author: Patchett, J. Patchett, J. Patchett, J.

text:
    (No. 84-CC-1568
    Abbington House, Inc., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 29, 1990.

      Order filed November 21, 1991.

      Stipulated Order filed May 13, 1992.

    Nisen & Elliott, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Mitchell Katten, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Patchett, J.

This cause comes on for hearing upon the Claimant’s motion for summary judgment. Oral argument was had on this matter on October 30,1987, before the entire Court. Subsequent to the oral argument on the motion for summary judgment, leave was given to the Claimant to file an amended claim. That claim was filed on November 6,1987.

The basis of the amended claim was to extend the requested relief for a period between January 1, 1982, and the date a judgment, if any, is rendered herein. In addition, the claim, as amended, requests interest, attorneys fees, and costs.

The Respondent filed a response to Claimant’s brief in support of the motion for summary judgment on January 22, 1988. These documents were not provided to the judge in a timely manner. The Claimant filed a reply to the Respondent’s response on February 16, 1988.

The relevant facts in this matter appear to be uncontested. On March 1, 1976, Christopher Hagen purchased a nursing home business known as Abbington House. Included in the purchase was an assignment of the leasehold interest in the buildings and real estate owned by the Roselle State Bank and Trust Company, Trust No. 1175 (hereinafter called the “Land Trust”). On the same date, Christopher Hagen and Clarence Hagen, and The Doctors Hagen, a partnership made up of Christopher and Clarence Hagen, purchased 75% of the beneficial interest in the Land Trust. Further purchases of beneficial interests in the Land Trust were made by those parties on November 13,1978, May 31, 1979, and June 10,1980. On June 10,1980, with that purchase, 100% of the beneficial interest in the Land Trust belonged to the Hagens. Abbington House was incorporated as Abbington House, Inc., on April 1,1980.

Abbington House filed its annual cost report for fiscal year April 1, 1980, to March 31, 1981, with the Illinois Department of Public Aid (hereinafter called “IDPA”). The IDPA applied the provisions of the Illinois Administrative Code, section 140.537, in an effort to determine that the Abbington House business and the Land Trust were related organizations, and that the rent paid by Abbington House to the Land Trust was no longer an allowable measure of the reimbursement due to Abbington House from the IDPA. The IDPA established that the capital cost of the related organization should be used rather than the aforesaid rent. Prior to the time that this annual cost report was filed, the IDPA had allowed the rent paid to be used in determining the reimbursement to be paid to Abbington House.

The IDPA then turned to the Illinois Administrative Code, section 140.563, and concluded that the year 1970 was the base year for determining capital cost for the purposes of Abbington House. The IDPA based this conclusion on the fact that:

1. 1980 was the year that the Hagens’ purchase of the complete beneficial interest in the land trust was accomplished; and

2. The provisions of the Illinois Administrative Code, section 140.563, establish January 1, 1978, as the effective cutoff date for the implementation of adjusted cost basis.

Illinois Administrative Code, section 140.563, has three paragraphs, and includes four provisions. A chart provided by the Respondent in his brief clearly illustrates the provisions as applicable to this claim:

Facilities 1/1/78 Base Year

1. Built Prior to Later of construction or purchase;

2. " After Year of construction;

3. Purchased Prior to Later of construction or purchase;

4. " After Base year established under No. 1 will not change

It is obvious from the provisions of this chart, gained from the section previously quoted, that the applicable date provided by section 140.563 is January 1, 1978. Therefore, if IDPA’s determination 1980 is the year of purchase is accurate, the base year established would clearly be 1970, since that was the date of construction.

The Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, has considered a closely related question in Moehle v. Miller (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 385, 513 N.E.2d 612. That case involved the interpretation of IDPA rule 4.14. That rule was the predecessor of section 140.563. The language of both sections is identical, except that rule 4.14 uses the effective date of July 1, 1977, while section 140.563 uses the effective date of January 1, 1978. It appears that there is no dispute between the parties hereto that the applicable regulation in the present case is Illinois Administrative Code, section 140.563, and that the effective date for the issue in question is January 1,1978.

There are two issues before the Court to be resolved in order to render a decision on whether or not the motion for summary judgment should be granted. The first is whether or not the transfer of a beneficial interest of the Land Trust is a change in ownership. The second issue, which need only be reached if the answer to the first issue is in the affirmative, is whether or not the transfer in ownership must be 100% complete before the adjustment of the basis, thus leading to a required adjustment in cost basis reimbursement.

The rules of the IDPA specifically state that a change in corporate stock ownership, or a partnership, is not a change in ownership for the purposes of applying the rules requiring increased cost reimbursement for a change in ownership. On the other hand, a transfer of land title, in the form of a deed or similar event, clearly would be a change in ownership sufficient to trigger an increased basis for the purposes of reimbursement under the applicable rules. Therefore, the first issue to be decided by the Court is whether or not the transfer of the beneficial interest in the Land Trust amounts to the transfer of ownership. In the last brief filed by the Respondent, the Respondent arguably has admitted that a transfer in beneficial interest is a transfer of ownership. However, the language used by the Respondent in that brief is somewhat unclear.

In People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 479, 389 N.E.2d 540, the supreme court of the State of Illinois held that beneficiaries of a land trust were owners in relation to the statute providing that the owner of realty shall be liable for taxes. The court held the beneficiaries personally liable for unpaid real estate taxes. The court defined ownership as comparable to control and consisting of an interest in real estate other than the holding of the title thereto. In making its decision, the court pointed out that the usual attributes of real property ownership were retained by the beneficiary of a land trust agreement.

In In re Estate of Albert (1983), 95 Ill. 2d 377, 447 N.E.2d 796, the supreme court held that the trustee of an Illinois land trust has both legal and equitable title. (See also Chicago Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Cacciatore (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 535, 185 N.E.2d 670, and Levine v. Pascal (1968), 94 Ill. App. 2d 43, 236 N.E.2d 425.) The court went on to hold that a beneficiary’s interest in an Illinois land trust is personal property, not real property, citing Horney v. Hayes (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 178, 142 N.E.2d 94, Shefner v. University National Bank (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 978, 353 N.E.2d 126, and Levine v. Pascal, supra.

In Just Pants v. Bank of Ravenswood (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 543, 483 N.E.2d 331, the court held that whether a beneficiary or a trustee was a proper party as a defendant in a lawsuit depended in a large part on the specific recitations in the trust agreement. There the court reversed a lower court order because the specifics of the trust agreement in question were not before the appellate court and were not in the record. The appellate court stated that beneficiaries of a land trust could be held responsible for the torts or frauds of the trustees, where the beneficiaries participate in or authorize the commission of the wrongs. The trustee, on the other hand, was insulated from liability and negligence for the operation and maintenance of the property, but the trustee had no rights of possession, operation, control, or maintenance. In the present case, the specific trust agreement is not before the Court, so we are somewhat similarly handicapped in terms of our interpretation of the trust agreement.

In Imm Acceptance Corp. v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Evanston (1986), 148 Ill. App. 3d 949, 499 N.E.2d 1012, the appellate court held that a statute of frauds does apply to the sale of beneficial interest in an Illinois land trust. The court pointed out, however, that title of property does not necessarily involve ownership of property. Title refers to the legal relationship to land, while ownership is comparable to control. The key elements of ownership are control, and the right to enjoy the benefits of the property. The record is clear in the present claim that the beneficiaries of the Land Trust in question clearly had the right to control it. People who purchase shares in a corporation, while ultimately being able to control the acts and direction of a corporation, still require certain steps to be taken before they can exercise direct control. These steps would include acts such as the naming of a new board of directors, who would then select new officers, and the possibility of requiring amended by-laws. The purchasers of the beneficial interest of the land trust, on the other hand, are in an immediate position to control and direct the use of the real estate in question, absent some specific provision in the land trust agreement to the contrary. In addition, the IDPA rules clearly provide that the transfer of corporate shares is not a transfer of ownership for the purposes of increased cost basis reimbursement. There is not, or at least was not at the time the transaction in question took place, a similar rule or regulation relating to the transfer of the beneficial interest of the land trust.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the transfer of the beneficial interest of the Land Trust is a transfer in ownership for the purposes of triggering the applicable IDPA rule regarding reimbursement rates.

We therefore reach the second issue which is whether or not transfer of the beneficial interest would have to be 100% complete before the applicable rule would come into question. Reviewing the case of Moehle v. Miller, supra, we find that it does not give us a great deal of direct guidance on the issue involved at the present time. In Moehle v. Miller, the court held that the Department’s interpretation of that issue was correct. However, that issue clearly involved the sale of corporate stock, and as that court pointed out, IDPA rule 4.143 specifically provided that a change of corporate stock ownership did not constitute a change in ownership.

We have already held that a transfer of beneficial interest of a land trust should, and it appears that the State agrees, constitute a change in ownership. There is nothing in Moehle v. Miller, nor in the other cases cited therein, nor in any rule or regulation cited to the Court to date, which gives us guidance regarding the State’s argument that 100% of the beneficial interest must be obtained prior to an adjustment in the reasonable cost-related basis as provided for in Federal law. We agree with the Respondent that the rules of the IDPA are entitled to substantial deference, and that it does not appear that the rules as set forth by the IDPA exceed any authority granted by either the Federal or the State government to make such rules. However, this Court cannot find an applicable rule to help us decide the issue at hand. With very little guidance to the Court in helping determine the second issue, we think it most logical to rule that the basis for reasonably cost-related reimbursement certainly not be adjusted until at least 50% change in the beneficial interest is achieved. It is quite clear that the initial 22% beneficial interest in the Land Trust was obtained by The Doctors Hagen, a partnership made up of Christopher Hagen and Clarence Hagen, on March 1, 1976. A more difficult question is when the 53% obtained from Dwayne and Suzanne Jacobson was achieved. An exhibit attached to documents filed by the Respondent shows that there is an assignment dated March 1,1976, to the Hagens from the Jacobsons, but that the acceptance by the Rozelle State Bank and Trust Company was not made until June 7, 1979. Since the acceptance date is after the effective date set forth in the IDPA rule, the issue that remains is whether more than 50% of the beneficial interest in the Land Trust was obtained prior to January 1, 1978. If so, the basis should be adjusted, and the Claimant should be given credit for all increases in beneficial ownership obtained prior to the effective date of January 1, 1978. There should be no increase in cost-related basis for purchases of beneficial interest which were obtained subsequent to January 1,1978.

Therefore, this brings us to the issue of whether, as appears from the record, an assignment of beneficial interest executed before January 1, 1978, but not accepted by the trustee until after January 1, 1978, would in fact be effective. Larkin v. Bank of Ravenswood (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 803, 415 N.E.2d 15, holds that under a trust agreement which specifically provided that,

“no assignments of interest hereunder by a beneficiary shall be binding on the Trustee until the original or a duplicate copy of the assignment, in such form as a Trustee may approve, is lodged with it and its acceptance indicated thereon,”

a purported beneficiary did not acquire status as a beneficiary until the trustee accepted the assignment. In Russell v. United States (N. D. Ill. 1966), 260 F. Supp. 493, the court held that an assignment, even though not filed with the trustee, or accepted by it, could be effective as between the parties in order to create a gift. What the specific provisions of the trust in question provide for, in terms of the effectiveness of an assignment of the beneficial interest without acceptance by a trustee, is beyond the power of the Court to discern since neither the Claimant nor the Respondent has provided us a copy of the original trust agreement in question. However, in Ravenswood, the court quoted Henry W. Kenoe, an authority on Illinois land trusts, in section 5-7 of the 1978 version of his book, as follows:

“The filing of the assignment of beneficial interest and its acceptance by the trustee may afford the assignee a measure of protection only against another assignee. The trustee’s acceptance is not a representation by it that the assignor’s rights are free from defect or claim. The acceptance is merely a receipt by the trustee and nothing more.” (Emphasis added). Kenoe, Illinois Land Trusts (1978), section 5-7.

It is difficult to reconcile the statement contained on the bottom of page 291 of the Ravenswood opinion with the quote of Mr. Kenoe. We believe the quote by Mr. Kenoe refers to the fact that the assignee may not propose a cause of action against the trustee based on the trustee’s acceptance of the assignment, at least on the grounds that the signatures were not genuine. That part of the Ravenswood opinion which holds that an assignee may not become a beneficiary until the trustee accepts the assignment appears to be a more logical interpretation. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Hagens did not achieve a beneficial ownership interest in the Land Trust in question that exceeded 50% until the acceptance of the assignment by the trustee in 1979. This was after the effective date of the regulation on January 1,1978. Therefore, the Department’s interpretation as to the correct basis appears to be correct. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is hereby denied. We will not deny the claim since the Claimant may still be able to show the Court that the specific provisions of the Land Trust in question differ significantly from the Land Trust considered in the previous cases cited. Therefore, we remand this case to a commissioner for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ORDER

Patchett, J.

This cause comes on for hearing upon the Claimant’s renewed motion for summary judgment. An order was entered by this Court on May 29, 1990, denying the Claimant’s previous motion for summary judgment and setting forth the issues to be decided by the Court in this case. At that time, this Court concluded that the Claimant should have a right to show the Court the provisions of the land trust in question prior to this Court making a decision on the merits. This has now been accomplished.

The Claimant has filed a renewed motion for summary judgment and included a copy of the land trust in question, an escrow agreement entered into between the buyers and sellers of the beneficial interests of the land trust, and certain other documents relating to the sale of the beneficial interest which occurred in 1976.

The only issue before this court is when the Hagens acquired ownership of more than 50% of the beneficial interest in the land trust; and whether or not they acquired that controlling interest under the language contained in the original trust agreement, supported by the other documents which have been provided.

There is a significant difference in the language in the trust agreement we are dealing with here as it relates to assignment, and the language in the trust agreement the appellate court interpreted in Larkin v. Bank of Ravenswood (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 803, 415 N.E.2d 15. As quoted in our previous order of May 29, 1990, the Ravenswood court was interpreting a trust provision which states,

“° * 'no assignments of interest hereunder by a beneficiary shall be binding on the trustee until the original or a duplicate copy of the assignment, in such form as a trustee may approve, is lodged with it and its acceptance indicated thereon.”

The comparable language of the trust agreement 1175 which was assigned to the Hagens as part of the purchase of the nursing home in question states as follows:

“No assignment of any beneficial interest hereunder shall be binding on the trustee until the original or duplicate assignment is lodged with the trustee, and every assignment of any beneficial interest hereunder, the original or duplicate of which shall not have been lodged with the trustee, shall be void as to all subsequent assignees or purchasers without notice.”

Clearly there is a significant difference in the language of the two trust agreements. In the trust interpreted by the appellate court in the Ravenswood opinion, the trustee had to note its acceptance. The trust agreement we are dealing with herein must only be lodged with the trustee in order to be effective. Abbington House filed with its renewed motion for summary judgment certain documents which include an installment note, escrow agreement, and power of direction. The Claimant filed with its response to the Respondent’s response to the Claimant’s renewed motion for summary judgment, an affidavit of the bank officer who handled the transaction in question. No counteraffidavits have been filed by the Respondent. No discovery depositions or other efforts have been made by the Respondent to lessen the impact of the documents in question.

Therefore, considering the affidavit of the bank officer, the documents attached to the renewed motion for summary judgment, the important difference in the language of the trust agreement we are interpreting herein as opposed to the trust agreement interpreted by the appellate court in Larkin v. Bank of Ravenswood, and considering the language in Alcoa Building Products, Inc. v. La Salle National Bank (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 510, 379 N.E.2d 66, wherein it was held that beneficial assignments are presumed to be accepted by the assignee, we hold that the Claimants have met their burden of proof that more than 50% of the beneficial ownership interest in the land trust in question was transferred by assignment prior to the effective date of January 1, 1978.

We therefore grant summary judgment to the Claimant on the issue of liability. This case is remanded to the commissioner for the purpose of determining the amount of damages to be granted in this claim.

STIPULATED ORDER

Patchett, J.

The captioned claim coming before the Court on the parties’ joint motion, and the Court being fully advised, finds:

1. By order filed November 21,1991, found liability to exist in Claimants’ favor, and directed the Court commissioner to conduct further proceedings to determine the amount of damages appropriate for award.

2. Claimants and Respondent now advise that they have stipulated to and agreed upon a proper resolution of this claim upon terms, which they ask the Court to approve, as follows:

(a) A Court award to Claimant Abbington House, Inc., of $225,732.07, calculated in accordance with an agreed methodology, which sum will fully compensate Claimants in incremental amounts for the difference between Public Aid Code (PAC) section 11—13 vendor-payments (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11—13) previously made by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) and the amounts calculated at an agreed, increased capital-cost rate, for all medical care rendered by said Claimant to IDPA recipients prior to July 1, 1991. Said incremental increases would have been payable from IDPA’s long term care line item appropriation code 001-47865-4400-33-00-0000; and the parties agree that the provider participation fee provisions of PAC section 5—4.20 et seq. (added by Public Act 87—13) will not apply to said proposed award; and

(b) Upward revision by IDPA of the capital-cost rate component in its calculation, in accordance with the agreed methodology, of the amounts payable to said corporate Claimant for medical care rendered during State fiscal year 1992 and for subsequent care, with IDPA to make a timely reconciliation payment to said Claimant, at the revised rate, in order to supplement previous SFY 1992 care payments. Provider participation fees will apply to all such SFY 1992 care and subsequent payments.

3. The Court, having reviewed the parties’ proposal, finds that their proposed disposition of this matter should be, and is hereby approved on the terms stipulated.

It is therefore hereby ordered that Claimant, Abbington House, Inc. (FEIN 36-3067203), be and is hereby awarded $225,732.07 in full payment of that portion of Claimants’ claim for an incremental, capital-cost increase pertaining to care rendered prior to July 1, 1991.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Sommer, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 84-CC-1890
    Michael Reese Hospital, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed Mach 24, 1992.

    Lawrence Friedman Law Offices, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Steven Schmall, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Sommer, J.

The Claimant hospital here seeks $4,457.12 from the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA), pursuant to section 11—13 of the Public Aid Code (or “PAC,” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 23, par. 11—13), for two days of “covered” inpatient care rendered during August 1982 to patient Turner, a Spenddown recipient of MANG (Medical Assistance-No Grant, per PAC section 5—2(2)) under IDPA’s Medical Assistance Program (MAP). Respondent denies all payment liability for these medical services and contends that recipient Turner’s own $1,164.00 monthly payment obligation, under IDPA’s Spenddown policy, is greater in amount than the per-diem-rate total ($882.80) which otherwise would have been payable by IDPA in the absence of Turner’s Spenddown obligation.

Claimant’s $441.40 inpatient per diem rate under its contract with IDPA — rather than its “private pay” rate— is the rate by which the dollar amount of liability for services rendered to IDPA recipients is determined (see section 5—5.11 of PAC 1983; and Franciscan Medical Center v. State (1991), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 431); and $441.40 was the payment rate which Claimant here properly utilized in calculating patient Turner’s service charges. Thus, IDPA’s contractual obligation to Claimant for these services, in the absence of Spenddown, would have been $882.80 (2 days care @ $441.40), not the $4,457.12 total of Claimant’s private-pay charges.

The purpose of Spenddown is to ensure equitable consideration of certain “medically needy” persons having income and assets at levels greater in amount than the levels established as the “standard” for MAP eligibility as of right, but who may realistically be as indigent, because of the medical expenses which they incur, as other. MAP-eligible recipients having lesser income or assets. The Spenddown-program enrollee and his or her medical vendors are all required to take an active part in the process of determining the point in time at which the enrollee’s medical debts equal or exceed his or her own Spenddown obligation.

To become an eligible “recipient” in respect to medical services rendered during a given calendar month within the Spenddown enrollment period, the enrollee must be adjudicated by IDPA’s local office to have incurred sufficient expenses for services rendered during or prior to that month to “meet” (equal or exceed) the enrollee’s own Spenddown obligation or “amount.”

“Such action [is] to assure that the patient had paid or incurred sufficient medical-expense obligations * 0 • to bring his income level within the monthly Spenddown ‘standard’ which IDPA had established for him, pursuant to federal Medicaid regulations (42 C.F.R. §§435.732 and 435.831) and IDPA Rules 120.10, 120.20, 120.30 and 120.60 [89 Ill. Adm. Code §§120.10, 120.20, 120.30 & 120.60] " ‘ In effect, a Medicaid Spenddownenrollee ° ° ° must comply with Spenddown requirements, and thereby reestablish his MAP eligibility, on a month-by-month basis.” (Franciscan Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 273.)

The enrollee is ineligible for MAP benefits • during a given month, unless adjudicated by the local IDPA office to have “met” his or her Spenddown amount for that month, and unless the enrollee’s vendors submit their related charges to that office promptly so as to permit adjudication to occur within the one-year period prescribed by regulation (42 C.F.R. section 447.45(d) and IDPA rule 140.20). Topics 105 and 141.2 of IDPA’s MAP Handbooks for medical vendors; and Mercy Hospital v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 204.

Once IDPA’s local office determines that the enrollee’s Spenddown obligation for a given month has been met, the enrollee becomes a recipient (i.e., MAP-eligible) as to all services rendered on and after his/her “Spenddown Met” date through the end of that month; and that office issues a Split Billing Transmittal (DPA form 2432) to each known vendor, reporting therein the dollar amount of the recipient’s obligation to be listed as a credit or deduction on the vendor’s invoice.

“The Department is not responsible for payment of expenses incurred that are used by the spenddown [recipient] toward meeting the spenddown obligation.” (Handbook topic 105)

Such expenses, as reported in the DPA 2432, are the recipient’s responsibility to pay. The vendor’s invoice to IDPA must be restricted to charges for services rendered on and after the recipient’s Spenddown Met date (i.e., for the period when the enrollee qualified as a “recipient”); must list charges calculated at IDPA’s payment rate,

“with such charges reduced by the amount of the patient’s Spenddown obligation pertaining to the charges dates of service.” (Franciscan Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 273.)

and must be submitted to IDPA within the one-year period prescribed by IDPA rule 140.20 (89 Ill. Adm. Code section 140.20) and section 447.45(d) of 42 C.F.R., with a copy of the DPA 2432 attached to the invoice Handbook topic 105.

In this case, patient Turner was obliged to assume liability for paying, from her own funds, the initial $1,164.00 (her Spenddown amount) in medical expenses which she incurred during August 1982, as determined by IDPA’s local office. Her Spenddown Met date, as established by that office, was August 11th, the date of her admission to Claimant’s facility. As Turner had not incurred any medical expense during that month prior to August 11th, and as her Spenddown obligation exceeded Claimant’s $882.80 charge, Turner was responsible for paying Claimant’s entire charge, with IDPA being responsible for her subsequent medical expenses incurred during that month.

Respondent has moved for summary judgment, pursuant to section 2—1005(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2—1005(b)), asserting that Claimant’s entire $882.80 charge is Turner’s payment responsibility. Based upon the above discussion, the Court finds that Turner is solely liable for payment of these services, and therefore grants Respondent’s motion.

It is therefore hereby ordered and adjudged that judgment as to all issues is entered against Claimant Michael Reese Hospital and in favor of Respondent, and this claim is dismissed.


author: Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 84-CC-2688
    Glenda Hunter, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 31, 1992.

    Steinberg, Polacek & Goodman (Bradley Steinberg, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Steven Schmall, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Montana, C.J.

Claimant Glenda Hunter filed this claim on April 6, 1984, seeking wages owed to her. As will be developed herein, the case was not in a posture to be tried for several years thereafter. Trial was finally held on October 10, 1991, briefs were waived, and Commissioner J. Patrick Hanley promptly filed his report.

Glenda Hunter was employed as a correctional parole counselor by the Department of Corrections (hereinafter referred to as the “Department”) since February of 1968. Claimant’s employment was terminated by the Department on May 4, 1982. As of that date, Claimant’s position was Correctional Parole Counselor 3.

On February 1, 1984, the Department, pursuant to an interim order of the circuit court, reinstated Claimant as an employee. Claimant was employed by the Department until she was terminated a second time on March 8, 1985, pursuant to further administrative proceedings.

The Claimant’s discharge was the result of administrative proceedings wherein it was alleged by the Department that she violated several of the Department’s administrative regulations and policies.

The circumstances of Claimant’s discharge are more fully detailed in an August 9,1989, opinion of the appellate court of Illinois. (Department of Corrections v. Illinois Civil Service Comm’n (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 304, 543 N.E.2d 190.) A petition before the Illinois Supreme Court seeking leave to appeal the appellate decision was denied on January 8, 1990, and Claimant was immediately reinstated as an employee of the Department.

The appellate court ultimately found, “that the totality of [claimant’s] conduct is insufficient cause for her discharge.” (543 N.E.2d 190, 196.) The court, in ruling that her discharge was against the manifest weight of the evidence, remanded the case with directions to reinstate the October 19, 1983, Illinois Civil Service Commission order that suspended Claimant for 90 days. CSC Case No. DA-290-82.

Claimant now seeks a sum (hereinafter referred to as “net back wages”), compensating her for wages she would have earned for the periods of time she was not employed by the Department (hereinafter referred to as “gross back wages”), set off by sums she earned from other employment. Additionally, Claimant seeks interest on her net back wages from August 9, 1989. The total claim is for $136,225.80; $120,553.80 representing net back wages and $15,672.00 as interest.

On May 4, 1990, an order was entered generally continuing this claim. That order stated that Claimant should exhaust her remedies pursuant to section 64.1(m) of the Civil Administrative Code of Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 127, par. 63b—4(m).) Section 64.1(m) allows the Department of Central Management Services to pay any wage claim if the

“chief officer of the State agency employing the claimant certifies to [CMS] that the claim is a valid wage claim and that the fiscal year and lapsed period have expired.” (par. 63b—4(m).)

The record reveals that Claimant filed a claim for back wages with the Department of Central Management Services. The Department would not certify the claim and objected to payment of the claim. On December 11, 1990, the Department of Central Management Services dismissed her claim for back wages.

Claimant was the only witness called at a hearing on this claim on October 10, 1991. If Claimant was suspended for only 90 days, as ultimately ordered by the appellate court, she testified that she would have returned to work on July 3,1982.

Claimant testified that the gross wages for her position classification for the respective time periods during the pendency of her discharge case were as follows:

a. $12,539.10 ($2,122.00 monthly) for July 3, 1982, through December 31, 1982;

b. $12,732.00 ($2,122.00 monthly) for December 31, 1982, through July 1, 1983;

c. $14,854.00 ($2,122.00 monthly) for July 1, 1983, through February 1, 1984;

d. $8,501.25 ($2,267.00 monthly) for March 8,1985, through June 30,1985;

e. $28,560.00 ($2,380.00 monthly) for July 1, 1985, through July 1,1986;

f. $7,284.00 ($2,428.00 monthly) for July 1, 1986, through October 1, 1986;

g. $22,725.00 ($2,525.00 monthly) for October 1, 1986, through July 1,1987;

h. $31,668.00 ($2,639.00 monthly) for July 1, 1987, through July 1,1988;

i. $33,252.00 ($2,771.00 monthly) for July 1, 1988, through July 1, 1989;

j. $17,208.00 ($2,868.00 monthly) for July 1, 1989, through December 31,1989; and

k. $647.61 (monthly not indicated) for December 31,1989, through January 8,1990.

Total: $189,970.96

Her testimony indicated what her monthly gross wages would have been and such sums are identified above in parentheses. She did not include wages she earned during her 11-month temporary reinstatement in her claim for back wages.

In addition to gross wages, the Claimant testified she would have received a total of $900.00 in bonuses; $150.00 in 1984, $150.00 in 1985, $200.00 in 1987, $200.00 in 1988, and $200.00 in 1989. Claimant stated that her gross back wages would have been $189,970.96 plus $900.00 in bonuses, for a total of $190,870.96. Claimant’s exhibit No. 1, demonstrative evidence of Claimant’s testimony, was admitted into the record without objection, as amended to reflect the sum of $190,870.96 as the total of gross back wages.

Claimant argues that she is not required to mitigate her damages. Regardless of the argument, Claimant presented testimony regarding mitigation of damages. Claimant stated that she sought employment during the period of time commencing in the middle of 1982 through January 1990 and at times did have some employment.

On October 8, 1982, she was involved in an automobile accident, suffered two crushed vertebrae and was unable to obtain or hold employment through the balance of 1982 and throughout all of 1983. She wore a steel brace after the accident until July 1983. She wore a body cast from July 1983 to February 1984, when she returned to work at the Department pursuant to the circuit court’s interim order.

After Claimant’s initial discharge in 1982, she aided in the preparation of her case, the first hearing occurring on August 26,1982, and the second on October 12,1982. She was devastated mentally and was under the care of a doctor. She was denied unemployment compensation after her initial discharge because the discharge was for alleged misconduct. She tried to seek employment at various places including Cook County Jail’s Adult Probation Division, Juvenile Probation in Juvenile Court, the Department of Children and Family Services, the Board of Education and Saint Edwards. She attempted to get a job through the State Unemployment Board and by talking to friends. She did not obtain a job offer prior to her automobile accident on October 8,1982. After her accident, she was physically unable to seek employment. On cross-examination she admitted receiving approximately $17,000.00 as a result of the accident for personal injuries but no sum for loss of earnings.

After her second discharge from the Department on March 8, 1985, she sought employment. After attempting to be hired at some of the places previously mentioned, she changed her employment strategy. She went to “all the hospitals” such as Michael Reese, Jackson Park and Mercy for social work positions. She went to “all the temporary services” to revert to her clerical abilities but could not pass the typing test. She applied at “all the airlines” as a flight attendant. Eastern Airlines apparently offered her a job as ground support but she could not lift luggage because of her back condition. She went to Kaleidoscope which did not have a position at that time. She also went to Gilly’s, Jewel, Walgreens, Clara House Shelter, Mile Square and the Onyx Nail School, without success.

Claimant testified that during all periods of time of unemployment, and those periods of time she was employed in a part-time capacity, i.e., Chicago Area Project, she actively sought employment on an average of twice a week.

Claimant testified that she received the following sums as gross earnings from the following sources, or from unemployment compensation, for the respective time periods:

a. $15,148.00 from the Department for July 1,1983, through January 13, 1984;

b. $5,434.00 as unemployment compensation in 1985;

c. $7,390.00 from Human Resources Department for 1986;

d. $1,702.11 from Chicago Area Project in 1987;

e. $5,694.00 as unemployment compensation in 1987;

f. $13,272.88 from Kaleidoscope in 1988;

g. $1,058.48 from Chicago Area Project in 1988;

h. $594.00 from Chatham Travel Services in 1988; and

i. $20,024.29 from Kaleidoscope for 1989.

Total: $70,317.16

In summary, Claimant stated that she received a total of $70,317.16 in earnings between July 3, 1982, through January 8, 1990. The $15,148.00 received from the Department on March 9,1984, for the time period of July 1, 1983, through January 13, 1984, was apparently back wages paid to her pursuant to the interim reinstatement order of the circuit court.

During cross-examination, Respondent offered into the record as Respondent’s exhibit No. 1, a nonpaginated group of tax returns, W-2 statements and other documents for the years 1983 to 1990. The commissioner allowed such documents to be admitted into the record because Claimant identified the documents as tax returns she and her husband filed. Such admission of the exhibit was conditioned on the premise that any document in the exhibit that relates to Claimant’s earnings would be relevant and any other document would be disregarded.

Respondent offered into the record Respondent’s group exhibit No. 2, a nonpaginated group of documents, declaring it to be the departmental report. Based upon section 790.140 of the Court of Claims Regulations, the exhibit was admitted into the record over the objection of the Claimant. (74 Ill. Admin. Code, sec. 790.) For the purposes of creating a record, Claimant’s counsel was permitted to make his objections, or at times, more appropriately, his observations, to any and all pages included in the exhibit. The objections and observations of Claimant’s counsel were permitted because Claimant was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine any of the purported authors, or custodians, of the documents included in the exhibit.

No further evidence was offered by Respondent. In its closing argument, Respondent acknowledged that “Glenda Hunter is owed some money for the time she was off [but respondent is] not really able to tell how much it is.”

This Court need not determine whether Claimant’s discharge was proper, or improper, and need not determine whether a 90-day suspension from her job was an appropriate discipline. (Halima v. State (1989), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 193.) The appellate court has opined that the decisions of the Department and the Illinois Civil Service Commission’s second order were against the manifest weight of the evidence. The appellate court ordered Claimant reinstated subject only to a 90-day suspension initially ordered by the Illinois Civil Service Commission.

The Claimant is entitled to receive full compensation as allowed by section 11b of the Personnel Code. Section 11b specifies that:

“Every employee reinstated 000 shall receive full compensation 000 [f]ull compensation shall mean compensation such suspended, discharged or laid off employee would have earned in the position classification during the period of suspension, discharge or layoff less amounts earned by the employee from any other source and unemployment compensation payments received during such period.”

(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 127, par. 63b 111b.) Therefore, the issue before this Court is the sum Claimant should be awarded.

According to the Claimant’s testimony, she would have received $190,870.96 in gross back wages and bonuses for the periods of time she was discharged. She received earnings from other sources and unemployment compensation totalling $70,317.16 for the same period. After subtracting the statutorily imposed setoffs from her gross back wages, she asserts the net back wages would be $120,553.80.

Claimant stated that she obtained her calculations of gross back wages by referring to, and utilizing, the union contract that specified the monthly salaries for her position classification for the time periods she was not employed. The monthly salaries are confirmed by certain documents in Respondent’s group exhibit No. 2. In relation to Respondent’s group exhibit No. 2, the ninth and eleventh pages purport to be calculations of sums owed by Claimant compiled by the Department. The monthly wages stated thereon are identical to those stated in Claimant’s testimony.

More importantly, a review of the seventh through tenth pages of the Respondent’s group exhibit No. 2 would lead one to conclude that the Department’s own calculations show that Claimant’s gross back wages were $189,785.88, or $105.08 less than the gross back wages, absent the bonus sums, testified to by Claimant. A review of Claimant’s exhibit No. 1 and the ninth page of Respondent’s group exhibit No. 2 reveals that the calculations are virtually identical for the period of time commencing March 8, 1985, through December 31, 1989. Two minor distinctions exist; the Department’s calculations show gross back wages for March 8, 1985, through June 30,1985, as $58.63 more than that claimed; and the Department does not calculate a sum owed for January 1 through January 8, 1990.

A review of the second paragraph of the tenth page of Respondent’s group exhibit No. 2 clearly shows the Department did not include $25,281.00 in gross back wages for July 3, 1982, through July 1, 1983, to the calculations on the ninth page. Again this is virtually identical to the sum testified to by Claimant. (Claimant’s exhibit No. 1.) Similarly, the first paragraph of the tenth page of Respondent’s group exhibit No. 2 shows that the Department’s calculations on the ninth page do not include $15,148.00 in gross back wages for July 1, 1983, through January 31, 1984. Therefore, the sums of $25,281.00 and $15,148.00 added to the Department’s partial calculation on the ninth page of $149,256.88, show the Department admits Claimant’s gross back wages to be $189,785.88.

Claimant testified that the $15,148.00 (for July 1, 1983, to January 31, 1984) was received by her and should be set off. Claimant included the sum in her testimony culminating in a total setoff of $70,317.16. Therefore, she does not include the $15,148.00 in her claim of $120,553.80 for net back wages.

The witness’ testimony was credible (as reported by the commissioner who heard it) and substantially corroborated by Respondent’s group exhibit No. 2. Therefore we will accept the testimony as it relates to gross back wages, with one exception. There was no testimony or other evidence as to how she would have been entitled to a bonus or how the amount of a bonus would have been determined. Subtracting the $900.00 claimed for bonuses, we find gross back wages are $189,970.96.

The remaining issues relate to the adjustments to the gross figure to be made in arriving at the net due the Claimant. The first issue involves her efforts to mitigate her losses. During Claimant’s testimony, the commissioner reported that she appeared to be a credible witness and the transcript shows she answered questions with specifics. The record indicates she assisted in the preparation of her case. She had a severe injury during the latter part of 1982 and most of 1983 which impaired her ability to be mobile and to work. She received unemployment compensation in 1985 and 1987. Therefore she was able to convince the Illinois Department of Employment Security that she was making sufficient efforts to obtain employment but was unable to find employment. Claimant provided proof of jobs held and wages earned. Respondent did not dispute any of the facts presented by Claimant and offered no evidence which would counter her testimony of efforts to mitigate damages. The Court finds that Claimant made reasonable efforts to mitigate her damages and that $70,317.16 should be deducted from the gross.

The second issue involves her automobile accident. Respondent, citing section 24 — 6 of the Court of Claims Act, argues that the claim for back wages should be set off by the $17,000.00 received by Claimant as a result of her accident. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 37, par. 439.24—6.) The Court finds that the back wage claim should not be set off by sums received for personal injuries suffered by Claimant. Claimant testified that no award was made for loss of earnings. Although section 24—6 appears too broad at first blush, it only stated that awards “shall be subject to the right set-off.” It does not specify what should be set off. An examination of section lib of the Personnel Code indicates that the proper setoff is the “amounts earned by the employee.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 127, par. 63b 111b.). Recovery of damages for personal injuries are not specified in section lib as a permissible setoff and are not “earned” by a person.

However, the testimony concerning the accident raises another issue, one that neither side addressed. The Claimant is entitled to that compensation she would have earned during the period of the wrongful discharge. During that period she was an accident victim and suffered severe personal injuries. It is clear to the Court that for some period of time she could not have worked and therefore may not have earned her salary.

The Claimant testified she was in a serious automobile accident on October 8, 1982, and hospitalized at three different hospitals until November 6, 1982. (Tr. 6) She said she was unable to obtain or hold any employment whatsoever through the balance of 1982 and all of 1983 as a result of the accident. (Tr. 7) For the first six or eight months after the accident she could not stand up without a steel brace. About July of 1983 she wore a corset or body cast and was still wearing it when she was called back to work on February 1, 1984. (Tr. 7) Whether she could have worked and earned a salary for some time prior to February 1, 1984, is not clear. On cross-examination she testified that she could not remember the exact date on which she was substantially healed so as to be able to go about her day to day living but she did say she wore the brace for six to nine months after she started back to work. (Tr. 59)

The record indicates that the Department has already paid Claimant for the period of July 1, 1983, through January 13, 1984, so the period in question is October 8,1982, the date of the accident, to July 1,1983, and the last two weeks in January of 1984. As for the two weeks, because the Department paid her for the several months prior and the lack of argument or position by the Respondent, we find that she could have earned her salary during that time. As for 8% months, the evidence is that she wore a steel brace and was unable to work.

In Neylon v. State (1986), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 63, the issue was expressly addressed. The claimant admitted to having suffered a non-occupational related disability stroke and claimed entitlement to a disability pension equal to one-half of the final average compensation he would have been entitled to at the time of the stroke had he not been wrongfully discharged. The argument was that had he been working he would have been entitled to the disability payments as a benefit of being a State employee under the provisions of sections 14—124 and 14—125 of the Pension Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 108½, pars. 14—124, 14—125.) Such a benefit is a part of an employee’s compensation and is clearly covered in section 111b of the Personnel Code. However, section 111b of the Personnel Code does not provide this Court with jurisdiction. The funds with which such disability benefits are paid are held in a trust and are segregated from other State funds. Determinations of eligibility are made by the Board of Trustees of the Retirement System. Those decisions are subject to administrative review, not review in the Court of Claims. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 108½, par. 14—150.) In Neylon, the claimant was directed to exhaust that remedy. Based on the record in that case, the Court was able to compensate the claimant for the sick days he would have accumulated, and been required to use, as a condition of eligibility to receive the disability payments. We cannot do so in this case. In Neylon, the claimant never actually went back to work. The Claimant in this case did go back to work. There was no testimony about sick days (or vacation days), no express claim made for them, or any indication whatsoever as to whether these days were “put back on the books” as of her final reinstatement. We find that Claimant failed to sustain her burden of proof as to entitlement to compensation from the Court of Claims which she would have earned during the 8M months she was recuperating from her injuries. The salary she testified she would have earned during that period was $2,122.00, so $18,567.50 will also be deducted.

The remaining issue before the Court is whether Claimant should be awarded interest.

In support of Claimant’s position that interest should be applied, three arguments are forwarded. Claimant first argues that section 11b of the Personnel Code permits interest to be paid on back wage claims. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 127, par. 63b 111b.) The argument is premised on a self-created meaning of the term “full compensation.” In order to receive full compensation for wages to have been earned in years past, Claimant asserts that a “reasonable interpretation to the value of money” requires the awarding of interest. Otherwise she is not getting full compensation. Claimant proposes using an interest rate of 6% as a measure, or a basis, of interest that should be added to her back wages awarded to give her full compensation. In support of her argument for interest, Claimant cites Nagle v. State (1975), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 74. Claimant notes that the Nagle court opined that a claimant for back wages should receive,

“an award in the amount of $20,000.00 000 which amount is to be full and complete compensation for any and all damages, as well as salary.” (31 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 77 (emphasis added).)

The Nagle court was not addressing whether a back wage claimant could receive interest. The language was in reference to other damages in addition to the loss of wages incurred by claimant.

Claimant also cites Lewis v. Stran-Steel Corp. (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 280, N.E.2d 714, in support. The Lewis decision does not pertain to the State of Illinois.

Claimant argues that the basic principles of the due process clause in the 1971 Constitution of the State of Illinois, article I, section 2, and in the Constitution of the United States, amendment XIV, section 1, requires that she be given full and complete compensation for any and all damages as well as salary incurred by her as a result of her discharge. If it is Claimant’s position that in not awarding interest this Court is acting in an unconstitutional manner, then the Claimant has a cause of action in another forum. In re Application of Reyes (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 498; Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 72, 485 N.E.2d 332.

Lastly, Claimant argues that section 2—1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires interest to be paid at 6% from the date of the judgment. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2—1303.) Section 2—1303 specifies that

“[judgments recovered in any court shall draw interest at the rate of " ‘ ' 6% per annum when the judgment debt is * 0 ° a governmental entity.”

Respondent objects to the awarding of interest, citing I & D Pharmacy, Inc. v. State (1984), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 37, in support of the objection.

The Court finds that interest is not recoverable in this matter. The I & D Pharmacy decision stands for the proposition that interest is not recoverable pursuant to section 2—1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure against Respondent. The I & D Pharmacy court noted that interest is only recoverable against the State if the State is specifically mentioned in a statute. The State of Illinois is not specifically mentioned in section 2—1303. (37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 37, 42.) See Doe v. State (1986), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 37, reconsid. (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 38; and In re Walker (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 300, 546 N.E.2d 520.

In summary, the adjustments are as follows:

Gross Back Wages $189,970.96

Less: Mitigation and

Unemployment $70,317.16

8/1 months at

$2,122.00 @ 18,567.50

88,885.10

Net Back Wages

$101,085.86

In the usual back wage claim additional adjustments are made for appropriate employer contributions and appropriate employee deductions and these adjustments are fully set forth in an appendix to the decision. Computation of the details contained in the appendix takes some time. Subsequent to her hearing Claimant filed a motion for an expedited decision citing time constraints involved with her election to participate in the early retirement incentive program. A concerted effort has been made by the commissioner and the judges to render a prompt decision. The exact details of contributions to the State Employees Retirement System and to FICA and tax withholdings will have to be rendered at a later date in order to accommodate the Claimant.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded $101,085.86 to be adjusted as described hereinabove which adjustments will be fully set forth in an appendix incorporated herein; it is further ordered that the additional sum of $11,128.00 is awarded and is to be paid to the Director of Employment Security to compensate, pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, par. 490D, for amounts of unemployment compensation received by the claimant in 1985 and 1987.

APPENDIX A

Identification of the State Contributions and Deductions from Back Salary Award.

To the State Employees Retirement System

Employee’s contribution to State

Employees Retirement Sys. $10,448.40

Employee’s contribution to FICA 6,277.32

State’s contribution to State

Employees Retirement System 9,004.62

State’s contribution to FICA 9,004.62

To Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to Internal Revenue Service:

Claimant’s Federal Income Tax 20,217.17

To Illinois Department:

Claimant’s Illinois Income Tax 2,527.15

To Office of Employment Security:

Director Dept, of Employment

Security 11,128.00

To the Claimant:

Net Salary 61,625.82

Total Award $127,485.80


author: Burke, J.

text:
    (No. 84-CC-3552
    Jan E. Heid, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1991.

    Clark & Sturgeon, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Claire Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Burke, J.

This claim arises from an automobile accident which occurred on March 3, 1984, in Madison County, Illinois. Claimant, Jan E. Heid, alleges that he was injured when he pulled his vehicle off of 1-70 onto a road where there appeared to be a weigh station. His vehicle fell into a hole where there had previously been a truck weigh scale, at a weigh station for eastbound traffic on Highway 70. Claimant alleges the State was negligent in removing the scale and for failing to properly secure the exit ramp to prevent vehicles from entering thereon, or to properly warn drivers eastbound on Highway 70 that the entrance was under construction, and a dangerous condition existed.

The accident happened at approximately 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., March 3,1984. Claimant was on his way home from work and stopped at the Dutch Hollow Barn in Belleville with a friend and had a sandwich and a couple of beers.

Later, Claimant was eastbound on Highway 70 at approximately mile post 9. Claimant was not aware that the weigh station had been removed. He saw a single sign that said the weigh station was closed and this meant to Claimant that they were not weighing trucks. Claimant pulled off the ramp and the next thing he knew, he woke up “beat-up.” Claimant stated that there were no barricades either on the ramp itself or anywhere in the vicinity that he could see other than the one at the entrance that said the weigh station was closed. The closed sign was a sign — not a barricade. Claimant stated he went right down the middle of the ramp. When he realized the accident happened, he was partially in a hole — the front end was cockeyed. A police officer found Claimant’s truck and he was taken to Memorial Hospital in Belleville.

Ronald W. Kraus, an engineer with the Illinois Department of Transportation testified that the weigh station had been at the location since the early 60s. A project was under way to remove the weigh station. The exit ramp was shut down and barricaded. Four barricades were erected at the site. Two were erected on either side of the sand pile at each end of the pit, and two barricades were put at the exit ramp where you would leave Interstate 70 to come up the ramp to the eastbound weigh station, and these two barricades were staggered. They were type 3 barricades averaging five feet tall, with reflectorized tape. Krause knew of no reason for there to be any indentation on the exit ramp at this location in March 1984 and all weigh station signs had been taken down.

James K. Ferraro, a resident engineer for the Illinois Department of Transportation, testified that he was familiar with the area of the weigh station after July 23, 1983. He saw the hole where the scale was removed on April 11, 1984, and it was full of sand and reasonably full. Ferraro had sustained a back injury so he was not familiar with barricades on the jobsite at or about the time of the accident.

Dennis Tarrant drove a wrecker to the scene. When he arrived at the scene, he observed at the entrance to the scale ramp, a barricade covering the entire entrance. He estimated the ramp to be approximately 12 to 15 feet wide with a grass ditch on either side. It appeared to Tarrant that the pickup truck had gone straight into a hole four feet deep and 12 to 15 feet from side to side, and six feet from front to back, and that the truck had bounced up and out, landing on all four tires approximately 20 to 25 feet on the other side of the hole.

Similarly, Brian Slesinski, who works at the same service station as witness Tarrant, stated that in December of 1983, a silver Pontiac had gone into the same hole as described by Tarrant. Slesinski also remembered seeing two barricades at the entrance to the ramp, but one had been knocked down. Both Tarrant and Slesinski noted that there were no flashing lights on the barricades or in the area.

The medical records of Claimant reveal that the Claimant was admitted to Memorial Hospital in Belle-ville on March 4, 1984. It was found that the Claimant had sustained a bilateral fracture of the mandible and dislocation of the right temporomandibular joint and multiple rib fractures on the left and a fracture of the temporomandibular joint. Chest X rays were consistent with pulmonary contusion with infiltrations that cleared. It was believed that Claimant had sustained a cerebral concussion with some loss of memory. An admission memo of Dr. Kini revealed that Claimant presented a history of alcohol abuse and that at his admission, his blood-alcohol level was such that he was intoxicated. Dr. Kini’s impression included the thought that Claimant was suffering from an element of alcohol withdrawal and possibly some drowsiness due to Librium. It appears that Librium was administered at Memorial Hospital.

Claimant was issued a traffic citation by the State Police for improper lane usage, pled guilty to the ticket and was convicted.

Claimant denies intoxication by alcohol or drugs; however, the emergency room record reveals a blood-alcohol content of .179 at 2:03 a.m. Claimant proceeded to Memorial Hospital in Belleville at 1:35 a.m., March 4, 1984. Claimant was hospitalized 19 days and incurred medical bills totaling $21,080.35, only $1,000 of which was paid by insurance. Claimant seeks damages against Respondent in the sum of $100,000.00 “plus whatever else this Court deems just and equitable.”

Claimant argues that at the time he pulled off of eastbound 1-70 onto the entrance ramp of the former weigh station, there were absolutely no barricades, gates, flares, lights or signs warning motorists of the ongoing construction, or of the danger that lay just ahead. Claimant argues that Respondent was negligent in failing to properly secure the exit ramp to avoid anyone from entering thereon, and in not filling the existing hole on the entrance ramp after creating a dangerous condition, and after having had. ample opportunity and notice that the defect existed. Finally, Claimant argues that the State failed to properly warn the general public that the entrance was under construction, and that a condition of danger existed.

The State argues that the ramp was barricaded and that Claimant’s testimony to the contrary consisted of falsehoods and self-serving statements. The State asserts that it was Claimant’s responsibility to look out and to drive in the proper highway lanes; the State asserts that Claimant’s plea of guilty to the traffic citation is prima facie evidence of Claimant’s failure to perform his duty. Furthermore, the State argues that Claimant’s blood-alcohol content at 2:03 a.m. on the day following the accident raises the presumption that Claimant was under the influence of alcohol, which constitutes yet further proof of Claimant’s breach of his driving duties under Illinois statute.

This Court has long held that

“although the State is not an insurer of the safety of persons in the lawful use of the highways, it is nevertheless under the duty to give warning by the erection of proper and adequate signs at a reasonable distance, of a dangerous condition of which the State had notice, either actual or constructive.” (Hout v. State (1966), 25 Ill. Ct. Cl. 301.)

In appropriate circumstances, this Court has repeatedly sustained awards in situations where the State has failed to give warning of dangerous conditions of which it has either actual or constructive notice. Gatlin v. State (1985), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 51.

The evidence in this case establishes that there was, indeed, a dangerous condition along and upon the exit ramp to the former weigh station for eastbound traffic on I-70. The State was under a duty to post warning signs and to give warning of the dangerous conditions of which it did, indeed, have actual notice. The evidence in this case as to whether or not there was an effective appropriate warning to the drivers of vehicles eastbound on I-70 is in dispute.

Claimant testifies that there were no barriers or signs that he could recall other than a sign which indicated to him that the weigh station was closed. The police report does not indicate the presence of barricades at the scene; however, Claimant received a traffic citation for a violation of chapter 95½, section 11—709(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code which prohibits a vehicle from being moved from the lane of a clearly marked roadway until the vehicle’s driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety, and to this charge, Claimant pled guilty. The wrecker driver, Dennis Tarrant, upon arriving at the scene, saw a barricade covering the entire entrance which was 12 to 15 feet wide. Tarrant found Claimant’s vehicle approximately 20 to 25 feet beyond a hole cut in the ramp itself, 40 to 50 feet beyond the barricade. Similarly, the witness Slesinski noted approximately three months before Claimant’s accident, that at the same location, he remembered seeing two barricades at the entrance to the ramp with one having been knocked down. Thus, on at least two occasions, disinterested witnesses observed barricades at the ramp. On one of those occasions, the barricade, extending completely across the ramp, was observed in place before the State Police had left the scene of Claimant’s accident. The evidence preponderates that there was a barricade across the entire width of the exit ramp at the time of Claimant’s unfortunate accident. Claimant does not remember how it came to pass that his truck bypassed the barricade, thereby enabling this accident to occur, and there is no other evidence in the record to suggest an answer to this mystery. The fact is that Claimant somehow, while admittedly violating the traffic rules and regulations of the State of Illinois, managed to drive his vehicle around a barricaded ramp entrance so as to ultimately cause this accident. The uncontradicted evidence with respect to the nature of the barricades used at this location established that they were five feet high and bore reflective tape.

We agree with Respondent that unbiased witnesses confirmed that a barricade was at the scene. We further agree with the State that the mere fact that more signs or lights or elaborate precautions could have been taken does not constitute proof of negligence. The record is barren of any suggestion that the barricades which were shown to be in place were inadequate, inappropriate or insufficient for the purpose of reasonably warning vehicular traffic not to enter the ramp. Once having ignored the barricade, Claimant apparently proceeded without sufficient caution, and was injured by a dangerous condition which the barricades had sought to insulate from vehicular traffic. We have no quarrel with the multitude of cases cited by the Claimant in support of his position. In none of those cases, however, can it be said that an award was sustained under circumstances comparable to those in the case at bar.

Wherefore it is ordered that this claim is denied.


author: Patchett, J.

text:
    (Nos. 85-CC-0073, 85-CC-0079 cons.
    Kevin R. Phillips and Tracy L. Phillips, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 19, 1991.

    Andrew C. Schnack III, for Claimants.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Patchett, J.

Actions sounding in tort were brought by Claimants against the State of Illinois pursuant to section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1990, ch. 37, par. 439.8(d).) The claims were consolidated for purposes of this review, as they both arose out of the same occurrence.

At the time of the accident, Claimant, Kevin R. Phillips, was driving an automobile east on Illinois Route 104, a two-lane highway approximately 1/2 miles east of the town of Liberty, Illinois. Also in the automobile was Mr. Phillips’ wife, Claimant Tracy L. Phillips, the front seat passenger, and his 18-month-old daughter. The accident occurred between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. on January 6, 1984, on a hilly stretch of Route 104. Mr. and Mrs. Phillips admitted to not wearing their seatbelts; however, their daughter was restrained in the back seat by a child’s safety seat.

Evidence indicates that several days before the accident, it had" snowed or rained, and that there was still some snow or ice on the shoulders of this stretch of road. There is also testimony that the snow or ice had melted during the preceding days and then refroze during the night.

Claimants assert that due to the hilly nature of Route 104, some of the melting snow/ice accumulated at the bottom of one of the hills, whereupon it froze that evening. It is Claimants’ theory that their car hit the ice, causing Mr. Phillips to lose control and thereby crash. As a result of the crash, Mr. and Mrs. Phillips were both thrown out of the car, each receiving serious physical injuries. The child was not injured.

Claimants allege that the State of Illinois was negligent in its removal of, or failure to remove, ice or failure to warn drivers of its presence.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not liable in that Claimants have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was indeed ice on the highway. Alternatively, Respondent argues that even if there was ice, the negligent driving of the Claimant, Kevin R. Phillips, was the proximate cause of the accident, thereby precluding recovery against Respondent.

Based upon a thorough examination of all the evidence, the Court concludes that Claimants have failed to meet their burden of proof. A claimant in a negligence action must prove that respondent had a duty towards him, that respondent breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of claimant’s injury. (Lucker v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp. (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 872, 492 N.E.2d 536.) Negligence may be shown by circumstantial evidence, but liability may not be based upon surmise or speculation as to what might have happened to cause claimant’s injury. McCormick v. Maplehurst Winter Sports, Ltd. (1988), 166 Ill. App. 3d 93, 519 N.E.2d 469.

Although both of the Claimants’ complaints allege the existence of an ice patch, neither Claimant could testify to such at the hearing. Both Claimants failed to remember what caused the accident or whether there was ice on the road. When asked about the possibility that their head injuries interfered with their memories, both Claimants felt their memories were just as good as they had ever been. In fact, the testimony of almost every other witness indicates that there was neither ice nor water on the highway. The most that can be said in support of Claimants’ theory is that there may have been water running down the gullies or ditches alongside the road, and that possibly some of it spilled over onto the westbound lane at the bottom of the hill. Remember, Claimants were in the eastbound lane.

Claimant Tracy L. Phillips, apparently relying on the spillover-of-water evidence, argued that their car was passing a semi-truck at the bottom of the hill, which therefore would place them in the westbound lane. However, this argument is directly contradicted by her husband, the driver, who said they were not passing anyone at that time. Indeed, the first witness to arrive at the crash site was a truck driver who, although admitting to having been passed, stated that the passing car had done so quite some time before the accident. When pressed about whether they passed a truck at the critical point in time, even Tracy Phillips admitted she really didn’t remember.

Based upon the above, the Court concludes that Claimants have failed to prove that there was any ice or water on the road. (Schuette v. State (1984), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 61.) Claimants cannot speculate as to the’cause of their accident. (McCormick, 166 Ill. App. 3d 93, 519 N.E.2d 469.) In addition, Claimants cannot rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as Respondent did not have “management and charge of Claimants’ automobile at the time of the accident.” Mavraganis v. State (1984), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 153.

Even if there was an ice patch on the highway, there was sufficient evidence presented to establish that Claimant Kevin R. Phillips was the proximate cause of the accident, and not the Respondent. (Feldman v. State (1984), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 158.) The semi-truck driver indicated that Claimants were speeding when they passed, and that this was the cause of the accident. The truck driver equated Claimant’s driving to “flying low.” In addition, it was demonstrated that Claimants’ car ended up some distance past the sign marking a no passing zone. If Tracy’s “passing” argument is believed, the final resting place of the automobile lends some support to the proposition that Claimant Kevin R. Phillips was trying to pass too close to the no passing zone. Finally, evidence reveals that both Claimants are intimately familiar with this area, having grown up in this region and traveled this road often.

It is therefore determined that Claimants have failed to prove the existence of ice or water on Route 104. Even if ice or water did exist, Claimant Kevin R. Phillips is determined to be the sole proximate cause of the accident. In either event, Claimants cannot recover against Respondent. We deny this claim.


author: Raucci, J.

text:
    (No. 85-CC-1613
    Theo Buetow and Marianne Buetow, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1992.

    Kavathas & Castanes (Samuel A. Kavathas, of counsel), for Claimants.

      Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Richard F. Linden, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondents.
   OPINION

Raucci, J.

This cause comes before us after a full evidentiary hearing before a commissioner, briefing and oral arguments by the parties before us.

Claimants owned a 33-unit apartment building in Chicago Heights, Illinois. The Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) sought to obtain the property for a State and Federal highway project.

On December 6, 1983, IDOT notified the tenants that negotiations with the Claimants would begin on December 9. On that date, the IDOT commenced negotiations by offering $250,250.00 for the property. Shortly thereafter, IDOT delivered a letter to tenants informing them that negotiations had commenced, and of the tenants’ right to relocation assistance and possible benefits. The letter also informed the tenants that under no circumstances would they be required to move prior to 90 days from the date of the notice and that they would receive at least 30 days’ notice.

On January 6,1984, Claimants made a counter-offer of $423,000.00. The IDOT commenced condemnation proceedings which resulted in a consent judgment of $290,000.00. The IDOT acquired title on June 19, 1984, and took possession on June 28,1984.

On December 31, 1984, Claimants filed their one-count complaint seeking “money damages in tort.” In substance, the complaint alleged that prior to instituting condemnation, IDOT

“without authority or approval notified the tenants * * * of its intention to pursue condemnation 000 and further induced said tenants to vacate Claimants’ premises by offering them money to relocate.”

Claimants cite no authority, and we find no authority, which would entitle them to the relief sought. It appears that this theory is based upon intentional interference by IDOT with Claimants’ contractual relationships with their tenants. The record does not support a finding of a lack of good faith on the part of IDOT. The entire process was completed, including a condemnation proceeding, within six months. IDOT acted pursuant to Federal regulations in sending notices to the tenants. Neither Federal nor State law creates a cause of action in favor of Claimants for damages caused by IDOT’s implementation of the regulations.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that this claim is dismissed and forever barred.


text:
    (No. 85-CC-1903
    Thomas Black, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 15, 1991.

    Arthur Bluestone, for Claimant.

      Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (John R. Buckley, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Sommer, J.

On September 19, 1984, the Claimant, Thomas Black, was in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. He was being transported by car from Elk Grove Village to Joliet. During the course of the trip, the automobile owned by the Department of Corrections and driven by an employee of the Department was involved in a collision with another vehicle.

The Claimant, who was wearing handcuffs and leg shackles at the time of the accident, alleges that upon impact he was thrown against the metal cage in the car striking it with his neck and shoulder. He claims he also struck his head against the car window. The Respondent stipulates to the accident, to the fact that the Claimant was injured, and to liability.

From the time of his arrival at the correctional facility in Joliet on September 19,1984, and all during his incarceration at that and other facilities until his release on January 6, 1985, the Claimant, who complained of pain, was treated with medication, heat treatments, physical therapy, cervical collar and ultrasound treatments. He was examined often by doctors during this period. X rays on two occasions, September 19, 1984, and November 19, 1984, showed no bone damage, disc compression, or other abnormalities. The diagnosis of the doctor who saw the Claimant on September 20, 1984, and an orthopod who saw the Claimant on October 19, 1984, was that the Claimant suffered from “cervical strain.” An examination on September 24,1984, by the same doctor who saw the Claimant on September 20, 1984, indicated “a muscle strain or spasm.” Another doctor indicated a “probable slipped disc” on September 27,1984, but neither of the X rays showed such.

After the Claimant’s release he did not seek any additional medical treatment though he testified that he suffered from headaches. Thereafter, the Claimant was gainfully employed as a warehouseman.

The State paid for all of the medical bills of the Claimant. The Claimant presented a witness who testified that the value of such was $2,188.00, if the Claimant had been privately treated. We do not believe exact comparisons can be made as cases vary in severity and as medical care in a prison is on request. A patient may be less apt to seek medical care for minimal complaint if he or she has to pay for it. In fact, the Claimant did not seek medical care when he was released four months after the accident.

We find that the Claimant did suffer a strain of the muscles of the neck along with minor bumps and bruises. The Claimant suffered no permanent effects from these injuries but did undergo some pain and suffering after the accident. With very few physical symptoms present, the Claimant’s pain and suffering is subjective and hard to measure. The Claimant’s witness’ testimony as to the value of the medical care was an attempt to measure the injury and the resultant pain and suffering. To arrive at an award, we will consider the value of the medical care in the circumstances along with the content of the medical reports. In doing so, we arrive at the conclusion that the injury to the Claimant was minimal and so will award the Claimant $1,500.00 for pain and suffering. It is therefore ordered that the Claimant be awarded $1,500.00.


author: Sommer, J. Sommer, J.

text:
    (Nos. 85-CC-1947, 86-CC-0527 cons.
    St. Anthony Hospital Medical Center, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 16, 1991.

      Opinion filed December 2, 1991.

    Thomas D. Luchetti, P.C., for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Steven Schmall, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Sommer, J.

This cause coming to be heard on the Respondent’s motion to dismiss consolidated claims, due notice having been given, and this Court being fully advised in the premises, finds that under the above claim numbers the vendor Claimant is seeking reimbursement for services provided to 30 different patient accounts. The Respondent in its motion agrees to liability and an award in the amount of $5,921.94 in regard to patients Brauer, Carter, Keller, Tillett, and Willis, identified as Nos. 6, 8, 20, 29, and 30 in the report of the Department of Public Aid. The Claimant characterizes these claims as “non-disputed.” Therefore, this Court will award the Claimant $5,921.94. In regard to the remaining patient accounts, this Court finds that the more expeditious procedure will be for the parties to proceed to a hearing before the commissioner. At this time, this Court takes no position as to the merits of the remaining patient accounts, but does remind the parties that there is a great deal of case law in the Court of Claims on the issues arising from vendor claims for medical reimbursement. It is therefore ordered that the Respondent’s motion to dismiss is denied and that the Claimant be paid $5,921.24, and the above claims be returned to the commissioner for hearing in regard to the remaining patient accounts.

OPINION

Sommer, J.

In the two captioned actions, Claimant hospital is seeking vendor payments from the Medical Assistance Program (MAP) administered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA), for medical services rendered to 30 named patients during the period July 1981 through April 1984. Respondent reports that IDPA had authorized payment for five of the subject patient accounts in June 1984, and that a $5,921.94 State warrant had been issued to Claimant by the State Comptroller in payment of them. However, that warrant was not negotiated and has since escheated. Respondent has moved to dismiss the 25 accounts for which IDPA had not authorized payment, based upon Claimant’s failure to invoice its related charges to IDPA in the manner and within the time prescribed by the Department’s MAP Handbook For Hospitals, IDPA Rule 140.20 (89 Ill. Admin. Code sec. 140.20) and Federal Medicaid regulation (42 CFR sec. 447.45); and upon Claimant’s failure to file these actions within the time period prescribed by section 439.22 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22) and section 11—13 of the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11—13).

The Court, being fully advised in the premises, makes the following findings.

Spenddown of. Patients’ Available Income And Assets. Seventeen of Claimant’s 25 unresolved accounts relate to IDPA’s “Spenddown” program, and to Claimant’s alleged failure to comply with Spenddown requirements within the time prescribed by IDPA Rule 140.20 and sections 447.45(b) and (d) of 42 CFR. The function of Spenddown is to ensure equitable consideration of persons having income and assets at levels greater in amount than the levels established for MAP eligibility as of right, but who may realistically be as indigent, because of the medical expenses which they incur, as other MAP-eligible recipients having lesser income or assets. The Spenddown-program enrollee and his or her medical vendors are all required to take an active part in the process of helping determine the point in time at which the enrollee’s medical debts equal or exceed his or her own Spenddown obligation.

To become an eligible “recipient” in respect to medical services rendered during an enrollment period, the enrollee must be adjudicated by IDPA’s local office to have incurred sufficient expenses for services rendered during or prior to that period to “meet” (equal or exceed) the enrollee’s own Spenddown obligation or “amount.” The enrollee is ineligible for MAP benefits unless adjudicated by the local IDPA office to have “met” his or her Spenddown amount for that period. (Topic 105 of IDPA’s MAP Handbook For Hospitals; Mercy Hospital v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 204.) In its report herein, IDPA identifies three patients (Berg, Bergeron and Crossno) whose Spenddown amounts were greater than Claimant’s authorized per-diem charges for their services. In such cases, the enrolleepatient remains liable, as a part of his or her Spenddown obligation, for the cost of such services. See Mercy Hospital, supra, at 205-06.

Medicaid Spenddown enrollees must meet their Spenddown obligation for each calendar month during which they incur expenses in order to establish MAP eligibility as to expenses incurred during the month. When the enrollee’s hospitalization spans two months, the hospital’s invoice(s) for related services must document that a Spenddown-met adjudication had been made for each of the calendar months, and must reflect a TPL (third-party liability) reduction of its monthly, per-diem charge by the amount of the patient’s Spend-down obligation. (Franciscan Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 273.) Here, IDPA’s report refers to three accounts (for patients Johann, Rumler and Somora), Claimant’s invoices for which were not documented, and its charges for each month reduced, in accordance with these requirements. Claimant has not established that IDPA had received a properly prepared and documented rebill-invoice for any of these three patients (showing MAP eligibility on each date of service invoiced, per Mercy Hospital & Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 269), prior to the prescribed one-year deadline for such receipt.

As to each of Claimant’s 11 other Spenddown accounts, Respondent contends that Claimant had failed, within the prescribed period, to submit a properly prepared and documented, “clean claim” invoice (defined in subsection (b) of section 447.45, 42 CFR), which would establish that Spenddown adjudications had been made and the patients’ payment liabilities credited against Claimant’s per-diem charges. The Court finds that Claimant had not submitted clean-claim, rebill-invoices for these accounts,, during the time prescribed by regulation.

Statutory Time Bar. Respondent asserts that Claimant’s causes of action, as to 22 of these 25 unresolved accounts, had previously been barred from prosecution as of either February 14, 1985, or September 30, 1985, the dates on which these actions were filed with this Court. The State contends the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant any relief as to said 22 accounts. The accounts which Respondent challenges on this ground include those seeking payment for services rendered more than 18 months prior to Claimant’s commencement of the related Court action (see PAC sec. 11—13, subpar. (2)), as well as those accounts Claimant’s initial DPA-form invoices for which IDPA had “refus[ed] to pay 9 9 9 in whole or in part” (Id., subpar. (1)) in notices (IDPA voucher-responses or remittance advices) issued more than one year prior to the corresponding filing of said accounts as Court actions. The related services span the period from July 1981 (for patient Brien) through patient Rumler’s October 1983 services, Claimant’s initial invoices for these two accounts having been refused payment by IDPA notices dated January 18, 1983, and January 23,1984, respectively.

This Court has consistently taken the position that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of those vendor-payment claims which were not commenced within the time periods prescribed by section 439.22(b) of the Court of Claims Act and section 11—13 of the PAC. See Kim v. State (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 286, and prior decisions therein cited.

Having reviewed the facts (dates of Claimant’s services and of IDPA’s payment-refusal notices responding to Claimant’s initial invoices of charges for said services) as outlined in Claimant’s complaints and IDPA’s report herein, the Court concludes that each of Claimant’s causes as to said 22 claims had in fact been barred by statute, prior to Claimant’s filing of the related actions as discussed above. Accordingly, the Court has no authority to award Claimant any relief as to said claims.

Failure to Comply with MAP Invoicing Requirements. Of the three accounts not barred by statute, two (Eberley and Harris) involve services to AMI (Aid to the Medically Indigent, or PAC Article VII) Spenddown patients. In each instance, Claimant had invoiced its charges to IDPA without attaching a split billing transmittal document, DPA form 2432 (to be completed by the local office as proof of Spenddown adjudication), and without reporting a TPL credit, on the face of the invoice, the amount of the patient’s Spenddown obligation. IDPA had refused payment because of these deficiencies. In neither case does Claimant allege that it had submitted a properly-prepared and documented rebill-invoice within the one-year period as prescribed by IDPA Rule 140.20. In the absence of this required Spenddown information, Claimant’s invoices contained no indication that the patients’ Spenddown status may have been adjudicated, or that the amounts being charged for vendor-payments should be reduced by the amounts of the patients’ payment obligations.

Claimant’s initial invoice of charges for patient Allen (the third non-barred account) had been prepared — and received by IDPA — more than six months following the patient’s April 6, 1984, discharge from Claimant’s facility. Subsection (c) of IDPA Rule 140.20 (89 Ill. Adm. Code (1985), sec. 140.20, formerly IDPA Rule 4.015; included in Topic 141 of IDPA’s vendor Handbooks) required that “[t]o be eligible for payment consideration,” vendors’ invoices must be received by the Department within six months following the date(s) of service, except in certain situations not here relevant. Further, subsection (e) of the rule relieved the State of payment liability as to services which had not been timely invoiced; and this Court has denied vendor-payment claims in such cases. (See Treister v. State (1989), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 185, and decisions therein cited.) We find no liability to exist here for patient Allen’s services.

The Court on May 16, 1991, awarded Claimant St. Anthony Hospital Medical Center the sum of $5,921.94 on the five accounts previously approved by IDPA, and the Claimant has no objection to the entry of this order and dismissal of this claim.

It is hereby ordered and adjudged that Respondent’s motion to dismiss Claimant’s claims based upon the remaining 25 accounts here presented be and is hereby granted. This claim is dismissed.