text:
    (Case No. 00141
    In Re Application of Marion J. Weston.

      Opinion filed November 14, 1978.

    Paddock, McGreevy and Johnson, by John C. Tower,. Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Vincent J. Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim allegedly arising out of the death of a police chief killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1977.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney general’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the Court on October 24, 1978, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Marion J. Weston, is the widow of the decedent, and, in the absence of a designation of beneficiary, is the person entitled to receive benefits pursuant to the Act;

2. The decedent, Arthur L. Weston, was the police chief, employed by the Rockton Police Department, and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on October 27,1977. He was 52 years of age;

On said date, at approximately 9:15 a.m., Chief Weston was stricken with a heart attack immediately after having seized and arrested a burglary suspect in a residential building in Rockton. Chief Weston apprehended the suspect, an escapee from a mental health center, after calling for the assistance of other police at 8:34 a.m., reporting a “burglary in progress.” The coroner’s certificate of death recited the immediate cause of death as “probable myocardial infarct,” due to or as a consequence of “arteriosclerotic heart disease,” and Chief Weston was pronounced “dead on arrival” at 10:57 a.m., the same date at the hospital to which he was taken directly from, the burglary scene;

4. Chief Weston was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act;

The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the sum of $20,000.00 be paid to Marion J. Weston, widow of the deceased Police Chief, Arthur L. Weston.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (Case No. 00143
    In Re Application of Richard Gesiorski.

      Opinion filed July 25, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim arising out of the death of a police officer allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. .48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and á report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at hearings before the full Court on June 15, 1978, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Richard Gesiorski, age 28, and his brother, Thomas Gesiorski, Jr., age 25, are the sons of the decedent and are the beneficiaries who were designated by him as stated in the application for benefits. The decedent’s wife died on October 3, 1977;

2. The decedent, Thomas Gesiorski, was a police officer employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on December 26, 1977. He was 52 years of age;

3. On said date, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Officer Gesiorski, together with his partner, were assigned to a shooting case. The shooting victim was carried by Officer Gesiorski and other policemen, in a chair-stretcher, from the third floor of a building, down the stairway, and to St. Bernard’s Hospital. As Officer Gesiorski entered the hospital emergency room, he collapsed with a heart attack and was pronounced dead at 7:30 p.m. The medical examiner’s certificate of death recites the immediate cause of death as “acute coronary insufficiency in association with stress (heavy weight lifting).” The evidence presented indicates that Officer Gesiorski’s death on December 26, 1977, was caused and precipitated by his active performance of the duties required of him as a police officer for the City of Chicago Police Department;

4. Officer Gesiorski was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensated thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 be awarded to Richard Gesiorksi and $10,000.00 be awarded to Thomas Gesiorski, Jr., as sons and designated beneficiaries of the decedent, Thomas Gesiorski.


text:
    (Case No. 00146
    In Re Application of Erika Smith.

      Opinion filed July 25, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence at a review before the Court on June 15, 1978, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Erika Smith, is the widow of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in the application for benefits;

2. The decedent, James M. Smith, was a firefighter, employed by the Chicago Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning Section 2(e) of the Act, on November 24, 1977. He was 56 years of age;

3. On said date, at approximately 5:45 p.m., firefighter Smith responded to a fire alarm at his fire station, 330 West 104th Street, Chicago, Illinois directly east of 104th Street and Howard Avenue. As the fire truck left the station, Smith was standing, and riding, on the running board at the rear of the fire truck on the driver’s side. The truck turned north on Howard Avenue; and at 103rd Street and Howard Avenue, approximately one block from the fire station, firefighter Smith was noticed as missing from the truck. The truck returned to the station, and Smith was found laying in the street, at the intersection near the fire station, alongside the curb, unconscious, bleeding from his nose and mouth, with a pool of blood around his head. Smith was taken by fire department ambulance to a hospital where he was admitted at 6:15 p.m. the same day. Surgery was performed on November 26, 1977, and a trachectomy was also performed on December 4, 1977. Smith never regained consciousness and died on December 16,1977. The medical examiner’s certificate of death recites the cause of death as “cranio-cerebral injury, traumatic, severe;” due to a “fall from fire truck.” The fire call to which he had responded was later found to be a false alarm;

4. Firefighter Smith was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to Erika Smith as widow and designated beneficiary of the deceased firefighter, James M. Smith.


text:
    (Case No. 00147
    In Re Application of Josephine Friddle.

      Opinion filed July 25, 1978.

    William Stefan, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Vincent J. Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on June 15, 1978, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Josephine Friddle, is the widow of the decedent, and, in the absence of a designation of beneficiary, is the person entitled to receive benefits pursuant to the Act;

2. The decedent, Melvin Friddle, was a Captain, employed by the Wilmington Volunteer Fire Department, and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on February 5, 1978. He was 62 years of age;

3. On said date, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Captain Friddle was responding to a call regarding an automobile accident. He was driving the fire department ambulance, with another fireman as a passenger, when he collapsed over the steering wheel while crossing the Kankakee River bridge. The ambulance struck the guardrail, traveling approximately 280 feet. The fireman riding with Captain Friddle was able to lift him from behind the steering wheel and control the ambulance until it could be stopped. The coroner’s certificate of death recites the cause of death as “cardiac arrest due to shock while driving ambulance on duty.” The evidence presented on June 15,1978, indicates that Captain Friddle’s death was caused and precipitated by his active performance of the duties required of him as a fireman for the Wilmington Volunteer Fire Department;

4. Captain Friddle was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to Josephine Friddle, as widow of the deceased fire captain, Melvin Friddle.


text:
    (Case No. 00149
    In Re Application of Mary McGann.

      Opinion filed November 14, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim allegedly arising out of the death of a policeman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1977.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney general; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the Court on October 24, 1978, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Mary McGann, is the widow of the decedent, and in the absence of a designation of beneficiary, is the person entitled to receive benefits pursuant to the Act;

2. The decedent, Patrick McGann, Jr., was a Lieutenant, employed by the Chicago Police Department, and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on July 13, 1977. He was 54 years of age;

3. On said date, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Lt. McGann was stricken with a heart attack while driving his police car from the scene of a reported “burglary in progress,” where Lt. McGann had assisted in the apprehension of four youths atop a commercial building. The death certificate recited the immediate cause of death as “severe coronary atherosclerosis,” and Lt. McGann was pronounced dead at 11:12 p.m., the same date at the hospital to which he had been taken immediately after being stricken;

4. Lieutenant McGann was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the sum of $20,000.00 be paid to Mary McGann, as widow and designated beneficiary of the deceased policeman, Patrick McGann, Jr.


text:
    (Case No. 00152
    In Re Application of Nancy Bowler.

      Opinion filed July 25, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1975.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence at a review before the court on June 15, 1978, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Nancy Bowler, is the former wife of the decedent and is one of the designated beneficiaries designated by him, to the extent of 40 percent of any benefits, as stated in the application for benefits; his three children, Patrick M. Bowler, Tracy A. Bowler, and Kathleen M. Bowler, are the other beneficiaries, each to the extent of 20 percent of any benefits payable;

2. The decedent, Patrick J. Bowler, was a firefighter employed by the Chicago Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on February 22, 1978. He was 39 years of age;

3. On said date, at approximately 3:00 a.m., firefighter Bowler responded to a call with the “Flying Manpower Squad 4” at a burning building. After being informed that there were people trapped on the third floor of the building, firefighter Bowler reached the third floor, became trapped in the living room and had to leap out of the third floor window, receiving multiple injuries. He was taken directly from the fire scene to a hospital where he died at 1:30 a.m. on February 24, 1978, of the injuries sustained in fighting said fire. The medical examiner’s certificate of death recites the cause of death as “traumatic ruptured aorta;”

4. Firefighter Bowler was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to the designated beneficiaries of the decedent in portions as follows:

A. Eight thousand dollars to Nancy Bowler, the former wife of the decedent, representing 40 percent of the benefits, as designated by him.

B. Four thousand dollars to Patrick M. Bowler, the son of the decedent, when Patrick M. Bowler attains majority on August 24, 1980, or, at time prior thereto upon appointment of a legal guardian for said child, said $4,000.00 representing 20 percent of the benefits, as designated by the decedent.

C. Four thousand dollars to Tracy A. Bowler, the daughter of the decedent, when Tracy A. Bowler attains majority on July 13,1982, or, at time prior thereto upon appointment of a legal guardian for said child, said $4,000.00 representing 20 percent of the benefits, as designated by the decedent.

D. Four thousand dollars to Kathleen M. Bowler, the daughter of the decedent, when Kathleen M. Bowler attains majority on December 2, 1984, or, at time prior thereto upon appointment of a legal guardian for said child, said $4,000.00 representing 20 percent of the benefits, as designated by the decedent.


text:
    (Case No. 00157
    In Re Application of Madeline McGovern.

      Opinion filed November 14, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim allegedly arising out of the death of a fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Madeline McGovern, is the widow of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in the application for benefits;

2. The decedent, Daniel J. McGovern, was a firefighter, employed by the Chicago Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on March 16, 1978. He was 46 years of age;

3. On said date, at approximately 3:52 p.m., firefighter McGovern was responding to a home fire alarm and on the second floor, pulling ceilings and sidewalls in the bedroom, kitchen, and hallway, when he was struck on the head by ceiling plaster. He complained of being dizzy and weak and oxygen was administered to him at the fire scene. After being transported to a hospital by ambulance, he was pronounced dead at 5:10 p.m. the same date. The medical examiner’s certificate of death recited the immediate cause of death as “coronary trombosis,” due to or as a consequence of “arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease” and “inhalation of smoke and soot;”

4. Firefighter McGovern was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the sum of $20,000.00 be paid to Madeline McGovern, as widow and designated beneficiary of the deceased Chicago fireman, Daniel J. McGovern.


text:
    (Case No. 00158
    In Re Application of Peggy Conkle.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim allegedly arising out of the death of a correctional officer killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1977.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Peggy Conkle, widow of the decedent, and in the absence of a designation of beneficiary, is the person entitled to the duty death benefits as provided by the Act;

2. The decedent, Robert J. Conkle, age 22, was employed as a Correctional Officer, by the Pontiac Correctional Center, Department of Corrections, State of Illinois, and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on July 22, 1978;

3. On said date, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Officer Conkle, during regularly assigned duty hours, was stabbed to death during a riot by prison inmates at the Pontiac Correctional Center. The coroner’s certificate of death recites the immediate cause of death as “bilateral hematothorax,” due to or as a consequence of “multiple stab wounds,” with an approximate interval between onset and death of “minutes.” The coroner’s certificate recites death by “homicide,” with Conkle having been stabbed by “unknown person(s);”

4. Correctional Officer Conkle was killed in the line of duty as defined, and required by, Section 2(a) and 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the sum of $20,000.00 be paid to Peggy Conkle, widow of the deceased correctional officer, Robert J. Conkle.


text:
    (Case No. 00159
    In Re Application of Sandi Cole.

      Opinion filed September 12, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim allegedly arising out of the death of a correctional officer killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, sec. 281, et seq., 1977.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Sandi Cole, widow of the decedent, and in the absence of a designation of beneficiary, is the person entitled to the duty death benefits as provided by the Act;

2. The decedent, Stanley E. Cole, age 47, was employed as a Correctional Officer, by the Pontiac Correctional Center, Department of Corrections, State of Illinois, and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on July 22,1978;

3. On said date, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Officer Cole, during regularly assigned duty hours, was stabbed to death during a riot by prison inmates at the Pontiac Correctional Center. The coroner’s certificate of death recites the immediate cause of death as “bilateral hemato-pneumothorax,” due to or as a consequence of “multiple stab wounds,” with an approximate interval between onset and death of “minutes.” The coroner’s certificate also recites death by “homicide,” with Cole having been attacked and stabbed by “unknown person(s);”

4. Correctional Officer Cole was killed in the line of duty as defined, and required by, Sections 2(a) and 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the sum of $20,000.00 be paid to Sandi Cole, widow of the deceased correctional officer, Stanley E. Cole.


text:
    (Case No. 00160
    In Re Application of Melba Jean Thomas.

      Opinion filed September 12, 1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim allegedly arising out of the death of a correctional officer killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1977.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Melba Jean Thomas, widow of the decedent, and in the absence of a designation of beneficiary, is the person entitled to the duty death benefits as provided by the Act;

2. The decedent, William N. Thomas, age 49, was employed as a Correctional Officer, by the Pontiac Correctional Center, Department of Corrections, State of Illinois, and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on July 22, 1978;

3. On said date, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Officer Thomas, during regularly assigned duty hours, was stabbed to death during a riot by prison inmates at the Pontiac Correctional Center. The coroner’s certificate of death recites the immediate cause of death as “puncture wound of apex of left ventricle of heart,” with approximate interval between onset and death of “minutes.” The coroner’s certificate also recites death by “homocide,” with Thomas having been attacked and stabbed by “unknown person(s);”

4. Correctional Officer Thomas was killed in the line of duty as defined, and required by, Sections 2(a) and 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered, by reason of the foregoing, that the sum of $20,000.00 be paid to Melba Jean Thomas, widow of the deceased correctional officer, William N. Thomas.


text:
    (Case No. 00165
    In Re Application of Norma Cearlock.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

This claim arising out of the death of a volunteer fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Section 281, et seq., 175.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on March 15,1979, the Court finds that:

1. The Claimant, Norma Cearlock, is the widow of the decedent, as stated in the application for benefits, and the beneficiary designated by him pursuant to a form executed on February 26,1975;

2. Delbert DeWayne Cearlock, age 42, was a volunteer fireman and a member of the Vandalia Fire Department in the active performance of his duties as a fireman on December 13, 1978;

3. On said date, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Cearlock was a passenger in a Vandalia Fire Department watertank truck, traveling to the scene of a fire, when the truck went out of control and overturned, killing Cearlock at the accident scene. The coroner’s certificate of death submitted recited that Cearlock’s death resulted from “injuries received from accident;” and he was pronounced dead at 11:45 p.m. the same night;

4. Cearlock was a volunteer fireman, and he was “killed in the line of duty” as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act;

5. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be awarded to Norma Cearlock, widow and designated beneficiary, of the deceased volunteer fireman, Delbert DeWayne Cearlock.


text:
    (Case No. 00166
    In Re Application of Arline Sorby.

      Opinion filed May 23, 1979.

    James J. Reidy, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Francis M. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act) Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1977.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on April 19,1979, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the Claimant, Arline Sorby, is the wife of the decedent, and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow.

2. That the decedent, Robert C. Sorby, was a 24 year veteran of the Chicago Fire Department and was engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on October 10,1978.

3. Fireman Sorby began his regular 24-hour duty assignment at 8:00 a.m. and at 3:12 p.m. on October 10, 1978, and Sorby and others assigned to Engine Company Ten responded to an alarm of an “oil spill.” While proceeding to the scene, Sorby fell from the engine truck on which he was riding, and he struck his head on the street. Fireman Sorby, unconscious, was taken to Resurrection Hospital and admitted at 4:00 p.m. He never regained consciousness and was pronounced dead at 7:40 a.m. on October 29, 1978. The medical examiner’s certificate of death recites the immediate cause of death as “severe skull fracture with intracranial and intracerebral hemorrhage.”

We find, therefore:

a) that Fireman Sorby was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act; and
b) that the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and is hereby awarded to Arline Sorby, as wife and beneficiary of the deceased fireman, Robert C. Sorby.


text:
    (Case No. 00168
    In Re Application of Imogene Bosak

      Opinion filed May 25, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1977.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on April 18,1979, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the Claimant, Imogene Bosak, is the wife of the decedent, and in the absence of a designated beneficary; Section 3(a) of the Act provides that the entire sum shall be paid to the surviving spouse.

2. That the decedent, William P. Bosak, was a police officer employed by the Chicago Police Department and was engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec.2(e) of the Act, on March 3,1979.

3. That on said date, Officer Bosak and his partner, Roger Van Schaik, began their regular duty assignment at 8:00 a.m. They were wearing civilian type dress and drove in an unmarked Chicago Police Department vehicle. At approximately 4:16 p.m. on March 3, 1979, the officers made a traffic stop at 1123 West 115th Street in Chicago, Illinois. While both officers were outside of their vehicle, another car drove up and stopped next to the police car. The occupant of this car, later learned to be Kenneth Allen left his auto and began shooting at the two police officers. Allen, after shooting both officers a number of times, fled the scene and was apprehended shortly thereafter. Officer Bosak was pronounced dead on arrival at Roseland Hospital at 4:40 p.m. The medical examiner’s certificate of death recites the immediate cause of death as a bullet wound in the heart.

We find, therefore:

a) that Officer Bosak was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act; and
b) that the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 be, and is hereby awarded to Imogene Bosak, surviving spouse of the deceased police officer, William P. Bosak.


text:
    (Case No. 00169
    In Re Application of Ann Van Schaik.

      Opinion filed May 31, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, the Act), Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et seq., 1977

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on April 18,1979, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the Claimant, Ann Van Schaik, is the wife of the decedent, and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow.

2. That the decedent, Roger Van Schaik, was a police officer employed by the Chicago Police Department and was engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec.2(e) of the Act, on March 3,1979.

3. That on said date, Officer Van Schaik began his regular duty assignment at 8:00 a.m. He and his partner, William Bosak, were wearing civilian type dress and drove in an unmarked Chicago Police Department vehicle. At approximately 4:16 p.m. on March 3, 1979, the officers made a traffic stop at 1123 West 115th Street in Chicago, Illinois. While both officers were outside of their vehicle, another car drove up and stopped next to the police car. The occupant of this car, later learned to be Kenneth Allen, left his auto and began shooting at the two police officers. Allen, after shooting both officers a number of times, fled the scene and was apprehended shortly thereafter. Officer Van Schaik was pronounced dead at 4:45 p.m. at Roseland Community Hospital. The medical examiner’s certificate of death recites the immediate cause of death as a bullet wound in the brain.

We find, therefore;

a) that Officer Van Schaik was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act; and
b) that the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $20,000 00 be and is hereby awarded to Ann Van Schaik, surviving spouse of the deceased police officer, Roger Van Schaik.


author: Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 75-CV-0057
    In Re Application of Sol Goldberg

      Opinion filed April 6, 1979.

    Pierce & Goldman, by Allen S. Pierce, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; by Orisha Kulick, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This matter comes before this Court on Respondent’s motion to dismiss the claim on the grounds that a claim for compensation under the “Crime Victims Compensation Act” does not survive the death of the Claimant.

Claimant filed his claim for benefits under the “Crime Victims Compensation Act” on July 29,1974. There were several hearings on this matter, and during the pendency of the claim, the Claimant, Goldberg, died of causes unrelated to his original injury. He apparently had a heart attack on July 13,1977 which caused his death.

The Court has never rendered an opinion on this claim, and upon the Claimant’s death, the Attorney General moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds that a claim for compensation under the “Crime Victims Compensation Act” does not survive the death of the Claimant.

The statute which the Court must consider is the “Survival Act” which is found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, Ch. 110-1/2, Sec. 27-6. That statute sets forth the Acts which, in addition to common law, survive the death of a party. The Court must determine whether or not the “Crime Victims Compensation Act” is therefore one of those which does survive the death of the Claimant..

There is no doubt that the Crime Victims Compensation Law was unknown at common law and thus is a purely statutory cause of action. It is clear that a statutory cause of action does not survive unless declared by statute to do so.

The case before the Court is a claim for an award in a Statutory Court and is not an adversary proceeding against a defendant as in a tort action.

In the instant case, the “Crime Victim Compensation Act,” Section 11 (Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 70, Sec. 81) provides as follows: “ Compensation due under this Act may not be assigned, pledged, encumbered, released or commuted____” It is clear that the compensation cannot be assigned, and that the drafters of the law in the Legislature did not wish it to survive because no mention is made in the Act that it survive the death of the Claimant.

In this case, the Claimant, Sol Goldberg, died prior to the adjudication on the merits of his claim. Goldberg claim did not survive his death because it is not an “action” to recover damages for the injury to the person. It is rather a statutory creation allowing a Claimant to seek compensation from the State.

Since the Crime Victim’s Act is totally silent as to survival, it is a strict statutory action which terminates and abates at the death of a Claimant.

It is therefore the finding of the Court that the claim of Sol Goldberg abated upon his death and the motion of the State to dismiss this claim is hereby granted.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-0743
    In Re Application of Markus L. Burton

      Opinion filed October 23, 1978.

   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an alleged criminal offense occurring on November 24, 1974, at 2233 S. Federal Ave., Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the terms of the, “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred to as the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat, 1975, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et.seq.).

Based on the investigatory report of the Attorney General this Court denied the claim on August 1,1977, on the ground that the Claimant did not cooperate with law enforcement officers in the apprehension and prosecution of the offenders. The Claimant objected to this order and requested a hearing on the merits of his claim. The claim was assigned to a Commissioner for the taking of evidence. On February 22,1978, a hearing was held before Commissioner Leo J. Spivack where the following facts were established by a preponderance of the evidence:

The Claimant, Marcus L. Burton, was the victim of a violent crime as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act to wit: Aggravated Battery (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

The Claimant incurred various medical and hospital bills after part of which were reimbursed and/or paid by insurance the net amount paid or owed by the Claimant was $295.05.

The Claimant was employed at the time of the offense and earned in excess of $500.00 per month. He was disabled due to his physical injuries from November 24,1974, to March 30,1975, for a total of 126 days. The Claimant did not establish his loss of earnings and did not return to work due to alleged but unsubstiantated claims of psychological disability due to this incident. During this period of disability the Claimant received $2,979.34 in disability payments.

The Act requires the Claimant to be an innocent victim of a violent crime and to cooperate fully with the law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the offenders. In this case the Claimant gave various and conflicting reports to police concerning the events leading to his injury. The Claimant also refused to view police photos in order to establish the identity of his assailant. In his notice of intent to file a Claim for benefits under the Act the Claimant made statements concerning the events which were materially different than he gave at the hearing on this claim. The competent and credible evidence does not establish by a preponderance that the Claimant cooperated fully in the apprehension of his assailants. The conflicting evidence and the refusal to cooperate with police officers precludes the Claimant’s recovery. The Claimant has not met the required condition precedent to his right to compensation under the Act. The Claimant’s failure to cooperate with police and the lack of credible evidence to support his claim require that it be denied.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of Marcus L. Burton be and the same is hereby denied and that the order denying this claim of August 1, 1977, stands.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-0928
    In Re Application of Katie Shivers, Claimant, Willie Cooper, Deceased Victim.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1978.

    Robert Frankenstein, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Barbara Gilleran-Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on December 18,1974. Katie Shivers, co-habitant of the deceased victim, Willie Cooper, and mother of his dependent children, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the, “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred to as the Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, §71, et seq.).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. The Claimant’s deceased co-habitant, Willie Cooper, age 36, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §72(c) of the Act, to wit: Murder (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, §9-lJ.

2. On December 18,1974, the victim was shot during the course of an armed robbery of his gas station. The incident occurred at 2675 E. 75th Street, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was taken to South Shore Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

3. The Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and for loss of support for her two children, Denardo Shivers Cooper, age 11; and Willie Rahsaan Cooper, born July 5,1975.

4. The Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $2,600.00. However, according to §73(a) of the Act, a person is eligible for compensation for funeral expenses provided that he is related to the victim.

5. The Claimant, Katie Shivers, was not related to the deceased victim.

6. The Claimant’s two minor children, children of the deceased, were totally dependent upon the victim for support.

7. That §74 of the Act states . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.”

8. That prior to his death, the victim was self-employed and his average monthly earnings were $1,944.06.

9. That the victim was 36 years of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1973, Life Tables, Volume II, his life expectancy would have been 71.4 years. The projected loss of earnings for 35.4 years is in excess of $10,000.00 which is the maximum amount compensable under §77(e) of the Act.

10. That §77(d) of the Act provides for a deduction of $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the “Workmen’s Compensation Act,” (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, §138.1, et seq.), from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

11. After making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the Claimant’s children’s loss is in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum award allowed in §77(e) of the Act.

12. That the Claimant, Katie Shivers is not entitled to an award for funeral expenses.

13. The Claimant’s interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid to her pursuant to the alternative provisions of §78 of the Act.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 be and is hereby awarded to Katie Shivers, on behalf of Denardo and Willie Cooper, children of Willie Cooper, an innocent victim of a violent crime to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

Twenty equal monthly payments of $500.00 each to be paid to Katie Shivers for the use and benefit of Denardo Shivers Cooper and Willie Rahsaan Cooper, minor children of the deceased victim, Willie Cooper.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0062
    In Re Application of Clara M. Votteler

      Order filed October 23, 1978.

   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on March 30, 1975, at 124th Street and Hals-ted Avenue. Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred to as “the Act.” (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.)

Based on the Investigatory Report of the Attorney General this Court denied the claim on November 3, 1976. The Court found that the Claimant’s husband’s death was caused by being struck and killed by a hit and run driver and therefore the Claimant’s husband was not killed as the result of being the victim of a violent crime as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act. The Claimant objected to this Order and requested a hearing on the merits. The claim was assigned to a Commissioner and a hearing was held before Commissioner Leo J. Spivack on May 17, 1978, where the following facts were established by a preponderance of evidence:

The Claimant was married to Christopher Votteler and on March 30,1975, her husband was struck by a hit and run driver as he was crossing the street on his way home. As the result of his injuries Christopher Votteler subsequently died. There was no evidence adduced to show the incident was deliberately caused. No one was ever arrested or charged with his death.

In order for a Claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act there must be proof that the injury or death was the result of one of the violent crimes defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act. In this case there is no proof that the victim came under the scope of any of those enumerated crimes of violence. Therefore the Claimant is not entitled to compensation under the terms of the Act.

There has been no evidence presented to cause the Court to modify or vacate the Order denying the claim.

It is hereby ordered that the Order of November 3, 1976, shall stand and the claim of Clara M. Votteler be and the same is hereby denied with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0224
    In Re Application of Ann Di Domenico

      Order filed September 14, 1978.

   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on March 13, 1975, at 1310 West Addison Street, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereinafter referred to as the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.).

Based on the investigatory report of the Attorney General and other documentary evidence this Court entered on order denying the claim on December 9, 1977. The Claimant objected to the order and sought a full hearing on the merits of her claim.

This claim was assigned to a Commissioner of this Court for the taking of evidence. At said hearing the Claimant testified in support of her claim.

Based on the preponderance of evidence adduced at said hearing, the Claimant was a victim of a violent crime defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to-wit: Robbery.

As the result of her injuries the Claimant incurred a hospital bill from Illinois Masonic Hospital for $11,779.60 and a physician’s bill from Dr. Walter Schwartz for $500.00. Both bills were paid in full by Medicare benefits. At the time the Claimant was receiving public aid benefits.

While totally disabled from March 13, 1975, to June 30,1975, the Claimant was not employed and had not been employed for over ten years before the incident. Therefore, she suffered no loss of earnings.

The Claimant suffered serious injuries causing pain and suffering but this is not a compensable loss under the Act.

Since the Claimant incurred no loss of earnings and incurred no pecuniary loss she is not entitled to any award. Based on the foregoing evidence her claim must be denied.

It is hereby ordered that the order of this Court of December 9,1977, stand the claim of Ann Di Domenico be, and the same is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0466
    In Re Application of Michael Bunna

      Opinion filed October 23, 1978.

   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on August 3,1975, at 5010 South Wood Street, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred to as the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., Chapter 70, Section 71 et seq.).

Based on the investigatory report of the Attorney General of the Court denying the claim on March 2, 1977, on the ground that the Claimant’s injury was attributable to his wrongful act. The Claimant objected to this order and the claim was assigned to a Commissioner Leo J. Spivack, where the following facts were established by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Claimant was the victim of a violent crime as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Aggravated Battery (Ill. Rev. Stat., Chapter 38, Section 12-4).

While the Claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses as the result of his injury the Claimant suffered his injury as the result of his wrongful act. The evidence is uncontradicted that the Claimant had been drinking with friends and gone to Cornell Park after it had been closed to the public and had entered the pool when it was closed in violation of Park District Ordinances. While unlawfully on the premises the Claimant and his friends were involved in an altercation with other persons which led to Claimant’s injuries.

Section 3(f) of the Act provides that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of the assailant.

The Claimant has not proved that he is entitled to compensation under the Act. His injury is substantially attributable to his wrongful acts. Therefore his claim must be denied.

It is hereby ordered that the Order of March 2,1977 denying the claim of Louis A. Bunna shall stand and the claim of Louis A. Bunna be and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0483
    In Re Application of Geraldine Brown

      Order filed September 28,1978.

   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on November 29, 1974, at 900 West Argyle Street, Chicago, Illinois. Geraldine Brown, the former wife of the victim, Donald C. Schumacher, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act”, hereafter referred to as the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.)

The Claimant, Geraldine Brown, seeks compensation for loss of support for the two minor children of the victim. The Court on December 2, 1976, denied the claim of Geraldine Brown based on the investigatory report of the Attorney General. The Claimant objected to the denial of her claim and the claim was assigned to a Commissioner of the Court for the taking of evidence. On October 26, 1977, a hearing was held before the Commissioner. The evidence adduced at the hearing established that the victim, Donald C. Schumacher was the victim of a violent crime, to-wit: Murder (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, Sec. 9-1).

Claimant seeks compensation for loss of support for the two minor children of the parties pursuant to a decree of divorce entered by the Circuit Court of Cook County calling for child support payments of $40.00 per week for the support of the two children.

While the decedent was the victim of a violent crime the evidence clearly shows that the deceased substantially provoked his assailant. The deceased had brought two prostitutes, one a female and one a male impersonating a female, to his apartment where he became involved in an argument with the male. The female prostitute tried to stop the fight and was kicked by the deceased who was then fatally stabbed by the male prostitute. Said acts of the decedent were in violation of Section 3(F) of the Act and foreclose compensation to the Claimant, Geraldine Brown.

Based on the foregoing facts, it is hereby ordered that the Claimant, Geraldine Brown, is not entitled to an award and that the order of December 2,1976, denying said claim is in full force and effect.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0839
    In Re Application of Marie Rovetuso Todorich, Claimant; Anthony Rovetuso, Deceased Victim.

      Opinion filed October 25,1978.

   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on October 10,1975. Marie Rovetuso, widow (now married) of the deceased victim, Anthony Rovetuso, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred to as the Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, §71, et seq.).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. The Claimant’s deceased husband, Anthony Rovetuso, age 45, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §72(c) of the Act, to wit: Murder (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. On October 10,1975, the victim was shot during the course of an armed robbery. The incident occurred on the street at 3956 W. Lake Street, Chicago, Illinois, The victim was taken to Loretto Hospital where he subsequently died of his wounds.

3. The Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and for loss of support for the victim’s stepson, Matthew Bowman, age 16.

4. Funeral and burial expenses were paid by the Claimant in the amount of $3,409.00, of which $2,000.00 is deemed compensable by the Court.

5. The Claimant’s son (victim’s step-son) was dependent upon the victim for support.

6. That §74 of the Act states “. . .loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.”

7. That prior to his death, the victim was employed by Sarcol, Inc. and his average monthly earnings were $1,243.51.

8. That the victim was 45 years of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1973, Life Tables, Volume II, his life expectancy would have been 72.5 years. The projected loss of earnings for 27.5 years is in excess of $10,000.00 which is the maximum amount compensable under §77(e) of the Act.

9. That §77(d) of the Act provides for a deduction of $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the “Workmen’s Compensation Act,” (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, §138.1, et seq.), from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

10. The Claimant has received $61,680.01 from life insurance policies as a result of the victim’s death, of which $36,680.01 can be counted as applicable deductions.

11. After making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the Claimant’s loss is in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum award allowed in §77(e) of the Act.

12. The Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

13. The Claimant’s interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid to her pursuant to the alternative provisions of §78 of the Act.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 be and is hereby awarded to Marie Rovetuso Todorich, widow of Anthony Rovetuso, an innocent victim of a violent crime to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $2,000.00 to be paid to Marie Rovetuso Todorich;
(b) Sixteen equal monthly payments of $500.00 each to he paid to Marie Rovetuso Todorich for the use and benefit of Matthew Bowman, stepson of the deceased victim, Anthony Rovetuso.

Supplemental Opinion

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of Respondent for entry of an order terminating periodic support payments, which are being made pursuant to this Court’s order of March 30,1976, to Marie Rovetuso Lodovich for the use and benefit of Matthew Bowman, the minor step-son of the deceased victim.

The Court has been advised that Matthew Bowman died prior to the expiration of those periodic support payments.

It is therefore ordered that the periodic support payments awarded to Matthew Bowman terminate forthwith.


author: Polos, C.J.

text:
    (No. 76-CV-0878
    In Re Application of Beatrice Chandler

      Opinion filed December 22, 1978.

    Michael D. Golden, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General for Illinois.
   Polos, C.J.

This is an action under the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” (Ill. Rev Stat. Ch. 70, para. 71, et seq.), hereafter the Act.

The Court has carefully reviewed the application for benefits submitted herein, the investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois, a stipulation entered into between the parties, and a transcript of evidence taken in this cause on August 2, 1978, before a Commissioner of this Court.

On consideration thereof, this Court finds as follows:

1. Claimant was, on and before September 4,1974, married to one Ben Chandler.

2. On September 7, 1974, the said Ben Chandler was a victim of a violent crime as defined by Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit “murder.”

3. The said Ben Chandler in no way contributed to or incited said crime.

4. Claimant and the decedent had, on the date of his death, one minor child.

5. Claimant and the deceased were separated on the date of his death, but no suit for dissolution of marriage had been filed.

6. The deceased was unemployed at the time of his death, and had been unemployed for more than six months last proceeding the date of his death, and was a recipient of Public Aid during said period.

7. Claimant has fully complied with all technical provisions of the Act.

8. Claimant did not pay any monies on account of medical, hospital and/or funeral expenses incurred by the deceased or his estate, and does not seek reimbursement therefore.

The sole issue before the Court is whether Claimant is entitled to compensation for loss of support under the foregoing facts.

Section 4 of the Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 70, para 74), provides as follows:

“Pecuniary loss to an applicant under this Act resulting from injury or death to a victim includes in the case of injury, appropriate medical expenses or hospital expenses, loss of earnings, loss of future earnings because of a disability resulting from the injury, and other expenses for treatment by Christian Science practitioners and nursing care appropriate thereto; and, in addition in the case of death, funeral and burial expenses and loss of support to the dependents of the victim. Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00per month, whichever is less. Nothing in this Section authorizes the making of child support payments for the benefit of a child conceived as a resuslt of the rape of its mother. Pain and suffering shall not be considered in determining pecuniary loss. Pecuniary loss does not include property damage.”

It is clear from Section 4 of the Act that as a condition to the right of a dependant to recover for loss of support in the case of death, the loss of support must first be established, and it must further be established that the victim had some earnings during the six month period preceding his death. It will be noted that the statute provides that loss of support “shall be determined” on the basis of the victims average monthly earnings for that period.

Here, the record is clear that the deceased had been unemployed for six months preceding his death. Claimant argues however that the deceased was a recipient of Public Aid during said period, and that amounts received from Public Aid were “earnings” within the meaning of the Act.

However, we adopt the ordinary and common definition of the word “earnings” i.e. “something earned as compensation for labor or the use of capital.” Webster, Third New Int. Dictionary, 1976, page 714. Proceeds of public charity can by no stretch of the imagination be deemed compensation for labor or capital.

Since the Act dictates that the amount of any award for loss of support be determined solely upon the basis of victims earnings for the six months preceding his death, and since Ben Chandler did not have earnings within that six month period, we are compelled to hold that an award for loss of support cannot be made in this cause.

It is therefore ordered that this claim be, and hereby is denied.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0936
    In Re Application of Jean Rosenbaum

      Order filed May 22, 1979.

   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on November 3, 1975, at or near 543 North Waller Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the applicable provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred to as the Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.).

Based on the investigatory report of the Attorney General the claim was denied on December 27,1977, for Claimant’s failure to prove a pecuniary loss of more than $200.00 as the result of the violent crime as required by Sec. 3(b) of the Act. At the request of the Claimant, who objected to this order, the claim was assigned to a Commissioner for a full hearing on the merits. On September 6,1978, a hearing was conducted by Commissioner Leo J. Spivack, at this hearing the following facts were established by a preponderance of the evidence:

The Claimant was the victim of a violent crime as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Robbery (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, Section 18-1).

As the result of the injury to her knee suffered in the robbery, the Claimant was treated at Michael Reese Hospital as an outpatient for which services she was billed $26.00 of which $15.00 was paid by insurance, leaving the net amount of $11.00 being paid by the Claimant.

At the time of the criminal offense the Claimant was employed by the Chicago Board of Education and by the Federal Government. She had been so employed for more than six months before the offense. In November 1975 she earned the sum of $499.59 and did not loose any time or earnings from her employment as the result of the criminal offense.

The Claimant alleges that she developed a hearing loss which she attributes to this offense. At the hearing the Claimant was unable to produce any admissable or credible evidence, to support her contention. No medical evidence was offered by her to support her contention. The evidence offered by the Claimant was not sufficient to prove any causal connection between the criminal offense and the subsequent hearing loss.

The Claimant has failed to prove by competent and credible evidence that as a result of the criminal offense she incurred medical or hospital expenses or compensable loss of earnings in excess of $200.00 as required by the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Act. Any claim for loss or damage to her personal property is barred by the provisions of Section 4 of the Act. Therefore, the Claimant is not entitled to compensation pursuant to the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the order of December 27, 1977, denying the claim of Jean Rosenbaum stand and remains in full force and effect.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0968
    In Re Application of Rose Bakes

      Order filed March 22, 1979.

    Donald Hubert, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General for Illinois; Faith Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on December 3, 1975, at Addison, Illinois. Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the applicable provisions of (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.), (“Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred as the Act.”)

The claim was filed on May 10, 1976. Based upon the investigatory report of the Attorney General and other documentary evidence the Court on July 10,1978, denied the claim for failure to fully cooperate with law enforcement officials. Claimant requested a hearing on the merits.

Commissioner Leo J. Spivack on December 19, 1978, at Chicago, Illinois conducted the hearing.

At the hearing the following facts were established by a preponderance of the evidence:

1. Claimant’s decedent, husband Ned Bakes, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: “Murder.”

2. Claimant has failed to comply with all pertinent provisions of the Act and does not qualify for compensation thereunder, to wit:

(a) On December 3,1975, Detective Edward Ley, in the company of two other officers, attempted to interview Claimant to further his investigation of the crime but was ordered out of Claimant’s house.

The Claimant conceded that his medical and hospital expenses were paid by Illinois Department of Public Aid.

Section 3(b) of the Act requires that a Claimant suffer a pecuniary loss of $200.00 or more as defined in the Act which is attributable to a violent crime causing injury. Compensation for pain and suffering is specifically excluded from any award. In the case the Claimant did not incurring pecuniary loss as defined by the Act and is therefore not entitled to compensation. His claim shall be denied.

It is hereby ordered that the order of January 31, 1978 denying the claim of Rose Bakes shall stand and the claim is denied with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-0997
    In Re Application of Epifanio Robles, Claimant, Robert C. Robles, Deceased Victim.

      Opinion filed August 31, 1978.

    Roberta Strickler, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Barbara Gilleran-Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on January 8, 1976. Epifanio Robles, father of the deceased victim, Robert C. Robles, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred to as the Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, §71, et seq.).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. The Claimant’s deceased son, Robert C. Robles, age 18, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §72(c) of the Act, to wit: Reckless Conduct (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, §12-5).

2. That on January 8, 1976, at 2150 West North Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, the victim was shot and killed with a bullet fired from a gun in the offender’s possession. Prior to the incident, the offender had been showing the gun to the victim. The victim’s body was taken to St. Elizabeth Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

3. The Claimant seeks compensation under the Act for funeral expenses only. The Claimant was not dependent.

4. Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $869.00.

5. That §77(d) of the Act provides for a deduction of . $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the “Workmen’s Compensation Act,” (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 48, §138.1, et seq.), from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

6. The Claimant has received $500.00 in reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions:

Public Aid $300.00
United Christian Community Service $200.00

7. The Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

8. The Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Funeral Expenses $869.00
Less Deductible -200.00
Public Aid $300.00
United Christian Community Service 200.00
Total $169.00

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $169.00 be and is hereby awarded to Epifanio Robles, father of Robert C. Robles, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-1277
    In Re Application of Charles Conti

      Order filed October 23, 1978.

   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on October 11,1975, in the 2600 block of North Southport Ave., Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred to as the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70., Sec. 71, et seq.).

Based on the investigatory report of the Attorney General the claim was denied on January 31,1978, on the ground that the Claimant did not incur a pecuniary loss of $200.00 or more atributable to a violent crime. The Claimant objected to this order and requested a full hearing on the merits. This claim was assigned to a Commissioner and a hearing was held on August 9, 1978, before Commissioner Leo J. Spivack where the following facts were established by a preponderance of the evidence:

The Claimant, Charles Conti, was the victim of a violent crime as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act to wit: Aggravated Battery (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

As the result of being beaten and robbed on October 11, 1975, the Claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses in the treatment of his broken jaw and head injuries. He seeks compensation for only these expenses. He suffered no loss of income because he had been unemployed for over six months prior to the offense.

On or about December 6,1975, Detective Ley called Claimant to set up an interview date but was told that Claimant, on advice of counsel, was to make no statement or give any information.
(c) On or about December 6,1975, Sargent James Tellme, in charge of the homocide investigation, detailed officers to interview Claimant. Such interview was never had, due to the officers inability to contact Claimant.

3. Claimant has not cooperated fully with the authorities in and about the investigation of the crime and the apprehension of those responsible, as is required by the letter of the statute.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to modify its order of July 10, 1978.


text:
    (No. 76-CV-1344
    In Re Application of Octavia Hadley

      Order filed July 28,1978.

   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an alleged criminal offense that occurred on April 26,1975, in Chicago, Illinois as a result of which Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, Sec. 71, etseq.), hereafter referred to as the Act.

On November 30,1977, this Court entered an order denying the claim for Claimant’s failure to establish that an alleged crime occurred. Said denial was based upon the investigatory report of the Attorney General.

The Claimant has asked for a hearing from the denial of her claim. The case was assigned to a Commissioner of this Court for the taking of evidence at the hearing before the Commissioner on June 21,1978. The Claimant stated that on April 29, 1975, she was employed at Square D Electric Company and returned to work on that day after being off work for some time due to illness. When she went to work she claimed “they were putting some type of chemicals around my work area that made me drunk.” The Claimant stated that “the chemicals” were the crime against her. No one was ever charged or arrested as the result of this alleged criminal conduct. The Claimant conceded that she is under psychiatric care at the University of Illinois on an out-patient basis.

The Court finds that, on the basis of the evidence adduced that the Claimant is not a victim of a violent crime as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act.

The Claimant is not entitled to compensation under the Act because of her failure to prove that she is a victim of a violent crime.

The Court therefore finds that there is no reason to modify its order of November 30, 1977, denying recovery to Claimant.


text:
    (No. 77-CV-0077
    In Re Application of Ruby Gale Stevens

      Opinion filed September 5, 1978.

    James Dewulf, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General for Illinois; George M. Schafer, Assistant Attorney General.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 23, 1976. Ruby Gale Stevens, mother of the deceased victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” hereafter referred to as the Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, §71, et seq.).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased son, Stephen Eric Skibba, age 16, was allegedly a victim of a crime of violence, as set forth in sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit: Murder (Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on June 23,1976, Claimant’s son was shot by James R. Michels as he was attempting to leave the assailant’s automobile after the victim had accepted a ride while hitch-hiking.

3. That sec. 3(f) of the Act provides that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the injury to or death of the victim was not substantially attributable to the victim’s wrongful act.

4. That it appears from the investigatory report and police report that the victim’s death was attributable to his wrongful act of hitch-hiking in violation of Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 95.5, sec. 11-1006.

5. That the Claimant’s claim does not meet a required condition precedent for the right to compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of Ruby Gale Stevens be, and is hereby denied.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 5220
    Anne Mestan, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 21, 1980.

   Holderman, J.

This claim arises from a one car automobile accident that occurred on February 15, 1964. Claimant was a passenger in a car driven by her husband in a northerly direction along Mount Prospect Road across the Northwestern Railroad leading to the Northwest Highway in Cook County in the Village of Mount Prospect.

The accident occurred where there is a sharp dip in the county-maintained right-of-way between the Northwestern Railroad tracks and the State-maintained Northwest Highway.

The County of Cook and the Northwestern Railroad made a settlement in the amount of $7,500.00 in return for a covenant not to sue.

The record discloses that the area that possibly contributed to the cause of the accident was a county-maintained road and was not under the control of the State.

The area in question not being under the control of the State, there cannot be any liability upon the State.

This cause is dismissed.


author: POCH, J.

text:
    (No. 5632
    Nestor Nieves, Administrator of the Estate of Elsie Nieves, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 3, 1979.

    Frank E. O’Reilly and Edward J. Bradley, both for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Saul R. Wexler, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This is an action brought by Nestor Nieves as administrator of the estate of Elsie Nieves, deceased, to recover $25,000.00 damages for the alleged wrongful death of the Claimant’s decedent on January 6,1968.

On December 26, 1968, at about 8:05 p.m., she voluntarily entered Elgin State Hospital. She had previously been in mental institutions four times.

On the fifth occasion, the admitting physician’s diagnosis was as follows:

“A 40 year old white female, married, Catholic, had three previous admissions at Elgin State Hospital ° ° *. On this fourth occasion she comes in anxious, quite restless, but answers questions with elusiveness, appears hostile, unmanageable at home where she fights with husband. Effect inappropriate, poor insight as well as judgment, fairly oriented to all three spheres, schizophrenic reaction, chronic undifferentiated type.”

She was taken by an attendant to a room on the second floor. There were two psychiatric aides on duty, who were in charge of from 30 to 32 patients. Once on the floor, she manifested peculiar behavior by crawling under beds, but was not placed in restraints. Later that same night, she walked into another patient’s room twice and tried to take this patient’s clothes. The incident was reported to an aide who returned Mrs. Nieves to her own bed.

The aide thought it was necessary to watch Mrs. Nieves because the aide did not want her to go into other rooms where she might molest the other patients or try to take their clothes. The aide was also concerned because there was another patient on the ward who would fight.

A short time later, Mrs. Nieves was given permission to be in the hallway for a few minutes. This was the last time that anyone saw her for the next 15 minutes. Sometime during this period, Mrs. Nieves walked 75 to 100 feet to the end of the hallway and jumped or fell from the second story window onto the frozen ground. The window was not locked, barred or secured in any way; it was just an ordinary window. She was observed lying on the ground at about 12:05 a.m. only four hours after she had been admitted and died as a result 11 days later.

Claimant has charged that Respondent was negligent in the operation of the building where Mrs. Nieves was placed; for failure to keep her under proper surveillance; and also for failure to provide adequately secured windows, which would have prevented the incident.

Although the State “in operating a mental institution is not an insurer * * Callbeck v. State of Illinois (1956), 22 Ill. Ct. Cl. 722, the State does owe patients the duty of reasonable care. Karulski v. Board of Trustees (1966), Ill. Ct. Cl. 295.

In the instant case, both expert witnesses for the Claimant testified that the hospital failed to meet the standard of care required and that the normal precautions were not taken. They also testified that Mrs. Nieves should have either been placed in restraints, or placed in a locked ward under constant supervision because her condition presented a “very tense, tricky and dangerous situation”.

Dr. Tuteur, a psychiatrist and the clinical director at Elgin State Hospital, testified for the Respondent that although restraints were not necessary, Mrs. Nieves should have been admitted to a closed ward, even though her symptoms did not show that she was a danger to herself or to others. He also testified that the symptoms which a patient displays should control the type of ward in which he should be admitted. Yet, at the time in question, the geographical location of a patient’s residence and not the symptoms a patient displayed, was the controlling factor in placing a patient in a locked ward or open ward. Dr. Tuteur was not able to explain why she was not admitted to a locked ward.

Dr. Tuteur further testified that there should have been more than two aides on duty that night, but that budgetary considerations prevented hiring more aides.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Respondent was negligent and that said negligence was the proximate cause of Mrs. Nieves’ death. The coroner determined the cause of death to be a cerebral embolism, resulting from the numerous injuries which she sustained from the fall. Dr. Rios, Director of the Medical and Surgical Services at the hospital, and Drs. Foldman and Ziporyn, expert witnesses for the Claimant, were also of the same opinion.

Respondent’s contention that Mrs. Neives was contributorily negligent is without merit. A mentally ill patient can not be charged with the same degree of care for his own safety as a mentally competent person. (Nickolic v. State of Illinois (1965), 25 Ill. Ct. Cl. 333.) The pathetic and confused behavior exhibited by Mrs. Nieves shows that little could have been expected of her in caring for her own safety. Hence, Mrs. Nieves was not guilty of contributory negligence.

The last point to consider is whether Claimant is entitled to the amount prayed for. Mrs. Nieves was married in 1952 and had three minor children at the time of her death. The record indicates that during her 16/2 years of married life, Mrs. Nieves spent 11 years at home caring for her family. During this time she did the housework, and made clothes for the family, tended a garden, drove the children to and from school, and kept the family financial records. If these services were to be performed by someone else, they would cost a considerable sum of money. Moreover, if a wrongful death action is brought for the benefit of a surviving spouse and children, the law presumes substantial damages from the fact of death alone. Lewinski v. State of Illinois (1967), 26 Ill. Ct. Cl. 166.

Wherefore, Claimant is awarded the sum of $25,000.00.


text:
    (No. 5682
    Ronald J. Kohut, a minor, by his mother and next friend, Mary Kohut, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1980.

    French and Rogers (William H. Warvel, of counsel), for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

The complaint seeks damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by Claimant on a State highway.

The complaint alleges that Claimant was injured on September 12,1968, at approximately 2:56 a.m. when the car he was driving struck a cement curbing on the west side of Route 53 approximately 50 to 80 feet south of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad overpass in Lisle, Illinois.

Claimant alleges that he suffered severe personal injuries caused by the Respondent’s alleged negligence in constructing the roadway in such a way that it suddenly narrowed from four lanes to two lanes, in failing to post any signs or other devices warning of such sudden narrowing and/or failing to paint the curbing or edge of the road to warn motorists of the alleged sudden narrowing.

Claimant testified that at the time of the accident he was 19 years of age. He had been working as a short order cook from 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on September 11,1968. At 10:30 p.m. on September 11,1968, he picked up some friends and went to Lake Villa and commenced the return trip at about 2:00 a.m. on September 12,1968, with a friend.

He admitted to having drunk a can of beer at 11:00 p.m. and one at 1:00 a.m. in violation of the Illinois drinking age in effect at that time, and that on the trip which commenced at 2:00 a.m. his passenger had been drinking beer ip the vehicle.

As the Claimant approached the area of the accident, he did not observe any warning signals or flashing barricades of any kind other than a sign posting the speed limit at 40 m.p.h. at which time he reduced his speed to 40 m.p.h. He was, however, aware that he was in a construction zone by reason of the fact that the lane marking dividing the two southbound lanes ceased just north of the accident’s scene.

As he proceeded south on Route 53, the right front of his wheel struck the cement curbing at a point where the roadway suddenly narrowed from four lanes to two lanes causing his vehicle to be thrown onto the northbound lanes and into a head-on collision with a northbound vehicle.

It was undisputed that the scene of the occurrence was actually within a construction zone on the highway.

Sgt. Frank Kruse of the Lisle Police Department, the investigating officer at the scene, testified on behalf of Respondent that the impact took place 53.8 feet south of the overpass and the vehicles came to rest 82 feet south of the point of impact; that the scene of the occurrence was a construction area and that he observed two to four illuminated barricades equipped with flashing functioning amber lights located on the median strip between the southbound and northbound lanes of traffic and located north of the point of impact; that there were street lights at the intersection of Burlington Avenue and Route 53 approximately 180 feet north of the point of impact; that he observed an empty can of beer in Claimant’s vehicle and that the speedometer of the car was in a stopped position at 80 m.p.h. Sgt. Kruse’s testimony was essentially corroborated by Sgt. Darryl Schul of the Lisle Police Department.

Joseph Kostur of the Illinois Department of Transportation testified that the area in question was within his district and that he inspected the area on a regular basis at least once a week during the period of time prior to' September 12, 1968. Prior to the accident, he testified, there were present north of the area of the accident three warning signs for a construction zone each of which were four foot by four foot square, reflectorized orange signs with black legends and black borders mounted on wood posts; warning signs within the construction zone with the legend “Construction Ahead”, construction speed limit signs and detour signs 300 to 400 feet north of the point of impact and about 50 reflectorized barricades on the median strip and shoulder; and that a vehicle southbound on Route 53 would have been required to pass all of the above signs and barricades prior to reaching the scene of the accident. All of the signs met the minimum Federal and State standards for construction signs.

He admitted, however, in cross-examination that where the pavement narrows to a lesser amount of lanes there should have been placed a yellow diamond shaped sign somewhether 1000 to 1500 feet in advance with a forewarning of a reduction in speed. There was no testimony that such a sign was in place at the scene.

It is fundamental that in order to recover, Claimant has the burden of proving that the Respondent was guilty of negligence and that the Claimant was free from contributory negligence. Howell v. State of Illinois, 23 Ill. Ct. Cl. 141.

From the testimony we believe that the Claimant sustained his burden as to the negligence of the State but failed to sustain his burden as to his own lack of contributory negligence.

It is clear that although the State maintained many signs warning of construction area and barricades on the median strip there was no sign warning of the narrowing of the pavement. By the testimony of respondent’s own witness, Joseph Kostur, such a warning sign should have been in place. Thus, the State, by that omission was guilty of negligence which contributed to the Claimant’s injuries.

However, Claimant was likewise guilty of negligence which contributed to his own injuries. He was driving without sleep for at least 17 consecutive hours. He failed to notice or see 50 reflectorized median barricades, three illuminated construction zone signs and numerous other signs advising of a construction zone.

A person is required to see what there is to be seen. The evidence as to the existence of these signs is clear and unequivocal. His failure to notice these signs showed an inattentiveness which contributed to his own injuries. In addition, the fact that Claimant’s automobile came to rest over 80 feet south of the point of impact after striking a vehicle going in the opposite direction head on indicates, at least circumstantially, a speed in excess of the limit of 40 m.p.h. One need not rely on the fact that the speedometer was fixed and broken at 80 m.p.h. to reach this conclusion.

Claimant argues that the presence of the reflectorized barriers in the median was only a warning not to drive on the median strip, were attention getting and in effect provided a trap for the Claimant, directing his attention from the narrowing of the pavement. This contention, however, flies in the face of Claimant’s testimony that he did not see any of the signs or barricades. His attention could not have been diverted by reason of something he did not see.

Had Claimant seen the various signs and barricades, he would have realized that he was approaching a place of danger and armed with that knowledge he would have reduced his speed sufficiently to have noticed the narrowing of the pavement and could have avoided striking the curbing.

The fact that the signs maintained by the State failed to adequately advise the Claimant of the specific danger and were thus inadequate does not reduce claimant’s own contributory negligence. Hansen v. State of Illinois (1975), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 643.

We conclude, therefore, from a careful consideration of the entire record and exhibits, that even though the State was negligent, the Claimant’s failure to observe posted signs contributed to his own injuries and this claim is, therefore, denied.


text:
    (No. 5788
    Melvin C. Allen, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 6, 1979.

    Morrill, Koutsky, Klomann & Chuhak (Thomas C. Bielinski, of counsel), for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Martin Soll, George Mustis, and Saul Wexler, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This case arose out of an unfortunate occurrence at the Illinois Security Hospital in Chester, Illinois. The Claimant, an inmate, while working as a baker in the kitchen on March 22, 1969, was suddenly assaulted by another patient named Jerry Behnke, who threw a liquid detergent into the Claimant’s face, injuring his eye and ultimately resulting in the removal of the eye.

The primary issue here is whether the State was negligent and whether the negligence caused the accident.

There is no allegation of contributory negligence and no question of damages resulting from the occurrence.

Both Claimant and Respondent are in agreement that while the State is not an insurer of the safety of its patients, it does owe them a duty of reasonable care in protecting them from harm. Karulski v. Board of Trustees, 25 Ill. Ct. Cl. 295; Callbeck v. State, 22 Ill. Ct. Cl. 722.

There is no evidence that the State had actual or constructive notice of the “violent propensities” of the assailant. There was no evidence of the negligence of the Respondent in screening and placement procedure.

The Claimant also alleges the State was negligent where there was only one guard stationed in the kitchen at the time of the incident. Under the circumstances, the Court feels the supervision was adequate.

Claimant argues that unless the Court finds that the liability of the State has been established on the evidence in the record, the hearing should be reopened to permit the introduction of the assailant’s records, and further to permit questioning of the witnesses on the adequacy of procedures employed by the State to determine the propensity of an inmate to violence.

It is the opinion of this Court that the Commissioner did not err in declining to order the State to produce the hospital records of Jerry Behnke. The Illinois Legislature severely limited access to these records in section 12 — 3 of the Mental Health Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 91M, par. 12 — 3). Claimant asks that the entire record be turned over to him. This is not permitted by this Statute.

Neither does the Court find that the hearing should be reopened to allow testimony on procedures followed to determine if a patient was dangerous. A careful reading of the record shows that the question that was not permitted was a question concerning the procedure used to confine a violent or dangerous patient and not the procedure used to determine whether or not a patient was dangerous or required restraint. Absolutely no foundation was laid for a question about confinement or restraining procedures, nor was there any evidence that a discussion of such procedures was relevant in any way. The matter was properly excluded. The Claimant made no offer of proof to preserve his record and establish what he intended to prove. Accordingly, the claim of Melvin C. Allen is hereby denied.