text:
    (No. 4993
    Joseph Karulski, Administrator of the Estate of Adella Karulski, Deceased, Claimant, vs. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 7, 1966.

    Dowd, Dowd and Dowd, Attorneys for Claimant.

      Raymond, Mayer, Jenner and Block, Attorneys for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

This is an action brought by Joseph Karulski, as Administrator of the Estate of Adella Karulski, deceased, against the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 1961 Ill. Rev. Stats., Chap. 70, Sec. 2, and the Court of Claims Act, 1961 Ill. Rev. Stats., Chap. 37, Sec. 439.8.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Approximately twenty-five years ago, when she was nineteen years old, Adella Karulski sustained head injuries in an automobile accident. After the accident she began experiencing severe head pains. About 1947, Mrs. Karulski began to have fainting spells. Between 1947 and May of 1960, Mrs. Karulski experienced six such fainting spells, several of which lasted approximately eight hours each. During this thirteen year period Mrs. Karulski received various treatments for her headaches and fainting spells, including operations, and radiation treatments.

By 1958, the headache pains had become so severe that they could only be relieved by increasingly larger doses of Levodromoran, a narcotic. Eventually Mrs. Karulski became addicted to Levodromoran. Her physician refused to give her any more, and referred her to the University of Illinois Research Hospital.

Mrs. Karulski was admitted to the University of Illinois Research Hospital on July 27, 1960 at about 1:00 P.M. At the time she was anxious, but in no distress. The admitting diagnosis was “Cushing’s syndrome.” Mrs. Karulski was placed in Medical Ward 10 under the care of Dr. Alf Tannenberg.

On July 28, 1960, Mrs. Karulski complained of a headache, and wanted her “medication.” Later that afternoon Mrs. Karulski told nurse Blackburn that, if her headache was not relieved, she would jump out of the window. As a result of this threat, Mrs. Karulski was transferred to a screened room, placed in restraints, and a psychiatric consultation ordered.

Mrs. Karulski was examined by two psychiatrists, Drs. Mary Samos and William J. Piper. After talking to Mrs. Karulski on July 28, 1960, Dr. Samos concluded she was having a withdrawal reaction from the narcotic addiction. She recommended that a narcotic be reintroduced, and a gradual withdrawal made. Dr. Tannenberg concurred with Dr. Samos’ diagnosis. Dr. Piper noted that Mrs. Karulski was depressed and discouraged, but, in his opinion, was not psychotic or a suicide risk.

On July 30, 1960, a narcotic was reintroduced, and a program of gradual withdrawal begun. On July 31, 1960, Dr. Reynolds ordered the restraints removed, Mrs. Karulski’s ward privileges were restored, and she was allowed to go about freely in the ward. Dr. Piper concurred in the judgment that there was no further reason to keep Mrs. Karulski under restraints.

The withdrawal program was successful, and by August 5,1960, in the opinion of the doctors and nurses treating her, Mrs. Karulski was much improved. On the morning of August 6,1960, Mrs. Karulski was given a tranquilizer. Later that morning she complained of difficulty in breathing. She was examined by Dr. Tannenberg, and advised that there was nothing wrong with her.

At about 10:00 o’clock on the morning of August 6, 1960 Mrs. Karulski jumped or fell from the tenth floor window of the sun porch where she had gone alone. The record in this case indicates that there were no witnesses to the acts of Mrs. Karulski on the sun porch, which resulted in her death.

The Court desires to voluntarily state that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to this case. Claimant does not urge its application in his complaint or brief. Conditions usually stated as necessary for the application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur are three: (1) the accident must be a kind, which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. With the question of whether Mrs. Karulski accidentally fell or intentionally jumped from the window on the sun porch unanswered by the evidence in this case, and the mental state of Mrs. Karulski at issue, the Court feels that the three conditions set forth above for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur have not been satisfied.

In his complaint, claimant appears to set forth two separate hypotheses concerning the death of Mrs. Karulski, for which claimant seeks to recover damages. Claimants first hypothesis, or theory, is that respondent was negligent in failing to prevent Mrs. Karulski from committing suicide when her propensity to commit suicide was known, or by the exercise of ordinary care should have been known to respondent.

Claimant’s second hypothesis, or theory, is that Mrs. Karulski accidentally fell out of the window, as a result of tripping or stumbling, and that respondent was negligent in failing to keep and maintain proper retaining screens or bars on the windows of the hospital for the protection of patients in the hospital from falling from said windows.

The Court will consider claimant’s second hypothesis first. It raises a question of fact, which claimant fails to answer. In fact, claimant’s brief and the testimony elicited from claimant’s witnesses appear to be based solely on and directed toward the substantiation or proof of claimant’s first hypothesis, namely, that Mrs. Karulski committed suicide. Claimant did not consistently pursue his second hypothesis, and has failed to prove the same by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Court will now consider claimant’s first hypothesis. In order to recover damages for the death of Mrs. Karulski, claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent failed and neglected to render the degree of care owed to Mrs. Karulski as a patient in the University of Illinois Research Hospital. Having proved that respondent failed to render the degree of care owed Mrs. Karulski as a patient, claimant must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Karulski was not guilty of contributory negligence.

In Mounds Park Hospital vs. Von Eye, 245 F. 2d 756 (1957), the court held that a hospital is not an insurer of a patient’s safety, but owes the patient the duty of protection, and must exercise such reasonable care as the patient’s known condition may require. In Peterson vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 381, this Court recognized and reaffirmed the rule that the extent and character of the care, which a hospital owes its patients, depends on the circumstances of each particular case. However, this rule is limited by the rule that no one is required to guard against or take measures to avert that which a reasonable person under the circumstances would not anticipate as likely to happen.

The principal question in the case at bar is whether respondent hospital took reasonable precautions, and exercised reasonable care for Mrs. Karulski’s safety following her suicide threat to nurse Blackburn on July 29, 1960. Immediately after the threat of suicide Mrs. Karulski was transferred to a screened room, and restrained. Two trained psychiatrists, Dr. Samos and Dr. Piper, were called, and both examined Mrs. Karulski. It was the opinion of the two psychiatrists, based upon their examination of Mrs. Karulski, that she was suffering a withdrawal reaction from a narcotic addiction, and, while depressed and discouraged, she was not psychotic or a suicide risk. Mrs. Karulski responded quickly to the treatment administered, which consisted of a program of gradual withdrawal from narcotic addiction, and the administration of certain tranquilizing drugs.

By July 31, 1960, it was the opinion of the two psychiatrists, concurred in by the physicians and nurses who had been treating, and who continued to treat Mrs. Karulski on a day to day basis, that the risk of suicide, if any had ever existed, was gone, and it was considered by them safe to permit her to resume the normal status of a patient in the ward. As the days progressed Mrs. Karulski’s condition, in the opinion of the hospital personnel, continued to improve. Mrs. Karulski’s husband and son both testified that Mrs. Karulski had never expressed any intention or desire to take her own life. From all outward signs there was apparently no reason to anticipate that Mrs. Karulski would commit suicide.

It is the opinion of this Court that claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent failed to exercise the degree of care owed Mrs. Karulski. It is our opinion that respondent took all reasonable precautions with regard to Mrs. Karulski’s safety, and rendered that degree of care owed Mrs. Karulski as a patient.

Claim is, therefore, hereby denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Perlin, C. J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 5027
    Cecil Hout and Motors Insurance Corporation, A Corporation, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 7, 1966.

    Roland J. De Marco, Attorney for Claimants.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

Cecil Hout and Motors Insurance Corporation, claimants, seek recovery of $60.00 and $1,463.90, respectively, for damages to a 1959 Chevrolet automobile, which was owned and driven by Cecil Hout, and insured by the Motors Insurance Corporation.

On March 31, 1960, Cecil Hout was driving the above mentioned automobile in a northerly direction on a section of Old Route No. 45, several miles south of Effingham, Illinois. At approximately 7:00 P.M. he crashed into a pile of crushed rock, which covered the width of the road, and had been placed there by the State Division of Highways.

A Departmental Report, which was submitted by the Division of Highways, describes the area of the accident as follows:

“Marked U.S. Route No. 45, south from the southerly limit of the city of Effingham, Effingham County, for a distance of slightly more than four miles, was constructed by the State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, in the year 1924 as a part of State Bond Issue Route No. 25. The construction consisted of an 18 foot Portland cement concrete pavement having a thickness of 9 inches, and a six foot earth shoulder on each side.
“In the year 1952 the southerly 4,000 feet of the above described section of highway was relocated to the east, and widened to 22 feet. The old pavement within the next above limits was disconnected from the new pavement by the complete removal of sections of the old pavement at the north and south ends. The north end of the old pavement is closed to all traffic; however, a gravelled connection of approximately 50 feet in length was made between the old and new pavements at the south end. All Route U.S. No. 45 traffic direction signs were removed from the old section of pavement in 1952, and re-erected immediately along the newly located pavement. The old section of pavement intersects an east-west county road, and serves as an access road for local traffic only in the immediate vicinity.
“The easterly half of that part of the old pavement located north of the county road was and is used for the open storage of stone, broken concrete, cinders, and other materials used in highway maintenance.”

Claimants allege that respondent was negligent because (1) it failed to have the old section of Highway No. 45 properly barricaded; (2) it failed to have the highway properly marked with warning, danger, or other appropriate signs to alert claimant to the fact that the road was closed or dangerous; (3) it failed to have flares, lights, or other warning signals to warn claimant that there was a danger in the road, to-wit: pile of crushed lime rock, or that there was a dangerous condition ahead.

Cecil Hout testified that on the day in question he had stopped at the home of the Secretary of his Union, which was located at the south end of Old Route No. 45. When Hout left the home he traveled north on Old Route No. 45. When Hout crossed Dutch Lane, which intersects Old Route No. 45, he did not see it because of the darkness, nor did he see any signs or barriers. As he proceeded on Old Route No. 45, Hout testified he was abruptly stopped by a rock pile, which ran the width of the road, and was 7 or 8 feet high. The rock pile was not visible, according to Hout. He stated that the glare from the lights of the cars traveling south on New Route No. 45 prevented him from seeing the obstruction.

At no time, Hout testified, did he see a sign, light, or marking indicating that Old Route No. 45 was not in use, or that the rock pile was there. The road on which he was traveling was made of concrete. Hout stated that he had his bright headlights on at the time of the accident, and was going about 40 to 45 miles per hour. The impact demolished the car.

Hugh Osborn, Traffic Engineer for the Division of Highways, testified that Dutch Lane led to the New Route No. 45 from Old Route No. 45. He also stated that Old Route No. 45 was intended to be used for local traffic, and that there are residences located on Old Route No. 45 at the point where it intersects with New Route No. 45.

Respondent presented no testimony or evidence disputing the fact that a rock pile was across Old Route No. 45 at the time of the accident, nor did it attempt to prove that there were warning signs or barriers to advise the traveling public of the existence of the rock pile.

Recovery will not be granted unless claimants prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Cecil Hout was free from contributory negligence; (2) that respondent was negligent; and, (3) that respondent’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

Respondent contends that Cecil Hout was contributorily negligent in that he continued to drive without slackening his speed or stopping when he was allegedly blinded by lights from other cars. Hout stated: “Well, I was going north. I came to a cross road, and the lights from the new highway were shining through there. I couldn’t see, and I ran into this pile of rock.” In other testimony Hout stated that the lights were shining over the rock pile, and he couldn’t see the rock pile. The question to be determined is whether Hout negligently proceeded for 200 or 300 feet at 45 miles per hour without being able to see anything as a result of being blinded by the lights altogether, or whether the lights merely prevented him from seeing the rock pile.

It is contended by respondent that, where the driver of a motor vehicle is so blinded by the lights of an approaching car that he cannot see the road upon which he is traveling for a reasonably safe distance ahead, ordinary prudence and care require that he shall stop, or proceed very slowly until the approaching car has passed. (60 C.J.S., Sec. 201 (h), pp. 541-542.) Respondent further asserts that the driver of a motor vehicle is required to exercise ordinary care to observe or discern dangerous obstructions in the highway, and to avoid running into them.

Photographs were introduced into evidence purporting to show the scene of the accident immediately after its occurrence. The pile of gravel, which stretches across the road, is not clearly visible. A prudent and careful driver could not reasonably anticipate this obstacle in the darkness in absence of warning signs or signals. Instead, he could reasonably assume that the cement highway would not end abruptly without warning.

There is no question but that respondent was negligent in placing a large pile of gravel across the width of a cement highway, little used as it may have been, without any warning signs, lights, or signals. This Court has long held that “although the State is not an insurer of the safety of persons in the lawful use of the highways, it is nevertheless under a duty to give warning by the erection of proper and adequate signs at a reasonable distance of a dangerous condition of which the State had notice either actual or constructive.” (Mammen vs. State of Illinois, 23 C.C.R. 130, 135, citing Bovey vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 95.)

In the Mammen case the Court held that a “No Outlet” sign was insufficient to warn the motoring public of a barricade across the road. In the instant case there were no signs whatsoever, and nothing to warn a reasonably prudent person of the danger created by respondent.

A staff adjuster for Motors Insurance Corporation testified that his company sustained a net loss of $1,463.90, which reflects the salvage recovery on the 1959 Chevrolet Station Wagon. Hout testified that his loss was $50.00, which was the amount deductible under his insurance policy.

Claimant, Cecil Hout, is hereby awarded the sum of $50.00, and claimant, Motors Insurance Corporation, is awarded the sum of $1,463.90.


author: Dove, J.

text:
    (No. 5245
    Richard F. Scholz, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 7, 1966.

    Richard F. Scholz, Jr., Claimant, pro se.

    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Richard F. Scholz, Jr., claimant, presented his statement to the State of Illinois Youth Commission, Division of Community Services, for expenses incurred by him for travel, meals, and lodging from May 8, 1963 to June 8, 1963 in the amount of $113.48 in connection with his services as a member of the Advisory Board to the Division of Community Services.

Claimant prepared and filed with the Illinois Youth Commission a travel voucher for said amount, but the payment of said claim was denied for the reason that there were no funds available, as the appropriation for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed, which stated that the Division of Community Services had investigated the facts set forth in the complaint, and that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed for his incidental expenses. Subsequently a stipulation was entered into between claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which found that claimant had expended the amount of $113.48 for travel, meals, and lodging in connection with his services as a member of the Advisory Board of the Division of Community Services, and that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed in that amount.

It appears that the sole reason for not paying claimant was that the appropriation for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $113.48.


author: Pezman, J.

text:
    (No. 5267
    St. Mary’s Hospital, Decatur, of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, An Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 7, 1966.

    Downing, Smith, Jorgensen and Uhl, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

St. Mary’s Hospital, Decatur, of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, An Illinois Corporation, claimant, presented its statement to the Department of Pub-lie Aid for hospitalization services rendered one Elmer Briscoe for the period from June 11, 1965 to July 23, 1965. The Department of Public Aid had determined that the recipient was eligible to receive aid under its program of Assistance to the Medically Indigent Aged, but the Department denied the claim in relation to that portion thereof for services rendered from June 11, 1965 through June 30, 1965 on the basis that tire claim was for services rendered prior to July 1, 1965, and that the appropriation for that biennium had lapsed. On January 7, 1966, a complaint in this matter was filed in the Court of Claims. It contains a request for payment of the sum of $453.40, representing charges for the hospital services furnished the said Elmer Briscoe during the period of June 11, 1965 through June 30, 1965.

A Departmental Report, which was received in the Attorney General’s office on February 2, 1966, was filed in this matter. It stated: “The Department admits claimant is justly entitled to the amount claimed.” Subsequently, a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and respondent, by their respective attorneys, which found that claimant had furnished services to the said Elmer Briscoe, that the reasonable and equitable charges for the services so provided by claimant amounted to $453.40, and, that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed in that amount.

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been: (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid has lapsed, it would enter an order for the amount due. Memorial Hospital of Du Page County, A Corporation vs. State of Illinois, Case No. 5196, opinion filed January 29, 1965. It appears that all qualifications for an award have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $453.40.


text:
    (No. 5274
    James Herman Gaa, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 7, 1966.

    James Herman Gaa, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

James Herman Gaa, claimant, presented his statement in the amount of $135.55 to the Illinois Department of Public Aid, Sangamon County, for services rendered and salary due him as a case worker for the period from April 16, 1965 to April 30, 1965, inclusive.

The Department of Public Aid mailed a warrant in the amount of $135.55 to claimant. The warrant was returned, and on September 17, 1965 was redeposited. Thereafter, and on February 10, 1966, a complaint in this matter was filed in the Court of Claims. It contains a request for payment of the sum of $135.55 for services rendered during the above period of time.

A Departmental Report was filed in this matter, which stated:

“Mr. Gaa was employed by this agency as a Public Aid Caseworker. He was discharged in April, 1965, after he reported he would not return to work from sick leave. This agency was unable to locate him in order to obtain a resignation, so the discharge was the only method by which we could terminate his employment.
“Vacation was due Mr. Gaa in the amount of $135.55, and this amount was issued to him in warrant No. 474656. We were unable to deliver the warrant after attempts to locate him by phone and registered mail. On September 17, 1965, the warrant was redeposited.
“This Department cannot re-issue the warrant because funds appropriated for such services have lapsed.
“This Department admits that it is a just claim, and the amount is properly due claimant.”

Thereafter a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which found that claimant had been employed by the Department of Public Aid as a Caseworker I; that claimant was entitled to the sum of $135.55; and, that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed in that amount.

This Court has repeatedly held that, where services have been satisfactorily performed; where adequate funds were available at the time the services were rendered; and, where the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an order for the amount due.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $135.55.


text:
    (No. 4971
    Joan Gillespie, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    Doyle and Berdelle, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Joan Gillespie, claimant, filed her complaint in this Court on March 1, 1961 in which she seeks an award of $25,000.00 for the fracture of her right ankle, which required two surgical operations. The injury resulted from a fall, which she experienced when she stepped over a curb into an asphalt parkway in a crosswalk in Evergreen Park, Illinois, which was maintained and controlled by the State of Illinois.

From the evidence it appears that claimant is a white female, thirty-two years of age, a housewife, and mother of three children. She testified that on February 23, 1959 she was crossing 95th Street in a southerly direction in the west crosswalk of South Kedzie Avenue, which intersection was located in Evergreen Park, Illinois. When she arrived at the southwest corner she stepped over a small slanting curb into an asphalt parkway in said crosswalk. The lighting at the intersection was poor, and, as she stepped into the area, her right foot was caught in the hole or cracked asphalt area, which caused her to be thrown to the pavement. As a result, she sustained a fracture dislocation of the right ankle. She was taken by ambulance to the Little Company of Mary Hospital. Subsequently, under a general anesthetic, the fracture was reduced by open surgery, and a cast was placed on her right leg. She remained in the hospital for approximately two weeks, and then was confined to her home with her right leg in a cast. Claimant further testified that she re-entered the hospital on May 31, 1959 and again on June 2, 1959, and, under a general anesthetic, had additional surgery on her right foot for the removal of the screw, which had been inserted in her ankle in the reduction of the fracture. She stated that she still has swelling, pain, and cramps in her foot and toes, and that she has an occasional limp. She testified that her medical expenses and specials totalled $1,175.43.

Medical testimony elicited the fact that the cast remained on her leg for approximately three months, and that, when removed, it was found necessary to remove the screw in her ankle. The condition of pain, discomfort, and swelling of the ankle, as a result of the injury, was believed by the doctor to be permanent.

A disinterested witness who assisted claimant into the drug store, which was located at the intersection where the accident occurred, testified as to the defective condition of the parkway in the crosswalk at the southwest corner of 95th Street and Kedzie Avenue. He stated that this condition had existed for at least four months prior to the date of the accident, and that the lighting at the intersection was poor.

Claimant was also examined by a medical doctor on behalf of respondent. His report confirms claimant’s injury, and likewise finds some loss of use of the right ankle.

Claimant had previously filed a common law action against the Village of Evergreen Park in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. The Village of Evergreen Park defended itself in the said lawsuit on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction over the area where claimant allegedly fell. The lawsuit was dismissed by stipulation, and claimant received $400.00 in settlement thereof on a covenant not to sue the Village of Evergreen Park.

Numerous pre-trial motions were filed by the State of Illinois in this cause, which dealt primarily with the jurisdiction of the State over the area where claimant fell. The motions were supported by various affidavits, plats, and charts, all of which have been read, and examined closely by this Court. From such examination, and from the testimony at the hearing, we are of the opinion that the area where claimant fell was a part of the highway system of the State of Illinois, and was under the jurisdiction of respondent and its agents.

From the evidence, photographs, plats, and charts, we find that a defective condition was present in the parkway and crosswalk, and that there was negligence on the part of the State of Illinois in the maintenance of the parkway in the crosswalk in question, which negligence was directly responsible for the injuries sustained by claimant. Knowledge of the condition was had by the State by reason of the lapse of more than four months, which was certainly sufficient time within which to make repairs or to barricade the same from use by pedestrian traffic. Visco vs. State of Illinois, 23 C.C.R. 149.

Claimant had made a purchase in the commercial area, and was using the west crosswalk to return to her parked automobile. She was crossing with the green light. She had not traversed the intersection on a prior occasion, and found the intersection dimly lighted. Claimant was watchful of the stopped traffic, and was looking ahead as she walked across 95th Street. She was wearing flat, heavy-soled shoes, and the ground was dry. Upon arriving at the south curbing, which was slanted and several inches higher than the adjoining pavement, she placed her right foot over the curbing, and immediately caught it on the cracked section of the parkway, which was just on the other side of the curbing. She fell in a heap with her right foot directly beneath her. Certainly nothing in her actions immediately before or at the time of the occurrence would give rise to any question as to due care for her own safety. We find no evidence of any contributory negligence on the part of claimant.

Claimant has sustained a serious fracture of her ankle, and has undergone multiple operations thereon. She has a disfiguring scar on her ankle, and the evidence indicates that she is unable to wear high heels for normal walking or when driving an automobile. Her ankle continues to swell several times weekly, which causes cramps. These conditions are permanent, as is a loss of motion in the ankle, a permanent scar, and a grating sound on circumduction. We are of the opinion that claimant is entitled to just and fair compensation for said injury.

The question now remaining for the Court to decide is the amount of claimant’s damages. The medical expenses, as previously indicated, totaled $1,175.43. The Court believes claimant is further entitled to an additional award of $5,000.00 for pain, suffering and impairment to her ankle, less the sum of $400.00, which she received from the Village of Evergreen Park.

An award is, therefore, made to claimant, Joan Gillespie, in the sum of $5,775.43.


text:
    (No. 5250
    Jack L. Munch, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 10, 1966.

    William H. Edwards, Jr., Attorney for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

ORDER

On November 8, 1965, claimant filed a complaint with the Court of Claims seeking $10,000.00 from respondent as a result of personal injuries and property damage incurred in an accident, which allegedly involved a car owned by respondent. The accident occurred on November 7, 1963.

Respondent has moved to dismiss the action because of the failure of claimant to file notice within six months from the date of his alleged injury as required by Sec. 22-1 of the Court of Claims Law. The pertinent sections of the Court of Claims Law (Chap. 37, Sec. 439, 1963 Ill. Rev. Stats.) provide as follows:

“Sec. 22-1. Within six months from the date that such an injury was received or such a cause of action accrued, any person who is about to commence any action in the Court of Claims against the State of Illinois for damages on account of any injury to his person shall file in the office of the Attorney General and also in the office of the clerk of the Court of Claims, either by himself, his agent, or attorney, giving the name of the person to whom the cause of action has accrued, the name and residence of the person injured, the date and about the hour of the accident, the place or location where the accident occurred, and the name and address of the attending physician, if any.
“Sec. 22-2. If the notice provided for by Sec. 22-1 is not filed as provided in that section, any such action commenced against the State of Illinois shall be dismissed and the person to whom any such cause of action accrued for any personal injury shall be forever barred from further action in the Court of Claims for such personal injury.”

It should also be noted that Rule 5B of the Court of Claims requires the following procedure:

“Where a claim alleges damages as a result of personal injuries, claimant must attach to his complaint copies of the notices served by him as required by Chap. 37, Sec. 439.22-1, 1963 Ill. Rev. Stats., showing how and when such notice was served.”

There appears to be no question but that claimant has failed to comply with any of the above statutory notice, requirements. However claimant, asks denial of respondent’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that claimant had notified at least two agencies of the State of Illinois of the accident within thirty days after it occurred. The complaint states that claimant had no intention of suing the State of Illinois until the insurance company, which insured the driver of respondent’s car, became insolvent.

This Court has long held that the notice requirements of Sec. 22-1 are a condition precedent to the filing of a complaint against the State of Illinois, and that, where claimant does not show complete compliance, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim.

In Thomas vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 137, 139, the Court held that the burden is on claimant to give the notice required by the statute, and that notice given to a State employee will not constitute compliance. In that case, a report of the accident, which was filed with the Department of Conservation, was not regarded as a notice to the Attorney General and the clerk of the Court of Claims.

In Frey vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 338, the case was dismissed because statutory notice was not filed in either the office of the Attorney General or the clerk of the Court of Claims until 7Vz months after the date of the alleged accident.

The Court in Telford vs. The Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 24 C.C.R. 416, 418, held:

“The patent purpose of notice requirements is to afford respondents an opportunity to promptly and intelligently investigate a claim and prepare a defense thereto, and to thereby protect governmental bodies from unfounded and unjust claims.”

Where a claimant does not allege that he has filed a notice, as provided by the statute, the Court has ruled that such a complaint does not state a cause of action, which would entitle the claimant to recover from respondent. (McDonald vs. The Teachers College Board, 24 C.C.R. 438.)

All claims on account of personal injury must be summarily dismissed where, as in the instant case, the statutory notice requirements have not met with exact compliance.

It appears from the complaint, which was submitted in the instant case, that there is an element of property damage as well as that of personal injury. There is no statutory notice requirement with regard to property damage, although Sec. 22 of the Court of Claims Law requires the filing of a suit with the clerk of the Court within two years after the action first accrues. Respondent contends that two years had already passed before the complaint in this case was filed. We cannot agree with respondent.

Sec. 22 of the Court of Claims Law (Chap. 37, Sec. 439.22, 1963 Ill. Rev. Stats.) provides that “every claim . . . cognizable by the Court and not otherwise sooner barred by law shall be forever barred from prosecution therein unless it is filed with the clerk of the Court within two years after it first accrues . . .” The interpretation of this section of the statute may be found in Chap. 131, “Construction of Statutes,” Sec. 1.11, 1965 Ill. Rev. Stats., which provides as follows:

“The time within which any Act provided by law is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is Sunday or is a holiday . . . and then it shall also be excluded.”

In the instant case, therefore, the fact that November 7, 1965 fell on a Sunday would extend the filing deadline to Monday, November 8, 1965. Since claimant’s action was timely, he may prosecute his claim as to property damage in this Court.

Accordingly, claimant’s action for damages incurred as a result of personal injury is dismissed, but the action for alleged property damage will be allowed to remain in this tribunal.


text:
    (No. 5257
    A. Michael Hess, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    A. Michael Hess, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Dr. A. Michael Hess of Rockford, Illinois seeks to recover for services rendered to one Noah Motsinger of Loves Park, Illinois, on March 1, 1965. Claimant sought to recover the sum of $400.00 for surgical services rendered said patient under the program of Aid to the Medically Indigent. It appears that the claim was originally presented to the Winnebago County Department of Public Aid in September of 1965. That Department determined the patient was eligible, but denied the claim upon the basis that the claim was not presented in apt time for processing payment from the appropriation for the 73rd biennium. Subsequently, on January 19, 1966, claimant filed an amended complaint reducing the amount of payment sought to $125.00.

On May 2, 1966, a stipulation of facts between Dr. A. Michael Hess and William G. Clark, attorney for respondent, was filed with the Court of Claims. It establishes the facts in the case to be as follows:

“1. That this claim arises out of the surgical services furnished Noah Motsinger on March 1, 1965 by Dr. A. Michael Hess.
“2. That the subject patient was eligible to receive assistance under the program of Assistance to the Medically Indigent Aged, but claimant did not submit a bill to the Winnebago County Department of Public Aid until September 27, 1965, which was too late for the county department to process same within the 73rd biennium appropriation.
“3. That the Department of Public Aid in its Departmental Report, dated January 4, 1966, admitted an amount is due to claimant in the sum of $125.00, and the only reason this sum had not been paid was that the Doctor presented his bill too late to be processed under the 73rd biennium.
“4. Claimant again represents that there has been no assignment or transfer of the claim in this cause, or any part thereof, or interest therein, and that he is justly entitled to the sum of $125.00 from the State of Illinois, or the Department of Public Aid, after allowing just credits.”

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been: (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an order for the amount due. Rockford Memorial Hospital, a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, Case No. 5165, opinion filed September 25, 1964; Memorial Hospital of Du Page County, a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, Case No. 5197, opinion filed January 12, 1965. It appears that all qualifications for an award have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is awarded the sum of $125.00.


text:
    (No. 5263
    Richard A. Carleton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion tiled May 10, 1966.

    Richard A. Carleton, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant, Richard A. Carleton, seeks to recover from respondent the sum of $60.00 for services rendered to one Mary Ellen Jackson at the request of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation of the State of Illinois. Claimant alleges that demand for payment was made from the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, and that such demand was refused on the grounds that the funds appropriated for the Division for such payment had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed in this matter on the day of February 2, 1966, which states as follows:

“An authorization was written for supervision and management during hospitalization to Dr. Richard Carelton for the period 5/21/65 to 6/16/65. This was to run four weeks with a schedule of $25.00 for the first week, $15.00 each for the next two weeks, and $5.00 for the fourth week. There was no insurance participation, and the bill presented by the doctor was not received in time to clear in the grace period of this fiscal year. This is a legal claim, the service was given, and the claim should be paid.”

Subsequently a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and respondent clearly establishing that claimant furnished services to the said Mary Ellen Jackson; that the reasonable and equitable charges for the services furnished was the sum of $60.00; and, that claimant is entitled to be reimbursed in that amount.

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been: (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an order for the amount due. Rockford Memorial Hospital, a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, case No. 5165, opinion filed September 25, 1964; Memorial Hospital of Du Page County, a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, Case No. 5197, opinion filed January 12, 1965. It appears that all of the qualifications, which were set forth in the case of Memorial Hospital vs. State of Illinois, have been met.

Claimant is awarded the sum of $60.00.


author: Pezman, J,

text:
    (No. 5276
    The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J,

Claimant seeks to recover from respondent the sum of $25.78 for materials delivered to the Bureau of Machinery, Division of Highways of the State of Illinois, at the State Garage in Ottawa, Illinois, and alleges that demand was made for payment of the said sum of $25.78, and that such demand was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for the Bureau of Machinery for such payments had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed in this matter by the Department of Public Works and Buildings of which the Bureau of Machinery is a part, and this Report agrees that the merchandise delivered, i.e. tires, was received in good condition, and that the charges are true and correct. Subsequently a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and respondent incorporating the Departmental Report as the sole and only evidence to be admitted in said cause, and finding that claimant had furnished the materials, and was justly entitled to be reimbursed in the sum of $25.78.

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been: (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an order for the amount due. Rockford Memorial Hospital, A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, case No. 5165, opinion filed September 25, 1964; Memorial Hospital of Du Page County, A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, case No. 5197, opinion filed January 12, 1965.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $25.78.


text:
    (No. 5278
    Medical Surgical Clinic, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    Medical Surgical Clinic, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Medical Surgical Clinic, claimant, presented its statement in the amount of $139.50 to the Illinois Department of Public Aid for services rendered to R. W. Curtis.

Claimant had prepared and filed with the Illinois Department of Public Aid a voucher for services rendered. Payment was refused, however, for the reason that there were no funds available, as the appropriation for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed, which stated that the said Department had not paid the sum of $139.50; and, further, that the claim was just and valid, and claimant was entitled to payment.

Subsequently a stipulation was entered into between claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which found that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed for services rendered the patient, R. W. Curtis, in the amount of $139.50.

It appears that the sole reason for not paying claimant was that the appropriation for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $139.50.


text:
    (No. 5279
    Centreville Township Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    Centreville Township Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Centreville Township Hospital, claimant, presented its statement to the Department of Public Aid of St. Clair County for hospitalization services rendered one Zula Elizabeth McLane, for the period from June 19, 1965 to July 1, 1965. The Department of Public Aid had determined that the recipient was eligible to receive aid under its program of Assistance to the Medically Indigent Aged, but the Department denied the claim on the grounds that the appropriation for the biennium had lapsed.

On February 25, 1966, a complaint in this matter was filed in the Court of Claims. It contains a request for payment of the sum of $232.75.

A Departmental Report was filed in this matter, which stated: “The claim in the amount of $232.75 is a just and valid amount, and has not been paid by the Department. The claimant is justly entitled to the payment of the above amount.”

Subsequently a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and respondent, which found that claimant had furnished services to the said Zula Elizabeth McLane; that the reasonable and equitable charges for the services so provided by claimant amounted to $232.75; and, that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed in that amount.

It appears that all qualifications for an award have been met in the instant case. (Memorial Hospital of DuPage County, a Corporation vs. State of Illinois, case No. 5196 opinion filed January 29, 1965.)

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $232.75.


text:
    (No. 5280
    Raymon A. Oberlander, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    Raymon A. Oberlander, Claimant, pro se.

      William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Raymon A. Oberlander, claimant, presented his statement in the amount of $84.78 to the Department of Financial Institutions for expenses incurred by him for travel, meals, and lodging from April 26, 1965 to June 8, 1965, in connection with his services as a member of the Board of Credit Union Advisers.

Claimant had prepared and filed with the Department of Financial Institutions a travel voucher for said amount, but payment of the claim was refused for the reason that the funds appropriated for the Department of Financial Institutions for such payment had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed admitting that claimant is a member of the Board of Credit Union Advisers, and that he was entitled to be reimbursed for his incidental expenses.

Subsequently a stipulation was entered into between claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois,, which found that claimant had expended the amount of $84.78 for travel, meals, and lodging in connection with his services as a member of the Board of Credit Union Advisers, and that he was entitled to be reimbursed in that amount.

It appears that the sole reason for not paying claimant was that the appropriation for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $84.78.


text:
    (No. 5282
    Kenneth O. Green, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    Kenneth O. Green, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Kenneth O. Green, claimant, presented his statement in the amount of $350.00. to the Department of Public Aid of St. Clair County for cataract surgery on the right eye of R. Carl Koch.

Claimant had prepared and filed with the Department of Public Aid a statement for said amount, but payment of the claim was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for the Department of Public Aid for such payments had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed, which states as follows:

“The amount claimed of $350.00 is not according to our fee schedule, as the maximum allowable by the Department is $100.00, and Dr. Green is aware of this maximum. The claim in the amount of $100.00 is a just and valid claim due from the Department.”

Subsequently a stipulation was entered into between claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which found that claimant should be paid the sum of $100.00 for the services rendered to the said R. Carl Koch.

It appears that the sole reason for not paying claimant was that the appropriation for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $100.00.


text:
    (No. 5286
    The Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, A Missouri Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    The Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, A Missouri Corporation, Claimant, pro se.

    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

The Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, a Missouri Corporation, claimant, presented its statement in the amount of $950.99 to the Department of Public Aid for hospitalization services rendered one Anna Bloss, for the period from April 20, 1965 to May 23, 1965. The Department of Public Aid had determined that the recipient was eligible to receive aid under its program of Assistance to the Medically Indigent Aged, but the Department denied the claim on the basis that the claim was for services rendered prior to July 1, 1965, and that the appropriation for that biennium had lapsed. On March 4,1966, a complaint in this matter was filed in the Court of Claims.

A Departmental Report was filed in this matter, which stated:

“The facts alleged in items 2 through 10 are true to the best of the Department’s knowledge, and the claimant is justly entitled to $950.99.”

Subsequently a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which found that claimant had furnished services to the said Anna Bloss; that the reasonable and equitable charges for the services so provided by claimant amounted to $950.99; and, that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed in that amount.

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been: (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an order for the amount due. (Memorial Hospital of Du Page County, a Corporation vs. State of Illinois, case No. 5196, opinion filed January 29, 1965.)

It appears that all qualifications for an award have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $950.99.


text:
    (No. 5287
    Angelo’s Firestone, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    Angelo’s Firestone, Claimant, pro se.

    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Angelo’s Firestone seeks from respondent payment of the sum of $49.71 for materials delivered to the State Highway Garage of the State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, said Garage being located at 4051 North Harlem Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Claimant seeks payment of said sum of $49.71 for said materials delivered, and alleges that its demand for payment was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for the Department of Public Works and Buildings for such payments had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed in this matter, which indicated that the materials ordered were received in good condition, and that the charges were true and correct. On May 2, 1966, a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and respondent, which found that claimant furnished said materials to the State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings; that the amount claimed, $49.71, was the reasonable and equitable charge for said material; and, that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed in that amount.

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been: (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into; and (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed; it would enter an order for the amount due. Rockford Memorial Hospital, a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, Case No. 5165, opinion filed September 25, 1964; Memorial Hospital of Du-Page County, a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, case No. 5197, opinion filed January 12, 1965. It appears that all qualifications for an award have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $49.71.


text:
    (No. 5288
    Burnham City Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    Burnham City Hospital, Claimant, pro se.

    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Burnham City Hospital, Champaign, Illinois, claimant, presented its statement to the Department of Public Aid for hospitalization services rendered one Mayme M. Hatter for the period from. June 6, 1965 to June 19, 1965. The Department of Public Aid of Ford County had determined that the recipient was eligible to receive aid under its program of Assistance to the Medically Indigent Aged, but the Department denied the claim on the basis that the funds appropriated for such payment had lapsed. On March 7, 1966, a complaint in this matter was filed in the Court of Claims, which requested payment of the sum of $72.03.

A Departmental Report was filed in the matter, which stated: “Claimant is justly entitled to the payment of $72.03.”

Subsequently a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and respondent, which found that claimant had furnished services to the said Mayme M. Hatter; that said charges were reasonable and equitable; and, that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed in the amount of $72.03.

It appears that all qualifications for an award have been met in the instant case. (Memorial Hospital of DuPage County, a Corporation vs. State of Illinois, No. 5196, opinion filed January 29, 1965.)

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $72.03.


text:
    (No. 5290
    Jose Morales, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    Jose Morales, Claimant, pro se.

    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Jose Morales, Claimant, presented his statement in the amount of $45.00 to the Department of Public Aid of St. Clair County for professional services rendered to Beatrice R. Egbert on April 2, 1965.

Claimant had prepared and filed with the Department of Public Aid a statement for said amount, but payment was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for the Department of Public Aid for such payments had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed admitting that claimant was justly entitled to payment in the amount of $45.00.

Subsequently a stipulation was entered into between claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which found that claimant was entitled to the sum of $45.00 for professional services rendered, as above set forth.

It appears that the sole reason for not paying claimant was that the appropriation for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $45.00.


text:
    (No. 5292
    William F. Rose, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    William F. Rose, Claimant, pro se.

    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

William F. Rose, claimant, presented his statement in the amount of $125.00 to the Department of Public Aid of St. Clair County for surgery on one Arthur Steininger.

Claimant had prepared and filed with the Department of Public Aid a statement for said amount, but payment of the claim was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for the Department of Public Aid for such payments had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed, which states as follows:

“The amount due from Department is $100.00. This is established by the Department’s fee schedule, and cannot be exceeded, but claimant is justly entitled to the payment of $100.00.”

Subsequently a stipulation was entered into between claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which found that claimant was entitled to the sum of $100.00 for services rendered the said Arthur Steininger.

It appears that the sole reason for not paying claimant was that the appropriation for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $100.00.


text:
    (No. 5294
    The Memorial District Hospital of Mattoon, A Municipal Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 10, 1966.

    Craig and Craig, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

The Memorial District Hospital of Mattoon, Illinois, claimant, presented its statement to the Department of Public Aid for hospitalization services rendered one Bessie B. Sampson for the period from June 23, 1965 to June 30, 1965. The Department of Public Aid for Moultrie County had determined that the recipient was eligible to receive aid under its program to the Medically Indigent Aged, but the Department denied the claim on the basis that the funds appropriated for such payments have lapsed. On March 25, 1966, a complaint in this matter was filed in the Court of Claims requesting payment of the sum of $489.75.

A Departmental Report was filed in the matter, which stated “The Department further admits that $489.75 is a valid and just amount due claimant.”

Subsequently a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and respondent, which found that claimant had furnished services to the said Bessie B. Sampson; that said charges were reasonable and equitable; and, that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed in the amount of $489.75.

It appears that all qualifications for an award have been met in the instant case. (Memorial Hospital of DuPage County, A Corporation vs. State of Illinois, No. 5196, opinion filed January 29, 1965.)

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $489.75.


text:
    (No. 5077
    Lazar Nikolic, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1966.

    Hugh B. Arnold, Attorney for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Sheldon K. Rachman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant, Lazar Nikolic, filed his complaint in this Court on November 30, 1962 seeking an award in the amount of $25,000.00 from the State of Illinois for personal injuries sustained by him when he was attacked by a fellow patient at the Illinois State Psychiatric Institute on November 10, 1961.

From the evidence it appears that claimant and James Watt were patients on the eighth floor of the Illinois State Psychiatric Institute, which is located at 1601 West Taylor Street in Chicago. At approximately 5:00 A.M. on November 10, 1961, Patient Watt who was returning from the bathroom in the company of a female aide ran into claimant’s room, and attacked Nikolic who was sleeping. Nikolic’s nose was broken. There was a cut over his nose and right eye, and he had two black eyes.

Claimant was committed to the Institute on May 23, 1961. It is not a maximum security type institution. Primarily it is a teaching and research institution, and secondarily serves the community. Patients are selected for the purpose of teaching residents in the art of psychotherapy, as well as for the benefit of the patients. It is jointly run by the State of Illinois, the five medical schools in the area, and the Michael Reese Hospital. There were eighteen patients in the ward to which claimant was committed, and each has his own room. The entrance to the ward was locked, but normally each patient’s room was kept unlocked at all times. The rooms could only be locked from the outside.

James Watt was also a patient in claimant’s ward. Watt was diagnosed as a disturbed man who was somewhat subdued, and had a delusion of persecution. He had homosexual fears that either people would call him a homosexual, or that people would attack him sexually. The Psychiatric Resident at the Institution testified that Watt had attacked claimant on two occasions, the first being approximately a month before the attack in November, which resulted in claimant’s broken nose. On the first occasion, as on the second, claimant was sleeping. He was struck in the left eye by Watt, as a result of which he sustained a black eye, which was discolored for approximately three weeks. Following this first instance, the staff “talked the matter over with Mr. Watt.” The evidence further discloses that Watt’s condition was one of having delusions of being persecuted, and a paranoid personality with homosexual feelings. Following the first attack on claimant, a female aide was assigned to Watt. Her function was to supervise his activities, but not to physically control them.

The Psychiatric Resident, a medical doctor, testified that he was aware of the possibility that Mr. Watt might attack either claimant or other patients. He discussed the matter with the staff, and more medication was prescribed for Mr. Watt to quiet his anxieties, but no recommendation was made for tighter security measures, although he was assigned an aide to take care of him, but not for the purpose of physically controlling him. During this period of time, Watt attacked two or three patients. Maximum medication was given to Watt, and he was secluded to his room for a week; then the door was unlocked during the day, and locked only at night. The doctor testified also that he could not predict that Watt would attack claimant again, but that there was a likelihood he would. Although the record contains corroborated and uncontradicted testimony of two physical assaults and battery by Watt on claimant while he was sleeping, the first resulting only in a black eye, the second resulting in two black eyes and a broken nose, and assaults on at least two other patients, still the three witnesses from the Institution did not consider Watt to be a dangerous person. They distinguished this by saying that he was a potentially dangerous person. The doctor could have recommended that Watt be transferred to a maximum security unit, but did not do so.

In the case of Maloney vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 567, we held that the agents of the State are required to use ordinary care to protect persons and their property from being damaged by those placed under their charge.

In view of the facts that Watt was described as being “a little impulsive,” was known to have destroyed property, had attacked claimant the month before, had attacked two or three other patients, and the staff knew that Mr. Watt “might attack”; and, in view of the fact that Watt passed within a few feet of Nikolic’s room in going to and from the bathroom, this should have been enough of a warning to the attendant to escort him manually past claimant’s door. The fact that Watt was in the company of a female aide who probably could not have controlled him does not relieve respondent of its obligation to safeguard claimant, but only calls into question respondent’s failure to transfer Watt to a different type institution in order to protect the safety of claimant and other patients.

Claimant was not guilty of contributory negligence. He was mentally ill, and could not be charged with the same degree of care for his own safety as a mentally competent person. However, there was nothing he could have done to protect himself, as he was attacked when asleep in the room assigned to him with the door open according to the rules of the hospital.

An award to claimant, Lazar Nikolic, is, therefore, made in the sum of $3000.00.


text:
    (No. 5266
    Watland, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1966.

    Watland, Inc., claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Gerald S. Grobman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Watland, Inc., claimant, presented its statement to the Department of Public Health for Verifax supplies in the amount of $69.40.

Claimant had prepared and filed with the Department of Public Health a statement for said amount, but payment of said claim was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for the Department of Public Health for such payments had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed, which stated that the Verifax supplies had been received, and that said claimant was entitled to payment of the above amount.

Subsequently a stipulation was entered into between claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which found that claimant was entitled to the sum of $69.40 for the Verifax supplies so delivered.

It appears that the sole reason for not paying claimant was that the appropriation for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $69.40.


text:
    (No. 5275
    Daniel E. Edgecombe, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1966.

    Armstrong, Winters, Prince and Tenney, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant, Daniel E. Edgecombe, seeks to recover from the State of Illinois the sum of $450.00, which was deposited by him as evidence of financial responsibility in accordance with Chap. 95%, 1965 Ill. Rev. Stats., commonly known as the “Safety Responsibility Provision of the Motor Vehicle Law” of the State of Illinois. Claimant alleges that, as the result of an automobile accident in which he was involved on the 21st day of November, 1960, he deposited as responsibility security the stun of $450.00 with the Secretary of State, and received for the same a receipt issued by that office. Claimant further alleges that all claims of a civil nature regarding said accident have been disposed of, and that a demand was made upon the Secretary of State for the return or refund of the deposit of $450.00, but was refused return of the money by virtue of the fact that the security deposit had been transferred to the General Revenue Fund of the State Treasury in accordance with Sec. 7-503 of the Illinois Motor Vehicle Law. No Departmental Report was filed by the Secretary of State, but attached to the complaint is a photographic copy of a letter, dated January 25, 1966, which indicates that the security was deposited on April 7, 1961, and was transferred to the General Revenue Fund in the State Treasury on September 1, 1964. In compliance with the statute, the Office of the Secretary of State, Drivers License Division, Safety Responsibility Section, did notify claimant on July 15, 1964 that such action would be taken.

Section 7-503 of Chap. 95%, Ill. Rev. Stats., provides as follows:

“During July, annually, the Secretary of State shall compile a list of all securities on deposit, pursuant to this Article, for more than three years and concerning which he has received no notice as to the pendency of any judicial proceeding that could affect the disposition thereof. Thereupon, he shall promptly send a notice by certified mail to the last known address of each such depositor advising him that his deposit will be subject to escheat to the State of Illinois if not claimed within thirty days after the mailing date of such notice. At the expiration of such time, the Secretary of State shall file with the State Treasurer an order directing the transfer of such deposit to the General Revenue Fund in the State Treasury. Upon receipt of such order, the State Treasurer shall make such transfer, after converting to cash any other type of security. Thereafter any person having a legal claim against such deposit may enforce it by appropriate proceedings in the Court of Claims subject to the limitations prescribed for such Court. At the expiration of such limitation period such deposit shall escheat to the State of Illinois.” (Added by act approved Aug. 7, 1961. L. 1961, p. 2868.)

On March 28, 1966, a written stipulation was filed with this Court, the same having been entered into between claimant and respondent by their respective attorneys, whereby the evidence mentioned herein above as being attached to the complaint of claimant was admitted into evidence without objection by either party. The stipulation further agreed that no oral or written evidence would be introduced, and that briefs would be waived by both parties. It further stated that both parties would waive notice of any hearing, and agreed that the aforesaid order could be entered without either party being present.

Pursuant to this stipulation, and by authority of the language contained in Sec. 7-503 of Chap. 95%, 1965 Ill. Rev. Stats., claimant is awarded the sum of $450.00.


text:
    (No. 5284
    Josiah S. Cooper, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1966.

    Josiah S. Cooper, Jr., Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant, Josiah S. Cooper, Jr., seeks to recover the sum of $387.64 for reimbursement of expenses for travel and for meals in connection with his duties as an employee of the Division of Highways of the Department of Public Works and Buildings. Claimant alleges that he presented his claim for that amount to the Division of Highways, but that payment of said claim was denied because the appropriation available for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed in this matter and received in the Attorney General’s Office on March 23rd, 1966. It stated in part:

“The only reason that the travel expenses have not been paid is that Mr. Cooper failed to submit the travel vouchers for the months of April, May, and June in time for them to be scheduled for payment from- the 73rd biennium appropriation. If the vouchers had been submitted at the proper time, payment of the travel expenses would have been made.”

Thereafter, a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and respondent, which found that claimant had furnished the money for the expenses claimed, and should be reimbursed for the same.

This Court has routinely held that, where a contract was properly entered into; the right to receipt of certain funds established; and, adequate funds were available at time said monies were expended on behalf of the State, then, when the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim should have been paid had lapsed, it will enter an order for the amount due.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $387.64.


text:
    (No. 5302
    Fairbury-Forrest Clinic, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1966.

    Fairbury-Forrest Clinic, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Fairbury-Forrest Clinic, claimant, presented its statement to the Department of Children and Family Services for services rendered one Rodney Bailey in the amount of $148.15.

Claimant had prepared and filed with the Department of Children and Family Services a statement for said amount, but payment of said claim was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for the Department of Children and Family Services for such payments had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed, which stated that the services were rendered, and that claimant was entitled to payment of the above amount.

Subsequently a stipulation was entered into between claimant and the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which found that claimant was entitled to the sum of $148.15 for services so rendered.

It appears that the sole reason for not paying claimant was that the appropriation for the 73rd biennium had lapsed.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $148.15.


text:
    (No. 5304
    Mays C. Maxwell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1966.

    Mays C. Maxwell, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant, Mays C. Maxwell, M.D., presented his statement to the Department of Public Aid for surgical services rendered to one Nona Sanders on the 23rd day of June, 1965. The Department of Public Aid had determined that the recipient was eligible to receive aid under its program of Assistance to the Medically Indigent Aged, but the Department denied the claim for the services rendered on June 23, 1965 on the basis that the claim was for services rendered prior "to July 1, 1965, and the appropriation for that biennium had lapsed. On April 27, 1966, claimant filed his complaint in the Court Claims, seeking to recover the sum of $100.00 for the surgical services furnished the said Nona Sanders on June 23, 1965.

A Departmental Report was filed in this matter as exhibit A, and, pursuant to stipulation, admitted into evidence. The Report consists of a letter from Harold O. Swank, Director, and states in part as follows:

“This is a justifiable claim. The services were performed, but the Department of Public Aid did not receive the bill before the appropriation for the 73rd biennium lapsed.”

Thereafter, a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and respondent, which found that claimant had furnished the services to the said Nona Sanders, and that the reasonable and equitable charges for the same amounted to the sum of $100.00.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $100.00.


text:
    (No. 5309
    St. Mary’s Hospital, East St. Louis, of the Hospital Sisters of the Poor Handmaids of Jesus Christ, An Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 14, 1966.

    Hotto and Marsh, Attorneys for Claimant.

      William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

St. Mary’s Hospital, East St. Louis, of the Hospital Sisters of the Poor Handmaids of Jesus Christ, claimant, presented its statement to the Department of Public Aid for hospitalization services rendered one Ida Silvey for the period from May 13, 1964 to June 13, 1964. The Department of Public Aid of St. Clair County had determined that the recipient was entitled to receive aid under its program of Assistance to the Medically Indigent Aged, but the Department denied the claim on the basis that the funds appropriated for such payments had lapsed. On May 4, 1966, a complaint in this matter was filed in the Court of Claims requesting payment in the amount of $560.82.

A Departmental Report was filed in this matter, which stated: “Claimant is justly entitled to the amount of $560.82.”

Subsequently a written stipulation was entered into between claimant and respondent, which found that claimant had furnished services to the said Ida Silvey; that said charges were reasonable and equitable; and that claimant was entitled to be reimbursed in the amount of $560.82. It appears that all qualifications for an award have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $560.82.


text:
    (No. 4904
    Jonnia Dirkans, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 25, 1965.

      Petition of claimant for rehearing denied August 17, 1966.

    Joseph A. Donovan and Kenneth S. Jacobs, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Edward A. Warman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

On March 3, 1958, between 2:00 ánd 2:30 A.M., claimant, Jonnia Dirkans, was drinking coffee in an establishment located on 47th Street in the City of Chicago, which was known as the “Hub Restaurant.” After he had been there for ten or fifteen minutes he was arrested by two police officers of the City of Chicago on the complaint of a woman and her male companion who were in the restaurant. The woman stated that Dirkans was the man who had robbed her approximately one month before at a point near Prairie Avenue and 55th Street in the City of Chicago.

Jonnia Dirkans, claimant in this cause, was indicted for armed robbery by the Cook County Grand Jury. The indictment alleged that on the 4th day of February, 1958, claimant assaulted the complaining witness, Berl Shorter, and, while armed with a dangerous weapon (indicated as being a knife), by force and intimidation robbed her of $65.00.

Claimant pleaded “not guilty” in the Criminal Court of Cook County, and waived a trial by jury. He was defended by an attorney from the Office of the Public Defender of Cook County in the trial before Hon. Grover C. Niemeyer, a Judge of the Criminal Court of Cook County. The trial took place on two separate dates, i.e., May 13, 1958 and June 16, 1958. Witnesses testifying in the criminal trial were Beryl Shorter, the complaining witness on behalf of the State, and Jonnia Dirkans, defendant in his own behalf. The defense offered was that defendant was not anywhere near the area of the alleged armed robbery at the time and place indicated by Beryl Shorter.

At the very beginning of the criminal trial the attorney from the Public Defender’s Office informed the Court, “If the Court please, in this Dirkans’ case I have two witnesses who are not here, but I am willing to go ahead and let them put in their case. And, if necessary, I will get my witnesses in later.” Again, at the close of the first segment of the criminal trial, Mr. John M. Branion, Assistant Public Defender, informed the Court that he could not proceed further in the defense because he had two witnesses who were not present. One lived downstate, and the other had moved but a few months before. During the second portion of the trial, which was resumed on June 16,1958, Mr. Bran-ion stated as follows, “I don’t know whether I have my witnesses, but I am ready to dispose of it. They are not present. I don’t know whether they will be here.” The Court asked him whether or not he was ready to proceed, and he stated, “I am ready to put my defendant on.” He restated, “I am ready to proceed with the defense.” During all of this questioning the defendant, Jonnia Dirkans, was present in open Court.

Following the conclusion of the trial on June 16, 1958, the Court entered a finding of “guilty of armed robbery,” and, on July 2, 1958, fixed the sentence at from one to four years in the State Penitentiary. A motion for a new trial on behalf of the defendant was denied, as was his motion in arrest of judgment. In November of 1959, Jonnia Dirkans brought a Petition for a Writ of Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, and, due to his financial inability, requested that the Court appoint counsel on his behalf to prosecute the Writ of Error.

In People of the State of Illinois vs. Jonnia Dirkans, 18 Ill. 2d 300, 164 N.E. 2d 23, the Supreme Court noted in its opinion that the Trial Judge in his decision and opinion in support of the finding of guilty against the defendant misinterpreted and misconstrued the evidence by stating that it was his recollection that the complaining witness had identified the defendant on two occasions, while, in fact, the evidence in the trial showed that she had only identified Jonnia Dirkans after the alleged robbery in the restaurant on March 3, 1958. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Criminal Court of Cook County. It stated that the confusion on the point identification was doubtlessly due to the lapse of more than thirty days between the hearing of the State’s case and judgment.

Following the reversal of his conviction and release from the State Penitentiary, Jonnia Dirkans filed a petition in the Court of Claims under the provisions of Chap. 37, Sec. 439.8C, Ill. Rev. Stats., which confers jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear and determine “all claims against the State for time unjustly served in prisons of the State where the persons imprisoned prove their innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned.”

On January 10, 1961, Chief Justice Joseph J. Tolson and Judges Gerald W. Fearer and James B. Wham entered an order for a general continuance in this cause. Prior thereto it had been consolidated with several other cases pending in the same category, namely, Virgil Baker vs. State of Illinois, Henry Napue vs. State of Illinois, and Roland Munroe, Jr., vs. State of Illinois. The contents of the order are set forth below:

“1. In 1959 the Court of Claims Act was amended as follows: (Chap. 37, Sec. 439.8, 1959 Ill. Rev. Stats.)
The Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters:
(a) --------
(b) --------
(c) All claims against the State for time unjustly served in prisons of this State where the persons imprisoned prove their innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned; provided, the Court shall make no award in excess of the following amounts:
For imprisonment of five years or less, not more than $15,-000.00; for imprisonment of 14 years or less but over 5 years, not more than $30,000.00; for imprisonment of over 14 years, not more than $35,000.00, and provided further the Court shall fix attorneys’ fees not to exceed 25% of the award granted.
“2. The above cases have been filed, and present diverse factual situations concerning proof of innocence,’ and this Court is unable to determine the legislative intent insofar as ‘the persons imprisoned prove their innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned.’
“3. The Court, therefore, finds that it is unable to hear and determine such cases without further clarification of the statute by an act of the Legislature.
“IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that all of the above cases be continued generally, without prejudice to either claimants or respondent, pending further action by the Legislature.”

This Court at the time the above order was entered felt that the Legislature would take some action to clarify the terminology “proof of innocence.” However, since no further clarification was made by the 1961 Legislature, on January 9, 1962, this Court, on its own motion, rescinded the order consolidating the several cases with that of Jonnia Dirkans, as well as its order of January 10, 1961 continuing the cases generally, and further directed that they be placed on the trial calendar for assignment to the Commissioners of the Court of Claims for hearing.

Hearings were held on August 27, September 5, October 19, and December 6, 1962, respectively, in this matter, during which claimant, Jonnia Dirkans, brought forth by subpoena the testimony of Jean Gilliand who was alleged to have been one. of the missing witnesses in the original criminal trial. She testified that claimant had spent from approximately 2:00 until 8:00 A.M. on February 4, 1958 with her and her small child in his room.

Claimant argues that he was deprived of more than two years of freedom by his incarceration in the State Penitentiary, as a result of mistaken identity by the complaining witness. He prays for recovery of an award of $15,000.00, as prescribed by the statutory provision, and, in addition thereto, an amount not to exceed 25 percent of the award granted as fees for his attorneys.

Respondent introduced the testimony of three police officers and one Deputy Clerk in the office at the City Hall. This testimony was in relation to the question of whether or not a lounge, which was located on the first floor of the building in which claimant had a room, was legally open for business between the hours of 2:00 and 4:00 A.M. on February 4, 1958, at which time it was alleged that the said Jean Gilliand went to the lounge to make certain purchases. Respondent contends that claimant, in addition to his conviction of the crime resulting in the presentation of the claim at hand, had been guilty of larceny in the State of Michigan, and had served three to four years for said conviction. It further contends that claimant substantiated his own testimony with the discredited testimony of a female witness who testified that on February 4, 1958, the date on which the alleged criminal act occurred, she had engaged in illicit relations with claimant during the entire night, as she had done on many other occasions.

Irregardless, the most important question involved in the cause at hand is whether or not claimant, Jonnia Dirkans did “prove his innocence” of the crime. It is believed that this is one of the first cases to be filed under the provisions of Chap. 37, Sec. 439.8C, Ill. Rev. Stats. A check of the authorities and precedents available indicates that there is no case in Illinois in which the statute involved, or the language “prove their innocence of the crime,” have been construed. The Illinois reports are devoid of authority on this point.

Reaching beyond the borders of our State, we find three cases in which the language and facts are of a similar nature. In Bertram M. Campbell vs. State of New York, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 638, defendant sought to recover from the State of New York for false imprisonment from May 17, 1938 to August 22, 1941. It appears that subsequently another man confessed to the crime of which defendant was convicted, and, on August 28, 1945, Thomas E. Dewey, the then Governor, pardoned defendant. The State of New York passed an enabling statute allowing him to sue and recover by presenting his claim to the Court of Claims of the State of New York.

In another case, People vs. Hoffner, 129 N.Y.S. 2d 833, defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and moved to set aside the judgment on the ground that he had been deprived of due process, inasmuch as a record of the proceedings of the lineup had been made, but thereafter was not made available to his defense counsel. In that matter the Court held that defendant was deprived of due process of law, and the judgment of conviction was vacated. Subsequently, Hoffner brought his action against the State in the New York Court of Claims for damages arising out of the wrongful conviction and imprisonment. That body held that, where defendant was erroneously convicted, the decision of the Court reversing the conviction is determinative where claims are made for wrongful conviction. The reversal apparently was a sufficient basis on which the Court of Claims could make an award. However, there was again an enabling statute granting claimant permission to bring his action in the Court of Claims of the State of New York.

There, is language of further interest to this Court in the case of Cratty vs. United States, 83 Fed. Sup. 897, which was brought before the United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio. This was a proceeding to secure a Certificate of Innocence, as provided for in 28 U.S.C.A., Secs. 1495 and 2513. In that situation claimant sought a Certificate of Innocence, which authorizes indemnification of innocent persons convicted of a crime. Respondent contended that claimant was not an innocent victim of a miscarriage of justice, and that a jury had found him guilty upon sufficient evidence. It was pointed out by respondent that it did not appear from the allegations of the Petition of Claimant, Judgment of Reversal of the Circuit Court of Appeals, or the Order of the District Court thereon that claimant did not commit any of the acts with which he was charged, or that claimant’s conduct in connection with such charges did not constitute a crime or offense against the United States. The government further contended that claimant was not one whom the statute was intended to benefit. Claimant Cratty was convicted of a violation of the Mail Fraud Statute, but was acquitted on the conspiracy charge. The conviction for Mail Fraud was later set aside in the Circuit Court of Appeals as having been barred by the Statute of Limitations. The Court denied the right of Cratty to recover under the statute authorizing indemnification of innocent persons who have been unjustly imprisoned. The Court ruled it was satisfied that the facts and circumstances presented therein did not make out such a case as Congress meant to include within the humane provisions of the statute there under consideration.

In the first place, the New York Statute, Sec. 9-3A of the Court of Claims Act, is quite different from that of Illinois. It is as follows:

“3A. To hear and determine the claim for damages against the State of any person heretofore or hereafter convicted of any felony or misdemeanor against the State and sentenced to imprisonment, who, after having served all or any part of his sentence, shall receive a pardon from the Governor, stating that such pardon is issued on the grounds of innocence of the crime for which he was sentenced.”

This statute relieves the Court of Claims of the State of New York of a considerable burden. Nevertheless, few, if any, claims have been filed under the New York Statute, and the cases cited above from that State were filed pursuant to enabling acts passed by the Legislature.

The law in Illinois is clear that claimant must prove his innocence in order to be entitled to an award by the Court of Claims. The burden is upon claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the time served in prison was unjust; (2) that the act for which he was wrongfully imprisoned was not committed by him; and, (3) the amount of damages to which he is entitled. (Jack Flint vs. State of Illinois, 21 C.C.R. 80; George A. Pitts vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 258.)

Claimant seeks to prove his innocence by the testimony of Jean Gilliand, a witness he was unable or unwilling to produce at the original criminal trial. That case was called for trial on May 13, 1958 before the Court without a jury. At the time claimant’s counsel stated that defendant had two witnesses who were not present, but that he was willing to permit the State to put its case on, if he could bring in defendant’s witnesses later. The State then proceeded with its case on that date, and the cause was continued until May 22, 1958. On that date it was again continued until June 16, 1958, at which time counsel for defendant stated that he did not know whether he had any witnesses, but that he was ready to dispose of the case. It appears that defendant was definitely present in open Court, and did not raise his voice or object to proceeding without the witnesses. As claimant in this cause of action, the same defendant seeks to convince this Court that he be permitted to retry the original charge against him by introducing the testimony of the witness, Jean GiUiand, and thereby establish his right to recover the sum of $15,000.00 from respondent.

The testimony of the said witness, Jean Gilliand, appears on page 97 of the original transcript of evidence in this cause of action, and portions of it are quoted below:

“Q. Did you ever receive after you left for Harrisburg any communication from Mr. Dirkans?
A. Well, I wrote him a letter, and — well, that was a week after I was down there, and he answered, and then I never heard any more after that.
Q. You did write him a letter?
A. Yes.
Q. About how long after you got to Harrisburg?
A. It was about a week, I’d say.
Q. Did you receive an answer to that?
A. Yes, he answered it.
Q. Within how long a period of time?
A. I’d say about three or four days.”

From this testimony it is clear that Jonnia Dirkans, at a time some two or three weeks before his arrest, knew exactly where to communicate with the witness whom he was unable or unwilling to produce at the original criminal trial.

We find that claimant, Jonnia Dirkans, has substantially failed to prove his innocence of the crime for which he was imprisoned. It is the studied opinion of this Court that the Legislature of the State of Illinois in the language of Chap. 37, Sec. 439.8C, Ill. Rev. Stats., intended that a claimant must prove his innocence of the “fact” of the crime. It was not, we believe, the intention of the General Assembly to open the Treasury of the State of Illinois to inmates of its penal institutions by the establishment of their technical or legal innocence of the crimes for which they were imprisoned. It is our opinion the legislators intended to provide a manner of recourse in the Court of Claims, with a specific amount of recovery provided, for a claimant who is able to establish his complete innocence of the “fact” of the crime for which he was imprisoned. The lawmakers of this State would not have intended to grant that recourse to the narcotic addicts, murderers, kidnappers, rapists, and other felons who obtain a reversal of their convictions upon a legal or technical basis, such as insanity at the time of commission of the crime, or the running of the Statute of Limitations against said crime. We believe it was the intention of the Legislature in creating Sec. 439.8C of the Court of Claims Act to provide a method of indemnification of persons innocent of the “fact” of the crime who have been unjustly imprisoned.

Claim is denied.