text:
    (No. 0048
    Josephine Hill, as wife of Burl Hill, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 10, 1974.

    Norbert J. Goetten, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a part-time policeman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant" to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act”, [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch.48, Sec. 281 et. seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full court on May 14, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Josephine Hill, is the wife of the decedent, and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow;

2. That the decedent, Burl Hill, was a part-time policeman employed by the City of Grafton and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on August 24, 1972;

3. That on said date, a report was made to the Police Department that "boys had escaped from the (Illinois) Youth Camp” in Grafton. Officer Hill was in the Grafton police car and was called to the launching ramp along the Illinois River, since the report of the escape indicated that a boat had been taken. Officer Hill and Mayor Nairn, Officer Hill’s supervising officer, "figured the boys would come ashore at the launching ramp.” Mayor Nairn and Officer Hill waited at the launching ramp until 1:00 a.m. when Mayor Nairn left the scene, Hill remaining. At 2:10 a.m. Officer Hill was joined by another part-time police officer, Steven D. Hays. After waiting approximately five minutes, the officers heard what sounded like a motor going in a boat and saw a flashlight. The moon came out and they could see a boat coming down the bank on the Grafton side. As the boat reached the ramp, Officer Hill turned on the beam on the police car and the officers saw three subjects and a motor in the boat. They were ordered to halt by Officer Hays, however, the boat continued on across the island at a slow pace. Officer Hill directed Officer Hays to go down the river to a sewage disposal area and wait in the event the suspects would come ashore there. Officer Hays found the abandoned boat and motor and brought them back to the launching ramp. At the same time, Officer Hill was tying up another boat that he had found in Officer Hays’ absence, which Officer Hill believed to be the property of one Mr. Arnold. Officer Hill directed Officer Hays to check the Arnold dock to see if his boat was gone. Officer Hays did as directed and upon his return, approximately three to five minutes later, he found Officer Hill lying on his right side on the launching ramp, whereupon Officer Hays radioed for an ambulance. Officer Hill was pronounced dead on arrival at Jersey Community Hospital at 3:45 a.m.;

The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "acute coronary occlusion” due to or as a consequence of "arteriosclerotic heart disease with extensive old myocardial infarction”;

No one knows whether Officer Hill actually encountered the escaped convicts during Officer Hays’ absence. However, the Court was convinced by the evidence that the excitement and strain in pursuing escaped convicts late at night caused or precipitated this officer’s fatal heart attack. Although Officer Hill’s death might not have occurred as it did if he had no pre-existing heart disease, coverage under the Act is not limited to healthy law enforcement officers;

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Officer Hill was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Act; and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (ten thousand dollars) be awarded to Josephine Hill, as surviving widow of the deceased police officer, Burl Hill.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 00050
    Mary E. Finlen, as wife of Charles M. Finlen, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois.

      Opinion filed July 10, 1974.

    Mary E. Finlen, Claimant, Pro Se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full court on May 14, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Mary E. Finlen, is the wife of the decedent, and, in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow;

2. That the decedent, Charles M. Finlen, was a volunteer fireman employed by the Minonk Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on June 10, 1973;

3. That on said date, Firefighter Finlen was called to an auto accident scene 2% miles east of Minonk and arrived at approximately 1:00 p.m. in his own auto. It was a hot and humid day and Firefighter Finlen wore a helmet and street clothing. Pumper Unit #4 and Rescue Squad #5 responded to the call and Firefighter Finlen was assigned to work with either unit. His duties were to extricate the people trapped in the two wrecked cars which had collided nearly head-on. Finlen was involved in the rescue, helping the victims to be placed in an ambulance. While so engaged, at approximately 1:15 p.m., Finlen collapsed and died. Emergency medical technicians and personnel present attempted to revive him without success. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "acute coronary occlusion” due to or as a consequence of "obesity”. The Court was convinced by the evidence that the strain and exertion in the aforesaid performance of his duties caused or precipitated this fireman’s fatal heart attack. Although his death might not have occurred as it did, if he had been in normal health, coverage under the Act is not limited to healthy firemen;

4. We find, therefore, that Fireman Finlen was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act; and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (ten thousand dollars) be awarded to Mary E. Finlen as wife and beneficiary of the deceased volunteer fireman, Charles M. Finlen.


text:
    (No. 00044
    Vivian D. Nolan, as wife of Thomas J. Nolan, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 24, 1974.

      Sidney Zipperman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill.Rev.Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Vivian D. Nolan, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Thomas J. Nolan, was a fireman employed by the Chicago Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on January 1, 1973;

3. That on said date, Lt. Nolan’s unit responded to a fire alarm in a two-story, townhouse residence at 6254 W. Peterson. Lt. Nolan was in command of three other men. and his unit was required to ventilate the building and search for occupants. Lt. Nolan, wearing his fire coat, helmet and boots, and carrying a hand light, entered the front of the first floor. The fire was directly below in the basement arid Lt. Nolari proceeded through the first floor apartment which was full of heavy smoke and heat, in search of a youth: who was reported by bystanders to be living iti the apartment. After searching the first floor Lt. Nolan went to the rear basement stairwell área.

Captain Bradshaw, in charge of Engine 119, states that at this time he was in the basement cohibating the fire. Firefighter Schoens came to Captain Bradshaw and fold him thát Lt. Nolan was not feeling well. Captain Bradshaw said he told Lt. Nolán to rest on the stairs. He describes Lt. Nolan as looking dazed and státes that he complained of weakness and chest pain. After sitfing down for a short time Lt. Nolan arose and started down the steps into the basement. Bradshaw ordered him to leave, and Lt. Nolan climbed the stairs and collapsed in the rear yard. Lt. Nolan was taken to Resurrection Hospital and placed in intensive care. He never returned to fire duty. The hospital physician, Dr. William R. O’Con-nor, states that a diagnosis was made upon admission of "acute posterior wall myocardial infarction due to arteriosclerotic heart disease arid also smoke inhalation

Lt. Nolan was discharged from the hospital on January 27, 1973, and continued under the regular care of his attending physician. On March 17, 1973, Lt. Nolan was stricken and collapsed in his home. He was rushed to Skokie Valley Hospital and pronounced dead on arrival. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "acute myocardial infarction” due to or as a consequence of "arteriosclerotic heart disease” and stating "other significant conditions” as "smoke inhalation”.

The report of Dr. William R. O’Connor who attended Lt. Nolan in the hospital and after his release states:

"It is felt that this entire illness since the inception on January 1, 1973, was one condition that was never adequately controlled. It is my opinion that his fire fighting activities on the 1st day of January, 1973, were an acute precipitating factor in his myocardial infarction and that the smoke inhalation that he suffered was a precipitating factor. At no time was I able to improve the condition adequately to declare him fit to return to duty.”

The Court was convinced by the evidence that the strain and smoke inhalation suffered in the aforesaid performance of his duties caused or precipitated this fireman’s fatal heart attack. Although his death might not have occurred as it did if he had been in normal health, coverage under the Act is not limited to healthy firemen;

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Lt. Nolan was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Vivian D. Nolan as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased fireman, Thomas J. Nolan.


text:
    (No. 00052
    Mable Haupt, as wife of Albert A. Haupt, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 24, 1974.

      Elsie G. Holzwarth, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of an auxiliary patrolman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Fireman Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et. seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Mable Haupt, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Albert A. Haupt, was an auxiliary patrolman employed by the Village of Orland Park Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on April 19, 1973;

3. That on said date, Officer Haupt was called to replace a "second shift” radio operator, Lois Garmon, who was hospitalized that day. Officer Haupt was, therefore, considered to be on duty from 4:00 p.m. on, as this was an emergency, "late call-out,” assignment, not regularly scheduled. At approximately 4:15 p.m., Mrs. Haupt drove her husband to the police station as his own car was under repair. Mrs. Haupt stopped the car in the station driveway within five or six feet from the station entranceway from the passenger’s side. Officer Haupt had exited from the car and was bending toward his wife when his gun fell to the driveway, discharged and struck him in the chest. Officer Haupt was dead on arrival at Palos Community Hospital. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "bullet wound of chest (heart and lung).”

The Court takes notice of the analysis of the Cook County Coroner’s Toxicologist showing an alcoholic content in the blood, but finds that the death of Officer Haupt was not contributed to, nor caused, by the consumption of alcohol.

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Officer Haupt was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Mable Haupt as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased patrolman.


text:
    (No. 00055
    Nancy J. Barron, as wife of Edward L. Barron, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 24, 1974.

    Nancy J. Barron, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Nancy J. Barron, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Edward L. Barron, was a patrolman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act on February 28, 1973;

3. That on said date, Patrolman Barron and his partner, Patrolman Daniel Abate, responded to a police call of a robbery in progress on the street at 8004 S. Kingston Avenue. The police officers were furnished with a description of the offender, and the direction of his flight. The officers observed a suspect fitting the description at 7958 S. Colfax. Both officers began to pursue the suspect, identifying themselves as policeman; they shouted to him to stop. As the officers approached him, the suspect pointed a gun at the officers and fired once, striking Barron. Patrolman Barron was pronounced dead on arrival at South Shore Hospital and the Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "bullet wound of the brain”.

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Patrolman Barron was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Nancy J. Barron as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased policeman, Edward L. Barron.


text:
    (No. 00058
    Mary Ann Barth, as wife of Richard J. Barth, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

      Mary Ann Barth, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a patrolman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Mary Ann Barth is the wife of the decedent and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Sec. 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow;

2. That the decedent, Richard J. Barth, was a patrolman employed by the Village of Downers Grove Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on March 18, 1974;

3. That on said date, Patrolman Barth responded to a call reporting two suspicious youths in the Northwest Park area. Officer Barth entered the park area on foot whereupon he was shot several times. Subsequent investigation resulted in the apprehension and arrest of two juvenile males who, it was discovered, had burglarized a residence in Downers Grove immediately prior to the killing of Officer Barth. The residence in question is located approximately two blocks from Northwest Park and the suspects fled through the park dropping some of the stolen items after the killing. Officer Barth was pronounced dead on arrival at Hinsdale Hospital, the Coroner’s Certificate of Death indicating the cause of death as "multiple gun shot wounds”.

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Officer Barth was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (twenty thousand dollars) be awarded to Mary Ann Barth as wife and beneficiary of the deceased patrolman, Richard J. Barth.


text:
    (No. 00059
    Terry Lynn (Anderson) Mayborne, as wife of Michael Edward Mayborne, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

    Terry Lynn (Anderson) Mayborne, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent’ Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent,
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a detective allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers. and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, "the Act”) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et. seq.

The Court has. carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Terry Lynn (Anderson) May-borne, is the wife of the decedent, and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Sec. 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow,

2. That the decedent, Michael E. Mayborne, was a detective employed by the Winnebago County Sheriff’s Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on March 15, 1974;

3. That on said date, Detective Mayborne responded to a call of a robbery at the Poplar Grove State Bank in Boone County. The suspect was observed entering a barber shop approximately one mile from the bank and Detective Mayborne, among others, proceeded to the scene. While attempting to capture the bank hold-up suspect, Detective Mayborne was shot in an exchange of gun fire and was pronounced dead on arrival at Rockford Memorial Hospital. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "gunshot injury to brain.”

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Detective May-borne was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (twenty thousand dollars) be awarded to Terry Lynn (Anderson) Mayborne as wife of the deceased detective, Michael Edward Mayborne.


text:
    (No. 00060
    Carol Ann Tiberi, as wife of John P. Tiberi, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

    Carol Ann Tiberi, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stats. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General's office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Carol Ann Tiberi, is the wife of the decedent and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Sec. 3(a) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the surviving widow;

2. That the decedent, John P. Tiberi, was a fireman employed by the Chicago Heights Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on May 6, 1974;

3. That on said date, Fireman Tiberi responded to a report of a telephone pole fire. On reaching the scene, Fireman Tiberi, carrying a booster hose, climbed a 24-foot ladder which was extended to approximately six feet below the electrical wires, in an attempt to extinguish the fire. After experiencing "a mild tingle” in his hands, Fireman Tiberi slumped and fell against the ladder, losing consciousness. At that time, Lt. Skowronski, Tiberi’s supervising officer, heard "the sound of electricity.” Lt. Skowronski climbed the ladder to remove Fireman Tiberi and on the way down, Tiberi fell approximately twelve feet to the ground from Skowronski’s grasp. Resuscitation was administered at the scene; however, Tiberi did not respond and was pronounced dead on arrival at St. James Hospital, Chicago Heights. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the cause of death as "cariopulmonary collapse, due to or as a consequence of, electric shock.”

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Fireman Tiberi was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Carol Ann Tiberi as wife and beneficiary of the deceased fireman, John P. Tiberi.


text:
    (No. 00061
    Gloria Bodnar, as wife of William C. Bodnar, Jr., Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

    Gloria Bodnar, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Brkupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respv. ent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act),” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Gloria Bodnar, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, William C. Bodnar, Jr., was a patrolman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on April 8, 1974;

3. That on said date, Patrolman Bodnar notified the Police Department communications division that he and his partner, Patrolman Thomas Wodarczyk (Court of Claims number 00064), were pursuing a stolen automobile traveling west on Van Burén Street. While the squad car was attempting to stop the wanted vehicle, a 2 Mi-ton produce truck entered the intersection of Morgan and Van Burén and collided with the police car. As a result of the impact, the truck fell on top of the squad car pinning both officers in the wreckage. The officers were transported to Illinois Research Hospital where they were pronounced dead on arrival. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "multiple injuries extreme”.

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Patrolman Bodnar was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Gloria Bodnar as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased patrolman, William C. Bodnar, Jr.


text:
    (No. 00063
    Ellyn Marsek Vachula, as mother of William C. Marsek, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

    Ellyn Marsek Vachula, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10,1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Ellyn Marsek Vachula, is the mother of the decedent and is one of the beneficiaries who was designated by him, together with decedent’s brother, Charles W.Marsek, as stated in the application for benefits.

2. That the decedent, William C. Marsek, was a patrolman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on February 27, 1974.

3. That on said date, Officer Marsek was fatally wounded while questioning a suspect, later identified as Jacob Paul Cohen, in a tavern at 1818 W. Foster. At the same time, Marsek’s fellow officer and partner, Bruce N. Garrison (Court of Claims No. 00065) was also fatally wounded, when the suspect pulled a gun from his jacket and fired "point blank” at both officers. Officer Marsek was pronounced dead on arrival at Ravenswood Hospital. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "bullet wound of head (brain), of chest (lung, heart and aorta), and of abdomen (mesentary and aorta).”

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Officer Marsek was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Ellyn Marsek Vachula, as the mother of the decedent, and $10,000 (Ten Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Charles W. Marsek, as brother of the decedent, both of whom were designated as beneficiaries of the deceased policeman, William E. Marsek.


text:
    (No. 00064
    Patricia Wodarczyk, as wife of Thomas Wodarczyk, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

    Patricia Wodarczyk, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a patrolman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, §281 et. seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence, submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Patricia Wodarczyk, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Thomas Wodarczyk, was a patrolman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of §2(e) of the Act, on April 8, 1974;

3. That on said date, Patrolman Wodarczyk notified the Police Department communications division that he and his partner, Patrolman William S. Bodnar, Jr. (Court of Claims number 00061), were pursuing a stolen automobile traveling west on Van Burén Street. While the squad car was attempting to stop the wanted vehicle, a 2M>-ton produce truck entered the intersection of Morgan and Van Burén and collided with the police car. As a result of the impact, the truck fell on top of the squad car pinning both officers in the wreckage. The officers were transported to Illinois Research Hospital where they were pronounced dead on arrival. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "multiple injuries extreme.”

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Patrolman Wodarczyk was killed in the line of duty as defined in §2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Patricia Wodarczyk as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased patrolman, Thomas Wodarczyk.


text:
    (No. 00065
    Edna Garrison, as mother of Bruce N. Garrison, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

    Edna Garrison, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiaries pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stats., 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10,1974, the Court finds.as follows:

1. That the claimant, Edna Garrison, is the mother of the decedent, a divorced man with two minor children, and in the absence of a designated beneficiary, Section 3(b) of the Act provides that any award hereunder shall be paid to the decedent’s descendants.

2. That the decedent, Bruce N. Garrison was a policeman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act, on February 27, 1974.

3. That on said date, Officer Garrison was fatally wounded while questioning a suspect, later identified as Jacob Paul Cohen, in a tavern at 1818 W. Foster. At the same time, Garrison’s fellow officer and partner, William C. Marsek (Court of Claims No. 00063) was also fatally wounded, when the suspect pulled a gun from his jacket and fired "point blank” at both officers. Officer Garrison was pronounced dead on arrival at Ravenswood Hospital. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "bullet wound of head, brain.”

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Officer Garrison was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to decedent’s minor children, Brett, aged 7 and Michael, aged 4, upon receipt by the Court of a certified copy of Letters of Guardianship, or upon their attaining their majority.


text:
    (No. 00066
    Olivia Hendree, as mother of James W. Campbell, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

    Olivia Hendree, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, §281 et. seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence, submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Olivia Hendree, is the mother of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits,

2. That the decedent, James W. Campbell, was a patrolman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of §2(e) of the Act, on February 1, 1974;

3. That on said date, Patrolman Campbell, having been assigned to a walking "beat” duty, entered a currency exchange at 5111 South Halsted. While in the currency exchange, with his back to the door, two unknown males entered the currency exchange, attacked Patrolman Campbell from behind, pulled his service revolver from his holster and shot Officer Campbell three times in the back and left shoulder as he struggled to apprehend them. Officer Campbell was removed to Billings Hospital where he remained until February 9, 1974, when he died of complications resulting from his wounds. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "bullet wound of chest-back (spinal cord)”;

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Patrolman Campbell was killed in the line of duty as defined in §2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Olivia Hendree as mother and designated beneficiary of the deceased patrolman, James W. Campbell.


text:
    (No. 00067
    Carol Jankovsky, as wife of Joseph R. Jankovsky, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

    Carol Jankovsky, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a patrolman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, §281 et. seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Carol Jankovsky, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Joseph R Jankovsky, was a Patrolman employed by the Countryside Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of §2(e) of the Act, on April 6, 1974;

3. That on said date, Patrolman Jankovsky was struck by a camper-trailer truck while outside of his patrol car and beside another vehicle he had stopped for an apparent traffic violation on Route 45 (near 67th Street) in Countryside. Patrolman Jankovsky died on April 6, 1974, and the Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "multiple injuries extreme.”

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Patrolman Jankovsky was killed in the line of duty as defined in §2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (twenty thousand dollars) be awarded to Carol Jankovsky as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased patrolman, Joseph Jankovsky.


text:
    (No. 00068
    Kathleen J. Whalen, as former wife of Michael L. Whalen, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

    Kathleen J. Whalen, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, §281 et. seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s suprvising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10,1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Kathleen J. Whalen, is the former wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Michael L.. Whalen, was ,a fireman employed by the Elgin Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of § 2(e) of the Act., on June .2, 1974;

3.. That, on said date, Fireman Whalen died in an attempt to rescue one James A. Krueger, who was trapped on a rubber raft in turbulent water beneath the Kimball Street dam of the Fox River. Krueger hád gone over the dam by reason of the strong current up river.

. 4. The Court finds, therefore, that Fireman Whalen was killed in the line of duty as defined in §2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Káthleen J. Whalen as former wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased fireman, Michael L. Whalen.


text:
    (No. 00069
    Barbara J. Balsis, as wife of Stanley Balsis, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1974.

    Barbara J. Balsis, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a fireman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, §281 et. seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Barbara J. Balsis, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Stanley Balsis, was a fireman employed by the Elgin Fire Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of §2(e) of the Act, on June 2, 1974;

3. That on said date, Fireman Balsis died attempting to rescue one James A. Krueger who was trapped on a rubber raft in turbulent water beneath the Kimball Street dam of the Fox River. Krueger had gone over the dam by reason of the strong current up river;

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Fireman Balsis was killed in the line of duty as defined in §2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Barbara J. Balsis as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased fireman, Stanley Balsis.


text:
    (No. 00070
    Anna M. Freeman, a/k/a Marguerite Freeman, as wife of Floyd Dean Freeman, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1976.

    Anna M. Freeman, a/k/a Marguerite Freeman, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a law enforcement officer, allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” [hereafter, "the Act”] Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on July 10, 1974, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Anna M. Freeman, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Floyd Dean Freeman, was a "Chief Investigator” employed by the Sheriff of Rock Island County and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on March 22, 1974.

3. That on said date, Sgt. John W. DePew, of the Sheriff’s Department, was attempting to place a prisoner, one Richard D. Owens, into a detention cell in the jail building. Owens refused to enter the detention cell and a scuffle ensued. Deputy Freeman was sitting near by and came to Sgt. DePew’s aid. The two officers struggled with the prisoner for approximately three to five minutes and finally restrained him and put him in the detention cell. After the scuffle, Sgt. DePew stated that Deputy Freeman’s face was "flush” and "he was breathing a little hard.” Deputy Freeman left the office at approximately 3:20 p.m. and thereafter called Dr. Joseph P. Hanrahan whose answering service contacted the doctor at his home. Dr. Hanrahan advised the answering service to contact Mr. Freeman and have him go to Franciscan Hospital where he was admitted to Intensive Care unit complaining of upper-mid-abdominal pain. Dr. Hanrahan contacted a Dr. A. W. Weise, a specialist of internal medicine for consultation, who reported that the patient was complaining of upper gastric discomfort. Later in the day, Deputy Freeman died suddenly of a heart attack. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recited the immediate cause of death as "Pulmonary Edema, due to or as a consequence of shock, due to or as a consequence of exertion.”

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Deputy Freeman was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act, and

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Anna M. Freeman, a/k/a Marguerite Freeman, as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased Deputy, Floyd Dean Freeman.


text:
    (No. 00056
    Elberta Collier, as wife of Charles Collier, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 23, 1975.

    James S. Parker, Attorney for claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a law enforcement officer, allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s surviving spouse pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, "the Act”) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on May 12,1975, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Elberta Collier, is the wife of the decedent as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Charles Collier, was an Effingham County Deputy Sheriff and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2 (e) of the Act, on October 12, 1973;

3. That on said date, Deputy Sheriff Collier, in uniform, was struck by a tractor-trailer truck while outside of his patrol car and beside another vehicle he had stopped, after pursuit, for an apparent traffic violation on Interstate Route 57, approximately six miles north of Effingham, Illinois. At the time of stopping said vehicle, Deputy Sheriff Collier had been engaged in the active search and pursuit of an escaped prisoner from Menard Penitentiary. Deputy Sheriff Collier was killed instantaneously on October 12, 1973, and the Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "multiple injuries extreme”;

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Deputy Sheriff Collier was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sect. 2(e) of the Act, and;

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Elberta Collier, as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased Deputy Sheriff, Charles Collier.


text:
    (No. 00077
    Eugenia Love, as wife of Donald Dean Love, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 23, 1975.

    Philip Wynn, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a law enforcement officer, allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s surviving spouse pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Fireman Compensation Act,” (hereafter, "the Act”) Ill. Rev. Stat., 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted at a hearing before the full Court on May 12, 1975, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Eugenia Love, is the wife of the decedent as stated in her application for benefits;

2. There was no "Designation of Beneficiary” form executed by the decedent prior to his death;

3. That the decedent, Donald Dean Love, was a Deputy Sheriff employed by the Sheriff of Macoupin County and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on January 4, 1974.

4. That on said date, Deputy Love, in full uniform, responded in a marked Sheriff’s automobile to a call of a disturbance at a home near the Carlinville city limits, where one David Woods, age 24, who had a history of mental problems and treatment, had been harassing a young lady and another couple. Deputy Love drove the Sheriff’s automobile onto the driveway of the residential property, parking it directly behind Woods’ car, at a location approximately 250 feet from the main roadway. The driveway was a sheet of ice and the weather was extremely cold, near zero degrees. Deputy Love entered the residence and began his investigation. Shortly thereafter, Woods attempted to enter the home, and Deputy Love told Woods that he would not be permitted to talk to the young lady, who was also within the house. At that instant, Woods ran from the porch of the home cursing and began to undress as he ran from the house into the darkness. Deputy Love pursued Woods, who began to throw pieces of ice at the officer. Deputy Love used his "mace” in an effort to subdue Woods. Woods then ran to his car, with Love chasing him, and Woods locked himself inside of his automobile in an attempt to avoid arrest. Thereafter, with the assistance of Woods’ uncle, who had arrived at the disturbance scene, Deputy Love was able to handcuff Woods. Deputy Love then began to lead Woods to the Sheriff’s squad car when Love suddenly collapsed, as a result of his exertion in pursuing Woods, through the darkness for more than 250 feet, in the bitter cold, in an attempt to apprehend him. Deputy Love was taken immediately to Carlinville Area Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival, approximately five minutes after his collapse. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recited the immediate cause of death as "ventricular fibrillation”, with an approximate interval between onset and death of "5-15 minutes”;

5. The Court finds, therefore, that Deputy Love was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act, and;

6. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Eugenia Love, as surviving spouse of the deceased Deputy, Donald Dean Love.


text:
    (No. 00079
    Mary Howard, as mother of Daniel E. Howard, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 23, 1975.

    Mary Howard, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a patrolman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, "the Act”) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Section 281 et. seg.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; official reports of the Chicago Police Department; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Mary Howard, is the mother of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Daniel E. Howard, was a patrolman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on January 1, 1975;

3. That on said date, patrolman Howard and his partner, patrolman Donald E. Andrews (Court of Claims No. 00082), both in uniform and in a marked Chicago Police Department squad car, responded to a police radio call of a "felony in progress, two men with a shotgun, aboard a southbound CTA train, from 31st Street on the Dan Ryan Route.” While traveling westbound to intercept the train, their squad car entered the intersection of 43rd Street and Michigan Avenue, where it was struck by a southbound, second, Chicago Police Department squad car responding to the same "felony in progress” call. As a result of the violent impact, the squad car in which officer Howard was riding was totally damaged. Officer Howard was transported to Mercy Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "multiple injuries extreme;”

4. The Court finds therefore, that Patrolman Howard was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2 (e) of the Act, and;

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Mary Howard, as mother and designated beneficiary of the deceased patrolman, Daniel E. Howard.


text:
    (No. 00082
    Cara Lee Andrews, a minor child and designated beneficiary of Donald E. Andrews, Deceased, by her court appointed guardian, Cara J. Noumoff, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 23, 1975.

    Cara Noumoff, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of the death of a patrolman allegedly killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, "the Act”) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Section 281 et. seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; official reports on the Chicago Police Department; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Cara Lee Andrews, age 13, is the daughter, sole surviving heir and designated beneficiary of the decedent as stated in the application for benefits filed in her behalf by her guardian, Cara J. Noumoff, pursuant to Cara J. Noumoff’s appointment as guardian by the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County.

2. That the decedent, Donald E. Andrews, was a patrolman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act, on January 1, 1975;

3. That on said date, patrolman Andrews and his partner, patrolman Daniel E. Howard (Court of Claims No. 00079), both in uniform and in a marked Chicago Police Department squad car, responded to a police radio call of a "felony in progress”, two men with a shotgun, aboard a southbound CTA train, from 31st Street on the Dan Ryan Route.” While traveling westbound to intercept the train, their squad car entered the intersection of 43rd Street and Michigan Avenue where it was struck by a southbound, second, Chicago Police Department squad car responding to the same "felony in progress” call. As a result of the violent impact, the squad car in which officer Andrews was driving was totally damaged. Officer Andrews was transported to Mount Sinai Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The Coroner’s Certificate of Death recites the immediate cause of death as "multiple injuries extreme.”

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Patrolman Andrews was killed in the line of duty as defined in Section 2 (e) of the Act, and;

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to his daughter, Cara Lee Andrews, as designated beneficiary; however, by reason of her minority, the proceeds should be paid to "Cara J. Noumoff, as guardian of the person and estate of Cara Lee Andrews, pursuant to order entered February 7, 1975 by the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County”.


text:
    (No. 00087
    Christine V. Strugala, as wife of Robert Strugala, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 23, 1975.

    Christine V. Strugala, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, "the Act”) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et. seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; official reports of the Chicago Police Department; and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Christine V. Strugala, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Robert Strugala, was a patrolman employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act on June 16, 1974;

3. That on said date, Patrolman Strugala and his partner, Joseph Wasco, in full police uniform, responded to the sound of gun shots coming from a tavern located at 2601 S. Kedzie Avenue, Chicago. The officers heard the gun shots fired while they stopped for a traffic signal, at the intersection of 26th Street and Kedzie Avenue, in their marked, Chicago Police Department squadrol. Officer Strugala, entered the tavern at Kedzie Avenue and Officer Wasco entered on 26th Street. Officer Wasco observed a suspect, later identified as Jose Guillen, holding an automatic pistol. Officer Wasco ordered Guillen to drop the pistol; instead, Guillen began to walk towards Officer Wasco. At this time, Officer Wasco fired one shot from his revolver, was shot in return, and fell outside on the sidewalk. Guillen then fired three additional shots in the direction of Officer Strugala, striking Strugala three times in the back. Guillen was arrested by other police officers as he attempted to flee from the tavern with the pistol still in his possession. Patrolman Strugala was taken to Mount Sinai Hospital, where he was pronounced dead. The immediate cause of his death was the three gun shot wounds.

Jose Guillen was found guilty of the murder of Officer Strugala by Judge Phillip Romiti in the Circuit Court of Cook County and he was sentenced to "50 to 100 years in prison.” In addition, Guillen was sentenced to a concurrent sentence of "10 to 30 years” for the attempted murder of Officer Wasco.

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Patrolman Strugala was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sect. 2(e) of the Act, and;

5, That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Christine V. Strugala, as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased patrolman, Robert Strugala.


text:
    (No. 00089
    Neva Cali, as wife of Joseph Cali, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 23, 1975.

    Neva Cali, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, and Vincent Biskupic, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim, arising out of the death of a policeman killed in the line of duty, seeks payment of compensation to the decedent’s beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of the "Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereafter, "the Act”) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, Ch. 48, Sec. 281 et. seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Attorney General; official reports of the Chicago Police Department and a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Neva Cali, is the wife of the decedent and is the beneficiary who was designated by him as stated in her application for benefits;

2. That the decedent, Joseph Cali, was a police officer employed by the Chicago Police Department and engaged in the active performance of his duties, within the meaning of Sec. 2(e) of the Act on May 19, 1975.

3. That on said date, Officer Cali and his partner, Officer James Kehoe, in full police department uniform, were patroling east on Lake Street, Chicago, in a full marked police car.

At Hoyne and Lake Avenues, they noticed a number of illegally parked cars along Lake Street. They stopped their vehicle at about 2103 West Lake Street, and Officer Cali got out of his police vehicle and began writing a traffic summons on an illegally parked car.

As Officer Cali stood by the illegally parked car, completing the traffic citation, he was struck directly above the left ear by a sniper shot filed from a rifle. The sniper fired from the housing project building at 2111 West Lake Street. Officer Cali was taken to Cook County Hospital; he did not recover consciousness from the time he was struck by the sniper shot; and he was pronounced dead the following morning at 8:22 a.m., May 20, 1975, as a result of the gun shot wound to his head.

4. The Court finds, therefore, that Officer Cali was killed in the line of duty as defined in Sec. 2 (e) of the Act, and;

5. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20,000.00 (Twenty Thousand Dollars) be awarded to Neva Cali, as wife and designated beneficiary of the deceased patrolman, Joseph Cali.


author: Dove, J.

text:
    (No. 5268
    Ray Alm and Donald Alm, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 10, 1968.

    Robert E. Kenny, Jr., Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky and Etta Cole, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

This is a cause of action brought by the Claimants against the Respondent, State of Illinois, for injuries suffered by Claimant, Donald Aim, a minor, while riding his bicycle along a three foot median strip dividing 95th Street in Cook County, Illinois.

The three cyclists had left the Evergreen Shopping Plaza, located on the south side of 95th Street and Western Avenue (2400 West), destined for the Branding Iron Restaurant, located on the north side of 95th Street, approximately one block west of Crawford Avenue (4000 West). Until they reached Crawford Avenue, the boys rode their bicycles on the sidewalk near the south curb of 95th Street. West of Crawford Avenue there are no sidewalks along 95th Street. After crossing Crawford Avenue, the three boys rode along the south curb of 95th Street, facing eastbound traffic, in a single file, with Donald Aim riding first, Terry Ellis riding second, and James Anderson riding third.

At a point approximately one-half block west of Crawford Avenue, when eastbound traffic was light and westbound traffic was stopped for the traffic light at Crawford Avenue, Donald Aim began to cross 95th Street in a northwesterly direction destined for the north curb of 95th Street, with Terry Ellis following. Upon reaching the center strip or median, the westbound traffic was released by the traffic light at Crawford Avenue and, since Donald Aim was unable to cross the westbound lanes of traffic, he continued westbound along the median strip with Terry Ellis following. After riding from 50 to 70 feet along the median strip, Donald Aim’s bicycle struck an unmarked hole approximately three inches deep and two feet long, which caused him to be thrown immediately in front of an oncoming eastbound car, which collided with and traveled over the Claimant.

Albert Miller, a police officer of the Village of Oak-lawn, arrived at the scene of the accident one or two minutes after the accident happened. He testified that the hole in the median strip was two feet wide, two feet long, and about three inches deep. He further stated that to his knowledge the hole existed for several weeks prior to the accident. Donald Aim, the Claimant, testified that just prior to the accident his bicycle was traveling at about 10 miles per hour. He further stated that he did not see the hole in the median strip before he struck it.

As a result of said accident, Donald Aim was rendered unconscious, suffered a cerebral concussion, and multiple contusions and abrasions of the body, severe fracture of one tooth and loosening of two teeth, and severe transverse fracture of left hip and pelvis just below the greater trochanter, requiring open reduction and insertion of four Knowles pins. Claimant was placed in a full body cast until September 4, 1965, at which time he was discharged from the hospital. Claimant was readmitted to the hospital on June 5, 1966, for seven days for removal of the Knowles pins.

On July 1, 1966, Dr. John F. Gleason examined Donald Aim, and found him to have a limp caused by shortening of the left leg, narrowing of the left thigh and calf, loss of knee flexion, loss of hip flexion, abduction and internal rotation, and a 10 1/2 by 1/4-inch scar on his left thigh.

Medical expenses incurred by Raymond Aim on behalf of Donald Aim amounted to $3,506.89, and the estimated cost of future dental treatment will amount to $225.00.

Claimant contends that the Respondent was negligent in permitting and allowing the hole in question to remain in the median strip, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries to Donald Aim.

The law in the State of Illinois is clear that, in order for a Claimant in a tort action to recover damages against the State of Illinois, said Claimant must prove that the State of Illinois was negligent, that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, and that Claimant was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety. McNary vs. State of Illinois, 22 Ill.Ct.Cl. 328, 334; Bloom vs. State of Illinois, 22 Ill.Ct.Cl. 582, 585.

The State of Illinois is not an absolute insurer of every accident that occurs on its public highways. Gray, Et AL., vs. State of Illinois, 21 Ill.Ct.Cl. 521; Riggins vs. State of Illinois, 21 Ill.Ct.Cl. 434; Terracino vs. State of Illinois, 21 Ill.Ct.Cl. 177.

The first question to be determined is whether the Claimant, Donald Aim, a minor, was, at the time of the accident in question, in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety.

In the case of Fahrney vs. O’Donnell, 107 Ill.App. 608, the Court held as follows:

A bicycle is a vehicle subject to the rules of law governing other vehicles using the public highway, and its rider is required to use the same degree of care to avoid the accident as the driver of any other vehicle.

Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 95 1/2, §121, provides as follows:

Every person riding- a bicycle or an animal or driving any animal drawing a vehicle upon a roadway shall be subject to the provisions of this act applicable to the driver of a vehicle, except those provisions of this act which by their nature can have no application.

Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 95 1/2, §156,provides as follows:

Whenever any highway has been divided into two roadways by leaving an intervening space or by a physical barrier or a clearly indicated dividing section so constructed as to impede vehicular traffic, every vehicle shall be driven only upon the right-hand roadway, and no vehicle shall be driven over, across or within any such dividing space, barrier, or section, except through an opening in such physical barrier or dividing section, or space or any crossover or intersection established by public authority.

It appears from the evidence in this case that the Claimant, Donald Aim, drove his bicycle on the left-hand roadway of 95th Street for approximately one-half block before crossing the left-hand roadway to the median strip. When Claimant was unable to proceed across the north half or right-hand roadway of 95th Street because of westbound traffic, he proceeded west on his bicycle along and over the median strip to the point of the accident. Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 95 1/2, $156, above set forth prohibits both the driving of a vehicle on the left-hand roadway and the driving over or upon the median strip.

It is the Illinois rule of law that the violation of an ordinance or statute such as Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 95 1/2, $156, is prima facie evidence of negligence. Miller vs. Burch, 254 Ill.App. 387.

With regard to contributory negligence on the part of a minor, Illinois law requires a minor over the age of seven years to exercise that degree of care which a reasonably careful person of the same age, capacity, intelligence and experience would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances. Wolf vs. Budzyn, 305 Ill.App. 603; Hartnett v. Boston Store, 265 Ill. 331. The evidence in this case indicates no reason or condition justifying Claimant’s violation by driving his bicycle on the left-hand roadway, and then along the median strip dividing 95th Street. It appears to the Court that the Claimant had several alternatives to avoid violation of the statute. Claimant could have crossed to the north curb of 95th Street. Instead Claimant chose to proceed along the left-hand roadway in violation of the statute. When Claimant reached the median strip and saw that he could not proceed to the north curb of 95th Street because of the westbound traffic, Claimant could have stopped his bicycle and waited for traffic to clear. Instead Claimant continued to ride his bicycle along the narrow median strip to the point of the accident.

In the case of McAbee vs. State of Illinois, 24 Ill.Ct.Cl. 374, the Court held that Claimant, who was riding a bicycle on a clear day on the pavement with no obstructions to bar visibility, was guilty of contributory negligence in not seeing a hole in the street where the Claimant had testified: "Actually, I didn’t see it, not before I hit it.”

The accident in question occurred during the daylight hours and the hole in the median strip should have been readily visible to the Claimant riding his bicycle. Had the Claimant been reasonably alert and observant, he should have seen the hole and been able to avoid the accident.

It must be concluded from the evidence in this case that the Claimant, Donald Aim, was negligent in the management and control of his bicycle. The Court is of the opinion that, even though Donald Aim was a minor, fourteen years of age at the time of the accident, he failed to exercise that degree of care which a reasonably careful person of the same age, capacity, and experience would have exercised under similar circumstances; and, therefore, was not, as a matter of law, in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety.

For the above reasons, it is the opinion of this Court that the Claimant, Donald Aim, was guilty of contributory negligence, and that his contributory negligence bars the Claimants from any recovery in this action. Therefore, Claimants’ claim must be denied.


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 5589
    Charles and Harold Eichen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 7, 1975.

    James R. Potter, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber and Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This claim is for damages to property, a sawmill in Macoupin County near Carlinville, owned and operated by the Claimants, Harold and Charles Eichen. The complaint alleges that, as a result of a fire set on October 7,

i ?

1968, the sawmill, including a storage building, logs, lumber, tools and other material were destroyed, total damage being in the amount of $25,000. The fire was allegedly set by Ora Hash, a ward of the Respondent, who escaped custody.

Ora Hash, at age 15, became a ward of the Department of Children and Family Services by order of the Circuit Court of Peoria County, entered on May 28, 1968; and Herschel L. Allen, Chief of the Division of Child Welfare, Department of Children and Family Services, was appointed his legal guardian with power and responsibility to place and provide for the care and supervision of the ward.

Prior to becoming a ward of the State, Ora Hash had been living in a relative’s home under the supervision of the Circuit Court of Peoria County. He and another boy had been picked up for breaking and entering, and the Court removed him to the Gift Avenue Detention Home in Peoria.

Ora Hash came from a difficult home situation. Both of his parents died, and he was accepted by an uncle who was very permissive in his parental responsibility. He moved often — from Kentucky to Tennessee, to Florida, and back to Kentucky. Ora Hash was never adequately supervised, a fact which contributed to his emotional instability. He went to live with an aunt who was unable to control or supervise him and was returned to his uncle. Ora later went to live with another aunt and uncle in Glasford, Illinois.

While in Glasford, Ora Hash and another boy ransacked the Glasford grade school and committed serious vandalism: spraying paint, breaking furniture, windows, and generally tearing up the school. These boys also broke into the Glasford Lumber Yard, stole a number of items, and tore up the plaqe. Thereupon, the Court removed him to the Gift Avenue Detention Home.

After becoming a ward of the State, Ora Hash remained in the Gift Avenue Detention Home for about a month until a boarding home could be found. At the Detention Home Ora was difficult to handle. He would threaten to do things, according to the record, but there is no explanation of the type of things he threatened to do in this particular home. They did not want him to remain.

From the Gift Avenue Detention Home, Ora Hash went to the Horton Foster Home in Tremont, where they found Ora was a very negative influence on other teenage boys. He smoked incessantly. There were further threats reported with no explanation as to what those threats were. Once again, this home would not keep Ora, and he was sent back again on an emergency basis to be placed at the Gift Avenue Detention Home. He was then placed in the Raymond Hanby Foster Home in Oak Hill. At both the Horton and Hanby Homes, Ora showed a tendency to run away, and he would make more threats when throwing one of his temper tantrums, which were frequent.

An example of the type of threats Ora would make was finally given in a belated departmental inter-office memorandum, written two months after Ora had caused Claimant’s fire loss. It stated that Ora formerly had a part-time job for a few days on a farm. When told that he might not be paid because of the poor quality of his work, Ora replied that, if he wasn’t paid, "he might burn down the barn.” At another time he told the foster parents that "during the night he might get up and knock them in the head.”

The Department sought another new home for Ora Hash. On October 1, 1968, he was accepted as "an emergency-type placement” at Peaceful Valley Youth Ranch at Carlinville. This was the fourth institution for Ora in five months as a ward of the State.

The complete history of Ora Hash was not known to the Director of Peaceful Valley Ranch until after Ora was admitted "because of the dire need of the Department to place him as soon as possible.” The director was Mr. Larry F. Renetzky. Mr. Renetzky, whose educational background includes a master’s degree in social work, had been a lay minister prior to joining the Department of Children and Family Services, where he was supervisor of a district office. He had helped Reverend Blackburn develop this home for boys. Mr. Renetzky had administrative and supervisory responsibility over the entire staff at Peaceful Valley.

Peaceful Valley Ranch is a private child placement home licensed by the Department of Children & Family Services, is sponsored by WORK, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation, and the Ranch charges a monthly fee for its services. The Ranch is not a closed institution. There are no fences or other restraints to prevent boys from leaving the premises, nor can the Ranch accept a boy that would exhibit a pathology requiring a real structured and closed environment. The boys attend school in Carlinville, just like other children of that community, and it was from school that Ora Hash "escaped” on October 7, 1968, to burn down Claimants’ sawmill.

In accepting the placement of Ora Hash at Peaceful Valley, Mr. Renetzky had agreed to do a diagnostic workup for the Department to determine whether Ora was the type that they could handle at the Youth Ranch or whether he should be placed elsewhere.

The Department had provided a brief report regarding Ora’s mode of conduct, and Mr. Renetzky agreed that it did indicate possible destructive behavior of some sort. He also thought that a psychological and psychiatric workup would also be in order, and this was requested. However, he was told that he would have to go through the Mental Health Center; that there was a long waiting list, and that due to funds being frozen by the State at this particular point, the Department of Mental Health could not provide the psychological and psychiatrict evaluation.

A few days after Ora Hash arrived at Peaceful Valley, Ora picked up a hatchet and threatened to kill another boy. "It nearly scared this boy to death,” Mr. Renetzky said. Ora also threatened the house father, stating that he would "burn Peaceful Valley down, and would kill everybody in it.” Mr. Renetzky attempted to reach the local district office of the Department of Children and Family Services to request an immediate replacement of Ora Hash. Unfortunately, this was on a weekend. Mr. Renetzky also tried to contact the Peoria office and was unable to do so.

On the following Monday, Ora Hash did not stay in school. That morning he set fire to the Bichen Brothers Lumber Mill. The fire completely destroyed the lumber mill and the forest surrounding the lumber mill. Ora Hash also set fire to a barn housing farm machinery. Later in the afternoon, he came in and admitted setting fire to the lumber mill and also the barn. Ora’s admission was made to Mr. Renetzky and the Macoupin County Sheriff.

Mr. Renetzky told the Department of Children and Family Services that Ora was so emotionally disturbed, and in such dire need of treatment, that he should be housed in Peoria State Hospital or confined temporarily in a jail. When the Department’s Mr. Durward Guth was removing Ora from Peaceful Valley Ranch to Zeller Zone Center in Peoria, Ora explained to Mr. Guth just how he started the fire that destroyed Claimants’ property. Ora was then confined to the Peoria State Hospital where a psychiatric analysis showed, among other things, that Ora was a pyromaniac.

Mr. Renetzky who previously worked for the Department of Children and Family Services for six years testified that if he had been provided with detailed background information concerning Ora’s destructive propensities, he would have exercised more caution and supervision in light of his problems.

Claimants support their claim for damages on more than one theory of liability. First, Claimants contend that the legislature has recognized absolute liability, independent of common law negligence, for damage done by an escaped inmate who is institutionalized by departments or agencies of this State. Claimants cite the following statute:

AN ACT concerning damages caused by escaped inmates of charitable, penal, reformatory or other institutions over which the State has control. Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 23, §4041.
4041. Claims. Whenever a claim is filed with the Department of Mental Health, the Department of Children and Family Services, or the Department of Corrections for damages resulting from personal injuries or damages to property, or both, or for damages resulting from property being stolen, heretofore or hereafter caused by an inmate who has escaped from a charitable, penal, reformatory or other institutions over which the State has control while he was at liberty after his escape, the Department... shall conduct an investigation to determine the cause, nature and extent of the damages and if it be found after investigation that the damage was caused by one who had been an inmate of such institution and had escaped, the Department may recommend to the Court of Claims that an award be made to the iiyured party and the Court of Claims shall have the power to hear and determine such claims.

With considerable logic, Claimants compare the above statute with the law of strict tort liability applied to storage of explosives or the recently developed area of products liability. Claimants argue, "if a business or a government stores, sells or houses persons or things which are in themselves inherently dangerous, the business or government should bear the loss of damage to persons or property rather than the person victimized.”

Respondent questions the applicability of the above statute on the grounds that Ora Hash was not an "inmate and did not "escape” from an "institution”. We do not find much support for this contention in our dictionary. We do, however, accept Respondent’s contention that the above quoted statute does not impose absolute liability, but rather the test is one of fault.

See — American States Insurance Company and Union Automobile Indemnity Association v. State, 23 Ill.Ct.Cl. 47; Huff v. State of Illinois, 22 Ill.Ct.Cl. 36.

Using the test of fault, Claimants contend that Respondent was negligent in placing an emotionally disturbed child with dangerous and destructive tendencies in an unstructured licensed child care institution. We believe the facts in this particular case support Claimants’ contention as to Respondent’s negligence.

This Court fully appreciates the difficult task of carrying out the policy and purpose stated in the Juvenile Court Act, Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 37, §701-2. It obligates the Respondent to balance the sometimes conflicting interests of a child and the safety of the community. We have often resolved doubtful cases in favor of the decision maker as in American States, et al. In the case at bar, Respondent suggests that its course of action might have been different if it had the benefit of 20-20 hindsight vision. Hindsight, of course, does often magnify acts of negligence that might go unnoticed if they produce no disaster.

In this case we find that Respondent was negligent in failing to exercise a reasonable degree of foresight in the light of their ward’s past record. Respondent failed to ascertain at the time it became guardian of Ora Hash whether or not he exhibited pyromaniac or other tendencies of a violent nature which would have required that he be confined in a structured environment, be given the mental care his condition demands, and the public safety protected.

The conduct of Ora Hash in the first three institutions in which he was placed after becoming a ward of the State should have warned the Respondent that Ora was not qualified for placement at Peaceful Valley Ranch, and that such placement involved a foreseeable risk to life and property. The police report of Ora’s larceny and vandalism before he became a ward of the State was part of his record. His numerous difficulties, threats of violence, and total inability to adjust at the several foster homes before going to Peaceful Valley were known to the State. Failure to make a full disclosure of all the facts to the director at Peaceful Valley was a further act of negligence.

We do not accept Respondent’s general proposition that a full disclosure of a ward’s case history to a foster parent should not be required "if to do so would seriously mitigate against the placement of the child or a third person’s acceptance of responsibility for the child’s welfare.” It seems to us that failure to disclose essential facts would amount to fraud in the inducement.

The case at bar can be distinguished from the New York case cited by the Respondent, Seavy v. State of New York, 216 N.E.2d 613, although the facts are strikingly similar:

Claimants, who owned a dairy farm, filed a claim against the State for the destruction of barn and contents by fire set by mentally retarded young man, on ground that the Claimants accepted custody of the young man as a farm worker because of alleged misrepresentation of the character of the young man by the State’s agent, and on ground that the State was negligent in transferring the young man to the Rome State School, which is operated by the State Department of Mental Hygiene for the care and training of mentally retarded individuals.
The New York Court of Claims, William G. Easton, J., entered a decision dismissing the claim after a trial, and the owners of the dairy farm appealed.
The Appellate Division, Goldman, J., entered an order which, by a divided court, affirmed the judgment entered on the decision of the Court of Claims, and held that the burning of the bam was unforeseeable from the young man’s past history of quick temper and disagreeable behavior and one incident of suffering burns after having spilled cleaning fluid on his body, and that the State was not liable though details of entire past history of the young man had not been disclosed to the Claimants. Williams, P.M., and Bastow, J., dissented.

We believe the case at bar differs from the above New York case in the foreseeability of the risk involved. To the extent that it does not, and on the issue of full disclosure, we would agree with the dissenters in the New York Appelate Division.

We can agree with that court’s finding that the burning of a barn was unforeseeable based on their young man’s past history of "quick temper and diagreeable behavior.” That would be a mild description of the record of Ora Hash. Ora had commmitted a violent crime just before he became a ward of the State; was found to be uncontrollable by four institutions; had made repeated threats to commit murder and arson; and, after the last threat was carried out, was found to be a pyromaniac. This determination was much too long delayed.

We must assume that the State’s failure to disclose full details of the ward’s entire past history was not a decisive factor in the New York case quoted above. In any event, we believe the rule is properly stated by the California Supreme Court in Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782; 447 P.2d 352. As that rule would be applied here, the State owed a duty to fully inform Mr. Renetzky of all matters that its agents knew or should have known that might cause Ora Hash to endanger the persons or property of the residents of Macoupin County.

The facts in this particular case do establish that the State failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care in the light of its ward’s admitted propensities for violence which existed before the fact which caused Claimants’ loss. This is not to say that the State is an insurer against any loss that might be caused by a ward or inmate any more than the parole board should be held to guarantee that a parolee will commit no further crimes. See our recent opinion in Flaim v. State, Ill.Ct.Cl. No. 5442, filed June 11, 1975.

On the question of damages, the only testimony before this court is that of the Claimants and their appraisers. Claimant Harold K. Bichen testified that, as a result of the fire, the brothers had to pay $600.00 to the fire department to come to the scene of the fire, and lost income of $7,825.00 as a direct result of their sawmill being burned by Ora Hash. Mr. Bichen also testified that he did receive insurance proceeds of $400.00. J. Glen Meyers who had operated a sawmill himself for some 20 years testified that the buildings that were destroyed had a fair market value of $5,000.00; that the "sawmill” had a fair market value of $4,000.00; the edger was valued at $1,500.00; saw blade at $2,292.00; and logs and lumber in inventory at $594.00. Isqdore Bertinetti testified that the pulleys, belts, motor and tools that were destroyed had a minimum value of $4,312.00.

The appraisers testified that the figures given were either minimum replacement values or the fair market value of the various items that were destroyed in the fire. The total of the income lost, equipment, tools and buildings that were destroyed in the fire is $26,123.00. This figure, reduced by the $400.00 received by the Eichens from their insurance carrier, reduces the total loss to the amount of $25,723.00. Respondent does not contest the accuracy of this figure as fairly representing Claimants’ actual pecuniary loss.

At the time of Claimants’ loss, the statutory limit on awards for damages in tort cases was $25,000. Since the operation of the sawmill was a partnership, Harold Eichen and Charles Eichen are each entitled to be awarded one-half of said compensable loss.

Claimants are hereby awarded damages for their property loss as follows: Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($12,500) to each Claimant.

To Charles Eichen the sum of $12,500.

To Harold Eichen the sum of $12,500.