text:
    (No. 75-CV-55
    In Re Application of Ida Smith.

      Opinion filed June 28, 1976.

    Ida Smith, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Paul West, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident which took place on February 19, 1974, at 131st Street and Ellis Avenue, Chicago. The Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and loss of support under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The issues presented to the Court are as follows:

(1) Whether the death of the victim was attributable to his own wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant.
(2) Whether the Claimant’s claim for loss of support for herself and the child of the victim is valid.
(3) Whether the Claimant may receive an award based on dependency while there are other persons who had a legal right to support from the victim who cannot be found and who have not filed claims in this Court.

Evidence was taken by the Court at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this Court.

As to the first issue, the evidence produced by the Claimant was that the victim and a woman, Gwendolyn Wilson, left the home of the victim’s mother, Ida Smith, at 3:30 p.m. on the date in question. The decedent was carrying a set of household type knives in a container which contained slots for the knives and which container was in a bag. The woman, Gwendolyn Wilson, was a girlfriend of the decedent and was the wife of the assailant, having been separated from the assailant and awaiting a divorce.

According to the testimony of Gwendolyn Wilson, the decedent and Gwendolyn Wilson left Ida Smith’s home and went to Gwendolyn Wilson’s sister’s home at 13056 South Ellis, Chicago. They left the sister’s home immediately thereafter and as they were leaving they saw Gwendolyn Wilson’s husband, Kerry Wilson, the alleged assailant.

As they walked to a bus stop, Kerry Wilson followed calling them dirty names. Kerry Wilson then walked away to his own home only to return a short time later. He accosted the decedent at the bus stop, shaking his finger in the decedent’s face and threatening to kill the decedent. The decedent and Kerry Wilson then struggled against each other while facing each other. The decedent then staggered away and Gwendolyn Wilson noticed that Kerry Wilson had a knife in his hand. The victim staggered toward the street and fell. As he lay in the street Kerry Wilson said, "Die, nigger, die. If you don’t die I’ll kill you anyway.” The assailant Kerry Wilson then fled.

The victim was dead on arrival at the hospital of a stab wound in the chest.

The assailant, Kerry Wilson, was indicted on a charge of murder and was subsequently acquitted.

According to Gwendolyn Wilson’s testimony the knife used was not one of the knives in the container being carried by the victim. Those knives remained intact in the container in the bag, which was left torn on the street.

The Respondent was unable to produce Kerry Wilson for the hearing before this Court and therefore did not submit any evidence on this issue.

From the evidence, the Court must conclude that the death of the victim was not attributable to his own wrongful act or substantial provocation.

Walking along the street with the spouse of another cannot be held to be provocation for an assault with a knife, especially when the assailant and his spouse are already separated and in the process of being divorced. The evidence was undisputed that the assailant followed the victim, threatened him, struggled with him physically, had a knife in his hand at the time the victim fell, and cursed and threatened him while he was lying on the street. Any conclusion other than that the attack was unprovoked would have to be based on conjecture.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court has not considered the fact of the acquittal of Kerry Wilson of the criminal charges arising from the incident, inasmuch as the Act provides in Section 7 that the Court:

Need not consider whether or not the alleged assailant has been apprehended or brought to trial nor the result of any criminal proceedings against that person.

Accordingly, this Court finds that Frank T. Smith III was the innocent victim of a violent crime, i.e. "Murder,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 9-1.

The Court further finds that the death of the victim was not attributable to his own wrongful act nor substantial provocation of his assailant. ,

The Court further finds that the victim and the assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

The next questions to be decided are those of dependency.

According to Claimant Ida Smith’s testimony, the Claimant is the mother of the victim. The victim was married to Pamela Smith. Of that marriage there were born three children, namely Michael Smith age 5, Mark Smith age 4 and Frank Smith IV, age 8. The wife, Pamela Smith, left the victim in 1971 taking the children, Michael Smith and Mark Smith, with her and leaving Frank Smith IV to live with the mother of the victim, the Claimant Ida Smith.

The Claimant Ida Smith testified that she has attempted to locate Pamela Smith and the two children, Mark and Michael, but has been unable to do so and at this time does not know where they are located. To her knowledge, her son, the victim, was not sending any support money to his wife nor to his children, Mark and Michael Smith. The Claimant Ida Smith did concede, however, that it was possible that her son had sent Pamela Smith money without the knowledge of the Claimant.

The deceased was, at the time of his death, an employee of the United States Postal Service. He had commenced the employment on October 22,1973, and his average monthly salary was $443.50 per month.

According to her testimony, the Claimant received from the victim approximately one-half of his net pay check i.e. approximately $200.00 per month. She used this money for food and clothing for herself and the child, Frank Smith IV, and for her other household expenses. Claimant Ida Smith’s only other source of income was $79.00 per month from Social Security.

It is obvious from the evidence the Claimant, mother of the victim, received the majority of her support from the victim and that she relied on the victim for support and was to a substantial degree supported by the victim.

The Court therefore finds that the Claimant Ida Smith was a dependent of the victim, Frank Smith III, within the meaning of the Act. The Court further finds that Frank Smith IV, son of the victim, was a dependent of the victim.

As to the third issue, the Act provides in Section 8(b) as follows:

If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for his support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled and (3) order that these amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor or incompetent, to his guardian or conservator, as the case may be.

The children of the victim, Mark Smith and Michael Smith, were unquestionably entitled to support from the victim and the wife, Pamela Smith, might have been entitled to support from the victim. But the Court has no evidence to indicate that these persons were, in fact, being supported by the victim at the time of the victim’s death. The evidence tends to indicate that they were not dependent upon the victim for support.

It is the opinion of this Court that mere entitlement to support is not dependency under the Act.

Where there is no evidence that a victim was actually contributing to a person’s support, or at least was under an order of a court to contribute to that person’s support, there can be no dependency under the Act. In looking at the Act as a whole, it is clear that the legislature intended to compensate those persons who lost actual out-of-pocket money as a result of violent crime. Every provision of the Act is strictly limited to out-of-pocket expense.

One who is not actually receiving support at the time of the crime cannot be said to have had an out-of-pocket loss. An expectancy of support is not dependency under the Act.

It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that an award for loss of support be made to Ida Smith and Frank Smith IV only. The Court is mindful of the fact that neither the minor children, Mark Smith and Michael Smith, nor anyone on their behalf were present before the Court and' cannot be found. Therefore, if at any time hereafter, and prior to the full disbursement of the award in this case, an application for a modification of this award is made on their behalf on the grounds that they were actual dependents of the victim, then this Court may at that time modify this award.

The victim was 25 years old at the time of his death. According to the United States Department of Health, Education & Welfare mortality tables, the victim had a life expectancy of 40.6 additional years. Taking $443.50 per month as the victim’s average monthly earnings, and taking $200.00 per month as the actual loss of support to his family resulting from his death, the lost support compensable under the Act is far in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum that can be awarded under the Act.

The Court further finds that the Claimant Ida Smith incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the death in the amount of $1,109.50 for which she is entitled to reimbursement before an award is granted for loss of support.

That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Section 7(d) of the Act states that this Court:

shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the "Workmans Compensation Act”, or from local governmental, state or federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death and a deduction of $200.00 shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000.00 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point, we are adopting a recent decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth, 296 N.E.2d 477 (1973).

That in the claim before us, no benefits other than social security, which is not deductible under the Act, have been received by either Claimant from other sources. The statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the amount of loss calculated above, leave an amount of loss sustained by the Claimant far in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum amount that can be awarded under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

That, before an award is granted for loss of support, the Claimant Ida Smith is entitled to an award to compensate her for the pecuniary loss suffered as a result of the funeral, namely $1,109.50. Hence, the Claimant Ida Smith is entitled to an award of $1,109.50. This leaves an amount of $8,890.50 that can be awarded to the Claimants for lost support of which Claimant Ida Smith is entitled to fifty (50%) per cent and Frank Smith IV is entitled to fifty (50%) per cent.

As to the award to Frank Smith IV, the Court takes notice of the fact that this minor child is being cared for by his grandmother, Ida Smith, who stands in loco parentis to the minor and is the natural guardian of the said minor child.

Under these circumstances, the Court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in Section 8(b):

If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for his support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also, dependent on that victim for their support, it shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled, and (3) order that these amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor or incompetent, to his guardian or conservator, as the case may be.

To comply strictly with the above legislation, it would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution in accordance with the Probate Act of Illinois which would require the opening of a guardianship estate.

However, to make distribution in this manner, we believe would impose an undue hardship on the grandmother, Ida Smith. If the funds were paid to her in a lump sum, she would be holding one-half of those funds in trust for the minor child, Frank Smith IV. Although she is guardian of his person, she would have no power to administer his estate, nor use his funds, unless she is duly appointed guardian of the minor’s estate as provided by law. Perry vs. Carmichael, (1880) 95 Ill. After such appointment, she would be required to manage the child’s funds frugally under the direction of the appointing court and present periodic accounts of her guardianship to such court. She would also be responsible for court costs and any legal expenses required in filing her petition for appointment, oath, surety bond, and accounts.

To obviate the necessity of the Claimant, Ida Smith, being appointed guardian of her grandchild’s estate, and considering all other facts in this case, the Court believes that the best interest of the victim’s family would be served by ordering that this award be disbursed to the Claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized in Section 8(a)(4) of the Act. As the natural guardian of the said minor child, the grandmother, Ida Smith, has undertaken the obligation of providing suitable support for the said minor child. Having undertaken this obligation, we believe that she would necessarily expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and maintenance of the minor child, Frank Smith IV, as well as for her own necessities.

It Is Therefore Hereby Ordered as follows:

(1) The sum of $1,109.50 is awarded to the Claimant Ida Smith, the mother of the victim of a violent crime, for funeral expenses this Claimant paid for the victim.

(2) The total sum of $8,890.50 be awarded to Claimant Ida Smith and the minor child of the victim, Frank Smith IV, collectively, as persons who were all dependent for their support on Frank Smith III, the deceased victim of a violent crime.

(3) That the aforesaid award in Paragraph (2) of this order be paid to the Claimant, Ida Smith, in eighteen (18) monthly installments, the first seventeen (17) in equal amounts of $500.00 each and the last installment in the amount of $390.00.

(4) That during the pendency of the payments hereunder, the Court may modify this order upon proper application being made by any person on behalf of the other minor children of the deceased victim, Frank Smith III.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 75-CV-61
    In Re Application of James S. Pockross.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1976.

    James S. Pockross, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Paul West, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on January 15, 1974, at 814 West Webster, Chicago. Claimant, James S. Pockross, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

An order was entered by the Court on July 15, 1975, dismissing the claim and upon Claimant’s moving for a hearing in accordance with Section 9 of the Act, a hearing was granted.

The facts are undisputed. On January 15, 1974, the Claimant took a break from his job at Metro Help Crisis Intervention Office, 2210 North Halsted Street, Chicago, to walk Ms. Elyse Friedman to her residence at 2157 North Fremont, Chicago. On his way back to work, an unidentified assailant demanded money from the Claimant in front of 814 W. Webster, Chicago. The Claimant refused, whereupon the assailant fired once into the ground. The Claimant then fled eastbound toward Halsted Avenue. The assailant fired another shot hitting the Claimant in the back. The Claimant returned to the Metro Help Crisis Intervention Office, whereupon the Chicago Police Department was notified. The police took the Claimant to Augustana Hospital where he was hospitalized from January 15, 1974, to January 18, 1974. The Claimant has fully recovered and suffers no permanent disability.

The Claimant’s pecuniary losses were as follows:

Hospital $359.00
Medical $100.00
Drugs $ 5.00
Total: $464.00

In addition, the Claimant lost six days of work from his job. His average monthly income for the six months preceding the crime was $1,073.00. According to Section 4 of the Act, loss of earnings is determined as follows:

. . . loss of earnings, loss of future earnings, and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.

For the six days during which the Claimant missed work the Court determines that the loss,, on the basis of $500.00 per month, is $98.64.

Thus the total gross losses of the Claimant is $557.64.

The Claimant received $379.50 from Blue Cross/ Blue Shield.

In determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Section 7(d) of the Act states that this Court:

(d) ... shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the Workmens Compensation Act, or from local governmental, state or federal funds or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).

Applying this provision we must deduct from the total pecuniary loss of $551.64, the $379.50 received from Blue Cross/Blue Shield and the $200.00 as provided in Section 7(d), leaving no amount due from the State to the Claimant.

The Claimant argues that both the $500.00 maximum for lost earnings and the $200.00 deductible provisions of the Act are unfair and the Court should consider his mental anguish and psychological problems caused by the criminal act, although the same are not accompanied by pecuniary loss.

It is, of course, basic that it is the legislature of this state that is entrusted with the responsibility of making laws and not this Court. This Court must therefore hold that under the Act no compensation in the case before us is authorized.

The claim is hereby dismissed.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-81 and 75-CV-297, consolidated.
    In Re Application of Lena D. Daniels. and In Re Application of Carl P. Daniels.

      Opinion filed October 20, 1975.

    Bertram D. Meyers, Attorney for Lena D. Daniels.
    Charles V. Falkenbert, Attorney for Carl P. Daniels.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois.
   Per Curiam.

The claims herein arise out of the death of Earl Daniels, age 13, who died on March 11, 1974, as a result of bullet wounds sustained on March 9, 1974, at 9130 South Bishop, Chicago, Illinois.

Both claims presented here were filed pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

Claimant, Lena Daniels, mother of the victim, makes claim as a dependent for alleged loss of support, and Claimant, Carl P. Daniels, father of the victim, makes claim for reimbursement for hospital and funeral expenses paid by him.

Evidence was taken by the Court at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this Court.

The facts of the incident were that the victim, Earl Daniels, was attending a party given by James L. Avery at 9130 S. Bishop, Chicago, Illinois. At 11 o’clock p.m., six persons walked into the apartment. The lights went out and shots were heard. When the lights were turned on again the victim and one other person had been shot. The victim died of the wounds inflicted two days later.

Six persons were arrested in connection with the shooting but the case against them was dismissed at a hearing in a criminal court.

As to the claim of Lena D. Daniels, mother of the victim, the sole issue presented to the court is whether the Claimant, Lena D. Daniels, was a person who was dependent on the deceased victim.

Claimant, Lena D. Daniels, testified that she had been married to Claimant, Carl Daniels, in 1956 but the marriage ended in divorce in 1970. The victim, Earl Daniels, was age 13 and was a seventh grade student with average grades. He did odd jobs around the neighborhood including cutting grass, shoveling snow, mopping floors, taking care of dogs, and raking leaves. He worked mostly for Christine Fulford and Alma Settles, both neighbors of the Claimant. He averaged about $40.00 per week during the six months prior to his death. The boy gave his mother all of the money he earned, out of which she gave him an allowance of $10.00 per week and the balance was used in common with her other funds for rent and food, and she also was able to save out of said money the sum of approximately $15.00 per week for her son, Earl Daniels. She kept no records of the income and expenses.

She testified further that she received $42.50 per week from her former husband, Claimant Carl P. Daniels, under the provisions of her Decree for Divorce. The Decree provided for $37.50 per week for child support for three children (including the deceased victim) and $5.00 per week for alimony. She also received $135.00 per month from the Illinois Department of Public Aid and she also was otherwise gainfully employed.

Lena Daniels’ testimony was somewhat supported by her witness, Christine Fulford, who testified that she lived alone in a 14 room house and she employed the victim for household tasks including cleaning the basement, washing windows, and mopping floors, and also for mowing the lawn, walking and bathing her dog, and running errands. She paid him by the job but at no set rate. He averaged $20.00 to $25.00 per week from her.

Also testifying for Lena Daniels was Alma Settles who stated that the deceased victim cut her lawn, raked leaves, and shovelled snow. He averaged about $5.00 per week for these jobs.

The victim’s father, Claimant Carl Daniels, testified that the boy spent most of the summer with him and spent some weekends throughout the rest of the year with him and while with him the boy did not do any jobs for money. The victim never told his father that he was earning any money whatsoever.

The Act provides in Section 3 that:

A person is entitled to compensation under this Act if:
(a) he ... is a person who was dependent on a deceased victim of a crime of violence for his support at the time of the death of that victim.

The Act contains no further definitions of a dependent.

Principles applicable to the factual situation presented here have been thoroughly explored by the Supreme Court of Illinois in construing the words "partially dependent” in the Illinois Workmens Compensation Act. In Roseberry v. Industrial Commission, 33 Ill.2d 520, 211 N.E. 2d 702, the Court said that:

A child contributes to the support of his parents within the meaning of the Act when he contributes a substantial sum to the support of the family although this sum is less than the actual cost of his support and maintenance where the child is a minor or in a position to demand legal support from his parents. . . . The test is whether the .contributions were relied upon by the applicant for her means of living judging by her position in life, and whether she was to a substantial degree supported by the employee at the time of the latter’s death.

The facts of the Roseberry case were that the deceased, a 19 year old bachelor, was irregularly employed for the year prior to his injuries and subsequent death and that for the 13 months prior to his injury his total net earning were approximately $830.00 or approximately $65.00 per month. His mother who was the Claimant earned $3,900.00 for the previous 12 months. The deceased employee would cash his pay checks and give his mother the cash and the mother would give him what he needed. She kept no records of what she gave him.

The Court in the Roseberry case concluded that the Industrial Commission was justified in finding a lack of partial dependency.

The rules of law enumerated are supported by a line of cases including: Art Castle v. Industrial Commission, 394 Ill. 62, 67 N.E. 2d 177; General Constr. Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 314 Ill. 58, 145 N.E.2d 90; Bauer & Black vs. Industrial Commission, 322 Ill. 165,152 N.E. 590; and General Constr. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 314 Ill. 58, 145 N.E. 90.

Applying these rules to the present case, it is clear that the Claimant, receiving child support and alimony from a former husband, receiving public aid and also being gainfully employed, could not have relied on the odd job earnings of a 13 year old boy. Even if one would wholly disregard the testimony of the victim’s father, the Court is left with the testimony of the Claimant Lena Daniels’ supporting witnesses that a total of $25.00 to $30.00 per week was earned by the boy. The Claimant testified that she gave her son $10.00 per week allowance and saved $15.00 per week on his behalf. This leaves little or no money being contributed by the decedent toward his mother’s support.

It is apparent in this case that the Claimant, Lena D. Daniels, was not supported to any substantial degree by her son and therefore does not meet the test of the rules of law pertaining to dependency.

This Court therefore finds that the Claimant Lena D. Daniels was not a dependent of a victim of a crime as defined in the Act and her claim is hereby denied.

As to the claim of Claimant Carl P. Daniels, the evidence shows that he paid the following amounts as a result of the crime:

Funeral $ 980.00
Grave $ 200.00
Tombstone $ 255.25
Hospital $ 169.00
Total: $1,604.25

The Court finds that Earl Daniels, son of Carl P. Daniels, was the victim of a violent crime as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: "Murder”, (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1973, Chap. 38, Sec. 9-1.) Further, that the victim’s death was not attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation and the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household and that the Claimant has fully cooperated with law enforcement officials.

In determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Section 7(d) of the Act states that this Court:

(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty Five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).

Claimant Carl P. Daniels received no other benefits which qualify as deductions under this section.

Applying this section, the Claimant is entitled to $1,604.25 less $200.00 for a net of $1,404.25.

It Is Therefore Ordered that the sum of $1,404.25 be awarded Carl P. Daniels, the father of an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $200.00 is reasonable considering the time invested by counsel and that therefore Charles V. Falkenberg, attorney for the Claimant, Carl P. Daniels, may charge said amount to the Claimant pursuant to Section 12 of the Act.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-94
    In Re Application of Peter Pippas.

      Opinion filed October 23, 1975.

    Leonard F. Amari, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Kenneth Mason, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

Claimant seeks compensation for alleged loss of earnings, medical bills, and hospital bills. He has submitted his claim pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Statutes 1973, Chapter 70, Section 70, 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

Evidence was taken by the Court at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this Court.

The only contested issues before the Court is the extent and duration of the Claimant’s disability and the amount of lost earnings, if any.

The Claimant was the manager of a restaurant and bar located at 504 West Van Burén, Chicago, Illinois, which business was owned by the Post Stop Inc., a corporation. The Claimant was an officer of the corporation and held some stock in the corporation.

On February 7, 1974, at about 2:05 a.m., the Claimant, age 44, was in the process of closing his business at that address. One of the employees of the business stepped outside of the premises to look for a cab when he was forced inside by three armed persons. While a pistol was held at the Claimant’s back, the Claimant was beaten on the top of his head with a pipe at least three times and once in the forehead and was knocked unconscious. He was shot on his right side.

The Chicago police responded to a call for aid. The Claimant was taken by the police to the Cook County Hospital for emergency surgery. The Claimant was hospitalized from February 7, 1974, to February 17, 1974. During that time, an exploratory laparotomy was performed in treatment of the bullet wound in the upper quadrant of the abdomen. The surgery was unsuccessful in removing the bullets and the Claimant still has one or more bullets in his body.

The Claimant testified that he still has pain in the abdomen, on occasions has difficulty in breathing, cannot walk very far, and still has spells of dizziness. He exhibits a scar on his forehead extending beyond the hair line.

Claimant still visits the doctor on occasion and takes medication to relieve his symptoms of headaches or dizziness. Because of his dizziness he is unable to walk more than one or two blocks. He testified that he has not been back to work since the incident and has not been employed nor sought employment since the incident of February 7, 1974.

At the time of the incident he had been earning $125.00 per week.

On cross-examination the Claimant stated that he has trouble sleeping nights because of bad dreams. He feels like someone is hitting him. He is afraid all of the time and wakes up in the morning feeling afraid. He is afraid to go out at night.

He has fallen down on the street from his headaches. He feels weak when he thinks about the incident that caused him his problems. Many times he gets headaches and dizziness when thinking about the incident.

The Claimant’s medical evidence consisted of the testimony of Dr. Elia Stambolis who testified as to the history he took from the Claimant which was essentially the same as the Claimant’s testimony in Court.

The doctor’s examination on February 21, 1974, revealed healed surgical wounds in the abdomen. The patient complains of headaches in the back of his head, dizziness and lost memory. He passes out from dizzy spells. He has difficulty in breathing. In the opinion of the doctor he considered that the Claimant’s condition was permanent by reason of there having been no improvement after one and a half years after the incident.

On cross-examination the doctor admitted that he had not taken any encephalograph tests. The doctor also admitted that the eye motion reflexes were normal and that the motor reflexes were normal and there was no way of telling whether the patient was a malingerer. There were no objective symptoms found by the doctor to account for the Claimant’s persistent complaints. He diagnosed the Claimant’s condition as a post cerebral concussion syndrome but had no objective findings upon which to base this diagnosis. He considered the Claimant permanently unemployable despite the lack of objective evidence.

The Respondent argues to the Court that although it is clear that the Claimant lost some time from work, he cannot be compensated for more than a fairly minimal period of time because he was unable to establish by objective evidence that it was necessary for him to stay away from work for any extended period of time. The Respondent further argues that it is fear of returning to work rather than a physical disability that prevents the Claimant from returning to gainful employment.

It is the opinion of this Court that the Claimant did establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it was necessary for him to absent himself from work for an extended period of time.

His injury was quite severe and he still carries bullets within his body. While his doctor could find no objective evidence which could account for the Claimant’s ailments, the doctor did not take all of the tests that were available to the medical profession to ascertain the cause of these ailments. In fact the doctor’s tests were minimal. However, it was clear from the doctor’s testimony that the doctor considered his patient completely unemployable.

The Court having heard the testimony of the Claimant and having observed his manner in court cannot disbelieve his testimony. His ailments were obviously real and manifested itself in physical ways which prohibited him from working.

Accordingly, this Court finds as follows:

1. That the Claimant was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: "Aggravated Battery”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That there was no evidence of any provocation by the Claimant for the attack upon him.

3. That there was no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

4. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and the Claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

5. That the Claimant’s injuries were not attributable to the Claimant’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailants.

6. That the Claimant has received no insurance benefits of any kind nor is he entitled to any insurance benefits of any kind as reimbursement of any of his expenses.

7. That the Claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses as follows:

Medical $ 326.00
Hospital $1,720.00
Total: $2,046.00

8. That the Claimant was unable to work during the period of February 7, 1974, to September 7, 1975, a period of 19 months, as a result of his injuries; that the sustained loss of earnings during this period is in the amount of $10,291.66.

The Act provides in Section 4 as follows:

Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings, and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.

The amount of actual loss of earnings sustained by the Claimant is more than $500.00 per month. In accordance with Section 4 of the Act, the $500.00 per month limit is controlling. The total compensable loss of earnings sustained by the Claimant is $9,500.00.

9. That based on the aforementioned calculations, the Claimant’s total pecuniary loss is as follows:

Hospital $ 1,720.00
Medical 326.00
Loss of Earnings 9,500.00
Total: $11,546.00

That after deducting $200.00 pursuant to Section 7(d) of the Act, the Claimant’s pecuniary loss is $11,346.00.

The Claimant is therefore entitled to the maximum award under the Act which is $10,000.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 be awarded the Claimant Peter Pippas, an innocent victim of violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $1,000.00 is reasonable considering the time invested by counsel and that therefore Lupel & Amari, attorneys for the Claimant, may charge said amount to the Claimant pursuant to Section 12 of the Act.


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    (No. 75-CV-152
    In Re Application of Marguerite Ziemba.

      Opinion filed October 28, 1975.

    Thomas R. Bobak, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Peggy Bastas, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

Claimant seeks compensation for alleged medical and hospital expenses. She has submitted her claim pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The Court entered an Order on March 18, 1975, [based on the Investigatory Report of the Attorney General, the Application and the form submitted by the Claimant] which Order found that the Claimant was not a victim of a crime as defined in the Act.

Pursuant to Section 9 of the Act, the Claimant requested a hearing.

Evidence was taken by the Court at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this Court.

The Claimant testified that on March 18, 1974, at approximately 11 o’clock p.m., she was arriving home after having been with other ladies at a cocktail lounge. As she attempted to get out of the car she was clubbed over the head and she does not remember anything thereafter until she woke up in the hospital. She was told that the police had brought her there. She suffered a broken nose and broken right arm and cuts on her left temple. Thereafter she was treated in St. Margaret’s Hospital, Hammond, Indiana, and by her family doctor.

In addition to the above mentioned ailments, she received a bad sprained ankle and scraped the flesh off one of her knees.

Prior to the alleged attack she was unemployed having had a history of heart problems.

As a result of the attack her glasses were broken and her purse was missing.

On cross-examination she admitted having had one bottle of beer to drink that evening. She did not recall talking to any police, nor did she recall describing her assailant because she did not see her assailant at all. She was unconscious that entire evening and early morning and does not remember any of the events until she was in the hospital.

The Respondent called as its witness an officer of the Village of Lansing Police Department, Henry S. Roberts. The officer testified that on March 17, 1974, the police received a call from a neighbor of the Claimant stating that the Claimant had been hurt in some way. The police received the call at 3 o’clock a.m. The weather was "dampish”, having rained earlier. When the officer arrived the Claimant was in the home of the neighbor. He observed that the Claimant was muddy, had a split lip and scraps on her knees and was bleeding. The Claimant was not coherent at the time. She could not reason out exactly what happened. She said that someone was out to get her, and that she had been beaten, and described the assailant as a man in his forties, about 5'7" tall. First she said she was getting out of the car and was attacked, and then she stated she was dragged out of the car.

The officer upon investigation found nothing at the scene of the alleged incident except spots of blood leading from the sidewalk to the neighbor’s house. He could find nothing on the ground that indicated a struggle. He could find no footprints other than the footprints of the Claimant leading from the driveway to the neighbor’s house. He did not find any broken glasses. He did not find any purse and interrogated the neighbor who said that the Claimant had not brought her purse into the home. The car keys were in the car.

The officer stated that the Claimant had a very strong odor of alcohol on her breath.

At 6:30 a.m. on the same day, the officer interrogated the Claimant again. The Claimant was not sure at that time if she was hit or pushed. She described her assailant as a big man with an ugly face. The officer could not find any indication of any attack having taken place. No neighbors heard any screams or saw anything. No arrests were made as a result of the incident. On cross-examination, the officer testified that when he arrived at the neighbor’s home, the Claimant was lying on the couch and was mumbling incoherently, and gave conflicting stories. He did not know if the neighbor had given the Claimant anything to drink.

The road in front of the home was an improved road, and he did not recall if the driveway upon which the car was standing was improved although admitting that if it was improved there would, of course, be no footprints to be found.

The Chief of Police of the Village of Lansing, Dean R. Stanley, testified that he became acquainted with the Claimant through numerous complaints from her residence over the years.

From the evidence the Court considers it to be clear that the Claimant was indeed the victim of a violent crime. While she gave conflicting stories to the Police Department immediately after the incident, and while she cannot remember anything of making these reports to the police, these inconsistencies are explainable by reason of the fact that the Claimant had suffered a severe blow upon the head. According to the police officer the Claimant was incoherent, or almost incoherent, at the time of his interrogation.

The fact that no neighbors heard any screams or saw any struggle does not cast doubt upon the Claimant’s story whatever. Merely because a crime is not witnessed does not mean that a crime did not take place.

The lack of physical signs of a struggle is completely compatible with the Claimant’s version of the incident inasmuch as no struggle took place. She was knocked unconscious without having had the opportunity of struggling.

The Claimant’s story is corroborated by the fact that the police found the key to her automobile still in the ignition. It is further corroborated by the fact that neither the police nor the neighbor saw the Claimant’s purse.

The Court having had the opportunity of hearing the Claimant testify and having seen her demeanor on the witness stand, and taking into consideration all of the circumstances of the incident, must conclude that the Claimant was the victim of a violent crime as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: "Battery”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Chap. 38, §12-3).

There was no evidence of any provocation by the Claimant for the attack upon her. The criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and the Claimant has fully cooperated with any requests for assistance. The Claimant and her assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

As a result of the criminal attack, the Claimant suffered various medical expenses including expenses for replacement of four pair of eye glasses. This Court concludes that the repair of one pair of eye glasses is reasonable under the provisions of the Act.

Accordingly, the hospital and medical expenses of the Claimant are as follows:

Medical and Drugs $ 670.87
Hospital 624.80
Total $1,295.67

As the Claimant was unemployed at the time of the incident, she makes no claim for any lost earnings.

The Claimant received $332.71 from Blue Cross insurance.

In determining the amount of compensation to which a Claimant is entitled, Section 7(d) of the Act states that this Court:

(d) ... shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under Workmans Compensation Act or from local governmental, state or federal funds or from any other source . . .

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00 plus the insurance benefits of $332.71, the Claimant’s pecuniary loss is calculated to be $762.96.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $762.96 be awarded the Claimant, Marguerite Ziemba, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $100.00 is reasonable considering the time invested by counsel and that therefore Thomas R. Bobak, attorney for the Claimant, may charge said amount to the Claimant pursuant to Section 12 of the Act.


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    (No. 75-CV-153
    In Re Application of Alice Johnson.

      Opinion filed November 19, 1976.

    Gary L. Kaplan, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a crime which took place on June 5, 1974, at 233 North Mason, Chicago. The Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and loss of support under the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The sole issue presented to the Court is whether the Claimant was dependent on the deceased victim for her support under the Act. The Claimant is the mother of the deceased victim.

The facts were that on June 5, 1974, the Chicago police, responding to a call from Margaret Johnson, the estranged wife of the victim, found the body of the deceased victim, Claude Johnson, on the floor of his apartment at 233 North Mason, Chicago, with a gunshot wound in the head. The victim was pronounced dead at Loretto Hospital.

This Court finds that the victim and his assailant were not related or sharing the same household and that the Claimant cooperated fully with law enforcement officials. No other benefits were received by the Claimant from any other sources.

The deceased victim, age 28, had been employed by the Chicago Board of Education prior to his death, earning $604.48 per month.

The Claimant’s testimony was that the deceased began living with her about one year prior to his death and continued to live with her until his death. During the time that the deceased lived with Claimant he gave her about $150.00 per month. Prior to his coming to live with her, he contributed $25.00 per week and for her support and had been so contributing since 1968.

No receipts were given for this money and no records were kept by the parties.

The Claimant likewise received approximately $150.00 per month from her daughter, Mary Johnson. No records were kept for these payments. The Claimant was unemployed at the time of her son’s death. Her husband had died about a month previous to her son’s death.

At the time of her son’s death, the Claimant was making monthly payments on a three flat building she owned with another son. All of the income received by her from the co-owner of the property and a tenant of the property were used to make these monthly payments.

It is clear to this Court that the Claimant was, at least partially, dependent upon the deceased crime victim for her support. The Claimant’s total monthly income, other than that which helped make her home payments, was $300.00, of which the deceased paid approximately $150.00. However, some part of the decedent’s contribution must be attributed to his own food and utilities. It appears therefore to this Court that the $25.00 per week contribution made by the decedent prior to his cqming to live with his mother is an appropriate indication of his support of the Claimant.

Section 3 of the Act provides that:

A person is entitled to compensation under this Act if: (a) he is a victim as defined in Section 2 of this Act, or is a person who was dependent on a deceased victim of a crime of violence for his support at the time of the death of that victim . . .

It is the opinion of this Court that in order to be classified as a dependent under Section 3 it is not necessary for one to be totally dependent. Partial dependency, such as in the case before us, is sufficient to qualify one as a dependent.

The Respondent has pointed out that the evidence at the hearing indicated that the Internal Revenue Service, after an audit, refused to allow the decedent to claim the Claimant as a dependent. However, in view of the fact that the criteria for dependency under the Internal Revenue Code is wholly different than dependency under the Act, we believe that the adverse determination by the Internal Revenue Service is not controlling here. In fact, the fact that the decedent attempted to claim his mother as a dependent is some evidence of the fact that the parties considered the Claimant to be a dependent of the deceased and reinforces the Court’s conclusion of partial dependency.

This Court finds therefore that the Claimant was a dependent of the deceased victim to the extent of $25.00 per week.

The Claimant was 55 years old at the time of her son’s death. Her life expectancy according to the life expectancy tables of the U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare was 22.7 years. It is, therefore, clear that the total lost support is far in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum awardable under the Act.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered As Follows:

The Court, considering all of the facts in this case, believes it is to the best interest of the Claimant and the State that this award be disbursed to the Claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized by Section 8, Subparagraph (a), Subparagraph 4 of the Act.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that the Claimant, Alice Johnson, be awarded monthly payments of $250.00 each, until the earlier of the following two events shall occur: the death of the Claimant or the total sum of $10,000.00 having been paid.

This Court further finds under Section 12 of the Act and based on the petition of attorney Gary L. Kaplan that attorney’s fees in the total amount of $400.00 is reasonable for representing the Claimant at the hearing of this case.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that Gary L. Kaplan may charge the Claimant $400.00 in attorneys fees.


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    (No. 75-CV-159
    In Re Application of Irene Miller.

      Opinion filed April 7, 1976.

    Irene Miller, Pro Se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an alleged criminal offense that occurred on July 8, 1974, at 8152 S. Kingston, Chicago. Irene H. Miller, Claimant, seeks compensation under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

On May 6, 1975, an order was entered by the Court dismissing the claim, and upon motion of the Claimant for a hearing under Section 9 of the Act, a hearing was granted.

The Claimant testified that she had lived with and shared her household with Leon Stewart, the assailant, until the end of May, 1974.

On July 7, 1974, Leon Stewart came to her home, severely beat the Claimant, threatened to move back in with her and threatened her with great bodily harm if she called the police. The Claimant’s daughter called the police but the Claimant ordered her daughter to cancel the police call and the daughter complied.

The next day, July 9,1974, the Claimant was obliged to be home from her place of employment because of the severity of the beating of the previous day. On July 9, 1974, the assailant, Leon Stewart, again came to the Claimant’s apartment. The assailant severely beat her, pushing her harshly against a wall and punching her in her face and body. In self defense she picked up a letter opener and stabbed him in his neck. Claimant then ran to a neighbor’s apartment, still holding the letter opener, and called the police.

After the police arrived she told them what had occurred and surrendered the letter opener to them.

She was taken to the police station. At the station the police interrogated her in an accusatory fashion and she became terrified that she would be accused of a crime instead of Leon Stewart. Finally the police told her that Leon Stewart would not sign a complaint against her. She was so relieved that she would not be charged with the crime and that she would not go to jail that she did not think of signing a complaint against Leon Stewart. The police, however, did inform her of her right to institute a criminal complaint against Leon Stewart. Thus, neither party filed a complaint against the other.

On July 26, 1974, Leon Stewart, having recovered from his injury, again invaded her home and sexually assaulted her daughter, Tammy Harper. The assailant was indicted for indecent liberties with a child and a trial on that charge was pending at the time of the hearing on the instant case in the Court of Claims. No criminal complaint has ever been made against the assailant for the beatings of July 8th and July 9th for which this claim is brought.

As a result of the beatings of July 7th and July 8th, the Claimant who was pregnant by her assailant lost the baby and was obliged to have her uterus removed.

The Act provides in Section 3(d) that a person is entitled to compensation under this Act if:

The applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant, (underlining ours)

In the case before us it is obvious that the Claimant did not comply with Section 3(d) of the Act. By her failure to sign a criminal complaint against her assailant, she not only failed to cooperate but in fact totally blocked a prosecution.

Claimant seeks to be excused from compliance with this provision because of her own fears of being prosecuted. The Act, which this Court is obliged to follow, provides no exception for fears of the victim. Indeed, it was one of the purposes of the Act to encourage full cooperation with the authorities in the apprehension and prosecution of criminals despite possible fears in the minds of victims.

If the Claimant had set aside her own doubts and fears and signed a complaint against Leon Stewart, perhaps Leon Stewart’s latter assault might have been prevented. This is the kind of preventative action the Act attempts to encourage.

This Court is cognizant of the apprehensions and fears of ordinary citizens when dealing with police in criminal matters and this Court understands how the Claimant might have thought that it would be better not to be involved further when she was told there would be no charge against her. However, Claimant’s failure to further involve herself is directly contrary to not only the letter but the spirit and intent of the Act.

Therefore, this Court finds that no compensation is authorized and this claim is dismissed.


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    (No. 75-CV-219
    In Re Application of Lera Gordon.

      Opinion filed April 7, 1976.

    Lera Gordon, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Paul West, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which took place on December 29, 1973, at 12004 S. LaSalle Street, Chicago. The victim, Lera Gordon, seeks compensation under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

An order was entered by this Court on March 27, 1975, dismissing the claim and the Claimant moved for a hearing under Section 9 of the Act, and the hearing was granted.

The facts are essentially undisputed. The victim was in her car on her way home from shopping when the assailant, Thomas Gordon, Jr., entered her car and shot her twice in the abdomen. The assailant was her estranged husband.

The assailant was indicted for attempted murder and aggravated battery and was at the time of the hearing awaiting trial.

At the time of this brutal attack, the victim had been living separate and apart from her husband for approximately six months. The victim lived with her mother and the assailant lived in the previous marital home of the parties. The child of the parties lived with the victim, Lera Gordon, and the assailant visited the child almost every day. Neither party had, at the time of the crime, instituted any divorce proceedings. The issue presented to this Court is whether a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if that person is related to the assailant but not sharing the same household.

Section 3(e) of the Act states that:

A person is entitled to compensation under the Act if:' ...(e) the victim and his assailant were not related, and sharing the same household;

The legislature, in enacting the Act, severely limited its application. Whether for budgetary or other considerations, the legislature intended to restrict application to only certain circumstances and only under certain conditions and with limitations as to amount of compensation and items to be considered for compensation. It is our opinion, from the words of Section 3(e) of the Act, that it was the intent of the legislature to deny compensation for injuries arising out of most domestic quarrels. It did not intend that this Court enter into the morass of trying to determine provocation or causes of quarrels between relatives or persons who reside together. Statistically, crimes arising between relatives or persons residing together constitute a large percentage of the total reported violent crimes. The legislature apparently did not intend the State of Illinois to take on the financial burdens involved in compensating victims of domestic quarrels.

From a grammatical standpoint, the comma after the word related in Section 3(e) indicates that either a condition of being related to the assailant or a condition of sharing the household of the assailant disqualifies a person from compensation. If the legislature intended that both the condition of being related to the assailant and sharing the same household must be present in order to disqualify a person, then the comma would not have been required.

To hold otherwise is also to hold that the legislature intended to pay a victim who shared the household of his assailant although not related to him. This Court cannot agree that such was the intent of the Act.

Although the Court sympathizes with the Claimant in that the attack upon her caused her pecuniary loss as well as great pain and anguish, the Court is compelled to follow what in its opinion is the clear intent of the legislature.

Therefore, the Court finds that no compensation in this claim is authorized under the aforesaid Act and the claim is dismissed.


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    (No. 75-CV-276
    In Re Application of Roberta L. Stevens.

      Opinion filed December 3, 1976.

    Melvin H. Sorkin, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident which occurred on September 8, 1974, at 3101 North Halsted, Chicago. The Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The sole issue presented to the Court was whether the Act covers injuries arising from automobile accidents.

Evidence was taken at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this Court.

The Claimant was struck by an automobile on September 8, 1974. The Claimant was severely injured, suffering fractures of both legs, cerebral concussion, and multiple bruises and contusions.

The Respondent, State of Illinois, moved to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction.

The Claimant alleges that the vehicle involved in the accident was driven in a reckless manner, that the driver had no insurance, and that she may obtain compensation under the Act by basing her claim on Chapter 38, Section 12-5, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1975, entitled "Reckless Conduct”.

The Act defines crimes of violence in Section 2, Subparagraph (c) as follows:

"Crime of Violence” means and includes any offense defined in Sections 9-1, 9-2, 10-1, 10-2, 11-1, 11-3, 11-4, 12-1, 12-2, 12-3, 12-4, 12-5 or 20-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 if none of the said offenses occurred during a civil riot, insurrection or rebellion.

It is the opinion of this Court that the Illinois General Assembly did not intend to include compensation for non-intentional motor vehicle offenses. The language of Chapter 38, Section 12-5 of the Illinois Revised Statutes does not specifically mention motor vehicle accidents. If the Illinois General Assembly had intended to include motor vehicle accidents, it could have done so very easily by including under its definition of crime of violence those sections of the statutes which specifically mentioned motor vehicle offenses. The General Assembly chose not to do so.

There is only one section of the Illinois Criminal Code, being Chapter 38, which specifically mentions reckless offenses committed in a motor vehicle and that is Section 9-3 of the Criminal Code which states in part as follows:

Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide.
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which caused the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly.
(b) If the acts which caused the death consist of the driving of a motor vehicle, the person may be prosecuted for reckless homicide or if he is prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter, he may be found guilty of the included offense of reckless homicide.

The General Assembly chose not to include that section under its definition of crimes of violence.

To construe the Act as offering compensation for acts of reckless driving which result in injuries but not for acts of reckless driving which result in death is absurd. Such a conclusion would lead to absurd results. As the Respondent points out, if two persons are hit by the same recklessly driven motor vehicle and one dies and the other lives, such a position would require the granting of compensation to the survivor of the accident but not to the family of the deceased. This Court can not interpret the statute in such a manner that the same would lead to absurd results such as this.

It is the Court’s opinion that the inclusion of Section 12-5 of Chapter 38 in the definition of crimes of violence in the Act was for the purpose of including all acts of reckless conduct other than motor vehicle accidents.

Further, there is no American jurisdiction that allows compensation for nonintentional harm inflicted by motor vehicles. The Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act which was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates on February 5, 1974, excludes acts involving motor vehicles from compensation unless the acts were intended to cause personal injury or death. It appears to be unanimous that no state compensates victims of traffic accidents under its Crime Victims Compensation Acts.

The Appellate Court in the case of People v. Johannsen, 126 Ill.App.2d 31, 261 N.E.2d 551 (1970), stated:

It is the primary rule in the interpretation and construction to be placed upon a statute that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect . . . Statutes must be reasonably construed in accordance with practical application. Where two constructions of a law are proposed, this Court will avoid the one which produces absurd results and renders the law difficult of operation.

This Court adopts the reasoning of the Court in the Johannsen case.

The motion of the Respondent to dismiss is, therefore, sustained and this claim is hereby dismissed.


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    (No. 75-CV-346
    In Re Application of Ruth Longstreet Sole.

      Opinion filed November 1, 1976.

    Alan Kawitt, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on October 13, 1974, at 325 West 115th Street, Chicago. Ruth Longstreet Sole, mother of the deceased victim, Charles E. Longstreet, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The sole contested issues presented to the Court were whether the burial expenses claimed were reasonable under the Act and whether the Claimant was dependent upon the deceased victim for her support.

The facts, other than those relating to the question of dependency, were undisputed. On the evening of October 13, 1974, at approximately 6:30 p.m. the victim was a patron of Smitty’s Crib #2, located at 325 West 115th Street, Chicago. He was seated at the bar when several men entered the tavern and announced a hold-up. All of the patrons were forced to lie on the floor and each patron was robbed. As the assailants were departing the tavern they began shooting and the victim who was lying at the front of the premises was shot several times. He was transported to Roseland Community Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Three men were arrested for the murder of the victim and at the time of the hearing were awaiting trial. There is no evidence that the victim in any way provoked the attack upon himself nor is there any evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or shared the same household.

The Claimant has cooperated with law enforcement authorities to the best of her ability.

With regard to the funeral expenses, the Claimant claims as follows:

Angelus Funeral Home for funeral $2,394.00 Flowers purchased 350.00 Cost of inquest 30.60 Burial suit 125.00 Total: $2,899.60

Although the Court is reluctant to question the funeral expenses sustained by a Claimant, the Court is compelled by Section 3(a) of the Act, which states that the compensation be: "only for reasonable funeral and medical expenses for the victim”, to look at the reasonableness of the expenses. The Court has reviewed the numerous claims for funeral expenses that have been submitted and has previously ruled that it considers reasonable funeral expenses in the Chicago area to be $2,000.00. (See claim of Anthony Gentile, 75-CV-117) Considering all of the relevant circumstances in the present claim, the Court finds that the reasonable funeral expenses that may be compensated for under the Act in the present claim are $2,000.00 plus $30.60 for inquest costs expended by the Claimant or a total of $2,030.60.

With regard to the issue of dependency, the essence of the Claimant’s sometimes contradictory testimony was that, during the six months prior to his death, the deceased victim was self-employed as a painter working on various jobs and earning anywhere from $30.00 to $200.00 per week. The Claimant testified that the victim contributed one-half of his earnings to her plus giving gifts of clothing at various holidays to his brothers and sisters. The Claimant admitted however that she could not name any person or company for whom her son had done any work. She doubted that he had filed any income tax returns and she made no attempt to ascertain this fact prior to the hearing. Her son owned no painting equipment — no brushes, rollers, ladders or trucks.

Her testimony regarding her son’s income was totally unsubstantiated.

It should be noted that during the same period of time the Claimant was married and her husband worked full time and supported her and her large family.

Section 4 of the Act provides:

. . . loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less . . .

The burden of proof is on the Claimant to prove her dependency and to prove the income of the decedent. In view of the unsubstantiated nature of the Claimant’s testimony and the fact that she had a husband working full time to support her and her family, the Court is of the opinion that the Claimant has not proved dependency by her upon the decedent by a preponderance of the evidence. This Court is further of the opinion that the Claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the decedent earned any money during the six months preceding the crime.

Her claim for dependency must, therefore, be denied.

It Is Therefore Ordered that the sum of $2,030.60 be awarded to the Claimant Ruth Longstreet Sole as a relative of a deceased victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-385
    In Re Application of Gene A. Goodwin.

      Opinion filed September 8, 1976.

    Gene A. Goodwin, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Paul West, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on September 14, 1974, at 1549 South Keeler Avenue, Chicago. Gene A. Goodwin, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

On July 15, 1975, this Court filed an opinion dismissing the claim and thereafter on motion of the Claimant a hearing was granted by the Court under Section 9 of the Act.

The issue presented to this Court is whether the Claimant’s delay in reporting the crime to the police was reasonably practical under the circumstances.

The facts as testified to by the Claimant were that the Claimant, while walking home at 1549 South Keeler, Chicago, was accosted by a man with a rifle who demanded Claimant’s money. The Claimant handed the assailant his money which amounted to $7.00. The assailant then fired a shot, turned around, and walked away.

The Claimant felt no pain. He raised his clothes and felt and looked for blood, but saw none. The Claimant then went home, arriving about 10 o’clock p.m. and went to bed.

The Claimant woke up the following afternoon at about 1 o’clock p.m. on September 15, 1974, with severe stomach pain. He took Alka Seltzer and Bromo Seltzer to ease the pain. His stomach then began swelling. He still did not realize what was wrong with himself. He found no bullet hole or blood on his stomach, but did see a minor scratch which he assumed occurred on his job which was loading trucks.

At about 12:45 a.m. on September 16,1974, the pain became unbearable and the Claimant went to the hospital where it was discovered that the Claimant had a 22 caliber bullet in his stomach. The police were notified at the hospital.

Claimant initially failed to report the theft of his $7.00 because, he stated, in the black ghetto where he lives thefts of small amounts of money were common and because of their frequency were rarely reported. However, as soon as the Claimant discovered that he had been shot, the police were notified — some 26 hours after the crime.

The assailant was never apprehended.

Section 3 of the Act provides:

A person is entitled to compensation under the Act if. . . (c) the appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime allegedly causing the death or injury to the victim as soon after its perpetration as was reasonably practicable under the circumstances . . .

This Court has frequently stated that one of the obvious objects of the Act is to encourage prompt notification of crimes to law enforcement officials and full cooperation with law enforcement officials.

Because of the fact that the assailant in this case was carrying a rifle, it is apparent that an immediate notification of the crime to the police might have resulted in the apprehension of the criminal. Notification 26 hours later greatly prejudiced possibility of apprehension of the assailant.

We do not doubt Claimant’s testimony that in a high crime area minor thefts go unreported, but it is precisely this situation that the Act seeks to remedy by offering compensation to those who do report crimes. Conversely, those persons who do not promptly report crimes cannot expect compensation under the Act.

This Court finds, therefore, that the Claimant failed to notify appropriate law enforcement officials as soon after the perpetration of the crime as was reasonably practical under the circumstances and is not eligible for compensation under the Act.

This claim is, therefore, dismissed.


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    (No. 75-CV-394 and 76-CV-504, Consolidated
    In Re Application of Susan Peterson. and In Re Application of Ernest and Edna Peterson.

      Opinion filed April 21, 1977.

    John D. Gottlick, Attorney for Susan Peterson.
    Ron Blair, Attorney for Ernest and Edna Peterson.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Kenneth G. Mason, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on November 6, 1974, at 8121 South Racine Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Claimants in these consolidated actions seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Section 71, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "Act”).

The sole contested issue presented to the Court is to determine the identities of those entitled to compensation under the Act.

The facts, other than those relating to the issue of those entitled to compensation, are undisputed. It appears that on November 6, 1974, Roy S. Peterson, the crime victim, was found shot to death at the Circle Chevrolet car lot, 8121 South Racine Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. It appears that he leased guard dogs to Circle Chevrolet and was apparently making a security check on ti e lot when he was shot by a robber.

There is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or shared the same household.

Claimants have cooperated fully with law enforcement authorities to the best of their abilities.

As to the issue of who is entitled to benefits under the Act, it appears that Roy S. Peterson, the victim, married Karen D. Peterson on June 19, 1965. Two children were born of this marriage, namely, Lisa K. Peterson and Christian L. Peterson. This marriage was dissolved by divorce on April 12, 1969. This wife is remarried and her name is presently Karen D. Vitale.

On April 16, 1969, the victim was married to Marilyn A. Peterson. One child, namely Roy S. Peterson, Jr., was born of this marriage. This marriage was dissolved by divorce on July 19, 1974. Marilyn A. Peterson has not remarried.

On September 19,1974, Roy S. Peterson was married to one Susan Gembara in Mexico. Susan Gembara received a Mexican divorce from her then husband on that same day. She was pregnant at the time of the marriage, and a son named Kristi Roy Peterson was born to her on February 9,1975, after the crime victim’s death on November 6, 1974. A copy of the birth certificate of Kristi Roy Peterson was introduced into evidence.

The victim’s father and mother, Ernest and Edna Peterson, paid the sum of $1,904.30 for the funeral of decedent. A claim for this amount is presented to the Court of Claims under the consolidated claim entitled, Ernest and Edna Peterson vs. State of Illinois, No. 76-CV-504. A copy of the paid funeral bill was introduced into evidence. i.

From the evidence introduced at the hearing herein, the Court finds that the sum of $10,000, the maximum award allowable under the Act, should be entered in this cause. "

The Court further finds that the Mexican divorce of the crime victim’s third wife and her subsequent marriage to the crime victim in Mexico were valid and recognized under Illinois law.

The Court further finds that the award herein should be allocated as follows:

1. To Ernest and Edna Peterson, parents of the crime victim, the sum of One Thousand Nine Hundred Four and 30/100 ($1,904.30) Dollars, as reimbursement for the payment of the funeral bill for the deceased.
2. To Susan Peterson, the widow of the deceased, one-third (%) of the award herein, less the amount of the award to Ernest and Edna Peterson, and less attorney’s fees, as hereinafter set forth.
3. To Lisa Peterson, a minor, child of Karen Peterson Vitale (Wife No. 1), one-fourth (14) of two-thirds (%) of the remaining sum of Five Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-Seven and 14/100 ($5,397.14) Dollars, or One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Nine and 28/100 ($1,349.28) Dollars.
4. To Christian Peterson, a minor, child of Karen Peterson Vitale (Wife No. 1) , one-fourth (14) of two-thirds (%) of the remaining sum of Five Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-Seven and 14/100 ($5,397.14) Dollars, or One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Nine and 28/100 ($1,349.28) Dollars.
5. To Roy S. Peterson, Jr., a minor, child of Marilyn A. Peterson (Wife No. 2) , one-fourth (14) of two-thirds (%) of the remaining sum of Five Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-Seven and 14/100 ($5,397.14) Dollars, or One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Nine and 28/100 ($1,349.28) Dollars.
6. To Kristi Roy Peterson, a minor, child of Susan Peterson (Wife No. 3), one-fourth (14) of two-thirds (%) of the remaining sum of Five Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-Seven and 14/100 ($5,397.14) Dollars, or One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Nine and 28/100 ($1,349.28) Dollars.

A petition for attorney fees, pursuant to Section 72 of the Act, has been filed by the Claimants’ attorney. On consideration thereof, the Court finds that attorneys fees should be granted in this cause only for presentation of the claim of Susan Peterson, and that a fee in the amount of Three Hundred ($300) Dollars shall be charged against the award of Susan Peterson.

It Is Therefore Ordered that the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000) Dollars is hereby awarded to the Claimants herein, to be paid and distributed as follows:

1. To Ernest and Edna Peterson, the sum of One Thousand Nine Hundred Four and 30/100 ($1,904.30) Dollars to reimburse them for payment of the deceased’s funeral expenses.
2. To Karen Peterson Vitale, for the use and benefit of her minor child, Lisa Peterson, the sum of One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Nine and 28/100 ($1,349.28) Dollars.
3. To Karen Peterson Vitale, for the use and benefit of her minor child, Christian Peterson, the sum of One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Nine and 28/100 ($1,349.28) Dollars.
4. To Marilyn Peterson, for the use and benefit of her minor child, Roy S. Peterson, Jr., the sum of One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Nine and 28/100 ($1,349.28) Dollars.
5. To Susan Peterson, for the use and benefit of her minor child, Kristi Roy Peterson, the sum of One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Nine and 28/100 ($1,349.28) Dollars.
6. To Susan Peterson, the widow of the deceased, for her own use and benefit, the sum of Two Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-Eight and 58/100 ($2,398.58) Dollars.
7. To John D. Gottlick, Esq., attorney for Claimant Susan Peterson, the sum of Three Hundred ($300) Dollars.


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    (No. 75-CV-435
    In Re Application of Stella Wallas.

      Opinion filed March 7, 1977.

    Kenneth Good, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; James Stola, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on December 24, 1974, at approximately 1:05 a.m. on a CTA bus near 1459 North Kedzie, Chicago, Illinois. The victim, Stella Wallas, age 65, of 4658 Milwaukee, Chicago, Illinois, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "Act”).

This cause is before the Court following a hearing held before the Honorable J. Barry Fisher, a Commissioner of this Court, on September 8, 1976, following Claimant’s objection to the opinion heretofore filed in this cause on March 29, 1976.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, the report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, and the record of the hearing of September 8, 1976. Based upon these documents and evidence, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant was riding northbound on Kedzie Avenue in Chicago on CTA bus No. 1284, at approximately 1:05 a.m. on December 24, 1974. An unknown man boarded the bus near 1459 N. Kedzie Avenue. The man robbed the Claimant at gunpoint and then fled. The Claimant alleges that the assailant gave her the flu and that she had 15 teeth extracted six months after the robbery as a result of nervousness from the robbery. The Claimant also lost her purse and its contents to the robber.

2. That the police were notified immediately after the robbery and the Claimant cooperated fully with their investigation.

3. That the Claimant’s alleged physical injuries of contracting influenza from the assailant and extraction of teeth six months after the crime because of nervousness are remote and speculative. Therefore, no compensation can be awarded for the losses under the Act.

4. That loss of personal effects is not compensable under the Act and therefore no compensation can be awarded for the Claimant’s loss of her purse and its contents.

5. That the Claimant has no loss which is compensable under' the Act.

It Is Hereby Ordered that no award be made to the Claimant because she has suffered no loss which is compensable under the Crime Victims Compensation Act.


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    (No. 75-CV-550
    In Re Application of Jacob R. Armstead, Father of Clarence H. Armstead.

      Opinion filed August 6, 1976.

    Jacob R. Armstead, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

The claim herein arises out of the death of Clarence Armstead, 28, who died on April 9, 1974, as a result of bullet wounds sustained on that day, at 7701 South Racine, Chicago, Illinois.

This claim was filed pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

Claimant, Jacob Armstead, father of the victim, makes claim as a dependent for alleged loss of support.

The facts of the incident were that the victim, Clarence Armstead, on April 5, 1974, was accosted by an unknown man after dropping off his car at the garage at 7701 South Racine, Chicago, Illinois. The offender displayed a hand gun and demanded the victim’s wallet. The victim handed over the wallet but tried to take the gun away from the offender. The offender then shot the victim and the victim expired on April 9,1974, as a result of the gun shot wound. The Claimant, Jacob R. Armstead, claims loss of support and funeral expense. He was the father of the victim.

The Claimant, who is 62 years of age, stated that he, his wife, Gladys Armstead, age 57 years, and a 17 year old child, Myra, were dependent on the assistance of their son, Clarence H., the deceased victim. Jacob Armstead, the Claimant, has not filed an income tax return since 1971 because he has allegedly not earned enough money to so warrant. The Claimant states that the victim, Clarence H. Armstead, dropped off groceries, bought clothes and made mortgage payments for the family. There is no evidence other than the testimony of the Armstead family.

The victim, Clarence H. Armstead, was employed, at the time of his death, by the U.S. Post Office, wherein in 1973 he earned $7,678.32 net less government pension deductions. The victim was denied the status of head of household for 1973. The victim was allowed only 1 personal exemption for himself in 1973.

The Claimant incurred burial expenses in the following amounts:

Lena Taylor Bryant Funeral Home (funeral) 1134-36 West 87th Street Chicago, Illinois $2,520.00
A. O. Norrander Co. (Marker) 11432 South Fairfield Avenue Chicago, Illinois 227.53
Total Funeral..................................$2,747.53

The assailant in this case has neither been identified nor apprehended.

The Claimant and the victim cooperated fully with the police investigation of the shooting.

There is no evidence to indicate that the victim and his assailant were related or shared the same household.

There is no evidence indicating that the death of the victim was substantially attributable to his wrongful act or his substantial provocation of his assailant.

All documents were timely filed.

The Claimant’s wife, Gladys Armstead, received $26,000.00 on a double indemnity life insurance policy #1700 G, which was issued by Federal Employees Group Life Insurance, 4 East 24th Street, New York, New York.

On direct and cross examination, the victim’s father could not ascertain or give any figure for the amount of assistance he was receiving from the victim. It was learned also that the victim leased his own apartment and owned an automobile, indicating the victim had substantial expenses. The victim was one of 11 children. The other children also contributed on occasions to the Claimant’s support.

At the time of the victim’s death, the Claimant’s wife owned the premises in which the Claimants lived.

The Claimant admits receiving money from a moving business which he owns but could not state how much. He also is a pastor in his church and receives some unascertainable benefits from this source. He operated a used clothing store at the same location but denied any gain. He stated all records from the moving and clothing business were burned in a fire.

The Act provides in Section 3 that:

A person is entitled to compensation under this Act if:
(a) he ... is a person who was dependent on a deceased victim of a crime of violence for his support at the time of the death of that victim.

The Act contains no further definitions of a dependent.

Principles applicable to the factual situation presented here have been thoroughly explored by the Supreme Court of Illinois in construing the words "partially dependent” in the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act. In Roseberry v. Industrial Commission, 33 Ill.2d 520, 211 N.E.2d 702, the Court said that:

A child contributes to the support of his parents within the meaning of the Act when he contributes a substantial sum to the support of the family although this sum is less than the actual cost of his support and maintenance where the child is a minor or in a position to demand legal support from his parents. . . . The test is whether the contributions were relied upon by the applicant for her means of living judging by her position in life, and whether she was to a substantial degree supported by the employee at the time of the latter’s death.

The facts of the Roseberry case were that the deceased, a 19 year old bachelor, was irregularly employed for the year prior to his injuries and subsequent death and that for the 13 months prior to his injury his total net earnings were approximately $830.00 or approximately $65.00 per month. His mother who was the Claimant earned $3,900.00 for the previous 12 months. The deceased employee would cash his pay checks and give his mother the cash and the mother would give him what he needed. She kept no records of what she gave him.

The Court in the Roseberry case concluded that the Industrial Commission was justified in finding a lack of partial dependency.

The rules of law enumerated are supported by a line of cases including: Air Castle v. Industrial Commission, 394 Ill. 62, 67 N.E.2d 177; General Constr. Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 314 Ill. 58, 145 N.E.2d 90; Bauer & Black vs. Industrial Commission, 322 Ill. 165,152 N.E. 590; and General Constr. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 314 Ill. 58, 145 N.E. 90.

It is apparent in this case the degree of support that the Claimant received from the victim is not ascertainable nor substantial and therefore does not meet the test of the rules of law pertaining to dependency.

This Court while sympathizing with Claimant’s loss, finds that the Claimant, Jacob R. Armstead, was not a dependent of a victim of a crime as defined in the Act and his claim is hereby denied.


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    (No. 75-CV-656
    In Re Application of Edgar Lee Waller.

      Opinion filed April 4, 1977.

    Mark Pettit, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Paul C. West, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on March 29,1974, at the Jazzie Ball Recreation Hall, 5109 S. Prairie Avenue, Chicago. The Claimant seeks compensation under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 70, 71, et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the "Act”).

The Court of Claims entered an order on September 16, 1975, dismissing this claim. Pursuant to Section 9 of the Act, the Claimant moved for a hearing and the request was granted.

The issues presented to the Court is whether the Claimant cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of his assailant and whether the Claimant established any compensable loss of earnings.

Claimant testified that he was shot by an unknown person on March 29,1974, while in a pool room known as the Jazzie Ball Recreation Hall. Claimant was transported to Provident Hospital and then to the Cook County Hospital.

He was at Cook County Hospital for six weeks and from there went to the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago.

During the time that he was in the Cook County Hospital an operation was required upon him. The police department came to the hospital the next day after the operation when the Claimant was in severe pain. The Claimant was unable to allow himself to be interviewed because of his pain. The police never interviewed him at the hospital again.

After his release from the hospital, the Claimant went to the police station and looked at various photographs for the purpose of attempting an identification. Claimant returned to the police station several times for this purpose.

From the above facts, which were undisputed by the State, it is clear that the Claimant did in fact cooperate fully with the police.

However, the testimony was that at the time of the incident Claimant was not employed. He had last been employed on February 2, 1974, almost two months prior to the assault upon him. At the time of the assault, Claimant was receiving public aid. During the time of Claimant’s physical infirmities he continued to receive the same sum from the Illinois Department of Public Aid that he had been receiving prior to the criminal assault upon him.

Section 4 of the Act provides:

Pecuniary loss to an applicant under this Act resulting from injury or death to a victim includes, in the case of injury, appropriate medical expenses or hospital expenses, loss of earnings, loss of future earnings because of a disability resulting from the injury, and other expenses .... Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less . . .

This Court has previously held, in the case of Wayne Bass vs. State of Illinois, 74-CV-15 (1976), that a Claimant who was not employed at the time of the assault, but in fact had already made arrangements for a job and was prevented from beginning the job by reason of an assault upon him, was entitled to compensation for lost earnings.

However, in the case before us, there is no indication that Claimant had any job prospect in the immediate future. He was receiving public aid. The public aid continued in the same amount as the Claimant was receiving prior to the assault upon him. His previous employment record was one of occasional jobs. He received public aid in 1973 and 1972 for the full years.

Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that the Claimant is not entitled to any compensation for lost earnings.

Inasmuch as Claimant’s other expenses, both medical and hospital, have been fully paid by the Illinois Department of Public Aid, the Court finds that no compensation in this claim is authorized under the Act.

Accordingly, this matter is closed.


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    (No. 75-CV-664
    In Re Application of Vincent J. Leone.

      Opinion filed April 13, 1977.

    Vincent J. Leone, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; Paul West, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an alleged criminal offense that occurred on December 2, 1974, at approximately 12:00 noon, at or near the comer of 79th Street and Harlem Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Vincent J. Leone, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (Hereafter referred to as the "Act.” Evidence was taken by the Court at a hearing conducted by J. Barry Fisher, a Commissioner of this Court.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Vincent J. Leone, age 32, allegedly was the victim of a violent crime as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit: "Battery,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-3.

2. That on December 2, 1974, at approximately 12:00 noon, the Claimant was driving his automobile westbound on 79th Street when he unintentionally "cut-off’ a truck. When the Claimant stopped for a red light at 79th Street and Harlem, the driver of the truck approached him and an argument began after the Claimant apologized. The driver of the truck then hit the Claimant in the mouth with his fist.

3. That the Claimant reported the incident to the police at approximately 4:00 on December 3, 1974. The Claimant was unable to furnish the police with any information as to the identity of his assailant or the make, color, year, or license number of the truck other than the truck was the type to transport gasoline. The Claimant stated to the police that he did not wish to prosecute.

4. That the Claimant incurred damage to his teeth as result of the incident and was treated by Gerald M. Ascherman, D.D.S.

5. That, according to Sec. 3(d) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 73(d), a person is entitled to compensation if:

(d) the applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

6. That the Claimant did not comply with Sec. 3(d) of the Act by advising the law enforcement officials that he would not proceed with prosecution if the assailant were found.

It is therefore the finding of this Court that the Claimant has failed to meet a required condition precedent to his right to compensation under the Act.

Therefore, this Court finds that no compensation in this claim is authorized under the aforesaid Act. Accordingly, this claim is hereby denied.


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    (No. 75-CV-669
    In Re Application of Paul Moy.

      Opinion filed December 3, 1976.

    Victor Sotos, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois; James O. Stola, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on December 11,1974, at 1435 East Hyde Park, Chicago. The Claimant, Paul Moy, seeks compensation for lost earnings pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

Evidence was taken at a hearing conducted by Martin C. Ashman, a Commissioner of this court.

The sole contested issue presented to the Court was the basis for computing the Claimant’s loss of earnings and future loss of income.

The facts were essentially undisputed. On December 11, 1974, at approximately 9:20 p.m., the Claimant was in the Lung Hing Restaurant at 1435 East Hyde Park, Chicago, where he was employed as a busboy and kitchen helper. Two armed men entered the restaurant and attempted an armed robbery. One of the men, holding a gun, fired two shots at the Claimant and the Claimant fell to the floor. The police were summoned and the Claimant was taken to Billings Hospital in Chicago. The Claimant was treated and the result of the treatment was that a bullet which entered the Claimant’s side passed through a lung and lodged near his spine.

As a result of this injury, the Claimant became a paraplegic. He uses a brace on his left leg and a cane in order to walk. He walks slowly and painfully. Certain parts of his legs are numb and he has no control over the muscles of his legs at various times. After 15 minutes of sitting, he has pain in his right leg and must lie down for one-half hour to an hour. He cannot stand more than 15 minutes at a time.

The medical report entered into evidence by agreement indicated that his condition of paralysis is permanent.

While there has been no apprehension of the criminals, it is clear and this Court finds that the Claimant has cooperated with law enforcement authorities to the best of his ability. There is no evidence that the victim in any way provoked the attack upon himself nor is there any evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or shared the same household.

The victim sustained medical and hospital bills amounting to $25,704.46, all of which was paid by the Cook County Department of Public Aid.

Prior to the assault upon him, the Claimant worked for his father at the Lung King Restaurant as a waiter, cashier, busboy, dishwasher, and general cleanup man. He has no other work training or experience. It is clear to this Court that, given the permanency of his condition, the Claimant can no longer be gainfully employed. The Claimant was aged 20 at the time of the assault upon him.

There is no question that the Claimant is entitled, under the Act, to payment for his lost future earnings. The difficulty is that the Claimant was employed in a family owned restaurant and drew no salary as such, but was paid for his living expenses, clothing, room and board. In addition he received an allowance of between $5.00 and $10.00 per week plus tips in the amount of $7.00 per day for a six day week.

Even without considering the value of the living expenses, clothing, room and board, it is apparent that the Claimant received in actual money the sum of approximately $47.00 per week.

Taking into consideration the Claimant’s age of 20 years and his normal life expectancy, it is clear that the total lost support is far in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum awardable under the Act. It is the Court’s opinion, however, that the best interests of the victim would be served by our ordering that this award be disbursed to the Claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized by Section 8(a), Subparagraph 4 of the Act.

It Is Therefore Ordered that the total sum of $10,000.00 be awarded to the Claimant and that the aforesaid award be paid to the Claimant, Paul Moy, in 20 equal installments of $500.00 each.

The Court further finds under Section 12 of the Act and based on the allegations of attorney, Victor Sotos, that attorneys fees in the total sum of $500.00 are reasonable for representing the Claimant at the hearing of this case.

It Is Therefore Ordered that Victor H. Sotos may charge the Claimant $500.00 in attorneys fees.