text:
    (No. 75-CC-396
    Kenneth E. Laird, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Kenneth E. Laird, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This case arises as a result of an hourly increase for day labor, extra help employed by the Department of Transportation. The increase in hourly pay scale was approved by the Department of Labor but not reported to the Department of Transportation in time for the changes to be made in the payroll effective period. The period for which back salary is sought is from May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974, and according to the Departmental Report, the amount due Mr. Laird is $134.40.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $134.40, plus employer contributions of $15.93, for a total employee benefit of $150.33 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 5.38 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 7.87 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 8.06 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 7.87 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 0 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$121.15 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $150.33, (One Hundred Fifty Dollars And Thirty-Three Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 75-CC-435
    Cannonball, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Cannonball, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-439
    Claude Lynn Walker, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Claude Walker, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for extra day labor help of $1. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation in September, 1974, allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Walker is due $129.60.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $129.60, plus employer contributions of $15.24, for a total employee benefit of $144.84 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 5.12 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 7.58 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 7.66 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 7.58 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 0 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$116.90 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $144.84 (One Hundred Forty-Four Dollars And Eighty-Four Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-455
    Drs. Burkle & Sison, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Drs. Burkle & Sisón, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-473
    Nyle Lee Dyer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Nyle Lee Dyer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for extra day labor help of $1. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation in September, 1974, allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Dyer is due $317.32.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $317.32, plus employer contributions of $37.35, for a total employee benefit of $354.67 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 12.52 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 18.57 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 18.78 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 18.57 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 33.02 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 7.99 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$245.22 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $354.67 (Three Hundred Fifty-Four Dollars And Sixty-Seven Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-474
    Joseph N. Killebrew, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Joseph Killebrew, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for extra day labor help of $1. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation in September, 1974, allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Killebrew is due $327.84.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $327.84, plus employer contributions of $35.27, for a total employee benefit of $363.11 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 12.96 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 19.19 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 16.08 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 19.19 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 15.54 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 4.07 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$276.08 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded the total employee benefit of $363.11 (Three Hundred Sixty-Three Dollars And Eleven Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-475
    Edgar F. Eldridge, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Edgar F. Eldridge, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for extra day labor help of $1. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation in September, 1974, allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Eldridge is due $336.28.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $336.28, plus employer contributions of $39.54, for a total employee benefit of $375.82 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 13.24 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 19.68 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 19.86 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 19.68 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 16.66 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 4.33 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$282.37 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $375.82 (Three Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars And Eighty-Two Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-476
    Frank A. Thomas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

      Frank A. Thomas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for extra day labor help of $1. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation in September, 1974, allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the payroll period in effect. Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Thomas is due $333.32.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $333.32, plus employer contributions of $39.24, for a total employee benefit of $372.56 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 13.16 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 19.50 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 19.74 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 19.50 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ .50 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ .94 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$299.22 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $372.56 (Three Hundred Seventy-Two Dollars And Fifty-Six Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-477
    Michael R. Calvin, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Michael R. Calvin, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for extra day labor help of $1. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation in September, 1974, allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Calvin is due $200.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $200.00, plus employer contributions of $23.80, for a total employee benefit of $223.80 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 8.00 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 11.70 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 12.10 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 11.70 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 6.16 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 1.93 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$172.21 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $223.80 (Two Hundred Twenty-Three Dollars And Eighty Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-478
    Gar-Wood Chicago Truck Equipment, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Gar-Wood Chicago Truck Equipment, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-487
    Dorothy Tomaszewski, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Child and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Dorothy Tomaszewski, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-494
    Riveredge Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Riveredge Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-497
    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-512
    Booth Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Booth Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-523
    Chanen’s, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Chanen’s, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-551
    Lanier Business Products, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Lanier Business Products, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-573
    Chicago Lakeshore Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Child and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Chicago Lakeshore Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-642
    Raymond H. Lane, Supt. Dist. #2, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Raymond H. Lane, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-644
    Gulf Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Gulf Oil Corporation, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-657
    Difco Laboratories, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Difco Laboratories, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-673
    Standard Industrial Products Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Standard Industrial Products Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7.5-CC-678
    Desaulniers & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Desaulniers and Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6481
    Inez Brown and Amazon Payton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Inez Brown and Amazon Payton, Claimants, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-112
    Office Equipment Co. of Chicago, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Child and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

      Office Equipment Co. of Chicago, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-184
    S. Stein and Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    S. Stein & Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-230
    Kattie Parham, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Kattie Parham, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-255
    Catholic Charities of the Archdioceses of Chicago, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Catholic Charities of the Archdioceses of Chicago, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-286
    David Pfoltner, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    David Pfoltner, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-293
    Bruning Division Addressograph Multigraph Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

      Bruning Division Addressograph Multigraph Corporation, Claimant,pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-295
    Bruning Division Addressograph Multigraph Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1976.

    Bruning Division Addressograph Multigraph Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-296
    Bruning Division Addressograph Multigraph Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Bruning Division Addressograph Multigraph Corporation, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent. .
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-297
    Woods, Division of Hesston, Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Woods, Division of Hesston, Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-301
    Patrick Owen Creviston, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Patrick Owen Creviston, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-302
    William J. Blazis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    William Blazis, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-335
    Valk Manufacturing Co., Claimant, vs. State, of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Valk Manufacturing Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-376
    Ernest Wilks, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Ernest Wilks, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-337
    Gene Staley, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Gene Staley, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-378
    Joseph Collins, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Joseph Collins, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-379
    George Wise, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    George Wise, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-381
    Robert Albertine, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Robert Albertine, Claimant pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-383
    John McDonald, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    John McDonald, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-382
    Gilbert Radley, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Gilbert Radley, Claimant pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-398
    Howard E. Reese, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Howard E. Reese, Claimant pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-422
    Amoco Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Amoco Oil Company, Claimant pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-426
    The Flax Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    The Flax Company, Claimant pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-437
    Methodist Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Methodist Hospital, Claimant pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-438
    Anderson Jacobson, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Anderson Jacobson, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-451
    Alberto-Culver Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Robert L. Aprati, Assistant General Attorney, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-463
    Gulf Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Gulf Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-466
    Star National, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Star National Incorporated, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-501
    Loyola University Medical Center, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

      Loyola University Medical Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-525
    Continental Bank, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Continental Bank, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-546
    Cornelius Mack, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Cornelius Mack, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-552
    Robert Ernstmeyer and Doris V. Ernstmeyer, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Robert Ernstmeyer and Doris V. Ernstmeyer, Claimants, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-556
    Central Office Equipment, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Central Office Equipment Company, Claimant pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-563
    Public Electric Construction Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Public Electric Construction Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-568
    Clyde F. Stein, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    William K. Cavanagh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-569
    Leonard R. Lehner, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    William K. Cavanagh, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-575
    Burnham City Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Burnham City Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-585
    Katharine D. Agar, Executor U/W/O William F. Edgerton A/K/A William Franklin Edgerton dec’d., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Katharine D. Agar, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-589
    Gailey Eye Clinic, LTD., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Gailey Eye Clinic, LTD, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-639
    The Brown Schools, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    The Brown Schools, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-675
    Patrick McVary, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Patrick McVary, Claimant, pro se.
    William; J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-710
    Schnepp & Barnes, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Schnepp & Barnes, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-713
    Jer-Lee Home for Children, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Jer-Lee Home for Children, Inc., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-714
    Bunny Bread Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Bunny Bread Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-720
    Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, et al., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Kenneth G. Kombrink, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-769
    Beverly Farm Foundation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1975.

    Beverly Farm Foundation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 5624
    Peter Gianos, Administrator of Estate of Jerry Gianos, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 5, 1975.

    Harry B. Aron and Milton W. Goldman, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Bruce Finne, Zeamore Ader and Saul Wexler, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This claim, sounding in tort, seeks damages for the wrongful death of claimant’s intestate, who committed suicide, and is based on the alleged negligence of respondent’s Illinois State Psychiatric Institute, hereafter referred to as "ISPI”.

From the evidence, it appears that on Juné 13,1968, claimant’s intestate, who was a patient at ISPI, a facility operated by the State Department of Mental Health located at Ashland Avenue near Taylor Street in Chicago, eloped from said institution and thereafter, on said date, took his own life. Claimant contends that the State was negligent in failing to guard claimant’s intestate and prevent him from leaving the hospital, since ISPI allegedly had knowledge of his propensity for leaving the premises, and that he was reasonably likely to commit suicide.

The evidence includes testimony of six psychiatrists on the issue as to whether or not the ISPI’s policy of placing certain psychiatric patients in open wards, and specifically the application of said practice in the present case, was in accordance with good medical practice.

The evidence showed that the claimant’s intestate was a twenty-five year old college student who had lived a normal life until he began to use drugs, including LSD and marijuana. Thereafter, his girl friend also left him and he became quite depressed. Ultimately, he was in such a condition that his family felt he needed medical attention. After a brief visit to ISPI, where he was not admitted, he was taken by the claimant to the Chicago Wesley Hospital, where he was restricted in his freedom, as are virtually all patients who are newly admitted to the psychiatric ward at Wesley until their condition has been fully evaluated. After two days at Wesley, claimant’s intestate was referred to ISPI facility attached to the Department of Mental Health of the State of Illinois and, on June 11, 1968, he was admitted to this institution. His history was taken which indicated sadness, depression, possible suicidal ruminations, and other psychiatric disorders.

The general policy of the state hospital, ISPI, was one of open wards wherever possible, and, two days after he was admitted, the claimant’s intestate attempted to leave ISPI. His elopment was successful and, shortly thereafter, claimant’s intestate shot himself with a .38 pistol, committing suicide.

The testimony of the psychiatric experts was in complete disagreement concerning the open ward policy of ISPI, and they also disagreed in answer to a somewhat uniform hypothetical question concerning whether or not a patient with the condition of claimant’s intestate should have been placed in a locked ward.

The court feels that the testimony of Dr. Jose F. Bayardo, the only testifying psychiatrist who actually examined claimant’s intestate, Dr. Lester Rudy, Director of ISPI, and Dr. Harold M. Visotsky, Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry of Northwestern University’s Medical School and a former director of the Illinois Department of Mental Health, should be accorded great weight. The court was particularly impressed by the testimony of Dr. Visotsky who strongly supported the open ward policy of ISPI, even though he was at the time Chief of Psychiatric Service at Wesley Hospital which places virtually all newly admitted psychiatric patients in locked wards.

In answer to a hypothetical question concerning the care to be afforded to a patient in the approximate condition of claimant’s intestate, Dr. Visotsky persuasively supported the action of ISPI in the instant case. Dr. Visotsky’s testimony stands as a definitive and convincing analysis of ISPI’s general policy and also its application to the present matter, as we will refer to again in this opinion. On the other hand, the court was not equally impressed by the testimony of the expert witnesses called by the claimant, and is strongly of the view that, though respected opinions may differ, the weight of medical evidence supports both the general policy of ISPI and the conduct of ISPI in the case at bar.

Respondent was not an insurer of Jerry Gianos, but was only under obligation to exercise reasonable care to protect him against a foreseeable injury. Clifton, Adm. v. State, 24 C.C.R. 404. The burden of proof is always on the claimant to warrant imposition of liability in negligence against a hospital. Graham v. St. Luke’s Hospital, 46 Ill. App.2d 147.

The evidence in this case does not support a finding that respondent’s ISPI knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, would have known that Jerry Gianos was likely to commit suicide; nor that he was "reasonably expected” to do so, to lift the words used in §1-11 of the Mental Health Code.

Jerry Gianos was in Chicago Wesley Memorial Hospital for two days before he was brought by his mother and sister directly from the Wesley Memorial Hospital to the ISPI, which he entered as a voluntary patient.

Claimant bases his case largely on an assumption that Jerry Gianos attempted suicide in Wesley Hospital and, therefore, should have been kept in "detention” in a locked ward at ISPI. The evidence does not support the assumption nor the conclusion. The assumption was drawn from a statement which Dr. Bayardo of ISPI inserted in a lengthy report of psychiatric examination, dictated after he learned that the patient had committed suicide. The doctor said he was trying to explain to himself "what had happened to Jerry for purposes of completing the chart”, when he dictated the following statement on which the claimant bases his case:

“The patient had a history of 'dramatical, hysterical’ attempts of suicide, as happened at Wesley when he was hitting the wall with his head.”

Dr. Bayardo acknowledged that he had not examined the Wesley Hospital records when he wrote the above statement and characterizes it as a conclusion of his own, "and my interpretation of what I knew at the time. Since he had killed himself, I felt that maybe when he was hitting his head against the wall, it was a gesture of suicide.” In the light of this explanation, and the facts in the record, we find that the statement in question was an erroneous conclusion of Dr. Bayardo inserted in his report as an afterthought.

The court, in examining the Wesley Hospital records, finds the only reference to an attempt at suicide was contained in the following statement in the "Nurses Daily Record” of June 9:

"His head felt like it was going to explode. This has steadily become worse until this morning in the bathroom and again this evening in the washroom, the patient attempted to commit suicide by spinning his head around in circles. After all, if it was about ready to explode, just a little more shaking was all it might need.”

The nurse’s conclusion that "spinning his head around” was a "significant” attempt at suicide is directly contradicted by the testimony of Wesley’s Chief of Psychiatry, Dr. Visotsky, who said:

"The most common way to determine whether or not a patient is a suicidal risk is a history of relatively significant attempts. And by "significant attempts” I do not mean gestures. I mean significant attempts such as someone may cut their wrist, require some suturing. They may shoot themself and not die. They may take some poison and be found in time.”

Again, in answer to a question based on the evidence that Jerry Gianos "hit his head against the wall but not hard enough to raise a bruise or laceration”, Dr. Visotsky said, "I would call that a gesture”?'Dr. Visotsky added that, if bumping one’s head against the wall is an attempt at suicide, a large portion of our children must be regarded as suicide risks. Dr. Visotsky indicated that the "gesture” of hitting one’s head against the wall is apparently an attempt to get attention.

Dr. Visotsky did say that, "A patient’s telling you that he is going to commit suicide in no uncertain terms is also a higher indicator of risk”. However, the evidence here shows that Jerry Gianos never spoke of suicide to anyone. His father, who was at Wesley when Jerry locked himself in the washroom, confirmed this, and also the fact that he did not notice any bruises on Jerry’s head after his so-called attempt at suicide. Upon his arrival at ISPI, Dr. Bayardo interviewed Jerry Gianos and said, "I did not see any evidence in his behavior that he might hurt himself or others”.

Not withstanding the nurse’s notation in the Wesley record, discussed above, it is apparent that Wesley Hospital did not regard Jerry Gianos as a person dangerous to himself or to others. Wesley Hospital knew he was transferring to ISPI, and released him merely in the company of his mother and sister without confined transportation. Wesley did not tell his family, nor advise ISPI, that they thought he attempted suicide at Wesley.

Under these circumstances, we cannot hold as a matter of law that ISPI was negligent in failing to phone Wesley Hospital for their records before he was admitted to an open ward as a voluntary patient. Seeing no emergency indicated in the conduct of Jerry Gianos, ISPI merely requested the Wesley Hospital records by their usual procedures in such cases. These records had not arrived in the two days that Jerry Gianos remained at ISPI. However, if the record had been received in advance, apd if ISPI'had spoken to the head of Wesley’s psychiatric department by phone, it is likely that Dr. Visotsky would not have interpreted their record as showing any "significant” attempt at suicide, as he testified in this case.

Indeed, if ISPI had asked Dr. Visotsky’s advice as to whether a patient in Jerry Gianos’ condition should be placed in an open or closed ward, it is likely that his response would be similar to his testimony in this case, which bears repeating. Dr. Visotsky said,

"Whether you used open ward or closed ward is dependent on the kind of treatment setting that you’re running and what your goals for treatment are.
"If your goals are solely to maintain life, then you must really put many patients in preventative detention. If you wish to treat a patient and give him some insight as to why he is feeling sick and why he is disturbed, then you have to trust him, and put him in a comfortable setting.
"I know, for example, that patients are stimulated to commit suicide when put in a closed ward.
"This is because of the confinement. The fact that people see them as dangerous. They have to act it out. There is no basic rationality. You have to assess each patient in terms of your best judgment.”

We regard Dr. Visotsky as an eminently qualified expert under the rules discussed by the Supreme Court in Darling v. Charleston Hospital (1966) 33 Ill. 2d 326 at pages 335 - 336. We believe he has correctly stated the rule applicable in this case and that ISPI did, in fact, exercise its best judgment for the treatment of Jerry Gianos.

At ISPI, the hospital personnel, psychiatrists, nurses, psychiatric aids, and others, were in about a one-to-one ratio to patients. By the undisputed testimony, this was better than most State psychiatric hospitals and as good as private hospitals. The record indicates that all of these people exercised a reasonable degree of care for Jerry Gianos, knowing his condition, watching over his activities,and. progress. He was given medication four times a day. He was in the hands of competent people. They used their best judgment.

Not being blessed with 20-20-hindsight vision, Dr. Bayardo said in his testimony, "Knowing what I know now, I would have started proceedings to have him committed, but at that time, I didn’t feel he was a suicidal risk. I might have given him a discharge if he had requested he be discharged from ISPI on either of the days he was there. I would have tried to talk him out of it. That is, I would have tried to convince him to stay.”

The weight of the evidence indicates that Jerry Gianos would voluntarily stay at ISPI until the doctors released him. When he returned to the lobby on the first day of his admission at ISPI, he said that he wanted to go home, but his mother told him that he had to stay until the physician said he could go. He was cooperative and went back upstairs to his hospital room. This was not evidence that he would elope nor justify reasonable foreseeability that he would leave. On the morning of his departure, he went to the lobby, and when he was told by hospital personnel to go back to his room, he turned about with every indication that he would do so, but then left from a rear door.

This was about 10:30 A.M., less than two full days after his voluntary admission at ISPI, that Jerry Gianos left the facility without the consent of the hospital, and went to his home. ISPI immediately notified his mother, who went with his sister to the home of Jerry Gianos and found him there. The mother and sister held his door open and spoke with him. At his request, and apparently having no reason to foresee the possibility of his committing suicide, they permitted him to close the door. "He wanted to close the door, so I took my foot out of the door,” his mother said. A short time later, and while his mother and sister were still outside his home, Jerry Gianos shot himself in the head. After they heard the shot, his mother and sister went to the back door of his apartment, by which they had access to enter the apartment, and found him on the floor, wounded. He died some hours later.

Jerry Gianos was a handsome and talented young man. None of his friends nor any member of his family, who had observed him for many months, had any reason to believe that he might take his own life. He never spoke of suicide to anyone.

It was the considered opinion of the doctors at ISPI that he be kept in an open ward as the better method of treatment. A closed ward, in the medical judgment of the psychiatrists, would be contrary to the therapeutic progress of the patient, and would hinder his recovery.

The law is clear that the respondent is not liable if reasonable care is exercised by the attending physicians, as we find here, even though the physicians’ judgment may prove to be erroneous. The fact that the medical judgment was made at the time a patient is admitted would not change this rule. Even after a mental patient has been hospitalized and under observation for a long period of time, an error in professional judgment concerning his release will not impose liability if reasonable care is exercised. The rule and rationale is well stated in Taig v. State of New York, 241 N.Y.S. 2d 495 at page 496:

"The prediction of the future course of a mental illness is a professional judgment of high responsibility and in some instances it involves a measure of calculated risk. If a liability were imposed on the physician or the State each time the prediction of future course of mental disease was wrong, few releases would ever be made and the hope of recovery and rehabilitation of a vast number of patients would be impeded and frustrated. This is one of the medical and public risks which must be taken on balance, even though it may sometimes result in injury to the patient or others.”

■We have examined the numerous authorities cited by the claimant" in his well-drawn briefs, but must distinguish them from the case at bar in that here we find no significant evidence that the patient'ivá¥'reasonably expected, at the time the determination was made or within a reasonable time thereafter, to physically injure himself or other persons.

For the above stated reasons, the claim must be and is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-349
    Bethesda General Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Bethesda General Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-47
    Saint Joseph Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid and Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Saint Joseph Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-142
    Kroch’s & Brentano’s, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Kroch’s & Brentano’s, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-294
    Bruning Division Addressograph Multigraph Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Bruning Division Addressograph Multigraph Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-324
    Powers 24-Hour Towing, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975

    Powers 24-Hour Towing, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-351
    L. B. Foster Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    L. B. Foster Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-352
    L. B. Foster Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    L. B. Foster Company, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-433
    Da-Com Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Da-Com Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-479
    Standard Stationery Supply Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Standard Stationery Supply Co., William Wilson, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-486
    Chicago Osteopathic Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Chicago Osteopathic Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-507
    Chicago Osteopathic Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Chicago Osteopathic Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-509
    The Howell Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    The Howell Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-683
    Donelson Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Donelson Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-684
    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-735
    Richard C. Druger, D.D.S., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 10, 1975.

    Richard C. Kruger, D.D.S., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 5427
    Harrison F. Blades, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 12, 1975.

    Samuels, Miller, Schroeder, Jackson & Sly, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber and Lee Martin, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

The claimant, Harrison F. Blades, Inc., an electrical contractor, seeks damages in the amount of $50,600.00 by reason of the refusal of respondent’s Department of Public Works and Buildings to make final additional payments to claimant for sums allegedly due and owing under a contract claimant entered into with the respondent, and for extra work allegedly performed by claimant thereunder at respondent’s direction.

Claimant was awarded the prime electrical contract for the construction of the Warren C. Murray Children’s Center at Centralia. The agreement is identified as Contract No. 72100, dated January 3, 1962, by the Division of Architecture and Engineering of the Department of Public Works and Buildings.

The original contract sum to be paid by the respondent to the claimant was $948,986.00. During the performance of the contract, change orders were issued by the respondent adding and deleting certain items. The net result of the change orders increased the total contract sum to $1,125,882.27. Payments have been made to the claimant in the amount of $1,111,885.27, leaving a balance due and owing of $13,997.07. This amount represents a customary retainage of 1.24%. The amount of $13,997.07 is not in dispute and will be included in the award.

In addition to the change orders, claimant allegedly furnished additional labor and materials at the -request and direction of the respondent, consisting of the 17 items listed in ¶5 of the complaint and itemized as parts (a) through (q) of ¶5. Claimant contends that these 17 items have a total value of $19,676.53. Of these 17 items, 5 were accepted by respondent’s stipulation and one was subsequently approved by the respondent in the amounts claimed. The items which are not in dispute are contained in 1Í5 (a) (b) (e) (g) (k) and (q) and have a total value of $1,000.42. We list these approved items as follows:

(a) Furnished and installed one 110 volt outlet in mechanical building for use by the telephone company; value of labor and material ...................................$ 21.81

(b) Installed seven 100 ampere circuit breakers furnished by other contractors in the seven ward building penthouses; value of labor................................... 134.42

(e) Additional labor and material furnished in the community building to add to outlets, move a three-gang switch, wire cash register and moving conduit due to late awarding of kitchen equipment contract; having a value of.......... 290.19

(g) Additional labor and material to revise stage curtain control in community building due to a change from a floor mounted to a wall mounted motor; of a value of......... 48.41

(k) Additional labor and material to move switch-boxes at doors of rooms 118, 138 and 166 in ward buildings 1, 2, 3 and 4; of a value of ..............................$171.83

(q) Labor and material to connect one additional unit heater in each ward building at the loading dock area; value of labor and material............................... 333.76

The above 6 items claimed in 1Í5 of the complaint will be included in the award in the amounts stated totaling $1,000.42. This leaves 11 items which are in partial or total dispute. The further amount of $16,927.00 claimed in 116 of the complaint is entirely disputed by the respondent.

The evidence taken on all of the disputed claims was extensive; the record, abstracts and briefs are lengthy. We will deal with each item in dispute as briefly and summarily as possible in stating our findings and conclusions without commenting on the numerous authorities cited by the parties in their briefs or quoting the specific language of the contract unless it seems essential to do so.

5(c) Claims $4,747.68 for "Labor and material necessary to change the size and location of conduit and cable from manholes to low voltage entrance panels on each of seven ward buildings”.

This item 5(c) is totally disputed by the respondent. Conceding that there was an error in the plans [Sheet SE-5] as to the size of the conduits required, respondent contends that the correct sizes are shown in certain contract drawings; that the contractor was required to coordinate his work with that of others involved in the project; and that he cannot take advantage of any error or omission in the drawings, etc., as stated in Art. 1077 of the Specifications.

The court finds that the facts in the record support claimant’s position. The drawings and plans for the project [Claimant’s Exhibit 3] show on sheet SE-1 an electrical low voltage duct run entitled "EL-8” running from the manhole outside of each of the seven ward buildings to the foundation line of each of the buildings. Sheet SE-4 shows that the duct run entitled "EL-8” is composed of 6 two-inch conduits and 2 four-inch conduits.

Sheet SE-5 shows the entrance panel inside each of the ward buildings, but shows only 6 two-inch conduits coming into the entrance box. Nowhere in the plans are the 2 four-inch conduits referred to after extension to the foundation lines of the building as shown on sheet SE-1.

Claimant brought this matter to the attention of respondent, and respondent directed claimant to extend the 2 four-inch conduits from the foundation line of each of the buildings, some twenty to thirty feet, through an unexcavated area to the entrance box in the basement of each of the buildings. Claimant, in complying with this direction of respondent, had to install additional duct-work, cable, and concrete encasement.

Admittedly, sheet SE-5 was prepared in error by respondent, and it omitted the 2 four-inch conduits. Mr. Roy Beers, respondent’s inspector on the project, when asked why the 2 four-inch conduits were not shown on sheet SE-5, stated, "You’ll have to ask them [the architects], I don’t know.”

Respondent disclaims responsibility for this error by pointing to Article 1077 of the specifications which states that "a contractor will not be allowed to take advantage of any error or omission in the drawings, etc.”. The record shows that the claimant did not take advantage of the error, but brought it to the attention of respondent as soon as the error was discovered.

Every contractor must rely on the plans given to him by an owner in order to calculate his bid for the price at which he will perform a contract. Claimant undoubtedly relied on the plans in arriving at his bid in this case, and subsequently was directed by respondent to provide extra materials and labor not indicated on the plans.

Article 1077 of the specifications, if strictly applied, could lead to unconscionable results. Mistakes by the state could cost a helpless contractor many thousands of dollars. The court has held that the state will not be unjustly enriched to the detriment of another. Standard Consessions, Inc. v. State, 22 C.C.R. 562. If Article 1077 were strictly applied, an unjust enrichment will result. The respondent made the error in the present case, and claimant is entitled to be compensated for the additional cost resulting from this error.

The cost of the labor and material involved in claim under 5(c), unrefuted in respondent’s testimony, was: material $1,627.92; labor $2,125.20; overhead charge $562.96; and ten percent profit charge $431.60. Total amount to be included in the award under 5(c) is $4,747.68.

5(d) Claims $1,230.63 for "Extra labor and material required to relocate low voltage duct run to hospital building due to lack of space inside of hospital building for both high voltage and low voltage entrances in the areas shown on the plan.”

This item is totally disputed by the respondent, and the court agrees with the respondent’s position.

Claimant bases this claim on the allegation that, because coordination drawings were not prepared for claimant’s use prior to the work actually being done, claimant partially installed some low voltage duct runs and then, because of congestion with other contractors, had to move them 20 feet in an easterly direction.

We find that claimant’s own testimony shows that he failed to furnish his Shop Drawings to the supervising architect or his representative for their use in preparing coordinating drawings. Claimant was thus in violation of Articles 4, 38 and 1078. The absence of coordinated drawings, of which he complains, was due to claimant’s own failure to cooperate in their preparation.

The contract makes it incumbent upon each contractor, especially in congested areas, to obtain these coordinated drawings before proceeding to install work that may conflict with other contractors and lead to the possibility of having the work removed and redone.

Claimant also contends that this alleged extra work was done because of a lack of space inside the hospital building for both high voltage and low voltage entrances. We need not belabor this point since claimant did not receive a "change order” to change the location of the low voltage duct. Such an order is mandatory under Article 22: "No change shall be made, unless in pursuance of a written order from the supervising architect, stating that the owner has authorized the change and no claim for an addition to the contract sum shall be valid unless so ordered.” The claim made in 115(d) will be denied.

5(f) Claims $918.90 for "Labor and additional material required to remove and re-route electrical conduits under the stage area in the community building.”

This item is contested by the respondent only as to the amount of additional compensation justified.

Respondent admits it directed claimant to re-route certain conduits. The only question is the value of the labor and material involved in making the change. Respondent admits that it offered claimant $286.00 for this extra work and claims that it had an oral agreement with claimant’s superintendent to do the work for this amount. Claimant properly objected to respondent’s testimony to this effect as being hearsay, and we must reject it for this reason.

Respondent erred in requiring claimant to proceed with this work before a change order was properly executed, as required in the specifications, and having no prior agreement as to cost. Had this been done, this problem would not have arisen. What changes were, in fact, made, is purely a question of fact.

There is a paucity of evidence in the record on this point. When asked how many conduits had to be moved, respondent’s Mr. Beers stated, "I’d say two and the telephone.” Mr. Blades testified that, "There were nine power conduits plus the power feed to the panel box and the telephone conduit” in place at the time the change was ordered.

We believe that the testimony of Harrison Blades was the most creditable evidence submitted, and find the cost of the materials to be $58.00; labor $668.40; fifteen percent overhead $108.96; ten percent profit $83.54 for a total of $918.90. Claimant will be awarded $918.90 in satisfaction of the claim in 5(f).

5(h) Claims $1,453.76 for "Additional labor and material required in the kitchen area of each of seven ward buildings to add an additional receptacle at the drinking fountain, install larger size circuit breakers and re-route conduit to conform to kitchen equipment installed by other contractors.”

Respondent totally rejects this item, and the court agrees that claimant did not support this claim by satisfactory evidence.

Three elements compose the claim in 5(h). First, the additional receptacles at the drinking fountains were not sufficiently proven, and claimant was unable to show the court an extra receptacle in an on-the-site inspection. There was conflicting testimony of two witnesses as to whether the respondent told the claimant to put them where they were marked on the plans. Giving equal credibility to these two witnesses, the claimant has failed to sustain his burden of proof as we said in Ackley v. State, 22 C.C.R. 41. It follows that we cannot accept claimant’s suggestion that the amount claimed in 5(h) be reduced only by one-seventh for the receptical that could not be found in one of the seven buildings.

As to the second element in item (h), larger size circuit breakers, claimant did not adequately demonstrate to the court that the plans called for smaller circuit breakers, but that larger circuit breakers had to be installed.

The last element in item (h), re-routing conduit to conform to kitchen equipment installed by other contractors, was not pursued by argument in claimant’s brief. We find no evidence in the record to substantiate this allegation. The claim made in ¶5(h) will be denied.

5(i) Claim $1,933.06 for "Additional labor and material in the hospital building to add electrical outlets and to change locations of outlets and switches roughed in prior to determination of requirements for hospital equipment furnished by other contractors.”

Originally, this item was only partially contested, but respondent’s brief denies any liability on this claim.'

Respondent estimated the value of the acceptable extras proposed to be done at $597.61. However, claimant failed to resubmit a proposal on the items tentatively approved. Therefore, he was operating, if he did in fact make any changes, without proper change orders and in violation of the contract. [Article 22] Supra. [Quoted under claim 5(d)]

The court does take notice of the fact, that the hospital equipment was not purchased by the respondent until many months after the contract was signed. Although claimant was ordered by the respondent to rough-in outlets and switches for hospital equipment, the specific electrical requirements for such equipment were not known at the time. Mr. Blades testified that, when the equipment arrived, changes were necessary for various items of hospital equipment including "physicial therapy baths, the morgue, and other areas”. This testimony conflicts with that of respondent’s Mr. Beers. We believe this dispute should be resolved by the following statement from the departmental report which was made a part of the record and reads in pertinent part as follows:

"The contractor submitted a second proposal for extra work in the Hospital Building, dated December 6, 1965, in the amount of $1,723.55. The Division of Architecture and Engineering, in a letter to this contractor dated March 8, 1966, stated they have reviewed the nineteen items of extra work listed and believed the contractor is entitled to additional compensation for four (4) items and not for the other fifteen (15) items. The contractor has never furnished a revised proposal for these four items. The Division of Architecture and Engineering has estimated the value of these four items as $597.69.”

The court accepts the recommendation stated on page 4 and 9 of the departmental report and will award the sum of $597.69 on the claim stated in 5(i)

5(j) Claim of $436.42 for "Extra length stems furnished for light fixtures F-10 and F-27 throughout the project.”

Respondent points out that these items were replaced only in the commissary building and not "throughout the project,” as stated in the complaint.

The testimony of the claimant does not clearly establish whether the $436.42 was the cost of 30-inch stems or the difference between the cost of 30-inch stems and the 12-inch stems called for in the specifications. Claimant’s brief states that the specifications required 12-inch stems and that respondent ordered claimant to install 30-inch stems in order to lower the light fixtures.

The paucity of evidence submitted on this issue includes a conflict in claimant’s own testimony, "We checked for the pendant length required before ordering them.” . . . "The plan called for 10-inch pendants and that was what we ordered. We ended up putting in 24-inch pendants.” . . . "In any event, as stated in the departmental report, the electrical contract specifications in paragraph #2392 require that the electrical contractor shall check the lengths of the lighting fixture pendant stems with the Supervising Architect before ordering. There is no record of this contractor having done this checking.”

We find that claimant has failed to prove by a prepondence of the evidence that he is entitled to the amount claimed in 5(j) and this part of the claim will be denied.

5(1) Claim of $192.02 for "Labor to move ceiling light fixture in ward buildings 2, 3 and 4 due to interference by locker doors.”

The facts on this issue, confirmed by this court’s Commissioner Robert F. Godfrey, in an on-the-site inspection, are as follows:

Claimant installed the ceiling light fixtures as directed in the plans. Thereafter, lockers were installed, the doors of which struck the light fixtures. The doors on the lockers were not indicated on the drawings or plans. Respondent ordered claimant to move the light fixtures, which necessitated changes in the wiring and conduit.

The evidence shows that extra rewiring had to be done, that claimant did the rewiring, and that this claim is justified. It does not appear to the court that this extra expense was due to claimant’s failure to coordinate with other contractors, as respondent contends. On this item, claimant will be awarded the sum of $192.02.

5(m) Claim of $1,081.44 for "Labor and materials furnished in the laundry building for installation of extra outlets at each of the shirt folder and pressing machines, extra light fixture in toilet room, additional circuit breaker and circuit on mono-rail and brackets and disconnect switches on all laundry equipment furnished by other contractors.”

There are four parts to the claim stated in H5(m). First, we find that the "extra outlets at each of the shirt folder and pressing machines” were required under the contract, viz., Article 2241 of the specifications provides that equipment furnished and installed by others shall be completely wired by the electrical contractor. Hence, no extra charge can be approved.

The second part of 5(m) is for an "extra light fixture in a toilet room.” Respondent’s inspector, Mr. Beers, admitted that the plans called for three lights in the ladies toilet room, and that a fourth light had been installed. Claimant testified that Mr. Beers ordered him to install the extra light, and Mr. Beers denied that he consulted with anyone from claimant’s company regarding this extra toilet room light. Mr. Blades admitted that he had no change order for this additional light.

On this individual item, we again have contradictory testimony, from two equally credible witnesses, coupled with claimant’s admission that he failed to obtain a change order as required by the contract. Hence, claimant failed to carry his burden of proof and must be denied recovery of this item.

The third part of 5(m) is for an "additional circuit breaker and circuit on monorail.” Claimant contends that sheet LE-1 of the plans shows one circuit serving an air-handling unit and also the monorail, an overhead cranelike affair. In other words, that the plans show a circuit for the two pieces of equipment. Claimant states that this circuit was too small to serve both pieces of equipment, and that respondent ordered claimant to install a separate circuit to serve the monorail.

We find that plan LE-1 calls for circuit #14 for the monorail. Respondent’s Mr. Beers denied that the plans called for a washer to be hooked up to the monorail circuit #14. He pointed out to the court, from the plans, that the plan LE-1 shows two circuits, four wires — [circuits 13 and 14] — in the same conduit with a circuit breaker for each circuit and the monorail operating off the circuit 14. Claimant failed to show that he had, in fact, installed an additional circuit or circuit breaker on the monorail. The testimony indicates that just two circuits [#13 and #14] were installed, those being the two called for in the plans. This item, part 3 of 5(m) will be denied.

The fourth and final claim in 5(m) is for "brackets and disconnect switches on all laundry equipment furnished by other contractors.”

We find that it was claimant’s duty under Article 2241 of the contract, to see that this equipment "furnished by other contractors” was completely hooked up, ready to operate. These laundry machines, and the main control panel, having been placed in such a location as to have the motors out of sight of the main control panel, require a disconnect switch located at the motor (at the back of the machine) before it can be considered to be a complete hook up ready to operate as required by Article 2241. This disconnect switch is a safety factor [required by the National Electrical Code] to protect a workman, who might be in behind the machine working on the motor, from being shocked by someone being unaware of his presence turning on the machine at the front of the machine or by tripping the switch at the. main control panel.

Claimant contends that these switches were not necessary for an approved installation under the National Electric Code, since the motor is not out of sight of the main panel board. Claimant testified that the motor is well within sight of the panel board. Respondent does not effectively contradict this evidence. However, claimant does not establish the cost of this element of item 5(m) beyond the cost of eight floor brackets at $36.00. Consequently, a total award of $36.00 will be made under all parts of item 5(m).

5(n) Claim of $2,213.93 for "Labor and additional material required to relocate circuits and boxes in dietary building due to purchase of kitchen equipment by respondent having different rough-in requirements from those shown in the plans.”

Respondent concedes that it directed claimant to relocate certain circuits and boxes in the dietary building, and that this change was necessary because kitchen equipment was not purchased by respondent until sixteen months after the building construction contracts, including the contract in question, were signed. Respondent admitted the sixteen months delay in purchasing the kitchen equipment. Respondent concedes that claimant is entitled to an award on this item, but questions the amount.

Claimant submitted its written change order in the amount of $2,213.93 to the respondent and the latter took no action with regard to the change order. Approximately three weeks after the change order was sent to the respondent, the latter directed claimant to begin the work. Thereafter, respondent asked claimant to reduce the labor charge from 284 hours to 160 hours at $5.10 an hour. However, claimant testified his workers spent 284 hours on this extra. This was not refuted by the respondent. We find that an award of $2,213.93 [for material, $301.75; 284 hours of labor at $5.10 — total $1,448.40; fifteen percent overhead at $262.52; and ten percent profit at $201.26] should be granted for this extra. An award of $2,213.93 will be made for the claim in 5(n).

5(o) Claim of $2,914.05 for "Labor and material required to pour additional concrete on bottom of manholes to improve drainage resulting from change of type and location of drains.”

This work involved pouring additional concrete on the floors of these manholes so that water in the manholes would drain out. The floor was poured by the claimant through the services of a sub-contractor. The drains were installed when the walls were poured. The result was that the drain was about % of an inch up off the floor. Additional concrete had to be poured on the floor of the manholes to slope the floor to the drain. Claimant admits that the drain, % of an inch off the floor, was apparently an error in judgment. If the drains had been set in place in the floor at the proper level initially, the extra concrete would not have been needed. Claimant bore the responsibility to see that the drain was properly installed, and cannot recover his claim for this extra.

5(p) Claim of $1,554.22 for "Labor and material to install additional cable racks in all low voltage manholes.”

This item was only partially contested by the respondent. The present demand is $1,554.22. However, by letter dated December 6, 1965, the contractor agreed to reduce this demand to $1,066.00 according to the departmental report. The dispute is as to the number of feet of additional cable racks actually installed. The racks in the manholes were counted by respondent’s Mr. Beers, and he found the number of feet to be 634% altogether.

Claimant alleges 317% feet, and we find this claim supported by the weight of the evidence. Respondent recommends that claimant accept payment on this item of $888.72 which is about $178.00 less than we believe is due the claimant based on 317% feet at the unit price of $3.36 per foot which comes to $1,066.00. An award of this amount is made under the claim in item 5(p).

6(a), (b), (c) & (d) Claims $16,927.00 for "The furnishing and installing of 12,750 straps and hangers on concealed conduit.”

This $16,972.00 claim is the largest single item claimed in the complaint and the one on which we find the least convincing evidence in support of claimant’s position.

The heart of the problem in connection with this claim deals with Section 2193 of the specifications. This section, which is the first section under the "Conduit Supports and Hangers” heading, describes the method for support of conduit "for exposed work on walls and ceilings” as follows:

CONDUITS SUPPORTS AND HANGERS:
2193: For exposed work on walls and ceilings conduits shall be supported every five feet with galvanized case one hold straps, clamp backs and anchors as herein specified.

Claimant argues that because Article 2193 refers to "exposed work” all the other articles [Arts. 2193 through 2199] refer only to exposed work; and that he was free to use another method, i.e., bare wire, to support concealed conduits above the ceiling.

Claimant commenced installing concealed conduit above the suspended ceilings by using bare wire wrapped around the conduits and the ceiling supports in order to support the conduits, but was not permitted to use such method by the respondent. At the direction of the respondent, the claimant agreed to install concealed conduit in the manner provided in the specifications for exposed conduit. Thereafter, the claimant states that he installed 12,750 straps and hangers to support concealed conduits.

Whether claimant did install 12,750 straps and hangers is a question of fact which claimant did not prove by the evidence submitted in the record, nor to the satisfaction of the court in our on-the-site visual inspection.

We deem it unnecessary, therefore, to comment on the numerous pages in the briefs of both parties dealing with the questions: (1) Whether the conduits above the "mechanical” ceilings were "concealed” or were in an "exposed” area because they are accessible; (2) Whether custom and usage in the electrical trade sanctions the use of bare wire to support conduits; and (3) Whether the contract was so ambiguous as to justify the contractor’s use of bare wire supports in "concealed” areas, if any.

Having found that the weight of the evidei, ee does not support claimant’s allegations as to the extra straps and hangers installed as requested by the respondent, it becomes immaterial as to whether they were required by the contract or by custom and practice in the trade.

The claim for $16,927.00 as stated in the complaint 116 (a), (b), (c), and (d) is denied.

A summary of our findings in this multi-count complaint is as follows: [* denotes items not contested by the respondent.]

The claimant, Harrison F. Blades, Inc., is hereby awarded as the amount due under its contract for electrical services performed, the sum of $24,769.71.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-335
    Doris D. Leffler, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Kleiman, Cornfield & Feldman, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-336
    Glenn Oliver Decker, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Kleiman, Cornfield, & Feldman, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-90
    Acme Visible Records, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

      Acme Visible Records, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-346
    Merle D. Koehler, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Merle D. Koehler, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-380
    Pete Lehnen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Pete Lehnen, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-468
    Sears, Roebuck & Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Sears, Roebuck & Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Wílliam E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-570
    Edward J. Lawless, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    William K. Cavanagh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-604
    Office Equipment Co., of Chicago, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Office Equipment Co. of Chicago, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-632
    Wolfe, Rosenberg & Assoc., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Registration & Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Wolfe, Rosenberg & Assoc., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-637
    Norman T. Thompson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Richard R. Cross, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-672
    Telemed Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Telemed Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-704
    E. Best Plumbing & Heating Supply Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    E. Best Plumbing & Heating, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-792
    Archway, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1975.

    Archway, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Perlin, C. J.

text:
    (No. 5480
    Harry A. Ohms, Jr., Administrator of Estate of Harry A. Ohms, Sr., deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 14, 1975.

    Harris and Lambert, and Robert L. Butler, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

Claimant Harry A. Ohms, Jr., as Administrator of the Estate of Harry Ohms, Sr., seeks to recover the sum of $25,000 for the death of his intestate in an automobile accident which occurred on December 20, 1967, along a portion of Illinois Route 13, known as Brandon Hill.

On December 20, 1967, the State of Illinois was in the process of resurfacing portions of the eastbound lane of Illinois Route 13, a two lane, east-west highway connecting Marion and Harrisburg, Illinois. In repairing the road, the State cut out patches of the pavement at various intervals along several miles of the highway preparatory to resurfacing, and placed barricades around the patches. Three such barricaded patches were located on the west slope of Brandon Hill.

Photographs and diagrams introduced into evidence by claimant show that the first barricaded patch was located approximately 350 feet west of the crest of the hill. Two hundred fifty feet east of this patch were the second and third barricaded patches, spaced about 10 feet apart and ending approximately 76 feet west of the crest of the hill.

The barricades around each of the patches completely blocked the eastbound lane of the highway. The highway was bounded by a steep embankment and gutter, which prevented vehicles from using the shoulder of the road to drive around the barricades. Motorists traveling eastbound along the highway were therefore required to drive into the westbound lane of traffic to negotiate the barricades.

To the west of Brandon Hill there were several sets of signs warning eastbound motorists of the roadwork, and about one quarter mile west of the hill was a sign stating, "One Lane Road Ahead.” There was neither a warning device nor a flagman at the crest of the hill to warn eastbound motorists of westbound traffic coming over the crest of the hill.

The accident occurred at approximately 1:45 p.m. as Harry Ohms, Sr., proceeded eastbound on Route 13. The pavement was damp and slippery from a morning rain, but the day was clear. The deceased was familiar with the condition of the road, having driven over it daily to and from his job.

John Stump, who was driving directly behind the deceased at the time of the accident, testified that the deceased came to a complete stop in front of the western most barricade on the slope of Brandon Hill. He drove into the westbound lane of traffic, went around the barricade, and pulled back into the eastbound lane. He then proceeded in the eastbound lane until coming to a halt before the next barricade at a point about 100 feet from the crest of the hill. As the deceased pulled into the westbound lane to negotiate this barricade, his car was struck head on by a westbound car which had just cleared the crest of the hill.

Harry Ohms, Sr., suffered a crushed chest and head injuries in the accident, and died within minutes of the crash.

John Stump and several other drivers at the scene who had traveled the road regularly, all testified that Brandon Hill had a reputation as being a dangerous portion of the highway and that in their opinion the construction thereon had made the road particularly hazardous. They further testified that the hill was "blind,” in that a driver could not see over the crest of the hill as he approached from either the east or the west.

Richard A. Ash, an Illinois State Trooper who traveled over Brandon Hill regularly, also testified that motorists approaching the crest of the hill from either direction are unable to see over the crest. Ash also said that the crest of the hill is a "no passing” zone for both eastbound and westbound traffic.

Carl DeWitt, a civil engineer with the Illinois Highway Department, testified, that he was in charge of the construction project on Route 13. DeWitt said that following the accident he took a "line of sight” measurement to determine the distance which Harry Ohms, Sr., could see as he went around the barricade at the crest of the hill. DeWitt stated that according to his calculations, when the deceased pulled behind the barricade nearest to the crest of the hill, he could have seen westbound traffic approaching from a distance of 445 feet. DeWitt further said that once Mr. Ohms pulled into the westbound lane of traffic to drive around the barricade, and reached the point of impact, he could see over a mile to the east.

It is claimant’s position that respondent was negligent in failing to post a flagman or some mechanical warning device at the crest of Brandon Hill to warn motorists forced into the oncoming lane of traffic of the presence of westbound automobiles. Respondent contends that it was under no such duty, and that it fully discharged its obligations to Mr. Ohms by posting warning signs along the highway indicating that the road was under construction, and that traffic was reduced to one lane at the point of the accident. Respondent also contends that the deceased was contributorily negligent in driving into the lane of oncoming traffic without keeping a proper lookout.

To recover damages for the death of Harry Ohms, Sr., claimant beare the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent breached a duty owed Mr. Ohms; that Mr. Ohms was free of contributory negligence; and that the negligence of the respondent proximately caused his death. Howell v. State, 23 C.C.R. 141.

We have often reiterated that the State is not an insurer of the condition of highways under its maintenance and control. Schuck v. State, 25 C.C.R. 209. We have also held that the State is nevertheless under a duty to the motoring public to use reasonable care in maintaining roadways under its control. Thus, respondent owed a duty to users of Route 13 to use reasonable diligence in insuring that the construction work on the road did not create an unreasonably dangerous condition.

We think it manifestly clear that respondent breached this duty to Harry Ohms, Sr., by permitting an extremely dangerous condition, to develop on Brandon Hill during the course of construction work. The testimony of numerous witnesses, including a State Highway Patrolman familiar with the area, established that Brandon Hill was a particularly dangerous portion of highway even absent the construction. The crest of the hill was a "no passing” zone for both eastbound and westbound traffic, and testimony by numerous competent witnesses established that the approach to the crest of the hill was "blind” to motorists approaching from either direction.

Yet, respondent caused barricades to be placed across the eastbound lane of the roadway, within the no passing zone at the crest of the hill, which necessitated eastbound traffic to cross into the oncoming lane of traffic at a point where oncoming traffic was not visible. The State permitted an extraordinarily dangerous condition to develop at the crest of Brandon Hill, and in view of this condition, we think that an obligation rested upon the State to provide a flagman, or a mechanical traffic control device, at the crest of the hill to control traffic thereon.

Respondent argues that it fulfilled its obligation to Claimant’s intestate by placing a series of signs on the approaches to Brandon Hill, which indicated that barricades and construction reduced traffic to one lane. Respondent cites Emm v. State of Illinois, 25 C.C.R. 213, where we said,

"*** the placing of adequate signs warning of the conditions to be met fulfills the obligation of the State to users of the highway.” Id. at 218.

We are not persuaded by this argument. This is not a situation where a claimant has ignored posted signs prohibiting entry to a closed road, as was the case in Emm v. State, supra. Rather the signs posted by respondent only informed Harry Ohms, Sr., that there was construction on the roadway, and that the two lane highway would be reduced to a single lane at some point. However, once Harry Ohms reached the barricade at the crest of the hill, he was left without any indication of whether it was safe to proceed around the barricade in the lane of oncoming traffic. It was at this point that a warning device was needed.

The more difficult issue is whether Harry Ohms, Sr., acted with reasonable care for his own safety and well-being and was thus free of contributory negligence. Considering all the circumstances here, we believe that Mr. Ohms acted with reasonable prudence under the circumstances. Once he found himself stopped before the barricade near the crest of the hill, Mr. Ohms had little alternative but to edge his car into the oncoming lane of traffic. The high bank to the side of the road prevented him from using the shoulder to negotiate the barricade, and traffic lined up behind him prevented him from backing down the hill. The testimony of John Stump, who was directly behind Mr. Ohms at the time of the accident, establishes that he came to a complete stop before the barricade near the crest of the hill, and then slowly edged out onto the lane of oncoming traffic. While an extraordinarily careful driver might have acted with even greater caution, we conclude that Mr. Ohms did act as would a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. We therefore find that he was free of contributory negligence.

We further find that the negligence of respondent was the proximate cause of his death.

Mr. Ohms left surviving a wife and two adult children who were not dependent upon him for support. He was a former teacher and coach and was employed full time by the Bowens Children’s Center in Harrisburg, Illinois, as a Child’s Aid earning $353 per month. In addition to his salary, he had received social security benefits of $463 per month from January 1, 1967, to December 20, 1967. He was 68 years old at the time of the accident, with an actuarial life expectancy of 13 years, although it is unlikely that he would have continued working for that entire period.

The automobile in which he was riding was totally wrecked, and testimony placed the net property damage loss at approximately $2,000.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $17,000.

      On July 22,1970, this cause was continued generally on the motion of the Respondent pending disposition of claimant’s lawsuit arising out of the same incident which was pending in the Circuit Court of Saline County, Illinois. That order was vacated on February 17, 1972, following disposition of that case.