text:
    (No. 6151
    Hillman’s, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Hillman’s, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Perlin, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 6182
    Commonwealth Edison Company, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Joseph C. Sibley, Jr. and Emmet T. Gallagher, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6194
    Pickens Kane Moving and Storage Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Pickens Kane Moving and Storage Company, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6197
    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Bureau of Administration, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6218
    Mackevich’s Department Store, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Mackevich’s Department Store, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6223
    Transworld Van Lines, Inc., a/k/a Majestic Warehouses, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Transworld Van Lines, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6224
    Loyola University Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Loyola University Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6231
    Bessie Krigel, Agent for Emily Economou, (Mother), Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Bessie Krigel, Agent for Emily Economou, (Mother) , Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6253
    Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Charles W. Ott, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6263
    Copying Products, Division of Clopay Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Copying Products, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6267
    Marie Krautsieder, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

    Marie Krautsieder, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5667
    Boise Cascade Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Various State Agencies, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Bell, Boyd, Lloyd, Haddad and Burns, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5833
    Thornburg Clinical Laboratory, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Thornburg Clinical Laboratory, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5961
    Ethelbert W. McClure, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Kleiman, Cornfield and Feldman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5962
    Medical Surgical Clinic of East St. Louis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Medical Surgical Clinic of East St. Louis, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5963
    Phillips Petroleum Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Various Agencies, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Phillips Petroleum Company, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5971
    Monterey Convalescent Home, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Monterey Convalescent Home, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L.S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5981
    Triangle Tire and Battery Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Triangle Tire and Battery Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5991
    Honeywell, Inc., A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Cardose and Cardose, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6007
    The County of Randolph, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    Don P. Koeneman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the claimant and the respondent and the Court being fully advised in the premises finds that this case arises pursuant to Ch. 65, Sec. 37,38 and 39, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1947, being; and that claimant is entitled to reimbursement of expenses, costs and fees as follows:

“An Act to provide for the imbursement (reimbursement) of counties within the State of Illinois for expenses, costs and fees incurred in habeas corpus proceedings in the courts of such counties, involving non residents of such counties who may be confined in State penal or charitable institutions.”
A. $1,420.00
B. 2,110.00
C. 1,140.00
D. 155.00
E. 256.00
$5,071.50

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the parties’ presence at a hearing and the filing of briefs is waived and in pursuance of the statutes of the State of Illinois, as set out above, and based on claimant’s complaint with attached Bill of Particulars, as revised by the parties and agreed and stipulated thereto, an award is hereby entered for claimant in the amount of $5,071.50.


text:
    (No. 6082
    The Hearthside Sheltered Care Home, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    The Hearthside Sheltered Care Home, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6090
    Calhoun County Contracting Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion tiled January 11, 1972.
    Calhoun County Contracting Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6097
    Walker Lumber and Construction, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.
    Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    Walker Lumber and Construction, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6106
    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Various State Agencies, Respondent.
    Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6148
    St. Joseph Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    St. Joseph Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6152
    Watson’s Drug Store, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Watson’s Drug Store, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6201
    Otis Vinson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Richard F. McPartlin, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6204
    RCA Computer Systems Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    RCA Computer Systems Division, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6205
    Eugene Dietzgen Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Eugene Dietzgen Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6208
    Itek Business Products, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.
    Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    Itek Business Products, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6217
    State House Inn, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Business and Economic Development, Respondent.
    Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    State House Inn, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


author: PERLIN, C.J.

text:
    (No. 6236 thru 6251-Consolidated
    St. Mary's Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.
    Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    St. Mary's Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   PERLIN, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6252
    Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.
    Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    Charles W. Ott, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6258
    Hubbard and Hyland and Bradley and Bradley, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.
    Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    Hubbard and Hyland and Bradley and Bradley, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6259
    Bradley and Bradley, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Bradley and Bradley, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6260
    Richard W. Prendergast and Associates, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Richard W. Prendergast and Associates, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6266
    The Salvation Army, An Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Kennedy, Golan, Morris, Spangler and Greenberg, Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6274
    Leandrew Moore, d/b/a Star Movers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Leandrew Moore, d/b/a Star Movers, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6279
    John G. Smith, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Insurance, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    John G. Smith, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6282
    E. F. Mueller, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Departments of Public Works and Buildings and Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    E. F. Mueller, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L.S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6285
    International Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Governor’s Office of Human Resources, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    International Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6286
    Clark Oil and Refining Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Clark Oil and Refining Corporation, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6292
    Rockford Industries, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Rockford Industries, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6295
    Jas. E. Rust Electric Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Jas. E. Rust Electric Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6296
    Sanders Associates, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Sanders Associates, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6298
    R. V. Monahan Construction Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Departments of General Services and Public Safety, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Edward G. Coleman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6299
    Patricia J. Callaway, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Personnel, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Kleiman, Cornfield and Feldman, Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6300
    Donald D. Kozoll, M.D., M.S.C., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Dr. Donald D. Kozoll, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6306
    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L.S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6307
    Druce Drug Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Druce Drug Company, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6313
    Carter Reporting Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Carter Reporting Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6314
    Kenneth Moy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Kenneth Moy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6315
    William D. Stiehl, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    William D. Stiehl, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6316
    Elsie Goldstein, C.S.R., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Elsie Goldstein, C.S.R., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6317
    Ellis E. Reid, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Ellis E. Reid, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6318
    Charles McCorkle, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Charles McCorkle, Jr., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6319
    Garland W. Watt, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Garland W. Watt, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6320
    Thomas S. Metskas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Thomas S. Metskas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6321
    William T. Regas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    William T. Regas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6322
    Joseph E. Engel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Joseph E. Engel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6323
    Keefe Reporting Services, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Keefe Reporting Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6324
    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6326
    Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6331
    William M. Cohen, D.P.M., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.
    Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    Dr. William M. Cohen, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6335
    Bismarck Hotel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.
    Opinion filed January 11, 1972.
    Bismarck Hotel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6336
    Anthony J. Pauletto, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Anthony J. Pauletto, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6337
    Rex Carr, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Rex Carr, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6338
    Lewis V. Morgan, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Lewis V. Morgan, Jr., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6339
    Dolmar Pharmacy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Dolmar Pharmacy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6341
    Supreme Motor & Van Lines, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    M. T. Gruener, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6344
    Marshall Field & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Robert A. Wilbrandt, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L.S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6347
    Seymour S. Kessler, D.P.M., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Dr. Seymour S. Kessler, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6350
    Cabrini Hall Maternity Home, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

      Cabrini Hall Maternity Home, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

   Perlin, C.J.


text:
      (No. 6356

      Richard J. Kareckas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

      Richard J. Kareckas, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

   Perlin, C.J.


text:
      (No. 6358

      Shamel Manor #2, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

      Shamel Manor #2, Claimant, pro so.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.

   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6360
    Our Lady of the Highlands, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Our Lady of the Highlands, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6368
    Bi-Rite Food Store, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    Bi-Rite Food Store, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6398
    RCA-Computer Systems, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Auditor of Public Accounts, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1972.

    RCA-Computer Systems, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 5795
    Benjamin H. Turner, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 21, 1972.

    Rainey and Murphy, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

In this case claimant seeks to recover $8.00 drivers license fee which he paid the State of Illinois.

In 1969, claimant applied for a renewal of his drivers license, paid the prescribed fee of $8.00, but failed to pass the examination due to his eyesight. The Secretary of State notified him by letter of his failure to pass the examination. Thereafter, claimant wrote a letter to the Secretary of State stating that he did not intend to apply again for a renewal of his license and requested a refund of the $8.00 he paid. The Secretary of State wrote claimant declining to refund the license fee.

The sole question is whether or not claimant should be refunded the $8.00 license fee paid by him at the time he applied for the renewal of his license.

The argument of claimant is that the fee had to be paid at the time of the application and therefore was not voluntary; that since the State refused to renew his license, the fee should be refunded to him because the $8.00 fee could not, under the law, be charged solely for taking of the examination; and that inasmuch as claimant never received his license, it would be unjust for the State to retain the fee.

It appears that there is some merit to the claimant’s position in that he never received what he applied for when he paid the $8.00 license fee. Nevertheless, the rale has been firmly established by many cases, that where a license fee is voluntarily paid to a governmental body, it cannot be recovered in the absence of a statute authorizing such a recovery. See the case of The L. F. Corporation vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 486. In that case, a fee in the amount of $6,750.00 for a racing license was not returned to the applicant after the applicant had abandoned his application.

To change this'long established principle of law in order to assist the claimant here could result in confusion in the rules. There is no provision in the Illinois Vehicle Code which authorizes the Secretary of State or any other person to refund a drivers license application fee in case the license is refused or the application withdrawn. There are provisions, however, for refunding fees received when an application for a certificate of title to a motor vehicle or when an application for registration of a motor vehicle is refused. Ch. 95½, Sec. 3 — 824, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1969, provides that any such fee shall be returned to the applicant when the application for title or for registration is refused or withdrawn. The Legislature has not adopted such provisions in connection with the fees collected for drivers licenses.

The claim is denied.


author: Bookwalter, J.

text:
    (No. 5332
    Charles Edward Ferguson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1969.

      Petition of Claimant for Rehearing denied February 14, 1972.

    Henning and Croft, Attorney for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bookwalter, J.

Charles Edward Ferguson has filed his complaint in this Court seeking to recover damages against respondent, charging respondent with certain acts of negligence in its failure to maintain a street, which was under its control.

From the evidence introduced, it appears that claimant, on October 30, 1965, at or about 6:45 a.m., parked his car at or near 3867 Elston Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, and entered the Elston Launderette; that some time later claimant left the launderette, and at the aforesaid location, while stepping from the sidewalk and curb onto the street, stepped into a hole in the asphalt pavement in the street. Claimant testified that the weather at the time was cloudy and hazy. He further testified that the hole in the pavement was approximately one foot from the curb.

On cross examination, claimant testified that he was well acquainted with the area in question; that the street along the block in question was cracked, and that he knew of the bad condition of the street. He also testified that he did not look down at the street when he stepped from the curb, even though he knew that the street and pavement was in a bad condition.

Joseph Ciborowski, a witness on behalf of claimant, testified that he is the owner of the Elston Launderette on Elston Avenue. He testified as to the photographs of the street in question, and testified that the hole depicted in claimant’s exhibits and photographs, existed for at least four or five months prior to October 30, 1965, the date of the accident in question.

In order for "claimant to recover, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent was negligent, that this negligence was the proximate cause of claimant’s injury, and that he was, at the time of the accident, exercising due care and caution for his own safety. It is the respondent’s contention that claimant was a pedestrian walking on a roadway in violation of Chap. 95 1/2, Sec. 175, Ill.Rev.Stat.; “Where sidewalks are provided, it is unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway except at a crosswalk,” and that respondent owes no duty to such pedestrian to keep the street in a safe condition, and, therefore, could not be guilty of negligence.

It is unnecessary for this court to consider respondent’s contention, since we find from the facts in this case the claimant was not in the exercise of due care.

Respondent is not an insurer of all accidents which happen to persons using its roads and it is incumbent upon the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was exercising due care and caution for his own safety at the time of the accident. Claimant has failed to discharge this burden. He knew of the condition of the roadway in the area where the accident occurred, but did not look down into the street before stepping off the curb, or in any other way exercise care for his own safety. Had he looked down, he could have avoided stepping into the hole. Thriege vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 470.

In view of the foregoing, the claim must be denied.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    (No. 5525
    Westchester Fire Insurance Company, A Corporation, Subrogee of Jesse C. Shepherd, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1971.

      Petition of Respondent for Rehearing denied February 17, 1972.

    John P. Wardrope, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Zeamore A. Ader, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

On February 4, 1968, there was an explosion and fire in the National Guard Armory in Aurora, Illinois, which resulted in the destruction of the Armory. As a result of the explosion and fire, an adjoining building owned by a certain Jesse C. Shepherd was damaged. Claimant, Westchester Fire Insurance Company, paid the owner of the adjoining building the sum of $25,124.55, and brings this claim to recover its payment as the subrogee of the owner of the adjoining building.

Donald Shepherd, a qualified and licensed architect, submitted a thirty-seven page itemization concerning necessary repairs to the building, and stated that the cost of repair, replacement and service required to repair the damage done to claimant’s building amounted to $39,067.89. The Assistant Claims Manager of the Westchester Fire Insurance Company, Charles J. Sniericky, testified that an agreement was made with the owner of the building whereby the claimant paid its assured, Jesse C. Shepherd, the sum of $25,124.55.

It is the contention of the claimant that the respondent, through its agents, members of the Illinois National Guard, was negligent in the operation, control and maintenance of the Armory, more specifically, the heating apparatus in the basement known as the “North Boiler”, and that it was through this negligence that the fire was caused, resulting in damage to the Shepherd Building. Count One of the claimant’s complaint alleges specific negligence in the operation of the “North Boiler” and Count Two alleges general negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Testimony taken at the hearing of this matter established that the Armory was under exclusive control of the respondent and that the “North Boiler” was in operation at the time of the explosion and fire. On December 23,1967, a gas regulator valve on the “North Boiler” was replaced for the reason that the boiler had not been burning with the proper flame. Captain Leo Stoecker, of the Illinois National Guard, testified that there had been no complaint regarding the “North Boiler” after that time. Neither claimant nor respondent introduced any expert witness who might have examined the “North Boiler” after the fire.

Lt. Ronald Miller of the Aurora Fire Department, testified on behalf of the claimant that he had investigated the fire and that in his opinion the fire had started in the basement boiler area and was consistent with a gas explosion. Arson was ruled out as a cause.

Another opinion was introduced in the form of a report by James F. Lahey, Deputy State Fire Marshal for the State of Illinois. In his written opinion, the most probable source of ignition was the Boiler Room and further, in his opinion, it was stated that the fire was accidental and due to a malfunction of one of the boilers.

In the opinion of this court, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is properly invoked by the claimant. In the case of Feldman vs.Chicago Railways Co., 289 Ill. 25,34., the court stated: “When a thing which has caused an injury is shown to be under the management of the party charged with negligence and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things will not happen if those who have such management use proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the parties charged, that it arose from want of proper care.” The claimant in this case has proven through a sufficient amount of circumstantial evidence that the fire started in the boiler area, which was under the control of the respondent, and that the probable cause of the fire was a gas explosion. Such circumstantial evidence, along with the fact that fires of this nature do not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence give rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the respondent. (Metz vs. Central Illinois Electric and Gas, 32 Ill. 2d 446).

The presumption which arises is subject to rebuttal by the respondent and may be overcome by explanation of the occurrence of the fire, consistent with due care on the respondent’s part. (Edmonds vs. Heil, 333 Ill. App. 497). Respondent did show that the boiler was repaired some time before the fire occurred, but failed to offer evidence as to its condition just prior to and at the time of the explosion and fire in question; and furthermore, failed to have the boiler inspected after the fire, although it was in respondent’s possession for four to five months. Respondent has failed to offer sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence.

Respondent argues that it might be just as reasonably be inferred that the fire was started by a bomb or that some other form of arson took place. The possibility of arson was ruled out both by Lt. Ronald Miller of the Aurora Fire Department and James F. Lahey, Deputy State Fire Marshal. There was no proof of contributory negligence on the part of the claimant.

In the opinion of this court, respondent is liable for the damages inflicted on the property of Jesse C. Shepherd and the court awards damages to the Westchester Fire Insurance Company, subrogee and claimant in this matter, in the amount of $25,000.00.


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 5570
    N. A. Masters, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Orwin H. Pugh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This is a claim for property damage based on the following facts which are not in dispute.

On Thursday, August 10, 1967, a sign crew from the District #9 office of the Division of Highways at Carbon-dale proceeded to the southwest corner of the intersection of Illinois Avenue (U. S. Route 51) and Main Street (Illinois Route 13) in Carbondale to install signs for a temporary one-way couple of Illinois Avenue and University Avenue.

The crew, operating a truck-mounted power digger, was drilling holes for the erection of a sign when the drill punctured a four-inch water service line under the pavement. The ensuing flow of escaping water flooded claimant’s place of business, a tavern known as the Rathskeller.

The time of the puncture of the water line was approximately 9:15 a.m. The Carbondale City Water Department was called immediately to repair the break, the Division of Highways being without authority to shut off the water supply or to repair the punctured service line. The flow of water was stopped at approximately 3:00 a.m. on the following day. The water was escaping for 18 hours, a portion of which time it was flowing through the public establishment of the claimant.

It would appear that there may have been undue delay on the part of the City in repairing the water main. Assuming that there was neglect involved in this delay, we are faced with a situation where we have joint tort-feasors. It has been long recognized in Illinois that a party damaged by the actions of joint tort-feasors may sue either or both tort-feasors and may collect in full from either.

The property damage sustained by the claimant was obviously caused by the water which was allowed to escape following the drilling operation of the respondent, and the latter acknowledges liability.

The only remaining question is the amount of damage actually inflicted by the water. According to claimant’s testimony on page 6 of his deposition, the floor in the Rathskeller was installed in 1955. This means that the tile floor had been subjected to use by the public for a period of 12 years prior to the water damage. Claimant, by letter dated August 3, 1970, attached to respondent’s Brief and Argument, agrees that the claim should be reduced from $1,254.78 to $882.34. Respondent does not contest the other damages alleged by claimant and agrees that the actual damages to the claimant’s property amount, to $882.34.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that claimant be awarded damages in the amount of $882.34.

Pursuant to Ch. 27, Sec. 439.24, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971, the Court directs immediate payment of this claim from the Court of Claims Fund. (Fund No. 572.)


text:
    (No. 6023
    St. Alexius Hospital, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    M. C. Elden, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6116
    Carmen Alonzo, d/b/a Carmen’s Movers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Edwin M. Raffel, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6235
    Parkhurst, Appier, Marolf, Associates, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Parkhurst, Appier, Marolf, Associates, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6265
    Crawford, Murphy and Tilly, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Crawford, Murphy and Tilly, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6273
    Engineering Service Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Engineering Service Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6283
    Lankton, Ziegele, Terry and Associates, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Departments of Public Works and Buildings and Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Lankton, Ziegele, Terry and Associates, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6330
    David V. Effron, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Dr. David V. Effron, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6349
    Arnold H. Albredcht, Homer Beall, Sr., Donald Haley, Ralph Johnson, Lynn Lamie, Curtis Orr, Otto Schriefer and Ray Stout, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Superintendent of the Educational Service Region, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Clifford Bury, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6355
    Lester L. Haag, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Lester L. Haag, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

THIS COURT FINDS that this claim is for damage caused to claimant’s 1970 Ambassador sedan, while parked, when respondent’s agent backed into it with a farm type International Model M Tractor.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. That the sum of $151.59 be awarded to claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 6374
    Flex-O-Lite Division, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Flex-O-Lite Division, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6375
    The Crest Lyn, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    The Crest Lyn., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6377
    Meco Distributors, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Meco Distributors, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6378
    Manpower, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Manpower, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6379
    Barber-Colman Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Barber-Colman Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6394
    Phillips Decorating Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Industrial Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Phillips Decorating Service, Claimant, pro se.
    . William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6397
    Millipore Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Millipore Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6401
    Smith-Corona Marchant, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Business and Economic Development, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Smith-Corona Marchant, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6409
    Olshaw’s Interior Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Industrial Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Olshaw’s Interior Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6413
    Braun Automotive, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Braun Automotive, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6417
    John E. Vrooman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    John E. Vrooman, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6428
    Boone Brackett, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Dr. Boone Brackett, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6441
    Holiday Inn South, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Personnel, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Holiday Inn South, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6448
    Uregas Service of Anna, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Uregas Service of Anna, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6450
    Olshaw’s Interior Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Industrial Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 17, 1972.

    Olshaw’s Interior Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


author: Dove, J.

text:
    (No. 5222
    Irving Silvers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 12, 1968.

      Petition of Claimant for Rehearing denied March 24, 1972.

    Morris A. Levy, Attorney for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

This cause of action was brought by the claimant against the respondent, State of Illinois, for personal injuries and property damage suffered by claimant, Irving Silvers, when the automobile he was driving struck a barrier median on Willow Road near the Tri-State Tollway in Cook County, Illinois.

On February 19, 1964, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Irving Silvers, the claimant, was operating his automobile in an easterly direction on Willow Road near the Tri-State Toll way in Cook County, Illinois. Traffic was light, and there were no other eastbound vehicles at that time. The weather was clear, and the pavement dry. Willow Road inclines upward as it approaches the overpass above the TriState Tollway. At the top of the incline there is a concrete abutment, technically known as a barrier median, which is approximately eight inches high, four to five feet in width, and four hundred feet in length, running in an east to west direction, and located in the middle of Willow Road. The accident in question occurred when claimant’s car struck the west end of this barrier median.

At the point of the accident, Willow Road is a four-lane highway. Claimant was proceeding eastbound in the inner lane when the left side of claimant’s automobile struck the barrier median, causing personal injuries to claimant and damage to his automobile.

Claimant testified that at the time of the accident he was driving his automobile at a speed of approximately 30 miles per hour. The evidence indicates that approximately one-tenth of a mile west of the barrier median there is an informational sign bearing the legend “Center Curb Ahead”. There is also the customary section of ribbed concrete one hundred feet in advance of the barrier median. The purpose of this ribbed section of concrete is to cause vibrations to a motorist’s automobile and generate a peculiar noise, warning a motorist that he has departed from and is not driving on the normal pavement.

Harry Waldon, Field Traffic Engineer, Division of Highways, testified that it would not be possible to strike the barrier median without first passing over this ribbed section of concrete. Waldon further testified that running parallel to the ribbed concrete section, and continuing along the side of the southern edge of the barrier median, was a painted, yellow diversionary line. Waldon also testified that, as a general policy, there would be posted a “Keep Right” sign at each end of a barrier median. The claimant testified, and the evidence indicates, that there was no “Keep Right” warning sign or other device of a similar nature located at the west end of the barrier median. The evidence indicated that a “Keep Right” sign was placed near the west end of the barrier median when it was originally constructed. However, this sign was subsequently torn down, and had not, at the time of the accident, been replaced. Claimant alleges that respondent’s failure to replace the “Keep Right” sign, or to provide other warning devices as to the existence of the barrier median, constituted negligence on the part of the respondent, which was the proximate cause of the accident.

It is the duty of the State of Illinois to maintain the highways within its jurisdiction and under its control in a reasonably safe condition or in the event a dangerous or.unsafe condition exists, to warn those persons using the highway of said dangerous or unsafe condition. Thompson vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 219; Bloom vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 582; McNary vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 328.

In the case of Thompson vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 219, the Court said: “It is an established rule, the state is not an insurer of all those traveling upon the highway, the extent of its duty being to use reasonable care to keep the highways in a reasonably safe condition for persons exercising due care for their own safety.”

The law in the State of Illinois is clear that in order for a claimant in a tort action to recover he must prove that the State was negligent, that this negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, and that claimant was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety. Link vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 69; McNary vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 328; Bloom vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 582. The burden of proof is upon the claimant to prove freedom from contributory negligence.

While there is some dispute as to the existence of the yellow diversionary line running parallel to the corrugated or ribbed concrete section and continuing alongside the edge of the barrier median, there is no dispute as to the existence of the “Center Curb Ahead” sign, approximately . one-tenth of a mile west of the barrier median, or to the existence of a ribbed concrete section running one hundred feet in advance of the barrier median. Claimant testified that he did not observe the yellow diversionary line; that he did not observe the “Center Curb Ahead” sign, or experience any vibrations or hear any warning noises, that would indicate that he had departed from the normal driving pavement, and was passing over the ribbed concrete section.

It is the opinion of this Court that the claimant, Irving Silvers, has failed to sustain the burden of proof that he was free from contributory negligence in connection with the accident in question. Claimant’s failure to sustain the burden of proof that he was free from contributory negligence effectively bars his right to recover damages from respondent for personal injuries and property damage when claimant’s automobile struck the barrier median. For this reason the question of whether respondent’s needs to maintain a “Keep Right’’ sign at the end of the barrier median need not be considered by the Court.

Claimant’s claim is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 5474
    Marilyn Kirkland, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Gillespie, Burke and Gillespie, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

On January 3, 1966, the claimant, Marilyn Kirkland, was appointed as a court reporter for the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Illinois by Chief Judge Creel Douglass. Her appointment was made pursuant to the Court Reporters Act, Ch. 37, Sec. 651-659, Ill.Rev.Stat, 1965. On the same day, January 3, 1966, claimant took the official oath as required by statute and served as a court reporter from January 3, 1966, until January 16, 1968, when she resigned her position.

Section 657 of the Court Reporters Act provided that each court reporter in office on January 1, 1966, or appointed on or after that date, must take a test to determine his or her proficiency. The statute provides that the proficiency test shall consist of two parts, designated Part A and Part B.

During the month of February, 1966, claimant took and passed Part B of the proficiency test provided for by statute. Thereafter, under the provisions of Section 658 of the Court Reporters Act, claimant was paid a salary of $6,-000.00 per year in monthly installments of $500.00.

On February 16, 1967, claimant took and passed Part A of the proficiency test, and was so notified by letter on March 1, 1967. Section 658 of the Court Reporters Act provides that Class A court reporters shall receive a salary of $9,000.00 per year.

Claimant’s complaint alleges that from March 1, 1967, until January 16,1968, when she resigned as a court reporter for the Seventh Judicial Circuit of the State of Illinois, the respondent, State of Illinois, failed and refused to pay claimant a salary of $9,000.00 per year in monthly installments of $750.00, but continued to pay her a salary of a Class B court reporter, namely $6,000.00 per year in monthly installments of $500.00. The claimant seeks damages in the sum of $2,625.00, which represents the difference in the statutory salaries of a Class A and a Class B court reporter for the period beginning March 1,1967, and ending January 16, 1968.

The record in this case reveals that all of the allegations of claimant’s complaint were supported by the testimony of claimant.

Respondent introduced no witnesses or evidence at the hearing. However, the record contains a departmental report and answers to interrogatories filed by the claimant. The defense to the claim appears to be that after claimant took and passed Part A of the proficiency examination, thereby qualifying as a Class A reporter, she waived her right to receive the $9,000.00 per year salary in a conversation with Chief Judge Creel Douglass, who had been asked by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts to see if claimant and another court reporter who had passed Part A of the examination would work for $6,-000.00 per year, although both were classified as Class A reporters. Such waiver was emphatically denied by claimant during the hearing, and no evidence was introduced to support the alleged waiver.

Although respondent alleges further that it was the policy of the Illinois Supreme Court after August, 1966, to pay $9,000.00 per year, to court reporters who passed Part A of the proficiency examination if they reported for a Circuit Judge, or if they worked full time on a reasonably heavy trial schedule of reasonably difficult cases, and if there were limited Class A openings, there is no statutory basis for this position. The applicable statute provides as follows:

“Salaries. §8. The salaries of all court reporters shall be paid by the state. Class A reporters shall receive $9000 per year, and Class B reporters shall receive $6000 per year. The salaries shall be paid monthly on the voucher of the Supreme Court.” (Ill.Rev.Stat. c.38 §658.)

In August, 1967, effective January 1,1968, that portion of the Statute was amended to provide that the Director of the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts may set up a salary schedule for each individual court reporter which reflects the “following relevant factors: (1) proficiency rating; (2) experience; (3) population of the area to which a reporter is normally assigned; (4) the types of cases and the number of each type of case to which a reporter is regularly assigned; (5) other factors considered relevant by the Director.”

Respondent cites the Illinois Constitution, Article IV §19, and the claimant cites the Illinois Constitution, Article V §23, the former prohibiting extra compensation to public servants after service is rendered and the latter providing that a state officer’s salary may not be diminished during his term of office. Neither provision appears applicable to the instant case.

The 1965 statutory language does not qualify the right of a Class A reporter to receive the $9,000.00 per year salary prescribed. From March 1, 1967, until January 1, 1968, the date the amended provision took effect, claimant is entitled to the extra $250.00 per month which was authorized for all Class A reporters.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $2,500.00.


text:
    (No. 5628
    Rusk Aviation, Inc., A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Bissonnette, Nutting and Lucas, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks recovery of damages incurred to property owned by it when two inmates escaped from the Kankakee State Mental Hospital in Kankakee, Illinois, on May 15,1967. The statutory provision under which the suit is brought provides as follows:

“Whenever a claim is filed with the Department of Mental Health, the Department of Children and Family Services, the Department of Public Safety, the Youth Commission, or the Department of Youth, as the case may be, for damages resulting from personal injuries or damages to property, or both or for damages resulting from property being stolen, heretofore or hereafter caused by an inmate who has escaped from a charitable, penal, reformatory, or other institution over which the State of Illinois has control while he was at liberty after his escape, the Department of Mental Health, the Department of Children and Family Services, the Department of Public Safety, the Youth Commission, or the Department of Youth, as the case may be, shall conduct an investigation to determine the cause and if it is found after investigation that the damage was caused by one who had been an inmate of such institution and had escaped, the Department or Commission may recommend to the Court of Claims that an award be made to the injured party and the Court of Claims shall have the power to hear and determine such claims.” (Chapter 23, §4041, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1967.)

The record contains reports that inmates, Patrick Henry Wright and Edward Patterson had escaped from the Kankakee State Mental Hospital on May 14,1967, and were returned May 15, 1967; and that Patterson admitted going during the time of escape to the Kankakee airport, stealing a pickup truck and with it smashing into two airplanes, damaging the truck and one of the airplanes.

Mr. Willard Rusk testified that he was the president of Rusk Aviation, Inc. on May 15, 1967, which company was acting as broker for one D-18 S twin engine Beachcraft airplane. There is no dispute over the facts. It appears that the inmates took a 1961 Chevrolet service truck owned by claimant and backed it into the tail section of the aircraft, causing damage in the amount of $4,125.00 which was the actual cost of repairs for the aircraft and $134.12 for the pickup truck.

Respondent has recommended that the awards in the aforesaid amounts be granted.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $4,259.12.


text:
    (No. 5743
    Dr. Comess and Associates, S.C., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Dr. Comess and Associates, S.C., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5766
    Friendly Chevrolet, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Sorling, Catron, and Hardin, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant seeks to recover the value of a 1966 Ford which he allegedly failed to receive as a trade-in when he sold a 1969 Chevrolet to the State.

The State’s purchase order #885910, dated January 21, 1969, was issued to the claimant for a 1969 Chevrolet for the price of $2,347.00 less a trade-in allowance of $1,000.00 for a 1966 Ford.

There is no dispute in connection with the purchase order nor its terms. The only issue presented is whether or not the claimant actually received the 1966 Ford that the State agreed to trade in.

Claimant delivered the nexv car along with several other new cars to the Department of Agriculture at a State garage. At the time of delivery, he should have picked up the trade-in vehicle. Later, claimant discovered that the 1966 Ford trade-in was missing. He contends here that he never received the trade-in vehicle.

Claimant testified that he delivered the new car, along with several others, and that at the time he and his employees picked up several trade-ins. He had a sheet with the State trade-ins listed. As he received a trade-in, he would check it off. It appeared, however, that the 1966 Ford trade-in was never checked off. Claimant actually noticed the missing trade-in some time later. He testified, however, that previously on sales there were delays in getting the trade-in; that often times the trade-in would be located in other parts of the State; and that on occasion they would be wrecked vehicles. The respondent did not offer any evidence to the contrary.

The original complaint asked for $1,000.00. The complaint was later amended by raising the amount to $1200.00 with the statement that the later figure was the fair market value of the trade-in item.

It is the opinion of this Court that claimant has produced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that the State did not deliver the 1966 Ford trade-in as agreed upon in the purchase order.

It is the further opinion of this Court that the sum of $1000.00 is the correct amount that should be allowed to the claimant and an award is therefore entered in said amount of $1000.00.


text:
    (No. 5954
    Moehle Prescription Pharmacy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Moehle Prescription Pharmacy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5997
    Sun Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Various State Agencies, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Sun Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6026
    Ralph Vancil, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Lansden and Lansden, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

For labor and materials furnished to the State, the claimant initially filed a claim in this cause for the amount of $2,498.78. Subsequently, the ad damnum was reduced to $2,253.75, because the original complaint contained certain items for which claimant apparently had been paid.

Claimant had originally contracted with the Illinois Building Authority to work at the 60-boy Forestry Cam]) in Dixon Springs, Illinois. That contract work was completed by the claimant and fully paid for by the State. This claim is based on extra work done at the request of one John Lovelock of the Department of Corrections who was Administrative Assistant to the Supervisor of Forestry Camps. The record contains a letter from Peter B. Bensinger, Director of the Department of Corrections, addressed to the Attorney General’s office, indicating that the Supervisor of Forestry recommended payment of the claim based on valid billing and due to the fact that the work was not part of the original IBA contract.

Further, there is in the record a copy of a letter from Charles Martini, Coordinating Architect, addressed to Albert Paga, State Supervising Architect, explaining that the IBA could not pay the bill since it had not approved the additional work prior to the time it was done, and because the change order was submitted after the work was completed. It appears, however, that the work done by claimant was in the nature of an emergency. The facility was needed to accommodate boys who were coming in to the Camp. Claimant was on the job, boys were coming in, and there was no way to feed them or wash their clothes without the additional work finished by claimant.

Respondent acknowledges the merits of this claim. However, in analyzing the claim, it appears to this Court that, in the first instance, claimant was lax in including items for which he had previously been paid. In addition, the computation of the claim contains an item for Supervision at 25% and Insurance and Taxes at 20%, but nowhere in the testimony is there any evidence to support these items as being proper. If these were proper, claimant should have submitted proof to substantiate their inclusion. There was testimony offered in support of the 15% for Overhead and 10% for Profit as being reasonable and customary charges. Also, it is noted in the itemization of the claim, the 25% amount for Supervision is stated at the same figure as the 20% amount for Insurance and Taxes. Thus, the claim is a bit casual in its original inception and in its final form.

This Court believes claimant is entitled to be compensated; and based on the records, we are allowing the following:

Cost of materials........................................$ 353.62
Labor.................................................. 952.00
Total.........................................$1,305.62
Overhead 15*........................................... 195.78
Total.........................................$1,501.40
Profit 10*.............................................. 150.14
Total Allowed.................................$1,651.54

Claim allowed in the amount of $1,651.54.


text:
    (No. 6036
    FS Services, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Illinois Agricultural Association and Affiliated Companies, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6119
    All Weather Courts, Inc., Claimant, vs. The Board of Regency of the Regency Universities System, Illinois State University, Respondent

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    All Weather Courts, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    Markowitz, Lawrence, Lenz & Jennings, Attorney for Illinois State University, and Paul E. Mathias, Attorney for Board of Regents, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 6056
    Commuter Airlines, Inc., An Iowa Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Various Agencies, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Nicholas G. Manos, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6127
    County of Cook, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Edward Y. Hanrahan, State’s Attorney of Cook County, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

THIS COURT FINDS that this claim is for salaries of employees of the staff of the Juvenile Court, wherein the State is obligated by Ch. 37, Sec. 706-7, Ill.Rev.Stat, 1969, to compensate the counties for such expenditures, that such obligations were incurred as a matter of law, and that the appropriation was depleted prior to the claimant’s filing for reimbursement.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sum of $87,244.45 be awarded to claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 6146
    Glick Medical and Surgical Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Click Medical and Surgical Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6290
    Rosewood Manor, Inc., A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State or Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Rosewood Manor, Inc., Claimant, pro so.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6340
    George Herrmann and Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Safety, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24 1972.

    George Herrmann and Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6342
    W. W. Grote Company, Claimant, vs. Board of Regents of the Regency University System, Sangamon State University. Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    W. W. Grote Company, Claimant, pro se.
    Paul E. Mathias, Attorney for Board of Regents, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.


text:
    (No. 6343
    Flynn Fence and Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Edward G. Coleman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6345
    Great Lakes Insurance Corporation of Wisconsin, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Frisch, Dudek, Slattery and Denny, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

THIS COURT FINDS that this claim is filed pursuant to Ch. 37, Sec. 8(f), Para. 439.8(f), Ill. Rev. Stat., 1969, and arises by reason of claimant having overpaid advanced privilege tax payment as computed on line 24, page 4 of the 1970 Privilege Tax Statement, as per Ch. 73, Sec. 1024, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1969, and no new or novel questions of law are presented.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sum of $217.94 be awarded claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 6348
    Bongi Cartage, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Waterways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Vincent Alfieri, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6364
    The Center—Sisters of the Good Shepherd, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    The Center—Sisters of the Good Shepherd, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6365
    American Institute of Engineering and Technology, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    American Institute of Engineering and Technology, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6369
    Caw Contractors Equipment Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Caw Contractors Equipment Company, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6372
    Robert H. Scanlan, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Local Government Offices, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Robert H. Scanlan, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6387
    Vito’s Market, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Vito’s Market, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6395
    Frank Hubbard Electric Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    Frank Hubbard Electric Company, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   PERLIN, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6396
    Ashland Petroleum Company, Division of Ashland Oil, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    Ashland Petroleum Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6399
    Bunn Capitol Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    Sorling, Catron and Hardin, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6403
    Morton Salt Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    Morton Salt Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6403
    Phillips Business Systems, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Pollution Control Board, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    Phillips Business Systems, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul B. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6420
    Oms Surgical Supply, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Oms Surgical Supply, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6421
    Belmont Community Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Belmont Community Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6422
    Belmont Community Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Belmont Community Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6427
    MacNeal Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    MacNeal Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6430
    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Berz Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6447
    Victory Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1972.

    Victory Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6451
    Stanley R. Rosen, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    Dr. Stanley R. Rosen, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Rosen, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6453
    Warga's Walgreen Agency Drug Store, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    Flynn & Flynn, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6455
    Jeremy Simpson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    Jeremy Simpson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6457
    Ridgeway Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    Blowits and Pastin, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6458
    Edward A. Glenn, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    Dr. Edward A. Glenn, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6455
    George L. Hockenyos, d/b/a Sentinel Insect Control Laboratory, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.
    Opinion filed March 24, 1972.
    George L. Hockenyos, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; WIlliam E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6357
    Roy T. Christiansen—S. Tinucci, Architects, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1972.

    Roy T. Christiansen — S. Tinucci, Architects, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 5417
    Robert C. Minor, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 12, 1972.

    William E. Aulgur, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

Claimant was assaulted in his home by three convicts who had escaped from one of respondent’s penal institutions and brings this action for damages resulting from his personal injuries and property stolen by the convicts.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court to hear and determine such claims by a special statute: Ch. 23, Sec. 4041, Ill.Rev.Stat, 1971.

The facts relating to the escape of the three inmates from the Illinois State Penitentiary, Vienna Branch, on December 16, 1966, their subsequent assault on the claimant, and their theft of his personal property are not in dispute. The escape was admittedly made possible by the negligence of respondent’s employees at this minimum security prison. Among other things, one of the three convicts was permitted to possess the keys to an automobile at the prison. This car was used by the three inmates as a means of transportaion in escaping from the institution.

On the following day the three convicts arrived at the home of the claimant in a rural area of Saline County near Equality while claimant was away.

It was just getting dark when claimant came home from work. He arrived in his own automobile. As he started into the house to change clothes, he heard a noise, knew there was somebody in the house and started back to get into his car when the three convicts grabbed him. Claimant was then 62 years old. The convicts were armed with a shotgun. They threw him down, kicked him in the side, tied him up and took $40.00 out of his billfold. Then they stole his car and drove away. Claimant’s car was never recovered.

Respondent concedes liability, and the only disputed question before us is the amount of claimant’s damages.

Claimant’s only apparent physical injury consisted of a cracked rib. According to the record, he saw Dr. Denton Ferrell three or four times and treatment consisted of shots and a heat pad for 30 minutes 3 times a day for a while. His total doctor’s bill was $32.00. There was no medical testimony or sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding of any permanent disability or residual effects.

The record does establish that, for a period of just over 3 months following his injury, claimant was physically unable to perform the duties of his occupation. He was employed by Stanley Edmister in the construction business, an occupation claimant had followed for 30 years, and Ms duties were those of a concrete finisher for which he was paid wages of $28.00 per day. According to claimant’s testimony, he lost 61 days of work which would amount to a loss of wages totaling $1,708.00.

Claimant’s other known financial loss was the $40.00 which the convicts took from his billfold and Ms 1956 Buick which the convicts stole. The parties agreed that the fair market value of claimant’s car was $200.00.

The above mentioned items show that claimant’s actual financial loss as a result of the injuries he sustained was at least $1,980.00. The major item was claimant’s loss of wages amounting to $1,708.00. Respondent does not question the amount of time lost from employment, but suggests that claimant’s damages for this loss should be based on his take-home pay, instead of gross pay, since any award for damages would be tax exempt. Respondent offers no authority in support of this contention. The Illinois Supreme Court, considering this question for the first time in Hall vs. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, at page 149, quoted with approval the following rules stated in 9 A.L.R. 2d 320:

“Where the question has arisen, in reported cases, the courts generally have been of the opinion that in fixing damages for impairment of earning capacity the fact that the damage award will be exempt from income tax, whereas if the awardee had not sustained the loss of earning capacity and had gone to work and received the income forming the basis of such damage award, he would have become subject to income tax liability on such earnings, is not a matter to be taken into consideration and is no ground for diminishing the amount of damages for impairment of earning capacity.”

In addition to claimant’s actual financial loss, the Court has also carefully considered claimant’s testimony as to the pain and suffering he experienced while he was off work and his discomfort after returning to his job, when, as was generally the case, his duties required him to lift heavy objects such as concrete blocks and forms. As we stated above, the record does not support a finding of any permanent injury, but there was unquestionably some pain and suffering during the period that claimant was unable to work and for some time thereafter. There is no fixed rule of compensation for such damages, and, they are incapable of exact mathematical calculation. See I.L.P. Darneges §141, 142. But in estimating damages, consideration may be given to physical pain and suffering, Kocimski vs. Yellow Cab Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d, 288. We believe that the case before us is one that merits such consideration, and that a reasonable amount should be included in the award for claimant's pain and suffering.

The claimant, Robert C. Minor, is hereby awarded the sum of $3,480.00.


text:
    (No. 5559
    Sarah M. Crawford, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 12, 1972.
    Roberts and Kepner, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee W. Martin and William E. Webber Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant, Sarah M. Crawford, brings this action to recover for personal injuries which she suffered on February 3, 1987.

Mrs. Crawford, a widow and sixty-three years of age, lives in East Peoria, Illinois, on 1112 Meadow Street, which is also State Route 150.

There are no sidewalks in this particular area and the claimant, who worked at a Fannie Mae Candy Shop in Peoria, was in the habit of catching a bus in front of her home in the morning to go to work.

She would use her driveway to get to the roadway and then walk to the bus stop which was a short distance away.

It is her contention that the State Highway Department, in removing the snow from the highway, piled up snow on her driveway and upon which rain had later fallen causing it to become very slippery and, in attempting to walk over this ridge of snow and ice, she slipped and fell, fracturing her right ankle.

She was confined to the hospital for some period of time and was off work for several weeks.

On January 26th and January 27th approximately ten inches of snow fell and from January 27th to January 29th there were strong winds which caused the snow to drift. On February 2nd and February 3rd there was five more inches of snow with some rain.

The record discloses that the State snow plow had pushed snow onto the driveway in question as it endeavored to keep Route 150 open for the traveling public on several different occasions.

The records show that on at least three occasions, a path was cut through the snow piled on the driveway so that Mrs. Crawford could get to the road and catch her bus. On at least one of these occasions, Mrs. Crawford cleared the driveway herself, in one instance, a neighbor cleared it for her, and her grandson and a neighbor boy made a path on one other occasion.

On the morning in question, she stated that she had not cleared it because she was going to work and when she endeavored to cross the ridge of snow, which was approximately knee deep and was somewhat icy due to the rain that had fallen previously, she slipped and fell causing the damage complained of.

Claimant maintains that it was the duty of the State to keep this driveway open so that she would have a means of getting to the road and catching her bus.

It is the State’s contention that it is not the responsibility of the State to remove the snow from individuals’ driveways and the only way possible to keep the State highway open is to plow the accumulated snow on the roadway onto the shoulders; otherwise, there is no other place for the snow to be placed.

Claimant also allows that in view of the fact that some of this snow had accumulated for several days at the place where the accident took place, even though there is evidence of repeated falling of snow and some rain, it is still the duty of the State to maintain each driveway in a condition that is safe to be used by pedestrians.

There is a great deal of law in this State on the liability of the municipalities, particularly in cities and villages, when accidents of this nature take place.

One of the leading cases where the State of Illinois was involved is the case found in 23 C.C.R. on page 172. In this particular case, the claimant fell and sustained injuries while on the shoulder of State Route 40. The actual fall evidently was caused by the claimant stepping into a depression or hole which was 2*2 to 3 feet in diameter and from 2 to 2% inches deep. The question was argued in this case as to what the liability of the State is in maintaining the shoulders of the road in such condition that they are safe for pedestrians and people using the State right-of-way and it was determined that the State is not an insurer of all persons injured on its rights-of-way.

Claimant contends that it was the duty of the State to maintain the open driveway, particularly in view of the fact that this accident happened some six days after the original snowstorm and it is suggested that the State had a duty, at Intervals, to open paths or maintain breaks so that people could get to the street despite the fact that there were not any sidewalks or intersections involved in this particular accident.

Claimant takes the position that it apparently is the duty of the State, even in situations such as this where there are no sidewalks or intersections, to keep open the private driveways so the street can be reached.

To do this would place an impossible burden upon the State because the crews would be so busy opening up private driveways, they would have little or no time left for keeping the road itself open for the benefit of the traveling public.

Claimant knew the condition that existed and had cleared the area on at least three separate occasions for her own use but still failed to do so on the morning in question even though she knew she was going to take the bus and knew the condition of the driveway.

It would be difficult to find her free from contributory negligence in going in to a place that was as dangerous as she claims it was and there is nothing in the record to show why, on that morning in question, a small path could not have been cleared by her before attempting to get to the street.

We are denying this claim for the reason that to place the burden upon respondent, which claimant is now contending in this particular area, would be placing a burden upon it, which the law does not contemplate.

The burden of maintaining an "open driveway" which claimant seeks to place upon the State is not a responsibility imposed by law. We do not believe that c1aiman~ has established the proof necessary to justify recovery.

For the reasons above stated, the claim is hereby denied.