text:
    (No. 75-CV-218
    Robert H. Stein, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Robert H. Stein, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on September 15, 1974, near 1047 North Keeler Avenue, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Robert H. Stein, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Robert H. Stein, age 48, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on September 15, 1974, at approximately 11:00 p.m., the claimant was attacked by a man with a hammer as he was walking near 1047 North Keeler, Chicago, Illinois. Claimant’s leg was broken as he struggled. The offender then took claimant’s wallet and fled the scene.

3. That the claimant went home and called the Chicago Police. Claimant was taken to St. Anne’s Hospital by police squadron where he was treated for his injuries by Dr. Henry Bernstein. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

4. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence that the claimant’s injuries were in any way attributable to his wrongful act or the substantial provocation of his assailant.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant and fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant. However, the assailant has not been identified at this time.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation for medical and hospital expenses only.

8. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$2,870.15
2) Medical...................................... 480.00
$3,350.15

9. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

10. That, in the claim before us, the claimant has not received benefits from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 1Í8, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $3,150.15. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $3,150.15.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $3,150.15 (Three Thousand One Hundred Fifty Dollars And Fifteen Cents) be awarded the claimant, Robert H. Stein, the victim of a violent crime.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 74-CV-84
    Edmund Szczesnowski, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 20, 1975.

    Edmund Szczesnowski, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on June 3, 1974, at 2314 W. Charleston, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Edmund Szczesnowski, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70 §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Edmund Szczesnowski, age 54, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat, 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on June 3, 1974, the claimant was beaten while being robbed by his assailant.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from June 3, 1974, to June 13, 1974, and received treatment for injuries sustained in the beating. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant has not been identified or apprehended. The case remains under investigation by the Chicago Police Department.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and the claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant worked 8 days a month on one job for an average monthly income of $217.80, and worked at another job for an average monthly income of $183.85, thus making a total average monthly income of $401.65, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act.

"... loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

That due to his injuries the claimant missed 4 days of work at his first job, thus losing $108.90 in wages. That the claimant’s income losses due to 15 lost work days from the second job may be determined using the Court accepted method of calculating salary losses over a portion of a month — average monthly income ($183.85) divided by the average number of days in a month (30.4) multiplied by the number of days out of work (15). Thus the victim’s wage loss from the second job totals $90.60, and the claimant’s compensable losses due to lost work days from both jobs may be determined to total $199.50.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital ......,...............................$1,072,70
2) Medical...................................... 264.80
3) Loss of Salary................................. 199.50
$1,537.00

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this Court:

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the "Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State, or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the claimant received benefits from Blue Shield totalling $1,122.60. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in H8 and 119, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant, as $214.40.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $214.14 be awarded to the claimant, Edmund Szczesnowski, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-6
    Joseph Hutchinson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 20, 1975.

    Stephen G. Baime, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on May 3, 1974, at 3900 South Wells Street, Chicago, Illinois. Joseph Hutchinson, a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Joseph Hutchinson, age 37, 5916 South Hermitage, Chicago, Illinois, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-3).

2. That on May 3,1974, the claimant was beaten by four assailants, three of which were identified as Ernest Plant, Sr., Ernest Plant, Jr., and Lamont Plant.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries to his face, arms, fingers and a broken jaw for which he was hospitalized for seven days at Michael Reese Hospital. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That one of the assailants, Ernest Plant, Sr., was convicted of Battery in the Cook County Criminal Court (Case #G464-636 and 7.) Lamont and Ernest Plant, Jr., were discharged, and the other assailant was never identified.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or were sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant was unable to work from May 3, 1974, through June 3, 1974, a period of one month. The claimant has not received any compensation for his lost wages. His average monthly earnings for the six months prior to his injury were $1,400.00 per month. The maximum compensable income pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act is $500.00 per month. Therefore, the claimant is eligible for $500 for one month, or $500.

9. That the claimant incurred hospital expenses which were partially reimbursed by Blue Cross/Blue Shield benefits. The gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

Michael Reese Medical Center
2929 South Ellis
Chicago, Illinois...................................$1,897.75
Total Medical Expense..............................$1,897.75
Total Loss of Earnings.............................. 500.00
Gross Loss.......................................$2,397.75

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which a claimant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act’, or from local, governmental, State or Federal funds, or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

11. That in the claim before us, the claimant received Blue Cross benefits of $1,437.40 that may be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. When this amount plus the statutory deduction of $200 is deducted from the gross amount of loss ($2,397.75) as calculated in $8 and 9, an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $760.35 is left.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $760.35 (Seven Hundred Sixty Dollars And Thirty Five Cents) be awarded from the Court of Claims fund to the claimant, Joseph Hutchinson, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-67
    Mary Herila, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 20, 1975.

    Mary Herila, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, Leonard
    Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on November 30, 1973, at approximately 10:00 p.m. near 1403 West 17th Street. Mary Herila, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Mary Herila, age 57, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on November 30, 1973, at approximately 10:00 p.m., the claimant, Mary Herila, was walking home from work when she was accosted by three men near 1403 West 17th Street, Chicago, Illinois. The men grabbed claimant’s purse and spun her around. They then kicked and hit her. Claimant’s neighbor, Jessie Arzesco, found claimant lying on the ground, took her home and notified the Chicago Police Department.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence that the claimant’s injuries were in any way attributable to her wrongful act or the substantial provocation of her assailant.

4. That the claimant was taken to St. Francis X. Cabrini Hospital, 811 South Lytle, Chicago, where she was treated by Dr. James J. Bransfield for fracture of both bones in the left leg. Dr. Bransfield’s treatment was to close reduction manipulation and application of a long leg cast.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and her assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the apprehension of the assailants. However, the assailants have not been identified at this time.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation for hospital and medical expenses and for loss of earnings.

8. That statements from claimant’s physician and claimant’s employer indicate that claimant was out of work from November 30,1973, to September 10,1974, a total of 8 months and 10 days, as a result of her injuries.

9. That claimant was employed by Elva’s Workroom, 4049 West 26th Street, where her average monthly earnings was $428.00 month.

10. That the claimant has shown to the court’s satisfaction that her loss of earnings as a result of her injury was $3,564.60.

11. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deduction and setoffs is as follows:

Hospital.........................................$ 713.45
Medical......................................... 613.00
$1,216.45

12. That the claimant has received the following benefits as a result of her injury:

Prudential Insurance Co., #H7220614, H7227130 ........ $1,235.45
State of Illinois, Dept, of Public Aid ................... 678.61
$1,914.06

13. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

14. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from her loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $1,914.06. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 1110 and 11, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $2,776.99. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $2,776.99. i.e.,

Loss of Earnings..........................$3,564.60
Hospital & Medical........................ 1,326.45 $4,891.05
Less benefits received...................... 1,914.06
$200 deductible........................... 200.00 2,114.06
$2,776.99

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $2,776.99 (Two Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy-Six Dollars And Ninety-Nine Cents) be awarded to Mary Herila, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-192
    Raymond E. Wittkopp, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 20, 1975.

    Raymond E. Wittkopp, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on September 8, 1974, in the 800 block of West Addison Street, Chicago. Raymond E. Wittkopp, the victim seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act’).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Raymond E. Wittkopp, age 41, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on September 8, 1974, the claimant was beaten, kicked and robbed by several assailants after the claimant left a tavern in the 800 block of West Addison.

3. That statements taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from September 8, 1974, to September 21, 1974, and received treatment for injuries sustained in the beating. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailants have not been identified or apprehended. Police investigation of this case has been suspended pending any new information.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim’s average monthly earning for the 6 months immediately preceding his injury was $614.40, but earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of earnings, pursuant to the following provision in §4 of the Act:

. . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

That the victim’s doctor has demonstrated that, due to extensive knee injuries sustained in the incident, the claimant missed 3 months and 8 days of work. That, based on the Court accepted method of calculating salary losses over a portion of a month — average monthly income ($500) divided by the average number of days in a month (30.4) multiplied by the number of days out of work (8) — The claimant’s compensable losses due to 3 months and 8 days of lost work time may be determined to total $1,631.52.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

Able Ambulance Service............................ $ 63.00
Town and Country Ambulance Service................. $ 49.00
Swedish Covenant Hospital ......................... $ 282.80
Ravenswood Hospital .............................. $1,397.76
Richard G. Nilges, M.D............................. $ 38.00
Dickens Medical Service (anesthesia service) ............ $ 100.00
S. Yelda, M.D. (orthopedic consultation)................ $ 25.00
Loss of Salary.................................... $1,631.52
$3,587.08

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the claimant has been fully compensated for all medical and hospital costs through his insurance, and has also received $153.60 in sick pay. That this deduction, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 119, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant as $1,277.92.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,277.92 (One Thousand Two Hundred Seventy Seven Dollars And Ninety Two Cents) be awarded to the claimant, Raymond E. Wittkopp, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-235
    Joseph Sansone, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 20, 1975.

    Stephen Addis, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 11, 1974, in a tavern at 2822 West Marquette Road, Chicago, Illinois. Joseph Sansone, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”.)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based on these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Joseph Sansone, age 38, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on March 11, 1974, the claimant was shot while sitting at the bar in Ziggy’s Tavern, 2822 West Marquette, Chicago, Illinois.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from March 11, 1974 to May 16, 1974, and received treatment for injuries sustained in the shooting. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant, Edward Tadewsiak, 6124 South Washtenaw, Chicago, Illinois, was arrested by the Chicago Police Department. He was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to two years probation.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and the claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of this case.

8. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital.....................................$14,292.62
2) Medical...................................... 3,865.00
$18,157.62

9. That the victim was unemployed during the 6 months immediately preceding the incident, and, therefore, that loss of salary cannot be determined.

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State, or Federal funds, or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the claimant received no benefits from other sources as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in H8, leaves an amount of loss sustained by the claimant of $17,957.62. That this loss is an amount far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded as compensation under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Dollars And No Cents) be awarded to the claimant, Joseph Sansone, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-243
    Robert Preston, on behalf of Cornelia Preston, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 20, 1975.

    Robert Preston, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on February 22,1974. Robert Preston, husband of the victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat, 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Cornelia Preston, wife of the claimant, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on February 22, 1974, at approximately 6:45 A.M., the Chicago Police, responding to a complainant, discovered the body of a white female behind the garage at '3533 South Wood Street. The police investigation later revealed that the body was that of the victim, Cornelia M. Preston. Statements of two witnesses, Gail Thomas of 4105 South Richmond, Chicago, and Sue Lenzie of 4228 South Mozart to Chicago Police, have revealed that the body was taken to 3533 South Wood Street by Tim Watts of 3038 South Keeley, Chicago, Illinois, in the trunk of his car. The cause of victim’s death has been determined to have been asphyxiation by manual strangulation. The victim’s body was taken to the Cook County Morgue where it was identified by Susan Keating of 2963 South Haynes.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators, present no evidence that the victim’s death was in any way attributable to her wrongful act or the substantial provocation of her assailant.

4. That a further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and her assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

7. That Timothy Watts has been arrested, and charged with the murder of the victim. He has been indicted in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Trial was set for May 13,1975, in the Courtroom of Judge Massey.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation’ for funeral expenses as follows:

Robert’s Funeral Home
2819 South Archer
Chicago, Illinois . . ...............................$1,500.00

9. That no claim is made for loss of support as no one was dependent on the victim for support.

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

11. That, in the claim before us, the claimant has not received benefits-from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 118, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $1,300.00. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $1,300.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,300.00 (One ' Thousand Three Hundred Dollars And No Cents) be awarded the claimant, Robert Preston, as the husband of an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-1
    Fred J. Kurth, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 28, 1975.

    Fred J. Kurth, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on May 12, 1974, at approximately 2:00 a.m., near the corner of North Avenue and Homan Avenue, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Fred J. Kurth, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Fred J. Kurth, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on February 12, 1974, at approximately 2:00 a.m., the claimant, Fred J. Kurth, was shot in the right side and stomach while waiting for a bus at the corner of North Avenue and Homan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The claimant was transported to St. Elizabeth Hospital, 1431 North Claremont, by police ambulance, where he was treated for his injuries by Dr. Miguel Teresi. Claimant was discharged from hospital on June 1, 1974.

3. That the claimant stated that he was coming home from a party with two friends. While waiting for a bus at the corner of North and Homan, a car with one male and two females pulled up to the corner and the driver said something in Spanish. The claimant or a member of his group then showed his middle finger to the persons in the car. The car then left. About five minutes later, a different car approached the corner with a male driver and two male passengers, one of which was the same person as was in the first car. One of the passengers got out of the car, started shooting and hit the claimant in the right side and stomach.

4. That in a statement taken by the police from Henry Rodriguez, the driver of the second car, Mr. Rodriguez stated that he was at a party when some of his friends came back to the party and stated that some boys on the corner of North and Homan were messing with their girls. Mr. Rodriguez went on to say that he left the party, driving his car, and took with him Gumer Rodriguez and Raymond Cruz, Jr. Henry Rodriguez stated that he was not aware that either of his passengers had a gun. When they arrived at the corner of North and Homan, Raymond Cruz and Gumer Rodriguez got out of the car and began hitting the claimant. Gumer Rodriguez then took out his gun and shot the claimant. A further and more detailed investigation considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the injuries to the claimant were not attributable to his wrongful act or the substantial provocation of his assailant.

6. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

8. That the assailant has been identified as Gumer Rodriguez. He has been indicted and pled guilty to Aggravated Battery. Sentence was 2 years probation and 90 days in the House of Corrections.

9. That the claimant seeks compensation for Hospital and Medical expenses as well as loss of earnings.

10. That the claimant’s average monthly salary prior to his injury was $441.62 and that the claimant was unable to work from May 12,1974, to August 14,1974, as a result of his injury, a total of 3 months.

11. That the claimant has received disability payments from Guardian Life Insurance Company of New York in the amount of $614.29.

12. That claimant’s net loss of earnings was:

$441.62 x 3 ..................................... $1,324.86
Less Disability payments ........................... —614.29
Net loss of earnings ............................... $ 770.57

13. That in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance as follows:

1) Medical ..................................... $ 840.00
2) Hospital..................................... 6,455.85
$7,295.85

That in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local government, State or Federal funds, or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

14. That in this claim before us the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act were shown to be in the sum total of $7,002.85. This amount plus the statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss, as calculated in ¶12 and 13, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $863.57. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $863.57.

Net Loss of Earnings .............................. $ 770.57
Net Hospital & Medical ............................ 293.00
$1,063.57
Less $200 deductible............................... —200.00
$ 863.57

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $863.57 (Eight Hundred Sixty Three Dollars and Fifty Seven Cents) be awarded to the claimant, Fred J. Kurth, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-31
    Anna M. Douglas, on behalf of Clyde Douglas, Victim, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 28, 1975.

    Anna M. Douglas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on December 7, 1973, in a parking lot near 2237 North Sheffield Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Anna M. Douglas, mother of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”.)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based on these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s son, Clyde Douglas, age 21, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on December 7, the victim was shot and wounded in the chest and right thigh while walking home from a girlfriend’s home.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from December 8,1973, to December 21,1973, and received treatment for injuries sustained in the shooting. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant, Terry Smith, of 1037 East 100th Place, Chicago, Illinois, was arrested by the Chicago Police Department on charges of Aggravated Battery. He has subsequently been found guilty and sentenced to one year and one day.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and the claimant and the victim have fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were in no part covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$3,336.20
2) Medical...................................... 900.00
$4,236.20

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds, or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five thousand dollars to life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, neither the claimant nor the victim received any benefits from other sources, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in ¶9 leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $4,036.20. Claimant paid these medical expenses for her son.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $4,036.20 be awarded to the claimant, Anna M. Douglas, as the mother of Clyde Douglas, the innocent victim of a violent crime. [Pursuant to §3(a) of the Act.]

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred and Ninety Nine Dollars and Ninety Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $3,306.21 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-141
    Andrea Miller, on behalf of Burton M. Miller, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 28, 1975.

    David M. Meister, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for- Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 23, 1974, at 2201 West Howard Street, Chicago, Illinois. Andrea Miller, wife of the deceased victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband, Burton M. Miller, age 33, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on March 23, 1974, the claimant’s husband was shot by an unidentified assailant or assailants during the course of a robbery of the Kwik Kleen Kar Wash shortly before the victim was to open the car wash.

3. That there is no evidence of any provocation by the decedent for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim died on March 23, 1974, as a result of the wound he received in the shooting six hours earlier. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. Th,at no suspects have been identified in connection with this crime as of this date, and the police investigation is ongoing.

6. That there is no evidence whatsoever that the victim and his assailants were related or shared the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of support to herself and her daughter, Tracy Miller, age 15. A second child Timothy is living with foster parents and was not supported by the victim at the time of his death.

9. That at the time of Burton M. Miller’s death, he was 33 years old and had a life expectancy to age 71 according to Vital Statistics of the U.S. 1970, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare Public Health Service mortality table for the U.S. population. Therefore, we must conclude that the decedent’s family has lost his financial support for the remainder of his normal life expectancy, computed to be 38 years.

10. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his death. were $1,522.75 but earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of support, pursuant to the following provision in §4 of the Act:

"... loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

11. That, based on the victim’s normal life expectancy of 38 years, and taking $500 per month as his average earnings, the loss of support of his family is computed to be an amount far in exess of the $10,000.00 maximum amount that can be awarded as compensation under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

12. That, in addition to loss of support, the claimant incurred medical and funeral expenses for the victim and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

Medical Expense
St. Francis Hospital................................$ 247.00
Funeral Expenses Memorial Park Cemetery
(evergreen covering and Maintenance)..................$ 72.75
Monument, Leve Monument
Chicago, Illinois...................................$ 348.25
Rabbi Singer (ceremony) ............................$ 125.00
Funeral Home
Weinsten Brothers Funeral Home.....................$2,564.60
TOTAL FUNERAL EXPENSE .......................$3,110.60

The Court has determined that, pursuant to the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” an amount of $2,500.00 would be reasonable compensation for the funeral expenses.

COMPENSABLE FUNERAL EXPENSE................$2,500.00
MEDICAL EXPENSE..............................$ 247.00
TOTAL MEDICAL AND FUNERAL EXPENSE ..........$2,747.00

13. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal Funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pensions plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefits of the applicant. . .).”

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death, and deduction of $200, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point, we are following an opinion of the Masachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth (1973) 296 N.E. 2d 477.

14. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $125,573.00. This amount minus the $25,000 nondeductible life insurance allowance, plus the statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in §11 and §12, leaves the amount of actual loss sustained by the claimant and her daughter far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime. Hence, the claimant and her daughter are entitled to an award in the maximum amount payable under the Act, $10,000.

The Court takes notice of the fact that the child of the deceased victim, named in §8 of this opinion, was also dependent on Burton M. Miller, as was his surviving spouse, Andrea Miller, the claimant, and the mother of decedent’s said daughter.

Under these circumstances the court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in §8(b):

"(b) If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for (her) support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it (the court) shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled, and (3) order that those amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor incompetent, to his (her) guardian or conservator, as the case may be.”

To comply strictly with the above legislative directive, it would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution of the $10,000 award in accordance with the rule of distribution stated in §11(1) of the Probate Act. This rule would allow one-third ($3,333.33) to the victim’s surviving spouse, and the remaining two-thirds ($6,666.66) to the victim’s daughter. This would create an estate in the amount of $6,666.66 for Tracy Miller, age 15.

However, to make distribution in this manner, we believe would impose an undue hardship on the mother. If the $10,000 award were paid to her in a lump sum, she would be holding $6,666.66 in trust for her daughter. Although she is guardian of her person, she would have no power to administer her estate nor use her funds unless she is duly appointed guardian of the minor’s estate as provided by law. Perry v. Carmichael (1880) 95 Ill. 519. After such appointment, she would be required to manage her daughter’s funds frugally under the direction of the appointing court and present periodic of her guardianship to such Court. She would also be responsible for Court costs and for any legal expenses required in filing her petition for appointment, oath, surety bond and accounts.

To obviate the necessity of the claimant being appointed guardian of her daughter’s estate, and considering all other facts in this case, the court believes that the best interest of the victim’s family would be served by our ordering that this award be disbursed to the claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized in §8(a)(4) of the Act. As the natural guardian of her daughter, the mother has a legal obligation to provide for her suitable support and education. In fulfilling this obligation we believe she would necessarily be required to expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and nature of her daughter as well as for her own necessities.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $10,000.00 be awarded to the claimant and her daughter, collectively, as persons who were both dependent for their support on Burton M. Miller, the deceased victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the aforesaid be paid to the claimant, Andrea Miller, as a lump sum of $2,747.00, and $500 per month for 14 months thereafter, and $253.00 in the fifteenth month. The Court directs that said monthly payments shall be made from the Court of Claims Fund insofar as it is legally possible to do so.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-184
    Clyde B. Maxwell, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 28, 1975.

    Melvin Gaines, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on the evening of March 5, 1974, at 6400 South Morgan Street, Chicago, Illinois. Clyde B. Maxwell, Jr., the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Acf”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Clyde B. Maxwell, Jr., age 25, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on March 5, 1974, at midnight, the claimant was shot and robbed at his girlfriend’s apartment by two unidentified assailants.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the claimant sustained a gunshot wound for which he was hospitalized twice for a total of 31 days. The claimant underwent surgery twice for severe damage to his liver and intestines. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. The assailants have not yet been identified, and the police investigation has been suspended.

7. That the victim was unemployed at the time of his injury. He therefore makes no claim for loss of earnings.

8. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

(Itemization)
1. Hospital (Englewood)............................$ 7,690.30
3-6-74 to 3-28-74
(Extensive surgery and medication were required due to the severity of the abdominal injuries sustained by the
claimant.
5-7-74 to 5-16-74 ............................... 1,748.10
(Supplemental surgery for injuries)
Total Hospital Expense.......................$ 9,448.20
2. Doctor (Rodrigo Floro, M.D.) ......................$ 1,940.00
Total Medical Expense .......................$11,388.20

9. That there is no evidence that claimant has received any compensation from local, state or federal funds, or insurance of any kind.

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the claimant received no benefits from other sources which must be deducted from his loss. After the statutory deduction of $200.00 is deducted from the gross loss as calculated in f8, an amount of loss sustained by the claimant of $11,188.20 is left.

11. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of this Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Dollars), the maximum allowable compensation under the Act, be paid to the claimant, Clyde B. Maxwell, Jr., an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-207
    Arne Pullen, Sr., on behalf of Arne Pullen, Jr., Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 28, 1975.

    Richard S. Jemilo, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on July 21, 1974, at approximately 5:00 p.m., near the corner of 139th and Grace, Cook County, Robbins, Illinois. Arne Pullen, Sr., father of the victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Arne Pullen, Jr., son of the claimant was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on July 21, 1974, at approximately 5:00 p.m., the victim, Arne Pullen, Jr., age 20, and the assailant were having a discussion concerning money at 139th and Grove Streets, in Robbins, Illinois, when the assailant shot the victim in the abdomen and then ran. The Robbins Police were notified by an unknown citizen.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence that the claimant’s injuries were in any way attributable to his wrongful act or the substantial provocation of his assailant.

4. That the victim was taken to St. Francis Hospital, 12935 South Gregory, Blue Island, Illinois, where he was treated for his injuries. All attempts made to save the victim’s life failed, and the victim died on July 22, 1974. The body was taken to Golden Gate Funeral Home, 2036 West 79th Street. The body was then transported to Smith Funeral Home, 104 Petty Street, Sikeston, Missouri. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

7. That the assailant has been identified as Anthony Gilberry, formerly of 13993 Grace Street, Robbins, Illinois. Murder warrant #74-6-64838 was issued July 23,1974 for the arrest of Anthony Gilberry; however, no arrest has been made as of this time and the assailant is still at large.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation for Hospital, Medical and Funeral expenses as well as loss of support.

9. That the claimant claims he was dependent on the victim for partial support. However, the victim had been unemployed since August, 1973, and no dependency has been shown.

10. That the claimant has not paid nor is he responsible for payment of any of the medical bills.

11. That §3(a) of the Act states:

"Any person related to the victim ... is eligible for compensation, but only for reasonable funeral and medical expenses for the victim, provided that such expenses were paid by him.”

12. That the claimant is not eligible for compensation for hospital and medical expenses of the victim since he has not paid for them.

13. That the claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses and the gross amount of pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

Golden Gate Funeral Home, Ltd.......................$1,842.00
2036 W. 79th St.
Chicago, Ill. 60620
Smith Funeral Home............................... 400.00
104 Petty Street
Sikeston, Missouri 63801 -
Total .......................................$2,242.00

14. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

15. That, in the claim before us, the claimant has not received benefits from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 1113, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $2,042.00. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $2,042.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $2,042.00 (Two Thousand Forty Two Dollars and No Cents) be awarded to Arne Pullen, Sr., the father of Arne Pullen, Jr., an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-347
    Grace L. Burkland, on behalf of Roger Dee Novotny, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 28, 1975.

      Grace L. Burkland, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of the death by homicide of Roger D. Novotny, 22 years of age, of 729 Hudson, Romeoville, Illinois, discovered on April 17, 1974, at Haraway Road near Patterson Road, Joliet, Illinois. The victim’s mother, Grace L. Burkland, 729 Hudson Street, Romeoville, Illinois, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act” (hereafter referred to as the "Act”), Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, § 71, et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates the matter set forth in the application. Based upon the documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. The claimant herein is the mother of a deceased victim of a compensable violent crime, to wit: Murder, specifically enumerated in paragraph 72 of the Act.

(Murder; Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Par. 9-1 (a) (1).

2. That the crime was promptly reported to the applicable law enforcement officials of Will County, Illinois.

3. That at all times claimant has fully cooperated with law enforcement officials in the investigation of this incident.

4. That the assailant or assailants have not been apprehended by law enforcement officials and that the investigation is ongoing by the Will County Sheriff’s Police.

5. That there is no evidence to show that claimant, or claimant’s deceased son were related to or members of the same household of the assailant.

6. There is no evidence that the injury to the claimant’s deceased son was attributable to his wrongful act or his provocation.

7. Claimant seeks reasonable funeral expenses of $1,093.00 and coroner’s fees of $11.00 for her son.

Funeral.........................................$1,093.00
Coroner Report Fee................................$ 11.00
$1,104.00

8. Claimant has received no deductible compensation pursuant to the Act.

9. Pursuant to f77(d) of the Act, the Court must deduct the first $200 of expenses.

- $ 200.00
$ 904.00

10. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $904.00 (Nine Hundred and Four Dollars) be awarded Grace L. Burkland for reasonable funeral expenses incurred in the death of Roger D. Novotny, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-135
    Rosa Lee Hopkins Bey, on behalf of Lee Hopkins Bey, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 1, 1975.

    Rosa Lee Hopkins Bey, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of a criminal act of murder that occurred on December 18, 1973, at 513 West 61st Street, Chicago, Illinois. Rosa Lee Hopkins Bey, widow of Lee Hopkins Bey, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the “Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband, Lee Hopkins Bey, age 49, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on the evening of December 18, 1973, at approximately 4:15 p.m., the victim was returning from work when he was approached by two negro males at 513 West 61st Street, Chicago, Illinois. One of the men pulled a gun and shot the victim through the head. Mr. Gordon Teasley of 513 West 61st, Chicago, looked out of his window, saw a man lying on the sidewalk and called the police.

The victim was transported to St. Bernard’s Hospital by squadrol where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Courts is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That the claimant has cooperated with the police to the extent possible, but that she has no independent knowledge of the crime. That no arrests have been made in connection with this crime and that the investigation continues.

4. That there was no evidence to indicate that the victim’s injuries were attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailants.

5. That there was no indication whatsoever that the victim was a relative of or ever shared the same household with his assailants.

6. That the claimant, Rosa Lee Hopkins Bey, is the widow of the deceased victim, Lee Hopkins Bey, and was dependent on the victim for her support and that there were no children born of this marriage.

7. That the claimant, Rosa Lee Hopkins Bey, has received $3,000 from the Traveler’s Insurance Company, and will receive a widow’s pension of $255.00 per month from the Social Security program for the rest of her life or until she remarries. That pursuant to §7(d) of the Act, the aforementioned benefits are exempt when considering the compensation due the claimant.

8. That the claimant incurred burial expenses in the amount of $855.00.

9. That in addition to the burial expenses, the claimant alleges loss of support. The victim was employed by Crown Metal Manufacturing Company of Chicago. His average monthly earnings for the six month period immediately preceding his death were $600 per month. Since this income is more than $500 per month, we are required by §4 of the Act) to use the amount of $500 per month in calculating the claimant’s loss of future support from her deceased husband. He was 49 years old when he died. Projecting an income of $500 per month over a period of the decedent’s normal life expectancy 24.9 years) according to acturial tables, we arrive at a sum far in excess of the maximum amount that may be awarded under the Act §7(c).

It Is Hereby Ordered as follows:

1. That the claimant, Rosa Lee Hopkins Bey, as widow of the deceased victim of a violent crime, is hereby awarded periodic monthly payments for loss of her husband’s support in the sum of $250 per month for a period of 40 months or until her widowhood is terminated by her remarriage, if the later event occurs before the said 40 month period has expired and the maximum amount of $10,000 has been paid. The said periodic payments for support will also be terminated in the event of the death of the claimant.

2. That it is the duty of the claimant to inform this court in writing if she remarries before this award is paid in full, and it is the duty of her personal representative to inform this Court in the event of claimant’s death.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-13
    Henry E. Gregg, Sr., on behalf of Henry E. Gregg, Jr., Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Henry E. Gregg, Sr., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 22, 1974, in the area of 1919 South 4th Street, Rockford, Illinois, 61108. Henry Gregg, Sr., father of the deceased victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased son, Henry Gregg, Jr., age 17, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. . That on March 22, 1974, the claimant’s son pursued an armed man who had just robbed the son’s place of employment and that the son was shot in the area of 1919 South 4th Street, upon catching up with the robber.

3. That there is no evidence of any provocation by the decedent for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim died on March 22, 1974, as a result of the wound he received in the shooting of March 22, 1974. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant, William Brown, 834 North Winnebago, Rockford, Illinois 61108, has been convicted of Armed Robbery and Murder.

6. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was reported promptly to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of this case.

8. That the claimant incurred funeral expenses for the victim which were not covered by insurance and the gross amount of pecuniary loss for this expense as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

Julian-Poorman Funeral Home
304 North 5th Street
Rockford, Illinois 61107
Personal & Staff Service............................ $ 375.00
Facilities & Equipment............................. 350.00
Casket ......................................... 698.00
Interment Receptacle .............................. 398.00
Cemetery (Including both purchase of cemetery plot and burial costs).................................... 440.00
Obituary Notice . ................................. 12.00
Certified copies................................... 2.00
Minister........................................ 20.00
Vocalist ........................................ 10.00
Tax............................................ 55.00
$2,360.00

9. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds, or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the victim was not eligible for any Workmen’s Compensation benefits. The claimant received $4,000 in life insurance and Social Security benefits, but that, pursuant to the above section of the Act, these benefits are not subtracted from any eventual award made by the Court. Thus, the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in ¶8, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $2,160.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $2,160.00 be awarded to the claimant, Henry Gregg, Sr., as the father of Henry Gregg, Jr., the deceased victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-15
    Emma Hope, on behalf of Marrie Annette Hope, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Emma Hope, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on January 24, 1974, in an elevator at 2501 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois. Emma Hope, mother of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, §71, etseq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”). The claimant alleges that she assumed funeral costs and that the victim’s son, Richard Hope, age 2, was completely dependent upon the victim for support.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the victim, Marrie Annette Hope, age 18, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on January 24, 1974, the victim sustained numerous stab wounds during the struggle in an elevator at 2501 West Monroe, Street, Chicago, Illinois.

3. That statements, taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the victim for the attack upon her.

. 4. That the victim was pronounced dead on arrival at Cook County Hospital. The Death Certificate, signed by the coroner on May 2, 1974, found the victim dead of a stab wound to the heart. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is contained in the Court’s file on this matter, and the facts as reported therein aré incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the alleged assailant, Nathanial McGhee, of 626 North Hamlin Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, has been indicted for murder (Indictment #74-1714). He is presently awaiting trial.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and her assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of this case.

8. That the victim was unemployed during the 6 months immediately preceding the incident. Thus, loss of support to the victim’s son, Richard, cannot be determined.

9. That the claimant incurred funeral expenses which were not covered by insurance or any other benefits, and the gross amount of pecuniary loss as computed before setoffs and deductions totals $1,150.00.

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, state or federal funds or from any other source (except annuitites, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”.

That in the claim before us, the claimant received no benefits from other sources, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 1Í9, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $950.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $950.00 (Nine Hundred Fifty Dollars and No Cents) be awarded to the claimant, Emma Hope as the mother of Marrie Annette Hope, minor, the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-39
    Wilbur Boland, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Wilbur Boland, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on April 25,1974, near 19 State Street, Calumet City, Illinois. Wilbur Boland, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Wilbur Boland, age 61, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on April 25, 1974, the claimant was shot in the foot while walking with a friend along State Street in Calumet City, Illinois after arriving by cab from Hammond, Indiana.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim received first aid treatment and was then hospitalized from April 26, 1974, to May 16, 1974, for injuries received in the shooting. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant has not been identified or apprehended. The case remains inactive pending further information.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and the claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his injury were $290.70 pursuant to the following provision in §4 of the Act:

"loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

That based on the Court accepted method of calculating salary losses over a portion of a month — average monthly income ($290.70) divided by the average number of days in a month (30.4) multiplied by the number of days out of work (8) — the claimant’s compensable losses due to lost work days may be determined to total $368.22.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$ 153.46
2) Medical ...................................... 30.60
3) Loss of Salary................................. 368.22
4) Transportation (to clinic)......................... 12.50
$ 564.78

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court:

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the claimant received insurance benefits totalling $112.96. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 119, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant, of $252.82.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $252.82 (Two Hundred Fifty Two Dollars and Eighty Two Cents) be awared to the claimant, Wilbur Boland, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-237
    David E. McGath, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    David E. McGath, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on February 22, 1974, at 1924 North Rockwell, Chicago, Illinois, 60647. David E. McGath, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, David E. McGath, age 20, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on February 22, 1974, the victim was shot in the stairway of the apartment building at 1924 North Rockwell, Chicago, after refusing his assailant entrance to the building.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the victim for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim received first aid treatment and was then hospitalized from February 22,1974, to April 1, 1974, for injuries sustained in the shooting. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is contained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the Chicago Police Department has arrested Charles Cox, 917 West Lawrence, Chicago, Illinois. Cox was indicted in Cook County on a charge of Aggravated Battery (indictment No. 74-4214). He is presently awaiting trial.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of this case.

8. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses as a result of his injuries which were partially covered by Aid to the Medically Indigent, and the gross amount of pecuniary loss as computed before setoffs and deductions is as follows:

1) Hospital .$ 9,814.36
2) Medical .$ 1,421.50
$11,235.86

9. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss were shown to be in the total sum of $9,292.57, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. This amount plus the statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 118, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant as $1,743.29.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,743.29 (One Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty Three Dollars and Twenty Nine Cents) be awarded to the claimant, David E. McGath, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-273
    Robert W. Mountsier, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Robert W. Mountsier, Claimant Pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 4, 1974, at the Park Shore Apartments, St. Charles, Kane County. Robert W. Mountsier, a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Robert W. Mountsier, age 24, 1000 Geneva Road, Apt. 2D, St. Charles, Kane County, Illinois, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on August 17, 1974, the claimant was cut on the hand during a struggle to protect his girlfriend from a would-be molester, Kenneth Taylor, age 25, 1621 Riverside Avenue, St. Charles, Illinois.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him. The claimant initiated the fight only to protect his girlfriend, "as would be expected of a reasonable man under the circumstances.” [§2(3)(2) of the Act.]

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries to his hand for which he received emergency first aid treatment at Delnor Hospital, St. Charles, Illinois, and for which he later received outpatient treatments and corrective surgery. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant, Kenneth Paul Taylor, was convicted of Aggravated Battery in the 16th Judicial Court, Kane County, Illinois. He presently is serving a ten-year sentence for this crime as well as numerous other crimes. (Indictment #74-CF-8194).

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or were sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant did not miss any work as a result of his injuries. He does not claim compensation for loss of earnings.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not, and will not be reimbursed by any insurance or disability benefits. The gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

Hospitals:
(Welnor and Community Hospitals)..................$ 537.45
Ambulance ...................................... 40.00
Radiology ....................................... 11.00
Doctors......................................... 304.00
Total Medical Expense ..........................$ 892.45

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which a claimant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

That in the claim before us, the claimant received no benefits whatsoever from other sources that may be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. Therefore, after the statutory deduction of $200 is deducted from the gross amount of loss ($892.45) as calculated in ¶8 and ¶9, an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $692.45 is left.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $692.45 be awared to the claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-46
    John T. Matthews, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Thomas D. Adams, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on December 28, 1973, at three miles north of Waterloo, Illinois, at the Half Way Tavern. John T. Matthews seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stats., 1973, Ch. 70, par. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act").

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, John T. Matthews, age 29, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on December 28, 1973, claimant received severe lacerations on the left side of his face when he attempted to assist a bartender who was being assaulted by a number of individuals.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the decedent for the attack upon him by the assailants.

4. That a further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein, are incorporated in this Opinion by reference.

5. That to date, none of the assailants have been charged with the subject crime.

6. That the victim and the assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for pecuniary loss in the amount of $645.50 as follows:

Hospital ......................................... $432.50
X-Ray........................................... 13.00
Doctor........................................... 200.00

9. Claimant missed seven days of work due to the injuries resulting from the criminal incident reported herein. His average monthly earnings for the six months preceding the injury were greater than $500, therefore, as set forth in the statute, the claimant’s loss of earnings will be based upon a maximum of $500 per month thereby allowing $116 for loss or earnings.

10. That this claimant has received $593.77 from Lincoln National Insurance Company in partial payment of his medical expenses.

11. That the claimant did not provoke the incident.

12. That this Court must deduct the first $200 in pecuniary loss from any award that this claimant might be entitled to.

13. That after allowing for all benefits and the statutory $200 deduction this claimant does not have a pecuniary loss sufficient to warrant any award.

It Is, Therefore Ordered that this case be and the same is hereby closed.

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS AND FIREMEN COMPENSATION ACT


text:
    (No. 00045
    Mary Macek, as wife of Peter Macek, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 10, 1974.

    George Filcoff, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a volunteer fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”.] Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on May 14,1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Mary Macek, is the wife of the decedent, and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow;

2. That the decedent, Peter Macek, was a volunteer fireman employed by the Madison volunteer fire department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on January 25, 1973;

3. That on said date, Fireman Macek was summoned by "phone siren” to a fire in a box car on a railroad spur into Owens Box Board Company. Macek drove his own automobile to the fire station and then drove Fire Department Unit #2, a 500 gallon pumper, equipped with 4,000 feet of hose, to the scene of the fire. Upon reaching the scene, Macek was ordered to extend about 500 feet of hose from Unit #2 to a fire hydrant. Macek was wearing full equipment, coat, boots and helmet, and was seen by Assistant Fire Chief Charles Voloski to pull the hose line from the truck, "run with it” assisted by "two or three men” and made the connection of the hydrant. Although Macek did not handle the hose as it was used against the blaze, Assistant Chief Voloski said that Macek probably "got within five feet” of the box car, and that the smoke from the burning paper inside the box car was "dense”. Having been at the scene of the fire for "at least one half hour” Fireman Macek was ordered to return with Unit #2 to the fire station. After Macek had returned and backed the truck into the firehouse, he left the truck and collapsed. Oxygen wás administered in the firehouse and he was taken to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 9:10 p:m. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "cardiac arrest” due to or as a consequence of "acute myocardial infarction” due to or as a consequence of "coronary artery disease”;

The Court was convinced that the strain and and exertion* in the aforesaid performance of his duties as fireman, caused or precipitated this fireman’s fatal heart attack. Although his death might not have occurred as it did if he had no pre-existing heart disease, coverage under the Act is not limited to healthy fireman;

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Fireman Macek was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Act; and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (ten thousand dollars) be awarded to Mary Macek as surviving widow of the deceased fireman, Peter Macek.