text:
    (No. 5240
    Elaine Scudiero, Administratrix of the Estate of Ralph Scudiero, Deceased; Elaine Scudiero, Individually; and Elaine Scudiero, Parent and Next of Friend of Janice Scudiero, Joyce Scudiero and Judith Scudiero, Minors, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1969.

    John T. Martin, Attorney for Claimants.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman and Arthur L. Berman, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimants seek recovery of damages arising out of an automobile accident on February 10, 1965 in which Ralph Scudiero, the husband of claimant, Elaine Scudiero, and the father of the other claimants, was killed, and the other claimants injured.

Claimants contend that the accident was caused by the negligence of respondent in that it carelessly maintained and failed to repair holes or defects in the highway, and failed to post adequate warning signs, when it knew or should have known of the existence of the holes- or defects.

Before claimants may recover they must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that respondent was negligent; (2) that the negligence was the proximate cause of the accident; (3) that claimants were free from contributory negligence; and, (4) damages.

Claimants introduced evidence, which established the following-:

On February 10, 1965, Ralph Scudiero was driving his automobile on U.S. Route No. 20 in a westerly direction, about 10:25 P.M. Claimant, Elaine Scudiero, was riding* in the front seat of the automobile, and the three Scudiero children, Janice, Joyce, and Judith, were riding-in the rear. Elaine Scudiero testified that her husband was driving in the curb lane of the four lane highway at about 35 miles per hour. When the car reached the area in the road at or near Bill Bailey’s Motor Sales, Inc., (19 West 326 Lake Street, Addison, Illinois) the left front wheel dropped into a hole, and the car swerved. The vehicle then went into the lane of traffic from the opposite direction, colliding with an eastbound car. According to claimant, after she felt the car going into the hole, her husband had his hand on the wheel at all times, and did not hit the brake hard. She further testified that the area where the car went out of control was at the west end of the Bailey car lot. After the collision, Mrs. Scudiero was taken in one ambulance with her husband, and her daughters were taken in another ambulance. Her husband was pronounced dead at the hospital.

About ten or twelve days after the accident, Mrs. Scudiero testified she returned to the spot in the road where the collision occurred, and saw an area of ruts running about 8 to 10 yards. Claimant stated that the last time her husband had traveled on the highway was Christmas, 1964. She herself had driven on the highway in question about a month before the accident, and had noticed ruts and holes. She further testified that the tires on the automobile were good, and it had snow tires at the time of the accident.

Janice Scudiero, age 16, the daughter of decedent and Elaine Scudiero, testified that she was riding as a passenger in the automobile in the rear seat on the left side of the car.. She described the accident as follows: “We were going along, and then all of a sudden the car must have hit a rut, and we started to jump — well, joggle up and down. All of a sudden the car went out of control, and it started to swerve, and then we went into the other lane. ’ ’ She was taken to the hospital in an ambulance where she was treated for injuries. Janice also testified that the car swerved out of the lane of traffic twice before the impact.

Joyce Scudiero, age 13, testified that she was sitting in the middle of the rear seat, and her sister Judy was sleeping on her right. She stated: “We were driving, and all of a sudden I felt like the car, well, went into this rut-like, and he was trying to get it out, so he couldn’t, so the car started swinging — he must have somehow got it out, and we started to go into the other lane. Then we hit the car. ’ ’ She said that she had a cut on her leg, a bruise on her arm, a cut on her head and scratches all over her face. She testified she has completely recovered, and that she never saw a doctor after she left the hospital.

Judith Scudiero testified she was asleep at the time of the accident; that she hurt her neck and left knee; that the discomfort lasted about four days; that she is fully recovered, and has no after effects.

Carmen Scudiero, a brother of the decedent, testified that Ralph Scudiero had four children, Jacquelyn, Janice, Joyce and. Judy, and that he was a good father. He first learned of the accident at five minutes to twelve on February 10 when he was called to the hospital. He went to the scene of the accident about nine o’clock the following morning, and testified that a photograph of the area of the highway at the west end of Bailey’s Used Car Lot correctly portrayed its condition at that time, with ruts and water on the road. He drove over the area, and his wheel hit the ruts described above.

Joseph Scudiero, also a brother of the decedent, testified that he had occasion to travel on Lake Street to get to and from his work, and used the highway in question daily; that he had noticed the conditions portrayed in the photograph at least two or three weeks before the accident occurred; that he did notice State of Illinois trucks maintaining the road before February 10, 1965; that he had hit the ruts, and bounced or swerved; that he never saw any signs warning him of rough pavement; and, that sometimes he didn’t see the ruts, because they were full of water.

Ralph Louis Blust testified that he lived about four blocks from Bill Bailey’s; that he is a volunteer fireman with the Addison Fire Department; that he left the fire house, located two blocks east of Addison Road on Lake Street about 10:15 or 10:20 on the night of the accident; that the condition of the pavement was good except for a stretch in front of Bill Bailey’s, which was “very rough, very bad”; that the speed limit at or near Bill Bailey’s is 45 miles per hour; that in some instances the condition of the highway was worse than portrayed in the photograph because of deep ruts, which have water in them; that the conditions were as portrayed at least a week or two before February 10,1965; that he came upon the accident before the ambulances arrived; that he did not notice any signs warning of the condition of the highway, barricades, or detour signs; that he had driven over the bumps in the past, and tried to straddle them; and, that this was a highly traveled road.

Larry Herbord testified that he was a police officer for the Village of Addison; that he did not investigate the accident in question; that he was very familiar with the general condition of the highway in question as it existed on February 10, 1965; that the condition of the road was worse than that shown in the photographs; that there was one very bad hole; that the conditions had existed for a couple of weeks; that there were no warning signs displayed, which would make a motorist aware of the highway; that the lighting at the scene of the occurrence was darker than it was just east of it; that the general condition of the highway was good from at least a mile east of the area in question; and, that he traveled over the same spot every night, and the area “jarred the living hell” out of his vehicle.

Dorrence Little testified that he was traveling east on Lake Street in the far right lane at about 50 miles per hour when he saw an oncoming vehicle swerve into his lane, apparently regain control, and then swerve into his lane again; that he struck the other car on the driver’s side, after trying to run off the road into a parking lot to avoid hitting the car; that he drives on the highway daily; that the lane going west was worse than the other; that from time to time the bad spots are repaired, but eventually became bad again; that the weather was good, but there might have been frost at the spot; that he had never observed warning signs in the area with respect to the condition of the highway; that he did observe patchwork being done; and, that the ruts and holes shown in the photograph were there for at least three days prior to February 10, 1965.

Nicholas Steffan testified that he was employed by the State of Illinois as a maintenance field engineer for the Division of Highways, and is in charge of the highways in DuPage County; that in February, snow, thaw and rain caused chuck holes in many of the roads in DuPage County; that the highways get resurfaced when funds are available; that Lake Street was resurfaced in 1953; that, prior to February 10, 1965, a request was made from the Department for resurfacing in November, 1964; that the money-has to be alloted for the next season’s program; that during the winter-the holes are patched with a cold mix, which is temporary in nature; that time cards show cold patching was done on Lake Street on February 10; that cold and rain, freezing and thawing take the patches out, and the “next day we patch them again until such time we can put a permanent patch in”; that the highways are inspected every day; that he personally inspects the highway, and has a supervisor and two foremen inspecting highways; that a maintenance man in each section maintains a particular section of the road; that the first thing the maintenance men do is ride their section of the road to ascertain the filling of holes, weather conditions, and debris on the highways; that he did ride Lake Street on February 9; that he did request that Lake Street be resurfaced in 1964 and 1962; that Lake Street was high on priority for reconstruction, because of the amount of traffic it had in 1962,1963,1964 and 1965, but no funds were available; that a permanent patching job was done on Lake Street about three years prior; that three men maintain the area, and are on the road every day; that every two miles there is a sign posted “rough pavement” as a warning to motorists; that he could not say where the signs were posted in relation to the accident; that the cold mix at times does not last an hour, because of the heavy speed of traffic, and the tires spinning it right out; that the cold patches would last about 12 hours or less on the day of the accident; that the westbound traffic is heavy at night with freezing and thawing and with water getting underneath, the cold mix might come out right after rush hour; and, that the presence of water indicated that the area in front of Bill Bailey’s was a low area, or the area somewhere around it was not drained.

Walter Kehoe testified that he was employed in the capacity of maintenance foreman in the Northeast Section of DuPage County; that he had charge of that section of Lake Street, or TJ.S. No. 20, between Addison Road and TJ.S. Route No. 53; that he had a crew of three men working on Lake Street; that he traveled over the various highways in his district not less than two times per day; that all crews make a trip on the highway in the morning to check for chuckholes and debris; that time cards are kept of the work; that time cards showed “patching holes” on Lake Street between Addison and Route No. 53 on February 10, 1965; that he drove over the highway on February 10, and there were some holes; that the photograph admitted into evidence shows the condition of the highway as it existed when he saw it on February 10, 1965, with peeling’ of blacktop caused by water and hydraulic pressure pushing it up; that the center lane had a few holes; that after patchwork was done the holes would be level with the road; that the depressions were four to six inches deep; that it would be easy for patchwork to be done one day, and pop out the following day because of water and heavy trucks; that there were “rough pavement” warning signs every two miles, and, “there would have to be one” in front of Bill Bailey’s, because it would be two miles from Walnut Street; that the three men crew would travel about twelve miles of four lane highway; that the records do not show the exact place of the patchwork; that he did not see a sign warning of icy conditions or bad pavement in the photograph; and, that the spot near Bailey’s was a low level area, and would accumulate water or condensation.

Chester Grains testified that he was employed by the State of Illinois as a highway section man; that he had charge of Lake Street on February 10,1965 and the area in question; that the total area of approximately 10% miles of four line pavement is inspected once in the morning and once in the afternoon for holes, ruts, abrasions, dead animals, debris and wood; that, if holes or ruts are spotted, they get the material to fix it; that they used cold pack to fill the holes and ruts, with some lasting for indefinite periods and others coming out in 13 or 14 hours; that there were signs warning of rough pavement in the area in question, and the one westbound would be slightly under a mile from Bill Bailey’s; that the general condition of the highway immediately adjacent to Bill Bailey’s Car Lot was in fair condition; that “patch holes” on a time card is different from “patching”, whch means taking out the top section with an air hammer, cleaning it out, and making a real patch; that he did not remember if he did patchwork in front of Bill Bailey’s on February 10; that after the accident it was not in bad condition; that it would have taken about 45 minutes to remedy the condition portrayed in the photograph; that, if it is impossible to repair properly, barricades and flashers are put up; that, if he had time, and had seen the conditions portrayed on the photograph, he would have followed the procedure with the air hammer, or cleaned out the hole with a pick by hand and made the patch. Mr. Gains further testified that, if everything is not repaired, “we work overtime until we do repair it. If it’s impossible to repair it properly, barricades and flashers are put up.” Mr. Galus also stated that if he passed over a section of the highway, which looked like the photograph in evidence, he would “definitely not” leave for the night leaving the section of the highway in that condition.

Although the State is not an insurer of all who travel on its highways, it does have an obligation to keep its highways in a reasonably safe condition for motorists traveling over them. If the highways are in a dangerously defective condition, the State is negligent if it does not notify the public of such condition. Mitchell vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 61; Sisco vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 306.

The Court must conclude that respondent was negligent in its failure to maintain U.S. Route No. 20, or Lake Street, in a reasonably safe condition for motorists, or, as an alternative, post adequate warning signs or signals. Without exception, all witnesses for claimants and respondent testified that the area of the highway on which the accident occurred, specifically the westbound lane in front of the west end of the used car lot, which was located at 19 West 326 Lake Street, Addison, Du Page County, was filled with ruts and holes, and often covered with water, which acted to conceal some of the defects. All of respondent’s witnesses testified that they knew of the condition of the area in question. Although claimants’ witnesses testified that they saw no warning signs, respondent’s witnesses stated that there were rough pavement signs every two miles. This hardly seems adequate when there was no sign at the spot, which all parties stated was one of the worst. Respondent could have exercised reasonable care in maintaining the area by doing thé patching job, which took 45 minutes instead of the ‘‘patch holes” job, which was known not to last in the heavy traffic, which occurred daily. Respondent’s witness, Mr. Gains, also testified that it would have been possible to put up barricades and flashers, if an area is impossible to repair. The condition in question had lasted at least three days to two weeks before the accident. Respondent, through its daily inspections, knew or should have known of the dangerous condition of the road.

There was no evidence introduced to show that the deceased or claimants exercised anything but due care for their safety, or that the cause of the accident was other than the condition of the highway. Respondent was guilty of negligence, which was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Ealph Scudiero and the injuries of the other claimants.

The evidence further revealed that Ealph Scudiero was 47 years old at the time of his death; that he had been married to Elaine Scudiero for 16 years; that four children were born of the marriage, Janice, Jacquelyn, Joyce and Judith; that he-was employed by Eay Eoberts Steak House in West Chicago, and earned a net amount of $110.00, all of which he contributed to the support of his family; and, that he was in good health.

The evidence further shows that on February 10, 1965, Elaine Scudiero was employed by the Boselle Snack shop as a waitress earning $40 to $45 per week. As a result of the accident, she sustained a fracture of the fibula, fracture of the left elbow, lacerations of the scalp and leg. She remained in the hospital for eight days, and was on crutches about five weeks. She was disabled until April 18,1965.

Dr. James Boyd, who treated Mrs. Scudiero at the time of the accident, stated that there may be some arthritis developing in the elbow region, and that she will have pain in the left leg related to the fracture. He also treated Janice Scudiero who had multiple abrasions of the left lower leg and laceration of the chin, multiple contusions, fracture of the left fibula, with a residual fracture of the fibia and a scar of the chin. Janice remained in the hospital six days and on crutches for a month.

Joyce Scudiero had a cut on her leg, a bruise on her arm, a cut on her head and scratches over her face. She has completely recovered, and never saw a doctor after she left the hospital. Judith Scudiero had discomfort of the neck and left knee for about four days.

Claimant Elaine Scudiero is hereby awarded the sum of $25,000.00, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ralph Scudiero, deceased; Claimant, Elaine Scudiero, individually, is hereby awarded the sum of $7,500.00; Janice Scudiero, a minor, is hereby awarded the sum of $2,250.00; Joyce Scudiero, a minor, is hereby awarded the sum of $250.00; and Judith Scudiero, a minor, is hereby awarded the sum of $150.00.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Dove, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 5273
    Salvatore Castoro and Joy Ann Castoro, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1969.

    Kirkland, Brady, McQueen, Martin and Callahan, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, Morton L. Zaslasky and Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimants bring this action to recover for damages to their automobile. On October 15, 1965, claimants were the owners of a 1963 Chevrolet Impala automobile. On that date Salvatore Castoro parked the automobile on a private parking lot located adjacent to his employer’s place of business. While the automobile was parked in this area, it was stolen by one Michael Creed, a patient at the Elgin State Hospital, who drove it to the intersection of LaFox and Quarry Streets in South Elgin, where the automobile collided with a utility pole. Claimants are seeking to recover damages in the sum of $672.19 for repairs to the automobile, and $80.00 for rental of an automobile while claimants’ vehicle was being repaired.

It appears from the record in this case that the damage to claimants’ automobile amounted to the sum of $651.09, and that claimants further expended the sum of $80.42 for rental of a car from the Avis Rent-a-Car Company. It further appears that, at the time the automobile was stolen by Creed, the keys were in the ignition and the doors unlocked. Respondent contends that the act of leaving the keys in the ignition and the doors unlocked constituted contributory negligence on the part of claimant, Salvatore Castoro; that such negligence was the proximate cause of claimants’ damage; and, that.claimants should, therefore, be denied recovery. Respondent also contends that claimants have failed to sustain the burden of proof with respect to showing that respondent was negligent in allowing Michael Creed to escape.

With regard to claims filed for damages caused by an escaped inmate of a State institution, prior decisions of this Court clearly indicate that the State is not an insurer, and is liable for damages only if the State is negligent in allowing the inmate to escape. Malloy vs. State of Illinois, 18 C.C.R. 137; Fern L. Huff vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 361. It was stipulated to by respondent that the automobile in question was stolen by Michael Creed, an inmate of Elgin State Hospital, after he had escaped from said institution, and while at large on unauthorized absence. Respondent offered no testimony with respect to the question of negligence in allowing Michael Creed to escape. In U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company, A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 23 C.C.R. 188, the Court held that it was incumbent upon the State to come forward with evidence to show that it was not negligent in a situation such as this. Without such a showing, it will be presumed that the State was negligent, based upon the inferences to be drawn from the fact of the escape. In the case of Finch vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 376, the Court held that, where there was nothing in the record to indicate whether or not the State was negligent in allowing a patient to escape from a State institution, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter would apply, and that the burden would be upon respondent to make some showing that the State was not negligent in allowing the patient to escape. Inasmuch as respondent has not offered any proof showing that it was not negligent in allowing Michael Creed to escape, this Court, therefore, concludes that claimant has borne the burden of proof that respondent was negligent in allowing the inmate to escape, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of damage to claimants’ automobile.

Respondent also contends that claimants were contributorily negligent in allowing the keys to remain in the ignition and the doors unlocked at the time said automobile was stolen. In U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company, A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 23 C.C.R. 188, an automobile was parked in the driveway of a private residence. It was stolen by an escapee from the Dixon State School, who drove it into a parking meter. In that case the Court pointed out that there was no rule of common law requiring that keys be removed from an automobile, and the Court went on to hold that the statute prohibiting the leaving of the key in the ignition of an automobile did not apply to an automobile parked on private property. In Stanko vs. Zilien, 33 Ill. App. 2d (1961), the Court held that the “Key in the Ignition” statute does not apply to persons who had their cars on private property, and which were stolen at a later time and driven away. The Court went on to say that the statute was not intended to apply to them, but to those who leave their cars on public highways with the ignition on, and the cars were then stolen.

It is the opinion of the Court that claimants herein were not guilty of contributory negligence in allowing the keys to their automobile to be in the ignition of the car while it was parked on the parking lot in question. It is the opinion of this Court that Sec. 189 of Chap. 95½, Ill. Rev. Stats., referred to as the “Key in the Ignition” statute, does not apply to a vehicle in any place other than on a public highway.

Claimants are hereby awarded the sum of $731.51.


text:
    (No. 5375
    Frank Kendrick, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1969.

    Redman and Shearer, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., and Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant brings this action to recover for theft of certain items of personal property valued at $122.10 from his automobile. On November 16, 1966, the automobile of claimant, Frank Kendrick, was stolen. At the time of the theft various items of personal property owned by claimant were located inside the vehicle. Claimant parked his unlocked car, with the keys in the ignition in a private parking area parallel to the street, and about forty feet from his home on 7th Street in St. Charles, Illinois. Sometime between midnight and 5:30 A.M. the following morning the vehicle containing the personal property was stolen.

Approximately one week later, Mr. Alfred Buscher, a representative of the St. Charles School for Boys, returned to claimant a green corduroy coat, which had been damaged. On December 5, 1966, Mr. Buscher again contacted claimant by letter acknowledging the theft of items listed by claimant, and stated that claim could be initiated through the Court of Claims of the State of Illinois. The letter further acknowledged the probability of the theft by inmates of the Boys ’ School, who had escaped on November 16, 1966.

Respondent contends that claimant has failed to prove that the State was negligent in allowing the inmates to escape, and further that claimant was contributorily negligent by reason of the fact that he left the keys to the car in the ignition when it was parked in front of his residence.

Prior decisions of this Court have held that the State is not an insurer, and is liable for damages only if the State is negligent in allowing the inmate to escape from a State institution. Malloy vs. State of Illinois, 18 C.C.R. 137; Huff vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 361. Respondent offered no testimony with respect to the question of negligence in allowing the inmates of the Boys’ School to escape on the date in question. In the case of U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company, A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 23 C.C.R. 188, the Court held that it was incumbent upon the State to come forward with evidence to show that it was not negligent in a situation such as this. Based upon the evidence submitted by claimant in this case, and upon respondent’s failure to offer any evidence showing its freedom from negligence in allowing inmates to escape from the State institution, the Court concludes that claimant has borne the burden of proof; that respondent was negligent in allowing the inmates to escape; and, that such negligence was the proximate cause of claimant’s loss of personal property.

It is the further opinion of this Court that claimant was not guilty of contributory negligence in allowing the keys to his automobile to remain in the ignition and the doors unlocked at the time said automobile was stolen. In the case of U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company, A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 23 C.C.R. 188, the Court pointed out that there was no rule of common law requiring that keys be removed from an automobile, and the Court held that the statute prohibiting the leaving of the key in the ignition of an automobile did not apply to an automobile parked on private property. In the case of Stanko vs. Zilien, 33 Ill. App. 2d (1961), the Court held that the “Key in the Ignition” statute does not apply to persons who have their cars on private property.

It is the opinion of the Court that the area in which claimant had parked his automobile should not be classified as a public highway, and that, therefore, to leave the keys in the car was not in violation of the statute.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $122.10.


author: Pezman, J.

text:
    (No. 5560
    Marie M. Parrott, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1969.

    Michael F. Ryan and Arthur A. Levisohn, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Etta J. Cole, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant seeks from respondent payment of the sum of $2,500.00 for services rendered to the Department of Mental Health of the State of Illinois. The complaint alleges that such demand was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for such payment had lapsed. The parties have stipulated that claimant is entitled to the sum requested, and that, as a result of claimant’s delay in billing, payment was not made prior to the closing of the biennial appropriation.

Where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and, (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509. It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $2,500.00.


text:
    (No. 5623
    Wanda Rozmarek, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1969.

    Joseph J. Ciaccio, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant, Wanda Rozmarek, is seeking recovery of $500.00, which was deposited with the office of the Secretary of State pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Law (1961 Ill. Rev. Stats., Chap. 95%, Sec. 7-503) on December 27, 1962. The requirement of deposit arose out of an automobile accident, which involved a vehicle driven by claimant. Claimant is also requesting $175.00 for attorney’s fees.

The Departmental Report shows that claimant received a receipt from the Safety Responsibility Division of the office of the Secretary of State, dated December 27,1962; that, on July 6, 1966, claimant received another letter from the office of the Secretary of State, Safety Responsibility Section, advising her that the above deposit had been on file with the office of the Secretary of State for over three years; and further advising claimant that, unless a claim was filed within thirty days, the deposit would be transferred to the General Revenue Fund, as provided by statute. No claim was filed, and the security deposit was thereafter transferred to the General Revenue Fund.

The parties have stipulated that the facts appearing in the Departmental Report are true and undisputed. Sec. 7-503, Chap. 95½, Ill. Rev. Stats., provides that any person having a legal claim against such deposit may enforce it by appropriate proceedings in the Court of Claims.

The Court is of the opinion that claimant is justly entitled to a refund. It is not the policy of this Court to allow attorney’s fees unless specifically authorized by statute.

An award is accordingly made by this Court to claimant, Wanda Rozmarek, in the amount of $500.00.


text:
    (No. 5143
    Martin J. McMahon, d/b/a McMahon Produce Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion re liability filed January 11, 1966.

      Opinion re damages filed May 29, 1969.

    Thomas and Thomas, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

The claim of Martin J. McMahon, d/b/a McMahon Produce Company, was filed in this Court on January 27,1964 seeking an award of $83,275.10 (later reduced by amendment to $25,000.00) for damages to a warehouse, equipment, inventory, produce and office furnishings, which were caused by a fire purportedly started as a result of the negligence of the employees of respondent.

The case is submitted to this Court only on the question of liability, claimant and respondent having filed a joint motion for separate trials on the issues of liability and damages, which motion was heretofore granted by the Court. At the hearing held before the Commissioner, the only testimony taken was that of claimant’s witnesses.

The case arises out of a fire, which occurred in Rockford, Illinois on January 14, 1963. Claimant, owner of a produce and beverage business, was the lessee of a portion of a building located at 340 Tinker Street in Rockford, and used it as an office and warehouse.

The Department of Public Aid of the State of Illinois also leased a portion of the same building for use as a surplus food storage and distribution depot. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that the fire started in that portion of the building occupied and controlled by respondent ; that at the time the fire started in respondent’s portion of the building the only persons present were two Illinois Public Aid employees, namely Irving Pollitt and Virgil August Schoenweiss; that both Pollitt and Schoenweiss had been drinking intoxicating liquor on the job that day for several hours prior to the fire; and, that Pollitt was in fact drunk at the time of the fire, and for several hours prior thereto; that Pollitt was alone in the office in an intoxicated condition for at least thirty minutes prior to the fire, while Schoenweiss was on the second floor of respondent’s portion of the building. •

The evidence further establishes that in the office on the first floor of respondent’s portion of the building a gas operated space heater and an automatic electric coffee pot, were being used immediately prior to the fire; that the heater had no automatic shutoff, but had to be turned on and off with pliers; that after the fire the heater was dug up by firemen, and the on-and-off value was found in a full “on” position; and, that the fire originated in the small office where the space heater was located.

The evidence further discloses that the wiring in this portion of the building was faulty and dangerous. When the dock lights were turned on, the fuse would blow, and the employees would then re-set the fuse control, and turn the lights on again until they stayed on without blowing a fuse.

Claimant has not been able to prove the proximate cause of the fire, but, in our opinion, he does not have to do so in this case, as the evidence fully supports the fact that claimant has made a prima facie case for recovery on the basis of the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and liability is thereby established against respondent. There is no evidence of contributory negligence on the part of claimant. (Edmonds vs. Heil, 333 Ill. App. 497; Metz vs. Central Ill. Electric and Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446.)

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is succinctly stated in 38 Am. Jur. 989, Sec. 295:

“The conclusion to be drawn from the cases as to what constitutes the rule of res ipsa loquitur is that proof that the thing, which caused the injury to the plaintiff, was under the control and management of the defendant, and that the occurrence was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, affords sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated by the court, reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.”

In this case, respondent has offered no evidence or explanation as to how this fire started. It is unrebutted that respondent was in control of that portion of the building where the fire started. Our Court has heretofore held in the case of Mertel vs. State of Illinois, 20 C.C.R. 287, that:

“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is grounded upon the principle of law that where one has charge or management of a thing in connection with which an accident happens, which in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management thereof use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from a want of proper care. The fact of this occurrence, therefore, will be deemed to afford prima facie evidence to support recovery in absence of any explanation by the defendant attempting to show that the occurrence was not due to its want of care. There was no explanation in the record of how the accident happened, nor was there any evidence of any negligence on behalf of the claimant. There being no rebuttal to the prima facie case made by the claimant, the facts are sufficient to support an award to claimant.” (Westerfield vs. State of Illinois, 18 C.C.R. at 186.)

Similarly, this Court allowed recovery for damages incurred to a house and its contents caused by a tow target, which fell from a National Guard airplane, and the Court found no evidence in the record sufficient to rebut the presumption or inference of negligence raised by the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. (Northwestern National Insurance Company, Et AL., vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 261). This Court likewise cited with approval therein the case of Mertel vs. State of Illinois, 21 C.C.R. 558, which was also a case of application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The reasoning of those cases is applicable to the case at bar.

The issue of liability is, therefore, resolved against respondent and in favor of claimant, Martin J. McMahon, d/b/a McMahon Produce Company, and a further hearing will be had solely on the question of damages.

Opinion Re Damages

Claimant filed his claim with this Court on January 27,1964, seeking an award of $83,275.10, which was later reduced by amendment to $25,000.00, for damages to equipment, inventory, office furniture, and loss of profits, caused by a fire purportedly started as a result of the negligence of the employees of respondent, State of Illinois.

The issue of liability was resolved in favor of claimant by opinion of this Court filed January 11, 1966. Testimony on the issue of damages was taken in the City of Rockford, Illinois on May 12, 1967. The only witnesses were claimant, James R. Zant, an individual engaged in the office supply business, and Loren Towne, an individual engaged in the refrigeration and air conditioning business.

Claimant’s evidence discloses that the following items were destroyed by the fire:

A. OFFICE FURNISHINGS. Claimant initially alleged that the value of the office furnishings destroyed was $4,394.50. Claimant’s witness, James R. Zant, manager of an office equipment and supply store, testified that in his opinion the office furnishings destroyed in the fire had a fair market value of $670.00. Mr. Zant gave no opinion as to the value of certain items of office equipment. However, there is testimony of claimant indicating that their value amounted to at least $230.00, thereby making the total fair market value of office furnishings and equipment destroyed by the fire $1,000.00.

B. WAREHOUSE EQUIPMENT. Under this category claimant lists refrigeration equipment destroyed at $18,000.00, and miscellaneous items totaling $3,460.00. Claimant testified that his figures were based on his estimate as to what it would cost to replace the items lost. Loren Towne, one of the owners and operators of Miller Engineering Company, testified on behalf of claimant that he had been in the refrigeration and air conditioning business for 15 years, and had serviced claimant’s equipment for 10 years. Loren Towne further testified that the value of the refrigeration equipment lost in the fire was $14,000.00, and miscellaneous equipment valued at $600.00.

C. UPSTAIRS STORAGE. There is evidence in the record that the value of 75 banana boxes and 50 banana drums destroyed in the fire was $450.00.

D. WAREHOUSE STORAGE. In this category, there is evidence in the record, which establishes the following damages:

Canfield Beverages .....................$2,350.00

Loss of Profit on the same............... 695.00

Canfield Empty Bottles.................. 1-50.00

Graf beverages and miscellaneous beverages 3,023.50

Loss of profit on Graf and miscellaneous beverages ............. 1,209.40

E. COOLER. The evidence is that the wholesale cost of the items in the cooler destroyed in the fire was $300.00, with a loss of profits of $100.00. There is also evidence that the beverage truck destroyed by the fire should be valued at $1,200.00, and that the accounts receivable, which were not collectable by reason of the fact that all of the records were destroyed, amounted to approximately $2,500.00.

F. LOSS OF BUSINESS. This is the final category of damages. Claimant testified that as a result of the fire he was put out of business. He testified that his past profits amounted to approximately $800.00 net per month. There was ample testimony that before the fire he had an established business in wholesale beverages and produce, and that because of the fire he was not able to resume that business. There was testimony bearing on the reasonable certainty that profits would have been made, orders received before and after the fire, output capacity of the business before the fire, output capacity of the business after the fire, and claimant’s inability to relocate.

In the opinion of this Court there is ample testimony in the record to make an award for loss of business.

While some of the evidence introduced by claimant with respect to the value of items destroyed in the fire appears somewhat uncertain, it is the opinion of this Court that such evidence is not so uncertain, contingent, or speculative as tó bar a recovery. It is the opinion of this Court that claimant has established by competent evidence the extent of damages suffered, and has established the amount of damages with a reasonable degree of certainty. Considering all of the elements of the case and the various categories of damage, which claimant has suffered, it is the opinion of this Court that claimant has sustained a loss in excess of $25,000.00.

An award is hereby made to claimant in the amount of $25,000.00.


author: Perlin, C.J.

text:
    (No. 5573
    Village of Weston, a Municipal Corporation; West Chicago State Bank, an Illinois Corporation; The Illinois Bell Telephone Company, an Illinois Corporation; The Commonwealth Edison Company, an Illinois Corporation; Samuel A. La Susa; Louis Ancel; William S. Lawrence and Associates, Inc. ; Edmund M. Burke and Associates, Ltd. ; Grumley, Dicke, Thorton and Clark ; and Wheaton Daily Journal, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 29, 1969.

    Ancel, Stonesifer and Glink, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimants seek recovery of a total sum of $43,800.00 resulting from professional services performed on behalf of the Village of Weston by the claimants, pursuant to contracts entered into between the claimants and the Village of Weston.

The parties in this case have submitted a stipulation, which sets forth in part the following:

“3. That claimants submitted bills for their services, and that said bills were approved by the Corporate Authorities of the Village at a duly constituted meeting.
“4. That the amounts set forth in Paragraph 6 hereof are the fair and reasonable value of the services performed by the claimants, and that said amounts are due and owing.
“5. That, as a direct and proximate result of the acquisition by the State of Illinois of all of the property comprising said Village of Weston, thus removing all such property from the tax rolls as tax exempt property, the said Village will be precluded from levying or collecting any future property taxes, thus destroying the ability of said Village to provide funds to pay the amounts claimed by the claimants herein.
“6. That the following (reduced) amounts represent and are a fair and reasonable settlement and compromise of the claims herein, which, as compromised, are as follows:
Samuel A. La Susa ..................$ 30,000.00
Louis Ancel.......................... 5,800.00
William S. Lawrence and Associates, Inc. 6,000.00 Edmund M. Burke and Associates, Ltd. .. 2,000.00
total ................................$ 43,800.00
“9. That each of the claimants herein is justly entitled to receive from the State of Illinois in this cause the amounts set forth in Paragraph 6 hereof.”

The stipulation further states that “upon the approval of said claims in this proceeding, the Corporation Authorities of the Village of Weston will take such action as may be necessary to cause the dissolution of said Village of Weston as a municipal corporation.”

There being no question in dispute, the claimants are hereby awarded the sum of $43,800.00 to be distributed as set forth in the foregoing stipulation.


text:
    (No. 5606
    County of Cook and Cook County Department of Public Aid, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 29, 1969.

      Edward V. Hanrahan, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimants, County of Cook and the Cook County Department of Public Aid, seek recovery of $408,278.80 for hospitalization services rendered to various citizens of Cook County under Chap. 23, Sec. 12-21.15 (Public Aid Code), 1967 Ill. Rev. Stats., which provides in part:

“In counties providing aid under Article VII for persons who fall sick or die in a city, village, or incorporated town of more than 500,000 inhabitants, or in an incorporated town, which has superseded a civil township located within such county, the Illinois Department shall reimburse the county for expenses incurred for such aid (1) in a county hospital maintained by it under Sec. 24 of ‘An Act to revise the law in relation to counties’, . . .”

The complaint sets forth that the hospital rendered the services described, and gave blood to various patients; that the respondent’s requirements of examining, auditing, approving each patient’s account have been so examined, audited, and approved by the agents and representatives of respondents; and that the claimants are entitled to the amount claimed.

In answer to the complaint, respondent sets forth the Departmental Report of the State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, which states that claimants failed to submit invoices for the services claimed before the appropriation for the biennium lapsed from which such claim could have been paid, and that claimants are justly entitled to the amount of the claim. The report also admitted all claimants’ allegations.

Claimants have requested summary judgment of its claim. Respondent does not contest claimants’ motion. There appear to be no triable issues of fact.

It has long been a rule of the Court that, where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and, (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509. It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimants ’ motion for a summary judgment is hereby granted, and claimants are hereby awarded the sum of $403,278.80.


text:
    (No. 5568
    Marx Industrial Maintenance, Inc., An Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 3, 1969.

    Herman R. Tavins, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks recovery of the sum of $2,632.50 for landscape services at State License Centers. It appears that the services were performed by claimant for the Secretary of State, Purchasing Division.

The parties have stipulated that there is lawfully due the claimant the sum of $2,632.50. They further stipulate that, as a result of delay in billing by the claimant, payment was not made prior to the closing of the biennial appropriation.

Where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and, (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509. It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $2,632.50.


text:
    (No. 5574
    Anken Chemical and Film Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 3, 1969.

    Anken Chemical and Film Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks recovery of the sum of $38,400.99 from respondent for materials and services rendered to the Office of the Secretary of State, Department of Motor Vehicles.

It appears that the materials and services were received by respondent, but that, as a result of delay in billing by the claimant, payment was not made prior to the closing of the biennial appropriation.

The parties have stipulated to a reduced sum in part as follows:

“7. That the said amount of $38,144.49 is lawfully due and owing to the claimant from the respondent, and should be paid.”

Where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and, (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509. It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $38,144.49.


text:
    (No. 5440
    Gertrude K. Allen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 11, 1969.

    Max L. Weinberg, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant seeks to recover the sum of $2,415.00 for rent of premises occupied by respondent, as well as damages, interest and reasonable attorneys fees. From the complaint it appears that the State of Illinois had been renting certain premises from one Robert R. Collier, alleged owner of the premises, under the terms of a lease, which began December 1, 1961. The complaint alleges that Collier was not the owner of the premises, and that claimant was the proper person entitled to receive rent for occupation of the same.

On the 17th day of April, 1968, a stipulation executed by claimant’s counsel and the Attorney General on behalf of the State of Illinois, was filed with the Clerk of the Court. The Court refused to consider this stipulation on the basis that it was not completely adequate in relation to the circumstances involved, and requested that the parties work out a more detailed stipulation of facts. On the 19th day of February, 1969, an amendment to the stipulation was filed by the Attorney General on behalf of the State of Illinois as respondent stating as follows:

“7. That under the stipulation of facts entered into between Francis S. Lorenz, Director of the Department of Public Works and Buildings, and claimant, claimant is justly entitled to recover from respondent the sum of $2,415.00, as such sum is lawfully due and owing to claimant.”

Taking into consideration the facts as set forth in the original stipulation, and the recommendation of the Attorney General contained in the amendment set forth above, claimant is awarded the sum of $2,415.00.


text:
    (No. 5595
    The County of Randolph, Claimant; vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1969.

    Don J. Koeneman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant, The County of Randolph, seeks reimbursement of $10,657.50, representing expenses incurred by claimant and its officials for services performed in connection with court proceedings involving petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus by inmates of the Illinois State Penitentiary and the Illinois Security Hospital. These are penal and charitable institutions of the State of Illinois. Both are located within the County of Randolph.

The parties hereto have stipulated to the facts herein, and have agreed that with appropriate deletions “the total amount of the claim is the sum of $10,657.50”.

Similar claims have heretofore been adjudicated in this Court, the most recent being Case No. 5378.

An award is, therefore, made to claimant, The County of Randolph, in the amount of $10,657.50.


text:
    (No. 5410
    Wallace Pantenberg and Helen Pantenberg, A Limited Partnership, d/b/a Mendota Diesel and Truck Service, Claimant, vs. Department of Public Works and Buildings, State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1969.

    Baker and Wagner, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

On January 26, 1967, a severe blizzard struck Lee County, Illinois, covering the highways with snow. The Division of Highways dispatched equipment to clear the highways, including several trucks that were operating on U. S. Route 52 near Mendota, Illinois. While removing snow from the highways, one of the trucks became stuck approximately seven miles north of Mendota, Illinois, on Route 52.

Helen M. Pantenberg, one of the claimants herein, testified that at approximately 3:30 p.m. on January 26, 1967, Eugene Washburn, Field Engineer for the Dixon Highway District, called the claimants’ place of business, and requested the services of claimants’ wreckers on Route 52. The caller said they were having trouble with State trucks stalled on Route 52, and requested claimants to send wreckers to assist them. Helen Pantenberg testified that she told the caller that one wrecker was already out, and that she would send the big wrecker, and, just as soon as the other wrecker got in, she would send that one up too.

The big wrecker went immediately to the spot where State truck T-7062 was stuck in the snow seven miles north of Mendota on U. S. Route 52. The large wrecker pulled State truck T-7062 from the ditch, and put it back into service. However, shortly thereafter State truck T-7062 again became stuck in a snowbank, and required the services of the big wrecker to remove it from the snowbank, and put it back into service.

The small wrecker was dispatched to assist several snowplows on Route 52 at about 5:00 p.m. on January 26, 1967. There is testimony in the record that the small wrecker pulled two highway snowplows out of snowbanks on at least two separate occasions. It appears from the record in this case that the large wrecker was engaged in assisting State Highway trucks from approximately 3:30 p.m. until at least 10:00 p.m. for a total of 6M hours. It also appears from the record that the small wrecker was engaged in assisting State Highway trucks and snowplows from approximately 5:30 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. for a total of 4/2 hours.

Wallace Pantenberg, one of the claimants in this action, testified that he has two wreckers in his business. One is a large 6-wheel drive wrecker, which rents for $35.00 an hour, and the other is a small wrecker, which rents for $25.00 an hour.

Respondent has not denied that claimants were asked to assist in removing a number of State Highway trucks from snowbanks on the date in question. There is some controversy as to whether the request was for one or both of the trucks. However, there appears to be evidence in the record that the request was for both trucks. There is also testimony in the record that claimants submitted a bill to respondent in the sum of $570.00, and that respondent has paid to claimants the sum of $150.00.

The issue in this case is whether claimants are entitled to compensation in excess of $150.00 for the services rendered to the State of Illinois on the date in question.

It is the opinion of this Court that respondent should pay to claimants the rental value of the large wrecker for the hours that the large wrecker was engaged in assisting State trucks at the rate of $35.00 per hour, which amounts to $227.50, and the rental value of the smaller wrecker for the 412-hour period that the small wrecker was engaged in assisting State trucks at the rate of $25.00 per hour, which amounts to $112.50, or a grand total of $340.00. Since respondent has already paid claimants the sum of $150.00, the Court hereby makes an award to claimants in the sum of $190.00.


text:
    (No. 5426
    Jacquelynne Gilmore and Carmella Jones, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1969.

    Minn and Auslander, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

The uncontested facts of this case are that on July 13, 1966, claimant, Jacquelynne Gilmore, was the operator of automobile in which claimant, Carmella Jones, was a passenger. The automobile was proceeding in a southerly direction on South Shore Drive at the intersection of 23rd Street in the City of Chicago. As the automobile of claimant was passing beneath the 23rd Street overpass, a portion of the railing of the overpass fell upon it, striking and shattering the windshield, and landing on the lap of claimant, Carmella Jones.

The slab of concrete was introduced into evidence, and appeared to weigh between six and seven pounds. It was approximately eight inches in length, and six to seven inches in width. The Chicago Police took claimants to the Michael Reese Hospital for first aid. The evidence indicates that the special damages suffered by Jacquelynne Gilmore amounted to $242.00, and the special damages for claimant, Carmella Jones, amounted to $215.00. The special damages of both claimants included medical expenses and loss of wages.

Respondent filed a departmental report, but offered no testimony relating to the occurrence.

It is claimants’ contention that the State of Illinois was guilty of negligence by reason of the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur. Respondent contends that the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur is not applicable because the claimants have failed to establish the element of control by respondent.

In the opinion of this Court the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur is properly invoked by claimants. In Charles M. Kenney, Administrator, etc., vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 247, the Court stated:

“Under the maxim res ipsa locquitur, our courts have announced many times that where a thing, which has caused injury, is shown to be under the management of the party charged with negligence, an accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen, if the management uses proper care. The accident itself affords reasonable evidence in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care.”

In the case of McCleod vs. Nel-Co Corp., 112 N.E.2d 501; 350 Ill. App. 216, plaintiff rented a room in a hotel, and, while in bed, piaster fell from the ceiling, and landed on the head of the plaintiff. The court in this case invoked the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur, and stated:

“... Requirement that before the rule of res ipsa locquitur can be applied it must appear that the instrumentality was under the management and control of the defendant does not mean or is not limited to actual physical control, but refers rather to the right of control at that time.”

While it might be argued in this case that the State of Illinois did not have actual physical control over the bridge from which a piece of the railing fell onto the claimants, it is the opinion of this Court that the State of Illinois did have the right of control at the time of the occurrence.

In this case there is no evidence, nor is there any contention on the part of respondent, that claimants were guilty of contributory negligence. Respondent has offered no evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence raised by the application of the doctrine of res ipsa locquitur. In the opinion of this Court, respondent is liable for the damages inflicted on claimants.

The Court hereby makes an award to claimant, Jacquelynne Gilmore, for her medical expenses and loss of wages, pain and suffering in the sum of $800.00; and makes an award to claimant, Carmella Jones, for her medical expenses, loss of wages, pain and suffering in the sum of $750.00.


text:
    (No. 5448
    Glader Corporation, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1969.

    Shurl Rosmarin, Attorney for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General, Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant, an employment agency, seeks the sum of $1,200.00 for services rendered to respondent pursuant to an agreement, dated August 15, 1966. The agreement provided as follows:

“Whereas, the Office of the Secretary of the State of Illinois desires to employ a qualified Computer System Analyst with extensive experience with the Univac III Programing in Salt Language. Said person to be employed must have at least a minimum experience with NCR Optical Scanner and Optical Font adding machine input to Univac III System.
“Whereas, the Glader Corporation of 110 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, Certified Personnel Service, desires to acquire such a person as requested by the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Illinois:
“Therefore, it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that should the Glader Corporation furnish the Office of the Secretary of State with a person possessing the above stated qualifications, and who is acceptable to the Office of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State agrees to pay the personnel fee for the services of said Glader Corporation up to and including the sum of $1,400.00.”

The contract was signed by the Secretary of State through his agent, and by Florence Smith for the Glader Corporation.

Claimant alleges that it furnished a qualified computer system analyst to respondent, namely Ernest Smale, who commenced work as an employee of respondent on September 1, 1966. Claimant further alleges that it presented a claim to respondent through his Administrative Assistant, I. Lawrence Richardson, on or about November 21, 1966, on which date the check, which had been issued by respondent to claimant, had been stopped; and, that claimant is entitled to the amount claimed herein.

A departmental report submitted by respondent denies that Ernest Smale met the qualifications of the contract in that “he did not have the extensive experience with Univac III Programing in Salt Language, nor did he have at least a minimum experience with NCR Optical Scanner and Optical Font adding machine input to Univac III System.” Respondent further contends that there was no provision in the contract as to when a decision as to acceptability must be made, and that a reasonable time, which must be inferred, would be six months.

Mr. Richardson testified that Mr. Smale worked for respondent for two and one-half months with six days of unexcused absences. He further testified that Mr. Smale could not program in Salt Language; that three people had to be hired to assist him, and that his work was not acceptable. Mr. Richardson stated that it would take a year to see if a man is qualified, and that Mr. Smale was not fired, but left of his own volition.

Mr. Richardson stated that payment on the check to claimant was stopped after he received notification that Mr. Smale was quitting. He also admitted that the reason for stopping payment on the check was not because S male’s qualifications were unsatisfactory, but that he sought employment elsewhere.

The matter appears to be resolved by the following provision of Ch. 48, Sec. 197(e), Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971:

“If the employer pays the fee, and the employee fails to remain in the position for a period of 30 days, such licensee shall refund to the employer all fees less an amount equal to 25% of the total salary or wages paid such employee during the period of such employment within 3 days after said licensed person has been notified of the employee’s failure to remain in the employment. . .’’

A further provision provides that, if the employee pays the fee, and is discharged at any time within 30 days for any reason other than “intoxication, dishonesty, unexcused tardiness, unexcused absenteeism or insubordination, or otherwise fails to remain in the position for a period of 30 days through no fault of his own, such licensee shall refund to the employee all fees. . .”

It is clear that the intent of the statute is that an employment agency is entitled to its fee from either the employer or the employee depending upon the original agreement, if the employee remains in the employment for a period of 30 days or more. The employee in the instant case worked for a period of more than 30 days. Therefore, claimant is entitled to the agreed sum of $1,200.00.

Claimant is hereby awarded $1,200.00.


text:
    (No. 5498
    Cavalier Insurance Corporation, as Subrogee of Virlee Brown, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1969.

    E. Paul Rustin, Attorney for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Cavalier Insurance Corporation, as Subrogee of Virlee Brown, seeks recovery for damages to Brown’s automobile in the sum of $265.80, which were incurred in an accident on October 20, 1966.

From the evidence it appears that Virlee Brown was the owmer of an automobile driven by one Clytee E. Fox; that said automobile was standing in the line of traffic, facing south, at 5118 North Cicero Avenue in the City of Chicago; that Kenneth Zydek was employed by the State of Illinois, and was operating a 1966 International truck, license No. U-5508, in a southerly direction; and, that the truck driven by Zydek collided with the rear of Virlee Brown’s automobile, causing damages thereto in the sum of $265.80.

Cavalier Insurance Corporation paid Virlee Brown the said sum of $265.80, and under its policy of insurance is now subrogated to the rights of the said insured.

It should be noted that no departmental report was submitted, and the respondent offered no testimony in its behalf. Before claimant makes a recovery it must be proved by a preponderance of evidence that he was free from contributory negligence, and that respondent’s negligence was the proximate cause of damages suffered.

From the evidence we are of the opinion that Kenneth Zydek was guilty of negligence in the operation of respondent’s truck, and was acting in the course of his employment; and, further, that there is no evidence of contributory negligence on the part of Virlee Brown, as owner of the car, or Clytee E. Fox, as driver.

Claimant, Cavalier Insurance Corporation, as Subrogee of Virlee Brown, is hereby awarded the sum of $265.80.


text:
    (No. 5527
    William S. White, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1969.

    William S. White, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5639
    W. A. Nye, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1969.

    W. A. Nye, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5642
    Paxton Community Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Lincoln State School, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1969.

    Paxton Community Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5646
    American Laundry Machinery Industries, Division of McGraw-Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1969.

    Teller, Levit and Silvertrust, Attorneys for Claimant,
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 3025
    Elva Jennings Penwell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 9, 1969.

    Gosnell, Benecki and Quindry, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant filed her petition for reimbursement for monies expended for nursing care and help, medical services, and expenses from February 1, 1968 to January 1, 1969, praying for an award in the sum of $5,245.47.

Claimant was seriously injured in an accident on the 2nd day of February, 1936, while employed as a Supervisor at the Illinois Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Children’s School at Normal, Illinois. The complete details on this injury can be found in the original cause of action, Penwell vs. State of Illinois, 11 C.C.R. 365.

On the 7th day of August, 1969, a stipulation between claimant and respondent was filed with the Clerk of the Court of Claims, as follows:

The petition filed by claimant seeking an award in the sum of $5,245.47 shall be admitted into evidence in this proceeding without objection by either party.
No other oral or written evidence will be introduced by either party.
The Commissioner to which this case has been assigned and the Court may make and file their reports, recommendations, orders and decisions based upon the pleadings heretofore filed, and the evidence herein stipulated.
Neither party objects to the entry of an order in favor of claimant and against respondent in the sum of $5,245.47.
Neither party desires to file briefs in this proceeding.
Both parties waive notice of any hearing, and agree that the aforesaid order may be entered without either party being present.”

An award is made to claimant for the sum of $5,245.47 for the period of time from the 1st day of February, 1968 to the 1st day of January, 1969. The matter of claimant’s need for additional care is reserved by this Court for future determination.


author: Bookwalter, J.

text:
    (No. 4858
    Betty Zidek, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Eugene R. Ward, Attorney for Claimant.
    William C. (’lark, Attorney General, Morton L. Zaslavsky and Bruce J. Finne, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.

Claimant, Betty Zidek, seeks recovery in the sum of $25,000.00 for personal injuries and related damages allegedly suffered when her automobile went out of control, and plunged over a bridge maintained by respondent.

The only testimony in this cause was given by claimant. Mrs. Zidek testified that on the morning of February 15, 1958, she was driving her automobile in a northerly direction on Harlem Avenue at or near West 69th Street in Cook County, Illinois; that she was en route to her place of employment, the National Chemical Company, which is located at 6216 West 66th Place, Clariton, Illinois. She testified that her speed at the time of the accident was approximately 15 - 20 miles per hour.

She stated that, as she was driving on the bridge over the Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad tracks at the aforesaid location, her car began to skid as a result of the icy and slippery condition of the bridge, and she skidded off of the bridge onto the railroad tracks some 75 feet below the bridge. After the car had started to skid, claimant’s testimony was to the effect that she attempted to bring the car under control, but that she did not apply her brakes.

The highway in this case rises and curves as it approaches the bridge overpass, and is slightly banked. There were no guard rails on the east side of the bridge, the one over which the car plunged, and no warning signs indicating the absence of such rails. There were, however, signs to the effect that the bridge was slippery when wet. Some time after the accident, concrete guard rails were installed on both the east and west sides of the bridge in question.

As a result of this accident, claimant sustained a dislocation of her left hip; fracture of the neck of the right hip, which was repaired by open reduction surgery and the insertion of a metal screw; a fracture of the shaft of the right femur, which was repaired by open reduction surgery and the insertion of a metal plate; fracture of the left fibula; multiple fractures of the ribs, and a cerebral concussion. Claimant’s Item of Special Damages, as testified to by claimant, and as stipulated by both parties, are as follows:

Dr. Kenneth Fitzgerald.....................................$1,500.00
Drs. Robert Meany and F. M. Howard.......................1,525.00
Arthur Wells, Physiotherapy.................................. 336.00
Little Company of Mary Hospital............................ 1,963.74
Little Company of Mary Hospital............................. 137.75
Little Company of Mary Hospital............................. 249.60
Little Company of Mary Hospital.............................. 37.75
Little Company of Mary Hospital..............................39.00
Chicago Orthopedic Company.................................82.50
Dr. A. D. Yaliunos (Anesthestist)............................... 60.00
Dr. Kenneth Wang (Anesthestist)...............................85.00
Southwest Ambulance......................................... 28.00
Medicines....................................................60.61
Household Help............................................. 800.00
Loss of wages as indicated by letter from Employer, National
Chemical Company....................................... 1,950.00
Total ' $8,854.95

Claimant testified that, as a result of the accident, she is unable to bend her right knee, and that her right leg is stiff, causing her to walk with a limp.

In order for claimant to be entitled to an award she must prove the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) That respondent was negligent; (2) That such negligence was the proximate cause of her injury; and (3) That claimant was in the exercise of due care for her own safety. We are all aware of the fact that the State of Illinois is not an insurer of all persons who travel its highways. However, the State is bound to maintain its highways in such a manner that those using them may travel in a reasonably safe manner.

In this case respondent did nothing to fulfill its duty to the public to maintain the roadway in a safe condition. There were no warning signs and no temporary barricade even though respondent knew of the dangerous condition of the bridge when it became slippery due to moisture, and the even more dangerous condition where, as in this case, the bridge was covered with snow and ice. There is no question that the absence of the guard rails was the cause in fact of the injuries sustained by claimant, and the proximate cause of these injuries. Had the guard rails or some other temporary structure been in place, this type of accident would never have occurred.

Respondent’s emphasis on the case of Vogt, et al, vs. State of Illinois, 18 C.C.R. 202 is misplaced. In that case the skidding of claimant’s car was the cause of his injury, a fact for which respondent could not be held accountable, whereas in the case before us the absence of the guard rails was the proximate cause of claimant’s severe injuries, and not alone the skidding of her automobile.

We are of the opinion that claimant’s testimony as to the speed of her vehicle at the time of the accident and as to her attempt to bring the car under control, without evidence to the contrary by respondent, discharges her burden of proving that she was free from contributory negligence. It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that claimant be awarded the sum of $19,500.00 as an award for medical expenses, loss of earnings, pain and suffering, and for any permanent disability or loss of use she may have sustained.


text:
    (No. 5252
    Fred C. Gronbach, Calvin O. Gronbach, and Betty Gronbach, his wife, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Perona and Perona, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton Zaslavsky, Etta J. Cole and Sheldon Rachman, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimants seek recovery of the sum of $2,888.28 for damages sustained to farm land owned by claimants after respondent took part of the land for the construction of Interstate 80. The claimants request reimbursement for monies spent to correct a flooding condition and for loss of specific crops.

The evidence shows that claimants are owners of 80 acres of land in Bureau County, Illinois, now and prior to 1963. In 1963, the State of Illinois built Interstate 80, which intersected claimants’ farm, and caused the highway to be approximately ten to fifteen feet higher than claimants’ land.

Respondent’s only witness, James McCoy, the project engineer testified that in 1963 the State of Illinois acquired claimants’ land for the necessary right-of-way for the sum of approximately $500.00 per acre. He testified that the settlement included land taken and damage for the remainder through severance and triangulation. Mr. McCoy stated that the possibility of a future drainage problem was discussed in the negotiations, but it was decided that it would be “speculative and conjecture” to determine the damages, and, if there were any, “this should be taken up with the Court of Claims”. The deeds to the land are not a part of the evidence, nor was there a departmental report submitted.

Claimants’ only witness, Calvin O. Gronbach, testified that the drainage of the farm before 1963 was good, but that after the road was installed, the farm was flooded and crops were drowned for two years in a row, which caused claimants to lose four acres of corn one year and seven acres the next.

Claimants submitted into evidence a plan of tiling to correct the flooding, which was prepared for them by the United States Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service in cooperation with the Bureau County Soil Conservation Service, and stated that they had hired a tiler to lay the tile as specified in the plan. Claimants spent $1,565.70 for tile and labor, and are also seeking reimbursement in the sum of $180.00 for the use of their cat machine at $15.00 per hour. They claim $1,056.00 in damages for four acres of corn lost in 1963, and seven acres of corn lost in 1964. The loss was computed at eighty bushels per acre at $1.20 per bushel. On cross examination, claimant testified that the corn would bring $1.20 per bushel on the market, but the cost of production was not figured in claimants’ estimate, and that cost would be between $0.60 to $0.80 per bushel.

Respondent objects to claimants’ request for reimbursement on the grounds that claimants took no bids for the tile work, nor obtained prior authority from the State to hire the particular tiler; that the construction of the highway was not proven to be the sole cause for the damage; that there was no evidence that the damage was not caused by an abnormally high rainfall; that the damages are speculative, and that claimants could not rely on representations by State employees as to payment for future damages.

However, respondent has submitted no evidence that the damages were not incurred by claimants; that the amount spent to correct the flooding was not reasonable, nor that there was another cause for the flooding.

Whether claimants may seek consequential damages after having been compensated for the land was decided in the case of Gan vs. State of Illinois, Court of Claims No. 5201. In that case, the right-of-way for a road built by respondent was procured, and the deed contained “the usual release from liability and damages to remaining property caused by the use, construction or opening up of the highway.” After the road was constructed, claimants’ property, which was approximately 23 feet below the grade of the highway,was flooded. Claimants contended that the flooding was caused by the failure of the Division of Highways to provide drainage. The Court denied recovery for depreciation of property value, because claimants had knowledge of the highway’s construction when they built their home, and also granted the right-of-way in a recorded deed. However, the Court allowed reimbursement for all expenditures made to, correct the flooding condition stating: “This Court holds that claimants are entitled to just compensation for consequential damages actually sustained subsequent to the taking of the property under the Eminent Domain Act, and after the construction of the highway.” (Tenboer vs. State of Illinois, 21 C.C.R. 359).

The instant case falls within the rules set forth in the Gan case, and claimants are entitled to the actual damages incurred by reason of the flooding.

Therefore, claimants may recover $1,565.70 for tile and labor, $180.00 for use of the cat machine, and $528.00 for loss of crops.

Claimants are hereby awarded the sum of $2,273.70.


text:
    (No. 5411
    Duffy Dodge, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Normano A. Cohen, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Bruce J. Finne, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5428
    Jones Towing, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    McBride, Baker, Wienke and Schlosser and Campoy and Horne, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky and Etta J. Cole, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

The complaint of claimant, a Louisiana Corporation, seeks recovery in the amount of $5,119.70 for damages sustained to its Barge JONES-110 on the DesPlaines River on August 13,1966, when a bridge owned and operated by respondent closed and struck the barge.

The record consists principally of depositions of claimant’s witnesses, and a stipulation of both parties that the depositions may be received in lieu of oral testimony. Respondent offered no witnesses on its behalf, and filed no departmental report.

The evidence shows that the barge was being towed on the DesPlaines River at or near the Ruby Street bridge in Joliet, Illinois. George Durham, a mate, who was on the barge at front end during the accident, testified that the boat blew a signal whistle for the approach to the bridge. The bridge tender responded with a green light, and proceeded to open the bridge, but, when the barge was about half way under, the bridge was dropped, tearing a valve on the load line of the barge, which carried tanks on it. Mr. Durham further testified that a green light means that the bridge is opening, and was blinking at the time of the occurrence.

Claimant originally sought damages to the barge in the sum of $5,119.70, but later testimony of Rubin Cioll, president of claimant corporation, revealed that replacement of two 8" gate valves amounted to $790.00, and that it cost $50.00 to test two cargo headers. A stipulation signed by the parties states: “That, if liability is established, claimant’s damages do not exceed the sum of $800.00.”

There is no dispute on the question of respondent’s negligent operation of the bridge in lowering it after giving notice that the boat could proceed downstream.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $800.00.


text:
    (No. 5530
    Stevenson Auto and Electrical School, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Stevinson Auto and Electrical School, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.


text:
    (No. 5532
    Mary M. Wilson and Wayne W. Wilson, d/b/a Hawthorne Drug Company, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Stuart, Neagle and West, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimants seek recovery of the sum of $272.45 for damages done to claimants’ drug store when one Walter R. Bunge, an inmate of the Galesburg State Research Hospital, escaped on October 10, 1967.

The action is brought pursuant to the following provision:

Whenever a claim is filed .... for damages resulting from personal injuries or damages to property, or both, or for damages resulting from property being stolen, heretofore or hereafter caused by an inmate who has escaped from a charitable, penal, reformatory or other institution over which the State of Illinois has control while he was at liberty after his escape, the Department of Mental Health, .... shall conduct an investigation to determine the cause, nature and extent of the damages, and, if it be found after investigation that the damage was caused by one who had been an inmate of such institution and had escaped, the Department or Commission may recommend to the Court of Claims that an award be made to the injured party, and the Court of Claims shall have the power to hear and determine such claims. (Ch. 23, Sec. 4041, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1967)

The evidence reveals the following undisputed facts:

On October 10, 1967, and for approximately seven years prior thereto, Walter R. Bunge was an inmate of the Galesburg State Research Hospital, Galesburg, Illinois. The hospital is an institution operated and maintained by the State of Illinois through its Department of Mental Health.

Terry Moon, a psychiatric social worker at the hospital, testified that prior to October 10,1967, Mr. Bunge escaped from the hospital seven times, and that on some of those occasions he attempted to take his life. The records of the hospital showed that Bunge escaped about 7:30 p.m. on the day in question, and returned the same evening. The hospital file also reflected that Mr. Bunge broke into the Hawthorne Drug Store in Galesburg, Illinois, at that time, and while at the store he attempted to commit suicide by cutting his left wrist with a razor blade. Mr. Moon further testified that Mr. Bunge has had another unauthorized absence from the hospital since that date. Mr. Moon stated:

“Walter ruminates of suicide, and consequently suicide precautions are taken for him in the hospital, watched particularly close. However, he does not reside on a closed ward. He has freedom to move through the hospital, as most of our patients do.”

On the occasions when he escaped he just walked out of the hospital, according to Mr. Moon.

Wayne Wilson, claimant, testified that he and Mary M. Wilson were the owners of the Hawthorne Drug Company located at 15 East Main in Galesburg, and that on October 11, 1967, he received a call from the police department in the early morning hours that someone had broken into his store. He went to the drug store, and observed that the glass in the front door had been broken. There was glass inside the store from the door, and on the east side of the store “the carpeting was saturated with blood, and the merchandise and the shelves on the north end of the prescription counter was all bloody.”

Mr. Wilson further testified that he had the door boarded up, and the carpeting was cleaned the next morning, but that the carpet cleaners could not remove all the blood stains. There were twelve square yards of carpeting, which had been installed a year before October 10, 1967, which remained stained. Nothing was stolen, except a pack of razor blades was lying on the counter, and one had been removed.

Claimant contends that respondent was negligent in not providing adequate supervision and confinement of Mr. Bunge; that his suicidal tendencies are such that “he should be under constant supervision, not only for the protection of the patient, but also for the safety and well-being of the person and property of others, and the public generally”; that he has escaped nine times from the hospital, and has attempted to take his life on some occasions.

Respondent argues that on the other occasions of Mr. Bunge’s unauthorized absences, he had returned the same day without incident of any kind or harm to any property or any member of the public, and it could not be foreseen that the patient would leave the hospital to break into a store, get hold of a razor blade, and attempt suicide in the store.

Respondent further notes that claimant was reimbursed in the amount of $91.00 by his insurance carrier for some of the damage, which amount should be deducted from any award.

The Court must conclude that respondent was negligent in its supervision of a patient who had escaped seven times prior to the occasion in question, and had tried to take his life at least some of those times. Although he was watched particularly close while in the hospital, it is apparent that no precautions were taken to see that he remained in the institution to which he was confined. A finding of negligence does not necessitate a finding that the specific act committed by an escaped inmate could have been foreseen. Respondent had ample reason to foresee that an escape by the patient could result in harm to himself or to the public.

Claimants are hereby awarded the sum of $181.45, being the amount claimed less the $91.00 paid by the insurance carrier.


text:
    (No. 5555
    Sinclair Refining Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Military and Naval Department, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Sinclair Refining Ccompany, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.


text:
    (No. 5569
    Sinclair Refining Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Sinclair Refining Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5626
    Wendell Niepagen, d/b/a Wendell Niepagen Greenhouse, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Costigan and Wollrab, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.

Claimant, Wendell Niepagen, seeks recovery in the amount of $634.44, this being the amount of credit extended by claimant to the Illinois Youth Commission for its purchase of certain plants during the years of 1965, 1966, and 1967.

The parties to this action have stipulated as follows:

“The report of the office of the Illinois Youth Commission, dated April 17, 1969, shall be admitted into evidence in this proceeding without objection by either party.
“No other oral or written evidence will be introduced by either party.
“The Commissioner to which this case has been assigned and the Court may make and file their reports, recommendations, orders and decisions based upon the pleadings heretofore filed, and the evidence herein stipulated.
“Neither party objects to the entry of an order in favor of claimant and against respondent in the sum of $634.44.”

The Illinois Youth Commission in its report admits to the fact that it purchased from Mr. Niepagen certain plants comprising a total amount of $634.44, and that Mr. Niepagen had supplied all of the items purchased.

Since there appears to be no dispute concerning the fact that claimant has performed all the services entitling him to payment, and the only reason for non-payment of his claim is the fact that it is not possible for the Illinois Youth Commission to make payment from its present appropriations, this Court hereby awards claimant the sum of $634.44.


text:
    (No. 5634
    Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, d/b/a St. Anthony Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Miller, Hickey, Collins and Close, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.


text:
    (No. 5644
    Uniroyal, Inc., A New Jersey Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Maracos, Richter, Russell and Gardner, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.


text:
    (No. 5653
    Charles R. Williams, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Charles R. Williams, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant, Charles R. Williams, seeks recovery of the sum of $200.00, which was deposited with the Office of the Secretary of State on January 28, 1963, pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Law. (Ch. 95M, Sec. 7-503, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.). The requirement of deposit arose out of an automobile accident, which occurred on October 19,1962, and involved a vehicle driven by claimant.

The evidence shows that a suit did arise out of the accident, being Case No. 64 L 3278 in the Circuit Court of Cook County, and being entitled “Charles R. Williams vs. Percy P. Casey”. This suit was resolved on March 25,1969, before Judge Meyer Goldstein when a not guilty verdict was rendered.

The evidence further shows that claimant made demand for said sum from the Office of the Secretary of State on May 19, 1969, which Office refused the demand on the grounds that the $200.00 had been transferred to the General Revenue Fund on September 8, 1966.

A stipulation has been entered into by claimant and respondent as follows:

“That claimant, Charles R. Williams, had deposited the sum with the Office of the Secretary of State — Safety Responsibility Section, as alleged in the claimant’s complaint.
That there is lawfully due claimant the sum of Two Hundred Dollars and No Cents ($200.00).
That said sum was transferred to the General Revenue Fund of the State of Illinois on September 8, 1966, pursuant to Ch. 95‘á, Sec. 7-503, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1967.
That claimant continues to be the sole person interested in this claim, and that no assignment thereof had occurred.
That upon the foregoing agreed case filed herein the Court shall decide thereon, and render judgment herein according to the rights of the parties in the same manner as if the facts aforesaid were proved upon the trial of said issue.”

Claimant, Charles R. Williams, is hereby awarded the sum of $200.00.


text:
    (No. 5657
    Harold Rothermel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Harold Rothermel, Claimant, pro se.

    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.


text:
    (No. 5658
    Tuscola Builders Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Tuscola Builders Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.


text:
    (No. 5674
    Alton Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    Alton Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5678
    American Limb and Orthopedic Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 11, 1969.

    American Limb and Orthopedic Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.