text:
    (No. 00036
    Mary Jane Stach, as wife of Alfred E. Stach, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 6, 1973.

    Mary Jane Stach, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Fireman Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, §281 et. seq., Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Mary Jane Stack, if the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits.

2. That the decedent, Alfred E. Stack, was a fireman employed by the Chicago Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of §2(c) of the Act, on January 6, 1973.

3. That on said date, Fireman Stach was at the scene of a fire at the Forum Cafeteria, 64 W. Madison Street in Chicago. While Fireman Stach was inside the cafeteria fighting the blaze, the building collapsed covering him with debris. Fireman Stach died on January 6, 1973, and the coroner’s certificate of death recites the immediate cause of death as "smoke inhalation asphyxia and extensive burns”.

4. That Fireman Stach was killed in the line of duty as defined in §2(c) of the Act.

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (ten thousand dollars) be awarded to Mary Jane Stack as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased fireman, Alfred E. Stach.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 00037
    Shirley M. Kowalzyk, as wife of Richard E. Kowalzyk, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 6, 1973.

    Shirley M. Kowalzyk, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et. seq., Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Shirley M. Kowalzyk, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits.

2. That the decedent, Richard E. Kowalzyk, was a fireman employed by the Chicago Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of §2(c) of the Act, on January 6, 1973.

3. That on said date, Fireman Kowalzyk was at the scene of a fire at the Forum Cafeteria, 64 W. Madison Street in Chicago. While Fireman Kowalzyk was insije the cafeteria fighting the blaze, the building collapsed trapping him and other firemen in the flaming building. Fireman Kowalzyk died on January 6, 1973, and the coroner’s certificate of death recites the cause of death as "smoke inhalation asphyxia”.

4. That Fireman Kowalzyk was killed in the line of duty as defined in §2(c) of the Act.

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (ten thousand dollars) be awarded to Shirley M. Kowalzyk as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased fireman, Richard E. Kowalzyk.


text:
    (No. 00038
    Roseann Moran, as wife of Timothy William Moran, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 6, 1973.

    Roseann Moran, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et. seq., Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant Roseann Moran, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits.

2. That the decedent, Timothy William Moran, was a fireman employed by the Chicago Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of §2(c) of the Act, on January 6, 1973.

3. That on said date, Fireman Moran was at the scene of a fire at the Forum Cafeteria, 64 W. Madison Street in Chicago. While Fireman Moran was inside the cafeteria fighting the blaze, the building collapsed covering him with debris. Fireman Moran died on January 6, 1973, and the coroner’s certificate of death recites the cause of death as "smoke inhalation (carbon monoxide asphyxia)”.

4. That Fireman Moran was killed in the line of duty as defined in §2(c) of the Act.

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (ten thousand dollars) be awarded to Roseann Moran as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased fireman, Timothy William Moran.


text:
    (No. 00024
    Mildred Scannell as wife of James R. Scannell, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 16, 1973.

    Mildred Scannell, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Fireman Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et. seq., Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full court on July 12, 1973, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Mildred Scannell, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits.

2. That the decedent, James R. Scannell, was a policeman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(c) of the Act, on July 2, 1972.

3. That on said date, Officer Scannell died after physically apprehending an escaping, violent prisoner, previously arrested by the officer. Officer Scannell died at the scene of the occurrence, shortly after returning the prisoner to a police department squadron. The death certificate recites the cause of death as myocardial infarction.

4. That Officer Scannell was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act.

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Mildred Scannell as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased police officer, James R. Scannell.


text:
    (No. 00026
    Ruth Mc Cluskey, as wife of Frank S. Mc Cluskey, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 16, 1973.

    Ruth Mc Cluskey, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Fireman Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et. seq., Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full court on July 12, 1973, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Ruth McCluskey, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits.

2. That the decedent, Frank S. McCluskey, was a fireman employed by the Villa Park Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(c) of the Act, on October 10, 1970.

3. That on said date, Captain McCluskey collapsed at the scene of an extensive residential fire, while helping his men pull a fire hose line. Two hours were required to contain the blaze and prior to his collapse, Captain McCluskey entered the burning building to assist in directing the firefighting activities. Captain McCluskey was rushed from the scene of the fire to Memorial Hospital of DuPage County, where he remained until October 16, 1970, when he was transferred to Loyola University Hospital, Maywood, Illinois. He underwent heart surgery at Loyola University Hospital from which he never recovered. Captain McCluskey died on October 31, 1970, and the cause of death, as recited in the death certificate, was "acute myocardial infarction”.

4. That Captain McCluskey was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act.

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Ruth McCluskey as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased fireman, Frank S. McCluskey.


text:
    (No. 00028
    Frances R. O’Neill, as wife of Edward O’Neill, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 16, 1973.

    Frances R. O’Neill, Claimant, by William Gibbons, her attorney.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et. seq., Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full court on July 11, 1973, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Frances R. O’Neill, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits.

2. That the decedent, Edward O’Neill, was a policeman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(c) of the Act, on November 1, 1972.

3. That on said date Lieutenant O’Neill was on duty in the airport terminal at Midway Airport at approximately 9:15 p.m. and was the senior commanding officer in charge of the airport traffic security for the arrival of Senator George McGovern. Lt. O’Neill’s commander, Captain Edward J. Barry, Traffic Area 3, received a call that George McGovern was to arrive in advance of his scheduled time. He notified Lt. O’Neill to rush to the airport and take charge of and complete the required traffic control procedures. Lt. O’Neill left Traffic Area 3 headquarters at 3900 S. California "with sirens sounding”. Approximately fifteen minutes after his arrival at the terminal, Lt. O’Neill was stricken and collapsed. Lt. O’Neill died at the airport terminal on November 1, 1972, the death certificate reciting the cause of death as "acute myocardial infarction”.

4. That Lt. O’Neill died in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act.

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Frances R. O’Neill as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased police officer, Edward O’Neill.


text:
    (No. 00016
    Nancy E. Wheeler, as widow and beneficiary of Frederick Leland Wheeler, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 13, 1973.

    Nancy E. Wheeler, Claimant, by Thomas Carmody, her attorney.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This action is brought by Nancy E. Wheeler, as widow and designated beneficiary of Frederick Leland Wheeler, deceased, pursuant to the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et. seq., Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

Claimant filed an application for benefits, narrative report prepared by her attorney, and coroner’s certificate of death. The Attorney General’s office investigated the claim, pursuant to Section 4 of the Act, received investigative reports from the Illinois State Police, and Edwardsville Police Department, and recommended that the case be set for hearing. The court, sitting en banc, heard the case on May 8, 1973.

The relevant facts, briefly, are as follows: the decedent, was a corporal employed by the Illinois State Police. He began his duties with the Illinois State Police at 8:00 a.m. on November 15, 1971. His activities on said date included a search for a stolen vehicle in East St. Louis, Illinois, a trip to the place of a homicide in Washington Park, Illinois, a drive to Maryville, Illinois, District 11 Headquarters, and a trip to Edwardsville, Illinois. He arrived at Edwardsville, at approximately 6:25 p.m. It is here that his duties as a state policeman ended, according to the testimony elicited from Corporal Wheeler’s supervisors. Thereafter, his activities were of a social, personal nature. At approximately 11:00 p.m., the application recites that his death occurred when his service pistol discharged, as it was being transferred, apparently from one hand to another in his car.

The dispositive issue for the Court’s determination is whether Corporal Wheeler was on duty at the time of his death at 11:00 p.m.

The Court finds from the testimony and evidence presented that Corporal Wheeler was not on duty at the time of his death and therefore, denies the claim presented herein.


author: Per Curiam:

text:
    (No. 00042
    Carol J. Klamen, as wife of Richard E. Klamen, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 13, 1973.

    Carol J. Klamen, Claimant, by Roland J. Mc Farland, her attorney.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam:

This claim, arising out of the death of a volunteer fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, §281, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full court on October 12, 1973, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Carol J. Klamen, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Richard E. Klamen, was a volunteer fireman employed by the North Park Fire Department, Rockford, Illinois, and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(c) of the Act, on January 27, 1973;

3. That on said date, Fireman Klamen was en route to the fire house responding to a fire call at approximately 10:30 p.m. His vehicle was equipped with an interior blue, rotating light which was operating and illuminated. The weather was raining and sleeting. At the intersection of Rt. 51 and Wood Avenue a collision occurred between Klamen’s vehicle and a private passenger vehicle, causing Klamen’s vehicle to overturn. Fireman Klamen died of his injuries on January 30, 1973, the coroner’s certificate of death reciting the immediate cause of death as "(a) massive pulmonary edema, due to (b) congestive heart failure and (c) contusion of the heart from automobile accident, with other significant findings — contusion of left lung and small laceration; traumatic laceration of the liver and spleen; fracture of the left humerus, right tibia, right fibula, left clavicle and left 6th and 7th ribs.”

4. That Fireman Klamen was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act.

5. That this Court finds no evidence to indicate that Fireman Klamen’s death occurred as the result of willful misconduct or intoxication.

6. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Carol J. Klamen as wife designated beneficiary of the deceased fireman, Richard E. Klamen.


text:
    (No. 00046
    Luecelestine Hicks, as wife of Wendell H. Hicks, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 13, 1973.

    Luecelestine Hicks, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et. seq., Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full court on October 12, 1973, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Luecelestine Hicks, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for banefits.

2. That the decedent, Wendell H. Hicks, was a policeman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(c) of the Act, on May 29, 1973.

3. That on said date at approximately 12:15 a.m. Officer Hicks was off-duty and had just finished bowling in a league at the Park Manor Bowling Center, 100 E. 75th Street. Officer Hicks left the Bowling Center; returned a minute or two later and announced over the P.A. system to the bowlers that he had noticed some men standing around a car in the parking lot across the street and inquired as to whether anyone owned the car or knew the men. No one responded, and Officer Hicks again left the Center. At the time in question, a Mr. Clarence A. Turner, the owner of said automobile, was being robbed by two men in the parking lot. The two robbers told Mr. Turner that they intended to take his automobile. One of the robbers had a gun in his hand. Mr. Turner was being forced to start the car for the robbers when Officer Hicks yelled from across the street "Halt, I’m a police officer”. One robber ran from the scene and the other robber drove off in Mr. Turner’s car. Officer Hicks got into his car, parked close by; chased the stolen car and blocked it when it crashed into a fence in an alley behind the Chicago Fire Department station at 6858 S. Indiana Avenue. A firefighter on duty as a "watchman” in the station reported that he heard "shots”, was aware of a commotion behind the fire station and saw a man running from the scene, whom he could not identify. Officer Hicks was found lying on the ground at the rear of his car and was pronounced dead on arrival at St. Bernard’s Hospital. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the cause of death as "Bullet wound to chest and heart”.

4. That Officer Hicks was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act;

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000. (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Luecelestine Hicks as wife acd designated beneficiary of the deceased police officer, Wendell H. Hicks.


text:
    (No. 00049
    Mary Louise Mc Coy, as wife and designated beneficiary of Kenneth Mc Coy, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1974.

    Mary Louise Mc Coy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This action is brought by Mary Louise Mc Coy, as widow and designated beneficiary of Kenneth Mc Coy, deceased, pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et. seq., Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; testimony of the witnesses at the hearing held November 12, 1973, and the documents admitted in evidence at said hearing; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application as testified to at the aforesaid hearing. Based upon said testimony, documents, and other evidence, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Mary Louise Mc Coy, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits.

2. That the decedent, Kenneth Mc Coy, was a policeman employed by the East St. Louis Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act, on June 7, 1973.

3. That on the afternoon of Thursday, June 7,1973, Detective Me Coy was at his home, on vacation. .He was called and requested to report for duty that evening by fellow officer William Stannis. Detective Stannis had been informed that a robbery was to be attempted that evening of one Henry Roewe, an East St. Louis tavern owner and resident. Detective Mc Coy responded, in plain clothes, with his 45 automatic weapon and a shotgun. In his ordinary assignments, Detective Mc Coy was not required to wear a uniform; the 45 automatic, while owned by him, (as in the case of most East St. Louis policemen), was the service weapon he was authorized to carry upon his assignments; and the shotgun was also owned by him. Detective Stannis also sought assistance from the Illinois State Police, District 11, Corporal Delaney and Trooper Johnson. Informants having recited that the robbery attempt of Mr. Roewe would be at his tavern or at his home, Detective Me Coy and Corporal Delaney "staked out,” waited, at Roewe’s tavern, beginning at approximately 7:00 p.m. Detective Stannis and Trooper Johnson waited at the Roewe residence, approximately one-and-half miles away, 3032 Waverly Avenue, East St. Louis, Illinois. Radio communication between the men and sites was maintained. As the suspects approached the tavern, they were frightened away when informed by black children playing in the area that two white men were in the alley near the tavern. This was at approximately 9:00 p.m. Shortly thereafter, the informants, separated from the suspects, and contacted Detective Mc Coy, relating that an attempt would be made at the Roewe residence. There were two informants and three suspects; the informants stated that they had given an excuse to separate from the suspects, stating they were to pick up additional weapons, the suspects having, apparently, only one gun. Detective Mc Coy and Corporal Delaney traveled to the Roewe home, and the four officers took positions in and about the house. Detective Mc Coy, raised the hood of Roewe’s car, in the driveway, put on a coat and hat and appeared to be working on the vehicle. At approximately 9:35 p.m., Trooper Johnson relates that the five men were observed across the street from the Roewe home. Trooper Johnson was in a darkened doorway, approximately 20 feet from Detective Mc Coy; he warned Detective Mc Coy, in a low voice, "Here they come Kenny, come inside, come inside.” One of the suspects separated from the group and came towards the home, Trooper Johnson stepping back into the doorway, when he heard a warning whistle from Detective Stannis, the pre-arranged signal that the robbery was beginning. Immediately thereafter, Trooper Johnson relates that the following weapon reports and exchanges were heard — the sound of a single .22 caliber shot, three (3) louder reports from Detective Mc Coy’s 45 automatic, and a shotgun blast. In the exchange between Detective Me Coy and the first assailant, Detective Mc Coy had moved from the front of the car toward the rear. As detective Stannis rushed to get a view and stop the assailant, he mistook Detective Mc Coy for a suspect and fired the shotgun, accidentally striking Detective Mc Coy. Detective Mc Coy had given the shotgun to Detective Stannis for his use at the scene. The first suspect was killed by the shots fired from Detective Mc Coy’s 45 automatic. At the time of the tragedy, it was dark. While there was a street light in front of the Roewe home, there was darkness in the area of the Roewe driveway and car, as reported by Trooper Johnson. Detective Mc Coy was pronounced dead on arrival at St. Mary’s Hospital in East St. Louis, Illinois.

4. That the above facts amply support our finding that Detective McCoy was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act.

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000.00 (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Mary Louise Mc Coy, as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased police officer, Kenneth Mc Coy.


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 00031
    Christina Carr, as wife of Loring Carr, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 19, 1974.

    Suddes, Davis & Wittman, Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This claim, arising out of the death of a law enforcement officer killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decendent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et. seq., Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Hearing was held on this claim before the full court in Springfield on August 6, 1973, and counsel for the claimant submitted further written evidence and a memorandum of law on September 3, 1973. Based upon these documents and other evidence, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Christina Carr, is the wife of tpe decedent and, in the absence of any designation of beneficiary by the decedent, she would be entitled to the compensation payable pursuant to §3(a) of the Act.

2. That the decedent, Loring Carr, was employed as a game warden in the Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Conservation and was engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of §2(c) of the Act, on November 17, 1972.

3. That on said date at about 8:12 a.m., Officer Loring Carr was killed in an automobile accident on Route 67 about 13 miles south of Jacksonville. He was on patrol duty, in uniform, riding in a state owned patrol car equipped with state police radio, driven by a fellow law enforcement officer, Eugene Allen. [Officer Allen died in the same accident, and his death is the subject of Claim No. 00035 in this court.] That the said state patrol car was proceeding north in the northbound lane when the southbound automobile, driven by one David H. Liebman, crossed over the center line and into the path of the State Conservation Department vehicle; that the Liebman car crossed into the lane of traffic of the State Conservation Department vehicle without warning, at high speed, and without giving Officer Allen an opportunity to avoid the head-on collision.

4. That Officer Carr was killed in the line of duty as defined in §2(c) of the Act.

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, under literal interpretation, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

The court wishes to add, parenthetically, that in several cases of this type we have felt some uncertainty as to the legislature’s intent by the words underlined in the following definition in the Act:

§2(c) "killed in the line of duty” means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer or fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accecental cause.”

We are mindful of the fact that the legislature’s intent cannot always be determined from a particular clause or phrase without considering the general purposes of the Act when reading it as a whole. There are other parts of the Act, as in §2(a), which leads us to believe that "other accidental cause’’ should include only such accidents that arise from the risks inherent in, and peculiar to, the duties of law enforcement; and that it would not include a normal hazard to which other persons may be equally exposed, i.e., a highway accident caused by the negligence or wrongful act of another party.

Nevertheless, we agree with claimant’s memorandum, that the legislature added no such qualifying words to the phrase, "or other accidental cause”. We urge the legislature to consider the necessity of clarifying this phrase, as we have indicated, so that the true intent of the legislature may be fully carried out, as mandated in Ch. 131 §1.01, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971. Until the phrase in question is so clarified, we must administer the Act literally, as we have done in this opinion.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (ten thousand dollars) be awarded to Christina Carr as wife and beneficiary of the deceased law enforcement officer, Coring Carr.


text:
    (No. 00035
    Irma S. Allen, as wife of Eugene Allen, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 19, 1974.

    Suddes, Davis & Wittman, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic Special Assistant Attorney, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This claim, arising out of the death of a law enforcement officer killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ch. 48, Sec. 281, et. seq., Ill.Rev.Stat., 1971.

The court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Hearing was held on this claim before the full court in Springfield on August 6, 1973, and counsel for the claimant submitted further written evidence and a memorandum of law on September 3, 1973. Based upon these documents and other evidence, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Irma S. Allen, is the wife of the decedent and, in the absence of any designation of beneficiary by the decedent, she would be entitled to the compensation payable pursuant to §3 (a) of the Act.

2. That the decedent, Eugene Allen, was employed as a game warden in the Law Enforcement Division of the Department of Conservation and was engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of §2(c) of the Act, on November 17, 1972.

3. That on said date at about 8:12 A.M., Officer Eugene Allen was killed in an automobile accident on Route 67 about 13 miles south of Jacksonville. He was on patrol duty, in uniform, driving a state owned patrol car equipped with state police radio, with a fellow law enforcement officer, Loring Carr. [Officer Carr died in the same accident, and his death is the subject of Claim No. 00031 in this court.] That the said state patrol car was proceeding north in the northbound lane when the southbound automobile, driven by one David H. Liebman, crossed over the center line and into the path of the State Conservation Department vehicle; that the Liebman vehicle without warning, at high speed, and without giving Officer Allen an opportunity to avoid the head-on collision.

4. That Officer Allen was killed in the line of duty as defined in §2(c) of the Act.

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, under a literal interpretation, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

The court wishes to add, parenthetically, that in several cases of this type we have felt some uncertainty as to the legislature’s intent by the words underlined in the following definition in the Act:

§2(c) "killed in the line of duty” means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer or fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.”

We are mindful of the fact that the legislature’s intent cannot always be determined from a particular clause or phrase without considering the general purposes of the Act when reading it as a whole. There are other parts of the Act, as in §2(a), which leads us to believe that "other accidental cause” should include only such accidents that arise from the risks inherent in, and peculiar to, the duties of law enforcement; and that it would not include a normal hazard to which other persons may be equally exposed, i.e., a highway accident caused by the negligence or wrongful act of another party.

Nevertheless, we agree with claimant’s memorandum, that the legislature added no such qualifying words to the phrase, “or other accidental cause”. We urge the legislature to consider the necessity of clarifying this phrase, as we have indicated, so that the true intent of the legislature may be fully carried out, as mandated in Ch. 131 §1.01, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971. Until the phrase in question is so clarified, we must administer the Act literally, as we have done in this opinion.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (ten thousand dollars) be awarded to Irma S. Allen as wife and beneficiary of the deceased law enforcement officer, Eugene Allen.


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    Tingley Drilling Company v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed September 17, 1916.

    1. License Fee — no refund of, when. Where a license fee to incorporate under the laws of this State is paid to the Secretary of State and the license issued, no refund of such fee will be made even though no further steps to incorporate be taken.
    2. Same — retention by State. The retention of a license fee by the Secretary of State is in no way conditional upon the commissioners taking further steps.
    Q. D. Bailey, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   The statement of claims sets forth that W. G. Tingley, A. D. Bartholomew, W. S. Thompson, Q. D. Bailey and D. B. Carrithers, as commissioners, applied to the Secretary of State for a license to open hooks and accept subscriptions to the capital stock of a corporation to be- -known as The Tingley Drilling Company; that the commissioners paid to the Secretary of State a fee of fifty dollars, and that a license was issued to said commissioners, but that no subscriptions were received to said stock.

This claim must be rejected for the reason set forth in the case of William McKinley, R. W. Hood, and J. R. Ebersole v. State of Illinois, Vol. 2, Ct. of Cl. Rep. p. 125; the facts being identical with those considered therein.


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    Herman Weller and Jacob E. Klick, Testamentary Trustees of the Estate of Mina Lorenz v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed October 2, 1916.

      1. Inheritance Tax — refund of when. Section 10 of the inheritance tax law provides that when an inheritance tax has been paid erroneously it shall be lawful to refund the amount so paid.
    2. Same — claim, for refund, made when. A claim for the refund of inheritance tax erroneously paid must be made within two years from the date of payment, or no refund will be made.
    3. Statute of Limitations — affects what — is not operative when. The Statute of Limitations affects only the remedy, and does not commence to run until the parties to be barred have a right to invoke the aid of the court to enforce the remedy.
    McCormick and Murphy, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   On January 4, 1898, George Weller conveyed a life estate in certain land in Logan County, Illinois, to Henry Lorenz by deed, with, remainder in fee simple to the child or children of Katharine Lorenz, the daughter of grantor and the wife of grantee, the grantor reserving unto himself, however, the possession, use and occupation of the real estate during his own life. This deed was recorded in the Kecorder’s office of Logan County on January 26, 1898. On March 30, 1910, the said George Weller died testate leaving no children or decendants except Mina Lorenz, the daughter of Katharine Lorenz. The will of said decedent devised a life estate in the same premises previously deeded to the said Mina Lorenz and Lillie Lorenz and claimants were appointed in said will as Trustees of the estate of the said Mina Lorenz and the said Lillie Lorenz. Lillie Lorenz, however, died before the testator, leaving only the said Mina Lorenz as sole devisee.

An inheritance tax appraiser was appointed by the County Judge of Logan County on June 20, 1910, an appraisement was made and it was found that the estate of Mina Lorenz under the aforesaid clause of the will was subject to an inheritance tax of $593.92, and the County Judge ordered said sum of money paid to the County Treasurer.

The said Mina Lorenz was represented by guardian ad litem on the inheritance tax hearing. On September 22, 1910, claimants paid to the County Treasurer of Logan County the sum of $564.22, the same being the amount assessed less five per cent discount for payment within six months. This money was' paid over by the County Treasurer to the State Treasurer.

On June 10, 1912, claimants filed report with the Circuit Court of Logan Count}1, and Mina Lorenz filed objections, claiming that $188.09 of the tax paid had been erroneously paid, in that it was an assessment against the property taken by her under the terms of the aforesaid deed. She denied that her title was a life estate under the will, and asserted that she had a fee simple estate under the provisions of the deed, and consequently said land was not subject to an inheritance tax. The Circuit Court overruled the objections and approved the report of the Trustees. Mina Lorenz appealed from the judgment of the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court, and at the April term, 1915, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court, and found that $188.09 of the inheritance tax paid by the testamentary trustees had been erroneously assessed against the estate of Mina Lorenz, and erroneously paid to the County Treasurer. The case in the Supreme Court is reported in "Volume 26‘< at page 230. On May 15, 1915, claimants revised their report in accordance with the order of the Supreme Court, eliminating the charge of $188.09 against the estate of Mina Lorenz.

Afterward, claimants made application to the State Treasurer for a refund of this amount, but the Treasurer refused payment. It is apparent from the evidence that the" claimants were advised that the title to the property in question was taken by the said Mina Lorenz under the will, and not under the deed. The testimony shows that claimant, Herman Weller, was so advised by counsel. Claimant, Klick, knew nothing of the existence of the deed, except that claimant Weller had told him of it and that claimant, Weller, had further taken advice of counsel on the proposition, and following counsel’s advice they paid the inheritance tax. There is no question about the good faith of claimants in this matter, and there is no question but that inheritance tax in the amount of $188.09 was paid in error.

The Attorney General had not filed any pleading in this case, nor has he filed any argument in opposition to the claim.

Section 10 of the inheritance tax law provides that when an inheritance tax shall be paid erroneously, it shall be lawful to refund, provided that application for re-payment be made within two years from the date of payment. Counsel for claimants argue that the statute of limitations has not been pleaded by the State, and that even if pleaded it could not be interposed as a bar to claimants’ right of action, for the reason that the statute could not commence to until the date of the final determination of the subject matter of the previous suit by the Supreme Court in 1915.

Rule 11 of the Rules of the Court of Claims, adopted and in effect Decelnber 9, 1913, provides: “If it appears on the face of the declaration that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations, the same may be dismissed.” It is a rule of statutory construction that a statute of limitations shall be strictly construed, and it has been further said as in Stanninger v. Taber, 103 Ill. App. 133, “The statute of limitations affects only the remedy, and does not commence to run until the parties to be barred have a right to invoke the aid of the court to enforce his remedy.”

The Supreme Court found in 1915, that this tax was erroneously paid. Previous to that time claimants were of the belief that it had been properly paid, and in this belief they were supported by the advice of their counsel as well as the findings of the Circuit Court. After the entering of the judgment of the Circuit Court, wherein it was found that the tax had been properly paid, claimants certainly could not have asked for a refund and it was not until the Supreme Court in April of 1915 found that the tax had been erroneously paid, that they could possibly have filed this claim.

This Court does not believe that it was the intention of the Legislature to make the limitation clause of the tenth section of the inheritance tax law applicable to a case such as the one before us. While this is not a case that would properly arise in a Court of Equity, it is one which will appeal to a sense of justice, and we believe that claimants are entitled to have refunded to them the amount of their claim.

It is accordingly the judgment of this Court that claimants be awarded the sum of one hundred eighty-eight and 09/100 ($188.09) dollars.


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    George Marsh Pulver v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed October 2, 1916.

    1. Contingency — happening of ma/y justify refund, when. If, by the happening of a contingency an interest in an estate is liable to a lesser tax than though the contingency had not happened, then upon the happening of such contingency, a refund should be made, in case the tax has been paid.
    2. Interest — when allowed. Where a tax has been fixed and the same paid and the happening of an event changes the situation of the parties so that a lesser tax would be due, interest will be allowed on the excess paid from date of payment.
    Herrick, Allen and Martin, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   Claimant was a legatee under the will of Lulu M. Pulver, deceased.

The will created a trust estate conveying certain property to Charles L. Allen in trust for the benefit for claimant and Irving Loveridge Pulver until December 8, 1914.

On appraisal for inheritance tax, the value of the interest of claimant was fixed at $2,396.22 and no tax was assessed, and the value of the estate of the trustee was fixed at $48,135.34. This valuation was fixed on the hypothesis that one or the other of the claimants would die before the date of distribution and resulted in allowing to the claimant and his brother together an exemption of $20,005.00, plus the value of the interest as found, $2,396.22, or $22,396.22, and the tax was fixed at $306.35. Claimant and said Irving Loveridge' Pulver both lived until December 8, 1914, and under section 25 of the inheritance tax law are entitled to a refund. Each is entitled to a refund of one-half the difference between the effective exemption of $22,396.22 and $40,000.00 which would be the exemption that both together would have. This difference amounts to $17,603.78, and the one-half to which each is entitled is $8,801.89. The tax at one per cent on the interest of each is $88.02, and the tax having been paid within the six months, and deducting a five per cent discount equally, the amount that each should have refunded is $83.62 plus interest from September 30, 1912, the date of payment.

It is accordingly the judgment of this Court that claimant be awarded the sum of $83.02, together with interest at the rate of 3% from September 30, 1912.


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    Alice P. Tapley, Executrix of the Last Will of Anna S. Tapley, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed October 2, 1916.

    Inheritance Tax — when refund will be awarded. In this claim the tax as fixed by the county court was paid. Later, the order fixing the tax was set aside and a lesser tax assessed. Held, that claimant is entitled to an award.
    Harold V. Amberg, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   This is the claim of Alice P. Tapley, executrix of the estate of Anna T. Tapley, deceased, for return of inheritance tax erroneously paid.

Claimant was a legatee of Anna S. Tayley, deceased, late a resident of Boston, Massachusetts.

Decedent died possessed inter alia of 164 shares of stock of The Pullman Company, an Illinois corporation, and other stock, which was subject to a tax under the inheritance tax law.

On hearing had before the appraiser appointed by the County Court of Cook County, the cash value of the property subject to tax was fixed at $29,360.70, and the tax was fixed at $1,468.04; this appraisal and tax assessment was confirmed by an order of the County Court on July 15, 1913, and notice thereof sent to trustees appointed under the last will and testament. The tax was levied on the theory that the property was willed to the trustees. Claimant paid the amount of the tax, less five per cent, or $1,394.64 on July 11, 1913.

Claimant had no notice of the basis upon which the tax was assessed until after she had made payment as aforesaid.

On February 15, 1915, the County Court of Cook County entered an order setting aside its prior order, and ordering a new and corrected appraisement; the appraiser appointed in said order fixed the value of the property subject to assessment at $9,360.70, and fixed the tax at $93.61. Claimant demanded return of the amount erroneously paid from the County Treasurer of Cook County, and the State Treasurer, but a refund was refused.

In view of the fact that the County Court by its final judgment in this case has fixed the amount of tax at $93.61, claimant is entitled to a refund. The amount to which claimant is entitled is the difference between the tax paid, $1,394.64, and the amount of tax as found, less five per cent, of $88.93, this amount being $1,305.71.

It is the judgment of this Court that the claimant be awarded the sum of $1,305.71.


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    Irving Loveridge Pulver v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed October 2, 1916.

      Pulver v. State ante followed.
    Herrick, Allen and Martin, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   The facts in this case are set out in the case of George Marsh Pulver v. State of Illinois.

Claimant is entitled to a refund of $83.62, together with interest from September 13, 1912.

This Court awards the claimant said sum of $82.62, together with interest from September 30, 1912, at three per cent per annum.


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    Lewis L. Clarke, Mary C. Case, E Stanley Clarke, Juliette P. Clarke, Alice C. Redfield, Corinne I. and Dumont Clarke, Jr. v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed October 2, 1916.

    1. Inheritance Tax — facts held sufficient to authorize recovery. In this claim by reason of the interests of claimants having been determined, the trust created having terminated, awards are accordingly made.
    2. Interest — when allowed. The right to recover in this case is based upon section 25 of the inheritance tax law, and since claimants are entitled to recover, interest will be allowed.
    Gardner, Carton and Thomson, for Claimants.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General and Arthur R. Roy, Assistant Attorney General, for State.
   Claimants are devisees and legatees of Dumont Clarke, deceased, who died testate on December 26, 1909.

By the decedent’s will a trust estate was created, claimants being beneficiaries.

An inheritance tax appraiser was appointed to appraise decedent’s estate by the County Court of Cook County, and on February 7, 1911, an order fixing the inheritance tax was made by the County Judge. This order determined the value of decedent’s estate to be $132,273.75, and the tax was levied in equal shares among four of the children under the proviso of section 25 of the inheritance tax law.

The tax was figured on the basis that Corinne I. Clark, Alice C. Redfield, Mary C. Case and Lewis L. Clarke, would each take one-fourth of the property or $33,068.43. After the deduction of the statutory exemption of $20,000.00 in each case the taxable cash value was ascertained to be $13,068.43 and on a tax rate of one per cent each was assessed $130.68, and the total paid, was therefore $522.72. The tax was paid after six months had elapsed after the death of-the testator and interest was paid on the tax, but as claimants admit, this interest was a penalty for which there could be no recovery.

The trust terminated on December 26, 1914, by its own limitations and thereupon the interest of claimants here became fixed.

Claimants now claim a refund under the proviso of section 25 of the inheritance tax law for the difference between the amount paid and the amount which each should pay, their respective interests having been determined.

On this theory Lewis L. Clarke, Mary C. Case, Corinne I. Clarke, Alice C. Redfield and Dumont Clarke should each have paid one-sixth of the total tax or $87.12 and E. Stanley Clarke and Juliette F. Clarke should each have paid one-twelfth or $43.56.

Lewis L. Clarke, Mary C. Case, Corinne I. Clark, Alice C. Eedfield. and Dumont Clarke each inherited property of the value of $22,045.62, the values being based upon the values as appraised by the inheritance tax appraiser, deducting from each of these interests the statutory exemption of $20,000.00, and leaving value of $2,045.62, the tax upon which at the rate of one per cent would be $20.45. The interests of Juliette F. Clarke and E. Stanley Clarke are each worth less than $20,-000.00, hence there would be no tax. The tax which all together should have paid would therefore amount to $102.25. Claimants therefore are entitled to a return of taxes overpaid as follows: To Lewis L. Clarke, Mary C. Case, Corinne I. Clarke, Alice C. Eedfield and Dumont Clarke, Jr., to each the sum of $66.67, and to E. Stanley Clarke and Juliette F. Clarke, to each the sum of $-43.56, or a total of $420.47. To this should he added three per cent interest from February 7, 1911.

It is accordingly the judgment of this Court that Lewis L. Clarke, Mary C. Case, Corinne I. Clarke, Alice C. Eedfield and Dumont Clarke are each awarded the sum of $66.67, and E. Stanley Clarke and Juliette F. Clarke, the sum of $43.56, together with interest thereon at the rate of three per cent per annum from February 7, 1911.


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    Timothy M. Coughlan v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed October 2, 1916.

    1. Inheritance Tax — exemptions should be deducted in fixing rate. Where the total estate amounts to $110,549.55, and there is an exemption of $20,000.00, the rate of the tax should be $1.00 on the hundred.
    2. Court of Claims — not a court of review. The Court of Claims is not vested with authority to review the action of another court in fixing an .inheritance tax.
    3. Contingencies — happening of may authorize refund in certain cases. Claimant paid a tax on $110,549.56, but by the happening of a contingency he inherited only $86,560.35. In such case he is entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount paid and the amount he should have paid.
    4. Interest — when allowed. Where a tax has been fixed and the same paid, and the happening of an event changes the situation of the parties so that a lesser tax would be due, interest will be allowed on the excess paid from date of payment.
    Arthur B. Wells, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   John Goughian, the father of claimant, died. September 29, 1909. Claimant inherited property to the value of $86,560.35, and this was increased for the purpose of taxation in the sum of $23,989.20, the value of property which claimant might have inherited had certain contingencies happened. But these contingencies have since become impossible, and it is now apparent that the entire estate inherited by claimant was of the amount as above set forth. Claimant paid a tax of 2% on an assessment of $110,549.56, less an exemption of $20,000.00 and further reduced by five per cent for payment within six months. The amount of the tax as assessed was $1,810.99, and the amount paid after deducting a discount of five per cent was $1,720.44.

Claimant should only have paid tax at the rate of one per cent instead of two per cent, and he is undoubtedly entitled to a refund of the tax on the value of contingencies which have become impossible, but the case presents the further question as to whether or not he is entitled to a refund of the excess one per cent that he paid on his own inheritance. jSTo appeal was taken by claimant from the order of the County Judge assessing the tax at the rate of two per cent, and we have repeatedly held that in such case, we could not act as a court of review, and are precluded by the final order of the County Court.

But -the language of section 25 of the inheritance tax law is to the effect that under such contingencies as exist in this case, claimant “shall be entitled to a return of so much of the tax imposed and paid as is the difference between the amount paid and the amount which said person, corporation or institution should pay under the inheritance tax law, with interest thereon at the rate of three per cent per annum from the time of payment."

Claimant inherited only $86,560.35, the tax on which, after deducting exemptions of $20,000.00, would be $665.60, less the five per cent discount, or $632.27. Following the language of section 25 of the statute, we think it plain that claimant is entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount paid and $632.27, the amount he should have paid, and this case may be differentiated from those cases wherein we refused to allow a refund because of the payment on a two per cent basis, because we have here a statute which explicitly says that he is entitled to a refund between the amount paid, and the amount that he should pay, after the failure of the contingency.

The contingent estates which have become vested are each worth less than $20,000.00, and no tax can be assessed as against them.

Claimant is accordingly entitled to an award of the difference between $1,720.44, the amount paid, and $632.27, the amount he should have paid, or $1,088.17, to which should be added three per cent per annum under the provisions of the statute, from the time of payment of the tax to the time of the payment of refund.

It is accordingly the judgment of this Court that Claimant be-awarded the sum of $1,088.17, with interest from March 25, 1910, at. the rate of three per cent per annum.


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    John Shields v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed October 2, 1916.

    1. Governmental Function — State in conducting hospital exercises. The State in conducting the Cook County Hospital exercises a governmental function, and is not liable in tort for acts of its agents in that behalf.
    2. Respondeat Superior — doctrine of — does not apply to State. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to the State.

    Walter T. Stanton, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   The declaration sets np that claimant was employed as an elevator operator in the Cook County Hospital, and was injured as he claims in •an accident while he was operating an elevator, through the negligence ■of a foreman.

The State has demurred and for special cause of demurrer sets up 'that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to the State of Illinois.

This Court has repeatedly held that the State! in the exercise of a governmental function is not responsible for injuries to its employees, and in consequence thereof, the demurrer must be sustained.


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    Clarence A. Burley, as Executor of Trustee Under the Last Will and Testament of Elizabeth J. Whitney, Deceased, Louisa Chapin Telling, Elizabeth Chapin Greene, Edward F. Chapin, Jr., and Mary W. White v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed October 2, 1916.

    1. Inheritance Tax — contingencies the happening of which may authorize refund. Where an estate is left in trust for a limited period with a provision that, upon the happening of a contingency, the estate should vest and in which case a tax has therefore been fixed as of the date of the death of the testator, which tax has been paid, a refund should be made if by the happening of the contingency the estate be circumstanced such that it would have been liable to a lesser tax.
    2. Interest — when allowed. Where a tax has been fixed and the same paid, and the happening of an event changes the situation of the parties so that a lesser tax would be due, interest will be allowed on the excess paid from the date of payment.
    Clarence A. Burley, for Claimants.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   Elizabeth J. Whitney died October 13, 1910, leaving a last will and testament which was probated in the Probate Court of Cook County on October 22, 1910.

The residuary estate was left in trust in equal portions to four grandchildren, Louisa Chapin, now Louisa Chapin Telling, Elizabeth Chapin, now Elizabeth Chapin Greene, Edward Fischer Chapin, Jr,, and Mary W. White, the will providing that the trustee should hold the respective portions of each of the beneficiaries until such beneficiary should attain the age of thirty years.

On proceedings to fix the inheritance tax, it was found that the fair market value of the estate was $63,666.18, and the estate was taxed on the basis that only the eldest grandchild would attain the age of thirty years. Allowing the statutory exemption of $20,000.00, the tax was fixed at one per cent on $43,666.18, or $436.66. This amount less five per cent discount was paid within six months, under protest. Payment was made out of the assets of the estate, by agreement among the legatees.

Louise Chapin Telling attained the age of thirty years on June 30, 1912, and Elizabeth Chapin Greene attained the age of thirty years in September, 1914.

Because of the fact that more than one of the heirs has now attained the age of thirty years, claim is now made that an additional exemption of $20,000.00 should have been allowed. Demand for such

return was made on the County Treasurer of Cook County, and the State Treasurer of the State of Illinois, and these demands met with refusal to refund. Claim is now made for a refund of the tax on $20,-000.00, which exemption would have been allowed the second grandchild, had she been thirty years of age at the time of the fixing of the tax, and claimants rely on section 25 of the inheritance tax law.

The tax was levied at the highest rate that would be possible, and it is apparent that a refund should be allowed in this case.

Inasmuch, as the tax was paid within the six months period, and a five per cent discount was allowed, claimants state that $190.00 was the amount of overpayment to which they should be entitled to an award.

In the opinion of this Court, a refund should be allowed. We, therefore, award the claimants the sum of $190,00 together with interest at the rate of 3% from March 30, 1911, the date the tax was paid.


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    The Chicago and Alton Railroad Company v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

      Demurrage — railroad companies may charge. In this claim the State concedes the right of claimant to recover demurrage charges. The Court follows the holding in The Chicago and Alton Railway Company v. State of Illinois, 2 Court of Claims Reports, 249.
    Winston, Payne, Straw and Shaw, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   Claimant filed a claim for two thousand seven hundred ninetyfive and 00/100 ($2,795.00) dollars, but on a hearing it was agreed between claimant and the attorneys for the State, that the amount due claimant was one thousand five hundred five and 00/100 ($1,505.00) dollars.

The State admits that claimant is entitled to an award for the latter amount. There is no controversy as to claimant’s right to recover in this case; the identical question having been passed upon by this Court in re:

The Chicago and Alton Railway Company v. State of Illinois, 2 Ct. of Cl. R. 249.

It is the judgment of the Court that claimant is entitled to an award amounting to one thousand five hundred five and 00/100 ($1,-505.00) dollars.


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    Edwin A. Pease, Executor of the Last Will and Testament of John H. Pease, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

    Inheritance Tax — exemptions should be deducted in determining the rate of tax. In this claim the appraiser fixed the value of the property at $107,087.74. An exemption of $20,000.00 was allowed and the tax was fixed at the 2% rate, which tax was paid. An appeal was taken to the county court, which court set aside the order of the county judge fixing the tax on the 2% basis and fixed the same on a 1% basis. Held, -an award should be made.
    Kraus, Holden & Lawless, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   John H. Pease who in his life time was a resident of Ivane County, Illinois, departed this life testate on the 9th day of May, A.' D. 1913, leaving claimant as his only son and heir at law. His will was admitted to probate in said county and the court appointed an appraiser to fix the value of the property for the purpose of levying an inheritance tax. The appraiser appointed by the court found the value of the property devised to claimant to be $107,087.74, and an order was entered fixing the net tax at $1,654.67, after allowing the statutory exemption of $20,-000.00, and deducting the 5%. which is allowed in cases where the tax is paid within six months after the same is found to be due.

Claimant prayed an appeal from the order of the county judge to the county court of Kane County, and in the meantime paid the amount of taxes levied to the County Treasurer, under protest, that he might save the five per cent discount. Shortly after the appeal to the County Court, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, in the ease of The People v. Ullman, 263 Ill. 258, rendered an opinion to the effect that “Where a child takes from its deceased parents property valued in excess of $100,000.00 which with lawful exemptions deducted leaves less than $100,000.00, subject to inheritance tax, the rate of taxation is one (1%) per cent.”

The County Court set aside the order of the Coiinty Judge and fixed the rate at one per cent in accordance with the above opinion.

Claimant sought to recover from the County Treasurer of Kane County, and from the State Treasurer, the amount erroneously collected from him, but was informed by the State Treasurer that there was no appropriation to take care of his claim.

He did everything the law required to recover the amount due him, and it is the opinion of the Court that he should he reimbursed to the extent of $827.33, which he was compelled to paj by reason of the erroneous assessment.

Claimant is accordingly awarded $827.33.


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    Andrew Holmes v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

      Extbadictioh — expenses of messenger. The court reviews the evidence and holds that,, while it would not be justified in making an award, still it recommends that the Legislature make an appropriation to claimant covering the amount of this claim.
    Frank J. Snite, for Claimant.
    F. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   Claimant a police officer of Chicago, Illinois, was detailed by his sujierior officer to go to New Haven, Connecticut, to arrest and bring back, one Lillian Smith, alias Lillian Stewart, who was under indictment by the Grand Jury of Cook County, Illinois. A requisition was procured from the Governor of Illinois upon the Governor of Connecticut for the return of the prisoner. Claimant went to New Haven and upon his arrival there found the said Lillian Smith to be in a very bad physical condition and for that reason it was deemed advisable to return her to Chicago at once without waiting for the Avar rant to come from the Governor.

The prisoner consented to go Avithout the warrant, and the police officer in New Haven informed claimant, that they Avould fonvard the Governor’s Avar rant to him at Chicago, as soon as it came to them.

For some reason the warrant from the Governor of Connecticut authorizing the return of the prisoner to Illinois, has never been located, although the files in this case disclose that the requisition from the Governor of Illinois was received and accepted and that a warrant issued in accordance therewith. Not having received the warrant in question, claimant has been unable' to secure from the State the money he expended in making this trip, amounting to $160.12. The warrant is the only authority he had for removing the fugitive to this State, and without it, he is not in a position to establish his claim against the State for expenses incurred by him.

We recognize the necessity of officers complying with the laAv before they can recover from the State for services rendered. HoAvever, we feel that in this case claimant made an honest endeavor to comply with the laAv and he accomplished as much as if he had secured the Avarrant. The money expended by him in returning the fugitive was expended for the benefit of the State, and as a matter of equity, claimant should be reimbursed.

While the defense interposed in this case estops us from making an aAArard to claimant, still Ave are of the opinion that claimant is entitled to the amount paid by him for and on behalf of the State and we recommend that the Legislature make an appropriation to him in the sum of $160.12.


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    W. W. Looney v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

    1. Jukisdictio-n — Court has not of claims under Workmens Compensation Act. Where an employee of the State is injured while in, the service of the State, this Court does not have jurisdiction of the claim for compensation.
    2. Same — Claims of this class are under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Board.
    Silas W. Cook, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   Claimant was employed as a guard at the Criminal Insant Asylum, at Chester, Illinois, and on July 27, 1914, while engaged in performing his regular duties as such guard, he was assaulted and beaten over the head and face with a brass bozzle, by an inmate of said hospital. Complainant further states that said State Insane Hospital at the time he received the injury had accepted and was operated under the AYorkmen’s Compensation law for accidental injury or death, passed by the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, and approved June 28, 1913, that said act was in full -force and effect at the time he received the injuries; that he had accepted and was working under this act; that he gave notice of said accident and injury so received to- the Industrial Board of the State of Illinois; that he complied with said law in every respect, that a hearing of this case was had before the Committee of Arbitration as provided by law; that said Committee of Arbitration found that claimant was entitled to the sum of $6.35 per week for a period of fifty weeks; that an appeal was prayed and perfected to the Industrial Board; that said Industrial Board heard said appeal and approved and confirmed the findings of the Committee of Arbitration, and that no appeal or further proceedings were had in said cause. A copy of the findings of said Industrial Board is attached to and made a part of claimant’s declaration, which shows that the Industrial Board ordered the compensation payments to be made accordingly.

Claimant files his declaration in this Court for the sole purpose of having this Court recommend to the Legislature the pajnnent of the amount found due him by the Industrial Board, and this Court is not to pass upon the merits of the claim; that although section 4 of the AArorkmen’s Condensation Law, defining the term employer includes the State, no provision is made in said law for the payment of the amounts found clue by said Industrial Board by the State of Illinois, and no appropriation has been made by the Legislature for the payment of the amount of such findings.

The Workmen’s Compensation Law having been passed by the Legislature subsequent to the act creating this Court, and the Industrial Board having passed upon this claim as provided in said Workmen’s Compensation Law, this Court is without further jurisdiction in cases that have been placed directly under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Board by the Legislature, such as claimant claims.

The claim is accordingly dismissed, without prejudice, however to the rights of claimant to present his claim to the Legislature for the payment of the amount allowed by the Industrial Board of the State of Illinois.


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    Dennis Hull v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

    1. Governmental Function — State in conducting charitable institutions exercises. The State in conducting the Illinois State School for the Deaf at Jacksonville, exercises a governmental function.
    2. Same — State incurs na liability when it exercises. In this claim, the claimant was injured while employed at the School for the Deaf at Jacksonville, one of the charitable institutions of the State. Seld).¡ that no recovery could be had.
    John C. Snigg, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   In the amended declaration in this case, claimant states that he was an employee of the Illinois State School for the Deaf, at Jacksonville, and was engaged in operating a circular saw in the carpenter shop at the time the accident occurred. Claimant alleged that the saw was dull and was unprotected by proper guards; that the wood being sawed by him was seasoned and tough and that the combination of circumstances caused the board to jump and catch claimant’s hand so that the thumb and two fingers of the left hand were cut off. It is apparent from the amended declaration that the place of claimant’s employment was operated by the State entirely in its governmental capacity.

It is impossible to ascertain from the amended declaration that what occurred as alleged by claimant was in any way the proximate cause of the injury.

The State has filed a general demurrer. We consider that the statement is bad on demurrer, and for the reason hereinbefore, stated, the demurrer is sustained.


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    Neils Buck for the Use of Boston Insurance Company of Boston, Massachusetts v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

    1. Negligence — State not liable for — of its agents, etc. The State is not liable for the negligence of its agents, servants or employees.
    Burt A. Crowe, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   The record in this case shows that about six o'clock on the afternoon of December 4th, 1914, Neils Buck, claimant for the use of the Boston Insurance Company of Boston, Massachusetts, was driving his automobile north on a street in the City of Chicago, commonly known and described as Lake Shore Drive, or Sheridan Eoad, near the intersection of Chestnut street with said Lake Shore Drive, and in the center of the street is what is known as a safety zone, in the center, of which zone is a lamp post, which contains a red lamp for the purpose of safety and warning; that said Lake Shore Drive at this particular place is under the control and jurisdiction of the Lincoln Park Commissioners. The evidence shows that Neils Buck, while driving his automobile on Lake Shore Drive, near the intersection of said Drive and Chestnut street, attempted to pass to the left of a line of automobiles towards the center of the street where the lamps were placed in safety zones, and thereby collided with the aforesaid post on which was placed an unlighted lamp. He had passed a number of these lamp posts prior to the collision, and therefore was duly apprised of the fact that these lamp posts were placed at intervals along said Drive. The evidence also shows that while darkness had set in Neils Buck did not have the headlights on his automobile lit. The evidence further shows that, at the time of the accident said Neils Buck owned and there was in full force and effect a policy of automobile collision insurance in a company known as Boston Insurance Company of Boston, Massachusetts, and that said Neils Buck recovered from and has been paid by said Boston Insurance Company of Boston, Massachusetts, the full amount of his damages.

It is hardly necessary in this case to discuss the general facts, for the reason that there is no liability on the State, in view of the well established rule that the State is not liable for the torts of its agents, servants or employees; and even though the lamp in the safety zone was not lit, it is clear from the evidence that the said Neils Buck did not exercise due care and caution for his own safetic

This Court in a long line of decisions has invariably held the same as stated in the foregoing paragraph, and it is needless to quote the decisions. The claim is therefore rejected.


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    J. F. Schmidt Bros. Co. v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

    State Contracts — facts held sufficient to justify an atioard. In. this claim a dispute arose over the interpretation which should he placed upon the specifications as to painting certain walls of the building — the Court held that the specifications did not call for painting the walls.
    Brown, Hay & Creighton, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   Claimant, is an Illinois corporation which on October 18, 1912, entered into a written agreement with the Board of Trustees of the Western Illinois State Normal School for the construction of “The Womans’ Building,” at Macomb.

Plans had been prepared by W. Carbys Zimmerman, the then State Architect, and, prior to the completion of the building he was succeeded by James B. Dibelka as State Architect, who assumed supervision of the job.

Claimant had been paid on contract price the sum of $03,022.00 and has given credit because of deductions in the amount of $1,295.50. The original contract price was $63,940.00. There remains in dispute and unadjusted the following items:

A. $25.00 on account of an off-set between the living and reception rooms.

B. $96.00 deduction claimed by trustees on account of sewer not being raised.

C. $965.00 deductions made by trustees on account of claimant refusing to paint the plastering in the building.

D. Damages claimed by claimant occasioned by alleged delay on the part of the board of trustees in exercising its option on roofing and metal.

On April 15, 1914, Architect Dibelka issued his certificate covering a balance due of $1,243.80. This was delivered to the claimant and in turn delivered by it to the board of trustees. The board, however, refused to pay.

The $25.00 claim appears to have been paid. An allowance of $85.00 was made and paid to the contractor because of a mistake in the drawing of certain “I” beams. The architect made this allowance to cover the extra expense due to this mistake, and it is apparent that the $25.00 was included in the payment of $85.00.

The claim for $96.00 arises out of the following state of facts: The plans and specifications called for a tile sewer under the unexcavated portion of the building. The sewer was installed by the contractor and it was afterwards discovered that the elevation was improper. The contractor made a bid to raise this sewer and this was accepted. The sewer as originally laid by the plumber was of iron pipe, where the plans called for tile. In the sewer as raised, the contractor used tile and the board insisted upon iron, claiming that because the contractor had seen fit to use iron in the first place, it should use it in the relaid sewer. This the contractor was under no obligationo to do, inasmuch, as the original specifications called for tile and his bid for raising the sewer was according to the original plans and specifications. The architect in a letter to the contractor dated May 19, 1913, stated that he had given no order for a change in the materials to be used. The State claims that in a certain agreement made September 30, 1913, the contractor withdrew this claim of $96.00. This agreement appears in the evidence as State’s Exhibit “D”, and recites by way of preamble that credits have been agreed upon among others, “sewer not raised, ninety-six dollars.” It purports to be made for the purpose of removing funds from the hands of the treasurer of the school and placing it in the hands of another, and further states that, “nothing herein contained shall be construed as changing or modifying in any way'the terms and conditions of the contract,” etc. This agreement would serve only as evidence tending to prove that such an agreement as claimed by the State had been made, but in and of itself is not such an agreement as the State contends it is.

The Court is of the opinion that this claim is just.

The next item of the claim is for the deduction of $965.00 because the claimant refused to paint the plastering in the building. The specifications for plastering offered in evidence by claimant contained the following language: “The surfaces of all plaster, including walls and ceilings, in all bath and toilet rooms on first and second floors, are to receive on coat boiled oil sizing, and two coats lead and oil paint, as directed. In all bath rooms this paint to be white followed by two c-oats approved white enamel. Paint plaster backs of all cases, without wood backs, in same manner.”

The State on the other hand, offered in evidence a copy of specifications that were exactly the same except that the comma was omitted after the word “ceilings.” The State contends that the contractor should have painted all plaster surfaces. On the other hand, claimant contends that the specifications did not call for painting of all plaster surfaces, but were limited to only bath and toilet rooms and placter backs of cases. Considerable argument is indulged in by counsel of both parties as to the effect of the insertion or omission of the particular comma. If the comma were inserted there would not be much doubt as to the intention.

A peculiar circumstance arises due to the fact that the word, “ceilings,” as printed in both copies of specifications as offered, occurs at the very end of the line, and on the copy as offered by the State, there would be no room for the insertion of a comma after the word, there being no room between the 1st letter of the word and the edge of the sheet upon which is written. In the copy as offered by claimant, there is sufficient room for a comma between the last letter of the word and the edge of the paper and a comma is there. The copy offered by the State is apparently a blue print, made from an original typewritten copy. There is no question but that the blue print offered by the State and the typewritten copy offered by the claimant, are identical. Every peculiarity of the typewriting and of the spacing are the same excepting that the lines on the page in question of the blue print copy begin an inch and a quarter from the left edge of the page, and on the tj'pewritten copy about eleven-sixteenths of an inch from the left hand edge of the page.

We are satisfied that the trouble arises from the fact that the typewritten matter did not occupy exactly the same relative positions on the pages. The: copy offered by the claimant contains sufficient space at the end of the line for a comma to appear; that offered by the State, due to the fact that the line begins farther to the right than in the other copy, does not contain space sufficient for a comma to appear.

We are satisfied that the comma appeared in the original specifications. The same paragraph of the specifications also contains the following language: “Paint plaster hacks of all cases, without Avood backs, in the same manner.” It -would seem that if it wrere contemplated that all walls should be painted that this would inchide the plaster backs of such cases and on the other hand if all Avails Avere not to be painted, then there is reason for this specification, providing for paint in those particular places.

Prior to the making of the contract for this building, the contractor inquired of the architect as to the proper interpretation of this particular paragraph, and on the same day on which the contract was dated, viz., October 18, 1912, the State Architect Avroto a letter containing the folloAving language: “You are correct in figuring that only the bath and toilet room Avails and ceilings are to be painted, but alloAV me to call your attention to the fact that these occur on the third floor as well as the remaining floors.” Wo have here an interpretation of the contract prior to the- beginning of the work, on the same day that the contract Avas dated, by the architect who drew the specifications.

There is also testimony in the record to the effect that in the construction of buildings, it is ordinarily not the custom to paint nerv plaster surfaces, except in hath rooms.

In addition to all this, for form of specifications used by the contractor, Avas furnished by the' architect employed by the State, and the contractor had a right to reply on same in the form as furnished to him. We believe that claimant is entitled to an arvard on this item.

There remains now for our consideration the claim for damages occasioned by alleged delays on the part of the board in exercising the option in the choice of materials. It is provided in the contract that the contractor should give an alternate proposal for furnishing all metal specified copper, in FTo. 24 gauge galvanized iron, and that the alternate bid shall be rejected or accepted within thirty days. This alternate bid was made, but the board did not exercise its option within thirty days. Claimant, alleges that because oí this fact it was put to greater expense because the price of material used increased $196.00 between the day on which he made the bid and the day on which he eventually bought the material. As we view this claim, the contractor would have been justified, and he should have purchased the material specified when the board did not exercise its option within the time limited. The material eventually used was the material as originally specified. This, of itself, is immaterial. However, had the contractor followed the clear language of the contract when the board did not exercise this option, this loss would not have occurred. In this view of the case, we do not believe that the claimant should receive any award on this item.

As above stated, we are of the opinion that the claim for $.25.00 should be denied, the claim for $96.00 should be allowed, the claim for $965.00 should be allowed, and the claim for $196.00 for damages should not be allowed.

It is accordingly the judgment of this Court that claimant be awarded the sum of $1,061.00.


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    Edward W. Eaton, et al v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

    1. Inheritance Tax — failure of trust ground .for refund — when. Where an estate is left to a person upon a condition, the happening of which may defeat the estate, and an inheritance tax has been paid upon the assumption that the estate will not be defeated, an award will be made.
    2. Interest — when allowed. Where the right to a refund is established under section 25 of the inheritance tax law, interest will be allowed.
    Kerr & Kerr, for Claimants.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   The will of Thomas W. Eaton, deceased, probated in the Probate Court of Cook County, created a trust estate making Olive M. Eaton and Edward W. Eaton, trustees to manage same, to make certain payments to beneficiaries named, and on the death of the widow to divide the remainder equally among his son and four daughters.

An inheritance tax was assessed on appraised value of $41,351.38, with an exemption therefrom of $30,000.00, at the rate of one per cent, making a tax of $313.51, to which was added interest of $33.94, a total of $345.45, which was paid on December 16, 1913.

The widow, Olive M. Eaton, died on July 23, 1914, and the five children named by the testator survived her and took the remainder of the estate. Claim is now made for refund of the tax paid on the theory that the trust has failed, and that the states created by the will have now vested.

Under the provisions of section 25 of the inheritance tax law, claimants are entitled to a refund.

It is apparent that the values of the estates inherited by the several claimants are less than $20,000.00, and that in consequence no tax can be imposed, so that claimants should have refunded to them the entire amount paid, together with interest at three per cent from the date of payment.

It is accordingly the judgment of this Court that the claimants, Edward W. Eaton, Charlotte G. Gardner, Marian A. Wade, Jessie M. Taylor, and Ethel B. Gassneck, be awarded the sum of $245.45, together with interest thereon at three per cent from September 16, 1913.


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    Samuel Rothenberg, Administrator, of the Estate of Issac L. Rothenberg, Deceased v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

    Respondeat Superior — doctrine of not applicable to State. The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to the State, and the State is not liable for the torts of its officers, agents or employees.
    Schuyler, Ettelson and Weinfeld, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   Claimant seeks to recover for the death of Isaac L. Rothenberg, a child of tender 3Tears, who came to his death by drowning in the lagoon in Douglas Park in the City of Chicago, Illinois.

It is set forth in claimant’s petition that the ice covering on the lagoon at that time was inviting to children; that the same was unsafe and that there were no guards, police officers or other attendants to warn children and keep them from going on the ice.

The State has filed a general and special demurrer to claimant’s petition. One of the causes assigned by the special demurrer is that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to the State, and that the State is not liable for the torts of its officers, agents or employees.

This Court has repeatedly held that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to cases of this kind. The law is so well settled that it will be unnecessary to cite any authorities.

The demurrer is sustained.


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    William T. Stauts v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

    1. Bailment — law of, where a horse is bailed. Where a horse is hired, the bailee is required to pay the expense of caring for it, use it moderately, and as carefully as a person of common discretion would use his own animal, and supply it with suitable food.
    2. Same — presumption of negligence. When a horse, in good condition, is placed in the hands of a bailee, and is later returned in damaged condition or -not returned at all, an action will lie in favor of the bailor, and the law in such case will presume negligence on the part of the bailee, and will impose on him the burden of showing that he exercised such care as was required by the bailment. Funkhouser v. Wagner 62 Ill. 59; Cummins v. Woods, 44 Ill. 416; Bennett v. O’Brien 37 Ill. 250).
    Ralph J. Hefferman, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, for State.
   This is a claim for damages to a horse rented by Captain Frank Taiman for claimant, for the use of Troop “B”, First Cavalry of the Illinois Hational Guard, during its annual tour of duty in July, 1913.

The evidence shows that the horse in question was in good condition when delivered to Captain Taiman, and was worth about $175.00, that being the value placed on the horse by the Board of Survey. The tour was made during the hot days of July, 1913, and several of the horses, on one of the journeys, seemed to be overcome by the heat, and would lie down and were almost exhausted on account of the extreme heat and the extra long and hard trip, and when claimant’s horse was returned to camp one night it was suffering from exhaustion. The next morning it was stiff and could not move. An assistant veterinary said it had foundered. 'The Board of Survey ordered the horse shot. The horse was not shot, but placed in a pasture, but it did not recover. Claimant was compelled to go to Chicago and get the horse, and he now claims $10.00 for expenses for said trip, and $10.38 for freight charges for shipping said horse and another horse from Chicago to Blooming-ton. He kept said horse from September, 1913, to the fall of 1914, at a cost of more than $25.00, and was unable to work him, because said horse never got over his stiffness, and finally was sold for $25.00.

When a man hires a horse the law is, “He is bound to pay the expense of keeping it, use it moderately, and treat it as carefully as any man of common discretion would treat his own animal, and supply it writh suitable food, and if the horse, when placed in the hands of a bailee, is in good condition, and it is returned in a damaged condition or not returned at all, in an action by the bailor against the bailee, the law will presume negligence on the part of the latter and impose upon him the burden of showing that he exercised such care as was required by the bailment.”

Funkhouser v. Wagner, 62 Ill. 59; Cummins v. Wood, 44 Ill. 416; Bennett v. O'Brien, 37 Ill. 250.

This Court passed on this same" question in Campbell v. State of Illinois, 2 Ct. of Cl. R. 298.

We hold, that under the law and the evidence in this case, that the claimant is entitled to an award, and it is the: judgment of this Court, that the claimant be and is hereby awarded the sum of one hundred ninety-five and 38/100 ($195.38) dollars.


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    Michael Heitler v. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1916.

      Extradition — expenses of messenger. The court reviews the evidence and makes an award.
    Morris Kompel, for Claimant.
    P. J. Lncev, Attorney General, for State.
   Eugene De Luxe was charged with having committed a felony in Cook County, Illinois, and to secure his release until the day of trial, claimant signed his bail as surety in the sum of five thousand dollars.

De Luxe left the State a short time afterward and was not to be found when his case was called for trial. The Court ordered the bond forfeited, and claimant spent a great deal of time and money in trying to locate the said Eugene De Luxe. He was located in the State of New York, and claimant through the State’s Attorney of Cook County, had a requisition for his arrest from the Governor of Illinois upon the Governor of New York, requesting him to deliver to the authorities of the State of Illinois, the said Eugene De Luxe.

When De Luxe was located in New York, it became necessary for a police officer to go from Chicago to New York to bring him back, and this was done; claimant furnishing one hundred forty-five dollars to cover the expenses of the police officer.

Claimant now seeks to recover the amount furnished by him to the police officer for the purpose of returning De Luxe to Illinois.

From the records before us it appears that a proper expense account has been prepared and certified by the police officer who returned De Luxe, and that the same was duly signed by the County Judge of Cook County, and that claimant has in all other respects done what was required to secure a refund of the money so furnished.

In order to have the prisoner returned to answer for the crime committed within the State, it would be necessary for the State to furnish the amount required to bring him back.

The claimant having paid this money, we are of the opinion that it was done for the benefit of the State, and he should be reimbursed.

We therefore award claimant one hundred fortj'-five dollars.