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 20, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant filed a claim in the amount of $29.47 for court reporting services rendered by her on May 1, 1974.

The record discloses that the law firm of Sidley and Austin hired Claimant to report the deposition of Donald F. Carey in the matter of Environmental Protection Agency of the State of Illinois v. Illinois Nitrogen Corporation. The record also discloses that an Assistant Attorney General in the Environmental Control Divison of the Attorney General’s office ordered a copy of the transcript from Claimant.

The Attorney General’s office forwarded the bill received from Claimant to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency which refused to pay on the grounds that the Agency did not order nor receive the transcript.

The record is silent as to why the Attorney General’s office has not paid the bill despite the fact that the Assistant Attorney General, acting in his official capacity, ordered and received the transcript.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $29.47 be paid to claimant.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1851
    Clyde E. Dickerson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 27, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1852
    Bemon Gartley, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 27, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl., this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl., we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1856
    Lavon Millie Peals, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 27, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1868
    Larry F. Gooden, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 27, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas u. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1911
    Gerald N. Lipinski and Steven J. Isaacson, Claimants, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed, December 13, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl., this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl., we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-2245
    James F. Vaughn, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed December 19, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-2417
    Sue Swanson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed January 9, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 77-CC-2449
    James Jones and Daniel Harry, Claimants, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 8, 1978.

   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court on a motion of Respondent to dismiss and Claimants’ objections to said motion.

The complaint in this matter complains of alleged negligent actions on the part of Mauro Nicoletti, individually and as agent, servant and employee of the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority. Respondent’s motion cites Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 121, para. 100-31, as amended by P.A. 79-1366, Section 45, eff. October 1, 1976, which provided in part:

“The State of Illinos hereby consents to suits against the Authority solely as in this section provided:
(a) ,..
(b) Any person or persons may bring a civil action to recover damages for injury to his person or property caused by any act of the Authority or by any act of any of its officers, agents, or employees done under its direction.”

The motion to dismiss also takes the position that the State of Illinois, through the legislature, having provided a remedy for the type of injuries complained of in the instant claim by way of a civil action against the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, the legal inference must be indulged in that the Claimants herein must pursue this remedy through a civil action brought in a competent Circuit Court as distinguished from the filing of a claim in the Court of Claims of Illinois.

Claimants, in their objection to Respondent’s motion, deny that Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 121, para. 100-31, has exclusive jurisdiction in the Circuit Courts of Illinois in actions where damages are sought from the Illinois State Tollway Authority or any of its officers, agents or employees, and state that said section does not expressly state that the Circuit Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in such actions.

If the theory of Claimants is correct, then the legislature has provided an additional remedy to people who are injured by acts of employees of the Illinois State Tollway Authority as against all other Claimants who have been injured by acts of other employees of the State of Illinois. This would result in giving a favored position as far as recovery from the State to those injured by acts of employees of the Illinois State Tollway Authority by giving them a double remedy, one against the State in the Court of Claims and another in the Circuit Courts of the State of Illinois.

It appears to the Court that it was the State’s intention to give individuals injured on the Illinois State Toll way Authority a choice of remedies — not an additional remedy.

The Court therefore holds that Respondent’s motion to dismiss is proper.

Motion to dismiss is hereby granted and said cause is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-2451
    Ernest J. Johnson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed January 9, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-2545
    Eugene E. Fred, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed January 19, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0019
    Julian Esparza, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed January 19, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl._, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0050
    Johnny Holmes, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed February 3, 1978.

   This action is before the Court on the motion of Claimant for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

In substance, the complaint herein alleges that Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois correctional facility, has been improperly deprived of the use of a television set which he owns, while he is confined in the Stateville Correctional Center hospital.

The Court finds that this is a matter within the administrative discretion of the Stateville Correctional Center, and that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted by this Court.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0081
    Patrick Bell, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed February 15, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimants property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0104
    Truxton K. Field, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed February 15, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0255
    James Benson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed February 24, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0336
    Billie Joe Davis, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 21, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that "the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0400
    Donald Leroy Holland, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 20, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0424
    David Walsh, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 7, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl._, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0461
    Michael Travis, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 7, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0513
    Joseph Murneigh, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 7, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas u. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0604
    John A. Woods, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 14, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This is an action by an inmate of an Illinois correctional facility to recover the sum of $128.00 he alleges he is due for work on the Stateville Correctional Center locking system in 1975.

Claimant has submitted a memorandum from the director of the Department of Corrections acknowledging that Claimant is owed the sum of $128.00 as Claimant alleges.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of $128.00.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0669
    Gary Gerloff, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 4, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.._, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0670
    Clyde E. Jackson, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 4, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to staté a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0684
    Charles Lindgren, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 4, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC—0692
    Jerry Carnes, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 4, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl._, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause he, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0695
    Jeff Brown, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 4, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas u. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0723
    Marion Elliot, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed August 24, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

This cause coming to be heard on the stipulation of the Respondent and the Court being fully advised in the premises find that pursuant to the stipulation of Respondent the prison officials became bailees of the property of the Claimant, and upon failure to return the property became liable for the fair value thereof. It is also found by this Court that the Respondent has stipulated that the $130.00 as claimed by the Claimant is a fair value for the radio in question.

It is therefore ordered that the Claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $130.00, and an award for that amount is hereby granted.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0750
    Edwin Calex, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 12, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0871
    Michael Paul Nitz, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 12, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0878
    Marcellas Boyce, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 12, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl._, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0931
    Joseph Davenport, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 28, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl._, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0995
    Travis L. Vannote, Claimant, v. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 28, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that his property was lost, misplaced, stolen or destroyed while he was imprisoned, and that the loss of his property was proximately caused by the negligence of employees of the State of Illinois.

In Bargas v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.__, this Court held that the State of Illinois does not owe a duty to inmates of its penal institutions to safeguard property which inmates keep in their cells. In the companion case of Doubling v. State, 32 Ill.Ct.Cl.1, we further held that only where the State takes actual physical possession of the property of an inmate, as during the course of his transfer between penal institutions, does a duty arise to use reasonable care in protecting the inmate’s property.

The complaint in this action does not allege that Claimant’s property was delivered to agents of the State, but rather that the property disappeared or was damaged in Claimant’s cell. Under our reasoning in Bargas v. State, supra, and Doubling v. State, supra, the complaint herein fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

It is therefore ordered that this cause be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 00101
    In Re Application of Norma Rydbom

      Opinion filed May 4, 1978.

    Balsley, Roper & Swanson, by William L. Balsley, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General for Illinois; Vincent J. Biskupic, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing on April 19, 1978, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Norma Jean Rydbom, widow of the decedent, and in the absence of a designation of beneficiary, is the person entitled to the duty death benefits as provided by the Act.

2. The decedent, Dale A. Rydbom, age 45, was a volunteer fireman, a member of the Monroe Township Fire Protection District, and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on February 15, 1975.

3. On said date, at approximately 3:00 a.m., after calling in an alarm on a fire in his home to his fire department, firefighter Rydbom returned, up the stairs of his house, to rescue his children. He was trapped in an upstairs bedroom, after all but one of his daughters had escaped from the burning building, and was pronounced “dead on arrival,” the same date, at 6:25 a.m., in the hospital to which he was taken upon being discovered, unconscious, in his bedroom. The coroner’s certificate of death presented recited the immediate cause of death as “suffocation,” due to or as a consequence of “smoke inhalation, home fire.”

4. Volunteer firefighter Rydbom was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act.

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to Norma Jean Rydbom, as widow of the deceased fireman, Dale A. Rydbom.


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    (No. 00105
    In Re Application of Shirley M. Gora

      Opinion filed November 14, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act) Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the Court on October 12,1977, the Court finds as follows that:

1. Joliet Police Sgt., Edward Gora, died February 14, 1976, at Silver Cross Hospital, Joliet, at the age of 46.

2. He was stricken with a heart attack, in a restaurant, on Saturday, December 30, 1975, while off-duty out of police uniform, and not within his regularly assigned police employment; and he was hospitalized from said date until his death;

3. The death certificate submitted by the Claimant recites the immediate cause of death as “acute coronary thrombosis, due to or as a consequence of obstructive lung disease” with other significant conditions recited as “recent acute coronary.”

4. Section 2, subparagraph (e) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that “killed in the line of duty” means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer ... if the death occurs within one year from the date of the injury received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.”

5. Sgt. Gora was not killed in the line of duty as defined in the Act.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the claim for benefits by Shirley M. Gora, pertaining to the death of her husband, Edward A. Gora, be, and the same is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 00109
    In Re Application of Beverly J. Findlay

      Opinion filed November 14, 1977

   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter the Act) Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the Court on October 12, 1977, the Court finds that:

1. Joliet Police Department Patrolman, William V. Findlay, died on March 20,1976, at St. Joseph Hospital, Joliet, of cancer, after a prolonged illness, at the age of 49.

2. The last day of police duty by Officer Findlay was March 25, 1975.

3. The death certificate submitted by the Claimant recites the immediate cause of death as “respiratory failure, due to or as a consequence of metastasis,” due to or as a consequence of “... cancer of the left lung.”

4. Section 2, subparagraph (e) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that “killed in the line of duty” means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer ... if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.”

5. Patrolman Findlay was not killed in the line of duty as defined in the Act.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the claim for benefits by Beverly J. Findlay, pertaining to the death of her husband, William V. Find-lay, be, and the same is hereby denied.


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    (No. 00110
    In Re Application of Josephine Klein

      Opinion filed December 19, 1977.

    Thomas P. Carmody, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General for Illinois; Vincent J. Biskupic, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a volunteer fireman, allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at hearings on May 11,1977 and November 8,1977, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Josephine Klein, is the widow and designated beneficiary of the deceased volunteer fireman, Walter V. Klein.

2. The decedent, Walter V. Klein, age 71, was a volunteer fireman employed by the Carlin ville Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on July 9, 1976.

3. On said date, at approximately 11:30 p.m., firefighter Klein was summoned from his home, by a fire department telephone alarm call, to a fire call at a residence at 635 N. Charles Street, Carlin ville, approximately two blocks from his home. He responded in his car for a part of the distance, approximately one block, and on foot for the remainder of the distance to the front door of the residence. He was the first fireman to the door of the residence and learned that the call was a “false alarm.” He alerted other firemen arriving at the scene of the “false alarm,” stopped the pumper truck from connecting to a nearby fire hydrant, and returned to his automobile to drive to the Carlin ville Fire Department fire house for the purpose of reporting his response to the alarm. As he drove towards the fire station, firefighter Klein was stricken with a heart attack, and his car crashed into the front of a drug store. Immediately after the crash, he was found unconscious, slumped behind the wheel, wearing his fire department boots with his fire coat, helmet, and gloves on the front seat. He was taken by the fire department to Carlin ville Area Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival at 11:50 p.m. the same night. The coroner’s certificate of death states the immediate cause of death as “severe occlusive calcific atherosclerosis, instant,” due to or as a consequence of “coronary arteries with a recent occluding thrombus in the left coronary artery,” and another significant condition is recited as “while in performance of his duty as Carlin ville fireman.” The evidence presented indicates that firefighter Klein’s death was caused and precipitated by the active performance of the duties required of him as a member of the Carlin ville Fire Department.

4. Firefighter Klein was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act.

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to Josephine Klein, as widow and designated beneficiary of the deceased volunteer fireman, Walter V. Klein.


text:
    (No. 00118
    In Re Application of Genevieve Simpson

      Opinion filed December 19, 1977.

    William E. Stewart, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General for Illinois; Vincent J. Biskupic, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arising out of the death of a volunteer fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at hearing on November 8,1977, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Genevieve Simpson, is the widow of the decedent, as stated in the application for benefits, and, in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3(e) of the Act, provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow.

2. The decedent, Wayne T. Simpson, age 54, was a volunteer fireman employed by the Prophetstown Fire Protection District and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on September 7,1976.

3. On said date, at approximately 12:05 p.m., firefighter Simpson responded to a fire alarm at a farm four and eight tenths miles from his home while operating a water hose line, and assisting, in an attempt to extinguish the barn blaze, firefighter Simpson collapsed at the fire scene. He was taken by ambulance to Community General Hospital, where he was pronounced “dead on arrival” at 1:15 p.m. the same day. The coroner’s certificate of death recites cause of death as “cardiac arrythmia,” of an interval between onset and death of “seconds to minutes,” due to or as a consequence of, “occlusive severe coronary atherosclerotic heart disease” of “years.” The evidence presented indicates that firefighter Simpson’s death was caused and precipitated by the active performance of duties required of him as a member of Prophetstown Fire Protection District Fire Department.

4. Firefighter Simpson was killed in line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act.

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00, be awarded to Genevieve Simpson, as widow of the deceased volunteer fireman, Wayne T. Simpson.


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    (No. 00123
    In Re Application of Earnestine Walker

      Opinion filed November 14, 1977

    Jack Carey, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General for Illinois; Vincent J. Biskupic, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et. seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court on May 11, 1977 and October 12, 1977, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimants, Earnestine Walker and Edward Mitchell, are the mother and father of the decedent, as stated in the application for benefits; and, in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving parents, equally.

2. The decedent, Anthony Walker, age 19, was a volunteer fireman and member of the Alorton Volunteer Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on November 28, 1976.

3. On said date, Lt. Walker and two other firemen were engaged in extinguishing a fire in a vacant building. As Walker was handling a water hose line near the building, the walls of the burning building collapsed, with bricks and debris striking Walker. He died, during surgery for his injuries the same day, and the Coroner’s certificate of death recited the immediate cause of death as “massive hemorrhage, due to or as a consequence of severe laceration of liver, about two hours interval.”

4. Firefighter Walker was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act.

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 be awarded to Earnestine Walker, as mother of Anthony Walker, and that the sum of $10,000.00 be awarded to Edward Mitchell, as father of Anthony Walker, the deceased fireman.


text:
    (No. 00125
    In Re Application of Margaret Marinec

      Opinion filed November 14, 1977.

    Peter A. Loutos, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General for Illinois; Vincent J. Biskupic, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arising out of the death of a police chief allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the Court on October 12, 1977, the Court finds that:

1. Alsip Police Chief, Raymond Marinee, was pronounced dead at Ingalls Memorial Hospital, Harvey, Illinois, at 12:33 a.m. on Saturday, November 6,1976, at the age of 38.

2. At 8:05 p.m., on Friday, November 5,1976, Chief Marinee, was stricken with a heart attack, in a Home-wood, Illinois restaurant, while attending a retirement party for another policeman sponsored by the South Suburban Association of Chiefs of Police, of which Chief Marinee was a member. He was taken directly to the hospital by ambulance, after being stricken.

3. The death certificate submitted by the Claimant indicated the immediate cause of death as “cardiac arrest, with an approximate interval between onset and death of seconds, due to or as a consequence of acute myocardial infarction, hours, due to, or as a consequence of, coronary artery disease years.”

4. Section 2, subparagraph (e) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that “killed in the line of duty” means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer... “if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.”

5. While testimony and evidence were presented as to Chief Marinee’s devotion to duty, the hours he worked, and the many services he performed, as the Alsip Police Department’s Chief, he was not “killed in the line of duty” as defined in, and required by, the Act.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the claim for benefits by Margaret Marinee, pertaining to the death of her husband, Raymond Mari-nee, be, and the same is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 00127
    In Re Application of Craig T. Hardie

      Opinion filed November 14, 1977.

   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the Court on October 12, 1977, the Court finds that:

1. Craig T. Hardie, is the brother of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in his application for benefits.

2. The decedent, David Hardie, age 27, was a full-time fireman, of the rank of “firefighter/paramedic,” employed by the City of Park Ridge Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on November 30,1976.

3. On said date, at approximately 2:30 p.m., during regularly assigned duty hours, Hardie accidentally fell from a ladder while painting the interior of a Park Ridge fire station; the painting had been previously directed by a superior officer. As a result of the fall, Hardie suffered a fractured left leg; he was taken, by ambulance, to a hospital; and, on December 2, 1976, surgery was performed on his leg. He was found dead, in his hospital bed, on the early morning of December 4, approximately 36 hours after his operation. An autopsy was performed, and the immediate cause of death was recited as a “pulmonary thrombo embolism in association with fracture of left femur.”

4. Section 2, subparagraph (e) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that “ ‘killed in the line of duty” means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer or fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.”

5. The pulmonary thrombo embolism, which caused firefighter Hardie’s death, resulted from the broken leg accidentally sustained as recited.

6. Firefighter Hardie was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act.

7. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to Craig T. Hardie, as brother and designated beneficiary of the deceased fireman, David Hardie.


text:
    (No. 00129
    In Re Application of Linda Skrabek

      Opinion filed November 14, 1977

   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act,) Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Linda Skrabek, is the widow of the decedent, as stated in the application for benefits, and, in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3(e) of the Act, provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow.

2. The decedent, Joseph H. Skrabek, age 32, was a full-time Deputy Sheriff employed by the Bureau County Sheriff s Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on March 27, 1977.

3. On said date, at approximately 2:15 a.m., during regularly assigned duty hours and in uniform, Deputy Sheriff Skrabek was operating a fully marked patrol car of the Bureau County Sheriffs Department, eastbound on “Route 6 and 34,” three miles east of Wyanet, Illinois, when his police car was struck by another motorist’s vehicle, a pick-up truck, which was westbound and crossed into the east-bound lane of travel upon the two lane roadway. Deputy Skrabek was killed in the collision of the two vehicles, and the coroner’s certificate of death recites the immediate cause of death as, “crushing head injuries, with an approximate interval between onset and death of minutes.”

4. Deputy Sheriff Skrabek was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act.

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to Linda Skrabek, as widow of the deceased policeman, Joseph H. Skrabek.