text:
    (No. 79-CC-0085
    Richard Skelton, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1980.

   Per Curiam.

The record indicates that the damages in this matter occurred when employees of the State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, were removing a tree from a parking lot of the Lincoln Developmental Center. In the process of the removal, the tree fell on Claimant’s car causing the damages which are the subject of this Complaint.

The record also indicates that the Attorney General has submitted a stipulation by Respondent.

Claimant has submitted billings which indicate what the reasonable, customary and usual amount of these . damages were.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be awarded, in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause, the sum of $437.66.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 79-CC-0190
    Evelyn Gentry, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1980.

   Per Curiam.

The record indicates that the damages in this matter occurred when employees of the State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, were removing a tree from a parking lot of the Lincoln Developmental Center. In the process of the removal, the tree fell on Claimant’s car causing the damages which are the subject of this complaint.

The record also indicates that the Attorney General has submitted a stipulation by Respondent.

Claimant has submitted billings which indicate what the reasonable, customary and usual amount of these damages were.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be awarded, in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause, the sum of $288.01.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0358
    Cristobal Rodriguez, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 1, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion of Claimant to reconsider order entered by this Court on March 14, 1979, Respondent’s objections to said motion, and reply of Claimant to Respondent’s objections.

In his motion to reconsider dismissal, Claimant took the position that the Court’s order of dismissal was not clear and that it needed clarification..

Respondent’s objection to Claimant’s motion to reconsider dismissal stated that Claimant must exhaust all other remedies before seeking a final determination of his claim, as required by section 25 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 439.24 — 5), and that Claimant has failed to exhaust all his remedies.

The Court calls Claimant’s attention to its order of March 14, 1979, which stated that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review a decision of an administrative agency of the State of Illinois.

For the two reasons above cited, the Court’s order of March 14, 1979, is hereby affirmed and Claimant’s motion for reconsideration is denied.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0361
    North Central Airlines, Inc., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed July 2, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

This matter comes before the Court upon a motion filed by Respondent to dismiss said claim.

The basis of the claim heretofore filed is that the State of Illinois purchased a ticket from Claimant for one of its employees. The employee in question, before the flight, sustained an injury and did not make the flight. It appears that the ticket itself was lost and the airline was not notified that the ticket was lost and would not be used until after the actual flight.

The Court finds that the ticket was sold to the State of Illinois in good faith and the fact that it was not used is not the fault of Claimant.

It is hereby ordered Respondent’s motion to dismiss is denied and an award is made to Claimant in the amount of $62.00.


author: POCH, J.

text:
    (No. 79-CC-0497
    Georgia Norma Jean Duffey, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 21, 1979.

   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of a reallocation of the employee. The question before the Court is how far back, if at all, should the retroactive pay be awarded? The collective bargaining agreement RC-14 was in effect at the time of this decision by the acting director of the Department of Personnel. The effective date of the collective bargaining agreement was July 1, 1977. It was the decision of the acting director, Mr. Daniel J. Linckos that the retroactive salary payments resulting from the reallocation should go back to the date the employee signed the information questionnaire requesting the audit and reallocation, pursuant to Article XVI, Sec. 4 of the collective bargaining agreement.

Ill. Rev. Stat., chapter 127, par. 63b 109 provides that it shall be the director’s duty “to conduct negotiations affecting pay, hourly work, and other working conditions of employees subject to this Act.”

Article XVI, Sec. 4 of the RC-14 contract was apparently agreed to by the director pursuant to the powers vested in him in the statute above cited. We now must decide whether the decision made by the director, in accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement provisions, is in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, which provides in part as follows:

“Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State, either temporary or regular, shall be considered as full payment of all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll or other voucher and no additional sum shall be paid to such officer or employee from any lump sum appropriation, appropriation for extra help or other purpose or any accumulated balances in specific appropriations which payments would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.”

The first fact that must be remembered is that this is a case involving a claim for retroactive salary as a result of the reallocation of a position of employment. It was found that the employee had been operating at a level higher than that for which the employee had been paid. Therefore, although the work had already been performed, the remuneration which the employee received was not remuneration for the work performed, but only remuneration for a lesser classification. Therefore, the prohibition contained in Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145 does not apply.

We therefore find that this Claimant is entitled to retroactive salary as directed by the acting director of personnel.

It is therefore ordered that this Claimant be awarded $603.70 subject to the appropriate added sums due from the State by way of contributions toward the employee’s retirement account and FICA and subject further to the appropriate deductions and withholdings for the employee’s contribution to his retirement program and FICA as well as Federal and State income tax obligations.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0498
    Arnold S. Wells, III, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 21, 1979.

   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of a reallocation of the employee. The question before the Court is how far back, if at all, should the retroactive pay be awarded? The collective bargaining agreement RC-14 was in effect at the time of this decision by the acting director of the Department of Personnel. The effective date of the collective bargaining agreement was July 1, 1977. It was the decision of the acting director, Mr. Daniel J. Linckos, that the retroactive salary payments resulting from the reallocation should go back to the date the employee signed the information questionnaire requesting the audit and reallocation, pursuant to Article XVI, Sec. 4 of the collective bargaining agreement.

Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par, 63b 109 provides that it shall be the director’s duty to “to conduct negotiations affecting pay, hourly work, and other working conditions of employees subject to this Act.”

Article XVI, Sec. 4 of the RC-14 contract was apparently agreed to by the director pursuant to the powers vested in him in the statute above cited. We now must decide whether the decision made by the director, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement provisions, is in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, which provides in part as follows:

“Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State, either temporary or regular, shall be considered as full payment of all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll or other voucher and no additional sum shall be paid to such officer or employee from any lump sum appropriation, appropriation for extra help or other purpose or any accumulated balances in specific appropriations which payments would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.”

The first fact that must be remembered is that this is a case involving a claim for retroactive salary as a result of the reallocation of a position of employment. It was found that the employee had been operating at a level higher than that for which the employee had been paid. Therefore, although the work had already been performed, the remuneration which the employee received was not remuneration for the work performed, but only remuneration for a lesser classification. Therefore, the prohibition contained in Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145 does not apply.

We therefore find that this Claimant is entitled to retroactive salary as directed by the acting director of personnel.

It is therefore ordered that this Claimant be awarded $642.16 subject to the appropriate added sums due from the State by way of contributions toward the employee’s retirement account and FICA and subject further to the appropriate deductions and withholdings for the employee’s contribution to his retirement program and FICA as well as Federal and State income tax obligations.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0499
    Paula Hoff, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 21, 1979.

   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of a reallocation of the employee. The question before the Court is how far back, if at all, should the retroactive pay be awarded? The collective bargaining agreement RC — 14 was in effect at the time of this decision by the acting director of the Department of Personnel. The effective date of the collective bargaining agreement was July 1, 1977. It was the decision of the acting director, Mr. Daniel J. Linckos, that the retroactive salary payments resulting from the reállocation should go back to the date the employee signed the information questionnaire requesting the audit and reallocation, pursuant to article XVI, section 4 of the collective bargaining agreement.

Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 63b 109 provides that it shall be the director’s duty to “to conduct negotiations affecting pay, hourly work, and other working conditions of employees subject to this Act.”

Article XVI, section 4 of the RC — 14 contract was apparently agreed to by the director pursuant to the powers vested in him in the statute above cited. We now must decide whether the decision made by the Director, in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement provisions, is in violation Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145 which provides in part as follows:

“Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State, either temporary or regular, shall be considered as full payment of all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll or other voucher and no additional sum shall be paid to such officer or employee from any lump sum appropriation, appropriation for extra help or other purpose or any accumulated balances in specific appropriations which payments would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.”

The first fact that must be remembered is that this is a case involving a claim for retroactive salary as a result of the reallocation of a position of employment. It was found that the employee had been operating at a level higher than that for which the employee had been paid. Therefore, although the work had already been performed, the remuneration which the employee received was not remuneration for the work performed, but only remuneration for a lesser classification. Therefore, the prohibition contained in Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145 does not apply.

We therefore find that this Claimant is entitled to retroactive salary as directed by the acting director of personnel.

It is therefore ordered that this Claimant be awarded $502.80 subject to the appropriate added sums due from the State by way of contributions toward the employee’s retirement account and FICA and subject further to the appropriate deductions and withholdings for the employee’s contribution to his retirement program and FICA as well as Federal and State income tax obligations.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0563
    Larry and Judith Shafer, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1980.

      Contracts — reimbursement of foster parents for medical expenses incurred on behalf of ward of State.

   POCH, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties in the above captioned matter and the Court being fully advised in the premises find:

1. That the Claimants are entitled to foster child care payments in the sum of $5,802.12, pursuant to a contract entered into by the Claimants and the State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services.

2. That the Claimants have expended moneys on behalf of the minor child, Christina Marie Smith, a ward of the Department of Children and Family Services, for medical expenses and costs incurred on behalf of said minor child, which pursuant to the placement of the said minor child in the Claimants’ home as a foster care child and pursuant to said foster child care agreement are to be reimbursed.

3. That the Claimants have expended $126.00 in medical expenses for the minor child, Christina Marie Smith, which have not previously been reimbursed.

4. That pursuant to an employee insurance agreement, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, through its insurance program, has provided and paid for certain medical expenses and costs incurred on behalf of the minor child, Christina Marie Smith, while in the Claimants’ home, for which costs and expenses Firestone Tire and Rubber Company and/or its insurance carrier has an alleged right of subrogation for the medical expenses and costs incurred on behalf of the minor child, Christina Marie Smith.

5. That the parties have agreed and stipulated that there is now due and owing from the State of Illinois unto the Claimants the total sum of $5,928.12 as and for foster child care payments and medical expenses incurred on behalf of the minor child, Christina Marie Smith. The parties have further stipulated that this complaint shall be allowed to be reinstated if Firestone Tire and Rubber Company or its insurance carrier makes claim against the Claimants for monies they have expended on behalf of the minor child, Christina Marie Smith, for the medical expenses incurred while the minor child was in the Claimants’ home.

6. The Attorney General, William J. Scott, by William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General of record has filed the report of the Department of Children and Family Services in this cause.

Wherefore, this Court having been fully advised in the premises, orders:

1. That the Claimants are entitled to the sum of $5,802.12 as and for foster child care payments accrued but not previously paid.

2. That the Claimants are entitled to the sum of $126.00 as and for reimbursement for medical expenses incurred by the Claimants on behalf of said minor child while the said minor child resided in the Claimants’ home.

3. That this cause shall be terminated with Claimants’ leave to reinstate the same if Firestone Tire and Rubber Company or their insurance carrier perfects their alleged claim against the Claimants for monies they have expended on behalf of the minor child, Christina Marie Smith, for medical expenses incurred while the said minor child resided in the Claimants’ home.

4. That this Court retains jurisdiction of this claim for the purposes of reinstating this claim as ordered herein.

Claimant is hereby awarded, as set forth above, the total amount of $5,928.12.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 79-CC-0651, 79-CC-0652, 79-CC-0653
    Kankakee County Sheriff’s Police Department, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1979.

    L. Patrick Power, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant filed three complaints based on the grounds that funds appropriated have lapsed. The State has moved to dismiss these cases, (though the cases are not consolidated).

The facts behind these cases are that the County of Kankakee authorized expenditures by certain of its deputy sheriffs for travel to other jurisdictions for the purpose of returning fugitives for prosecution in Kankakee County. Money was appropriated for this type of expenditure as reimbursement for the County by the Legislature.

The State claims in its motion that when the claims were presented to the Department for payment, the Department had insufficient funds ($32.07) remaining in their appropriation with which to pay the claims.

The State’s argument, which we think is sound is as follows:

Although the Constitution of 1870 has now been superceded, and the moneys for which the Claimant here seeks recovery were incurred following the effective date of the Constitution of 1970, the comments in the various opinions relating to article IV, section 19 of the Constitution of 1870 are still pertinent in view of the essential similarity with Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 166 which is still in full force and effect. Both forbid spending or binding of the State to debts in excess of money appropriated, unless expressly authorized by law.

“The General Assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compensation, fee or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor, after service has been rendered or a contract made, or authorize the payment of any claim, or part thereof, hereafter created against the State under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law; and all such unauthorized agreements or contracts shall be null and void; provided, the General Assembly may make appropriations for expenditures incurred in suppressing insurrection or repelling invasion.” (Article IV, section 19, Constitution of Illinois 1870)
“No officer, institution, department, board or commission shall contract any indebtedness on behalf of the State, nor assume to bind the State in an amount in excess of the money appropriated, unless expressly authorized by law.” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 166.

The essential similarity of these two provisions is the use of the term “express authority of law” used in the Constitution of 1870 and the term “expressly authorized by law” as used in the statute. These terms raise the issue as to what type of an expenditure is expressly authorized by law.

The leading cases would appear to be Fergus v. Brady 177 Ill. 272, Board of School Inspectors of the City of Peoria, a corporation v. State of Illinois 12 Ill. Ct. Cl. 17.

For purposes of this discussion it is not necessary to elaborate on the background of Fergus (supra) decision, but it would be pertinent to quote from that decision beginning on page 279:

“In Sec. 19, claims under an agreement or contract made by express authority of law are excepted, and if there is some particular and specific thing which an officer, board or agency of the state is required to do, the performance of the duty is expressly authorized by law. That authority is express which confers power to do a particular, identical thing set forth and declared exactly, plainly and directly, with well defined limits, and the only exception under which a contract exceeding the amount appropriated for the purpose may be valid is where it is so expressly authorized by law. An express authority is one given in direct terms, definitely and explicitly, and not left to inference or to implication, as distinguished from authority which is general, implied or not directly stated or given. An example of such express authority is found in one of the deficiency appropriations to the Southern Illinois Penitentiary which had been paid, and serves only as an illustration. The authorities in control of the penitentiary are required by law to receive, feed, clothe and guard prisoners convicted of crimes and placed in their care, involving the expenditure of money which may vary on account of the cost of clothing, food and labor beyond the control of the authorities, and which could not be accurately estimated in advance for that reason or by determining the exact number of inmates.”

The Board of School Inspectors (supra) case involved a suit by the City of Peoria for reimbursement of expenses incurred in the education of crippled children. The education of these children was apparently induced by the passage of a statute by the Illinois Legislature which provided for reimbursement of the expenses incurred by school districts or others in the education of these children. The Legislature in passing the statute provided for $100,000.00 to defray this expense. The response was so overwhelming that the expenses of the various school districts far exceeded the $100,000.00. The director of the Department of Public Welfare, who was charged with the responsibility of the administration of this program, prorated the claims and authorized the payment to each Claimant on a prorated basis. The claim of the city of Peoria was for the excess over and above their prorated share. The Court of Claims in that case held that the proration was an equitable approach and that the city of Peoria had no claim to any further reimbursement as the expenditure was one not expressly authorized by law in accordance with definitions set forth in Fergus v. Brady, (supra). The Court distinguished Fergus v. Brady (supra) from Board of School Inspectors, (supra) by pointing out that in the illustration set forth in Fergus v. Brady, (supra) the authorities in charge of Southern Illinois Penitentiary had a duty imposed by law to take care of all prisoners sent to their institutions whereas in the Board of School Inspectors, (supra), it was not compulsory that the counties provide the education for these crippled children. The Court points out that as a matter of fact many school districts throughout the State did not choose to participate. The claim of the Board of School Inspectors of the City of Peoria was therefore denied.

This Court has in the past gone both ways on the question now before this Court. In the case of Orville St. P. Clavey v. State of Illinois, 73 — CC—17 this Court in a rather perfunctory opinion, in a case handled by Assistant Attorney General Saul Wexler, granted a recovery. However, in two cases absolutely identical with the ones currently before the Court, City of Kankakee v. State, 73 — CC—191 and City of Kankakee v. State, 73 — CC—19, this Court, based on the identical arguments expressed in this memorandum granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss. In the cases involving the City of Kankakee, the claims were for the reimbursement to the City of funds which they had in turn reimbursed to certain detectives on the Kankakee police force for their expenses in having traveled out of state for the purpose of bringing back to Kankakee for trial certain extradited prisoners.

It is inherent in the administration of State government that expenditures should not exceed appropriations previously made with the possible exception set forth in the case of Fergus v. Brady, (supra) where the expenditure is strictly prescribed and the spending agency is compelled by circumstances and law to obligate the State.

Without strict and well enforced guidelines, the spending of State officials could become rampant.

The drafters of the Constitution of 1970 were fully cognizant of this situation when they drafted article VIII, section 1. They provided two requisites for spending of public funds; it must be for a “public purpose” and it must be “only as authorized by law”:

“Section 1. General Provisions
(a) Public funds, property or credit shall be used only for public purposes.
(b) The State, units of local government and school districts shall incur obligations for payment or make payments from public funds only as authorized by law or ordinance.”

We find here a similarity of the concepts that obligations must be made only with “express authority of law” (Constitution of 1870) or “only as authorized by law” (Constitution of 1970).

The basic concept of the obligation of having to be authorized by law remains. What is the significance of the fact that the drafters failed to utilize the word “express” or “expressly” in conjunction with the phrase “only as authorized by law.”

Did this indicate an intent that the restrictions on obligating or spending public funds be less stringent; was this simply an attempt to delegate a wider latitude of discretion to the General Assembly; or was it neither, but simply an example of the elimination of superfluous verbiage,

The determination of this question seems academic in view of the fact that the law on the books today remains as it was in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967-1968, ch. 127, par. 166, and retains the “restrictive” phrase “expressly authorized by law”.

The question then is, were the expenditures in question here expenditures absolutely (expressly) required by law. This Court is of the opinion that the decision to incur the expense for which claim is here made is discretionary and is not analogous to the situation where the prison officials had no choice but to feed, clothe and house the prisoners assigned to their care. It would therefore follow that the claims should be denied.

Motion to dismiss is allowed.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0673
    Robert H. Lower, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1980.

    Robert H. Lower, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

Claimant, an inmate of an Illinois penal institution, has brought this action to recover the value of certain items of personal property of which he was allegedly possessed while incarcerated. Claimant contends that the property in question was lost while in the actual physical possession of the State of Illinois, and that the State is liable as a bailee for the return of that property.

There is little dispute in the record that the property was taken into the possession of respondent and thereafter lost or stolen. Respondent failed to introduce any evidence tending to demonstrate the exercise of due care. Therefore, the Claimant is entitled to be reimbursed for the fair value of said property which the record has established as $64.00.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be and the same is hereby awarded the sum of $64.00.


author: Roe, J.

text:
    (No. 79-CC-0695
    Ernest Davis, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 1, 1979.

   Roe, J.

This case is before this Court on a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Respondent. After a careful reading of the pleadings of the Claimant, we note that the complaint is an attempt to sue both the Macon County Sheriff’s Department and the State of Illinois.

This Court was created by the legislature for the purpose of hearing and determining claims made against the State of Illinois only. Claims against counties or departments of the counties are not within the jurisdiction of this Court. The Claimant is therefore in the wrong forum for a suit against the Macon County Sheriff’s Department.

As to the Claimant’s attempt to sue the State of Illinois we find, after a careful reading of the complaint, that the only conduct for which tortious action is alleged was perpetrated by either employees of the Macon County Jail or the prisoners of that jail. We find no allegations which attribute tortious conduct to the State of Illinois.

This Court, therefore, grants judgment in favor of the Respondent and against the Claimant.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0793
    Richard G. Brown, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 8, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

This is a claim for $20.00 per pay period for 17 pay periods arising out of certain changes in the pay plan to bring the pay plan in line with certain collective bargaining agreements entered into between the State and employee representatives. The change in question granted employees $20.00 per pay period for all employees who were on the payroll as of June 30,1978, with the pay to be retroactive to July 1, 1977, for ány pay periods worked during that period of time. Mr. Brown commenced his employment with the Department of Labor on July 18, 1977, until March 20, 1978, at which date he commenced his employment with the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency where he was employed on the June 30, 1978, qualifying date. The Environmental Protection Agency paid Mr. Brown $140.00 for the seven pay periods for which he qualified while in their employ. The seven pay periods included the last pay period in March as well as two pay periods each in April, May and June. Having received the pay for the second pay period in March from the Environmental Protection Agency Mr. Brown is not entitled to that pay period from the Department of Labor. He is, therefore, entitled to only 16 pay periods as opposed to the 17 for which he made claim.

Except for the fact that Mr. Brown was employed by the State of Illinois on June 30, 1978, the issues raised in this case are identical to those in the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 78-CC-1585. In the Beard case this Court considered the statutory prohibitions against retroactive back pay and concluded that they did not apply to the current situation inasmuch as the legislature through their actions had mooted out the question by acquiescing in the actions of the director of personnel and ratifying the actions of the agencies and the director of personnel in paying these claims by expressing a legislative intent through the passage of legislation providing the funds for the payment of these claims.

It is, therefore, ordered that Mr. Brown be awarded the sum of $320.00 subject to the customary added benefits for retirement or F.I.C.A. and the customary and legal deductions and withholdings for retirement, F.I.C.A. and income tax.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0830
    Hunter Bowie, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1980.

    Berry & O’Conok (Richard J. Berry, of counsel), for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Glen P. Larner, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arose from a vehicular collision at the intersection of Illinois Route 71 and the exit road from Matthiessen State Park in LaSalle County, Illinois. The Claimant was waiting in his automobile at the exit road facing north where it meets Illinois Route 71, preparing to turn onto Route 71. At the same time, an employee of the Respondent was operating a State-owned tractor westbound on Route 71, intending to turn left onto the park road where the Claimant was situated. The tractor operator turned left in front of Claimant’s automobile and onto the park road, but instead of straightening out his tractor after completing the turn, he continued turning to the left and collided with the left rear fender of the Claimant’s automobile. Although Claimant himself was not physically injured, the left rear portion of his automobile was damaged.

The above facts have been presented to the Court by means of a joint stipulation signed and agreed upon by both parties. The stipulation further sets forth that the Claimant was in the exercise of due care for his own safety and the safety of his property, that Respondent’s employee was negligent in making his turn, and that this negligence was the cause of the collision. Both parties agree that the damages equal $450.00 and that an award in that amount should be made.

It is the province and the duty of the Court to adjudicate claims on the basis of its own determinations of law and fact, and, consequently, the Court is not bound by any such determination agreed upon by the parties to a claim. The Court, however, is not desirous of creating a controversy where none exists, and will not peremptorily reject a joint stipulation which offers a basis for a fair and reasonable resolution to the claim. Where, as in this instance, the joint stipulation sufficiently sets forth the proper elements necessary for a well-founded decision, and appears to have been entered into freely and with knowledge of the circumstances relative to the claim, the Court will accept it and grant an award accordingly.

Claimant is hereby awarded the amount of $450.00.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0870
    Carol Bonds, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 11, 1979.

   POCH, J.

This case comes before this Court as a result of a complaint filed against the Department of Registration and Education by the Claimant before the Fair Employment Practices Commission alleging certain unfair employment practices. Following an investigation report submitted by the Fair Employment Practices Commission which found several grounds for sustaining the complaint of unfair employment practices the Claimant and the Department of Registration and Education entered into an agreement whereby the Claimant agreed to withdraw her charges and the Department agreed to a payment of $1,500.00.

The case was then submitted to this Court. The Attorney General in investigating the claim obtained a departmental report and supporting documents and submitted to this Court a Respondent’s stipulation wherein he set forth the findings of the Fair Employment Practice Commission and recommends to this Court that this Court accept those findings as prima facie evidence. The Attorney General in its stipulation further recommends that this Court accept the amount agreed to as a reasonable settlement of this action. Respondent’s stipulation is set forth below as follows:

“Now comes the Respondent by William J. Scott, Illinois Attorney General, of William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General of Record, and stipulates to the following:
1. This claim is before the Court on a complaint by the Claimant stemming from a complaint with the Fair Employment Practices Commission against the Department of Registration and Education. In her complaint the Claimant alleges that she was denied the opportunity to apply for two positions within the electronic data processing department due to her race, which was black and her sex which was female. Those positions were data processing analyst III and methods and procedure advisor III, both positions having been filled by white males.
2. The investigation by the Fair Employment Practices Commission concluded that the charges filed by the complainant before the F.E.P.C. were essentially substantiated and specifically found as follows:
a. Respondent did not post position openings.
b. Respondent’s general pattern of employing women and blacks was to hold them at a certain level thus preventing their advancement.
c. Respondent’s policy of not posting positions had a disparate impact on minorities and women.
d. Complainant was a qualified candidate.
e. Complainant was the only black in a nonclerical position.
f. Complainant was promoted internally to a point and was unable to apply for further positions because they were not posted.
The office of the Attorney General accepts the findings of the Fair Employment Practices Commission as prima facie evidence as to the facts stated therein.
In view of the above findings of the Fair Employment Practices Commission investigation the Attorney General stipulates that the facts support a reasonable claim for monetary damages and that the settlement agreed to between the parties was a reasonable settlement considering all the factors involved. The Attorney General recommends to the Judges of the Illinois Court of Claims that the investigation report of the Fair Employment Practices Commission be accepted as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and that the settlement agreement between the parties be accepted as a reasonable amount to be awarded to the Claimant under the facts situation set forth in the record.”

As stated many times in the past this Court is not a rubber stamp for the Fair Employment Practices Commission but unless challenged in some manner this Court will not look behind a finding by the Fair Employment Practices Commission of a violation of the statute relating to those practices. Having carefully examined the record we agree with the recommendation of the Attorney General that the conclusions arrived at by the investigators for the Fair Employment Practices Commission constitute unfair employment practices and we accept their findings as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. We further note from the record that the Claimant has severed her employment relations with the Department and in view of the record in this case we agree with the office of the Attorney General that the agreement reached between the Claimant and the Department of Registration and Education is entirely reasonable under all of the circumstances involved.

It is, therefore, ordered that this Claimant be and is hereby granted an award in the amount of $1,500.00.


author: Roe, C. J.

text:
    (Nos. 79-CC-1008, 79-CC-1009, 79-CC-1010, 79-CC-1011
    Melba Jean Thomas, Administratrix of the Estate of William N. Thomas, Deceased; Dale E. Walker, Robert H. Conkle, Administrators of the Estate of Robert J. Conkle, Deceased; Sharon D. Patchett, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois and Illinois Department of Corrections, Respondents.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1980.

    Fawell, James, and Brooks (Jeffry J. Knuckles, of counsel), for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Marsha Capraso, Assistant Attorney, of counsel), for Respondents.
   Roe, C. J.

These four claims arose out of the tragic deaths of four guards during the prison riot at Pontiac Correctional Center on July 22, 1978. On July 6, 1979, the Respondents moved to dismiss the claims. By order of the Court, the claims were consolidated on July 25,1979. At the direction of the Chief Judge, Commissioner Robert Barnes, Jr., was assigned to hear oral arguments on said motion, and a hearing was held on November 15,1979, at Room 122B of the Capitol Building in Springfield, Illinois.

The Respondents moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 48) on the grounds that the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine these claims. The issue before the Court is whether or not the exclusive remedy provision of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.5a bars a common law action by the Claimants.

The Claimants’ theory of recovery is based on the “dual capacity” theory which first appeared in Marcus v. Green (5th Dist. 1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 699. The Court stated that the defendant was an owner of property as well as an employer and allowed plaintiff to proceed under both the Scaffolding Act and the Workmen’s Compensation Act. This doctrine has been rejected by virtually all of the other Appellate Districts and limited on its facts by the 5th District. Dintelwan v. Granite City Steel Co. (5th Dist. 1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 509; see also Carey v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (2nd Dist. 1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 482; Winkler v. Hyster Company (4th Dist. 1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 282; McCarty v. City of Marshall (4th Dist. 1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 842; Rosales v. Allsteel Press Co. (1st Dist. 1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 787; Sago v. Amax Aluminum Mill Products Inc. (1st Dist. 1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 270. The doctrine did receive some viability from the Supreme Court in Laffoon v. Bell & Zoiler Coal Co. (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 437, under a very distinguishable set of facts dealing with subcontractors with no liability insurance. The Courts have interpreted this decision as a bar for immediate employees. See McCarty v. City of Marshall, supra, at 844. The latest Supreme Court decision found is Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago et al. (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524. In reversing the granting of a motion for summary judgment the Court felt that it was a factual question as to whether an employee of a joint venture could sue a member of a joint venture who was also a lessor of equipment to the joint venture when such equipment was alleged to be defective.

It is noted, by way of reconciliation of all of the above cases, that the only cases allowing recovery under the doctrine deal with parallel statutory obligations, e.g., the Scaffolding Act. It is further noted that this parallel statutory obligation must be coupled with a showing of a distinct legal entity, (partnership — ownership—employee, Marcus v. Green, supra; lessor — employer, Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District, supra). The Courts in Illinois have universally rejected products liability causes of action on equipment of employers. This also includes allegations of negligence and willful and wanton misconduct. Rosales v. Allsteel Press Co., supra, states as follows:

Nor does the allegation that the defendant’s action in modifying the safety control was willful and wanton and in direct violation of the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act help plaintiff. An action whether grounded on negligence or willful and wanton misconduct is still a common law action. The Legislature imposed no qualification, limitation or exception in Section 5(a) on the prohibition of common law actions against the employer.

The Supreme Court in Smith, supra, further cites Professor Larson, Workmen’s Compensation with approval at 77 Ill. 2d 313, 318-19, 396 N.E.2d 524, 527, as follows:

.. (T)he decisive test in applying the dual capacity doctrine ‘is not concerned with how separate or different the second function of the employer is from the first, but with whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the first....’A mere separate theory of liability against the same legal person as the employer is not a true basis for use of the dual capacity doctrine; the doctrine instead requires a distinct separate legal persona.”

Taking the above discussion, it remains to apply it to the present complaints. The complaints are identical with the exception of a count for wrongful death filed on behalf of the decedent plaintiffs by their legal representatives.

Counts I, II, and IV are based on negligence, either for breach of a standard of care or statutory duty. Count III is an allegation of willful and wanton intentional disregard. We find no allegations in any of these counts which would remove the State from its ordinary status of employer. This regrettable incident is clearly within this type of hazardous employment. The State is charged with the care, custody, and supervision of prisoners in its penal institutions. To this end it employs persons such as the Claimants to carry out this purpose and function. There is always the possibility during the course of this employment and function that inmates may be dangerous and situations may deteriorate to riot and anarchy. The decisions of discipline, reason, or course of action to remedy or prevent these situations are vested in the employer. To say that the State owns the prison and therefore has a separate duty does not square with the law. If that theory was followed, every employer who owned the premises in which the employee was injured would be subject to multiple suits.

Count V, dealing with an alleged violation of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 23, par. 4041, merits separate discussion. The duty imposed upon the State to protect the public by this statute is used by Claimants to support a further theory of recovery. The argument is that once the riot developed, the inmates were “at liberty.” This allegedly imposed additional duties upon the State which should allow recovery under the statute. The theory is novel and there are no cases directly on point. The elements needed for recovery, however, were set forth by this Court in Fuller v. State of Illinois (1967), 26 Ill. Ct. Cl. 14:

“... (T)he elements which must be ascertained before a recovery is awarded to Claimant are: (1) that an inmate escaped from an institution over which the State had control; (2) that the inmate caused the damage claimed while he was at liberty after his escape;.... (emphasis supplied) Supra at 15.”

Thus we have heretofore determined that the remedy is available only to citizens outside the confines of a penal institution. It would be inconsistent for the Legislature to have intended to confer additional causes of action upon the very employees who are charged with the duty of preventing escape.

Although the Court regrets this tragic and senseless incident, we find that the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to determine these claims. It is hereby ordered that the motion of Respondent for involuntary dismissal be and is hereby granted as to all counts of the complaints.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-1089
    Brokaw Hospital, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 30, 1980.

   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion of Respondent to dismiss, Claimant’s objections to said motion, and Claimant’s motion for summary judgment.

The facts are as follows. One Randel Huddleston was committed to the Department of Corrections prior to his escape from the Vandalia Correctional Center on June 18,1978. Huddleston was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Normal, Illinois, on August 24, 1978. Claimant provided medical service to Randel Huddleston in the amount of $526.28.

Huddleston was returned to the Department of Corrections after Claimant completed its treatment of him.

Claimant contends that since Huddleston had been committed to the Department of Corrections, it was the responsibility of the State to see that he secured proper medical service during the term of his commitment. The injury did not occur until approximately one month after his escape on June 18, 1978.

This Court has previously held that the liability is limited to damages that were actually committed during the escape or apprehension of an escaped prisoner and that it was directly related to the escape or apprehension. See Douglas Voll and Sharon Svoboda v. State of Illinois 77-CC-135 and 77-CC-1316. This Court has also held that the State is not absolutely liable for acts of escaped prisoners nor is the State an insurer. See 23 Ill. Ct. Cl. 47.

Respondent’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted, Claimant’s objections to motion to dismiss are overruled, and motion for summary judgment is denied.


text:
    (No. 80-CC-0009
    Michael Chan, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 29, 1980.

   Per Curiam.

This matter coming to be heard upon the motion of Respondent to dismiss the claim herein, and, it appearing to the Court that Claimant has received due notice of said motion, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, finds:

A. That the Claimant, Michael Chan, a civil service employee, filed a complaint in which he alleged the existence of a valid grievance relating to a condition of State employment.

B. That the Claimant, as a basis for the above allegation, relied on section XIV, of Collective Bargaining Agreement RC — 9.

C. That the Claimant made no effort to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him as set forth in Section 3, of the Rules of the Department of Personnel and as required by section 25 of the Court of Claims Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, eh. 37, par. 439.24 — 5.

D. That as a matter of law the Claimant is under a duty to exhaust all administrative remedies pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 439.24 — 5, and Court of Claims Rule 6.

E. That as a matter of law the failure of the Claimant to exhaust all administrative remedies, subjects his action to dismissal pursuant to Court of Claims Rule 9 and Frazier v. State of Illinois (1972), 28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 80.

Pursuant to the above findings of fact and law, it is hereby ordered that Respondents’ motion be, and the same is, hereby granted and the claim herein hereby dismissed.


text:
    (No. 80-CC-0011
    Douglas Sailsbury, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 8, 1980.

   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on a stipulation of the Respondent and the Court being fully advised in the premises finds that the Claimant herein is entitled to compensation as agreed to by the Department of Insurance as set forth in the settlement agreement agreed to by the parties and that there is no evidence to indicate a failure on the part of the Claimant to reasonably litigate his damages and, in fact that he went to work shortly thereafter, thereby mitigating further damages. All this has been set forth in Claimant’s answers to interrogatories in the record.

It is therefore ordered that this Claimant be granted an award in the amount of $3,614.00.


text:
    (No. 80-CC-0050
    Frank Gunderson and Robert Woslyus, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 30, 1980.

   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion for rehearing filed by Claimants and objections to said motion filed by Respondent.

Under date of February 4, 1980, this Court granted Respondent’s motion for dismissal. On March 7, 1980, Claimant filed its motion for rehearing, and on March 20, 1980, Respondent filed its objection-answer to motion for rehearing.

The original cause of action was filed in the Circuit Court for the Third Judicial Circuit, Madison County, Illinois, on or about December 15, 1975, within the applicable five-year statute of limitations. This case was transferred to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, Jackson County, Illinois, on January 24, 1978. The Circuit Court for the First Judicial Circuit of Jackson County dismissed this cause for want of jurisdiction. During the pendency of this action in the Circuit Court, the five-year statute of limitations expired on December 15, 1978.

It is Claimants’ contention that under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 83, par. 24(a), they had one year from the time of the dismissal to file their cause in the Court of Claims.

It is Respondent’s contention that under the old statute, Claimants’ position would be correct but under the new statute it is not correct.

The facts show that the Circuit Court of Jackson County dismissed this case involuntarily for want of jurisdiction. Under the old statute, a plaintiff whose suit was dismissed involuntarily could commence a new action within one year of the dismissal order where the statute expired during the pendency of the suit. The statutory basis under the old statute was the language: “or, if the plaintiff has heretofore been non-suited or shall be non-suited.”

Two cases are cited by Claimant, both of them being before the change in the statute of 1976.

It is Respondent’s contention that the new statute affords protection only to plaintiffs whose law suits are voluntarily dismissed and its protection is unavailable to plaintiffs whose actions are involuntarily dismissed.

It is the opinion of this Court that under the new section of the statute, the statute of limitations had expired at the time of the filing of this claim and, therefore, the Respondent’s objections to Claimant’s motion for rehearing is correct.

It is hereby ordered that motion for rehearing be, and the same is, dismissed and objections to said motion are sustained. This cause is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 80-CC-0468
    Jay Noel Howver, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 29, 1980.

    Jay Noel Howver, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (John R. Fanone, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The Claimant, Jay Noel Howver, seeks a recovery based upon tort against the Respondent for damage inflicted upon his automobile by an employee of the Secretary of State.

Both the Claimant and Respondent have entered into a joint stipulation of facts as follows:

* On May 11, 1979, Claimant accompanied his son to the Secretary of State Driving Facility in Schaumburg. On that date Fred Bauer, employed by Respondent as an examiner, entered into Claimant’s 1973 Ford Station Wagon for the purpose of administering a driving examination to Claimant’s son. At that time Fred Bauer was informed that the passenger door was sticking.

When Mr. Bauer was exiting the auto the door became stuck and he threw his full weight against the door forcibly opening it and damaging the door and fender. The auto was repaired by Claimant at a cost of $310.88.

Based upon the report of the office of the Secretary of State the above statement of facts is true. It further was stipulated that Claimant was at all times acting with due care and caution.

Both parties have waived the right to a hearing and to file briefs in this proceeding. They further agreed that no other evidence, either written or oral, would be introduced by either party.

Based upon the above stipulated facts Respondent has agreed to the entry of an award of $310.88, and Claimant further agreed that the settlement amount shall apply to all unknown and unanticipated damages arising out of this cause of action.

Lastly, Claimant, in consideration of the payment of the above stated amount, waives, releases and relinquishes any and all claims whatsoever, which are the subject of the instant complaint against the State of Illinois, Secretary of State, and any other department or agency, or any individual acting as an employee or agent of the State of Illinois or its departments or agencies.

The Court has reviewed the facts set forth in the joint stipulation and considered the legal conclusions. It appears that the stipulation is accurate, thorough, and that it has been entered into legitimately. It also appears that the facts agreed upon are legally sufficient to sustain Claimant’s cause of action and the granting of an award would be fair and consistent with the findings.

While the Court is necessarily limited, in its findings of fact, to those facts presented to it by the parties, it is not bound by a stipulation between the parties as to the amount of an award to be granted, just as it is not bound by such a stipulation in its findings of law.

It is the opinion of the Court, however, that based upon the undisputed facts before it that the Respondent is liable to the Claimant.

The Court is also of the opinion that an award of $310.88 is fair and reasonable compensation for the losses suffered by Claimant.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $310.88 be awarded to Claimant.


text:
    (No. 80-CC-1337
    Cayman Associates, Ltd., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 12, 1980.

   Roe, C. J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of Claimant for summary judgment, due notice having been given, and the Court being fully advised in the premises.

This claim arose out of a proceeding in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The Illinois State Scholarship Commission filed a lawsuit against Craig Warren on February 15, 1977, based upon an alleged default on a guaranteed student loan. Judgment was entered in favor of the Commission on April 4, 1978.

The Commission then filed a wage deduction summons on June 2, 1978, to be served upon Cayman Associates, Ltd., Craig Warren’s former employer and the Claimant herein, in order to collect the judgment debt owed by Craig Warren. Final judgment was entered against Cayman on September 26, 1978.

The Commission then filed a non-wage garnishment summons on November 17, 1978, serving Continental Bank in Chicago, Illinois, which resulted in $6,305.91 being removed from Cayman’s operating account and being sent in check form to the office of the Illinois Attorney General. From that office the funds went through proper channels, eventually being deposited in the General Revenue Fund of the State.

On July 18, 1979, the order entered against Cayman dated September 26,1978, was vacated, the garnishment proceedings against Cayman dismissed, and the Circuit Court also ordered the monies previously removed from Cayman’s account at the Continental Bank be returned. The order of vacation gave no rationale.

At this point an issue involving jurisdiction arose. The Commission moved to vacate that portion of the order July 18,1979, which required it to return the funds on the grounds that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 439.8(a) provides that the Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims brought against the State of Illinois. There is nothing in the record before this Court indicating how the Circuit Court of Cook County ruled on this motion. Cayman did bring its claim to this Court however.

Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Claims and Section 25 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 439.24 — 5) require that persons exhaust all other remedies before seeking final determination of their claims before this Court. Even though the motion of the Attorney General to vacate the Circuit Court’s order may not have been ruled upon yet by that Court we feel that Claimant has sufficiently exhausted all other remedies inasmuch as Claimant would have to come here to recover the funds allegedly due it regardless of the ruling by the Circuit Court. The Court of Claims has jurisdiction pursuant to section 8 of the Court of Claims Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 439.8.

We now turn to the motion for summary judgment by Claimant. Section 57(3) of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 110, par. 57(3)) provides that summary judgment shall be rendered if the record shows no genuine issue as to a material fact and that the moving party is entitled to the judgment as a matter of law. The record before us indicates that the State has in its possession funds obtained from Cayman pursuant to a void Court order. Thus the State has no legitimate interest in the funds and they should be returned to the Claimant.

The amount turned over to the State by the bank from Cayman’s account was $6,305.91. In its complaint and again in its motion for summary judgment Claimant seeks interest and costs in addition to the above sum.

There is no authority for this Court to grant such added relief and we adhere to and hereby affirm our long standing position of denying interest and costs.

It is hereby ordered that the motion by Claimant for summary judgment be and hereby is granted, that Claimant be awarded the sum of $6,305.91, and that Claimant’s request for costs of this litigation and interest be denied.


text:
    (No. 80-CC-1788
    Harold McGahee and Diane Henry, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 18, 1980.

    Goldstein, Goldstein and Fishman (John E. Marszalek, of counsel), for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (John R. Fa-none, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C. J.

This cause coming on to be heard on two motions by the Respondent: (1) to strike the complaint against Harry Dantzler, an individual, and to dismiss the cause of action against him, and (2) to dismiss the claims against both the State and Harry Dantzler, it appearing to the Court that Claimants have had due notice of said motions, and the Court being advised:

The Court hereby finds that:

1. As to the first motion, Harry Dantzler is an individual and as such the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction over the claims against him. Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 439.8 etseq.) provides that the Court only has jurisdiction over claims against the State.

2. As to the second motion, the Court finds that the Claimants failed to comply with Sec. 22 — 1 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 1) which provides that, within six months of the date that a cause of action for personal injury arises, any person who is about to commence any action in this Court on account of said injury must file in the office of the Attorney General and also in the office of the Clerk of the Court of Claims notice which must contain certain provisions set forth in the Act.

The Deputy Clerk of the Court has provided us with a copy of the notice filed with his office. However, the office of the Attorney General has alleged in its motion that no such notice was filed with that office within six months of the occurrence and has attached a sworn affidavit in support of said allegation. No objection to the motion has been timely filed pursuant to Rule 20 R. of the Rules of the Court of Claims.

Section 22 — 2 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 2) provides that if the notice provided for by Section 22 — 1 of the Act is not filed as provided in that section, any such action commenced against the State shall be dismissed and the person to whom any such cause of action accrued shall be forever barred from further action in this Court for such personal injury.

It is hereby ordered that both motions of the Respondent be and hereby are granted and this cause is dismissed with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 00086

      In re Application of Betty F. Pine.
    Opinion filed July 9, 1979.
    Betty F. Pine, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Francis M. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose from the death of an investigator employed by the Consumer Fraud Division of the Illinois Attorney General’s office in Springfield, Illinois. The Claimant seeks payment of compensation as the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office. Based upon these documents, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the Claimant, Betty F. Pine, is the wife of the decedent, and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, section 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow.

2. That the decedent, John R. Pine, Jr., was an investigator in the Consumer Fraud Division, and, in the Special Prosecution Unit of the Office of the Attorney General in Springfield, Illinois, and was so employed on April 28,1975.

3. That on said date, decedent had commenced work at 9:00 a.m. The statement of the supervising officer of the decedent indicates that he had been assigned to investigate a murder case and an automobile theft ring case. His investigations entailed intensive work which led to many hours of uncompensated overtime. Investigation showed that Mr. Pine became ill at his desk and had told fellow employees that he had experienced a sharp pain in his head. No injury, however, was suffered by the deceased in the office of the Attorney General on this date. He was taken to the hospital in a private car, and while enroute it was noted that his speech became extremely slurred. His death followed on April 30, 1975. The medical certificate of death shows that the immediate cause of death was a hemorrhage in the left frontal lobe of the brain.

4. That decedent, as an investigator for the Attorney General’s office, was not a “law enforcement officer” as defined by section 2(a) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 282(a).

5. That the death of John R. Pine, Jr. did not stem from circumstances which involved loss of life as a result of injury received by a law enforcement officer. Furthermore, injury which led to the death of the deceased did not arise from violence or accidental cause. Therefore, Mr. Pine was not “killed in the line of duty” as defined in section 2(e) of the Act.

We find, therefore:

(a) that Mr. Pine was not a law enforcement officer as defined in section 2(a) of the Act.

(b) that the decedent was not killed in the line of duty as defined in section 2(e) of the Act; and

(c) that the proof submitted in support of this claim does not satisfy the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore not compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of Betty F. Pine, as wife of the deceased investigator, John R. Pine, Jr., be denied.


text:
    (No. 00142
    In re Application of Mary L. Burd.

      Opinion filed December 4, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

This application for benefits came on for hearing under the following circumstances: Mary L. Burd filed her application for benefits on December 30, 1977, and alleged that she was the widow of Peter B. Burd, a guard in the Stateville Correctional Center. Lieutenant Burd was stabbed to death by a prison inmate on January 10, 1977. No designation of beneficiary form was found.

Mary L. Burd and Peter B. Burd were divorced by a decree of the Circuit Court of Will County which was entered March 11,1975. By reason of this decree, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss which is pending.

Rita Marie Burd filed her motion for leave to intervene herein, as the mother of Peter B. Burd. This motion was granted in June, 1979. The motion of Respondent to dismiss the claim of Mary L. Burd is allowed, and the application for benefits will be treated by this Court as proceeding in the name of Rita Marie Burd, Claimant, under order of this Court granting her intervention as an applicant.

It appears that Peter B. Burd left no children and that his father, Lyle Beckett Burd, died April 25, 1974. It appears further, that Rita Marie Burd is decedent’s sole heir and next of kin of Peter B. Burd.

The investigatory report shows that decedent was killed in line of duty within the provisions of section 282(e) of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 282(e).) This Court must resolve the question whether Rita Marie Burd is entitled to an award.

The facts are clear. Rita Marie Burd is the surviving parent of Peter B. Burd. By reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 283(e), Rita Marie Burd is entitled to an award of the entire sum of $20,000.00.

We find that the proofs submitted in support of the claim of Rita Marie Burd satisfy all of the requirements of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 283(e), and her claim is compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and is hereby awarded to Rita Marie Burd as the surviving parent of Peter B. Burd, and intervenor Claimant herein.


text:
    (No. 00150
    In re Application of Frank Score.

      Opinion filed December 4, 1979.

   Roe, C. J.

The Court had heretofore considered the application for benefits filed by Frank Score, brother of Harr W. Scornavache, and ordered the claim re-opened for further consideration, based upon the following facts. Frank Score filed his application on April 19, 1978, as a result of the death of his brother, Harry W. Scornavache, a police officer of the City of Chicago, who died from a heart attack on March 15, 1978.

The investigation of the Attorney General and the statement of the decedent’s supervising officer show that decedent was on duty March 15, 1978. At 6:10 p.m. on that date, he and other officers were assigned to duty at the Chicago Stadium, to which place he had driven in his own car.

Officers Rolston and Piekentowski found decedent sitting in his car at 1720 West Madison Street. He did not respond to their inquiries, and they called an ambulance. Decedent was taken to Cook County Hospital where he died at 10:30 p.m. on March 15,1978.

The death certificate shows that the cause of death was a myocardial infarct, and that decedent had suffered from chronic heart disease for two years. The heart condition had been caused by hypertension for a period of four years. Another significant physical condition was obesity. The investigation shows that death was not the result of willful misconduct or intoxication.

There is nothing in the facts to show that decedent’s heart problem was caused by any activity other than the stress of performance of his assigned duties. He had been a police officer for 23 years.

It is the opinion of this Court that Officer Scornavache was killed in the line of duty and that the facts contained in the report support the claim, and that the claim is compensable.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be and is hereby awarded to Frank Score, the brother and sole beneficiary of decedent.


text:
    (No. 00151
    In re Application of Mary E. Parchert.

      Opinion filed June 4, 1980.

    Marshall E. Douglas, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (James S. Stephenson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C. J.

This claim arises out of the death of a deputy sheriff for Rock Island County, Illinois. The decedent’s beneficiary seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

The applicant for these benefits is Mary E. Parchert, the wife of the decedent. She is the beneficiary designated by him as evidenced by the form completed by him and by the application submitted by her. Subsequent to the filing of her claim, Mrs. Parchert died. Thus at the outset we must first determine whether or not a claim for benefits under the Act survives the death of the applicant. This is an issue of first impression in this Court. There is no language in the Act itself which explicitly deals with the issue. However, the obvious purpose and legislative intent of the Act were to compensate the designated beneficiaries or, in event there are none, the families of law enforcement officers and firemen killed in the line of duty. A finding that the cause of action survives would further the purpose of the Act and we believe it would be consistent with the legislative intent. The right to compensation is not a personal right in the sense that benefits under the “Blind Relief Act” were personal in Creighton v. County of Pope (1944), 386 Ill. 468; the right vests in the whomever is designated by the law enforcement officer of firemen or his family at the time he dies in the line of duty. We find that a cause of action under the Act does survive the death of a named beneficiary who is alive at the time of death of the law enforcement officer or firemen.

At the hearing, the attorney for the applicant entered a suggestion of death in the record. No substitution of named parties was made. This is a matter of form only. The Respondent has not raised any issues relating to the proper form pursuant to the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 54(2)) and the Court raises no motion pursuant thereto on its own.

We turn now to the merits of the case. This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits, the statement of decedent’s supervising officer, the death certificate, the investigatory report of the Rock Island Sheriff’s Police, an evidence deposition of decedent’s regular physician, the evidence adduced at a hearing before the full Court on March 15, 1979, and briefs and arguments of counsel for both Claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois. Based upon this evidence the Court finds as follows:

The deceased, Clair Adam Parchert, was employed as a deputy sheriff by Rock Island County. On February 23,1978, he was assigned to serve civil process on a party residing at 141st Avenue, Milan, Illinois. In order to reach that address Mr. Parchert entered a driveway at 14205 Coyne Center Road. Approximately two-thirds of the way up the driveway the deceased’s automobile became stuck in the snow.

The sheriff’s department car with which he was provided on this day was not equipped with any radio device to allow decedent to communicate with the sheriff’s radio network. Unable to call for assistance, Mr. Parchert made an attempt to extricate the vehicle by himself. The evidence showed that he made his way to a nearby machine shed and secured a shovel.

At 4:10 p.m. on this date, a civilian found Mr. Parchert dead behind the wheel of the squad car, his head resting against the headrest and holding a cigarette in his right hand. Evidence indicated that prior to his death the decedent had tried to shovel snow from around the car. A snow shovel was found in the snow at the rear of the car and snow had been shoveled away from both the front and the rear of the car. The immediate cause of death was determined to be a coronary occlusion.

Section 3 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 283) provides that if a claim is made for compensation pursuant to the Act, within one year of the date of death of a law enforcement officer killed in the line of duty, compensation in the sum of $20,000.00 shall be paid. There is no dispute as to whether or not petitioner has complied with all of the procedural requirements of the Act. The issue in this case is whether or not the decedent, Mr. Parchert, was “killed in the line of duty” within the meaning of the Act.

Section 2(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 282(e)) defines “killed in the line of duty” as losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer if death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or . other accidental cause. Although his section of the Act is not conductive to a precise delineation of eligibility for compensation in all cases, and incidents of death resulting from heart ailments comprise the most difficult cases, it is the sole criteria that the Legislature has provided. Since the Act was passed a significant body of case law has developed. Because the legislature has remained silent in wake of the way this Court has interpreted the Act in the past, we must continue to administer the Act literally. Carr v. State of Illinois (1974), 29 Ill. Ct. Cl. 540, 543; Allen v. State of Illinois (1974), 29 Ill. Ct. Cl. 543, 545, 546.

In their briefs both parties to this case placed heavy reliance on Georgean v. State (1973), 28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 408. The applicant in that case was denied benefits under the Act because he did not come within the statutory definition of a “law enforcement officer.” From the statutory language defining a “law enforcement officer”, section 2(a) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 282(a)), a test was set forth:

“The test is whether the ‘officer’ is charged with ‘the enforcement of the law and protection of the public interest at the risk of his life.’ 28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 408, 411.

Georgean turned on whether or not the applicant was a law enforcement officer as defined in the Act; there is no question that Mr. Parchert was such an officer. The duties of a deputy sheriff are different from those of the clerical employee of the Secretary of State’s Office in Georgean. Thus the holding in Georgean is inapposite to resolution of the issue in the case at bar.

However, certain guidelines and principles regarding heart attack cases were set forth as dicta in Georgean. Those guidelines related to the words “or other accidental cause,” as found in the statutory definition of “killed in the line of duty.” They were derived from what the Court determined to be the intent of the General Assembly when it passed the Act and were summarized as follows:

In summary, it is our opinion that the legislature intended to compensate the survivors of law enforcement officers and firemen who were exposed to risks greater than those to which the public is exposed. 28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 408, 413.

Since Georgean we have had occasion to apply the Act to other sets of facts. Although the causal connection between the incident and the death remains the difficult issue in heart attack cases, the analysis of the risks involved remains the same for all cases arising under the Act. The following is a list of some cases decided after Georgean wherein the Court granted awards:

Birkshire v. State (1973), 28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 417.
After responding to a call regarding a runaway horse, decedent mounted the horse and subsequently fell off, striking his head and dying.
Haupt v. State (1974), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1081.
Decedent was called to work to replace a radio operator. After arriving at the station he exited the car and was bending over toward his wife when his gun fell, discharged, and fatally wounded him.
Mackey v. State (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 607.
Decedent was killed while driving a car on routine patrol when his car collided with a bus.
Elliott v.State (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 607.
Game Warden was killed when car in which he was riding collided with a semi-tractor truck.
Maltby v. State (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 608.
Decedent died in auto accident en route to pick up a prisoner to be transported.
Hardie v. State (1977), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl___
Decedent was painting firehouse per orders, fell from ladder breaking his leg, and died two days later in hospital following surgery.
Rusnak v. State (1977), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl___
Officer died in auto wreck while investigating auto theft.
Janowski v. State, No. 161, filed December 4,1979.
Civilian ran a red light and collided with patrol car killing officer inside.

In Carr v. State, supra, and Allen v. State, supra, two game wardens on patrol duty were killed when the car in which they were riding collided with a car driven by a civilian which crossed over the center line. In interpreting the phrase “other accidental cause” in the section of the Act defining “killed in the line of duty” we said:

“We are mindful of the fact that the Legislature’s intent cannot always be determined from particular clause or phrase without considering the general purposes of the Act when reading it as a whole. There are other parts of the Act, as in Sec. 2(a), which lead us to believe that ‘other accidental cause’ should include only such accidents that arise from the risks inherent in, and peculiar to, the duties of law enforcement; and that it would not include a normal hazard to which other persons may be equally exposed, i.e. a highway accident caused by the negligence or wrongful act of another party. Nevertheless, we agree with claimant’s memorandum, that the legislature added no such qualifying words to the phrase, ‘or other accidental cause.’ We urge the legislature to consider the necessity of clarifying this phrase, as we have indicated, so that the true intent of the legislature may be fully carried out, as mandated in Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971, ch. 131, Sec. 1.01. Until the phrase in question is so clarified, we must administer the Act literally, as we have done in this opinion.” Carr, 29 Ill. Ct. Cl. 540, 542-43; Allen, 29 Ill. Ct. Cl. 543, 545-46.

In the case at bar, the Respondent, citing Georgean, argues in his brief that shoveling snow was not an activity which posed risks inherant in the job of law enforcement. Analyzing the risk encountered by Deputy Par-chert in light of what we said and decided in cases after Georgean, we disagree. The Legislature has not amended the Act with any qualifying language. If intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute differed from the way this Court has interpreted it, it is their prerogative to enact changes. Deputy Parchert was assigned to serve process on a day when there was a significant accumulation of snow on the ground at a location which had not been shoveled out and had been provided with a car not equipped with a two-way radio. We therefore find that the risks he encountered in performing his assigned duties were such as to qualify for compensation under the Act.

It remains to be discussed whether or not Deputy Parchert lost his life as a result of injury received in the active performance of his duties as a law enforcement officer, such injury arising from some accidental cause. The coroner’s certificate of death recites coronary occlusion as the immediate cause of death. This Court has on numerous occasions granted compensation to victims of heart attacks. The determining factors are the circumstances leading up to the heart attack.

The decedent was charged with the responsibility of serving civil process. While performing this duty his car became stuck in the snow. At the location where the car became stuck it was difficult, if not impossible to secure assistance in extricating the vehicle. The squad car had not been equipped with communications devices. He chose a logical course of action. In order to continue in the performance of his duties Deputy Parchert attempted to free the vehicle himself by trying to shovel the snow from around it. He subsequently suffered a heart attack and died.

There was also evidence indicating that the deceased was a heavy smoker, was overweight, had high blood pressure, and suffered from arteriosclerosis and hypertension. It was the opinion of Dr. McClellan, decedent’s physician, that heart attacks from shoveling snow are common, particularly among those with a medical history similar to decedent’s. Strenuous exercise in cold weather, such as shoveling snow, greatly increases the amount of work the heart is required to do. Although his death might not have occurred as it did if he had been in better physical condition, coverage under the Act is not limited to healthy policemen and firemen. Macek v. State (1974), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1071; Hill v. State (1974), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1073; Finlenv. State (1974), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1076.

Taking all of the circumstances surrounding the death of Deputy Parchert in consideration we conclude that he did lose his life as a result of injury arising from accidental cause and received in the active performance of his duties as a law enforcement officer. We further find that he was killed in the line of duty as defined in section 2(e) of the Act, that the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and that the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be and hereby is awarded to the estate of Mary E. Parchert.


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    (No. 00154

      In re Application of Patricia M. Nicholson.

      Opinion filed December 4, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

The facts presented to the Court at the hearing of the application of Patricia M. Nicholson were stipulated to by counsel for the Claimant and the Attorney General of Illinois. It appears that the claim herein was filed as the result of the death of Frank M. Nicholson, Jr. on June 8, 1978. Decedent was a police officer of the City of Chicago. His duty assignment was that of fingerprint technician.

The death certificate shows that death occurred at 1:30 p.m. on June 8, 1978 as the result of arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease. Decedent had been under medical care for hypertension and an ulcer. He had complained of pressure in his work, and was taking medication for high blood pressure.

It was noticed by a brother officer on the morning of June 8, 1978 that decedent did not look well, and he told this officer that his chest was bothering him. Decedent was sweating and was pale.

Decedent asked for and received permission to go home. At about 11:30 a.m. that day, his wife saw him lying in bed. He told his wife that he did not feel well. Shortly after 12:30 p.m., Claimant called an ambulance. Her husband was taken to Northwest Hospital where he died.

It should be noted that the Retirement Board of the Policemen’s Annuity and Pension Fund of the City of Chicago voted unanimously to award compensation to the Claimant. There is nothing in the facts to show that decedent died as the result of a willful act, or as the result of intoxication.

The facts show that Officer Nicholson died in line of duty within the provisions of section 2(e) of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 282(e)), and that the claim herein is compensable.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be and is hereby awarded to Patricia M. Nicholson, the surviving spouse of Frank M. Nicholson, Jr.


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    (No. 00155

      In re Application of Barbara Mieszkowski.

      Opinion filed December 4, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant filed her application for benefits as the widow of Officer Richard Mieszkowski on June 20,1978, and as the designated beneficiary of that officer.

At the time of his death, Richard Mieszkowski was on duty during regularly assigned hours, having begun his duty assignment on March 28, 1978 at 8:00 a.m.

At about 10:00 a.m. on that day, decedent had gone to Norwegian-American Hospital in response to a call that there was in the hospital a dog-bite victim. At that time, decedent was wearing on a belt and carrying in its holster a Colt Python .357 calibre six-shot revolver (serial No. 33632) which was his service side arm, and which was registered in the name of decedent under registration number 077153.

The investigative report of the Attorney General and the formal investigation of the City of Chicago Police Department were received as evidence pursuant to a stipulation of the Claimant and Respondent.

From the several reports, it appears that a nurse at the hospital had handled the decedent’s revolver, which he had handed to her, butt first. She reached for the revolver and in some way pulled the trigger. A bullet was discharged, which entered the left temple of decedent.

It is clear that the decedent was on duty at the time he was shot. The question which this Court must resolve is whether section 2(e) of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 282(e)) prohibits entry of an award in favor of Claimant. We are of the opinion that section 2(e) does not bar an award. That sub-paragraph of section 282 reads:

“(e) ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer, civil defense worker, civil air patrol member, paramedic or fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause. The term excludes death resulting from the willful misconduct or intoxication of the officer, civil defense worker, civil air patrol member, paramedic or fireman, however, the burden of proof of such willful misconduct or intoxication of the officer, civil defense worker, civil air patrol member, paramedic or fireman is on the Attorney General.”

There is no evidence to show that the incident resulting in the Claimant’s decedent being shot was a result of his intoxication.

Was the incident the result of willfulness on the part of decedent? We do not find the actions of decedent immediately before handing the revolver to the nurse to be of a willful nature. The nurse had asked decedent whether the revolver could go off if it was defective and the decedent replied, “No.” Shortly thereafter, he handed the revolver to her, holding the barrel with his left hand. We regard decedent’s actions as representative of his desire to show that the revolver was safe to handle unless the trigger was pulled.

“Willful” has been defined as “intractable,” or, an act showing a strong disposition to do what is contradictory. Black’s Law Dictionary (Revised Fourth Edition) p. 1773. The facts before this Court on hearing of the application for benefits do not in our opinion show willfulness on the part of decedent.

It should be noted that the revolver of the deceased officer was produced at the hearing. Upon examination, it appeared that the cylinder mechanism and trigger assembly functioned efficiently, demonstrating that the revolver could not function unless the trigger was pulled, and that handling of the revolver by holding the barrel, or the butt, could not activate the trigger mechanism.

We have noted that Officer Mieszkowski was killed in line of duty, and we find that the proofs submitted in support of the application for benefits satisfies all of the requirements necessary to support an award.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and is hereby awarded to Barbara Mieszkowski, the surviving spouse and beneficiary of Richard Mieszkowski.


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    (No. 00156

      In re Application of Barbara A. Woods.

      Opinion filed April 1, 1980.

   Roe, C. J.

On motion of the Claimant, it is hereby ordered that said claim be, and it is hereby dismissed, with prejudice.


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    (No. 00161

      In re Application of Angeline G. Janowski.

      Opinion filed December 4, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

A memorandum of law was filed with the Court by the Attorney General of Illinois, at the request of the Court after it had conducted a hearing on October 24, 1978. The need for such a memorandum was based upon the fact that beneficiary designation forms were later found, dated December 20, 1969, designating $5,000.00 each for Anthony F. Janowski, Jr., and Gloria Ann Janowski, son and daughter respectively of Anthony F. Janowski, formerly a police officer of the City of Chicago Police Department. Officer Janowski died on September 14, 1978, as the result of an automobile accident which occurred when one Elíseo Rivera disregarded a red light and allowed his car to collide with the police car driven by decedent.

Decedent was taken to Illinois Masonic Hospital where he was pronounced “dead on arrival” at 3:00 a.m., September 14, 1978. There are no facts in the report of the Attorney General of Illinois which show, or tend to show, that decedent died as the result of his willful misconduct or intoxication. The death certificate shows that death resulted from multiple severe injuries. There is no question that Officer Janowski was killed in the performance of his duties.

The question to be decided for full disposition of this claim deals with the amount to be awarded to Claimant, Angeline Janowski. It is to be noted that she, as the surviving spouse, is the only Claimant before this Court, and also it must be noted that Anthony F. Janowski, Jr., predeceased his father by about four years.

We note from the memorandum of law that section 3(a) of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 283(a)), provides for payment of the “entire” sum to the surviving spouse. However, the designation of beneficiary form directs payment of $5,000.00 to decedent’s daughter, Gloria, and this direction, under the statute, must be recognized.

As of January 1,1974, the statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, pars. 281-285) was amended to increase the amount allocable to beneficiaries to $20,000.00. Under the facts before us, there remains $15,000.00 to be awarded.

We find that proofs submitted in support of the claim herein satisfy the requirements of the Act and that the claim of Angeline Janowski is compensable.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $15,000.00 be and is hereby awarded to Angeline G. Janowski as the surviving spouse of Anthony F. Janowski, pursuant to the application filed by her.

It is further ordered that the sum of $5,000.00 be and is hereby awarded to Gloria Ann Janowski, daughter of Anthony F. Janowski, pursuant to the designation of beneficiary form executed by Anthony F. Janowski.


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    (No. 00162

      In re Application of Katherine O’Connell.

      Opinion filed December 4, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

Claimant filed her application for benefits on October 26, 1978, as the result of the death of her husband, James E. O’Connell, on May 20,1978. At the time of his death, he was patrolman, 1st Class, assigned to duty in the 19th Police District, City of Chicago.

Investigation by the Attorney General resulted in obtaining a statement of decedent’s supervising officer which brought forth the fact that on May 20, 1978, decedent was on squadrol duty from 12:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. About 3:00 a.m. on May 20,1978, Officer O’Connell was attempting to subdue an offender and as a result of the exertion, he suffered a heart attack.

Decedent was taken to Illinois Masonic Medical Center, and there passed away as the result of cardiorespiratory arrest. Operative procedures at the Center disclosed the presence of a massive ventricular aneurysm.

The investigation discloses that there is no evidence which would show, or tend to show, that decedent’s death was the result of willful misconduct or intoxication.

We are of the opinion that Officer O’Connell was killed in the line of duty as defined in section 2(e) of the Law Enforcement and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 282(e)), and that proofs taken by the Court at the hearing herein satisfy all of the requirements of the above statute, and we find that the claim is compensable as provided therein.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and is hereby awarded to Katherine O’Connell as the surviving spouse of James E. O’Connell in accordance with the provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 283.


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    (No. 00163

      In re Application of Patricia L. Grasser.

      Opinion filed August 28, 1979.

    Patricia L. Crasser, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Francis M. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (hereafter, the Act). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

The Court has considered the application for benefits, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates facts set forth in the application. Based upon these documents, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the Claimant, Patricia L. Crasser, is the wife of the decedent, and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving spouse.

2. That the decedent, John W. Crasser, was a fire fighter employed by the City of Chicago Fire Department and was engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of section 2(e) of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 282(e)), on May 4, 1978.

3. That on said date, the decedent was performing his duties with Hook and Ladder No. 26 and was engaged in fighting a fire in a two-story brick building at 3108 West Taylor Street in Chicago, Illinois. Fireman Crasser had been cutting a hole in the roof of said premises, and in an unknown manner had fallen into an air shoot and dropped to the first floor of the building. He was pronounced dead on arrival at Mount Sinai Hospital at 4:35 a.m. on the same day. The medical examiner’s certificate of death recites the cause of death as carbon monoxide intoxication due to smoke and soot inhalation.

We find, therefore:

(a) that fireman Crasser was killed in the line of duty as defined in section 2(e) of the Act; and

(b) that the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and is hereby awarded to Patricia L. Crasser, as wife and beneficiary of the deceased fireman, John W. Crasser.