text:
    (No. 5091
    Melvin H. Shook, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Clarence B. Davis, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.

Claimant, Melvin H. Shook, seeks recovery in the sum of $15,000.00 as damages for the time he unjustly served in the Illinois State Prison. He was incarcerated from February 2, 1961, to September 28, 1962.

This cause of action arises under Section 8C of the Court of Claims Act, which states as follows: “All claims against the State for time unjustly served in prisons of this State where the persons imprisoned proved their innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned; provided, the Court shall make no award in excess of the following amounts: for imprisonment of five years or less, not more than $15,000.00. . .”

The evidence shows that on June 9,1958, the Phillips 66 Service Station in Sidney, Illinois, was burglarized. Mr. Clyde Walker, the operator of the station, observed an individual take two tires and flee. The minister of the Methodist Church in Sidney, Mr. Harold E. Sheriff, lived near the station, and immediately after the burglary saw a man unwrapping new tires. When this party fled, Mr. Sheriff notified the sheriff, and advised him that he could recognize the thief. Neither of these witnesses, however, were present to give testimony in this case, which means that claimant was not personally identified as the thief.

Claimant was arrested on June 10, 1958, in the St. Joseph area where he was working at the time. The arresting officer, Sheriff Everett J. Hedrick of Champaign County, had made a general investigation of the crime in the course of which he found claimant’s car abandoned about one-half block from the service station. Subsequent to his arrest and in the presence of Sheriff Hedrick and Deputy Sheriff Slim Boswell, claimant signed a confession in which he admitted burglarizing the Phillips 66 Service Station. Claimant was tried in absentia in the Champaign Circuit Court, and upon the finding of guilty by a jury, was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year and not more than twenty years in the Illinois State Penitentiary.

Claimant’s right of recovery is, of course, controlled by the Court of Claims Act. The Act states that one who feels that he. has been imprisoned unjustly must prove his innocence of the crime for which he was charged in order to recover damages. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the burden is placed on the claimant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty of the “fact” of the crime. Dirkans vs. State of Illinois, Case No. 4904; Martin vs. State of Illinois, Case No. 5136. Claimant thus must show that he did not commit the act of burglary.

Claimant’s only evidence put forward to sustain this burden was the fact of his release by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and his uncorroborated testimony that he did not commit the crime. The Supreme Court released claimant upon a Writ of Habeas Corpus, but did not file any opinion. This in no way proves that claimant was not guilty of the crime charged, but only indicates that his constitutional rights were violated in that he was tried in absentia, and was deprived of his due process of law.

The uncorroborated testimony of claimant is contradicted by the confession that he signed, which was introduced by respondent.

The law in Illinois is clear that claimant must prove his innocence in order to entitle him to an award by the Court of Claims. The burden is upon claimant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) That the time served in prison was unjust; (2) That the act for which he was wrongfully imprisoned was not committed by him; and, (3) The amount of damages to which he is entitled. Dirkans vs. State of Illinois, Case No. 4904.

It is the opinion of this Court that claimant’s evidence does not sustain his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the act for which he was wrongfully imprisoned was not committed by him. Therefore, his claim for an award against the State of Illinois in the sum of $15,000.00 is hereby denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Perlin, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 5186
    James Barrow and Denby Barrow, a Minor, by and through his Father and Next Friend, James Barrow, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Liebenson and Raszus, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman and Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimants, James Barrow and Denby Barrow, a Minor, through his Father, James Barrow, seek recovery of $1,000 each for damages and personal injury when a truck owned by respondent, and operated by its employee, Arzell Hyde, collided with an automobile owned and operated by claimant, James Barrow at 8:15 a.m., on March 12, 1963. The evidence reveals that Mr. Barrow’s car was stopped upon the northbound entrance ramp to the Dan Ryan Expressway near 6200 south in the City of Chicago, Illinois, and was waiting behind another car to enter traffic, when the truck, which was traveling about five miles an hour, bumped into the rear of the claimant’s automobile. Respondent does not deny its liability for the collision, but disputes the amount of damages requested by claimants.

Claimant, James Barrow, testified that at the time of the accident he was a professional bondsman for the Atlas Bonding Company. After his automobile was bumped from the rear by respondent’s truck, he did not feel the effects of the accident “until the next morning or late that night.” On March 14, two days after the accident, claimant then went to his family physician, Dr. George Barnett, also taking his son, Denby, who was with him in the automobile at the time of the collision.

Mr. Barrow testified that at the time he complained of stiffness of the neck and headaches. The doctor examined him, and gave him approximately thirteen or fourteen treatments. Medical reports submitted into evidence for Denby Barrow and James Barrow supported Mr. Barrow’s testimony, and showed bills outstanding for Denby Barrow of $119.00 and for James Barrow of $145.00. Claimant testified that as of the date of the hearing the bills had not been paid.

Mr. Barrow stated that he did not suffer any permanent injuries from the occurrence, but that he lost a week’s work as a result. He testified that he saw Dr. Barnett every day during that week, and that his son accompanied him for treatment and examination.

Claimant also testified that, based upon his average salary, he lost at least $200.00 in wages. He further testified that he was a licensed bondsman for the State of Illinois, and worked for the Atlas Bonding Company on commission. He stated that he made at least $14,000 during the year of 1963, and never made less than two hundred dollars per week, although sometimes he made four or five hundred dollars per week.

The repair bill for the automobile for $103.00 was submitted in evidence. Claimant testified that he paid the bill, and that all the damage was the result of the accident.

Denby Barrow, thirteen years old at the time of the hearing, testified that he felt no effects of the accident, but at the time his head hurt, as did his right leg, and that the doctor gave him about fifteen treatments of heat and massage.

Dr. Barnett’s report of the “Objective Symptoms” of Denby Barrow, then aged 11, includes the following:

“This patient entered the examination room with a right sided limp. On examination of this patient’s skull, there was tenderness in the left occipital region of the skull on palpitation. . . There was a slight swelling in the right popliteal area of the leg. There was tenderness in his right thigh.”

The doctor’s report of the “Objective Symptoms” of James Barrow includes the following:

“This patient entered the examination room holding his head and neck in a rather stiff position. His head and neck were turned slightly to the left. Examination of the neck muscles revealed spasms in the left posterior neck muscles. These muscles were very tender on palpitation. It felt as if there were fibrous nodules within the bodies of the left paravertebral neck muscles. This patient had limited range of motion on rotating his head and neck to the right. He had trouble and alleged pain when rotating his head and neck to the left. The muscles of his left shoulder were spastic. The left deltoid muscles were tender on palpitation. There was limitation of range of motion in the left shoulder. There was only 90 degrees of abduction of the left shoulder and 110 degrees of forward flexion of the left shoulder. . .”

Respondent argues to the request for medical expenses, because there was no corroborating testimony as to reasonableness. However, respondent did not raise the question of reasonableness during the trial, and the report of the claimants’ doctor and the itemized medical bill for treatments, which were submitted by claimants in their “Answer to Interrogatories”, would corroborate claimants’ position.

Therefore, claimant James Barrow is awarded the sum of $800.00, and Denby Barrow, a Minor, through his father and next friend, James Barrow, is awarded the sum of $350.00.


author: Bookwalter, J.

text:
    (No. 5198
    Ralph E. Wilhoit, John Owen Wilhoit and Margaret Jean Stanfield, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Brunsman, Beam and Crain and Jack Austin, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.

This is a group of claims against the State of Illinois for alleged consequential damages to crops and the value of farm land in Edgar County, Illinois, and for alleged consequential damages to a dwelling in the Village of Kansas, Illinois, by reason of certain alleged acts and omissions of the State of Illinois in the widening and improving of Illinois State Highway 16 in the spring of 1962.

It is claimants’ contention that the improvements were so constructed as to cause a change in the flow of surface waters, and an increase in the flow of water over the properties of claimants, resulting in damages to crops on approximately ten acres in 1962 in the amount of $370.00, 1963 in the amount of $184.00, and 1964 in the amount of $224.28; and damages to the village property of $5,478.00.

Claimants further contend that, if the State is allowed to leave certain ditch blocks installed in the ditches along Route 16, claimants will continue to suffer annual crop damage. An element of damages, therefore, is claimed to be loss in land value on ten acres of land at $200.00 an acre, or an additional $2,000.00.

On July 1, 1961, Ralph Wilhoit executed warranty deeds for certain parcels of property that were needed by the State for construction of the improvements on Highway 16. Contained in the warranty deeds was the following clause: “The Grantor, without limiting the fee simple interest above granted and conveyed, do hereby release the Grantee or any agency thereof forever, from any and all claim for damages sustained by the Grantor, heirs, executors or assigns by reason of the opening, improving and using the above described premises for highway purposes.” Respondent gave consideration for the deeds executed. Release clauses, as the one found in the conveyance from Ralph Wilhoit, have been construed many times by this Court, and their effect has been compared to releases of future damages found in condemnation proceedings. In Lepski Admr., Etc., vs. State of Illinois, 10 C.C.R. 170, the Court stated:

“As we view the facts herein, no award can be allowed in this case because of the conveyance by claimant’s intestate to the State of the right of way, that having the same effect as a condemnation of the same land for such public use would have had, the one being a voluntary conveyance made for public use, and the other amounting to a statutory conveyance for public use, the rule being that the appraisement of damages in a case of condemnation embraces all past, present and future damages, which the improvement may thereafter reasonably produce.”

Again, in Sauerhage vs. State of Illinois, 16 C.C.R. 217, this Court pointed out that, where an owner conveys property for public use, the consideration received for such conveyance covers all damages for property taken and also damages for injury to adjacent property not taken, the same as an assessment of damages for property taken through a condemnation proceeding would cover.

Claimant may only recover if it is shown that the damages produced were not of a nature that would have been “reasonably produced”, Lepski, Admr., Etc., vs. State of Illinois, 10 C.C.R. 170, or, if there was fraud involved in the securing of the deeds from the claimant, Cole, et al, vs. State of Illinois, 23 C.C.R. 74.

From a review of the testimony, it is the decision of this Court that claimant has not met his burden of showing that the natural drainage pattern of the area was substantially changed, and, therefore, any damages, which may have occurred, could be said to be reasonably produced.

The only fact, which would weigh against such a decision by this Court, has to do with the installation of ditch blocks in the ditches along the north and south side of Route 16. Testimony by claimant and respondent’s engineers was completely contradictory on this point. In the record, however, it will be noted that two other property owners in the area, Messrs. Brown and Pinnell, objected to the fact that, when the State lowered the depth of the ditches to three feet, they removed certain natural high points in the ditches, and that this caused water to be diverted from its natural flow. In order to remedy that situation it was necessary for the State to put in the ditch blocks, and maintain the natural course of the waters.

There was no fraud alleged in the securing of the deeds, and, therefore, it will be conclusively presumed that claimants transferred all rights to their property past, present and future, voluntarily.

Having found the release clause to be controlling, an award, therefore, is denied.


text:
    (No. 5355
    Beatrice Markley, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Meyer and Irving H. Weinstein, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslawsky, Phillip Rock, and Saul R. Wexlkr, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.

This is a claim for the sum of $20,000.00 as damages for injuries sustained by claimant when an iron fence surrounding the swine pen on the Illinois State Fairgrounds fell on claimant’s right foot.

Beatrice Markley, the claimant, testified that she was a paying patron at the Illinois State Fair, and that, while she was in the swine shed at the Fair, one of the swine bumped against an iron fence causing it to be toppled over onto her right foot. Claimant further testified that she was taken to St. John’s Hospital in Springfield, Illinois, where x-rays of her right foot were taken; that she received treatment in the hospital, and remained there for three days. She developed an infection in her foot, and Dr. Bom, her physician, placed her in the Hinsdale Sanitarium and Hospital, Hinsdale, Illinois, where she remained for ten days. The evidence indicates that claimant was absent from her job for a period of eight weeks, and incurred medical expenses of $761.57.

It was the duty of respondent to maintain the swine exhibit area in a reasonably safe condition. As the evidence points out, respondent failed to exercise this duty of care. An iron fence such as the one surrounding the swine pen would not have been knocked over had it been in a repaired and safe condition.

From the transcript of the evidence it may be seen that claimant was acting with due care for her own safety at the time of the accident.

This Court accordingly awards claimant the sum of $3,000.00.


text:
    (No. 5399
    Joseph Krieger, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Morgan, Brittain, Ketcham and Imming, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky and Bradley M. Glass, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.

This is a claim for nursing services allegedly rendered to Public Aid recipients during the months of January and February of 1966 in the Hampshire Nursing Home, Hampshire, Illinois. Claimant received $959.60 from the Department of Public Aid, but is seeking to recover the additional amount of $2,297.76. The essential facts are not in dispute.

Joseph Krieger, claimant, was the owner and operator of the Hampshire Nursing Home during 1965 and 1966. Sometime prior to October, 1965, the Department of Public Aid placed twelve Public Aid recipients in the Hampshire Nursing Home at the rates of between $190.00 and $225.00 per month, which were set by the Department of Public Aid. At the time the patients were placed in the home it was fully licensed with the Department of Public Health of the State of Illinois.

The right to operate a nursing home in the State of Illinois, and the manner in which it is operated is controlled by statute: Ch. 111/2, Sec. 35.16 thru Sec. 35.17, Ill. Rev.Stat., 1969. This statute provides in Sec. 35.17 that no person shall operate a nursing home unless he is duly licensed by the Department of Public Health.

Claimant’s license was subject to renewal on October 4, 1965, but, because of various failures to comply with minimum standards set by the Department of Public Health, the license was not immediately renewed. As of October 4,1965, claimant did not shut down his nursing home even though he was operating without a license, nor was he ordered to close by the Department of Public Health.

During a period from October 4, 1965, to February 15, 1966, claimant sought to bring the Hampshire Nursing Home up to the minimum standards required by the Department. The Department, through an inspection conducted on February 15, 1966, determined that the nursing home did meet its minimum standards. Claimant’s attorney received the following letter from the Department of Public Health under date of March 4, 1966:

“Thank you for your March 3rd letter transmitting copies Nos. 1 and 2 of the application for renewal of the home’s license. Enclosed please find the renewal certificate Annual No. NH 1448, which renews musing home license No. NH 1448 for the period October 4,1965, to October 4,1966. It was determined by Mrs. Wiener, Miss Heide and Mr. Wilson during their February 15,1966, inspection that the home did meet minimum licensing standards.
We certainly appreciate your cooperation.”

As the letter indicates, the Department considered the license as being effective from October 4,1965. On May 11, 1966, however, the Department of Public Health sent a letter to claimant indicating that the statement, “which renews nursing home license No. NH 1448 for the period October 4,1965, to October 4,1966,” was not meant to imply retroactive approval.

Claimant, upon payment of the required $50.00 fee, was issued a renewal certificate, which is effective for a period of one year. The expiration date appearing on this certificate issued by the Department of Public Health was October 4, 1966.

It is the opinion of this Court that, from the fact of the record and from a careful reading of the statute involved, the license issued to the Hampshire Nursing Home should be considered effective as of October 4, 1965. Both the renewal certificate and the letter of the Department of Public Health made it plain to claimant that the license was to run from October 4,1965, to October 4,1966. The agency clothed with the power to grant, revoke, reissue and renew licenses for nursing homes saw fit on March 4, 1966, to renew claimant’s license for the period October 4, 1965, to October 4, 1966.

The Department of Public Aid pays for care provided Public Aid recipients in facilities subject to licensing only when the facility is currently licensed by the Department of Public Health. (See Ch. 23, Sec. 3.2, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1969, and Rule 7.03.2 of the Department of Public Aid.)

The Department of Public Aid’s refusal to play claimant for nursing services rendered during January and February of 1966 was based on the fact that claimant’s license had not been renewed. However, the Department had paid claimant for the services rendered from October 4, 1965, to January 1,1966, and they at no time attempted to remove the recipients, whom they had placed in the hospital, even though a demand was made to do so by claimant. At no time, according to the testimony given, did the Department of Public Aid object to the treatment and care given Public Aid patients in the nursing home.

Since this Court has held the effective date of the license to be October 4, 1965, and has found that the nursing services were rendered by claimant’s nursing home, there is no longer a statutory bar to payment by the Department of Public Aid for services rendered by claimant’s nursing home. It is, therefore, the judgment of this Court that claimant be awarded the sum of $2,297.76.


author: BoOKWALTER, J.

text:
    (No. 5503
    Edward P. Allison Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Edward P. Allison Company, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   BoOKWALTER, J.


text:
    (No. 5673
    Gulf Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Auto Investigation Division, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Gulf Oil Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.


author: Dove, J.

text:
    (No. 5685
    Central Illinois Barber College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Central Illinois Barber College, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5686
    Central Illinois Barber College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Central Illinois Barber College, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


author: Bookwalter, ].

text:
    (No. 5687
    Mario L. Gospodinoff, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Mario L. Gospodinoff, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, ].


text:
    (No. 5690
    Evansville Association for the Blind, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Evansville Association for the Blind, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William ]. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


author: Perlin, C.j.

text:
    (No. 5694
    Thomas Plumbing and Heating Company, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

    Barash and Stoerzbach, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.j.


text:
    (No. 5180
    Clinton G. Ortgiesen, Rilla Ortgiesen, Grace Hanson, Edith Robbins Leider, Alice Margaret Thompson, Ellen Lucille Robbins, Warren G. Robbins and United States Fire Insurance Company of New York, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 26, 1970.

    Gunner and Keller and Albert H. Hanneken, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Etta Cole and Bruce J. Finne, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimants seek recovery of $21,572.80 in damages to real and personal property, which were incurred by them as a result of a fire set by three inmates, who had escaped from the Dixon State School on August 4,1963. The liability of respondent was established in the case of Jones vs. State of Illinois, No. 5141. The only issue in dispute in the instant case is the amount of damages.

The fire destroyed a house owned by claimants. The evidence reveals that the house, which was located on 100 acres of ground, contained fourteen to fifteen rooms, and was approximately 125 years old. It had no plumbing or central heat, but it did have storm windows and wiring. All but four rooms of the house were rented to a family for forty dollars per month. The remainder was used by claimants for storage of personal items.

Five witnesses testified for claimants as to the amount of loss to the real property: LaVerne John, a building contractor, testified that the replacement value of the house would be $46,325.07. However, it is well established that the proper measure of damages for a dwelling destroyed by fire is the difference in market value of the property before and after the fire when the cost of restoration exceeds the value of the property. J.W. Curran, et al. vs. State, 21 C.C.R. 278; Clark vs. Public Service Co., 278 Ill. App. 426; Hubele vs. Baldwin, 332 Ill. App. 330; Johnson vs. Pagel Clikeman Co., 343 Ill. App. 346; Dixon vs. Montgomery Ward and Co., 351 Ill. App. 75.

Claimant, Clinton G. Ortgiesen, testified that in his opinion the value of the property before the fire was $850.00 per acre, and the fair market value immediately after the fire on August 4,1963, was between $300.00 and $400.00 per acre, which amounts to a loss of approximately $45,000.00 to $55,000.00 for the 100 acre farm. Mr. Ortgiesen stated that the farm was sold after the fire for slightly under $38,500.00. Claimant further testified that he received $4,000.00 in insurance, money for the loss of the house, which was the full value of the policy.

John W. King, a former real estate broker who owned the property across the road from claimants’ property, testified that the value of the property immediately before the fire was $600.00 per acre, and immediately after the fire was $385.00 per acre, which would be a loss of $21,500.00.

Dorothy Butler testified that she was the Secretary and Managing Officer of the First Federal Savings and Loan of Dixon, and was responsible for the company’s loans. She had been a real estate salesman for 15 years. She testified that she saw the Ortgiesen house frequently, and had been in it about two years before it burned. In her opinion the fair market value of the property was $50,000.00 before the fire and $35,000.00 after the fire, which amounts to a loss of $15,000.00.

Another witness had not seen the house before it burned, and estimated that the loss was $22,472.00.

Claimant, Clinton G. Ortgiesen, was the only person who testified as the value of the personalty. Although claimant, Rilla Ortgiesen, claimed a loss of $268.30, claimant, Clinton Ortgiesen, testified that he did not have personal knowledge of the contents and a box belonging to her, and the claimants in their brief concede that proof of only a $181.00 loss was made. Respondent, in its brief, objected to claimants listing of objects as antiques, which would presumptively add more value to them. Mr. Ortgiesen testified that he prepared the list of property which was allegedly destroyed in the fire from memory, and that there was no insurance carried on the furniture and other chattels owned by himself, Grace Hanson, or Rilla Ortgiesen, although Edith Leider’s insurance covered her personal property.

The Court concludes, from the foregoing testimony, that the fair market value of the property was $50,000.00 before the fire and $38,500.00 after the fire, leaving claimants with a loss of $11,500.00 for the real property. The award for the realty is apportioned as follows:

United States Fire Insurance Company of New York $ 4,000.00 Clinton G. Ortgiesen 1,875.00 Rilla Ortgiesen 1,875.00 Grace Hanson 1,875.00 Edith Robbins Leider 468.75 Alice Margaret Thompson 468.75 Ellen Lucille Robbins 468.75 Warren G. Robbins 468.75 Total: $11,500.00
The award for personalty is as follows: Clinton G. Ortgiesen $1,000.00 Grace Hanson 70.00 Rilla Ortgiesen 181.00 Total: $1,251.00

Therefore, claimants are awarded the sum of $12,751.00, as set forth above.


text:
    (No. 5696
    Livingston Service Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 26, 1970.

    Livingston Service Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William ]. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5697
    Draughon’s Business College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Vocational Education and Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 26, 1970.

    Draughon’s Business College, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5701
    Rambo Funeral Home, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 26, 1970.

    Rambo Funeral Home, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5717
    James E. Coeur, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 26, 1970.

    James E. Coeur, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 3025
    Elva Jennings Penwell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Gosnell, Benecki and Quindry, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant filed her petition for reimbursement for monies expended for nursing care and help, medical services, and expenses from January 1,1969, to December 31, 1969, praying for an award in the sum of $5,861.49.

Claimant was seriously injured in an accident on the 2nd day of February, 1936, while employed as a Supervisor at the Illinois Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Children’s School at Normal, Illinois. The complete details of this injury can be found in the original cause of action, Penwell vs. State of Illinois, 11 C.C.R. 365, in which an initial award was made, and at which time jurisdiction was retained to make successive awards in the future. This Court has periodically made supplemental awards to claimant to cover expenses incurred by her, the last award covering the time period from February 1, 1968, to January 1, 1969.

A joint motion of claimant and respondent was filed herein requesting leave to waive the filing of briefs and arguments. This motion was granted, and no further pleadings have been filed herein.

Since the Attorney General does not contest the veracity nor the propriety of the items and amounts set forth in claimant’s petition, this Court must assume that the Attorney General agrees with the amounts thus set forth.

The Court, therefore, enters an award in favor of claimant in the sum of $5,861.49 for the period of time from January 1,1969, through December 31,1969. The matter of claimant’s need for additional care is reserved by this Court for future determination.


text:
    (No. 5215
    Roney R. Nunes, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    James P. Chapman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Philip Rock and Sheldon K. Rachman, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks recovery of the sum of $30,000.00 in this action brought pursuant to Ch. 37, Sec. 439.8(c), Ill. Rev. Stat., 1969, which provides as follows:

“The Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters:
(c) All claims against the State for time unjustly served in prisons of this State where the persons imprisoned prove their innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned; provided, the Court shall make no award in excess of the following amounts: . . . for imprisonment of 14 years or less but over 5 years, not more than $30,000.00. . .”

Claimant contends that he was unjustly imprisoned for nine years after being convicted of taking indecent liberties with Mary Lee Hill, a minor, and contributing to her delinquency.

The record reveals the following evidence:

After his trial and conviction claimant became a pauper, and was unable to employ counsel to seek review of his conviction until the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois appointed counsel to represent claimant in the prosecution of a writ of error. On J anuary 22, 1964, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois, and, on February 20,1964, claimant was released from the Illinois State Penitentiary, having been discharged.

In the instant proceeding, claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was innocent of the crime for which he was imprisoned. The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of People of the State of Illinois vs. Roney R. Nunes, 30 Ill. 2d 143, 195 N.E. 2d 706 (1964), is part of the record in this proceeding as follows:

“The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Roney R. Nunes, Plaintiff in Error, 30 Ill. 2d 143, 195 N.E. 2d 706 (1964).
“Mr. Justice Underwood delivered the opinion of the court:
“The defendant, Roney Nunes, was tried by jury in the Circuit Court of Lake County, and convicted of the crime of taking indecent liberties with a 12-year-old girl. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than 4 nor more than 12 years. We have issued a writ of error to review the judgment of conviction.
“The defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Mary Lee Hill testified that on Sunday, April 3, 1954, she and Frances Kelly, another 12-year-old girl, went to the office of the Veterans Cab Company where the defendant was working as a dispatcher. After some conversation between the two girls and the defendant, the defendant asked Mary Lee to take off her sweater because it was warm in the office. She told the defendant she was not warm, and did not remove her sweater. The defendant then asked her to sit on his lap, and after first refusing, she did so when Frances told her to go ahead. The defendant put his arm around her, kissed her, and fondled her, and induced her to touch his private parts. The defendant asked her to go in the other room with him, but she told him she could not, because of her menstrual period. Frances Kelly was in the same room with the defendant and Mary Lee at the time these acts took place. She testified that she was sure that these events occurred on April 3. On cross-examination the witness testified that she and Frances Kelly went downtown looking for the cab office. The office was on the second floor, and the defendant called out of the window, told the girls to go around to the back of the building, and come up the stairs. She and Frances were in the office for about 4 hours except for a short time after the alleged indecent acts when they went to a drug store, and returned with coffee for the defendant and soda for themselves. During the time they were in the office the defendant was busy answering the phone, and talking to cab drivers on the radio. He also talked to a girl and a cab driver who came up to the office, and talked through the window to cab drivers on the street. The defendant was seated at his desk during all the time the girls were in the office. Mary Lee testified that she had never been in the cab office before the day in question, and that she never went back there. She did not tell her mother about these incidents until a week or two later. The defendant was indicted for the offense in July, and Mary Lee testified that in August, with her mother’s consent, she worked as a baby sitter in the defendant’s home while the defendant’s wife was out of town.
“Frances Kelly testified that she could not remember the exact date of the alleged offense but remembered that it was a Sunday in April. She testified that she saw Mary Lee sit on the defendant’s lap, saw him kiss Mary Lee, and perform some of the other acts to which we have referred. On cross-examination she testified that the defendant was busy answering the telephone and dispatching cabs over the radio. The defendant remained seated at the desk in the cab office during the time the girls were there. The desk was near a large front window, and people on the street in front of the office could look up and see the defendant. Frances did not tell her mother about the events in the cab office until about a week later. After she told her mother she also worked as a baby sitter for the defendant. She testified that she and Mary Lee had been in the cab office together two or three times.
“For the defendant, one Nick Perusky testified that at the time in question he was the owner of the cab company. The defendant was his brother-in-law, and he occasionally employed the defendant as a dispatcher on a part-time basis. After referring to a record, which had been kept in compliance with regulations of the Federal Communications Commission, Perusky testified that April 3 was a Saturday. According to the record the defendant had not worked at the cab office on either April 3 or April 4, and the last time prior to April 3 that the defendant worked in the office was on March 24.
“The defendant testified that on Saturday, April 3, he went to work as a bus driver at about 4:15 p.m., and did not work in the cab office at any time during that day. On Sunday, April 4, he also worked for the bus company, and was not in the cab office. He testified that neither Mary Lee Hill nor Frances Kelly had ever been in the cab office while he was there.
“It is axiomatic that a charge of indecent liberties is an accusation easily made, hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused. (People vs. Hinton, 14 Ill. 2d 424.) In such cases reviewing courts are especially charged with the duty of carefully examining the evidence, and, while due weight must be given to the judgment of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, it is our duty to reverse the judgment if the evidence is not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt and create an abiding conviction that he is guilty of the crime charged. In our opinion the. testimony of the two girls was not sufficient to remove all reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. The testimony of the complaining witness as to the date, of the occurrence was obviously incorrect, since both girls testified that the incidents occurred on a Sunday, and April 3, the date alleged in the indictment and the date referred to by the complaining witness, fell on a Saturday. The testimony of the complaining witness that she had never been in the cab office before or after the occurrence was contradicted by the testimony of her friend that both girls had been there several times. The testimony of both the complaining witness and her friend that they did not tell their parents about these incidents until more than a week later in itself tends to create some doubt as to whether these events occurred. Even more significant is the fact that after these supposed indecent acts by the defendant, and after these acts had been reported to the parents of the girls, the parents permitted the girls to work as baby sitters in the defendant’s home while the defendant’s wife was out of town. According to the testimony of the complaining witness she worked as a baby sitter for the defendant for several days, even after the indictment had been returned against him. The alleged indecent acts were supposed to have taken place in a busy cab office where the defendant was constantly answering the telephone, talking to other people, and dispatching cabs on the radio, and supposedly occurred while the defendant was seated at a desk in front of a large window in the office. The combination of all of these circumstances is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was guilty of the crime alleged in the indictment. It cannot be said in the face of contradictions and the improbabilities in the testimony of the two girls that the evidence creates an abiding conviction of the defendant’s guilt.
“It does not appear that any additional evidence could be produced on a new trial, and, therefore, the cause will not be remanded. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Lake County is reversed.
Judgment reversed.”

In addition to the evidence presented at the original trial, claimant produced the following at the trial before the Commissioner of the Court of Claims:

Claimant’s testimony as to his work schedule for April 3 and 4, 1954, was corroborated by records of the Waukegan-North Chicago Transit Company and the testimony of Kenneth E. Johnsen. Johnsen testified that in April, 1954, he was the station supervisor of the company. He produced station reports and run reports maintained by the company in its usual course of business. Johnsen testified that the reports have been kept continuously in the company files since April, 1954, and that they showed that on April 3, 1954, claimant operated Bus No. 57 from 5:03 p.m. until 8:42 p.m.; bus No. 51 from 9:12 p.m. until 12:42 a.m.; and, that on April 4, 1954, he operated bus No. 59 from 4:50 p.m. until 8:57 p.m.; and bus No. 62 from 9:27 p.m.. to 12:43 a.m.

William D. Moore testified that he was employed by the Waukegan Veterans Cab Company as a driver and dispatcher prior to and at the time of the occurrence in question; that on April 3 and 4,1954, he was working at the dispatcher’s office of the Waukegan Veterans Cab Company as a dispatcher. His duties as a dispatcher were to answer the telephone, write down incoming calls, the time the drivers cleared, their destination, and similar information. He entered this information on a desk or master sheet. Moore produced two master sheets dated April 3 and 4, 1954. The writing on the sheet for Saturday, April 3, 1954, was all in his handwriting for the time period between 1:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. His examination of the master sheet, dated April 4, 1954, indicated to him that he had been on duty from at least 11:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m.

Linton Godown, an expert on questioned documents, testified that he had examined the handwriting on the desk or master sheets of the Waukegan Veterans Cab Company for April 3 and 4,1954, and had compared entries made on those sheets with a standard of claimant’s handwriting. He concluded that none of the entries on the sheets were made by claimant.

The testimony of Nick Perusky, the owner of the Veterans Cab Company, at the original trial was made part of the record by stipulation. At the trial he testified that he employed claimant when he needed help rather than on a steady basis. He produced a record book, which the Federal Communications Commission requires be kept. His dispatchers had to use the book to sign in and out when they got on or off work. From his refreshed recollection he testified that six different persons had worked as dispatchers on April 3,1954, and that claimant was not one of them. He himself had worked from 2:45 to 6:00 p.m. that day. He testified that William Moore had worked all afternoon on the day of April 4, 1954. He stated that it was unlikely that any dispatcher could have been relieved by somebody for a short time. The only time Nunes apparently worked during the general time in question was March 24, 1954.

Mrs. Lillian Lorraine Humphrey testified that she was married to claimant in 1945, and divorced from him in 1958. In July, 1954, she went to Rhode Island with two of her children, and left the other two children with her husband. She had been away from Waukegan for three or four days when she received a telegram that her husband had been arrested. Before she left she had made arrangements for baby sitting for the children with Frances Kelly, who lived next door. Frances Kelly had sat for the Nunes’ children many times on prior occasions, and Mary Hill usually sat with her. Mrs. Kelly knew that Frances was going to sit for the Nunes’ children. The witness had never learned from the Kelly or Hill girls, or their parents, that her husband was supposed to have taken indecent liberties with either of them, and in the three or four month period prior to going to Rhode Island the Kelly and Hill girls were the only baby sitters she had.

The witness had also worked at The Waukegan Veterans Cab Company prior to the time her husband was arrested, and had seen both of the girls at the cab company offices. The uncle of Frances Kelly also worked there. During the six month period, which preceded her husband’s arrest, his days off from the bus company were Thursday and Friday. He was required to wear freshly laundered uniforms twice a day when he worked at the bus company. During the six month period prior to the time he was arrested he could not have worked for the cab company a portion of the day on Saturday or Sunday, because his hours were too irregular, and he would sleep when he was home. She further testified that she was home on April 3 and 4, 1954, that she was present at the original trial, but was not called to testify.

Nunes testified that Frances Kelly lived next door to him, and Mary Lee Hill lived a block away. The girls were frequently baby sitters in his house. The first time he had knowledge of a charge being brought against him by Mary Lee Hill was on July 22 or 23, four months after the alleged occurrence, when he was asked to come to the State’s Attorney’s office. He was accused of taking indecent liberties with Mary Lee Hill, and remained in jail for three months when his bond was reduced. He was tried on March 15, 1955, the same date that the verdict was entered, and he was sentenced on April 6, 1955. He was then taken to the penitentiary where he remained at the Statesville and Menard branches until February 22, 1964.

On April 3 and 4, 1954, he was working for the bus company, arriving there about 4:10 p.m. and working until 12:42 a.m. on April 3, and arriving at the same time on April 4, 1954, and working until 12:43 a.m.

On the day before he was arrested (July 22,1954), and while his wife was in Rhode Island, Nunes came home during a break in his bus run shortly after noon when the Hill and Kelly girls were sitting with his two children. When he entered his house, he saw that one of the girls was holding a lighted cigarette to the mouth of his seven year old child, and the other girl was talking on the telephone. Nunes discharged the girls, paid them, and they left the house. He then put the children in the back yard where he asked a neighbor to watch them, and returned to the bus company to complete his bus run, which extended for over two more hours. After Nunes was finished with his work, he drove by his house to take a fellow employee’s car to downtown Waukegan as a favor, and saw his children walking with Mary Lee Hill and Frances Kelly. He stopped the car, told the girls to leave his children alone, and instructed his children to return home. He then delivered the car and returned home, but his children were not there. He went to the Kelly home where he was told his children were at the home of Mary Lee Hill. He went to the Hill home, but no one answered. He was again told his children were at the Hill home, and, when he returned Mrs. Hill answered the door, he took his children. Nunes then testified as follows:

“Yes. I called Mrs. Hill on the phone immediately after — shortly after 1 arrived home and told her that my daughter had said she had been given beer to drink by Mrs. Hill, while I was at the door Mrs. Hill held my oldest daughter on her lap, and her daughter held my youngest with her hand over her mouth so when my child heard my voice she couldn’t call out to me.
So I told Mrs. Hill I was going to have her arrested the next day for kidnapping, for giving my child intoxicating liquor, and living ‘common law, with someone that she wasn’t married to’.”

Claimant then stated he never had any further conversations with Mrs. Hill, and that the next day he was called down to the State’s Attorney’s office; that he did not at any time take any indecent liberties, or do any other improper acts to Mary Lee Hill. His testimony also established that he had his own limousine service with six cabs, which netted him about $125.00 per week, and he was also employed at the Waukegan-North Chicago Transit Company as a bus driver for two years up to July 21, 1954, when he was arrested.

Mary Lee Hill testified that on April 3 or 4, 1954, she was going to be 13 in May; that she went to the cab office with Frances Kelly on the day she thinks was a Sunday in the afternoon; that she thinks she babysat once for Roney Nunes and his family; that she didn’t remember whether she sat before or after the events, which happened at the cab office on that Sunday; that she had never gone to the cab office at any time except April 3 or 4,1954; that she did not remember much of the testimony at the original trial; that she did not tell her mother about what happened when she got home, but probably did a week or more after she was in the office. At the original trial, Mary Lee Hill testified that on Sunday, April 3,1954, she and Frances Kelly were present at the offices of the cab company from about 2:00 p.m. until 6 or 6:15 p.m. when the alleged acts took place; and that she babysat for the Nunes’ children at various times with her mother’s knowledge.

Mary Furman, who did not testify at the original trial, stated that she was the mother of Mary Lee Hill; that in August, 1954, she called the Lake County State’s Attorney subsequent to the following conversation with her daughter:

“ ‘Well, did he ever try anything with you or anything?' So then she told about his inviting the two girls to this cab company, and I says, ‘Well, did you go?', and she says they did. She said he tried to kiss them, and this, that and the other, and I says, ‘Was that all there was to it?’ She claimed it was.”

The record continues:

Q. “To the best of your recollection was this the first and the only occasion on which you talked to your daughter about her relationship . . . any occurrence with Roney Nunes?”
A. “Yes.”
Q. “So that from April, when the alleged event took place, until August when your daughter told you about it, you had no knowledge of these things?"
A. “No, I didn’t.”

Mrs. Furman did not refute the conversation, which Roney Nunes claimed took place between them over the phone, and her testimony apparently refers to the incident. The testimony of Mrs. Furman also contradicts that of Mary Lee Hill as to when Mary Lee Hill told her mother of Nunes’ alleged misconduct.

Respondent argues that the testimony of witnesses, who had not been called at the original trial (in this case, Kenneth E. Johnsen, William Moore, Linton Godown, and Lillian Lorraine Humphrey), should be barred, since all the witnesses and the records of the bus company could have been produced at the original trial.

Respondent cites the case of Dirkans vs. State of Illinois Case No. 4904, in support of its proposition. In that case the claimant, who had been found guilty of armed robbery, produced an alibi witness at the Court of Claims hearing. The witness had been available at the original trial, but was not called. The Court found that Dirkans had failed to prove his innocence of the crime for which he was imprisoned.

The production of such a witness at a Court of Claims hearing raises a question of credibility of that witness. In the instant case, no one has questioned the credibility of either the witnesses or the two sets of documents, which have clearly established that claimant was present at his job with the bus company, and was not present as a dispatcher in the office of the Waukegan Veterans Cab Company on either April 3 or 4, 1954, during the hours charged. The records were kept in the regular course of business of the two companies, and not one scintilla of evidence has been presented which would refute their accuracy.

Claimant has proved himself innocent of the crime for which he was imprisoned by the de-novo hearing, which is contemplated under Sec. 439.8 C of the Court of Claims Act.

Claimant has suffered a substantial loss during his nine years of imprisonment. Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $20,000.00.


text:
    (No. 5234
    Gibson Electric Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    McBride, Baker, Wienke and Schlosser, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

• Claimant, Gibson Electric Company, seeks recovery of a deposit of $24,190.45 made in conjunction with a bid for work to be performed on the Charles F. Read Hospital-Clinic.

Claimant presented two witnesses, James B. Sassman, an employee of Gibson Electric Company, who prepared the estimated costs on jobs, which Gibson was to perform; and, Thomas Gibson, President of the Company at the time of the hearing. Humphrey Gibson, who had been President at the time the bid in question was pending, had died prior to the hearing.

Respondent presented one witness, Lorentz A. Jchanson, Supervising Architect of the Department of Public Works and Buildings.

The record reveals the following sequence of events: 1. On April 24,1963, an advertisement was published in the Illinois State Register giving notice that bids would be received by the State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Architecture and Engineering, for work to be performed on the Charles F. Read Hospital-Clinic. The pertinent portion of the advertisement reads as follows:

“Proposals for the following will be received by the State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Architecture and Engineering,.....Tuesday, May 28, 1963.....
“1. General; Heating, Air Conditioning and Temperature Control, Ventilating, Plumbing; Covering for Piping, Ductwork and Equipment; Electrical Work; Food Service Equipment.....
“All proposals to be in accordance with plans and specifications, which may be obtained from the Division of Architecture and Engineering. . . Mailing of plans and specifications will be discontinued one week before bid opening date. Affidavit of Availability required on all trades."

2. A letter, dated April 24,1963, was addressed to the Gibson Electric Company from Lorentz A. Johanson, Supervising Architect, stating that plans, specifications, and bidding documents on the Read project were being sent, under separate cover, with an enclosed Affidavit of Availability to be signed by Gibson at least seven days prior to the bid opening date. The pertinent portions of the documents tendered to claimant read as follows:

(a) “CALL FOR BIDS”
“INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRACTORS ESTIMATING THE ELECTRICAL WORK FOR CHARLES F. READ HOSPITAL-CLINIC. . . .”
“If any person contemplating submitting a bid for the proposed contract is in doubt as to the true meaning of any part of plans, specifications, or other proposed contract documents, he may submit to the Supervising Architect a written request for the interpretation thereof. The person submitting the request will be responsible for its prompt delivery. Any interpretation of the proposed documents will be made only by addendum duly issued, and a copy of such addendum will be mailed or delivered to each person receiving a set of such documents. The Supervising Architect will not be responsible for any other explanations or interpretations of the proposed documents."(Emphasis supplied.)
(b) “PROPOSAL SHEETS FOR ELECTRICAL WORK, CHARLES F. READ HOSPITAL-CLINIC.....”
“All proposals shall be accompanied by a certified check, cashier’s check or bank draft made payable to the Department of Public Works and Buildings of the State of Illinois in the amount of five per cent (5%) of the total of all proposals upon which the Contractor is bidding. Failure of the Contractor to submit the full amount in his check to cover all proposals bid upon shall be sufficient cause to reject his bid. The Bidder agrees that the proceeds of the check or draft shall become the property of the State of Illinois, if for any reason the Bidder within sixty (60) days after official opening of bids withdraws his bid, or, if on notification of award, refuses or is unable to execute tendered contract, and provide an acceptable performance bond within fifteen (IS) days after such tender.” (Emphasis supplied.)

3. In a designated space on page one of the proposal sheets, dated May 27, 1963, Gibson Electric Company signified that it subscribed to the Instructions to Contractors, Notice to Contractors, General Conditions of the Contract, Supplement to the General Conditions, and the Drawings and Specifications of Material and Workmanship for the “Interior Electrical Work for the Charles F. Read Hospital-Clinic.....and, having examined the premises and conditions affecting the work, agreed to furnish all labor and material, implements, etc., as provided in the above Instructions to Contractors, Notice to Contractors, General Conditions of the Contract, Supplement to General Conditions, Specifications, ... .as follows: This proposal consists of six pages for Electrical Work for Charles F. Read Hospital-Clinic. . . .’’(Emphasis supplied).

Pages two and three of said proposal sheets provide as follows:

“PROPOSAL NO. 1: For the complete Interior Electrical Work for the Charles F. Read Hospital-Clinic, Zone 2, Chicago, Illinois, as shown on the Drawings. . . .”
(Claimant’s figure is $483,809.00)
(PROPOSALS NOS. 1-A through 1-D are deductions in case the Owner elected to order certain omissions or additions in case of a substitution.)
“PROPOSAL NO. 2: For the complete Exterior Electrical Work for the Charles F. Read Hospital-Clinic, Zone 2, Chicago, Illinois....."(Claimant's figure is $130,935.00.)
“PROPOSAL NO. 3: For the complete Interior and Exterior Electrical Work for the Charles F. Read Hospital-Clinic, Zone 2, Chicago, Illinois, . . . .’’(Claimant’s figure was $614,744.00)

Page 4 of the Proposal provided that Gibson Electric would perform and complete their work in progress with the work of the other contractors, and that all work would be performed in a manner which would not cause delays.

Gibson listed three Surety Companies, who would write its surety bond if the contract was awarded it, the names of three insurance companies for Contractor’s Builder’s Risk Insurance, and one insurance company for Contractor’s Workmen’s Compensation and Public Liability Insurance.

Page 5 contains the corporate name and initials of the President, Secretary and Treasurer. Page 6 states that a certified check, cashier’s check, or bank draft in the amount of $31,150.00 is enclosed.

(c) An Affidavit of Availability, dated April 25, 1963, was signed by H. M. Gibson for Gibson Electric Company. The Affidavit listed three jobs: the State of Illinois Eye and Ear Infirmary, Chicago, Illinois; Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois; and E. J. Marhoefer, Jr., Inc., for construction of West Side High School, Lockport, Illinois; and also attached thereto was a declaration that this was a true statement “relating to all uncompleted contracts.....and all pending low bids not yet awarded or rejected.” (Emphasis added).

4. A letter, dated June 27, 1963, to Gibson Electric Company, Inc., from Lorentz A. Johanson stated in part as follows:

“SUBJECT: The Charles F. Read Hospital-Clinic, Zone 2, Chicago, Illinois — Interior Electrical Work.”
“I have been directed to notify you of the acceptance of your proposal for this project. A formal contract will be sent you later for signature, but pending its receipt please consider this letter your authority to proceed with the work, as soon as your indemnity bond and insurances have been approved by this division.”

The letter then states approval of particular companies to furnish the indemnity bond, Workmen’s Compensation and Builder’s Risk insurances.

“Description of work under your contract: Date of opening of Proposals: Tuesday, May 28, 1963. Proposal No. 1: FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINE AND 00/100 DOLIARS ($483,809.00).”
“Time of Completion: In progress with General Work and work of other contractors engaged on the project. . . .”
“ALL CORRESPONDENCE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS PROJECT SHOULD REFER TO SUBJECT TITLE AND CONTRACT NUMBER 72830.”

5. Mr. Johanson testified that there was no request from any of the contractors as to an interpretation of plans and specifications, and no conversation or correspondence between Gibson Electric Company and the Department from June 27, 1963, until July 15, 1963. On that date, Mr. J ohanson met with Mr. Humphrey Gibson, two men from the Department of Public Works and Buildings, and two men from Gibson Electric Company. Mr. Johanson further testified as follows:

“Mr. Gibson told me he was in a very unenviable position of being the contractor with too much work rather than the normal position of not having enough work, and presented me a rundown of jobs he had been the bidder on and subsequent being the apparent low bidder on my job.”
“This caused him difficulty in getting a bond for my job. I had given him over fifteen days at that time."

Mr. J ohanson then identified a document, which was given to him by Mr. Gibson at the conference showing that the Gibson Electric Company had become involved in four additional jobs since he had signed the Affidavit of Availability showing three jobs, thus bringing the number of jobs in progress on July 15,1963, to seven. Mr. Johanson stated that the other jobs, amounting to about $400,000, caused Mr. Gibson to be overextended so that he could not get a bond on the job for the Charles F. Read Hospital-Clinic. The other participants in the conference did not testify at the hearing.

6. Mr. Johanson further testified that on July 16, 1963, a contract was tendered to Gibson Electric Company, but was never signed. No further conversations or correspondence took place between his office and the Gibson Electric Company at that time.

7. A letter, dated July 19, 1963, from the Department of Public Works and Buildings to Mr. H. M. Gibson, Gibson Electric Company, stated as follows:

“Pursuant to our conversation in my office on Monday, July 15, in the company of Messrs. Van Giesen and Evans of Architecture and Engineering Division, I have reviewed the data you gave me regarding the approximate $400,000.00 worth of work you have been awarded subsequent to the award on the Charles Read Clinic for the State of Illinois.”
“As at the foregoing meeting, we did not feel that the information supplied by you is sufficient to cancel our letter of intent on the Read Clinic, and, if you do not accept the award of this contract, we will require you to forfeit your certified check.”

Mr. J chanson testified that the Department did not receive an indemnity check within the fifteen days after the tender of the contract, as agreed by claimant under the Proposal Sheets, nor did he receive any notification from Gibson Electric Company as to any intention they had regarding the job.

8. In September the contract for interior work was awarded to the second lowest bidder at a cost of $21,891.00 higher than the Gibson Electric Company’s bid.

9. Claimant’s combination bid had been the lowest total bid.

10. A letter, dated November 13, 1963, to the Attorney General from Gibson Electric Company contains the following:

“RE: The Charles F. Read Clinic Zone 2. . . .Chicago, Illinois
Dear Sir:
With reference to the electrical work on the above project, we wish to submit the following facts:
The bid form called for the proposal to be in three parts. . .one quotation for the wiring of the interior of the building, on which we quoted $483,809.00; one quotation for the exterior wiring on which we quoted $130,935.00; and a combined quotation, on which we bid the sum of the above two quotations. . . .or $614,744.00.
Inasmuch as electrical jobs historically are never let in sections, we were led to believe the entire job would be awarded as a unit, assuming that the breakdown was wanted for accounting purposes. Had we been aware that the job possibly would be awarded in sections, we obviously would have bid the same on the total, but would have had to increase our bids on the component parts, due to overhead expenses.
We were awarded the interior wiring, and the exterior wiring was awarded to another contractor.
In view of the foregoing, we feel that forfeiture of our bid deposit under these circumstance is confiscatory, and that our bid deposit bond should be returned to us.
Very truly yours,
Gibson Electric Company, Inc.
H. M. Gibson”

According to Thomas Gibson, the foregoing letter written in November was the first indication to the State of Illinois that Gibson refused to perform on the grounds set forth therein.

The issues which are presented to this Court are: (1) whether a contract was in fact entered into by the parties; (2) whether claimant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the contract was properly rescinded; and, (3) whether respondent has a right to forfeit claimant’s entire deposit or only its actual damages.

Claimant contends that a contract was never entered into between claimant and respondent, since claimant offered to furnish the complete interior and exterior electrical work for $614,744.00. Respondent rejected the offer, and countered with an offer to permit the installation of the complete interior electrical work at a cost of $483,809.00. Claimant was forced to reject this offer because of the impossibility of meeting expenses on only the interior section of the work.

Claimant further contends that it submitted an offer based on the bidding method, which was the industry-wide practice. To support this claim, it submitted the Compilation of Final Bids, which was prepared by respondent, showing that ten out of thirteen bidders submitted bids for Proposal No. 3, which were totals of Proposals Nos. 1 and 2. Claimant alleges that, if it were known in the industry that bids would be accepted on individual proposals, then the total of the separate proposals would be a greater amount than the aggregate bid submitted for the award of the whole job. Therefore, claimant argues, that the mistake precluded mutual assent to the terms of the contract, and consequently that it is non-existent, and the parties should be placed in status quo.

Thomas Gibson, President of the Company at the time of the hearing, testified that the mark-up would have been 5 to 8% different if the bids had been made on each individual item, and that they would have submitted two certified checks in the amount of the individual bids instead of one. Gibson stated that he had no documents to verify the fact that there would not have been sufficient profit if he had undertaken only Proposal No. 1.

Respondent’s witness, Lorentz J chanson, testified that the reason for breaking down the proposal for electrical bids into three components was to attract contractors that are more conversant with the particular type of work called for, and that the intent of the Department of Public Works and Buildings was to let the contract to the lowest combination of bids. He stated that the Proposals, which were broken down into Interior, Exterior and Combination (Proposals No. 1, 2, and 3) were in the standard form used for this type of work.

Where the contracting parties have reduced an agreement to writing, it is presumed that the agreement expresses their mutual intentions. Hardy vs. Greathouse, 406 Ill. 365, 94 N.E. 2d 134.

An examination of page one of the Proposal Sheets, signed by Gibson Electric, shows that it specifically refers to “Interior” electrical work, to wit:

“The UNDERSIGNED hereby subscribing to the Instructions to Contractors, Notice to Contractors, General Conditions of the Contract, Supplement to General Conditions, the Drawings and Specifications of Material and Workmanship for the Interior Electrical Work for Charles F. Read Hospital-Clinic, Zone 2, Chicago, Illinois, and having examined the premises and conditions affecting the work AGREES to furnish all labor and material, implements, etc. as provided. . .” (Emphasis supplied).

This statement refers only to the INTERIOR electrical work. There is no such statement in regard to the Exterior Electrical work. Therefore, it would seem that claimant specifically agreed to perform the INTERIOR electrical work according to instructions and specifications. Had claimant been awarded only the Exterior job, its contention that it did not agree to accept only the Exterior job might have had merit due to the industry practice of awarding contracts as a whole, and the statement appearing on the form that “This proposal consists of 6 pages for Electrical Work.”

Accepting, arguendo, claimant’s contention that industry practice led it to believe Gibson Electric was .bidding on a single proposal instead of three separate proposals, let us examine whether the contract was properly rescinded. As a general rule, a right to rescind a contract must be exercised promptly on discovery of facts which confer the right to rescind.

In Mound City Distilling Co. vs. Consolidated Adjustment Co., 152 Ill. App. 155 at 159, the Court stated:

“One who has a right to rescind must act with reasonable promptness in rescinding, otherwise he will have waned his right to rescind. Willistons Wald’s Pollack on Contracts. .345-6.”

Claimant knew of the alleged mistake as soon as it received the letter, dated'June 27, 1963. However, there was no notification to respondent of either the mistaken understanding or of claimant’s intention to rescind on these grounds until November 13, 1963.

As a general rule, a party who desires to rescind a contract must, in order to effect a rescission, indicate his intention by an affirmative act, and give notice thereof to the other party. (12 I.L.P. Contracts, Sec. 351.)

Claimant alleges in its complaint that in the conference on July 15,1963, Mr. Humphrey Gibson conferred with Mr. Johanson in Mr. Johanson’s office, and advised him that Gibson’s bid had been computed on the assumption that the award for electrical work on the Hospital-Clinic would be made under Proposal No. 3, that Gibson was for that reason unable to accept an award based only on Proposal No. 1, and demanded return of his certified check. Not one scintilla of evidence supporting these allegations was presented in the hearing. In fact, the testimony of respondent establishes that claimant had been unable to obtain the required performance bond because it had overextended itself with too many additional jobs, and that this was the reason for its inability to perform.

In the alternative, claimant alleges that Gibson made a bona fide error in the preparation of its bid, which error would have given rise to a substantial loss to Gibson, and that it should have been allowed to withdraw its bid. No proof was offered that acceptance of the Interior award would have given rise to a substantial loss. As a matter of fact the Exterior work was ultimately awarded at a cost to the State of $935.00 less than Gibson’s bid. It is difficult to see how the awarding of the exterior work to claimant would have prevented this alleged “substantial loss” inherent in its acceptance of the Interior contract.

That the time lapse of almost five months after discovery of the “mistake” was not a reasonable time in which to rescind is readily ascertainable from the circumstances of the case. It would appear that claimant should have acted to rescind on the grounds of mistake at least by its meeting of J uly 15th with respondent, having had ample notice since June of respondent’s interpretation of the contract.

This Court has allowed rescission of a contract for mistake in the cases of Allen vs. State, 2 C.C.R. 404, and English vs. State, 3 C.C.R. 80. The standards for such rescission are set forth in the Allen case at p. 407 thusly:

“and for the further reason that we are convinced that claimants did not try to rescind their contract for any other reason than the mistakes made by them in the preparation of their several estimates^.we believe it would be unjust and inequitable to compel them to suffer a loss as would be occasioned by the forfeiture of their. . . . checks.”

In both of these cases it was established that claimants made the mistake, and that their refusals to proceed with the contracts were in fact based on the mistake. No such showing has been made in the instant case.

Claimant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that its refusal to proceed before the time for forfeiture of its check was occasioned by a mistake. On the contrary, respondent has presented documentary evidence to show that claimant’s refusal was based on the fact that it had taken on too many jobs. Impossibility of performance or the inability of the promisor to perform does not discharge a duty created by the contract, especially where the impossibility arises from the act of the promisor himself. (Pioneer Life Ins. Co. vs. Alliance Life Ins. Co., 374 Ill. 576, 30 N.E. 2d 66; Chicago, M. ir St. P. Ry. Co. vs. Hoyt, 13 S. Ct. 779, 149 U.S. 1, 37 L. Ed. 625.)

In the alternative, claimant requests the difference between its deposit and actual damages allegedly suffered by respondent in the amount of $2,299.45, which is the difference between claimant’s deposit and the next lowest bid on the Interior work.

Respondent cites the case of Warner Construction Co. vs. State of Illinois, 8 C.C.R. 92, to the effect that, although forfeiture was not generally favored in law, a forfeiture by the State was an exception to the general rule where the State has fully performed its part of the contract.

Claimants argue that the standards set in the more recent case of Bauer vs. Sawyer, 8 Ill. 2d 351,134 N.E. 2d 329, are controlling. In the Bauer case, the Supreme Court reviewed a forfeiture clause and declared it to be an invalid penalty. It approved the rule stated by the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 339 (1) which provides as follows:

“An agreement made in advance of breach fixing the damages therefor is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the damages recoverable for the breach unless (a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is caused by the breach, and (b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation.”

Claimants further argue that respondent has recognized that the deposit made by claimant would only be used to satisfy the expenses incurred. In a letter dated August 8, 1963, Mr. Johanson stated in part to claimant:

“This leaves us no alternative but to declare your proposal guarantee forfeited in the amount required to cover our expense to accept the next lowest bidder.”

In the instant case, the deposit was not a reasonable forecast of just compensation as is required by Bauer, and the actual damages were readily ascertainable. Therefore, claimant is entitled to recover the difference between the actual damages suffered by respondent ($21,891.00) and the amount of the deposit retained ($24,190.45).

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $2,299.45.


text:
    (No. 5247
    Meyer Machine, Inc., A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Smith, Penniman and McGreevy, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky and Etta Cole, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant’s action arises out of a contract entered into between claimant and respondent on August 21, 1963, which provided that claimant furnish and erect certain traffic signs and concrete foundations therefore on Route 55 in Sangamon County, Illinois. The undisputed evidence shows that claimant completed the work required by the contract in February or March, 1964.

In Count I of its amended complaint claimant seeks recovery for sixty-four items of work performed by it in completing the original contract, and requests an additional $14,862.66. The parties have stipulated that the amount owed to claimant should take into account a penalty of $1,000.00 for claimant’s failure to meet the completion date of the contract. It was, therefore, agreed by both parties that respondent owes claimant $13,812.66 under Count I.

The questions remaining arise under Counts II, III and IV of claimant’s complaint.

As part of the original contract a sign had been erected on concrete foundations. After claimant had moved all of its men, materials, and equipment out of the area, and its work was complete except for minor maintenance work, respondent decided that the location of the sign was unsatisfactory, and that it should be moved to a new location. On April 2, 1964, respondent authorized claimant to proceed with changing the plans. Its written authorization specifies quantities of additional work and unit prices therefore. The additional work is described as follows: “Force account work for removing overhead truss, re-erecting on new foundation, and removing portions of old foundation.”

Count II is claimant’s claim for such portion of additional work detailed as items 75 through 176. Respondent admits that it owes $4,037.64 under Count II, but disputes items 168 through 175 in the amount of $1,737.75, which are listed as follows:

“168. Costs incurred by Contractor due to the Force Account and Revisions: work within the Contract during the period of April 1 thru June 25, 1964:
169 Administrative Executive Salary
96 hours at $6.50 $624.00
170 Secretary
33 hours at $4.85 an hour 160.05
171 Telephone Bills, mise. 206.20
172 Field Foreman’s living expenses
47 days at $10.00 a day 470.00
173 Truck on job site (Inactive)
15 days at $8.50 a day 127.50
174 Field Office Rent
2 months $75.00 per month 150.00
Total $1,737.75”

Article 9.4 of the agreement provides for payment for extra work:

ARTICLE 9.4 PAYMENT FOR EXTRA WORK. . .
1. Extra work will be paid for as follows:
(a) Labor. The Contractor will be paid the actual amount of wages for all labor and foreman in direct charge of the specific work for each hour that said labor and foreman are actually engaged in such work, to which costs shall be added 15 per cent of the sum thereof. A foreman shall not be used when there are less than 2 laborers employed, except with the written consent of the Engineer.
(b) Bond, Insurance, Tax, Welfare Fund and Other Payments. The Contractor will receive the actual cost of contractors bond, public liability and property damage insurance, workmen's compensation insurance, social security tax, welfare fund and other payments, if any, in accordance with agreements applicable to the contract, required for force account work, to which no percentage shall be added. The Contractor shall furnish satisfactory evidence of the rate or rates paid for such bond, insurance, tax, welfare fund and other payments.
(c) Materials. The Contractor will receive the actual cost for all materials which are an integral part of the finished work, including freight charges as shown by the original receipted bills, to which shall be added 15 per cent of the sum thereof.
The Contractor will be reimbursed for any materials used in the construction of the work, such as sheeting, falsework, form lumber, curing materials, etc., which are not an integral part of the finished work. The amount of reimbursement shall be agreed upon in writing before such work is begun and no per cent shall be added. The salvage value of such materials shall be taken into consideration in the reimbursement agreed upon.

Respondent contends that Article 9.4 specifies that the Contractor will be paid the actual amount of wages for all labor and foremen “in direct charge of the specific work”, and that neither the administrative executive nor the, secretary (items 169 and 170) were directly involved in the specific work of re-erecting Truss No. 2 (the support for the sign). Respondent contests the amount in item 172, because the contract expressed hourly compensation for foremen, but was silent as to other compensation, and, therefore; respondent argues it must be implied that this is excluded. Respondent states that there is no category in Article 9.4, which would provide for telephone calls in item 171.

Item 173 concerns a claim for the rental of a truck on the job site, which was described by claimant as “inactive”. Respondent claims that the rent for the field office (item 174) was already paid for by the State under the original contract. (Rec. II pp. 14 and 15)

Claimant contends that the expenses enumerated in items 168 through 175 are actual damages incurred because of the change in plan and the errors of the State, and the claimant should be reimbursed. Claimant argues that the amount of $1,737.75, which was incurred for these items would have been absorbed in the bidding of the original contract.

Claimant cites Divane Brothers Electric Co., A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 546, which allowed actual expenses for delay occasioned by change in plans made by the State. In that case recovery was allowed for expenses not originally anticipated, including overhead, labor increases and insurance, material increases, lost time, and supervision. However, in the instant case, claimant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that items 169 (the administrative executive), 170 (the secretary), or 171 (the telephone and xerox paper charge) pertained to the particular job. There was no proof that the truck was needed at the site because it was never used (item 173). However, claimant is entitled to be compensated for the living expenses of the field foreman and rent for the field office, (items 172 and 174) for a total of $620.00 of the disputed items under Count II.

Under Count III, claimant is requesting an additional award of $4,110.65 for the additional concrete foundations. Respondent argues that, since concrete foundations appear in the original contract at a unit price basis of $60.00 per cubic yard of concrete, payment for the additional concrete foundations should also be made at the unit price. Claimant takes the position that it should be allowed the difference between the unit price and the price computed on a labor, materials and equipment basis under Article 9.4 as “Payment for Extra Work.”

The evidence leads to the inescapable conclusion that, since the request to move the signs was not made until all of claimant’s men and equipment had been moved out of the area, and the original contract had been completed, there was a substantial and material variation from the original contract requiring payment to the contractor on a force account basis rather than a unit price basis.

The extra work was occasioned solely by the State’s failure to properly plan the location of the sign in the first instance. The Court has frequently awarded additional payments where changes in plans by the State have resulted in extra expenses to the contractor. Matthew M. Walsh and John J. Walsh, a Co-Partnership, d/b/a Walsh Construction Company, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 441; Hyre Electric Company, An Illinois Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 554; Chism, Inc., A Delaware Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, No. 5313; Mass Construction Company, A Delaware Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, No. 5254.

The Court has never awarded interest, which is also requested by claimant, and there seems to be no basis in the Mechanic’s Lien Act for levying interest on the State of "Illinois. Therefore, claimant’s request for $5,677.17 in interest must be rejected.

Claimant is hereby awarded the following:

Count I..................$13,812.66 (stipulated)

Count II. ................ 4,037.64 (stipulated)

620.00

Count III ............ 4,110.65

Total.....................$22,580.95


text:
    (No. 5659
    Virgil Skinner, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Kleiman, Cornfield and Feldman, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant, Virgil Skinner, has filed his complaint against respondent for the sum of $322.00 for damages incurred as a result of a fire, while he was in the employ of the Illinois Youth Commission of the State of Illinois.

A stipulation was thereafter entered into by claimant and respondent as follows:

“That the facts as set forth in claimant’s complaint are substantially correct.”
"That there is lawfully due claimant the sum of THREE HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO DOLLARS AND NO CENTS ($322.00).’’
“That upon the foregoing agreed stipulation filed herein the Court shall decide thereon, and render judgment herein according to the rights of the parties in the same manner as if the facts aforesaid were proved upon the trial of said issue.”

The claimant, Virgil Skinner, is hereby awarded the sum of $322.00.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 5704
    The Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    The Chicago Lighthouse for the Blind, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5707
    Southern Illinois University, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Southern Illinois University, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

On November 19, 1969, claimant, Southern Illinois University, filed a complaint in this Court seeking an award in the amount of $90.50 for services rendered to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation.

The record consists of the following:

1. Complaint
2. Stipulation
3. Joint motion of claimant and respondent for leave to waive
the filing of briefs
4. Order of the Chief Justice granting the joint motion of claimant and respondent for leave to waive the filing of briefs

The facts appear to be that claimant, Southern Illinois University, rendered services to the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation to one Janet C. Conley of Alton, Illinois. Claimant contends that the amount due is for tuition and fees for the Spring Quarter of 1969.

The Court, therefore, finds that services were rendered at the request of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, and that respondent has agreed to pay the said amount of $90.50.

An award is, therefore, made herewith to claimant, Southern Illinois University, in the amount of $90.50.


text:
    (No. 5708
    Johnson Office Supply, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Fred Carman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5711
    St. Joseph Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    St. Joseph Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5713
    The Field and Shorb Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    The Field and Shore Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5719
    Mercy Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Mercy Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5720
    Rich Truck Sales and Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Rich Truck Sales and Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

On December 4, 1969, Rich Truck Sales and Service, Inc., filed a complaint in this Court seeking an award of $248.70 for work done on a truck of the Division of Highways.

The record consists of the following:

1. Complaint
2. Stipulation
3. Joint motion of claimant and respondent for leave to waive
the filing of briefs
4. Order of the Chief Justice granting the joint motion of claimant and respondent for leave to waive the filing of briefs

The facts of the case appear to be that claimant did certain work on truck T 6617, and the charges for such work, according to the invoice submitted, was $248.70.

The stipulation provides that said amount of $248.70 is correct, and it is the amount due claimant.

The Court, therefore, finds that the work for which claimant has billed the State has been performed at the request of the State, particularly the Department of Public Works and Buildings, and that it should be paid.

An award is, therefore, made herewith to claimant, Rich Truck Sales and Service, Inc., in the amount of $248.70.


text:
    (No. 5721
    Barnes Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Barnes Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5722
    James E. Couer, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    James E. Cover, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5724
    Mildred Haysbert, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Kleiman, Cornfield and Feldman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5726
    Robert Lindner, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Kleiman, Cornfield and Feldman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5727
    Marine Drive Medical Group, Ltd., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Marine Drive Medical Group, Ltd., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5731
    The Chicago School for Retarded Children, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    The Chicago School for Retarded Children, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.


text:
    (No. 5733
    Thomas V. Cassidy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Thomas V. Cassidy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5736
    Sharon Harold, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Sharon Harold, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5739
    Rogers Park Manor, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Rogers Park Manor, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

On December 31,1969, Roger Park Manor, Inc., filed a claim in the amount of $324.00 for room and board for one Steve Beran, who was a Boarding-Out resident of the Dixon State School at Dixon, Illinois. The amount of the services, namely room and board, was for the month of June, 1969.

The record consists of the following:

1. Complaint
2. Departmental Report
3. Stipulation
4. Joint motion of claimant and respondent for leave to waive
the filing of briefs.
5. Order of the Chief Justice granting the joint motion of claimant and respondent for leave to waive the filing of briefs.

The facts of the case are as follows:

The Dixon State School at Dixon, Illinois, boarded out one Steve Beran to the Rogers Park Manor, Inc., at 1512 West Fargo, Chicago, Illinois, and incurred an obligation in the amount of $324.00, which is the amount being claimed by claimant for the month of June, 1969.

The Court, therefore, finds that the obligation is one that was incurred by respondent, and should be paid.

An award is, therefore, made herewith to claimant, Rogers Park Manor, Inc., in the amount of $324.00.


text:
    (No. 5753
    St. Joseph Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion fled July 9, 1970.

    St. Joseph Hospital, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5755
    Sidney J. Marx, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Suth and Peters, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Bruce J. Finne, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5768
    Daniel E. McCarry, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Racing Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.
    Daniel E. McCarry, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5770
    Ronald Wainer, d/b/a 3441 West Jackson Building, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Ronald Wainer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5771
    Ann C. Limerick, Executor of the Estate of George F. Limerick, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction Committee, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Hatch, Corazza, Baker and Jensen, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5774
    Biagio Frisina, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Drivers Examination Station, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Robert D. McWard, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5775
    Harold Gordon, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Harold Gordon, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5776
    Florence Bergman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Florence Bergman, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5782
    Northeast Community Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Northeast Community Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William ). Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.


text:
    (No. 5784
    Shepard’s Citations, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Roy Geibe Hill, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

On March 4, 1970, Shepard’s Citations, Inc., filed a complaint against the State of Illinois in the amount of $170.00.

The record consists of the following:

1. Complaint
2. Stipulation
3. Joint motion of claimant and respondent for leave to waive the filing of briefs
4. Order of the Chief Justice granting the joint motion of claimant and respondent for leave to waive the filing of briefs

The facts are that claimant provided the Supreme Court Library at Springfield, Illinois, with certain legal periodicals and books in the amount of $170.00. It also appears that the General Assembly made an appropriation of $1,000.00 to the Judicial System to pay certain obligations incurred by the Supreme Court Library for prior expenses. Some of these bills were paid, but the appropriation was exhausted before the instant bill was paid.

The Court, therefore, finds that the items for which the bill was submitted were ordered and received by the Supreme Court Library, and would have been paid except that the appropriation was exhausted.

An award is, therefore, made herewith to claimant, Shepard’s Citations, Inc., in the amount of $170.00.


text:
    (No. 5787
    The Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    The Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 5790
    Theodore R. Beck, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1970.

    Theodore R. Beck, Claimant, pro se.

      William ]. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.