text:
    (No. 74-CC-37
    Finger Enterprises, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 4, 1974.

    Aaron, Aaron, Schimberg & Hess, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This matter comes now before the Court on claimant’s motion [filed September 21, 1973] for judgment on the pleadings, since each and every allegation in claimant’s complaint are admitted by the respondent. The court finds that claimant is entitled to the award prayed for under the following admitted facts stated in the complaint:

1. This claim is founded upon a law of the State pursuant to § 8(c) of the Court of Claims Act.

2. Claimant submitted $100.00 to the Department of Public Health and the State of Illinois for a permit to construct a swimming pool under the provisions of the “Recreational Area Licensing Act”, Ch. 111½, Sec. 764, Ill.Rev.Stat.

3. Subsequently, the Department of Public Health was informed by an opinion of the Attorney General of Illinois that the area on which said swimming pool was to be constructed was not subject to the aforementioned Act, but was instead subject to the provisions of the “Swimming Pool Act”, Ch. 111½, Sec. 88-94, Ill.Rev.Stat., which Act does not require a deposit.

4. On May 10,1973, claimant requested a refund of the $100.00 from the Department of Public Health and in reply thereto received a letter from the Department, a copy of which is attached to the complaint, stating that the $100.00 had been deposited in the State General Revenue Fund, and that the Recreational Area Licensing Act did not provide for reimbursement. The said Department letter further suggested that claimant bring an appropriate action for a refund of the $100.00 in the Illinois Court of Claims. Respondent does not oppose claimant’s motion.

The court finds that claimant’s deposit of $100.00 should be refunded and the claimant, Finger Enterprises, is hereby awarded the sum of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 74-CC-157
    R. L. Cummins, d/b/a Cummins Food Specialties, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Louis G. Horman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-213
    Edgewood Childrens Center, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Edgewood Childrens Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-238
    Structo Division, King-Seeley Thermos Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Structo Division, King-Seeley Thermos Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respodent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-254
    Carmean Electric, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Carmean Electric Inc., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-291
    Charles E. Glisson d/b/a Cap Glisson Motors, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Charles E. Glisson d/b/a Cap Glisson Motors, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-296
    Gulf Oil Co. — U.S., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Gulf Oil Co. — U.S., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-309
    Standard Oil Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois State University, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Standard Oil Division, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-311
    Standard Oil Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Standard Oil Division, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-324
    Amos S. Moore, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Amos S. Moore, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-328
    Plains Construction Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Plains Construction Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-331
    Mansion View Lodge, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Mansion View Lodge, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-332
    Mansion View Lodge, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Mansion View Lodge, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-334
    Mansion View Lodge, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Mansion View Lodge, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-363
    Aetna Letter Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Registration and Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Aetna Letter Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S.

      Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-395
    Matthews Ambulance Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Matthews Ambulance Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-427
    Desaulniers and Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Desaulniers and Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-433
    Phillips Business Systems, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Appellate Court of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Phillips Business Systems, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-437
    Harry E. Gunn, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    Dr. Harry E. Gunn, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-448
    South Elgin Manor, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 8, 1974.

    South Elgin Manor, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 5593
    Samuel Faulisi, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 11, 1974.

    Rinella & Rinella, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant, Samuel Faulisi, seeks recovery from the State of Illinois in the amount of $30,000.00, plus an additional $7,500.00 for attorneys’ fees, as a result of his illegal incarceration in the Illinois State Penitentiary.

Claimant’s action is brought under Illinois Revised Statute, Chapter 37, Section 439.8(c). Claimant was indicted, tried and convicted of the crime of murder on December 2, 1963, and shortly thereafter, he was sentenced to a term of 100 to 199 years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.

Claimant was charged and convicted of the murder of one Chester Nowaczyk who was murdered on May 17, 1963 at the rear of his home located at 3606 South 55th Court, Chicago, Illinois. Also charged with this crime, along with claimant, were his brother, Robert Faulisi, Gerald Divits, and Gregory Leigot, who is the stepson of the deceased Chester Nowaczyk.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the conviction of the claimant on March 24, 1966 on the grounds that the panel of jurors, from which the jury in the claimant’s case was selected, contained jurors which had been selected in the trial of two of the co-defendants of the claimant.

Testifying on behalf of the claimant was Mrs. Caroline Long Gall who testified at both trials of the claimant.

Testifying, under subpoena, for respondent were Gregory Leigot, James Sullivan and Gerry Fujolek.

It is apparent from the record that there were no actual eye witnesses to the murder.

The record indicates that claimant had previously been sentenced to the Illinois State Penitentiary for a term of three to five years and to one to three years and was also sentenced to two to five years and three to seven years for burglary and armed robbery.

Claimant testified, at the second trial, on his own behalf and stated that on the night in question he was at a restaurant known as Dawn’s Grill located at Crawford and Irving, Chicago, Illinois, that he arrived there about 9:45 p.m., and that he stayed there until a little bit after 1:00 a.m. He stated that when he left the restaurant he went to his father’s home, where he was staying, and eventually went to bed.

Caroline Gall, a waitress at the restaurant, testified on behalf of the claimant, and said she remembered his being in the restaurant, drinking coffee and making telephone calls, until she left shortly after 12:00 midnight.

Gregory Leigot, stepson of the victim, called as a witness for the respondent, testified that he confessed to the police that there was a conspiracy to kill Chester Nowaczyk, and that Gerald Divits had hired claimant to murder his stepfather, Chester Nowaczyk. He further testified that claimant had inquired of the witness as to what time his stepfather got up and whether the garage was open, and, if it were closed, how he could open it. The witness further testified that he told the claimant how to open the garage without a key. Additional testimony from this witness was to the effect that the night before the murder, claimant told him that the next day would be the day and he was shown a slip of paper in Gerald Divits’ handwriting with dates and amounts written thereon which indicated payments to claimant totaling $1,000.00 in payment for the murder of Chester Nowaczyk.

James Sullivan, another witness called on behalf of the respondent, testified that Gerald Divits told him on a number of occasions that he was going to have Chester Nowaczyk killed. He testified that Divits had asked the witness to get him a hit man, that he was unable to locate a hit man, which he later told Divits, and that Divits then told him that the claimant and he were working on a plan to murder Nowaczyk, and that he was later told that Divits was paying claimant to kill Nowaczyk. This witness further testified that claimant arrived at a lounge after the murder and was paid $300.00 by Divits, and that claimant then got sick. He further testified that the claimant’s brother later threatened him about testifying against claimant. This witness also testified that on the night of the murder Divits told the witness to establish an alibi; that he, Divits, was going to establish an alibi; and that if Sam Faulisi didn’t get it done that night, then he, Divits, would kill Nowaczyk.

The evidence indicates that Gerald Divits was having an affair with the wife of the deceased and it was his desire to get rid of him so he could marry the decedent’s widow.

Gerry Fijolek was called as a witness on behalf of the respondent. His testimony was to the effect that several months prior to the murder claimant brought a bowling bag, which contained a gun and knife, into the apartment of Gerald Divits. Gregory Leigot testified that he was present and saw the weapons in the bowling bag and also that he saw the gun in the back of claimant’s car a week before the murder. The witness, Fijolek, also testified that a week after the murder claimant threatened him, since he did not want it known that he possessed a gun and knife in violation of claimant’s parole.

The respondent raises the question as to whether or not claimant has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was innocent of the "fact” of the crime.

It is interesting to note the testimony of the only other witness besides the claimant, that of Mrs. Caroline Long Gall, who stated that prior to the night in question she had met the claimant only once and that claimant had spent approximately two hours in the restaurant, where she was a waitress, drinking coffee and making telephone calls. She further testified she could not remember the day that claimant was in her restaurant. It appears she drove to the hearing from Pontiac, Michigan without being compensated or subpoenaed because, in her words, she said, "Sam called me Saturday.” Her testimony at the second trial was in contradiction to that which she gave at the original trial. At the original trial, she testified that she first saw claimant between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m.; that claimant was only in the restaurant for about one hour, and that she left the restaurant around 12:30 a.m. At the second trial, she testified that the claimant was at the restaurant for a period of approximately two hours.

The deceased met his death outside his garage at approximately 1:00 a.m. on May 17, 1963. There were no actual eye witnesses to the murder and no weapons were ever found.

It is the respondent’s contention that the claimant has failed to sustain his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was innocent of the "fact” of the crime, citing the case of Dirkans v. State, 25 C.C.R. 343 (1965), which held that the statute under which the claimant seeks to recover intended that claimant must prove his innocence of the "fact” of the crime. The Court, in this case, also stated:

"It was not, we believe, the intention of the General Assembly to open the Treasury of the State of Illinois to inmates of its penal institutions by the establishment of their technical or legal innocence of the crimes for which they were imprisoned. It is our opinion the legislators intended to provide a manner of recourse in the Court of Claims, with a specific amount of recovery provided, for a claimant who is able to establish his complete innocence of the "fact” of the crime for which he was imprisoned.”

The Court further stated that the lawmakers of this State would not have intended to grant that recourse to the narcotic addicts, murderers, kidnappers, rapists, and other felons who obtain a reversal of their convictions upon a legal or technical basis.

We believe in the present case the claimant did not prove his innocence of the "fact” of the crime with which he was charged and, therefore, was not unjustly imprisoned.

Claim is denied.


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 5312
    Frank Dobbs, Individually and Frank Dobbs, Father and Next Friend of David Dobbs, A Minor, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 14, 1974.

    Joseph P. Smith, Jr., Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This is an action for personal injuries sustained by the claimant, David Dobbs, when a hand grenade exploded in his hands. Claimant, who was just under 16 years of age at the time of his injury, alleges that members of the Illinois National Guard were, in effect, responsible for placing this dangerous explosive in claimant’s hands. Hence he seeks damages for his injuries which include the loss of his right hand and the fourth and fifth fingers of his left hand.

Claimant, who lived just 2 blocks from the National Guard Armory in Mattoon, was a frequent visitor to the 2 brick garage buildings north of the main armory which were used for the storage, service and maintenance of motor vehicles belonging to the National Guard.

Over a period of several years, prior to his injury, claimant went to these garages almost daily during summer vacations from school and on some school days. Frequently claimant would assist the military personnel at the garages in performing light jobs, such as sweeping, painting and washing vehicles. There is no evidence that claimant’s assistance was solicited or other than voluntary, but apparently was appreciated. Claimant became well acquainted with members of the Guard employed in the maintenance shop, particularly Richard E. Highland, the shop chief, with whom claimant would occasionally go squirrel hunting; also George H. Schnapp, whom claimant once helped move his personal property from one residence to another; find Sgt. Junior Scott, another mechanic at the garage, all of whom testified at the hearing as witnesses for the respondent.

Raymond Wines, claimant’s neighbor about the same age, would often accompany the claimant to the garage and both would loaf around or do about the same little chores for the guardsmen. These boys were sometimes allowed to ride on military vehicles, though never on maneuvers or on vehicles transporting ammunition. The boys were also given used items of military apparel, such as a pair of pants, a fatigue jacket, a pair of boots, and empty ammunition boxes, all items that were described as disposable and would otherwise be thrown in the trash barrel.

The above uncontroverted facts lead us directly to the first key issues of facts in dispute: How did claimant obtain possession of the hand grenade that caused his injury? How did claimant obtain the additional powder which he added to the "practice” hand grenade which transformed it from a harmless "simulated” grenade, that would do no damage, into the destructive weapon that exploded in his hands?

It seems obvious to the court that the practice grenade and the dangerous ingredients claimant added to it was property belonging to the Illinois National Guard. How these particular items came into claimant’s possession remains a mystery after carefully weighing the conflicting testimony in the record. Except for the .22 caliber rifle shells, the same is true of the other items of ammunition which claimant had in his room for some time prior to his accident.

We agree with claimant’s contention that the receipt from Lt. Col. Lang, which claimant submitted in evidence, establishes the fact that the ammunition in claimant’s possession prior to his accident was property belonging to the National Guard. But, the receipt merely establishes ownership. It does not negate the possibility that the items mentioned were taken from the Guard’s trucks or weapon carriers, after they came in from training maneuvers, without the knowledge or consent of any officer or member of the Guard.

The one exception, established by the record, was the .22 caliber rifle shells. Shop Chief Highland acknowledged that he had given the claimant such ammunition when Highland and his son, about claimant’s age, would take claimant with them to hunt squirrels. Highland said that this .22 ammunition could be bought by the carton any place in town; that he always kept .22s in his desk; and that he gave claimant a box of .22s to go squirrel hunting. However, there is no evidence that the .22 caliber shells were in any way used in, or in connection with, the hand grenade that caused claimant’s injuries.

Highland emphatically denies that he ever gave the claimant, or ever knew that the claimant ever had in his possession any ammunition of any kind other than the .22 caliber shells. Highland specifically included the simulated hand grenade, smoke bombs, and other ingredients, in disclaiming any knowledge that such items were ever in claimant’s possession. Equally firm and positive in their testimony to the same effect were all other witnesses connected with the National Guard who testified in this cause. This includes George H. Schnapp and Junior Scott, the only others mentioned by claimant as possible suppliers of the black powder he obtained and used to potentiate the hand grenade.

On the other hand, a careful examination of claimant’s testimony indicates that he was never sure or positive as to where he obtained the simulated hand grenade. Whenever he expressed the belief that Dick Highland gave it to him, he added qualifying expression of uncertainty.

In one of claimant’s first statements after his accident, he answered a question from Mattoon Police Chief, Ed Horn, as to where he got the hand grenade. Claimant replied, "Maintenance shop. Dick Highland, who is in charge of the maintenance shop, I believe gave it to me. I am not sure.” (Emphasis supplied)

Later, at the hearing, claimant’s counsel asked him a series of questions as to how, when and where he obtained the grenade without eliciting any positive or unqualified answers. From the record, we quote the following questions asked by claimant’s attorney and the answers given by the claimant:

"Q. Now did you ever receive a hand grenade out there? [National Guard Garage]
A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember when you received this? [The hand grenade.]
A. No, I couldn’t tell you.
Q. Do you have any judgement as to when you received it?
"A. Oh, three or four months or so before the accident.
Q. Was this in any way connected with a training trip by the National Guard?
A. The way I got it was, it was some they’d brought back with them from field maneuvers or something.
Q. Had you seen other hand grenades, other than the one you got out there at the National Guard garages?
A. Yes, sir, just pieces of them.
Q. Was this [grenade] assembled at the time you first saw it?
A. No.
Q. Well, where did you find it, or where did you first see it, the first time you ever saw this hand grenade?
A. It was in the trunk of Dick Highland’s car, I believe.” [Emphasis supplied]

The court finds it strange that a boy almost 16 years old could not be more explicit as to where and how he obtained an item as unique as a practice hand grenade. Several witnesses for the claimant said they knew claimant had and kept in his room a smoke bomb or two, and some items of ammunition that appeared to be from the Guard, but no witness corroborated claimant’s uncertain belief that Highland, or anyone else from the Guard, gave him a hand grenade.

Raymond Wines, claimant’s constant companion on their numerous visits to the armory maintenance shop, testified that he had never seen a hand grenade there.

In any event, the National Guard personnel are all steadfast and positive in their statements throughout that they did not give a grenade to the claimant or any other unauthorized person. Even if claimant had been equally positive and unequivocal as to how he obtained the grenade, his uncorroborated statement would hardly amount to a "preponderance of the evidence”. The rule is stated in Brady v. Chaffee, 163 Ill.App. 242 as follows:

"An affirmative statement by one witness met by a flat categorical denial by another of equal credibility, does not meet the requirement of the law that the plaintiff must make out his or her case by a preponderance of the evidence.”

The court cannot accept the argument, so ably presented in claimant’s well prepared brief, that it is reasonable to assume that claimant was given the hand grenade, or authorized to take it, by some member of the National Guard in consideration of the chores claimant did for the guardsmen. Logical as this assumption might appear, it is conclusively refuted by the evidence. We do accept claimant’s theory as to the items of clothing, the empty ammunition boxes, and the 22 caliber rifle shells. This conclusion is supported by the record. But these items had nothing to do with claimant’s injuries. The overwhelming weight of the evidence supports a different assumption as to the hand grenade which became the instrument of claimant’s injury.

We do not hold that there is no evidence of any negligence whatsoever on the part of the respondent. Perhaps, as claimant suggests, it was negligence per se if respondent failed to prevent any unauthorized person from obtaining access to any explosives on its premises, even smoke bombs and simulated grenades which, according to the record, are not dangerous if properly used. These items were not "calculated to do injury” and. therefore, not "considered to be dangerous per se” under the rule stated in 57 Am. Jur.2d, Negligence, §109.

Perhaps it should have been foreseeable that the practice grenades, which are just designed to create a noise and puff of smoke, could be potentiated into a dangerous instrument as claimant did. This suggestion would be more persuasive if claimant had been a child of such tender years that he could not be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Cicero State Bank v. Dolese & Shepard, 298 Ill.App. 290.

We agree that claimant did not come upon premises of the National Guard maintenance garage as a trespasser. But whether his status on the premises was that of an invitee or a mere licensee is not significant here. There is no proof in the record that respondent breached its duty to use reasonable care for the safety of claimant on its premises even if he were an invitee. See I.L.P. Negligence §51-52. From the same volume and chapter in §62, we find the rule, applicable here, that respondent owned no greater duty to the claimant than it would to any adult:

"Children have no greater right to go upon other people’s property than adults have, and the mere fact that they are children does not, of itself, impose a duty on an owner or person in charge of property to expect them or prepare for their safety.”

In any event, we need not comment further on the probability that there was some negligence on respondent’s part, since the record supports our finding the claimant was contributorily negligent.

This court is bound by the well established rule of law in Illinois that a claimant must be free from contributory negligence in order to recover damages. This rule was carefully re-examined and upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in Maki v. Frelk (1968) 40 Ill.2d 193, reversing the Appellate Court which had attempted to change the contributory negligence rule and adopt the comparative negligence doctrine. [85 Ill.App.2d 439] The law remains unchanged.

We are mindful of the fact that claimant was a minor, just under 16 years of age, at the time of his unfortunate accident. However, the law is equally well settled in this state that, a claimant 14 years of age or over is required to prove freedom from contributory negligence as in the case of an adult, except that his intelligence and experience is considered. Callaghan’s Illinois Digest (3rd Ed.) Negligence §58.5. I.L.P. Negligence §⅓ . Lester Simmons, a minor, et al v. State 26 C.C.R. 351.

Claimant does not plead any lack of experience with the explosive device which caused his injury. He knew exactly what he was doing when he overloaded the relatively harmless hand grenade "to make it a more destructive type of grenade”, as he said at the hearing.

Claimants testimony reveals that he had a thorough knowledge of the hand grenade; how to assemble it; load it; put in a cork and firing pin; and that you could shoot it over and over if you did not overload it with powder. He said he had fired this grenade "once or twice” during the 3 or 4 months since he obtained it.

After admittedly packing and overloading the grenade with powder, he knew and appreciated the danger of this explosive instrument. As stated in his brief, "he was proud of the fruits of his ingenuity and wanted all of his companions to view with awe an object probably never seen by any of them before”.

So, on the date of his injury, claimant took the grenade into an automobile driven by his friend, Raymond Wines. Claimant exhibited the grenade to the 5 other passengers. Claimant handed the grenade to one of the passengers while claimant crawled over into the front seat. When claimant turned around to get the grenade, the other passenger had pulled the pin, putting the grenade in a "hot” condition. Claimant, realizing the imminent danger of explosion, snatched the grenade from his fellow passenger and attempted to toss it out of the automobile. Before succeeding, and while his hands were cupped over the grenade, it exploded. Claimant lost his right hand and 2 fingers of his left hand. No one else was seriously injured.

It is undoubtedly true that there would have been many more severe injuries to others in the car if claimant had not acted as he did, displaying a high sense of respect for lives of others. Claimant’s heroic act also displayed his admitted knowledge of the dangerous explosive device he had created and which caused his unfortunate accident.

Knowing its potential danger, claimant negligently placed the live grenade in the hands of an inexperienced companion. Claimant obviously could not and did not prove that he was free from contributory negligence. Therefore, this claim must be denied.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-228
    Churchill Chemical Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Churchill Chemical Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-318
    Funk Seeds International, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Funk Seeds International, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-327
    Burham City Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Burham City Hospital, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-341
    Berkey Photo Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Reuben J. Zellemayer, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respodent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-343
    Steve Nosser Ford, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Steve Nosser Ford, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-344
    Bunny Bread Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Bunny Bread Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-351
    Cozette Mc Cutchen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Cozette Mc Cutchen, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-370
    Dr. Ralph H. Baahlmann, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Registration and Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Dr. Ralph H. Baahlmann, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-374
    Alfred W. Pflasterer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Alfred W. Pflasterer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-377
    Miller Industrial Supply Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Miller Industrial Supply Co., Inc., Claimant pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-388
    Maurice Metzger, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Maurice Metzger, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This Court Finds that the purpose of this expenditure by the Department of Mental Health was for the payment of a retroactive pay increase which was not paid along with the other employees so entitled, due to the fact that the Department was not notified of such increase until after the funds for FY 1973 had lapsed. According to the departmental report there was a retroactive pay increase of $87 per month for employees classified as Painters under the Illinois Personnel Code. The claimant was so classified from October 1, 1972, to June 30, 1973. On December 12, 1973, the Department of Mental Health was informed by the Department of Personnel, Labor Relations Division, that pursuant to a new collective bargaining agreement pay was to be paid retroactively to October 1, 1972. Money was appropriated for this expense in Fund No. 129, Anna State Hospital, Personnel Services. Of this fund $8,919.53 was returned to the State Treasury upon the lapsing of said fund.

Express authority to pay retroactive pay increases, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is found in Ch. 127, Sec. 145, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, where the legislature stated:

"Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State, either temporary or regular, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates as specified in the payroll or other voucher and no additional sums shall be paid to such officer or employee from any lump sum appropriation, appropriation for extra help or other purpose or any accumulated balances in specific appropriations, which payments would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement the State or state agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.” (Emphasis Added)

In light of this Court’s decision in City of Jacksonville v. State of Illinois, 1946, 15 C.C.R. 62, and Illinois-Iowa Power Company v. State of Illinois, 1942, 12 C.C.R. 308, and the legislative intent embodied in the Ch. 127, Sec. 145, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, it is our opinion that the claimant should be paid.

The sole reason that this claim was not previously paid is due to the fact that the Department of Mental Health was not notified of the pay increase until December 12, 1973, after the lapse of the appropriation which would have covered the payment of this expenditure. This fact is indicated in the departmental report a copy of which is attached to the Joint Stipulation of the parties.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $783 (Seven Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars) be awarded claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above-captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-389
    James A. Reinhart, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    James A. Reinhart, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-394
    Bio Quip Products Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Natural History Survey, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Bio Metal Associates, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-403
    Revell Data Placement, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Revell Data Placement, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-411
    St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-435
    Vic Koenig Chevrolet, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Vic Koenig Chevrolet, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-436
    Metrogas, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Metrogas, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-443
    Daniel Stallings, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1974.

    Daniel Stallings, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-239
    S. J. Reynolds Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1974.

    Bishop, Ericson & Flynn, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

Claimant in this action seeks recovery of $7,500.00 representing the amount of a security bid. deposit held by the Illinois Department of General Services, pursuant to claimant’s withdrawal of a bid on certain work to be done for the State of Illinois on the William W. Fox Childrens Center at Dwight, Illinois.

Claimant’s original complaint sought a refund in the amount of $7,500.00. Thereafter the parties stipulated that if an award is granted, $7,000.00 would be due and owing to the claimant, and that $500.00 would be retained by the State as administrative costs incurred in reletting the contract for new bids.

On August 6, 1973, claimant filed a motion for summary judgment, supported by an affidavit of Robert F. Lawinger, claimant’s President and Chief Executive Officer. The said affidavit recited the following statement of facts which are admitted by the respondent:

1. He [Robert F. Lawinger] is now and at all times material to this controversy has been the President and Chief Executive Officer of S. J. Reynolds Co., Inc. whose principal office is located at 6101 West 28th Street, Cicero, Illinois.

2. S. J. Reynolds Co., Inc. (Reynolds) is now and at all times material hereto has been engaged in the piping and air conditioning business.

3. Sometime prior to June 19, 1972, Reynolds obtained from The Department of General Services of the State of Illinois, Construction Management Division, Office of Supervising Architect, the documents necessary to enable it to submit a bid on certain work to be done for the State of Illinois on William W. Fox Children’s Center at Dwight, Illinois, said project bearing O.S.A. Project No. 72-2123-6.

4. Affiant delegated to Leo Davis, an estimator employed by Reynolds, the work of preparing a bid on the above described project which included heating and refrigeration work in Buildings Nos. 1, 2 and 8 — Phase II at the above described school. The estimator visited the site of the work and then began assembling the necessary data to prepare the bid. Prior to the time that the bid was completed, he left on vacation and turned the completion of the estimate over to Louis Benedict. The latter estimator in completing his calculations failed to include in such calculations the cost of the omitted work, namely cutting, patching and removal work. The error therefore was a misconception on the part of the estimator completing the estimate and preparing the bid documents as to what was included in that part of the estimate completed by the original estimator, and also a misconception of the scope of the work to be performed; all of which contributed to errors in recording the bid that was submitted for the work.

5. Upon the opening of the bids and the discovery that Reynolds’ bid was approximately $90,000 less than the lowest bid of any other contractor bidding on the job and upon Reynolds then learning how the error arose, it immediately dispatched to the State of Illinois, a telegram advising the State of Illinois of the error, copy of said telegram being attached to the Complaint. On June 26, 1972 Reynolds wrote the State of Illinois with reference to said matter, copy of said letter being attached to the Complaint. Thereafter pursuant to the request of the State of Illinois, it submitted all of its records, including the original estimate, with reference to said project to the engineers, architects and other employees of the State of Illinois who were charged with the responsibility of designing and supervising the construction of the above described project; so that the State of Illinois was then fully advised that a mistake had been made.

6. Subsequent to the notification above referred to, Reynolds withdrew its bid and requested that its security deposit of Seven Thousand Five Hundred ($7,500.00) Dollars be returned to it. To this date, said security deposit has not been returned.

7. Thereafter the State of Illinois rejected all bids and readvertised the work. When the bids on the second readvertisement were opened, it was found that the price of the lowest bidder was $13,450 less than the lowest bid that was submitted under the first advertisement of the work, — assuming that Reynolds’ bid be excluded because of the mistake hereinabove described.

8. This Affidavit is submitted in support of a Motion for Summary Judgment in the above entitled cause requiring the State of Illinois to return to Reynolds its security deposit of Seven Thousand Five Hundred ($7,500.00) Dollars.

All of the above allegations were admitted by the respondent in its reply to claimant’s motion for summary judgment, and no defense to this claim was proffered by the respondent.

Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the court to review the Illinois cases involving bidding errors to determine the legal basis, if any, for granting the relief sought by the claimant in this action as we did in the case of Consolidated Engineering Division v. State, C.C. No. 5487, filed April 27, 1971. Under the facts in that case, which are quite similar to the case at bar, we awarded a refund in the amount of the claimant’s bid deposit, relying on the Illinois Supreme Court’s ruling in Bromagin v. City of Bloomington, 234 Ill. 114 (1908). This still appears to be the latest word from the Supreme Court that is closely in point. There a bidder in a municipal construction project erred in estimating his bid by inserting in the column set apart for the cost per foot of pipe the weight of the pipe per foot. The proposal was prepared in haste, the bidder having on the same day received financial backing for the job. The City accepted the bid knowing the mistake had been made. The Supreme Court held that the mistake did not show such negligence as would bar relief.

More recently our Appellate Court, speaking directly on the question involved here, reviewed Bromagin v. City of Bloomington (Supra) and cases from other jurisdictions in People Ex Rel, Ill.Dept. of P. W. & B. v. South East National Bank, 266 N.E.2d 778 (1971). This case is summarized in its syllabus as follows:

"Action by the Illinois Department of Public Works and Buildings against a bank to recover the amount of a certified check drawn on the bank by an engineering company as security deposit for a public construction contract. The engineering company intervened and filed a counterclaim for rescission. The Circuit Court of Cook County, George N. Leighton, J., granted the engineering company’s motion for summary judgment; ordered the check "returned, and that Department appealed. The Appellate Court, Dempsey, J., held that the engineering contractor which submitted the lowest bid on public construction contract was entitled to rescind the contract and recover the amount of the security deposit upon showing that the mistake in the bid was due to an inadvertently misplaced decimal point that resulted from hasty preparation because of late quotations from some subcontractors and suppliers; That Department of Public Works and Buildings was promptly notified of the bidder’s intention to withdraw its bid before the award was made; and that the Department was able, with no great loss, to award the contract to the next lowest bidder.”

In the case at bar the respondent did not award the contract to the next lowest bidder, which would have been a substantial loss to the State, nor did it accept claimant’s bid after knowing the mistake had been made, as in the case of Bromagin (Supra). Instead, respondent rejected all bids and readvertised the work. This procedure actually resulted in a savings to the State of $13,450.00 as explained in ¶7 of the facts previously stated. Moreover, claimant has agreed by stipulation that $500.00 of his claim is to be retained by the State to cover administrative costs incurred in reletting the contract for new bids.

As we said in Consolidated (Supra), "The Court is mindful of the fact that public officials must exercise extreme care and caution to avoid abuses of the competitive bidding process which have come to light in the past.” However, we find no such abuse indicated in the case at bar.

Based on the uncontroverted facts in this case, the joint stipulation of the parties, and the law of this state as enuniciated in the cases cited above, we find that claimant’s motion for summary judgment should be granted and an award made in the sum of $7,000.00.

The procedure for a summary judgment, is stated in §57 of the Civil Practice Act, pursuant to Rule 2 of this Court. Claimant has correctly followed such procedure and the respondent has declined to oppose claimant’s motion.

An award is, therefore, entered in favor of claimant, S. J. Reynolds Co., Inc., in the sum of $7,000.00. This is a refund of a security deposit.


author: Perlin, C. J.

text:
    (No. 73-CC-402
    Allied Electronics Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Allied Electronics Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-124
    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-193
    Joseph C. Moore, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Dyer, Richmond, Moore & Nelson, Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-222
    Parkway Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Parkway Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-229
    Humma’s Drug Store, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Humma’s Drug Store, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-258
    Public Electric Construction Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Landesman & Schwartz, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-269
    University Pharmacy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    University Pharmacy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-272
    Everett L. Vestel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Everett L. Vestel, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This Court Finds that the purpose of this expenditure by the Department of Children & Family Services was for the payment of a retroactive pay increase which was not paid because the notification to the Department was not received until November 27, 1973. According to the departmental report there was a retroactive pay increase of $87 per month for employees classified as Plasterers under the Illinois Personnel Code. Claimant was so classified during the months of April, May and June of 1973. Money was appropriated for this expense in Section 2 of House Bill No. 4197, Approved July 7, 1972 in the amount of $2,623,700, Personal Services, Regular Positions for the Illinois School for the Deaf (001-2335-120). Of this appropriation, $29,509.01 was returned to the State Treasury upon the lapsing of said fund.

Express authority to pay retroactive pay increases, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement is found in Ch. 127, Sec. 145, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, where the legislature stated:

‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State, either temporary or regular, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates as specified in the payroll or other voucher and no additional sums shall be paid to such officer or employee from any lump sum appropriation, appropriation for extra help or other purpose or any accumulated balances in specific appropriations, which payments would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon an effective date of the collective bargaining agreement the state or state agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.” (Emphasis Added)

In light of this Court’s decisions in City of Jacksonville v. State of Illinois, (1946), 15 C.C.R. 62, and Illinois-Iowa Power Company v. State of Illinois (1942), 12 C.C.R. 308, and the legislative intent embodied in the Ch. 127, Sec. 145, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971, it is our opinion that the claimant should be paid.

The sole reason that this claim was not paid is due to the fact that the Department of Children & Family-Services did not receive notification of the pay increase until November 27, 1973, after the close of the appropriation period from which this debt would have been paid. This fact is stated in the departmental report of the Department of Children and Family Services, a copy of said report being attached to the Joint Stipulation of the parties.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $261 (Two Hundred Sixty-One Dollars) be awarded claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above-captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-289
    Bismarck Hotel Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Personnel, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

      Bismark Hotel Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-293
    Amity Hospital Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Amity Hospital Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-321
    Helix Limited, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Helix Limited, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-322
    Entrex, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Entrex, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-352
    Zion Nursing Home Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Zion Nursing Home, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-355
    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-361
    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-364
    Nasco, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Natural History Survey, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Nasco, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-376
    Susan Rentle, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Susan E. Rentle, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-379
    Central Illinois Electric Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Central Illinois Electric Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-382
    Harold S. Marshall, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Harold S. Marshall, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-390
    Avalon Building Maintenance, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Avalon Building Maintenance, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-401
    Harold L. Davenport, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Harold L. Davenport, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-429
    Richard Simmons, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Richard Simmons, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-430
    Ogle County Sheriff’s Department, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Ogle County Sheriff’s Department, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-431
    Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-441
    Hub Clothiers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Hub Clothiers, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-449
    E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-468
    Huston-Patterson Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois State Museum, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Huston-Patterson Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6953
    Ford Tractor Operations, Ford Motor Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1974.

    Ford Tractor Operations, Ford Motor Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6893
    Alice N. Sweet, Claimant, vs. The Board of Regents of the Regency University System, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 28, 1974.

    Fred Lambruschi, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

The parties hereto have submitted to this Court a joint stipulation establishing the following factual situation:

On October 15, 1971, the Claimant was walking upon a public sidewalk on the campus of the Illinois State University at Normal, Illinois. While in the exercise of due care for her safety, Claimant fell over a foreign object which the Respondent admittedly had carelessly and negligently permitted to accumulate and remain on the sidewalk.

As a result of the aforesaid incident Claimant sustained a fracture of her right leg, and incurred medical and hospital expenses in the sum of $1,103.05 for the treatment of her injury.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $2,500.00.


text:
    (No. 5995
    Keuffel and Esser Company, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 29, 1974.

    Wolfe, Klein, Bonner and Berzark, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
    Wolfe, Klein, Bonner and Berzark, Attorney for Claimant.
   Burks, J.

Claimant filed this action on December 10, 1970, seeking payment in the amount of $286.80 for materials allegedly furnished and delivered to the respondent on December 8, 1967, pursuant to respondent’s order for said materials.

The complaint alleges that, on the aforesaid date, on request of the respondent’s Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, it delivered to the Division of Highways District No. 6 at 126 East Oak Street, Springfield, Illinois, 24M Band Chains. The unit price was $11.95, making a total price of $286.80.

Respondent’s Departmental Report shows that, from its records and investigations, it is unable to verify whether or not the respondent received the goods in question. Respondent’s letter recommended that the claim be set for a hearing in order that the claimant may submit proper proof. At the hearing Roger R. Doyle, supervisor of the order department of the claimant’s company, identified a copy of the invoice for the material in question. He testified that the M bands were tapes used in surveying and that they were shipped in two packages; that a delivery receipt would be in the possession of United Parcel Service, the delivery company; that the receipt was requested from the delivery company about a year ago but that it was not available because their records are destroyed after three years.

Respondent offered no rebuttal evidence. Respondent’s departmental report does not deny the probability that the merchandise was received as claimant alleges. The record shows that claimant has been supplying materials to the respondent for many years.

The Court feels that claimant did deliver the material in question to the respondent pursuant to respondent’s order, and that the claimant in this claim has sustained its burden of proof.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $286.80, being the amount due the claimant under a valid contract.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-114
    Evanston Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974

    Evanston Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-145
    Multigraphics Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Multigraphics Division, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-162
    Harold L. Wells, d/b/a Metropolis Block Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Louis G. Horman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-290
    Bismarck Hotel Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Bismarck Hotel Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-308
    Standard Oil Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Standard Oil Division, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-312
    Standard Oil Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Standard Oil Division, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-342
    Computer Machinery Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Computer Machinery Corporation, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-346
    Gulf Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Gulf Oil Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-353
    Fred Peters Welding Supply Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Thomas F. O’Connor, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-366
    Consolidated Oil Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Consolidated Oil Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-369
    Edward J. Morthole, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Edward J. Morthole, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-397
    Memorial Hospital, Etc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Brown, Hay & Stephens, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-399
    William J. Blazis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    William J. Blazis, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-432
    General Electric Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    General Electric Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-438
    Forrest N. Jones, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Forrest N. Jones, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-442
    Mose Farris, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Mose Farris, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-453
    Kimmel-Jensen and Associates, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Kimmel-Jensen and Associates, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-476
    Premium Instruments Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Premium Instruments Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-477
    Edwin R. Walters, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Edwin R. Walters, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-493
    The Jefferson House, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    The Jefferson House, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-495
    Allied Handling Equipment Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Allied Handling Equipment Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-502
    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Giffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk, Cohen, Bodewes & Narmont, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-505
    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Giffin, Winning, Lindner, Newkirk, Cohen, Bodewes & Narmont, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-511
    Hedges Clinic, S. C., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Hedges Clinic, S. C., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-536
    Columbus Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Columbus Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-561
    Flink Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Flink Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-470
    Schuster Equipment Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1974.

    Donald L. Mrozek and Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban and Fuller, Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-14
    Lloyd E. Dyer, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Pollution Control Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Lloyd E. Dyer, Jr., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-67
    St. Mary’s Hospital, E. St. Louis, Illinois, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    St. Mary’s Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-136
    Evelyn Pauline Steck, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Evelyn Pauline Steck, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-176
    Laminex, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Laminex, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-198
    Moline Public Schools, Board of Education, Dist. No. 40 By Dr. Theodore F. Rockafellow, Supt., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Dr. Theodore F. Rockafellow, for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-200
    Central Office Equipment Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Central Office Equipment Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-228
    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-265
    Illinois National Bank, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Illinois National Bank, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-365
    Cahill Printing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Cahill Printing Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-392
    Lucy L. Reese, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Lucy L. Reese, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-403
    James Gordon d/b/a Silver’s Foods, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Frank A. Edelman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-419
    Lutheran Child and Family Services, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Haffner, Grow, Overgaard and Berghoff, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-424
    The Western Union Telegraph Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Southern Illinois University, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Eckhart, McSwain, Hassell & Silliman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-428
    West Publishing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    West Publishing Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-456
    Reed Leon Faith, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Reed Leon Faith, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-469
    Huston-Patterson Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Attorney General’s Office, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Huston-Patterson Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-481
    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-482
    Harold E. McMann d/b/a Illini Moving and Storage, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Governors Office of Human Resources, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 8, 1974.
    Harold E. McMann d/b/a Illini Moving and Storage, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-488
    Ivan L. Ford, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Ivan L. Ford, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-489
    Central Office Equipment Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Central Office Equipment Co., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-494
    Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Roberts, Gundlach & Lee, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-496
    Kankakee Industrial Supply Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Kankakee Industrial Supply Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-532
    Joel Gleckler, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Joel Gleckler, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-534
    Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-542
    Educational Service Region, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Educational Service Region, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-562
    Griggsville Community School Unit 4, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1974.

    Griggsville Community School Unit 4, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-165
    George J. Skontos, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    George J. Skontos, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-298
    IBM Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Comptroller, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    IBM Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-299
    Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Brown, Hay & Stephens, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-329
    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-337
    Instant Printing Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Instant Printing Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-407
    Harry Burge, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Harry Burge, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-408
    Rosemont Building Supply Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Rosemont Building Supply Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-422
    Joseph N. Killebrew, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Joseph N. Killebrew, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-426
    Nyle Lee Dyer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Nyle Lee Dyer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-465
    Chicago Police Department, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Richard L. Curry, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-478
    Air Illinois, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Air Illinois, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-479
    Air Illinois, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Air Illinois, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-509
    Park Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Park Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-524
    Bradner Smith & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Bradner Smith & Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-540
    Park Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Park Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-552
    Larson and Mc Ginnis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1974.

    Larson and Mc Ginnis, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.