author: BLACKWELL, J.,

text:
    In re Sarver

      C.P. of York County,
    no. 62 M.A. 2003.

      John Ogden, for petitioner.

      Donald B. Hoyt, for York City Police.
    July 15, 2003
   BLACKWELL, J.,

Mr. Brian Sarver, petitioner, seeks to have expunged his mental health records surrounding events of June 29, 2000 to July 3, 2000. He also seeks an order that the York City Police Department, respondent, return his weapons that were seized on or about June 30, 2000.

Petitioner was involved in a standoff at his house with the York City Police on June 29, 2000. Apparently, petitioner’s sister called the police and stated a concern about her brother’s mental status and that he might be suicidal. The police, as noted in respondent’s exhibit 1, called petitioner numerous times until petitioner answered the telephone. The standoff itself lasted 8 to 9 hours, after which time petitioner was taken into custody and, within 45 minutes, taken to York Hospital, where he was admitted.

At some point, a search by consent form was signed by petitioner’s mother, the owner of the house at which the subject events transpired. Petitioner’s gun, rifle scope and ammunition located in the home were confiscated by the York City Police. Petitioner was never arrested or charged with any offenses as a result of the events on June 29, 2000. Moreover, there was no evidence that petitioner’s weapons were used in or in any way related to the events which occurred.

Petitioner, as his counsel indicates, was “brought to” York Hospital on a petition pursuant to 50 Pa.C.S. §7302 (section 302) of the Mental Health Procedures Act, 1976, July 9, P.L. 817, no. 143 §101 et seq. A review of the file establishes that on July 3, 2000, York Hospital applied under 50 Pa.C.S. §7303 (section 303) of the MHPA to have petitioner’s involuntary mental health treatment continue. George A. Lapes, M.D., who examined petitioner, concurred with that request. See request for certification; petitioner’s exhibits A. 10-A. 13.

On that same date, a hearing was conducted by Attorney Victor Neubaum, a hearing officer appointed by the court to conduct mental health commitment hearings. Attorney Neubaum convened the hearing pursuant to 50 Pa.C.S. §7303. Testimony was taken from three police officers involved in the incident and from Dr. Lapes.

Attorney Neubaum found that there was no direct testimony as to the nature of any suicide threat made by petitioner and that there was no testimony that the petitioner engaged in any threatening or dangerous behavior toward the police. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, Attorney Neubaum stated that he could not find that petitioner suffered from a mental illness or that he presented a clear and present danger to himself or others. Accordingly, Attorney Neubaum found that “there [was] no need for continuing involuntary care and treatment.” The section 303 petition was dismissed and petitioner was discharged.

RETURN OF PROPERTY

In his petition currently before the court, petitioner seeks the return of his Taurus PT 945 handgun, six boxes of ammunition and a rifle scope. In support of his position, petitioner cites to the standard which generally requires that in order to retain an individual’s property, the Commonwealth must prove that the seized property is contraband. We agree with petitioner that the subject property is not contraband in the sense that it was not used in criminal conduct by the petitioner and was not per se illegal at the time of the incident. However, respondent argues that, based on the events as recited above, the petitioner is prohibited from possessing a firearm under 18 Pa.C.S. §6105(c)(4). 18 Pa.C.S. §6105 states in pertinent part as follows:

“Section 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms

“(a) Offense defined.—

“(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.

“(c) Other persons. — In addition to any person who has been convicted of any offense listed under subsection (b), the following persons shall be subject to the prohibition of subsection (a):

“(4) A person who has been adjudicated as an incompetent or who has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and treatment under section 302, 303 or 304 of the provisions of the Act of July 9, 1976 (P.L. 817, no. 143), known as the Mental Health Procedures Act. This paragraph shall not apply to any proceeding under section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act unless the examining physician has issued a certification that inpatient care was necessary or that the person was committable.”

Respondent argues that a commitment under 50 P.S. §7302 (section 302) occurred in this case and that therefore petitioner would be prohibited from possessing his firearm pursuant to section 6105. We would agree with respondent that if petitioner was indeed committed under section 302 of the MHPA as required in 18 Pa.C.S. §6105, this court could not return petitioner’s firearm to him.

50 P.S. §7302 (section 302) provides as follows:

“Section 7302. Involuntary emergency examination and treatment authorized by a physician — not to exceed 120 hours

“(a) Application for examination. — Emergency examination may be undertaken at a treatment facility upon the certification of a physician stating the need for such examination; or upon a warrant issued by the county administrator authorizing such examination; or without a warrant upon application by a physician or other authorized person who has personally observed conduct showing the need for such examination.

“(1) Warrant for emergency examination. — Upon written application by a physician or other responsible party setting forth facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, the county administrator may issue a warrant requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace officer, to take such person to the facility specified in the warrant.

“(2) Emergency examination without a warrant.— Upon personal observation of the conduct of a person constituting reasonable grounds to believe that he is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, an[y] physician or peace officer, or anyone authorized by the county administrator, may take such person to an approved facility for an emergency examination. Upon arrival, he shall make a written statement setting forth the grounds for believing the person to be in need of such examination.

“(b) Examination and determination of need for emergency treatment. — A person taken to a facility shall be examined by a physician within two hours of arrival in order to determine if the person is severely mentally disabled within the meaning of section 301 and in need of immediate treatment. If it is determined that the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency treatment, treatment shall be begun immediately. If the physician does not so find, or if at any time it appears there is no longer a need for immediate treatment, the person shall be discharged and returned to such place as he may reasonably direct. The physician shall make a record of the examination and his findings. In no event shall a person be accepted for involuntary emergency treatment if a previous application was granted for such treatment and the new application is not based on behavior occurring after the earlier application.

“(c) Notification of rights at emergency examination. — Upon arrival at the facility, the person shall be informed of the reasons for emergency examination and of his right to communicate immediately with others. He shall be given reasonable use of the telephone. He shall be requested to furnish the names of parties whom he may want notified of his custody and kept informed of his status.

“The county administrator or the director of the facility shall:

“(1) give notice to such parties of the whereabouts and status of the person, how and when he may be contacted and visited, and how they may obtain information concerning him while he is in inpatient treatment; and

“(2) take reasonable steps to assure that while the person is detained, the health and safety needs of any of his dependents are met, and that his personal property and the premises he occupies are secure.

“(d) Duration of emergency examination and treatment. — A person who is in treatment pursuant to this section shall be discharged whenever it is determined that he no longer is in need of treatment and in any event within 120 hours, unless within such period:

“(1) he is admitted to voluntary treatment pursuant to section 202 of this Act; or

“(2) a certification for extended involuntary emergency treatment is filed pursuant to section 303 of this Act.”

Thus, section 7302 of the MHPA allows a person’s liberties to be restricted if that person meets the definition stated in section 7301(a) (section 301). Section 7301(a) of title 50 defines “Persons who may be subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment.”

“(a) Persons subject. — Whenever a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, he may be made subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment. A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or himself.”

Section 7302(b) requires that a person taken to a facility under the MHPA shall be examined within two hours of arrival to ascertain if the person is severally mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment. For a person to be taken into custody and taken to such a facility, there must be “reasonable grounds.” If, after the examination, the physician finds that this person meets this criteria, treatment begins immediately. If a person is immediately admitted, he or she can be held up to 120 hours. For a person to be held beyond that time frame, a physician must state in writing that the person continues to be in need of extended involuntary emergency treatment. A hearing is then held by either a judge or a mental health hearing officer appointed by the court. See 50 Pa.C.S. §7303. Only a judge or a hearing officer can certify that further treatment is needed and this certification must comply with subsection 7303(d):

“Section 7303 Extended involuntary emergency treatment certified by a judge or mental health review officer — not to exceed 20 days

“(d) Contents of certification. — A certification for extended involuntary treatment shall be made in writing upon a form adopted by the department and shall include:

“(1) findings by the judge or mental health review officer as to the reasons that extended involuntary emergency treatment is necessary;

“(2) a description of the treatment to be provided together with an explanation of the adequacy and appropriateness of such treatment, based upon the information received at the hearing;

“(3) any documents required by the provisions of section 302;

“(4) the application as filed pursuant to section 303(a);

“(5) a statement that the person is represented by counsel; and

“(6) an explanation of the effect of the certification, the person’s right to petition the court for release under subsection (g), and the continuing right to be represented by counsel.”

If a certification is issued, a person can be kept for 20 more days. See 50 P.S. §7303(f). Section 7304 and section 7305 allow a person to be involuntarily committed for up to 90 days and up to 180 days respectively. In the instant matter, there is no dispute that petitioner was discharged at the section 7303 proceeding because the hearing officer found that there was no clear and present danger as to petitioner or the public. Accordingly, no commitment for extended involuntary emergency treatment was ordered by the court.

Respondent argues that, although petitioner did not meet the criteria under section 7303 for extended involuntary emergency treatment, petitioner was “involuntarily committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and treatment under section 7302” and that therefore the prohibitions of 18 Pa.C.S. §6105 applies.

Clearly, the plain language of 18 Pa.C.S. §6105 provides that section 6105 does not apply to proceedings under section 7302 of the MHPA unless an examining physician has issued a certification that inpatient care was necessary or that the person was committable. 18 Pa.C.S. §6105. Under section 7302, a determination that inpatient care is necessary is required to be made within the first two hours of the individual’s arrival at the facility. 50 PS. §7302(b).

In its memorandum of law, the respondent asserts that “petitioner was examined under section 302 of the MHPA,” that “Dr. Lapes determined petitioner was severely mentally disabled” and that a “commitment under section 302 occurred.” Respondent’s assertions, particularly that petitioner was determined by Dr. Lapes to be severely mentally disabled, however, are not supported by the evidence presented to the court. It was never established that petitioner’s examining physician at the time of his admission “certified that inpatient care was necessary” or that “petitioner was committable” under the MHPA. Indeed, the testimony of Dr. Lapes indicates that he himself did not initially examine petitioner when he was brought to the hospital, nor that he made any 302(b) determination. Dr. Lapes merely indicates that petitioner would have been examined by an emergency room physician who would have rendered an opinion about his admission to the hospital under section 302. N.T. 04/03/03. Contrary to this testimony, we do note that attached to petitioner’s petition is a report signed by Dr. Lapes entitled “admission note” indicating the date of evaluation to be June 30, 2000. However, even if we were to determine that Dr. Lapes was the physician who examined petitioner on June 30, 2000, he offered no testimony that petitioner at the time of his admission was a clear and present danger to himself or to others. Nor does his report suggest anything to support such a finding.

Respondent’s referral to Dr. Lapes’ examination on July 3, 2000 is of really little consequence to our determination of whether the examining physician, at the time petitioner was admitted, issued the required certification that inpatient care was necessary or that the petitioner was committable. Attorney Neubaum, at the section 7303 hearing held on that same date, determined that petitioner did not suffer from a mental illness or present a clear and present danger to himself or others.

Respondent would have us infer that because petitioner was admitted to the hospital, the requirements of section 302 of the MHPA, and therefore those of section 6105 of title 18, were met. Needless to say, we do not wish to infer facts not supported by the record.

As we have no evidence before us that clearly demonstrates that a certification was issued by a physician stating that inpatient care was necessary or that petitioner was committable under the MHPA, the court will at this point grant petitioner’s petition for return of his firearm, as well as his ammunition and riñe scope.

REQUEST TO EXPUNGE MENTAL HEALTH RECORD

Petitioner also requests that the court expunge his mental health records in possession of the Pennsylvania State Police. The statutory provisions relating to petitioner’s request can be found at 18 Pa.C.S. §6111.1 which provides in pertinent part the following:

“(f) Notification of mental health commitment. — Notwithstanding any statute to the contrary, judges of the courts of common pleas shall notify the Pennsylvania State Police on a form developed by the Pennsylvania State Police of the identity of any individual who has been adjudicated incompetent or who has been involuntarily committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and treatment under the Act of July 9, 1976 (P.L. 817, no. 143), known as the Mental Health Procedures Act, or who has been involuntarily treated as described in section 6105(c)(4) (relating to persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms). The notification shall be transmitted by the judge to the Pennsylvania State Police within seven days of the adjudication, commitment or treatment.

“(g) Review by court.—

“(1) Upon receipt of a copy of the order of a court of competent jurisdiction which vacates a final order or an involuntary certification issued by a mental health review officer, the Pennsylvania State Police shall expunge all records of the involuntary treatment received under subsection (f).

“(2) A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant to section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act may petition the court to review the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the commitment was based. If the court determines that the evidence upon which the involuntary commitment was based was insufficient, the court shall order that the record of the commitment submitted to the Pennsylvania State Police be expunged. A petition filed under this subsection shall toll the 60-day period set forth under section 6105(a)(2).

“(3) The Pennsylvania State Police shall expunge all records of an involuntary commitment of an individual who is discharged from a mental health facility based upon the initial review by the physician occurring within two hours of arrival under section 302(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act and the physician’s determination that no severe mental disability existed pursuant to section 302(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act. The physician shall provide signed confirmation of the determination of the lack of severe mental disability following the initial examination under section 302(b) of the Mental Health Procedures Act to the Pennsylvania State Police.”

Because we have found that the record is without evidence to establish that the required certification was issued under section 7302(b) or that petitioner was com-mittable, we will order that petitioner’s record of commitment on June 30, 2000 be expunged. Lastly we note that although petitioner had requested of the court to order that he receive a gun permit, petitioner withdrew this request as the issue had been resolved.

The following order shall issue.

ORDER

And now, to wit, July 15, 2003, it is hereby ordered and directed that the petition for return of seized property filed by petitioner, Brian Lloyd Sarver, is granted as follows:

(1) If there is no appeal taken by any party within 30 days of the entry of this order, the York City Police Department shall return the petitioner’s Taurus PT 945 handgun, six boxes of ammunition and rifle scope to petitioner, Brian Lloyd Sarver, at his request; and

(2) If there is no appeal taken by any party within 30 days of the entry of this order, the Pennsylvania State Police shall expunge any record of commitment concerning petitioner with regard to the events of June 29, 2000 through July 3, 2000.

(3) If an appeal is taken concerning this order, the parties shall supply notice of such appeal to the Pennsylvania State Police.

(4) Petitioner’s name is Brian Lloyd Sarver. Petitioner’s date of birth is February 12, 1969, and petitioner’s Social Security Number is [ ].

The clerk of courts shall provide a copy of this order and the foregoing opinion to counsel of record and to the Pennsylvania State Police within ten days of the entry of this order. A courtesy copy of this order and opinion shall also be provided to Attorney Peter J. Mangan.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: NEALON, J.,

license: Public Domain

text:
    Osborne v. Neville

      C.P. of Lackawanna County,
    no. 92 CV 3102.

      James F. Mundy and Roger Mattes Jr., for plaintiff.

      John J. Aponick Jr. and Carl Greco, for defendant Neville.

      John J. Aponick Jr., for defendant Surgical Group Inc.

      Lise Luborsky, for PPCIGA.

      Zella Smith Anderson, for the MCARE Fund, successor to the CAT Fund.
    February 27, 2004
   NEALON, J.,

Defendants’ petitions to stay or set aside the plaintiff’s execution proceeding raise a troubling issue in malpractice litigation involving an insolvent insurer: Whether a health care provider may be personally liable for the amount of a malpractice judgment which is not paid by the Insurance Guaranty Association, the statutory excess coverage fund or an insurer or other collateral source? Pennsylvania common law has long held that a tort-feasor is personally liable for any judgment that is not paid by the applicable insurance. No provision in the statutes governing the Guaranty Association and the former Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund immunizes a health care provider from personal liability for any malpractice judgment that is not paid by those funds or some other collateral source, nor does either statute abrogate the existing common law recognizing such personal liability. Consequently, for the reasons set forth below, the defendants remain personally liable for the unfunded portion of the plaintiff’s malpractice judgment and the defense petitions to stay or set aside the plaintiff’s execution proceedings will be denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 30, 1990, defendant Edwin C. Neville performed a saphenous vein stripping procedure on plaintiff James J. Osborne, for treatment of varicose veins in his left leg. During this surgery, Dr. Neville negligently severed and occluded the common femoral vein, rather than the saphenous vein, which caused his 26-year-old patient to sustain irreparable circulation damage to his leg and suffer permanent pain and disability. On May 29,1992, Osborne’s original counsel filed a malpractice action against Dr. Neville and his professional corporation, the Surgical Group Inc. See Osborne v. Neville, 102 Lacka. Jur. 132, 134-35 (2000).

At the time of Osborne’s surgery, Dr. Neville maintained $200,000 in primary insurance coverage through Physicians Insurance Co. (PIC) as per section 701(a) of the Health Care Services Malpractice Act (HCSMA), Act of October 15, 1975, PL. 390, no. 111, as amended, 40 PS. §1301.701(a) (repealed by Act of March 20, 2002, PL. 154, no. 13, §5104(a)). PIC provided separate “corporate coverage” to the Surgical Group with primary liability limits of $200,000. (See dkt. entry no. 145, exhibit A, p. 2.) Dr. Neville also maintained an additional $1,000,000 in excess coverage through the Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss (CAT) fund in accordance with section 701 of the former HCSMA. Regrettably, PIC became insolvent on January 21, 1998, such that the Pennsylvania Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (PPCIGA) assumed coverage for Osborne’s malpractice claim to the extent that it was covered by the PIC policies. See Strickler v. Desai, 571 Pa. 621, 625-26, 813 A.2d 650, 652-53 (2002).

Prior to trial, Osborne and his trial counsel offered to settle this malpractice action for the sum of $100,000 and Dr. Neville provided his consent to PPCIGA to settle this case for that amount. Despite the recommendation by Dr. Neville’s counsel that PPCIGA tender $100,000 in settlement, the maximum offer made by PPCIGA was $75,000, and as a consequence, this matter proceeded to trial. Because of the clear negligence on his part, Dr. Neville was unable to secure the services of an expert witness in his defense and did not offer any expert testimony at trial. In response to special interrogatories, Dr. Neville and the Surgical Group were both found liable and the jury awarded Osborne $730,500 in damages. See Osborne, 102 Lacka. Jur. at 138-39.

Dr. Neville and the Surgical Group filed a joint motion for post-trial relief whereas Osborne presented a motion for delay damages under Pa.R.C.P. 238. By memorandum and order dated September 26, 2000, the jury verdict was remitted to $728,000 to reflect a reduction in the award for past loss of income, but in all other respects, the defense post-trial motion was denied. Delay damages were awarded to Osborne in the amount of $382,211.42, and a molded judgment of $1,110,211.42 was entered in his favor. Id. at 166-67. The judgment was later affirmed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on January 18,2002, see Osborne v. Neville, 797 A.2d 381 (Pa. Super. 2002), and the defense petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on July 9, 2002. See Osborne v. Neville, 569 Pa. 694, 803 A.2d 735 (2002).

From the date of the entry of judgment on September 26, 2000, until the time of the Supreme Court order of July 9, 2002, post-judgment interest of $116,572.19 accrued on the original judgment of $1,110,211.42, thereby resulting in an aggregate verdict of $ 1,226,783.61. By letter dated July 18, 2002, PPCIGA forwarded checks to Osborne’s counsel in the amount of $200,000 and $26,783.61 ostensibly representing its payment under the dual coverages afforded to Dr. Neville and the Surgical Group. On August 23, 2002, the CAT fund advised Osborne’s counsel that it would contribute $944,052 toward payment of the total judgment on December 31, 2002. Hence, the combined payments by PPCIGA and the CAT fund totaling $1,170,835.61 resulted in $55,948 of the judgment being unfunded. (Dkt. entry no. 143, pp. 2-3.)

The unpaid judgment continued to accrue six percent post-judgment interest pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §8101 and on May 16, 2003, Osborne’s collection counsel filed a praecipe for writ of execution against Dr. Neville and the Surgical Group in the amount of $84,718.56. Dr. Neville and the Surgical Group have filed a motion to set aside the execution, or in the alternative, to stay the execution proceeding. (Id., nos. 134-142.) On December 16, 2003, PPCIGA and the CAT fund were directed to file amicus curiae briefs addressing their failure to pay the entire judgment entered against Dr. Neville and the Surgical Group. On January 7, 2004, PPCIGA and the CAT fund submitted their legal memoranda and following the completion of oral argument, this matter became ripe for disposition. (Id., nos. 145-146.)

PPCIGA argues that it “paid the $200,000 policy limit of Dr. Neville’s policy issued by the insolvent insurer PIC” and “also paid $26,783.61 under the corporate coverage ... for the corporation, Surgical Group Inc.” (Dkt. entry no. 145, p. 1.) PPCIGA’s exhibits reflect that the Surgical Group’s policy with PIC contained an “other insurance” clause which made the corporate coverage excess to Dr. Neville’s individual liability insurance and his CAT fund coverage. (Id., pp. 10-11, exhibit A, p. 5.) Thus, PPCIGA asserts that it “paid $26,783.61 under the corporate coverage” because it had “mistakenly assumed” that the “CAT fund would pay $1 million” to satisfy the total judgment of $1,226,783.61. (Id., p. 1.) Although PPCIGA now avers that it “should have paid only $200,000” since the CAT fund never exhausted its $ 1,000,000 in coverage for Dr. Neville, it “is not requesting a refund” based upon PIC’s “other insurance” provision. (Id., p. 2.)

The CAT fund submits that its payment of $944,052 represents its indemnity portion ($528,000) of the $728,000 verdict ($728,000 - $200,000 PPCIGA payment = $528,000) and its proportionate share of delay damages ($279,014) and post-judgment interest ($137,038) on that indemnity amount. According to the CAT fund, the unpaid shortfall of $84,718.56 is attributable to delay damages and post judgment interest which have not been paid by PPCIGA under the basic insurance coverage. The CAT fund argues that it has fully satisfied its statutory obligation and “is not required to pay Osborne the delay damages and post-judgment interest attributable solely to PIC’s, now the Guaranty Association’s, liability.” (Id., no. 147, p. 4.)

Dr. Neville contends that the writ of execution should be set aside since he secured the requisite primary insurance and CAT fund coverage for Osborne’s claim and the unfunded judgment of $84,718.56 “would have been paid on his behalf if his insurance carrier remained solvent.” (Id., no. 136, p. 5.) Dr. Neville asserts that it is improper “to allow execution on his assets where he had a viable, legal policy of insurance at the time of Mr. Osborne’s surgery and where PIGA or the MCARE fund may be responsible for payment of the judgment.” (Id., p. 7.) Osborne counters that no provision in the PPCIGA statute or the HCSMA insulates a tort-feasor from personal liability for any excess judgment which is not paid by PPCIGA, the CAT fund or an insurer. Osborne maintains that only the legislature may create such an exemption from execution and that in the interim, the court should interpret the applicable statutes as written and allow him to proceed forward with his execution efforts. (Id., no. 144, pp. 2-3.)

II. DISCUSSION

(A) Relief From Execution

Dr. Neville seeks to stay the execution pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 3121(b)(2) which provides that an “[ejxecution may be stayed by the court as to all or any part of the property of the defendant upon its motion . . . showing ... any other legal or equitable ground therefore.” The grant or denial of a stay of execution is within the sound discretion of the trial court whose decision will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Keller v. Re/Max Centre Realty, 719 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. Super. 1998). As a general rule, a court “will not disrupt the rights of creditors to collect judgments.” Commonwealth Bank, A Division of Meridian Bank v. Iorio, 451 Pa. Super. 330, 349, 679 A.2d 820, 830 (1996). Rather, the court “should not stay an execution unless the facts warrant an exercise of judicial discretion.” Keller, supra; Kronz v. Kronz, 393 Pa. Super. 227, 233, 574 A.2d 91, 94 (1990). A proper exercise of this discretionary authority “entails a balancing of the rights of the debtor and creditor.” Kronz, supra. However, “[wjhilst the power to stay execution of a judgment is necessary to prevent injustice, it should never be exercised unless the case is plain, and the equity of the party asking the interposition of the court is free from doubt or difficulty.” Chestnut v. Pediatric Homecare of America Inc., 420 Pa. Super. 598, 601, 617 A.2d 347, 349 (1992) (quoting Pennsylvania Company for Insurances v. Scott, 329 Pa. 534, 549, 198 A. 115, 122 (1938)).

Dr. Neville alternatively seeks to set aside the writ of execution under Pa.R.C.P. 3121(d)(3) which empowers a court to take such action “upon any other legal or equitable grounds therefor.” Once again, it is incumbent upon the debtor to provide a cognizable legal or equitable basis for setting aside the writ of execution. Compare Unity Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. DiDomenico, 274 Pa. Super. 263, 265, 418 A.2d 397, 398-99 (1980) (averment that insurance proceeds were not subject to attachment because they were entireties property of insured and his wife was insufficient to support setting aside a writ of execution); Fleming v. Quaid, 204 Pa. Super. 19, 22, 201 A.2d 252, 255 (1964) (mere allegation that the property attached does not belong to the judgment debtor furnishes no legal or equitable ground for setting aside a writ of attachment) and Gulf Mortgage and Realty Investments v. Alten, 286 Pa. Super. 253, 259, 428 A.2d 978, 981 (1981) (seizure of bank accounts without prior notice or hearing violated depositor’s constitutionally protected right of procedural due process and provided basis for setting aside the writunder Rule 3121(d)(3)). When considering a petition to set aside an execution, the court should be mindful that “[i]n a system centered around the judicial resolution of disputes, the right to execution must occupy a cherished position.” Patterson v. Hopkins, 247 Pa. Super. 163, 170, 371 A.2d 1378, 1381 (1977) (cautioning that the court “must be careful to prevent overly technical interferences with the execution process and a resultant elevation of form over substance.”)- See also, 8 Goodrich-Amram 2d §3121(d):5.

(B) Tort-feasor Liability for Uninsured Judgment

Since the disposition of Dr. Neville’s petition to set aside or stay the execution is dependent upon the interpretation of the Insurance Guaranty Association (IGA) Act and the HCSMA, a brief analysis of those two statutes is necessary. PIGA was created by the Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association Act, Act of November 25, 1970, P.L. 716, no. 232, as amended, 40 P.S. §§1701.101-1701.605 (superseded), which was later repealed and replaced by the Act of December 12, 1994, P.L. 1005, no. 137 §1, as amended, 40 P.S. §§991.1801-991.1820, that created its successor, the PPCIGA. See Bell v. Slezak, 571 Pa. 333, 336 n.2, 812 A.2d 566, 567 n.2 (2002). The IGA Act established the Guaranty Association to provide “a safety-net for insurance claims when the insurance carrier becomes insolvent” by stepping “into the shoes of the insolvent carrier” and acting as “a ‘lastresort’ remedy for ‘covered claims.’ ” Sotack v. Pennsylvania Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, 104 F. Supp.2d 471, 474 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The express purpose of the Act is “[t]o provide a means for the payment of covered claims under certain property and casualty insurance policies, to avoid excessive delay in the payment of such claims and to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders as a result of the insolvency of an insurer.” 40 P.S. §991.1801(1). PPCIGA “is funded by assessing a fee against all member insurers, and every insurer is required to be a member as a condition of its authority to write property and casualty policies” in Pennsylvania. Bell, 571 Pa. at 347, 812 A.2d at 574 (citing 40 P.S. §§991.1803(a), (b)(3), and 991.1808).

Once an insurer becomes insolvent, PPCIGA is “deemed the insurer to the extent of its obligations on the covered claims and, to such extent, shall have all rights, duties and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if that insurer had not become insolvent.” 40 P.S. §991.1803(b)(2). The only exceptions to PPCIGA’s assumption of the insolvent insurer’s duties are: (1) PPCIGA’s maximum statutory obligation is $300,000 per payment, regardless of the amount of the insolvent insurer’s coverage limits in its policy (40 P.S. §991.1803(b)(1)(B)); and (2) any amount payable by PPCIGA on a covered claim is reduced or offset by any payments that the plaintiff has received from other insurance (40 P.S. §991.1817(a)). In all other respects, PPCIGA “is placed in the stead of the insolvent insurer, with all of that insurer’s rights and duties and obligations,” Donegal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Long, 528 Pa. 295, 300-301, 597 A.2d 1124, 1127 (1991), including the duty under 40 P.S. §991.1803(b)(4) to investigate, compromise, settle and pay covered claims. See Hall v. MPH Transportation Inc., 58 D.&C.4th 482, 495 (Lacka. Cty. 2002).

The CAT fund was established by the HCSMA as a statutory excess insurer for a health care provider’s liability which exceeds its primary insurance coverage in effect at the time of an occurrence. See Pennsylvania Medical Society Liability Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, 842 A.2d 379, 380 (Pa. 2004); Elliott-Reese v. Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, 805 A.2d 1253, 1254 n.1 (Pa. Commw. 2002), aff’d per curiam, 574 Pa. 705, 833 A.2d 138 (2003). The CAT fund “serve[d] the dual governmental function of providing reasonably priced professional malpractice insurance to Commonwealth health care providers and insuring that injured persons will obtain prompt and fair compensation for their claims.” DeVeaux v. Palmer, 125 Pa. Commw. 631, 636, 558 A.2d 166, 168 (1989). To finance the fund, all health care providers were assessed an annual surcharge based upon their primary insurance premium. Milton S. Hershey Medical Center v. Commonwealth Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, 573 Pa. 74, 79, 821 A.2d 1205, 1208 (2003). At the time of Osborne’s surgery, the CAT fund provided an additional $1,000,000 in coverage above Dr. Neville’s basic coverage of $200,000. See 40 P.S. §1301.701(d) (repealed). With respect to the fund’s responsibility for interest on awards, section 102(f) of the HCSMA was amended in 1996 to state that “[djelay damages and post-judgment interest applicable to the [CATfund’s] liability in a case shall be paid by the fund and shall not be charged against the insured annual aggregate limits.” Walsh v. Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, 838 A.2d 692, 695 n.8 (Pa. 2003). (emphasis in original)

Because of the foregoing statutory framework relating to the payment of pre- and post-judgment interest, and PPCIGA’s interpretation of the “other insurance” provision in the Surgical Group’s corporate coverage policy, there is an accruing shortfall in the funding of Osborne’s judgment by PPCIGA and the CAT fund. Relying upon the above-quoted language of 40 P.S. §1301.702(j) (repealed) which was in effect at the time of Osborne’s verdict, the CAT fund contends that it is liable for payment of delay damages and post-judgment based solely upon its proportionate share of the verdict. See Walsh, 838 A.2d at 699-700 (CAT fund was not liable for post-judgment interest on entire judgment, but rather was responsible only for interest on its pro rata share of the verdict); Elliott-Reese, 805 A.2d at 1258 (CAT fund responsible only for its proportionate share of delay damages and post-judgment interest as they relate to its excess coverage). Conversely, PPCIGA posits that once it paid PIC’s $200,000 limit applicable to Dr. Neville, it was not required to make any additional payments under the Surgical Group’s corporate coverage until the CAT fund had exhausted its entire $1,000,000 in coverage for Dr. Neville. Cf. Milton S. Hershey Medical Center, 573 Pa. at 86, 821 A.2d at 1213 (“Where, as here, the insurance coverage for the physicians was sufficient to satisfy the claims, their coverage should finance the settlement; there is no reason to utilize the insurance coverage of the vicariously liable hospital.”). Since neither PPCIGA nor the CAT fund has intervened as a party in this action, we do not have the authority to decide whether PPCIGA or the CAT fund is responsible for the payment of Osborne’s unpaid judgment. See Shay v. Flight C Helicopter Services Inc., 822 A.2d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2003) (vacating trial court order directing PPCIGA to pay judgment, including delay damages, “because PPCIGA is not a party in this case, nor did any party in the underlying action file a declaratory judgment action against PPCIGA or otherwise seek to assert rights against PPCIGA.”). Nevertheless, the question remains whether a malpractice victim may seek to recover directly from the tort-feasor for a judgment which has not been paid by PPCIGA, the CAT fund or any other insurance or collateral source.

Pennsylvania tort law has long recognized that “the tort-feasor is liable for all injury caused by his negligence” and that “[i]t is also a fundamental, general principle that a plaintiff in such an action is entitled to compensation from the tort-feasor to the full extent of the injury sustained.” Bethea v. Forbes, 519 Pa. 422, 426, 548 A.2d 1215, 1217 (1988) (citing Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 299, 307, 282 A.2d 206, 228 (1971)). It is equally well established under our common law that the tort-feasor is personally liable for any judgment in excess of the applicable insurance policy limits, Cowden v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 389 Pa. 459, 476, 134 A.2d 223, 227 (1957), or the maximum CAT fund coverage. Finkbiner v. Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, 119 Pa. Commw. 243, 246, 546 A.2d 1327, 1328 (1988), aff’d, 523 Pa. 101, 565 A.2d 157 (1989) (noting that since the total judgment exceeded the CAT fund coverage, “Dr. Mauriello remains liable to the Finkbiners for approximately $950,000 for the jury verdict and another $600,000 in delay damages imposed by the judge.”). No provision in the IGA Act or HCSMA states or infers that an insured is immune from personal liability for any unfunded judgment, nor does either statute expressly abrogate the existing common law recognizing such personal liability on the part of a tort-feasor. See Birth Center v. St. Paul Companies Inc., 567 Pa. 386, 402-403, 787 A.2d 376, 386-87 (2001) (holding that since the bad faith statute does not reference the common law or explicitly reject it, “the common law remedy survives.”); Metropolitan Property & Liability Insurance Co. v. Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania, 525 Pa. 306, 310, 580 A.2d 300, 302 (1990) (statute cannot be interpreted as abrogating common law by implication and instead “[t]he legislature must affirmatively repeal existing law or specifically preempt accepted common law for prior law to be disregarded.”).

Dr. Neville cites Panea v. Isdaner, 773 A.2d 782 (Pa. Super. 2001), aff’d sub nom., Bell v. Slezak, 571 Pa. 333, 812 A.2d 566 (2002) for the proposition that he is protected from personal liability for Osborne’s uninsured judgment, but a closer reading of that decision reveals that it is inapplicable to the issue at hand. In Panea, the plaintiffs sought to recover from the insured of an insolvent insurer for medical expenses which had been paid by the plaintiffs’ health insurance carrier and later deducted from the plaintiffs’ settlement payment pursuant to the non-duplication of recovery provision in 40 P.S. §991.1817. Since the plaintiffs had already received those proceeds from a collateral source and the health insurance carrier could not assert a subrogation claim against the plaintiffs or PPCIGA, the Panea court reasoned that the tort victims were “in the same position they would have been in had there been no insolvency.” Panea, 773 A.2d at 792. Therefore, inasmuch as the plaintiffs had already been made whole for their losses by virtue of the payments made by PPCIGA and the plaintiffs’ own health insurer, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could not recover those unsubrogated payments directly from the insured as well. Id. at 791 (“In each of the three cases under consideration the plaintiffs will receive the full amount of either their settlements or jury verdict, it just will not necessarily come from PPCIGA or the doctors.”). Compare Fetters v. Pennsylvania Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, 804 A.2d 126, 130 n. 12 (Pa. Commw. 2002) (observing that although the Panea court precluded “a claimant from seeking to collect the amount of any offset from the tort-feasor personally,” “[t]his court has not addressed the issue, and we need not decide it here.”).

However, the Panea court did not address the issue of whether an insured of an insolvent insurer may be held personally responsible for the amount of a verdict which is not paid by PPCIGA, the CAT fund or some collateral source. Indeed, the Panea court expressly stated:

“We are not here presented with a situation where the settlement or jury damage award exceeds the insolvent insurer’s policy limits or PPCIGA’s liability cap. Thus, we will not address the question of whether a defendant can be held personally liable for the amount exceeding the policy limits or statutory cap.” Id. at 792-93. (footnotes omitted)

At least one appellate court has indicated in obiter dictum that the plaintiff may recover any unfunded amount directly from the defendant, and has remarked:

“Although instantly, [plaintiff’s] damages were less than PIGA’s statutory limit of liability, we note that if his damage award had been in excess of the $300,000 cap, then he could have collected directly from [the tort-feasors] the amount which exceeded the statutory cap. Such a ruling would promote the common-law rule that the tort-feasor is liable for the full extent of damage caused by his negligence, while at the same time insuring that the public policy underlying PIGA is enforced.” Burke v. Valley Lines Inc., 421 Pa. Super. 362, 370 n.5, 617 A.2d 1335, 1339 n.5 (1992).

The double recovery concerns which served as the basis for the Panea ruling simply are not present in the case sub judice. Unlike the plaintiffs in Panea, Osborne is not attempting to recover from the tort-feasor for damages which were previously paid by a collateral source and subsequently deducted from the malpractice verdict pursuant to 40 P.S. §991.1817. Rather, he is seeking to be made whole for his loss by recovering that amount of his malpractice judgment which has not been paid by PPCIGA, the CAT fund or any other insurer or person. To date, no insurer, statutory fund or other collateral source has paid the $84,718.56 shortfall in Osborne’s malpractice judgment, and for that reason, Panea is clearly distinguishable.

Resolution of the parties’ dispute in this case must begin and end with the plain language of the IGA Act and HCSMA. See Price v. Pennsylvania Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, 795 A.2d 407, 412 (Pa. Super. 2002) (when interpreting the IGA Act, “the court must begin with the plain meaning of the language used in the statute.”), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 698, 825 A.2d 1262 (2003). Nothing contained in the IGA Act or HCSMA bestows immunity upon a health care provider for any portion of a malpractice judgment that is not paid by PPCIGA, the CAT fund or some other collateral source. Nor does any provision in either statute reflect a clear intent to abrogate the long established common-law principle that a tort-feasor is personally liable for any excess judgment that is not paid by an insurer or statutory fund. Cf. T.B. v. L.R. M., 567 Pa. 222, 231, 786 A.2d 913, 918 (2001) (“The mere fact that the statute does not reference the [common-law] doctrine cannot act to repeal by implication what has been entrenched in our common law.”). One of the stated purposes of the IGA statute is “to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders as a result of the insolvency of an insurer,” 40 PS. §991.1801(1), and the denial of Dr. Neville’s petitions to stay or set aside execution will avoid financial loss to Osborne but not to Dr. Neville. Nevertheless, the primary goal of that statute is to place the claimant and insured in the same position that they would have enjoyed in the absence of insolvency, Panea, 773 A.2d at 791, and it is clear under our common law that if PIC had not become insolvent, Dr. Neville would have remained personally liable for any portion of Osborne’s malpractice award which was not paid by PIC and the CAT fund. See Finkbiner, supra. In light of the clear and unambiguous language employed in the relevant statutes, see 1 Pa.C.S. §1921(b), the IGAAct and HCSMA cannot be construed as granting a health care provider immunity from personal liability for that amount of a malpractice judgment which is not paid by PPCIGA, the CAT fund or another insurer. See In re Rodriguez, 2003 WL 22208117, *3 (Pa. 2003) (since statute expressed no clear intent to repeal or preempt the common law, it would be interpreted as having retained the common-law principle).

If insureds of insolvent malpractice insurers are to be afforded immunity from personal liability for unfunded judgments, only the legislature can grant that immunity by amending the IGAAct or HCSMA to alter the existing common law. See King, 537 Pa. at 580, 645 A.2d at 222 (“It is possible that the legislature did not intend the CAT fund to pay post-judgment interest, and if that is the case, the legislature has the power expressly to exempt the fund from the payment of post-judgment interest as it sees fit.”). To some extent, Dr. Neville has been a victim of PIC’s insolvency and PPCIGA’s inexplicable failure to settle this clear liability malpractice claim for $100,000 in accordance with Dr. Neville’s wishes and his trial counsel’s recommendation. If a private insurer had handled this malpractice claim in the manner that PPCIGA did, that insurer arguably would be liable to Dr. Neville for payment of the excess verdict, see Cowden, supra, as well as foreseeable compensatory damages, see Birth Center, 567 Pa. at 401-403, 787 A.2d at 385-86, and punitive damages. See 42 Pa.C.S. §8371. However, because PPCIGA is not regarded as an “insurer” for purposes of bad faith liability, it does not possess the same duties and obligations as the insolvent insurer in that regard and cannot be held liable for its bad faith conduct. See T & N PLC v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association, 800 F. Supp. 1259, 1264-65 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (PIGA not liable for bad faith damages under 42 Pa.C.S. §8371); Schreffler v. Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association, 402 Pa. Super. 309, 313, 586 A.2d 983, 985 (1991), appeal denied, 528 Pa. 644, 600 A.2d 196 (1991) (finding that there is no cause of action against PPCIGA “for bad faith failure to settle since settlement is a power conferred upon PIGA under the terms of the [IGA] Act.”). Accord Pennsylvania Medical Society Liability Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, Medical Professional Liability Catastrophe Loss Fund, 804 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. Commw. 2002), rev’don other grounds, 842 A.2d 379 (Pa. 2004) (holding that CAT fund cannot be liable for bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S. §8371 “because the statute requires that an action be brought under an insurance policy, and the CAT fund is not an insurer but a statutorily-created executive agency designed only to provide the coverage enumerated in the Act.”); Finkbiner, 119 Pa. Commw. at 246-47, 546 A.2d at 1328-29 (physician could not assert common-law bad faith claim against the CAT fund since no contractual or fiduciary relationship existed between the insured physician and the CAT fund). Once again, only the legislature may rectify that dilemma for health care providers by amending the IGA Act or 42 Pa.C.S. §8371 to create a bad faith remedy for insureds of insolvent insurers who are victimized by PPCIGA’s egregious failure to act in good faith in investigating, settling and paying covered claims under 40 PS. §991.1803(b)(4).

Based upon the language of the IGA Act and HCSMA and the current state of the common law, Osborne may seek to recover directly from Dr. Neville and the Surgical Group for that portion of his malpractice judgment which has not been paid by PPCIGA, the CAT fund or any other insurer. Thus, Dr. Neville has not articulated a legal or equitable basis for staying or setting aside Osborne’s execution efforts under Pa.R.C.P. 3121(b)(2) or (d)(3). Accordingly, an order will be entered denying the petitions of Dr. Neville and the Surgical Group to stay or set aside the execution proceedings.

ORDER

And now, February 27, 2004, upon consideration of the petitions of Dr. Edwin C. Neville and the Surgical Group Inc. to stay the execution proceedings by plaintiff James J. Osborne pursuant to Pa.R.C.R 3121(b)(2), or in the alternative, to set aside the writ of execution under Pa.R.C.R 3121(d)(3), and based upon the reasoning set forth in the foregoing memorandum, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the defendants’ petitions to stay or set aside the execution proceedings initiated by the plaintiff are denied.

      . The HCSMA was amended by the Act of November 26, 1996, P.L. 776, no. 135 (Act 135), to increase the required policy limits for primary insurance coverage and to change the procedures and coverage limits for the CAT fund. Act 135 was subsequently amended by the Act of March 20, 2002, P.L. 154, no. 13, which repealed the HCSMA and supplanted it with the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, 40 P.S. §1303.101 et seq. The MCARE Act established the Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) fund to replace the CAT fund. See 40 P.S. §1303.712.

      . Section 701(e)(8) of the HCSMA governed payment of claims by the fund and stated that “[a]ll such claims shall be paid on or before December 31 following the August 31 by which they became final, as provided above.” 40 P.S. §1301.701(e)(8) (repealed). An identical provision was contained in an earlier version of the HCSMA, see 40 P.S. §1301.701(e)(2) (repealed), which the Supreme Court interpreted as not requiring the fund to wait until December 31 to pay malpractice judgments. See King v. Boettcher, 537 Pa. 574, 578-79 n.3, 645 A.2d 219, 221 n.3 (1994) (“It is entirely possible, pursuant to this language, that the fund could pay its liabilities before December 31 of each year, thereby avoiding post-judgment interest.”).

      . Dr. Neville’s reliance upon Tominello v. Janeway, 392 Pa. Super. 404, 573 A.2d 218 (1990) is likewise misplaced. In Tominello, a plaintiff sought to execute on the personal assets of an insured physician in order to collect immediately on a malpractice judgment that the CAT fund did not intend to pay until December 31. (See n.2, supra.) The Superior Court concluded that since the plaintiffs’ judgment would eventually be paid in full by the CAT fund, the plaintiffs could not execute on the assets of the physician, but could instead institute a garnishment proceeding against the CAT fund until it paid the judgment. Tominello, 392 Pa. Super. at 409, 573 A.2d at 220-21 (“An individual doctor’s expectation that personal assets are secure in return for paying the premiums required, (provided that liability falls within the statutory limits set by the Act), would be unfairly undermined if, because of a necessary administrative procedure, successful plaintiffs could execute on the assets of a health care provider, when plaintiffs failed to receive immediate payment of the judgment owed by the CAT fund.”), (emphasis added) Instantly, Osborne’s full judgment has not, and will not, be paid by the CAT fund, PPCIGA or any other insurer. In light of the Tominello court’s parenthetical proviso that the doctor’s expectation of protection from execution is applicable “provided that liability falls within the statutory limits set by the Act,” Tominello does not govern the case at bar where Dr. Neville’s liability purportedly exceeds the statutory limits of the HCSMA and IGA Act.

      . Funding shortfalls of malpractice judgments involving insureds of insolvent insurers are likely to increase following the 1996 amendments to section 701(a) and (d) of the HCSMA, 40 P.S. §1401.701(a)(l) and (d) (repealed), and the 2002 adoption of section 711(d) of the MCARE Act, 40 P.S. §1303.711(d), increasing the basic or primary insurance coverage limits for health care providers. Under the HCSMA, the basic coverage limits were increased to $400,000 in 1999 and $500,000 in 2001 with the CAT fund’s excess coverage being reduced to $800,000 in 1999 and $700,000 in 2001. See 40 P.S. §§ 1301.701(a)(l)(ii)-(iii) and (d)(2)-(3) (repealed). The MCARE Act maintains the basic or primary coverage limits at $500,000 from 2002 to 2006 at which time those limits will increase to $750,000. See 40 P.S. §1303.711(d). The MCARE fund’s excess liability limit, is reduced to $500,000 for calendar year 2003, and once the basic coverage limits have been increased to $750,000 in 2006, the MCARE fund limits are reduced further to $250,000. See 40 P.S. §1303.712(c)(2). However, although the HCSMA and MCARE Act have increased the basic coverage limits for primary malpractice insurers, the IGA Act has not implemented a corresponding increase in PPCIGA’s maximum coverage of $300,000 under 40 P.S. §991.1803(b)(1)(B). As a result, if a $1,000,000 malpractice judgment is entered against a health care provider under an insolvent insurer’s policy for 2003 or 2004, PPCIGA will pay $300,000 and the MCARE fund will tender $500,000 in fulfillment of their maximum statutory obligations, thereby resulting in an unfunded or unpaid judgment in the amount of $200,000. Unless the IGA Act is amended to increase PPCIGA’s maximum obligation in malpractice cases or the MCARE Act is revised to lower the MCARE fund’s monetary level of participation in actions involving an insolvent insurer, malpractice claimants will be deprived of full compensation for their injuries in contravention of those statutes’ goals of avoiding financial loss to claimants and ensuring prompt and fair compensation for injured persons.