text:
    (No. 75-CC-960
    Westinghouse Security Systems Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Westinghouse Security Systems Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 75-CC-969
    Commonwealth Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

      George O. Shaffner, and Joseph C. Sibley, Jr., Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-970
    Commonwealth Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    George O. Shaffner, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-972
    Commonwealth Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    George O. Shaffner, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-973
    Commonwealth Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    George O. Shaffner, and Joseph C. Sibley, Jr., Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-976
    Donna M. Brandis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Donna M. Brandis, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-980
    Riverside Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Riverside Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-989
    Marjorie Klock, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Marjorie Klock, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-990
    Lynn White Pomp, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Lynn White Pomp, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-996
    John E. Gannon, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Kleiman, Cornfield & Feldman, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1003
    Linda L. Neuman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Linda L. Neuman, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1007
    Multigraphics Division, Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Multigraphics Division, Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1011
    Elaine Revell, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Elaine Revell, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1016
    Marvin J. Schwarz, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Marvin J. Schwarz, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1019
    Marvin J. Schwarz, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Marvin J. Schwarz, M.D. Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1021
    Marvin J. Schwarz, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Marvin J. Schwarz, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1023
    International Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    International Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Per Curiam. "

text:
    (No. 75-CC-1024
    Village of Old Shawneetown, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Village of Old Shawneetown, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam. "


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1041
    Acco Seed, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

      Acco Seed, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1063
    Sears, Roebuck & Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Sears, Roebuck & Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1143
    Zella Bauer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Registration and Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Zella Bauer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-849
    Harley Duncan, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 19, 1975.

    Frank, H. Walker, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-499
    William J. Sabatini, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

    William Sabatini, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-505
    Madge Noble, Bureau County Treasurer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Local Government Affairs, Claimant.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

    Madge Noble, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-597
    Mental Health Service of Franklin & Williamson Counties Incorporated, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

    Mental Health Service of Franklin & Williamson Counties Incorporated, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-598
    Francis E. Walsh, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

    Burditt and Calkins, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim is for six months of back salary. Trooper Walsh and the Department of Law Enforcement became embroiled in a dispute resulting in Trooper Walsh submitting his resignation. However, before the resignation became effective, Trooper Walsh withdrew the resignation. The Department of Law Enforcement then stated that the resignation had already been accepted and that Trooper Walsh could not withdraw same. They removed Trooper Walsh from their payroll effective October 15, 1973. Trooper Walsh received no compensation from the State Police from that time until April 15,1975. On April 15, 1974, the State Police reinstated Mr. Walsh and immediately filed charges against him for the purpose of determining whether they should continue to employ Trooper Walsh notwithstanding the validity of his purported withdrawal of his resignation. Trooper Walsh was paid one day’s salary for April 15, 1974. On April 24, 1974, Trooper Walsh sustained a heart attack and was hospitalized for six weeks. He has since been declared by his doctor to be unable to perform the duties of a State Police officer. Subsequently, the Department of Law Enforcement entered into an agreement with Trooper Walsh wherein they agreed to withdraw charges against him, have agreed to payment of six months of back salary and to place Trooper Walsh on a medical leave of absence and assist him in his attempts to obtain disability status in the Illinois State Employees’ Retirement System in return for Trooper Walsh’s resignation. The agreement is duly signed by Dwight E. Pitman, Director of the Illinois State Police, Francis Walsh and his attorneys. As indicated in the departmental report and Agreement of the parties (attached to the joint stipulation) Francis E. Walsh is due back salary in the amount of $7,351.57.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $7,351.57 plus employer contributions of $470.48 for a total employee benefit of $7,822.05 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 661.69 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ — Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 470.48 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ — State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$1,043.92 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 122.29 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$5,523.67 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded the total employee benefit of $7,822.05 (Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Two and 05/100 Dollars), to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-626
    C. C. Hoeszle, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

    C. C. Hoeszle, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-876
    Robert Hall, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

    Robert Hall, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E.. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-968
    Commonwealth Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

    George O. Shaffner, and Joseph C. Sibley, Jr., Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-995
    Variety Travel, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

    Variety Travel, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1109
    Standard Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

      Standard Oil Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1145
    Laurel Haven School, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

    Laurel Haven School, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1147
    Smoot Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 26, 1975.

    Smoot Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-186
    Charles S. Robinson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Charles S. Robinson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-425
    General Binding Corporation, A Delaware Corporation and GBC Sales & Service, Inc., An Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Steve Rubin, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-620
    Harza Engineering Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

      Harza Engineering Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-749
    James W. Phelan, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    James W. Phelan, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-892
    Mercy Center for Health Care Services, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Mercy Center for Health Care Services, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-898
    Edward Don & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Edward Don & Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-912
    Donald R. Owen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Donald R. Owen, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-921
    Farns Associates Incorporated, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Farns Associates Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-938
    Denson’s Pharmaceutical Center, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Denson’s Pharmaceutical Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-951
    Sears Roebuck & Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Sears Roebuck & Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1037
    De Paul University, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    De Paul University, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1039
    Right Girl Temporary Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Right Girl Temporary Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1052
    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1084
    McMaster-Carr Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    McMaster-Carr Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1094
    Leland H. Rayson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Leland H. Rayson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1097
    Stewart Warner Alemite Sales Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Stewart Warner Alemite Sales Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1117
    Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Chicago, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 2, 1975.

    Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Chicago, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 6898
    Savin Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Arthur Spiro, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This matter comes before the court for a ruling on respondent’s motion for a summary judgment, pursuant to §57 of the Civil Practice Act, contending that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in this matter, and that the respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In its objections to said motion, claimant contends that there are material issues of fact; that respondent has misinterpreted the facts in the record; and that respondent has misapplied the relevant case law and statutes.

Claimant in this action seeks a refund for an alleged involuntary overpayment of its 1970 franchise tax in the amount of $9,060.53, being the difference between the $9,269.71 which claimant paid and the amount of tax actually owed, amounting to $209.18, as subsequently determined by the Secretary of State.

Claimant’s statement of the facts, which respondent has not denied, strongly supports claimant’s contention that it did not pay the tax voluntarily, but paid it under duress or compulsion. Yet, claimant apparently caused or contributed to the duress of which it complains.

Claimant concedes that its 1970 Annual Report was inadvertently filed late. Said report, due before March 1, was filed on November 4, 1970, some eight months late, accompanied by a letter explaining the failure to file timely. This letter stated that the corporation was in the process of moving its headquarters from New York City to Valhalla, New York, and that the aforementioned return was inadvertently overlooked.

Seven days later, on November 11, 1970, claimant paid the amount of $9,269.71 to the Sheriff of Cook County as demanded in a warrant issued by the Secretary of State for failure to pay franchise tax due the State of Illinois.

Nineteen days later, on December 1, 1970, the Secretary of State issued an adjusted statement for the franchise tax reducing the correct tax to only $209.18, apparently based on the Annual Report belatedly filed by the claimant.

In the meantime, on December 15, 1970, a copy of the receipt from the Sheriff of Cook County was mailed to the Secretary of State pursuant to advice received from his office that a copy of the receipt was necessary to effect a refund.

On January 20, 1971, claimant was advised by the Secretary of State that the statute contained no provision for the issuance of a refund inasmuch as the warrant held by the Sheriff of Cook County was in the correct amount at the time payment was made. The Secretary of State subsequently suggested that a petition for refund be filed with the Court of Claims.

The claim was filed in this court on September 8, 1972, some 18 months after the excessive tax was paid. We note that three hearings were scheduled but not held, for reasons not appearing in the record; that respondent’s motion for summary judgment was filed September 3, 1974, and claimant’s reply on September 11, 1974.

It would appear from the motion and reply that one issue of fact exists, namely, whether claimant paid the tax voluntarily or involuntarily. This, however, may be a question of law after accepting the facts as stated by the claimant. If the tax were paid voluntarily, as respondent contends, respondent correctly relies in its motion on our holding in New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co. v. State of Illinois (1954) 22 C.C.R. 60, in which Judge Fearer stated the general rule at page 64 as follows:

. " . . .in the absence of a statute, a tax which is paid voluntarily, and not under duress or compulsion cannot be recovered.”

This is a rather liberal restatement of the rule established in People v. Lindheimer (1939) 371 Ill. 367, cited by the respondent. In Lindheimer our Supreme Court said at page 371:

"The obligation of the citizen to pay taxes is purely a statutory creation, and taxes can be levied, assessed and collected only in the method pointed out by express statute. [Citing cases] So, also, any right to a refund or a credit of taxes is purely of statutory origin, and in the absence of an authoritative statute, taxes voluntarily, though erroneously paid, cannot be recovered, nor even voluntarily refunded by a county, although there may be justice in the claim.”

Claimant argues that neither of the above cited cases apply since in both cases the excess tax was paid "voluntarily”. Although it is not alleged that the tax was paid under protest, claimant contends that its payment of the tax was made involuntarily and under duress or compulsion.

The duress or compulsion to which claimant refers may be summarized from claimant’s affidavit as follows:

A warrant for the collection of franchise taxes and penalties was mailed to the Sheriff of Cook County on August 27, 1970, by the Secretary of State. The Sheriff then sent claimant a form letter demanding payment of $9,269.71 by November 16, 1970. The letter stated that failure to pay the full sum of $9,269.71 by November 16, 1970, would oblige the Sheriff "to make a return of the writ 'No part satisified’; whereupon, it will be obligatory under the statute for the Attorney General to take action to dissolve your corporation.” Mr. J. Mills, of the Office of the Secretary of State, in a telephone conversation, allegedly warned claimant that failure to pay the full amount demanded by the Sheriff would obligate the Sheriff to serve the warrant and close claimant’s Illinois office forthwith, thereby precluding claimant from doing business in the State of Illinois. In addition, Mr. Mills is reported to have said that the Attorney General’s office would revoke claimant’s authority to carry on corporate activities in Illinois.

In light of these express threatened actions, claimant states that it paid the sum of $9,269.71 on November 11, 1970, by certified check, "to avoid material and substantial economic and legal sanctions to claimant’s business enterprise in this state.” Claimant does not allege that the collection procedures employed were illegal nor contrary to established practice. Claimant contends that its payment was made under duress.

As authority for its contention that such duress is recognized as sufficient grounds for permitting a refund, claimant cites Snyderman v. Isaacs (1964) 31 Ill. 2d 192; and Alton L. & T. Co. v. Rose (1904) 117 Ill. App. 83. These cases do not significantly support claimant’s position. In both cases the tax refund was denied. It was denied, not withstanding the alleged duress, primarily because the payment was not made under protest. In the first case cited by claimant, Snyderman at page 194, the Court does say. "The Complaint does not allege payment under protest, and it contains no factual allegations to support a theory of legal duress.” The Court does not elaborate on the term "legal duress,” but does announce that a tax payment is not rendered involuntary by the existence of a penalty for failure to pay.

In Benzoline Motor Fuel Co. v. Bollinger (1933) 353 Ill. 600, we find the Court referring to "virtual or moral duress” as being sufficient to prevent a payment made under its influence from being voluntary. The court also indicates that anticipated "disastrous effects to business,” somewhat stronger but similar to claimant’s contention in the case at bar, would amount to such duress. However, the key distinction from the case at bar is that, in Benzoline, the taxpayer made the payments under protest and the tax was held to be unconstitutional.

In the case at bar, claimant does not allege that its payment of tax was made under protest. We find no precedent in this state for awarding a tax refund unless the tax was paid under protest or, as stated in Alton Light & Traction Co. v. Rose (1904) 117 Ill. App. 83 at page 86, "with notification of some sort equivalent to a reservation of rights. The mere fact that a tax was paid unwillingly or with complaint is of no legal importance,” the Court said at page 85. This Alton case was decided before our protest statute first became law in 1911, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1973) Ch. 127 §172. This protest statute is referred to in our 1954 decision, N.H. Fire Ins. Co. v. State (Supra) at p. 62, and our decision in that case would apparently have been different if the claimants had pursued their remedy as provided in the protest statute. Even when a protest accompanies the remittance, taxes cannot be recovered in equity unless certain requirements are met. See Standard Oil Co. v. Bollinger (1929) 337 Ill. 335 in which the court held:

"The tax paid by a distributor of motor fuel under the invalid act of 1927 cannot be recovered in equity notwithstanding the distributor protested against the tax at each time a remittance thereof was made, as the payment was nevertheless voluntary.”

In both of the cases cited by the claimant, and in all other cases referred to in this opinion, a tax refund was denied because claimants failed to act promptly to protect their rights and failed to avail themselves of the remedy which the statute affords in Chapter 127, Section 172 Ill. Rev. Stat. For the same reasons, we find that the instant claim must be denied.

A recent case very similar in facts to the case at bar, is Western Union Telegraph Co. (a New York Corporation) v. Lewis (1972) 7 Ill. App. 3d 285; 287 NE 2d 169. Here, the claimant had filed an erroneous annual report overstating its capitalization. It then filed a supplemental annual report which inadvertently repeated the same clerical error. After receiving the Secretary of State’s invoice for franchise tax based on the incorrect figures, claimant paid the excessive tax under protest, filed a second annual report with correct figures, and filed its suit for the over payment. The Secretary of State argued that the statute did not permit the claimant to correct errors in its report after June 25. In granting the requested franchise tax refund, the court said,

"The plaintiff here availed itself of a remedy which the statute affords. It applied for adjustment of the franchise tax, and it paid under protest.”
"Taxes paid under protest may be recovered if improperly imposed, Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Carpentier, 10 Ill.2d 300, 140 N.E. 2d 115; Ill. 422, 172 N.E. 705, and Section 172 of the Statute expressly provides the procedure followed here.”

In the case at bar, the claimant admittedly, though unintentionally, created the situation which resulted in its payment of an excessive franchise tax in 1970. Unfortunately, claimant failed to make its payment under protest pursuant to the statute cited above, and failed to avail itself of the remedy which the statute affords. Under these facts, and all the facts before us, considering in a light most favorable to the claimant, we conclude that the claim must be denied as a matter of law. Since claimant did not pay the tax under protest, although it had justifiable grounds and a statutory right to do so, the payment is deemed to have been made voluntarily. According to the weight of authority in this state, a tax paid under duress may be refunded by court order only if the tax were also paid under protest.

Summary judgment is a procedure to be encouraged in cases of this type as a method of facilitating the administration of justice. It is, however, a remedy granted by this court with some caution so as not to pre-empt the right of any claimant to present further facts or authorities that might have a significant bearing on our conclusion. In such cases a petition for rehearing will inavariably be granted for good cause shown and authorities cited according to our rules.

Respondents’s motion for a summary judgment is hereby granted, and this claim is denied.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-419
    The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    David L. Passman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-420
    The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    David L. Passman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-508
    Central Illinois Light Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

      O’Hern & Wombacher, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-524
    Sidney Harrison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, and Developmental Disabilities, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Jack A. Coney, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-537
    Gulf Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Gulf Oil Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-592
    James R. Dishman, Sr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    James R. Dishman, Sr., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-813
    Smith Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Smith Oil Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-929
    Edgewater Hospital, A Non-Profit Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    William L. Silverman, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-927
    Superior Ambulance Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Governor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Superior Ambulance Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott., Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-993
    Hill Camera Repair Serv., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Hill Camera Repair Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1044
    R. R. Bowker Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    R. R. Bowker Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1049
    Melvina Kleppe, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Registration and Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Melvina Kleepe, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1085
    Emmett H. Jurgens, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Emmett H. Jurgens, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1087
    Hoe Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Hoe Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1103
    Barnes Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Barnes Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1127
    Peter Stubing, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Peter Stubing, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1146
    Smoot Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Smoot Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1155
    Good Samaritan Shelter Care Home, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Good Samaritan Shelter Care Home, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1187
    Ace Glass, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Ace Glass, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1212
    Scientific Products, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Scientific Products, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (75-CC-1238
    D. K. Agencies, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    D. K. Agencies, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1239
    Charles Scribner’s Sons, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Charles Scribner’s Sons, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1242
    James Packer Swank, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

      James Swank, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1255
    Greenwood Press, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Greenwood Press, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1274
    Mogul-Ed, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 5, 1975.

    Mogul-Ed, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (Nos. 6203, 6210, 6233, 6261 (Consolidated)
    Cecil L. McDougall, R. L. Austin, Donald R. Basler, and James B. Wentworth, Jr., Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Repsondent.

      Opinion filed June 9, 1975.

    McDougall, Austin, Basler, and Wentworth, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

These four claims were consolidated by our prior order as an aid to convenience and economy, pursuant to §51 of the Civil Practice Act, since the claims all present exactly the same issue and they differ only as to the amount claimed by each claimant.

Each claimant was employed by the respondent as a "Crime Scene Technician” in the Department of Law Enforcement, and each seeks compensation for overtime work required by the respondent during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 in the amounts shown in the above caption.

The claimants were not represented by counsel. They have entered into a joint stipulation with the respondent as to the facts and the issues, and state: "The parties waive briefs and desire the court to rule on the claims on the basis of the record and the stipulation.”

The respondent recognizes the merits of these claims in the following letter dated August 18, 1971, signed by Gary D. McAlvey, Superintendent of the aforesaid department’s Bureau of Investigation:

"The overtime covered in the above claims accumulated during Fiscal Year 1968 and Fiscal Year 1969. At that time there were no provisions to make cash payment for overtime, and because of the heavy work load, compensatory time off for overtime earned could not be allowed to these employees.
"The overtime was authorized as a part of these employees’ regular duties as Crime Scene Technicians. Because of the lack of authorization to make cash payment for overtime, no monies were appropriated to reimburse these employees during the fiscal years in question.
"It would appear to me that these employees have a valid claim and it will be up to the Court of Claims to determine whether or not they should be paid by the State of Illinois regardless of whether cash payment for overtime was authorized.”

The claimants’ scheduled work week was 37.5 hours for which they were paid a monthly salary. However, the nature of their work necessitated their being on call 24 hours per day to go out on crime investigations and devote as much time as the case required. They all understood then that they were not to be paid for overtime but were entitled to compensatory time off. Because of the heavy workload, these claimants could not be given their earned time off nor were they otherwise compensated for their hours of overtime work which are not in dispute.

To determine whether claimants can now be compensated for the overtime worked, we turn first to a prohibition found in Ill.Rev.Stat. (1967) Ch. 127, §145, ¶3 which reads in part as follows:

"Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State, either temporary or regular, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll or other voucher and no additional sum shall be paid to such officer or employee from any lump sum appropriation, appropriation for extra help or other purpose or any accumulated balances in specific appropriations, which payments would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, [emphasis added.]

Under the facts in this case at bar, it cannot in fairness be said that claimants here are seeking "additional payment for work already performed” since they have received nothing for their overtime. Hence, we do not find that their claims are barred by the above quoted statutes.

We next examine a restriction found in Article IV of the Constitution of 1870, in effect at the time of the performance of the services in question, which reads as follows:

"Sec. 19. The General Assembly shall never grant or authorize extra compensation, fee or allowance to any public officer, agent, servant or contractor, after service has been rendered or a contract made, nor authorize the payment of any claim, or part thereof, hereafter created against the State under any agreement or contract made without express authority of law . . .” [Art. 4, Sec. 19.] (emphasis added)

The above constitutional barrier would preclude the payment of these claims unless payment can be made with "express authority of law.”

Respondent stipulates that the rules promulgated by the Department of Personnel "shall have the force and effect of laid’. [The Personnel Code, Ill.Rev.Stat. (1967) Ch. 127, §63b 108] Looking then for such rule that would be applicable to the case at bar, and binding on the Department of Law Enforcement, we find that Sec. 3-340 of the Rules propounded by the Department of Personnel, effective November 1, 1967, provided, among other things, that—

"Each operating agency shall grant its full time employees the equivalent time off for overtime worked. Such compensatory time off shall be scheduled * * * within 12 months of its accrual. If such compensatory time off is not liquidated within 12 months of its accrual, the agency shall pay the employee for such overtime work * * *. * * * where the granting of compensatory time off is not practical * * * the Director of Personnel may authorize * * * wages for overtime work, * * *. Authorization must be obtained prior to the time work is performed.

Since Sup’t. McAlvey states that overtime for these claimants had prior authorization, being inherent in their duties as Crime Scene Technicians, it seems clear that these claims should or could have been paid under the above stated "authority of law”. But it also appears from the record that personnel and payroll supervisors in the Department of Law Enforcement at that time had no knowledge of the rules then in effect which provided that payments could be made to these claimants for overtime worked.

Claimants admit that they too had no knowledge of the said rules at that time, but relied on their employer’s payroll supervisors to protect and advise them of their rights. All of the claimants conceded that they were not anticipating overtime pay, but thought they were only entitled to compensatory time off. It was generally agreed among the claimants that they put in such a great deal of overtime that they only applied for a small amount of it, knowing that they weren’t going to get it; and that the only compensation that they could foresee was compensatory time off, and they could see no way that they could take that amount of time off because of their work load. Sup’t. McAlvey’s letter confirms this.

"As it turned out, the man that turned in the most overtime [Verne Dalluge] was paid in full, and the employees that did not claim all they worked were ignored,” claimants testified. Apparently, Mr. Dalluge fortunately had knowledge of his rights and timely applied for overtime pay. Claimants logically contend that if they are expected to know the law, the department’s payroll supervisors are also presumed to know the law; and that the law should protect the employee as well as the state from loss due to ignorance of the pay plan rules on the part of the employee and his payroll supervisor.

The record shows that claimants were finally told by their payroll supervisors that they would be paid for their overtime work by filing a lapsed appropriation claim in this Court, as they have done. This Court granted an award under similar circumstances in Riefler v. State, 11 C.C.R. 381.

We do not regard these claims as being based on the theory of quantum meruit which we held in Schutte et al v. State, 22 C.C.R. 591 at page 626, that this theory does not generally lie against the State. Rather, we find that these claims should be paid under the "express authority of law” as stated in the 1967 Department of Personnel Rules Sec. 3-340 (Supra). This rule, determined at the hearing to be applicable to these claimants, declares that such state employees shall be granted equivalent time off for overtime worked, within 12 months of its accrual, otherwise they shall be paid for such overtime work. Since claimants were never given the opportunity to take the time off, it always being denied because of the workload and the promise that claimants would be paid for this overtime later, claimants are entitled to an award for the overtime pay in the amounts claimed.

Awards are hereby granted in these four claims as follows:

In claim No. 6203 the claimant, Cecil L. McDougall, is hereby awarded compensation for overtime pay in the total sum of $263.53.

In claim No. 6210 the claimant, R. L. Austin, is hereby awarded compensation for overtime pay in the total sum of $626.29.

In claim No. 6233 the claimant, Donald R. Basler, is hereby awarded compensation for overtime pay in the total sum of $601.95.

In claim No. 6261 the claimant, James B. Went-worth, Jr., is hereby awarded compensation for overtime pay in the total sum of $377.19.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 75-CC-310
    Capitol Glass Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 9, 1975.

    Capitol Glass Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant filed a claim against the State of Illinois for material allegedly furnished on behalf of the Secretary of State.

On April 18, 1975, respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment for all of the alleged material furnished except one item in the amount of $13.90. Respondent based its motion on the fact that claimant was unable to verify either the order showing where the goods were ordered or delivery receipts showing where the items were received by the State with the exception of the item in the amount of $13.90.

Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby entered against the claimant, except in the amount of $13.90 for which judgment is entered against the respondent.

Claimant is awarded the sum of $13.90.


text:
    (No. 5442
    Christina Flaim, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 11, 1975.

    Hugh M. Matchett, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Etta Cole and Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This action, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained by the claimant, is based upon the alleged negligence of respondent’s Department of Corrections in approving the parole and release of one Ronald Sledge, a juvenile, who, after his release, attacked, battered, and robbed the claimant; and that respondent knew the said parolee to be a dangerous person.

Claimant also contends that the State of Illinois is, pursuant to the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions, under a duty to compensate innocent victims of crime "without regard to whether the state was negligent or not.”

The second contention is a theory which has been specifically rejected recently by the Illinois Supreme Court. In Inez Williams v. Medical Center Commission [Docket No. 46562 Supreme Court Opinion filed March 24, 1975] Justice Schaefer analyzed similar constitutional arguments as to the State’s liability and said, among other things:

"A constitutional grant of immunity to a sovereign government has never, so far as we are aware, been held to be an arbitrary classification which violates equal protection.”
"The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Edelman v. Jordan (1974), 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662, 94 S. Ct. 1347, indicates clearly, we believe, that the assertion of sovereign immunity by a State is not offensive to any provision of the Constitution of the United States.”

Although it was under no legal duty to do so, the State of Illinois has now voluntarily agreed to assume some of the financial loss suffered by innocent victims of crimes by enacting the "Crime Victims Compensation Act” effective October 1, 1973, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1973) Ch. 70 §71 et seq. However, this gives no relief to the claimant nor any other victim of a crime committed prior to the effective date of this Act, October 1, 1973. See §84 of the Act. "This act applies only to injuries inflicted after the effective date of this Act.”

We return now to claimant’s first and basic contention, i.e., that the Youth Commission of the Department of Corrections was negligent in granting parole to Ronald Sledge who was a dangerous person. Although the alleged negligence was not proved by a preponderance of the evidence in this case, it is plausable to conclude, with the benefit of hindsight, that the officials responsible for paroling Ronald Sledge made an error in judgment.

It is well-established law in Illinois that public officials are immune from liability for performing discretionary functions. The rationale for such immunity was best expressed by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F. 2d 579, 581, 2nd Cir. 1949:

"It is thought to be better to leave unredressed those wrongs done by dishonest [or negligent] officials than to subject those who try honestly to perform their duty to the constant fear of retaliation.”

In Lusietto v. Kingan, 107 Ill.App. 239 (1969), the court noted (at page 245) that an immunity exists in favor of public officials when they are exercising their official discretion on matters which are discretionary in nature. In Kelly v. Ogilvie, 64 Ill.App. 2d 144 (1965), Aff. 35 Ill. 2d 297 (1966), this doctrine of quasi judicial immunity was more fully expounded. See also Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). This doctrine, well established and of long standing in Illinois, states that, where official action is the result of judgment or discretion, it is judicial and immune from liability. People v. Bartel, 138 Ill. 332; McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263. As the Court said in Kelly v. Ogilvie (Supra) at page 147:

"This doctrine rests on the principle that the public decision maker, like the judge, ought to be shielded from personal liability or other factors extraneous to a judgment based on his best perception of public needs.”

Since public officials are immune from liability under Illinois law for negligence in the performance of discretionary duties, their principal, the State, is similarly immune under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Moreover, at the time of claimant’s injuries, there was in effect a statute specifically exempting a public employee or a local public entity from liability from "any injury resulting from determining to parole or release a prisoner.” Ill.Rev.Stat. (1965) Ch. 85 §4-106 effective August 13, 1965:

"§4 — 106. Parole — Escaped prisoners
Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for:
"(a) Any injury resulting from determining to parole or release a prisoner, to revoke his parole or rlease, or the terms and conditions of his parole.
(b) Any injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner.”

Although the above statute specifically applies to local governmental units, it is a declaration by the General Assembly as to the public policy of this State controlling the precise issues presented in the case at bar. In determining to parole a prisoner, government officials are performing a discretionary duty or function. Such officials and their governmental unit are excused by law from any liability for any injuries that might result from the exercise of such discretionary power.

It was not necessary for the State to be included in the "Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act.” The sovereign immunity of the State, except as such immunity is specifically waived by the General Assembly, rests firmly on sound constitutional grounds according to recent decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court in Inez Williams v. Medical Center Commission (Supra) and according to the U.S. Supreme Court in Edelman v. Jordan (Supra) and Krause v. Ohio, U.S. Supreme Court Reports 34 L.Ed. 2d 506. Same case below, 31 Ohio St 2d 132, 60 Ohio Ops 2d 100, 285 N.E. 2d 736 contains an exhaustive treatise on the subject of a state’s sovereign immunity confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972.

By contrast, the immunity once claimed by units of local government was judicially abolished in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, Harvey v. Clyde Park District (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 60, and other subsequent opinions.

"Those opinions, however, [quoting our high court in Inez Williams (Supra)] did not involve the sovereign immunity of the State or the validity of the Court of Claims Act, questions which were thoroughly threshed out in the recent constitutional convention. The present language of §4 of Article XIII — 'Except as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in this State is abolished’ — was adopted only after the defeat of an amendment which would have limited the power of the General Assembly to the provision of a special forum, and would have eliminated its authority to restrict the right of trial by jury and to impose time limitations and limitations upon the amount of recovery. (5 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 3948-3952.)”

The State’s liability is no greater, and its immunity is certainly no less, under existing law, than that of local governmental units which are creatures of the State. To hold the State liable for any errors in judgment by its officials, in the exercise of their discretionary decision making powers and duties, would be contrary to the public policy established by the General Assembly. This is particularly true of a decision to parole or release a prisoner, "one of the most difficult, sensitive and complicated decisions that must be made in the criminal justice system.” "Parole Decisions” Ill. Bar Journal, Sept. 1973, p. 20.

For the reasons stated herein, this claim must be and is hereby denied.


author: Holderman J.

text:
    (Nos. 5671 and 6055 (Consolidated)
    Margaret Manos, Administrator of Estate of Harry Manos, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Robert Lisco, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman J.

This is a cause of action brought by claimant against respondent, State of Illinois, for the death of claimant’s husband.

The claimant alleges that the respondent negligently failed to maintain a section of Roosevelt Road, approximately 1000 feet west of Ardmore Avenue, in the Village of Villa Park, County of DuPage and State of Illinois.

On January 31, 1969, at about 1:00 p.m., the decedent, Harry Manos, was the owner of a certain station wagon which he was driving in an easterly direction on Roosevelt Road, the place above mentioned. The claimant charges that the deceased struck a large chuck hole in the road, causing his car to go out of control and collide with a utility pole alongside Roosevelt Road and, as a result of the injuries he received in this accident, Harry Manos died on February 27, 1969.

Claimant called Ralph Franklin North, a police officer for the Village of Villa Park, who testified that he arrived at the scene immediately after the accident and conducted an investigation. He took some pictures of the accident, including a picture of the chuck hole which allegedly caused the car to swerve, resulting in the death of the claimant’s husband. The picture indicates there was a large chuck hole about three feet two inches wide and three and three-fourths inches deep.

James J. Gorman was also called as a witness for the claimant. Mr. Gorman testified that he was following the car of the deceased and that the road was very rough, causing difficulty in driving, and he described the driving as "turbulent.” This witness also testified the decedent was travelling between 45 and 50 miles an hour and that when decedent struck one of the chuck holes, his car went out of control and struck the utility pole, wrecking the car and causing the death of decedent.

Claimant also called Robert Bartel, who operates a service station approximately 1,000 feet west of the utility pole that was struck by decedent’s car. He testified that he was on the scene immediately after the accident as he was attracted to the accident because of the noise caused by the force of the impact. He further testified there were deep chuck holes in the road where the accident occurred and that on previous occasions many other cars had lost their hub cabs after striking the chuck holes and that on many occasions drivers would stop at his gas station inquiring about their lost hub caps. This witness further testified that these chuck holes had existed at least 30 to 60 days before the accident in question. He further testified, that cold patching was very often done on the road but cold patching did not hold because of the weather and heavy traffic. He also stated he had seen crews put in cold patching one day and in two days it would be gone. He also testified the hole in question was "big enough to swallow a wheel” and that it was about a foot deep and a couple of feet in width.

The widow, Margaret Manos, testified to the effect that the decedent was a chef at the Trotter’s Restaurant, that he was 53 years of age, and earning about $100.00 per week at the time of his death. She also identified medical and hospital bills which were admitted into evidence and they are as follows:

Dr. Eugene Fitzgerald...........................$ 750.00
Elmhurst Clinic................................ 750.00
Dr. John E. Finch.............................. 810.00
Gibbons Funeral Home.......................... 1,770.00
Memorial Hospital of DuPage..................... 6,431.26

Also admitted into evidence were Letters of Office in the decedent’s estate and decedent’s Income Tax Returns.

It was stipulated by and between the parties that the highway in question was a State highway and that Harry Manos died as a result of the accident in question, and that such is evidenced by the death certificate and coroner’s certificate which were admitted into evidence.

Joseph Koster, head of the Regional Safety Division for the State of Illinois Department of Transportation, was called as a witness for respondent and he testified that crews had been working in the area of the accident a few days before the date of the accident in question. He further testified that cold patching could come out within a matter of hours. He stated that this highway was reconstructed in 1972.

The law in the State of Illinois is clear. In order for a claimant in a tort action to recover against the State, he must prove that the State was negligent; that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury; and that claimant was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety. McNary vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 328; Link vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 69. This Court has held many times that the State is not an insurer of all persons traveling upon its highways. McNary vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 328; Link vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 69.

It is also apparent from the evidence, that the deceased was not a constant user of the area in which the accident occurred, although at times he did use this thoroughfare but not frequently enough to be aware of the situation that caused the accident.

It is clear in the case at bar, that the deceased was not guilty of contributory negligence which contributed to his death. It is also clear that the negligence of the State in allowing the chuck holes to exist was the proximate cause of the accident.

There being no contributory negligence on the part of the deceased, it is the opinion of this Court that an award should be made in the amount of $25,000.00.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $25,000.00.


author: Perlin, C. J.

text:
    (No. 6650
    Edith Hansen; Richard G. Hansen, individually; Merrill Hansen, Arthur Hansen, Corrine Hansen, Elaine Hansen and Maren Hansen, minors, by Richard G. Hansen, their father and best friend, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Bozeman, Neighbour, Patton & Noe, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

Edith Hansen, her husband, Richard Hansen, and their five minor children have brought this action to recover for injuries which each sustained in an automobile accident on April 11, 1971. The accident occurred on Illinois Interstate 80 at its intersection with Interstate 280 and Interstate 74 in Henry County, Illinois. Claimants contend that their injuries were proximately caused by the negligence of respondent in designing the portion of Interstate 80 whereon the accident occurred, and respondent’s further negligent failure to provide proper signs in the area.

The accident occurred at about 6:50 a.m. on April 11, 1971, a clear, dry day. The Hansen family was returning to their home in Cleveland, Ohio, from a skiing trip in Utah. They had left Utah about 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, April 10, 1971, and had driven continuously with Mr. and Mrs. Hansen alternating behind the wheel. At the time of the accident, Mrs. Hansen was driving the family’s 1970 Ford station wagon, having taken over the driving from her husband about 45 minutes earlier. The station wagon was equipped with a mattress in the rear, which permitted the person not driving to sleep.

Mrs. Hansen had not previously driven over the portion of highway in question. The family had taken the same route on returning from their skiing vacation the year before, but Mr. Hansen had then been driving when they reached the junction of Interstate 80, Interstate 280 and Interstate 74.

The junction had been designed in 1958 and approved by the Illinois Department of Public Works in 1959. Construction of the junction itself was completed by the Illinois Department of Public Works in October, 1968.

Eastbound traffic on Interstate 80 changes direction at the junction in that an eastbound motorist on Interstate 80 at the junction has actually been proceeding in a southerly direction from the Iowa-Illinois border and resumes an easterly path at the interchange by traversing a cloverleaf ramp to his right.

The Hansens were negotiating this cloverleaf ramp on the morning of April 11, 1971, when their vehicle overturned. Mrs. Hansen received permanently crippling injuries in the accident, while the other members of the family fortunately received much less serious injuries.

It was admitted by respondent that a total of 16 accidents on the curve of Interstate 80 at the junction of Interstate 80 and Interstate 280 were reported to the State of Illinois from October, 1968, through April, 1971.

Photographs and diagrams introduced into evidence by claimants and respondent clearly illustrate both the configuration of Interstate 80 at the point of the accident, and the signs that were placed along the highway advising motorists of the existence of the cloverleaf ramp for eastbound traffic. The speed limit on Interstate 80 west of the intersection was 70 miles per hour. Claimants’ Exhibit One is a photograph of eastbound Interstate 80 at a point 4,750 feet west of the cloverleaf ramp and shows overhead signs indicating that eastbound traffic for Interstate 80 should utilize the right lane of the two lane highway, and that eastbound traffic for Interstate 74 should utilize the left hand lane. Mrs. Hansen testified that she was in the right hand lane when she approached this set of signs, and that she noted that the right hand lane was the proper lane for Interstate 80 traffic.

Claimants’ Exhibit Three is a photograph of eastbound Interstate 80 at a point 2,100 feet from the cloverleaf. Overhead signs at this point direct eastbound traffic on Interstate 80 to use the right lane and indicate a junction one third of a mile ahead for Interstate 80 traffic. A diagramatic sign posted on the right shoulder of the highway just beyond the overhead signs, bears a diagram of the cloverleaf ahead for eastbound traffic on Interstate 80 and the words, "Next Right.” Mrs. Hansen testified that as she passed this point she had moved into the left lane, because there was a large tractor-trailer in the right lane. She said that she saw the signs depicted in claimants’ Exhibit Three and dropped her speed to 60 miles per hour.

Claimants’ Exhibit Four was a photograph of eastbound Interstate 80 taken from a point 1,600 feet from the cloverleaf showing another diagramatic sign on the right shoulder of the road containing a diagram of the cloverleaf ahead for eastbound Interstate 80 traffic and bearing the words, "Next Right.” Mrs. Hansen testified that she did not see this sign because she was passing the tractor-trailer truck in the right lane, and the truck obliterated her view of the sign.

Claimants’ Exhibit Five was a photograph of eastbound Interstate 80 at a point 1,050 feet from the cloverleaf and shows a sign on the right shoulder of the roadway stating, "Interstate 80 East, Joliet, Chicago, Next Right.” Mrs. Hansen testified that she was unsure whether she had seen this sign, as she may still have been passing the truck. Contrary to her testimony that she saw the signs depicted in claimants’ Exhibits One and Three, Mrs. Hansen said that at this point she had received no indication that she had to be in the right lane if she was to continue eastbound on Interstate 80.

Claimants’ Exhibit Six is a photograph of eastbound Interstate 80 taken from a point 750 feet from the cloverleaf. An overhead sign in the distance, which appears to be placed just slightly ahead of the cloverleaf ramp, indicates with an arrow that eastbound traffic must follow the off ramp to the right of the highway. On the right shoulder of the highway at the point of the overhead sign, there is a sign stating, "Ramp Speed 25.” Mrs. Hansen stated that as she neared the ramp for eastbound traffic, she was watching the overhead signs and did not see the sign at the side of the ramp indicating a 25 miles per hour speed on the ramp. She said that she dropped her speed to 55 miles per hour at a point about 400 feet from the ramp, and she said she was moving from the left to the right hand lane because she had noticed the arrow on the overhead sign in claimants’ Exhibit Six. She said she was anticipating a junction permitting a 55 miles per hour speed based upon her past experiences on interstate highways.

Claimants’ Exhibit Seven is a photograph of eastbound Interstate 80 taken at the cloverleaf ramp. Mrs. Hansen said that at this point she was "really shook up” because she was in the wrong lane, but said that she still never saw the 25 miles per hour sign at the side of the road. She said that at this point, she knew that she was going too fast for the curved ramp and took her foot off the accelerator and put on the brakes, but the car went out of control on the shoulder of the ramp and overturned.

In support of their contention that Interstate 80 was negligently designed and that there was inadequate signing to warn motorists of the sharp cloverleaf for eastbound traffic, claimants presented the testimony of Dr. John W. Hutchinson, a well-qualified expert in the field of highway design and operation.

Dr. Hutchinson testified preliminarily that at a speed of 70 miles per hour, a driver is going 90 feet per second and cannot see a sign for more than six or eight seconds, and thus needs a series of signs to lay out information. He testified that good practice calls for a sign at least two miles ahead of a junction to tell a driver that another highway is ahead and to give him the name of a major city where it would take him. Next, three quarters of a mile to a mile ahead, the same information should appear on an overhead sign also indicating the lane he needs to get into. Next, from a third of a mile to a half a mile from the junction, a sign should be placed telling the driver that the next right is to a given destination with route or cities indicated. Finally, a sign should be placed in the gore area which says absolutely nothing but "Exit,” because it is then too late to give the driver any additional information,

"... because if the driver has not learned by the time he gets to the point where the exit actually is that that is where he does or does not want to go — if he hasn’t already made up his mind, it is too late to tell him suddently, 'Look, here it is.’ You just tell him suddenly, 'That is all.’ If you tell him something else, he will make a last minute decision which can be fatal.”

Dr. Hutchinson enumerated what he considered to be defects in the designing and signing of the interchange in question. He said that the sign shown in Claimants’ Exhibit Four is misleading because it indicates the driver will proceed straight ahead on the route he is on and need not slow more than 10 or 15 miles per hour below the posted speed he is traveling in order to negotiate the diagramatic turn or curve, when the curve requires a reduction of 45 miles per hour from 70 miles per hour to 25 miles per hour. He said that the sign is forbidden by the Illinois Sign Manual on highways such as the one in question, and that because of the very sharp turn ahead, a yellow, diamond-shape warning sign with black lettering, warning of a curve, and an advisory-speed plate posted with the warning sign, were called for by the Illinois Traffic Control Devices Manual.

He further testified, that signing on the highway was not adequate because during the period 1968 through 1971, seventeen accidents (including the one in question) had occurred on the curve going into the ramp:

"From police accident reports I have learned that of 15 or 16 accidents on the ramp, 13 exhibited the same syndrome — turning into the ramp at too high a speed and running off the outside of the curve. These accidents involved various types of vehicles, ages and sexes of drivers, times of day, and weather conditions. This dictates the conclusion that drivers are being tricked into making the turn at too high a speed.”

He said that customs and standards in the field of traffic engineering, as well as the Illinois Manual, call for advance speed warnings of 700 feet for a 25 miles per hour advisory speed, while here the first warning is given right at the gore, far too late. He added that there were too many signs at the gore which would confuse drivers. Dr. Hutchinson said that the State failed to mark the deacceleration lane with a standard skip line as provided for in the Illinois Sign Manual and that the design of the junction did not provide route continuity:

"In my opinion the route continuity provided at the site in question does not comply with customary and standard practices in the traffic engineering field. This is because the driver will not expect to go around a curve at 25 MPH through a 270 degree angle in order to proceed straight ahead on an interstate highway which has posted speeds of 70 MPH elsewhere.”

He testified that the sight distance of the ramp was inadequate because of the overpass structures hiding the ramp; that it would have been better to use a direct connection design rather than a cloverleaf to avoid the sharp degree of curvature on the ramp; and that a flashing yellow light could have been placed at the gore.

He concluded his direct examination with the statement that nowhere in the United States had he seen an interchange as bad as the one in question, and that in his opinion to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty the design and signing of Interstate 80 did not comply with the customs and standards applicable in the traffic engineering field in 1971.

Mr. David Lutyen, Geometric Designer for the State of Illinois Division of Highways, testified for respondent that in 1971, the traffic count on the ramp was one million six hundred thousand and that there were two reported accidents in 1971 and two reported accidents in 1972. He also testified that the radius of the turn off was standard throughout the State. On cross examination, he acknowledged that a sign distance of 250 feet for a 70 miles per hour traveller when he is required to reduce speed to 25 miles per hour along a curve, is not adequate.

Mr. Donald R. Giese, District Traffice Engineer, acknowledged that the numerals on the 25 miles per hour sign at the gore would only be visible from about 18 feet back. He also testified that in his opinion, a 25 miles per hour speed sign farther back on Interstate 80 would be confusing.

The State is not an insurer of the safety of all persons who travel upon its highways, but it does owe them a duty to utilize reasonable care in the construction and maintenance of roadways under its control. See, Ervin v. State of Illinois, 25 C.C.R. 256. Claimants bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent breached this duty, that claimants were in the exercise of reasonable care for their own safety, and that respondent’s negligence was the proximate cause of their injuries.

Claimants contend that respondent was negligent both in designing the interchange of Interstates 80, 280, and 74 and in failing to provide signing adequate to warn motorists of the sharp cloverleaf for eastbound traffic on Interstate 80.

Although it may be that the cloverleaf could have been better planned, and that more warning signs might have been desirable, we must conclude after a careful consideration of the totality of the record that the proximate causes of the injuries suffered by claimants was Mrs. Hansen’s failure to exercise reasonable care at the interchange.

Mrs. Hansen testified that she saw the sign depicted in claimants’ Exhibit One advising motorists eastbound on Interstate 80 to use the right hand lane of the highway at a point 4,750 feet west of the cloverleaf ramp. She said she also saw the two signs depicted in claimants’ Exhibit Three, places 2,100 feet west of the cloverleaf. One sign again advised eastbound traffic to use the right lane and advised that the junction was one third of a mile ahead. The other sign contained a diagram of the cloverleaf ahead.

These signs clearly indicated a cloverleaf junction one third of a mile ahead and advised that the right hand lane was to be used for Interstate 80 traffic. Yet, Mrs. Hansen ignored these signs and pulled into the left hand lane of traffic to pass a tractor-trailer truck. Consequently, she did not see the additional advisory signs depicted in claimants’ Exhibits Four and Five and proceeded in the left hand lane until she reached the gore of the junction when she pulled sharply across the highway and entered the cloverleaf at too a high a speed.

Claimants argue strongly that the sign depicted in claimants’ Exhibit Three was inadequate to warn Mrs. Hansen of the extraordinary condition she was about to encounter, but the sign certainly was adequate to advise Mrs. Hansen of a junction one third of a mile ahead and to stay in the right hand lane. We are persuaded that had Mrs. Hansen obeyed that sign, this accident would not have occurred.

Mrs. Hansen’s failure to heed the advisory signs posted along Interstate 80, and in particular the signs depicted in claimants’ Exhibit Three, is most regrettable. The contributory negligence rule has often been criticized as producing harsh results, but in Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill.2d 193, the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine, and we are bound to apply it here. We must conclude that Mrs. Hansen has not proven either her freedom from contributory negligence or that the negligence of respondent proximately caused the accident, and her claim must therefore be denied.

While the remaining claimants were free of contributory negligence, their claims must also be denied because their injuries were not proximately caused by any act or omission of respondent. In the opinion of this Court, the ultimate reason that the accident occurred was Mrs. Hansen’s failure to heed the posted signs advising of the cloverleaf. In Briske v. Village of Burnham, 379 Ill. 193, at 199, the Court said,

"If a negligent act or omission does nothing more than furnish a condition making an injury possible, and such condition, by the subsequent independent act of a third person, causes an injury, the two acts are not concurrent and the existence of the condition is not the proximate cause of the injury.”

This accident was extremely unfortunate and resulted in crippling injuries to Mrs. Hansen. We have accordingly carefully scrutinized the record and applicable precedents and must reluctantly conclude that these claims must be, and hereby are, denied.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-48
    Hurst-Rosche Engineers, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    A. Paul Rosche, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-268
    Kankakee Industrial Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Robert Fleischer, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

This is an action to recover the sum of $468.00, which claimant asserts it is due for 52 bleach drums delivered to respondent and not returned.

Claimant is engaged in the industrial supply business and on three occasions in 1973, delivered a total of 52 full drums of bleach to the Kankakee State Hospital in Kankakee, Illinois.

The Standard Specifications for Laundry Supplies of the Illinois Department of Finance provides that such drums are to remain the property of the vendor, but that if the institution fails to return them within 120 days of delivery the vendor may bill this institution $9.00 for each drum not returned.

Claimant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the drums were delivered, and not returned.

Claimant is therefore awarded the sum of $468.00.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-92
    Harvard University, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Harvard University, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-419
    Larry Love, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Larry Love, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-459
    Klaus Radio, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Klaus Radio, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-942
    John E. Meyer, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    John E. Meyer, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-943
    John E. Meyer, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

      John E. Meyer, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-974
    Harry J. Siebold, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Harry J. Siebold, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-975
    Edgewater Uptown Community Mental Health Council, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Edgewater Uptown Community Mental Health Council, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1004
    IBM Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    IBM Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1026
    West Publishing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    West Publishing Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1036
    Mennonite Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Mennonite Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1078
    George W. Rose, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    George W. Rose, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1120
    C. Lee Baker, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    C. Lee Baker, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1122
    Parkland College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Board of Vocational Education and Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Parkland College, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1157
    Fisher Scientific Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Fisher Scientific Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1160
    Fisher Scientific Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Fisher Scientific Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1189
    Morgan Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Morgan Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1192
    Central Office Equipment Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Central Office Equipment Company, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1247
    David Williams, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Grossman & Mitzenmacher, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This Court finds that this claim is for the refund of a security deposit held by the Illinois Secretary of State, Safety Responsibility Unit, pursuant to Illinois Vehicle Code, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1967, Ch. 95%, Par. 7-503. An investigation of this claim by the Secretary of State determined that the amount due would have been paid in the regular course of business had the claim been presented to the proper office before the money was transferred to the General Revenue Fund. The sole reason said claim was not previously paid, is due to the fact that the money was transferred to the General Revenue Fund in the State Treasury in accordance with Section 7-503 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the same having been confirmed by the Secretary of State, a copy of its report being attached to the joint stipulation of the parties.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $750.00 (Seven Hundred And Fifty Dollars) be awarded to claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above-captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1320
    Ada S. Evart, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1325
    Rene Saint Leger, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Rene Saint Leger, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1326
    Arthur A. Fenton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 16, 1975.

    Arthur A. Fenton, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-210
    Western Traffic Control, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

    Western Traffic Control, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-320
    Marie I. Dickerson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

    Kleiman, Cornfield & Feldman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-119
    Public Electric Construction Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

    Public Electric Construction Company, Inc., Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-400
    Eleanor Robison, Executor of the Estate of Leopold O. Potokar, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

    Dixon, Devine, Ray & Morin, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-496
    Case Power & Equipment, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

    Case Power & Equipment, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-689
    Azalea Beverly, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

      Azalea Beverly, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-737
    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

    Mobil Oil Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-884
    West Side Organization Health Services Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

    West Side Organization Health Services Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-991
    The American Appraisal Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Local Goverment Affairs, Respondent.
    Opinion filed June 20, 1975.
    Lee B. Mc Turnam, J. Douglas Donenfeld, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1047
    Elaine Revell, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.
    Opinion filed June 20, 1975.
    Elaine Revell, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1088
    Michael Reese Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health Emergency Psychiatric Inpatient Agreement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

    Michael Reese Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1148
    University of Chicago, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

    University of Chicago, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1170
    Village of Cantrall, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

      Village of Cantrall, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1184
    Allegheny Valley School, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1975.

    Allegheny Valley School, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, . Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-17
    C & H Electric Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 23, 1975.

    John P. Loftus, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coining on to be heard on the joint stipulation of the parties hereto and on the testimony presented on June 19 and August 15, 1974, and the finding of facts entered by Commissioner Joseph P. Griffin, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This Court finds that this cause is for recovery pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. Chapter 37 Section 439.8(b) and is a claim for the balance due on the electrical contract for the Manteno State Hospital, Manteno, Illinois, known as project number 70-2119-4B. The claimant hereunder commenced work on said project on or about May 29, 1970. The amount of the contract and the payments thereon were heretofore stipulated to and the balance claimed by C & H Electric Company and denied by the State of Illinois was the sum of $66,654.87.

This Court further finds that the work performed by claimant was done in accordance with the specifications drawn on the project, which called for the installation of unshielded electrical cable.

On July 17, 1970, the electrical cable furnished by claimant was approved by respondent’s authorized consulting engineers, Gritschke and Cloke, Inc., as conforming to those specifications.

Subsequent to the approval of the cable by Gritschke and Cloke, but prior to its installation, Kaiser Aluminum Company, the manufacturer of the cable in question, advised claimant that the unshielded cable was not suitable for its proposed use and that unless a shielded cable were substituted the electrical system would possibly experience failure.

Claimant conveyed this information to respondent and to Gritschke and Cloke on several occasions, but Gritschke and Cloke refused to alter the specifications calling for unshielded cable.

The Court is advised that claimant had no alternative but to proceed with installation of the unshielded cable as required by the specifications. Claimant’s failure so to do would have been considered a breach of contract.

Respondent concedes that the work performed by claimant was done satisfactorily and that although the system did subsequently experience some failures, said failures were not attributable to the claimant.

The Court further finds that the sum of $50,000.00 is a just, reasonable and fair compensation for the balance due and owing claimant for the electrical work performed under the contract.

It Is Therefore Ordered that claimant be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of Fifty Thousand and no/100 ($50,000.00) Dollars in full satisfaction of any and all claims herein.

CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION ACT