author: Sommer, J. Sommer, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CC-0452
    Bernadino Bravo, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order on motion to dismiss filed January 8, 1991.

      Order on motion to dismiss filed June 19, 1991.

    Lewis, Davidson & Hetherington, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Gurion & Lewis, by Kurt Olsen, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Sommer, J.

This cause coming to be heard on the motion of the Respondent to dismiss and the Court being fully advised in the premises,

Finds that the Claimant was working on a highway construction project when he was injured. The Claimant’s employer, a private contractor, has paid over $100,000.00 in workers’ compensation payments to the Claimant. The Respondent has moved that this claim be dismissed as the Claimant has received over $100,000.00 “from other sources for the same incident.”

This Court, in Sallee v. State (1990), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 41, has held that the collateral source rule applies in the Court of Claims as in the Circuit Courts. In Paschal v. State (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 229, this Court held that monies received from workers’ compensation are not to be “set-off” and that an injured person, who is not a State employee, may maintain an action for his injuries in this Court even if that person has received over $100,000.00 in workers’ compensation from his employer.

The Paschal decision was filed in 1991, and the opinion appears in this volume at page 229, supra.

It is hereby ordered that the Respondent’s motion to dismiss is denied.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Sommer, J.

This cause coming to be heard on the motion of the Respondent, State of Illinois, to dismiss, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant’s complaint is dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties agreeing that the action has been fully settled, compromised, and adjourned.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Raucci, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 89-CC-0507
    St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 8, 1991.

    Grabowski & Clutts, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Steven Schmall, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Raucci, J.

Claimant hospital is here seeking a vendor payment, from the Medical Assistance Program (MAP) administered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA), for eleven days of psychiatric inpatient services which it had rendered during November 1987 to patient Varner, a 24-year-old recipient of General Assistance. Claimant had invoiced its charges for said services to IDPA; and IDPA notified Claimant that payment was being refused because the services provided to Mr. Varner were “not covered for [the] recipient category” of which he was a member, viz., the General Assistance (GA) category as provided for in Article VI of the Public Aid Code. This matter is now before the Court on the cross-motions of the parties for summary judgment.

The issue thus presented is whether a hospital’s psychiatric inpatient care is a covered service, entitled to a vendor-payment under IDPA’s MAP, when rendered to a GA recipient.

Claimant hospital takes the position that nothing in the Public Aid Code (or “PAC,” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 1 — 1, et seq.) authorizes IDPA to deny MAP coverage for “essential medical care” (par. 5 — 1, Id.) or other “necessary treatment” (§6 — 1, Id.), including psychiatric inpatient services, provided only that the person who received such medical care was “receiving [a]-basic maintenance grant” (par. 6 — 1, Id.). Claimant contends that any recipient who is receiving cash-grant assistance — thus including all GA recipients — is automatically entitled to receive the full range of medical services described in Article V, as well as in Article VI, of the PAC.

In responding, the State notes that MAP-covered services available to GA recipients are restricted to those enumerated in IDPA Rule 140.5 (89 Ill. Admin. Code §140.5, formerly IDPA Rule 4.011). Rule 140.5 expressly provides that “psychiatric services are not covered for GA and AMI [PAC Article VII] recipients” when provided in a hospital-inpatient setting. The restrictions are also explained in Topic H-220 of IDPA’s MAP Handbook For Hospitals. Claimant hospital, in contracting with IDPA to perform services for its recipients, had agreed to abide by the Department’s vendor Handbook and notice policies, and its rules and regulations. This Court has previously upheld IDPA’s refusals to make vendor-payments for psychiatric inpatient services, when rendered to GA or AMI recipients; as examples, see our opinion filed December 30, 1985, in Mercy Hospital v. State, No. 82-CC-2504; and Methodist Medical Center of Illinois v. State (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 871.

As authority for its adoption of Rule 140.5’s restrictions on GA medical assistance, IDPA cites the general regulatory powers set out in section 12 — 13 of the PAC; and in section 6 — 2 of Article VI thereof, which provides that

“[p]ayments may also be made to provide persons receiving [GA] basic maintenance support with necessary treatment, care and supplies required because of illness or disability.” (Emphasis added.)

The First District Appellate Court, in Miller v. IDPA (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 11, 49 Ill. Dec. 534, cert. denied 85 Ill.2d 566, addressed the same issue of statutory authority for restricting the scope of GA medical services which Claimant raises here; and concluded:

“The decision as to whether these services and others are to be provided has not been conclusively made by the legislature. Rather, the decision has been left to IDPA, to be made through the agency’s utilization of the administrative discretion granted to it by the terms of the statute.” (Id., 94 Ill. App. 3d 17; 49 Ill. Dec. 540-41; emphasis in original.)

Distinguishing between section 6 — l’s “eligibility standards” and section 6 — 2’s “amount” provisions, the Miller Court found that the latter section confers broad discretion upon IDPA in its efforts to adjust “the extent and types of assistance to be forthcoming under the GA program within the broad borders which the statute outlines” (Id., 94 Ill. App. 3d 19; 49 Ill.Dec. 542), consistent with the numbers of GA recipients, expanding program costs and State budgetary constraints.

The influence of budgetary limits on the availability of GA and AMI medical services was demonstrated in Warrior v. Thompson (1983), 96 Ill.2d 1, in 70 Ill.Dec. 179, in which the Supreme Court rejected challenges to emergency funding restrictions imposed by the General Assembly and the Executive upon such services.

Having examined the parties’ contentions, the Court finds: that the psychiatric inpatient services which Claimant provided to GA recipient Varner were expressly excluded from MAP coverage in IDPA Rule ^140.5; that said rule, and above-referenced provision of IDPA’s Handbook For Hospitals had notified Claimant that said services, if rendered to members of the GA category, were not covered services, and thus would not be entitled to a vendor-payment; that Claimant had committed itself to this coverage exclusion, in its contract with IDPA; and that IDPA had the requisite authority to adopt said regulatory exclusion.

It is therefore hereby ordered and adjudged that Claimant’s motion for summary judgment is denied; that Respondent’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted; and that Claimant’s claim for payment of the subject services is denied.


text:
    (No. 89-CC-0629
    A. Wayne Morie-Bey, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 29, 1991.

    A. Wayne Morie-Bey, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Arla Rosenthal, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Motion of Respondent to dismiss the instant claim, due notice having been given the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds:

That Claimant herein seeks recovery for injuries he sustained on June 2,1988, due to the alleged negligence of agents and employees of the Department of Corrections. Claimant alleges that the employees of the Department of Corrections violated their duty to protect Claimant from sustaining injuries due to an attack by other inmates.

At the time of the attack, Claimant alleges that he was assigned to the job of phone clerk on two gallery, in cell-house Unit-F. Claimant alleges that he gave the phone to an inmate to use and while waiting for him to finish observed two other inmates take the phone and bring it to cell 227. Claimant alleges that he informed the inmate in cell 227 that it was not his turn to use the phone. Claimant acknowledges in his complaint that there was a crowd of about ten to fifteen inmates gathered around cell 227 at the time Claimant told the man that it was not his turn to use the phone.

Claimant alleges that at the time he asked for the phone back, an inmate hit Claimant in the back of the head knocking him to the floor. Further, that as soon as Claimant hit the floor, the inmates began stabbing him. At this time, employees of the Department of Corrections fired warning shots into the air in an attempt to disburse the fight. Claimant was found guilty of willingly and knowingly participating in a dangerous disturbance in violation of DOC Rule 504 A, Section 105.

Corrections Officer Harris indicated that he observed inmate Jones physically assaulting and stabbing an unidentified inmate. Investigator J. Sanders indicated in his report that inmates Wrice, Carter, Hunter, Morie(Bey), Howard and Freeman received emergency medical treatment resulting from their participation in a dangerous disturbance. Inmates Wrice, Howard, Morie(Bey), Carter and Freeman were issued a Disciplinary Report for violation of Department Rule 504, Section 105; “Dangerous Disturbance.” The allegation of aggravated battery by Inmate Jones was substantial against him and was referred to the Will County State’s Attorney Office for consideration of criminal prosecution.

Section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations and section 25 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 439.24 — 5) requires that any person who files a claim before the Court of Claims shall, before seeking final determination of his claim by this Court, exhaust all other remedies and sources of recovery whether administrative, legal or equitable. The Court finds that it was incumbent upon Claimant, A. Wayne Morie-Bey, to exhaust such remedies and sources of recovery before seeking final determination of his claim by the Court of Claims. In this case, Claimant should pursue any remedy or recovery from the inmates who participated in the dangerous disturbance, including inmates Jones, Wrice, Carter, Hunter, Howard, Freeman or any other inmate that could have possibly stabbed or assaulted the Claimant.

We find that the Claimant never pursued any possible remedies from the inmates who were also charged with participating in a dangerous disturbance in violation of DOC Rule 504, Section 105. It was incumbent on said Claimant to exhaust all other remedies or sources of recovery before seeking final determination of his claim by this Court.

Section 790.60(a) of the Court of Claims Regulations entitled (“General Continuance”) mandates that “Any complaint filed or pending in the Court of Claims shall be continued generally * * * until the final disposition of all other claims or proceedings arising from the same occurrence or transaction.”

Section 790.90 of the Court of Claims Regulations, entitled “Dismissal,” mandates that “Failure to comply with the provisions of sections # * 790.60 (Section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations) * # * shall be grounds for dismissal.”

It is therefore ordered that the motion of Respondent be, and the same is, hereby Granted, and Claimant’s claim is hereby dismissed.


author: Patchett, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CC-0630
    Randy Daugherty, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 26, 1991.

    Randy Daugherty, pro se, for Claimant.

      Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Terry Roach and Carol Barlow, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Patchett, J.

This is a claim by an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections seeking damages from the State of Illinois because of personal injuries. These allegations were a result of the Claimant being attacked and stabbed by other inmates in May 1988.

On May 7, 1988, shortly after 5:00 p.m., the Claimant was attacked by a group of other inmates. The Claimant indicated that this was a racially motivated incident, and the second such incident of the day at the institution.

Claimant’s entire case is based upon the proposition that the Respondent’s agents failed to give him adequate protection from attack. Approximately two minutes elapsed from the time the attack began until the guards arrived.

The Respondent called correctional officer Brian Thomas who was present at the scene of the attack on the Claimant. He and Officer Patterson had first observed another inmate bleeding from the mouth. Both officers escorted that inmate downstairs to safety. Officer Thomas then went back upstairs and found the Claimant in a daze. Officer Thomas took the Claimant to the hospital.

Upon cross-examination, Officer Thomas testified that when he and the other officer escorted the first wounded inmate downstairs, Officer Thomas was not aware of any other fighting.

Officer Vanpelt, who was present in the cell house at the time of the attack on the Claimant, was then called as a witness. Vanpelt claimed that he was present at the scene of the scuffle within thirty seconds of having first heard it. He indicated that there was no fighting going on when he arrived. Vanpelt further stated that he had no indication of prior racially-motivated problems on the day in question.

This Court has considered on repeated occasions claims by inmates injured at the hands of other inmates. In Childs v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 196, Judge Raucci reiterated the rule that in the absence of proof that Respondent’s agents anticipated, or should have anticipated, that third persons would commit criminal acts against a Claimant, there is no liability. This Court has even held that where institutional procedures were violated, and the violation permitted one inmate to attack and injure another, no recovery would be had in the absence of proof that the Respondent’s agents anticipated, or should have anticipated, that third persons would commit the criminal attack. Carey v. State (1981), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 96.

In the case herein, there was simply no proof that agents of the Department of Corrections did in fact anticipate, or should have anticipated, an attack against the Claimant by other inmates.

Therefore, we deny this claim.


text:
    (No. 89-CC-0637
    James E. Williams, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 29, 1991.

    James E. Williams, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Lance T. Jones, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Patchett, J.

This is a claim by an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections seeking judgment against the State for the sum of $250.00 based on allegations that there was an unauthorized withdrawal from his trust fund of that amount between July 11, 1987, and July 14, 1987.

The Claimant did establish that he had certain funds in his trust account at the time in question. A copy of the Claimant’s trust fund record was attached to the complaint covering the time period of July 10, 1987, through August 5,1987. This included a disbursement to Ms. Gail Bender on July 14, 1987.

The parties in this case stipulated that the Claimant had indeed received a lump sum deposit of $5,000.00 to his trust account, and that the disbursement in question came from that deposit. It was undisputed that the Claimant’s trust fund was administered and managed by agents of Respondent.

When they administer and manage trust funds of inmates, the Illinois Department of Corrections disburses funds pursuant to a formal written request referred to as a “P — 96.” Attached to the complaint was a copy of a P — 96 which purported to bear his signature and the signature of a correctional officer, Louis Richardson. The Claimant contends that this P — 96 form which caused the $250.00 at issue to be withdrawn did not bear his signature. He further contends that he first became aware of the problem when he was contacted by an agent of the Respondent from the Internal Affairs Department of Pontiac Correctional Center.

Apparently the Claimant had been contacted by agents of the Respondent in connection with three disbursement requests that were successfully stopped by Respondent’s agents. Claimant testified that he then checked his trust funds disbursements sheet, and he recognized for the first time that there had been another unauthorized withdrawal which had cleared. This was the $250.00 withdrawal in question. The Claimant then requested a copy of the receipt from the Trust Fund Office around July 25,1987.

Cathy Verdun, the trust officer of Pontiac Correctional Center at the time, was called as a witness by the Respondent. She testified that if her office receives a P— 96 form in the institutional mail, the office checks to see if the inmate has sufficient funds in his trust account to allow the withdrawal. Once the withdrawal is made, the account is debited, and the inmate is sent a receipt consisting of one of three copies of the P — 96 form.

In the event that the trust fund office was furnished with a bogus P — 96, and a disbursement was made on that basis, the inmate would know about the transaction by receiving a copy of the P — 96 in the mail. Cathy Verdun testified that the residents receive a copy of the transaction that same day. She further testified that the checks are held by the trust fund office for the period of a day and a half so the inmate would have time to alert the Trust Fund Office to a fraudulent P — 96. Verdun testified that if the Claimant had placed a stop order on any of his trust fund transactions, this would have been reflected on the trust funds sheet for the Claimant. A copy of the trust fund sheet was admitted into evidence as exhibit A of the Respondent. That exhibit indicated that there were no stop orders by the Claimant.

Verdun testified that the Claimant had indeed written her a letter on August 4, 1987, requesting a copy of the P — 96 form in question. That letter had simply requested a copy “of the return receipt for this deduction.” Although it is true that the Claimant did not indicate to the trust fund office in the letter that there was a possibility of a forgery or anything amiss, evidently the Claimant had already been contacted by the agents of the Internal Affairs Department of the Respondent.

Verdun went on to testify as to the procedures involving the trust fund office, indicating in part that the copies of P — 96 forms are always sent to the inmates. However, there was no testimony as to the specific P— 96 form in question, or whether a copy of that P — 96 form was furnished to the Claimant in a timely manner.

On cross-examination, the Claimant testified that he first became aware of the $250.00 deduction in question on July 20,1987, while being interviewed by the internal affairs officer. The Claimant testified he had no idea that he could request a stop order at that point.

The Claimant’s testimony that an unauthorized withdrawal in the amount of $250.00 was made from his trust account on the basis of a forged P — 96 form is not disputed. The Respondent indicates that the Claimant knew about the unauthorized withdrawal six days after the Claimant’s account had been restricted. The Claimant denies having received a copy of the P — 96 form, but admits he was interviewed by an internal affairs officer on July 20, 1987. The Respondent has previously indicated that Claimant did not communicate directly with the trust fund office until August 4, 1987. At that time there was no complaint of an unauthorized or fraudulent withdrawal, but a request for receipt, which the trust fund office indicated would have been previously forwarded to him.

The Commissioner of this Court held a hearing in this case and indicated that he did not believe the Claimant when he testified that he was unaware on July 20, 1987, that he could have requested the stop payment on the P — 96 form in question. In fact, the unauthorized check in question was not cashed until July 23, 1987. If the Claimant had alerted the trust fund office on July 20, 1987, of the unauthorized or fraudulent form P — 96, this loss could have been prevented. The Claimant’s own testimony established that the trust fund office responds to inmates’ inquiries promptly.

This is a difficult case. It is undisputed that the Respondent had control of the trust fund account. The Claimant could control his account to the extent that he could have alerted the Respondent’s agents in a timely fashion of the attempted unauthorized withdrawal. However, the evidence is undisputed that there were in fact attempts to withdraw money from his trust fund account.

While the Claimant’s failure to ask for a stop payment order resulted in a check being cashed three days after the Claimant was first alerted to the problem, it is also not in dispute that the $250.00 check was not authorized. Results of the internal affairs investigation as to the cause, and person responsible for the attempted unauthorized withdrawals were inconclusive.

However, since the Claimant was notified of the attempted fraudulent transfer in time for an objection by him to stop payment of the check in question, we deny this claim.


author: Burke, J. Burke, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CC-0770
    Willie Burns, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed November 30, 1989.

      Order filed November 2, 1990.

    Willie Burns, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Arla Rosenthal, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Burke, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of Respondent to dismiss the claim herein; due notice having been given the parties hereto and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds:

The Claimant has filed a complaint seeking recovery for loss of personal property. However, the Claimant has failed to exhaust his remedies, because he has not grieved his alleged loss before the Administrative Review Board of the Illinois Department of Corrections. The Claimant has failed to submit his grievance to the Administrative Review Board in the submitted time frame outlined in department Rule 504 F — 1 section 504.810(a) which requires that a grievance shall be filed within six months of the discovery of the incident, occurrence, or problem which gives rise to the grievance or within six months of the receipt of a decision concerning an informal resolution thereof. Claimant discovered that his property was missing on December 24, 1987. However, he filed his grievance past the six-month deadline on July 15, 1988.

This Court has consistently interpreted the exhaustion of remedies to be an inescapable requirement. In Lyons v. State, this Court stated that section 25 of the Court of Claims Act and section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations “quite clearly makes the exhaustion of remedies mandatory rather than optional.” (Lyons v. State (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 268.) The Court further stated that if the exhaustion of remedies requirements were waived, “merely because Claimant waited until it was too late to avail himself of other remedies, the requirement would be transformed into an option, to be accepted or ignored according to the whim of all Claimants.” (Lyons, 272.) This Court’s interpretation of section 25 of the Act and section 790.60 of the Regulations clearly mandates that a Claimant must exhaust all remedies available to him and if he has missed the deadline for one such remedy he cannot recover in the Court of Claims because he still had failed to exhaust all available remedies.

The Claimant in the instant matter has failed to pursue his remedy at the Administrative Review Roard because he filed past the statute of limitations. Section 790.90 of the Court of Claims Regulations mandates dismissal of all cases where Claimant has failed to comply with section 790.60.

It is therefore ordered that the Respondent’s motion be, and the same is hereby granted, and the claim herein is dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER

Burke, J.

This cause coming to be heard upon Claimant’s motion to amend motion for relief from judgment and Respondent’s motion to dismiss, all parties having notice and Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds:

The Claimant filed a complaint seeking recovery for loss of personal property. However, the Claimant failed to exhaust his remedies because he did not grieve his alleged loss before the Administrative Review Board of the Illinois Department of Corrections. The Claimant failed to submit his grievance to the Administrative Review Board in the submitted time frame outlined in department Rule 504 F — 1 section 504.810(a) which requires a grievance to be filed within six months of the discovery of the incident, occurrence, or problem which gives rise to the grievance or within six months of the receipt of a decision concerning an informal resolution thereof. Claimant discovered that his property was missing on December 24, 1987. He filed his grievance after the six-month deadline on July 15, 1988.

This Court has consistently interpreted the exhaustion of remedies to be an inescapable requirement. This Court stated that section 25 of the Court of Claims Act and section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations, “quite clearly makes the exhaustion of remedies mandatory rather than optional.” (Lyons v. State (1980), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 268.) The Court further stated that if the exhaustion of remedies requirements were waived, “merely because Claimant waited until it was too late to avail himself of other remedies, the requirement would be transformed into an option, to be accepted or ignored according to the whim of all Claimants.” (Lyons, at 272.) This Court’s interpretation of section 25 of the Act and section 790.60 of the Regulations clearly mandates that a Claimant must exhaust all remedies available to him and if he has missed the deadline for one such remedy he cannot recover in the Court of Claims because he failed to exhaust all available remedies.

The Claimant in the instant matter failed to pursue his remedy at the Administrative Review Board because he filed past the statute of limitations. Section 790.90 of the Court of Claims Regulations mandates dismissal of all cases where Claimant has failed to comply with section 790.60.

It is hereby ordered:

1. Claimant’s amendment is allowed;

2. That the Respondent’s motion be, and the same is hereby granted; and the claim herein is dismissed with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 89-CC-0840
    Marshall Pippion, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 7, 1990.

    Marshall Pippion, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Michael Castaldo, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Patchett, J.

This is a claim filed by an inmate at the Stateville Correctional Center. Mr. Pippion was employed as a chef in September of 1987 in the kitchen. During that time period he was charged with certain infractions, and appeared before the adjustment committee of the Stateville Correctional Center on September 25, 1987. The charges included assault, and disobeying a direct order. Mr. Pippion was initially found guilty of the charges, placed in segregation, lost 360 days of good time, and lost his job as a chef.

Mr. Pippion’s grievance was then reviewed by the Stateville Institution Inquiry Board. That board found that the initial finding had been in error. Mr. Pippion then received his good time back, and all restrictions against him were lifted. He eventually returned to his job as a chef.

Mr. Pippion then filed this action claiming back pay for the time period he was not working as a chef. Testimony presented at the hearing on this matter clearly established an inmate in a correctional institution in the State of Illinois does not have a right to a job. Indeed, only a small percentage of the inmates at Stateville held jobs which were paying positions. Claimant therefore did not lose something to which he had a right.

However, the Claimant was also denied his unassigned pay for the period in question. All inmates receive this amount when they are not in segregation. Clearly, Mr. Pippion had a right to his unassigned pay since he was wrongfully placed in segregation. Therefore, we award Mr. Pippion the amount of his unassigned pay, which equaled ten dollars ($10.00) a month for six (6) months, or a total award of sixty dollars ($60.00).


author: Sommer, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CC-2133
    Theodora Batemon, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 19, 1991.

    Friend, Steponate, Levinson & Merkel, Ltd., for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Gregory Abbott, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Sommer, J.

This matter coming to be heard on the motion of Respondent to dismiss the Claimant’s claim, due notice having been given the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds:

That the Claimant, Theodora Batemon, brings the instant cause of action in tort seeking money damages for personal injuries incurred on January 9, 1987, while working at Chicago-Read Mental Health Center in Chicago, Illinois. Claimant suffered injuries as a result of a piece of ceiling tile falling and landing on her head.

That on January 9, 1987, the Claimant was employed by Chicago Temporaries, Inc. and was working in the accounting department at Chicago-Read Mental Health Center which is operated by the Illinois Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities.

That both Chicago Temporaries, Inc. and the State of Illinois are Claimant’s employers under the Workers’ Compensation Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 138.1.) Pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 138.1(a) (4), Chicago Temporaries, Inc. is considered a loaning employer because it is “[A]n employer whose business or enterprise * * * consists of hiring, procuring or furnishing employees to or for other employers.” The State of Illinois was the borrowing employer of Claimant Theodora Batemon on January 9,1987.

That under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 138.1(a)(4) “the liability [under the Workers’ Compensation Act] of such loaning and borrowing employers is joint and several.” Consequently, both Chicago Temporaries, Inc. and the State of Illinois are liable to the Claimant under the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Evans v. Abbott Products, Inc. (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 845, 502 N.E.2d 341.

That the Workers’ Compensation Act has an exclusivity provision, which states that an injured employee retains “[n]o common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer * * * for injuries * * # sustained by an employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided # * (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.5(a).

That consequently, the Claimant has no common law or statutory right to recover damages from the State of Illinois other than provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act. Therefore, the Claimant is precluded from bringing this action in tort against the State of Illinois in the Court of Claims. Since this honorable Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, it must dismiss the Claimant’s claim, with prejudice. See Willis v. State of Illinois (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 381.

Therefore, it is ordered that Respondent’s motion is hereby granted and that Claimant’s claim is dismissed, with prejudice.


author: Montana, C.J. Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 89-CC-2203
    James Earl Williams, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed January 22, 1990.

      Order filed November 2, 1990.

    James Earl Williams, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Lance T. Jones, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Respondent’s motion for summary judgment and the Claimant’s objections thereto, due notice having been given, and the Court being advised;

Claimant, an inmate at a State penal institution, brought this claim seeking compensation for personal property which was allegedly in the exclusive possession of the Respondent and is now missing. In response to the complaint, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment wherein liability was conceded but denied that any damages were owed on the grounds that the Department of Corrections had previously reimbursed the Claimant for his loss. In support of its motion Respondent stated that Claimant was reimbursed the fair market value of the personal property as determined by the application of a straight-line depreciation schedule with an assigned useful life of three years. An affidavit purportedly executed by a supervisor of the department’s Administrative Review Board was attached. The supervisor attested that the Board generally applied this rule in such situations and felt that the scale reflected the fair and reasonable market value of personal property in a prison setting. She stated that property depreciated more rapidly in such an environment than it would elsewhere. None of the four copies of the affidavit in the file at the clerk’s office were signed or notarized. The Claimant filed a response objecting to the use of the three-year depreciation schedule and to how the Department applied it in this case.

Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In this case there is no issue as to liability for the loss, but we find that there remain issues of fact as to the value of the missing property. While a three-year straight line depreciation schedule may be appropriate under certain circumstances and may be the best approach for the Department of Corrections’ Administrative Review Board, this Court is not prepared to adopt it in all cases here or, based on the record and the pleadings, in this particular case. However, nothing we have said herein is to be construed as a comment on the fair market value of the items lost.

It is hereby ordered that a judgment is granted to Claimant on liability and this cause is referred to the Commissioner on the issue of damages.

ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This cause coming to be heard upon the motion of the Respondent for summary judgment, due notice having been given, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, finds:

That as to Claimant’s stereo receiver, Claimant has already received from the Department of Corrections the fair, reasonable, market value of this receiver and he is entitled to no more.

That as to Claimant’s TV, Claimant has filed in this court one claim for reimbursement of a component part of this TV and a second claim for reimbursement of the unit as a whole. Such duplicate claims are not allowed.

It is therefore ordered that Respondent’s motion should be, and hereby is, granted. Judgment is entered in favor of the Respondent.


text:
    (No. 89-CC-3279
    Thorlief Larsen & Son, Inc., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order on motion for disbursement of award filed October 25, 1990.

      Order filed May 15, 1991.

    Querry & Harrow, Ltd., for Claimant Thorlief Larsen & Son, Inc.
    Howard M. Turner, for Kleich & Galanis.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Erin M. O’Connell, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER ON MOTION FOR DISBURSEMENT OF AWARD

Montana, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard pursuant to Claimant Thorlief Larsen & Son, Inc.’s motion for disbursement of award, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

Now therefore, it is hereby ordered that this Court’s award of $407,086.91 to Claimant entered on June 8, 1990, be disbursed to the following payees in the following amounts and subject to the following requirements:

(i) $150,000.00 to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County under Case No. 80-CH-9055, entitled Kleich & Galanis Kontractors, Inc. v. Thorlief Larsen & Son, Inc.
(ii) $9,924.00 to Du-Al Floor Company, Inc., c/o its attorney, James B. Rice, 847 Highland Road, Frankfort, Illinois 60423 upon delivery to the Court of Claims by counsel for claimant of a certified copy of the order of the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois dismissing Du-Al Floor Company, Inc.’s claim for a lien against public funds in the amount of $10,054.00,
(iii) $24,938.96 to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois under Case No. 80-CH-7643, entitled Bari Sewer & Water Company, Inc. v. Thorlief Larsen & Son, Inc. which was reinstated by the Court after having been dismissed,
(iv) $27,935.00 to the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois under Case No. 85-CH-1770 entitled Engineered Erection Company, Inc. v. Capital Development Board of the State of Illinois and Thorlief Larsen & Son, Inc.; and
(v) $194,288.95 to Thorlief Larsen & Son, Inc., representing the balance of this Court’s award, to be disbursed after items (i) through (iv) have been disbursed and the Court is notified that Cook County Circuit Court case No. 80-CH-9055, entitled Kleich & Galanis Kontractors, Inc. v. Thorlief Larsen & Son, Inc., is resolved.

ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the second joint stipulation of the parties, due notice having been given, and the-Court being advised;

The facts of this case were set forth in our order entered herein on June 8, 1990. (42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 195.) We retained jurisdiction for several reasons including resolution of what the parties referred to as “the Separate Action” which is now before us.

The parties’ stipulation reads in relevant part as follows:

“1. This proceeding was commenced by the filing of a Complaint for recovery of a lapsed appropriation, pursuant to Section 790.50(d) of this Court’s Rules.
2. Pursuant to the Joint Stipulation of the Claimant and Respondent dated May 17, 1990 filed herein, the Court, by Order of June 8, 1990, awarded Claimant $407,086.91 and retained jurisdiction of the balance of Claimant’s claim.
3. Pursuant to the Joint Stipulation, the Capital Development Board (‘the CDB’) agreed to process for payment the Authorized Extra Work, as defined in Paragraph 6 of the Joint Stipulation, and to review promptly and consider for approval the Undetermined Extra Work, as defined in Paragraph 6 of the Joint Stipulation.
4. Claimant and Respondent have taken all actions required of them by the Joint Stipulation and the Court’s Orders of June 8,1980 and October 25, 1990.
5. Consequently, for purposes of this action, the CDB acknowledges and agrees that $101,717.40 is due Claimant as follows:
Original Contract Amount $5,361,780.00
Plus Approved and Agreed Change Orders $ 386,639.24
Net Contract Amount $5,748,419.24
Less Prior Payments $5,239,614.93
Less Prior Court Award $ 407,086.91
Net Contract Balance Due $ 101,717.40
6. In the interest of reducing the time 'and expense of trial and in recognition of Claimant’s right to payment, Respondent consents to the entry of judgment in favor of Claimant and against Respondent in the amount of $101,717.40.”

This Court is not bound by such agreements and we cannot acquiesce in approving this one. As was fully explained in our order of June 8,1990, all of the lapsed funds available for the project have been paid out. That was the reason for the Court’s reduction of a portion of the agreed amount awarded to the Claimant in the previous order. In this type of case the Court cannot approve an award in excess of the amount lapsed. To do so would be adding money to the project or making a deficiency appropriation. Appropriating funds is the sole prerogative of the General Assembly.

Although we are constrained by law to disapprove the settlement, we have no quarrel with the amount of the settlement. But for the insufficiency of lapsed funds we would approve the settlement and award in the agreed upon sum. Claimant has stressed that both parties have agreed to an award. Even if we could make the award, payment would have to be approved by the General Assembly. The Court would not be authorized to direct immediate payment. (111. Rev. Stat., eh. 37, pars. 439.23, 439.24.) For purposes of potential consideration of this matter by the General Assembly, the Court finds that the services were performed to the satisfaction of the Capital Development Board, that the Capital Development Board agrees the money is owed, that the settlement appears to be fair, reasonable and reached pursuant to arms-Iength negotiations, and that but for the lack of funds Claimant would have been awarded $101,717.40.

For the reason stated above, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied.


author: Burke, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CC-3298
    Jesse A. Bellamy and Vera Bellamy, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 8, 1990.

    Mitchell, Brandon & Schmidt, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Frank Hess, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Burke, J.

This cause coming to be heard upon the report of the Commissioner, after hearing before said Commissioner, and this Court being fully advised in the premises:

Claimants seek compensation for property damage to their 1985 Mercury Lynx vehicle allegedly caused by the negligence of Bobby Robertson, a State of Illinois employee.

A hearing was held before Commissioner, Robert G. Frederick. Claimants filed their brief and the State failed to file its brief.

The Court finds:

On September 15, 1988, Claimant, Vera Bellamy, was driving her 1985 Mercury Lynx on Route 37 near Olmstead Road in Pulaski County, Illinois. The Claimants live in Olmstead and were very familiar with these roads. She and her husband owned the vehicle. A tractor driven by a State of Illinois employee was also traveling north on Route 37. Both vehicles turned off Route 37 onto Olmstead Road. The Claimants were following the tractor. After crossing a bridge, Claimant, Vera Bellamy, looked to see if it was clear to pass the tractor. The road was clear for a quarter mile so she pulled out to pass the tractor, which was moving at five miles per hour. As she attempted to pass, the tractor pulled in front of her into the passing lane without signaling that he was going to turn. There was no road for the tractor to turn left, there were no warning lights on the tractor and no “caution” mowing signs on Olmstead Road. However, there were mowing signs on Route 37. Claimant’s car was damaged on the right front. The car was repaired for $917.79. The Claimants paid $50.00 of the bill and State Farm Insurance paid the balance of $867.79 pursuant to Claimants’ collision insurance policy.

In order for a Claimant to recover in a case against the State, the Claimant must prove the State was negligent, that such negligence caused the damages complained of, and that Claimant was free from contributory negligence.

A driver of a State vehicle working on a State highway has a duty to yield to traffic on the roadway. (Guffey v. State (1987), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 179.) Claimants proved their damages with certainty. The cost of repairing Claimants’ vehicle was $917.79.

The only issue that remains is whether the Court should award damages to Claimants of $50 which is their deductible or award damages of $917.79 to Claimants and State Farm. Claimants subrogated their rights to State Farm. This Court recently adopted the collateral source rule. (Sallee v. State (1990), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 41.) The $867.79 paid by State Farm to Claimants is no longer considered a set-off to the State and Claimants are entitled to their full measure of damages.

It is therefore ordered: that an award of $917.79 is hereby entered in favor of Claimants and State Farm, said award being in full and complete satisfaction of Claimants’ complaint.


text:
    (No. 89-CC-3655
    Clement Vaughn, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1991.

    Clement Vaughn, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Frank Hess, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Raucci, J.

Claimant, an inmate with the Illinois Department of Corrections, seeks judgment against Respondent for amounts removed from Claimant’s Trust Fund for expenses to pay for Claimant’s “furlough” to his sister’s funeral which Claimant contends he was not permitted to attend.

The Complaint alleges that on May 24,1988, Claimant made an agreement with Respondent’s agents at Shawnee Correctional Center that they could withdraw from his Prisoner Trust Fund Account up to one-half of all monies received by Claimant to reimburse the Department of Corrections for expenses incurred by them in order to transport Claimant to his sister’s funeral. Claimant contends that he was not permitted to attend his sister’s funeral, and the complaint arises from the fact that Respondent is alleged to have continued to withdraw sums from Claimant’s fund before a furlough “that was not completed.”

At the hearing in this cause, Claimant testified that while he was on the funeral furlough, it was canceled as a result of disputes between Claimant and attending officers over the question of whether or not Claimant would be provided with suitable clothing and personal hygiene items. Apparently, as a result of this dispute, Respondent’s agents called Claimant’s relatives and advised Claimant’s relatives that Claimant did not wish to attend the funeral.

Claimant had been driven by Respondent’s agents from Shawnee Correctional Center to Joliet Correctional Center in anticipation of the funeral furlough. When Claimant and Respondent’s agents arrived at Joliet Correctional Center, Claimant was not permitted to go on the furlough and it was canceled. Claimant contends that he was denied the right to attend the funeral because he had asked for clothing and soap to use for washing.

Prior to going on the furlough, Respondent’s agents had required Claimant to sign a money voucher. One month after the aborted furlough, the State began taking sums from Claimant’s trust account, and were in the process of withdrawing up to $526.00 to cover the State’s expenses at the time of the hearing in this case.

After reviewing the record, it was determined that Claimant had not filed a grievance with the institutional inquiry board and had not obtained any review of his grievance except by means of written complaints addressed to Warden Jim Greer at Menard Correctional Center. (See letter of Jim Greer to Claimant dated August 4, 1988.) In light of the fact that decisions of the institutional inquiry board must be approved by the warden before implementation, it seems that Claimant’s complaint to Warden Greer which produced the response of August 4, 1988, was sufficient compliance with the requirement that Claimant exhaust his administrative remedies. The record in this case establishes that Claimant’s agreement with respect to his attendance upon the funeral furlough was by agreement directly with the warden’s office; accordingly, it would seem to be a triumph of form over substance to deny this claim on the basis of the fact that no formal grievance was filed with the institutional inquiry board in light of the expressed intentions of Warden Greer as stated in his letter of August 4,1988, to the Claimant.

Respondent produced no evidence or testimony. Claimant contends that since he was not transported the additional 100 miles from Joliet to the location of the funeral and was denied the opportunity to attend the funeral due to a dispute with Respondent’s agents over clothing and personal hygiene items, the State should be required to reimburse Claimant for the amount of funds removed from Claimant’s trust account. At the time of the hearing in this cause, $350.00 had been removed from Claimant’s trust account to reimburse the State for expenses incurred by the State in driving the Claimant from Shawnee Correctional Center to Joliet.

There is no evidence in the record with respect to the ability of Respondent’s agents to provide Claimant with clothing or personal hygiene items while at Joliet. It does seem peculiar that these items were not resolved prior to departing from Shawnee Correctional Center; however, the Court cannot decide this matter in a vacuum of evidence or proof as to what Respondent’s responsibilities should have included once Claimant was transported to Joliet Correctional Center.

The burden of proof is on the Claimant. Claimant does not suggest that Respondent did not incur expenses of $526.00 in Respondent’s ill-fated attempt to provide Claimant with a funeral furlough. The gravamen of the agreement between Claimant and Respondent was reimbursement by Claimant to Respondent for Respondent’s expenses reasonably incurred in connection with the funeral furlough. The record demonstrates that substantial expenses were incurred by Respondent on Claimant’s behalf. The record is barren of any explanation as to why Claimant was not transported to the funeral from Joliet, except through Claimant’s “version” which relates to a dispute regarding Claimant’s contention that Respondent’s agents should have provided Claimant with clothing and personal hygiene articles. There is no proof in this case that Respondent had at any time undertaken to provide Claimant with these amenities.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that this claim is denied.


author: Raucci, J. Raucci, J.

text:
    (No. 90-CC-0052
    John M. Geraghty, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed October 25, 1990.

      Order filed June 19, 1991.

    John M. Geraghty, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Raucci, J.

The Claimant, John M. Geraghty, brought this complaint seeking recovery in excess of $106,000.00 from the State. Claimant alleges that he was a petitioner before the Illinois Industrial Commission (hereinafter the “Commission”) docket Nos. 86-WC-4610 and 88-IIC-577. He alleges that there is evidence of fraud, perjury, obstruction of justice, intimidation, harassment, conspiracy and negligent improper practices in relation to the before mentioned proceedings.

Claimant complains that officers and employees of the Commission, namely, Arbitrator Joann Fratianni, Commissioners Douglas Holland and Richard Gilgis, and an unidentified woman, were the individuals perpetrating the alleged wrongs.

At the hearing Claimant appeared pro se and presented 32 exhibits all of which were admitted into the record without objection. The State presented one group exhibit which included the memorandum of decision of arbitrator before the Industrial Commission in Claim No. 86-WC-4610. The State’s group exhibit also included the decision and opinion on review before the Commission in document No. 88-IIC-577.

Claimant’s exhibit Nos. 3 and 6, show that Claimant filed an action in circuit court of Cook County, docket No. 88-L-50946, seeking review of the Commission proceedings at the administrative level. That action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by order of Judge Alexander P. White due to the failure of Claimant to file his complaint for review within the 20-day period of time specified in the statute.

The record indicates that Claimant was at one time represented by counsel at Commission proceedings, but was not so represented at the hearing before the arbitrator and also at the time the decision and opinion on review was rendered. Claimant’s exhibit No. 2 shows that Claimant rejected a $50,000.00 settlement offer during proceedings before the Commission. This document is offered to support the allegation of intimidation.

Throughout the hearing held on the present claims, Claimant asserted that he disagreed with the findings of fact by the arbitrator at the commission. He also disagrees with the conclusions of Commissioners Gilgis and Holland in their opinion and decision on review. Claimant maintains that he proved facts sufficient in the case before the commission to support his claim for compensation. The commission concluded that he failed to prove that he sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of this employment. Claimant maintains the commissioners were wrong therefore their conclusions are tantamount to fraud. Claimant testified that “they couldn’t have ruled the way they did if they considered the entire record.”

Claimant also alludes to conduct by attorneys, doctors, and other medical personnel alleging that such conduct supports his theory of conspiracy and cover-up.

Section 8(a) of the Court of Claims Act states that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the Workers’ Compensation Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.) It is apparent Claimant is dissatisfied with the results of his commission proceedings and his unsuccessful attempt to have them subjected to administrative review in the Circuit Court. Claimant has failed to prove facts sufficient to prove the allegations in his complaint.

It is therefore ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied. The Clerk shall return Claimant’s exhibits to the Claimant.

ORDER

Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Claimant’s request for a “review” of his claim, or alternatively a “Petition for Rehearing,” the Court finds:

1. On February 11, 1991, we denied Claimant’s “Request for Review” which we treated as a “Petition for Rehearing.”

2. We have no jurisdiction to conduct further proceedings.

It is therefore ordered:

1. The February 26,1991, filing is denied.

2. The Clerk is directed to accept no further filings in this cause.


text:
    (No. 90-CC-0438
    John Peterson, M.D., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 29, 1990.

    John Peterson, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Steven Schmall, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Raucci, J.

This vendor-payment action, filed under section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 13), is before the Court on Respondent’s motion for summary judgment, made pursuant to section 2— 1005(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 2 — 1005(b)). Respondent cites the absence in Claimant’s complaint of any showing that the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) had received a DPA-form invoice of Claimant’s charge for the subject medical service within the one-year time period prescribed for such receipt by IDPA Rule 140.20 (89 Ill. Adm. Code §140.20; reprinted at Topic 141 of IDPA’s MAP vendor Handbooks) and by Federal Medicaid regulation (42 C.F.R. §447.45(d).)

Claimant, Dr. Peterson, alleges a DPA form 2360 invoice of this service, bearing a signature date which implies that said invoice had been prepared within three months after the service had been rendered. Nothing in his complaint indicates, however, that said invoice had ever been received by IDPA. No IDPA voucher-response (or “remittance advice”) is offered as evidence of such receipt; and neither a document control number (or “DCN,” which IDPA reports it assigns to each invoice received) nor an IDPA voucher number is alleged in Claimant’s bill of particulars. (Rock Island Franciscan Hospital v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 100, 102.) Claimant does not allege here that he had submitted to IDPA either a written inquiry as to the status of said invoice, or a replacement “rebill-invoice,” within sixty days after said invoice had allegedly been prepared, as suggested in Topic 144 of IDPA’s Medical Assistance Program (MAP) Handbook For Physicians. (See Simon v. State (1987), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 246, 250-51; and Franciscan Medical Center v. State, No. 86-CC-0368.) As noted in IDPA’s report herein this initial invoice, Claimant alleges in his complaint was apparently prepared at least ten months following the signature date listed on it.

IDPA policy provides that, except for vendor-payment claims submitted to the Department on unapproved forms or otherwise facially unacceptable for automated processing,

“all claims [vendor invoices] received are assigned a Document Control Number, microfilmed and computer processed [for assessment of payment entitlement]. The action taken on each [invoice] so processed is reported to the provider [vendor] on Form DPA 194-M-l, Remittance Advice [or voucher-response](MAP Handbooks, Topic 144.)

Thus, if IDPA had received the initial invoice which Claimant here alleges, then Claimant should be able to produce or identify IDPA’s voucher-response to that invoice for the purpose of pleading IDPA’s “action taken” in respect to it, as required by Court Rule 5(A)(3)(b) (74 Ill. Admin. Code §790.50(a)(3)(B)). (Treister & Wilcox v. State, 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 185, and Franciscan Medical Center v. State, No. 86-CC-0368, cited supra.) Claimant should be able to produce any such voucher, because State and Federal Medicaid regulations obligate vendors to maintain and retain all of their business and professional records relating to their services rendered to IDPA recipients. (89 Ill. Admin. Code §140.28; 42 C.F.R. §§431.17, 431.107(b); and see the MAP Handbook, Topics 112, A-205, A-230 and A-240.) And, as discussed above, there is no indication that Claimant had taken any follow-up action in respect to said initial invoice, as suggested in Handbook Topic 144.

Absent some showing by Claimant that IDPA had received a timely-submitted invoice from him, the complaint here lacks an element which the Court has found to be essential to a section 11 — 13 vendor-payment action, since there is no prima facie showing that any invoice of the service had been received within the prescribed time “as limited by [IDPA’s] regulations” (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 13). As we have held:

“The vendor must have invoiced his services to the Department, on IDPA invoice-forms which have been properly prepared by the vendor and timely submitted to IDPA, in accordance with Department Handbook instructions and regulatory requirements (IDPA Rule 140.20, Id.)” (Canlas v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 150, 152;)

and see University of Chicago Professional Services Offices v. State (1990), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 277, and prior decisions therein cited; and United Cab Driveurself, Inc. v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 91, 92-93. One practical consequence of Claimant’s invoicing delay is that, if this claim were now to be paid, Illinois would not be entitled to FFP (Federal financial participation) in any such payment; see Memorial Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 73, 78-79; and Pinckneyville Medical Group v. State, No. 87-CC-0962.

We note that if Claimant had timely submitted his invoice of this service (or if he had followed Handbook Topic 144’s suggestion by timely submitting a replacement-invoice) so as to allow for its receipt prior to IDPA Rule 140.20’s deadline, then his compliance with both the State and Federal regulatory requirements could have been assured; and IDPA’s administrative payment of his claim could have resulted. As Claimant did not comply, and as such noncompliance is evident on the face of his complaint herein, the Court will grant the relief which Respondent has requested.

It is therefore hereby ordered and adjudged that Respondent’s motion for summary judgment is granted, Dr. Peterson having failed to establish that he had invoiced the subject service and charge to IDPA within the time prescribed by the applicable regulations. Judgment is hereby entered for Respondent, and against Claimant, as to all issues presented in this matter.


text:
    (No. 90-CC-0585
    Tummala Ramabrahmam, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 10, 1990.

    Tummala Ramabrahmam, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Steven Schmall, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Sommer, J.

This is a vendor-payment action, filed pursuant to section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code (or “PAC,” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 13), in which Claimant is seeking payment from the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) of his charge for medical care rendered to a hospitalized patient and recipient of public aid. Claimant’s action was filed with this Court more than one year after the subject services had been rendered, and more than one year after IDPA had mailed to Claimant a remittance-advice, or “voucher” notice that it was “refusing to pay” (section 11 — 13 of the PAC) his initially-invoiced charge for said services. Respondent has moved for summary judgment, citing Claimant’s failure to commence this action within the time prescribed by statute, as well as his failure to submit a properly corrected, rebill-invoice of said charge to IDPA, with his services properly identified by appropriate procedure code, within the one-year period prescribed by IDPA Rule 140.20 (89 Ill. Admin. Code 140.20) and by Federal Medicaid regulation (42 C.F.R. §447.45(d)).

IDPA sent Claimant a-“remittance advice” notice of its refusal to pay his invoice, which notice listed “invalid procedure code” as its reason for such refusal; and that Claimant thereafter failed to submit a corrected, rebillinvoice of said service to IDPA, within the one-year period prescribed by IDPA Rule 140.20 and 42 C.F.R., section 447.45(d). A vendor must comply timely with each of the aforementioned requirements, as each is a condition precedent to an award by this Court. Methodist Medical Center v. State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 208; Memorial Medical Center v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 73, 77-78, and decisions therein cited; Franciscan Medical Center v. State, No. 86-CC-0368; Riverside Medical Center v. State, No. 87-CC-0780; and St. John's Hospital v. State, No. 86-CC-2055.

In its report, IDPA advises that the hospital in which said surgery was performed, and two other physicians who treated this patient during his hospitalization, had all invoiced their services — properly identified — in the manner and within the time prescribed by the Handbook and IDPA Rule requirements; and that each such vendor had been paid by IDPA for such services.

It is therefore hereby ordered and adjudged that Respondent’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and this claim is dismissed with prejudice.


author: Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 90-CC-1366
    Airwork Corp., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 10, 1990.

    Defrees & Fiske, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Steven Schmall, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This cause coming to be heard on the motion of Respondent to dismiss Claimant’s claim, due notice having been given the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

The Court finds: That Respondent’s motion was brought pursuant to section 2 — 619(a) (9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2— 619(a)(9)). That Claimant filed this action as a lapsed appropriation matter, and seeks interest on an invoice dated 10/18/88, for which suit was filed in the Court of Claims on 10/25/88 as No. 89-CC-1154. Claimant appears to seek interest for the time that the claim was pending before this Court.

We find that even though Claimant has invoked “An Act to require prompt payments by the State of Illinois for goods or services” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 132.401 et seq.), the invoice at issue herein was filed against the Department of Transportation one year and 18 days after the end of the 90-day grace period following the end of the fiscal year and the Department’s ability to pay such invoice. After September 30, the Department was unable, by law, to pay any bills for the prior fiscal year and any vendors with unpaid bills had to file in the Court of Claims.

This Court has previously ruled, in Branch-Nicoloff Co. v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 253, that the Prompt Payments Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 132.401 et seq.), does not authorize interest on claims in the Court of Claims which would accrue after the responsible agency’s ability to pay has ended.

We find that the ability of the Department of Transportation to pay the invoice at issue herein ended before an obligation to pay interest would have begun.

It is hereby ordered that the motion of Respondent be, and the same hereby is granted, and Claimant’s claim is dismissed, with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 90-CC-2488
    Patrick T. Murphy, Cook County Public Guardian, et al., Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 27, 1990.

    Patrick T. Murphy, pro se, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Montana, C.J.

The Claimants herein brought this claim seeking payment of $135,000.00 in actual damages and $8,126.61 in expenses arising out of a lawsuit filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, No. 87-C-8150, informally entitled Doe v. Lambert. The case is before this Court on a joint stipulation whereby the parties have agreed to our entering an award in the full amount sought.

In relevant part the stipulation reads as follows:

“1. That on September 22, 1987, Patrick T. Murphy, Cook County Public Guardian, filed an action for damages in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, • * *, No. 87-C-8150 (“Doe, et al. v. Lambert, et al.”).
2. That Doe, et al. v. Lambert, et al. arose from the alleged abuse of ° * ® (name deleted by Court), and the abuse and killing of ° ° ° (name deleted by Court), allegedly by their foster parents, Ann and Sylvester Phillips.
3. That the instant cause, filed on March 13, 1990, seeks payment pursuant to a settlement reached between the parties hereto in Doe v. Lambert, the terms of which are attached hereto, and are incorporated herein and made a part hereof.
4. That the parties hereto have agreed to the disposition of this claim predicated on the terms and provisions of their settlement of Doe v. Lambert, and respondent hereby agrees to the entry of an award in favor of claimants in the amount of $143,126.61 (ONE HUNDRED FORTY-THREE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX DOLLARS AND SIXTY-ONE CENTS), in full and final satisfaction of the claim herein.”

The settlement agreement consists of a letter from counsel for the Respondent to counsel for the Claimants, dated January 26,1990, which reads as follows:

“The State of Illinois through the Illinois Court of Claims agrees to pay plaintiff a total of $143,126.61 to fully resolve the above-entitled case. The $143,126.61 is a bottom line figure. Plaintiff agrees to waive attorneys’ fees and any and all other claims of any kind.
In addition, we previously agreed that our settlement agreement will incorporate the following language:
Any payment made through the court of claims or by the Department of Children and Family Services and/or by the State of Illinois or any agency thereof to" ° “ (name deleted by Court) and the Estate of * ' * (name deleted by Court) pursuant to this settlement agreement shall not affect the subsidized adoption agreement by which * * * (name deleted by Court) has been adopted by * ' “ (name deleted by Court). At the time this settlement agreement has been entered into, Mrs. 0 ® * (name deleted by Court) is receiving $396.00 per month by way of the subsidized adoption of * ° * (name deleted by Court) and ° ° ° (name deleted by Court) under the terms of that agreement is receiving therapy. By entering into this agreement and giving * * ® (name deleted by Court) certain funds the Department of Children and Family Services through its agents and attorneys guarantee and agree that no agent of the Department of Children and Family Services shall consider this payment when determining whether the subsidized adoption agreement shall continue and under what circumstances it shall continue.
If you accept, please sign below and return to me.”

The letter was signed by counsel for the parties. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Federal court approved the settlement.

This Court is not bound by such settlements and, for the reasons stated hereinbelow, decline to approve this one.

As evidenced by exhibit A attached to the complaint, the underlying Federal court case was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. That case was filed against individuals. The State of Illinois was not named as a defendant therein, nor could it have been under Federal law. The State’s responsibilities under these circumstances would be as set forth in the Representation and Indemnification of State Employees Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 1301, et seq.). If the circumstances are consistent with the terms and conditions set forth in the Act, the Act provides, at section 2(e) (ii), that “The judgment or settlement shall be paid from the State Treasury on the warrant of the Comptroller out of appropriations made to the Department of Central Management Services specifically designed for the payment of claims covered by this Section.”

The Representation and Indemnification Act does not provide for payment through the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims set forth its position on the issues in its decisions on the Norman v. State (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 896 and, more recently, in Lin v. State, No. 84-CC-2219, Orders filed November 29, 1988 and June 12, 1989 (as yet unpublished), and Cornfield & Feldman v. State, No. 90-CC-2004, Order filed March 7, 1990 (as yet unpublished).

Acordingly, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, dismissed. It is further ordered that this decision be captioned for purposes of reporting and publication as Patrick T. Murphy, Cook County Public Guardian, et al. v. State of Illinois in order to maintain the anonymity of the person and estate on which behalf this claim was brought.


text:
    (No. 91-CC-0711
    Darrin Cummings, Claimant, v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 27, 1991.

    Heckenkamp, Simhauser & Labarre, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Helen Ogar, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Sommer, J.

This is a personal injury claim in which the Claimant did not file the notice required by section 22 — 1 of the Court of Claims Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 39, pars. 439.22-1, 439.22-2.) The Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss.

The Claimant filed an action for damages for personal injury arising from the same facts in the circuit court. The Respondent entered a “Special and Limited Appearance” in the circuit court and moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Board of Governors cannot be a defendant in a claim for damages for personal injury in the circuit court. The Claimant now argues that the Board of Governors’ appearance in the circuit court was a general appearance; and since the Board of Governors did not then object to the failure to file the statutory notice, it waived the right to object to a “defect of notice” in the Court of Claims.

It is well established that a party generally appearing in a circuit court action cannot later argue that it did not have notice of the proceedings. The issue before us does not concern notice of the proceedings; rather it concerns the filing of the statutory notice in an action for injuries before this Court. The filing of the statutory notice is a condition precedent to filing a complaint in this Court and is jurisdictional. (Munch v. State (1966), 25 Ill. Ct. Cl. 313, 315.) This Court requires strict compliance with the notice requirement. Slepcevich v. State (1988), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 197, 199.

The Claimant’s argument equates notice of proceedings with the statutory notice required for injury claims brought before the Court of Claims. The Claimant calls both “notice,” but they are not equivalent. Obviously a party appearing in a court has “waived” its opportunity to claim that it did not have notice that the proceeding was going on. However, a party finding itself a defendant in the wrong court and entering an appearance for a motion to dismiss does not waive its opportunity to enter jurisdictional or statutory objections to other courts hearing the claim when before those courts.

This Court finds that the Respondent did not waive its opportunity to object to the failure to file the statutory notice in this claim when it entered its special and limited appearance in circuit court. It is therefore, ordered that the Respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted and this claim is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 91-CC-2734
    Rabinowitz Communications, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed May 14, 1991.

    Rabinowitz Communications, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Phillip McQuillan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

Claimant Rabinowitz Communications brought this claim seeking payment of $11,550.00 for telecommunications services. In its standard lapsed appropriation form complaint, Claimant alleged that it made demand for payment to the Respondent’s Department of Central Management Services (CMS) which manages the Respondent’s Telecommunications Revolving Fund. Claimant further alleged that its demand was refused on the grounds that the funds appropriated for the payment had lapsed. The parties filed a joint stipulation as to the facts and have agreed to have the Court decide the case based on that joint stipulation. The case is now before us.

In relevant part, the parties stipulated to the following:

“1. This claim was brought for telecommunication services provided by the claimant to the Office of the Attorney General. Claimant herein is seeking $10,190.00 based on services performed, which is a lesser amount than the original claimed amount.
2. The services for which this claim is made were performed to the satisfaction of the Office of the Attorney General.
3. The telecommunication funds for the Office of the Attorney General have been depleted. No additional money from the Office of the Attorney General is available for payment of this claim.
4. The Telecommunication Fund administered by the Department of Central Management Services, appropriation No. 312-41655-1700-0000, had remaining as of September 30,1990, sufficient funds.
5. A part of the claim, i.e., $835.00, was incurred and is owed by the Illinois Asbestos Abatement Authority, and the Illinois Asbestos Abatement Authority had sufficient lapsed funds to pay said amount.
6. The respondent agrees that had the Office of the Attorney General funds not been depleted the Office of the Attorney General would have paid the claimant, Rabinowitz Communications, $10,190.00.
Wherefore respondent respectfully moves this Court to enter an Order for the payment of this claim in accordance with the above Stipulation, or, in the alternative, make a special recommendation to the General Assembly to pay this claim.”

CMS is primarily responsible for the payment of telecommunications expenses through its revolving fund which was created specifically for that purpose. After payment, CMS seeks reimbursement to the fund from the user agency. For a discussion of the use and purpose of revolving funds see Correctional Industries v. State, No. 90-CC-0023, as yet unpublished; Order filed May 14, 1991. Claimant named CMS as the Respondent agency. When claims are made against revolving funds for which the agency which administers the fund has not been reimbursed, the Court has looked to the user agency for payment and made its awards payable not with revolving funds but from the same source of funds which the user agency would have used to make the reimbursement. If an award were made payable from the revolving fund, the fund would be reduced by the amount of the award without being able to recoup the money other than filing a claim here. Thus, bypassing the revolving fund appears to be the correct procedure from an accounting perspective and a practical standpoint.

However, in the case at bar the user agency did not lapse sufficient funds to make the reimbursement to the revolving fund. This does not negate the fact that CMS is primarily responsible and we enter judgment in Claimant’s favor payable from the revolving fund. The alternative request in the stipulation — making a recommendation to the General Assembly — is noted. Regardless of whether an award payable with revolving fund money is made or a recommendation is made, the General Assembly will have to act on this case. The Court cannot make direct payment with revolving funds. It is for the consideration of this claim by the General Assembly that the Court has explained this decision. We also note for that purpose that the departmental reports which were filed with the stipulation and offered as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein pursuant to 74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.140 indicate that both CMS and the user agency, the office of the Attorney General, agree that this is a valid claim.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be, and hereby is, awarded $10,190.00 in full and final satisfaction of this claim, said award to be paid from the CMS Telecommunication Revolving Fund, No. 312.


author: Raucci, J. Poch, J. Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. Unassigned —
    George Schenk and Jean Schenk, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 30, 1989.

      Order filed September 10, 1990.

      Order filed February 26, 1991.

    George Schenk & Jean Schenk, pro se, for Claimants.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Carol J. Barlow, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the petition for extension of time to file necessary documents to claim compensation under the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

The crime was committed on February 21, 1987. The notice of intent to file claims was filed April 24, 1989, more than two (2) years after the crime. Since the maximum amount of time to file the notice of intent is eighteen (18) months, including any extension, we have no alternative but to deny the petition.

Petition Denied.

ORDER

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on February 19,1987.

Claimants seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

On June 30, 1989, the Court entered an order denying the petition, stating the intent to file claims was filed April 24,1989, more than two years after the crime. As the maximum time to file notice of intent is 18 months, including any extensions, the Court had no alternative but to deny the petition.

The Claimants requested a hearing. The hearing was held before a Commissioner on March 26,1990.

At the hearing the Claimants raised as an excuse that the hospital failed to post signs about the Crime Victims Compensation Act and the police did not advise them about the act. The statute does not grant an exception to the limitations period for an excuse of lack of information from police or hospitals.

The claim will be denied, as no State officer has authority to waive or arrest the running of a limitations period in favor of the State. Bodine v. State, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 777.

In this case, no evidence of disability or other possible legal exception to the notice requirements of the statute has been presented. The notice of intent was filed more than 18 months after the date of the crime.

The order of June 30, 1989 denying this claim be and is hereby affirmed. So ordered.

ORDER

Montana, C.J.

Claimant’s recent letter to the Court dated October 12,1990, is construed as a motion for reconsideration.

Having again reviewed the case, we are constrained to deny the request for reconsideration.


author: Poch, J. Poch, J. Sommer, J. Poch, J.

text:
    (Nos. 85-CV-0983, 85-CV-0984, 85-CV-0985, 85-CV-0986, 85-CV-0987, 85-CV-0988

      In re Application of Homero Rodarte

      Order filed May 10, 1985.

      Order filed January 24, 1989.

      Order filed March 29, 1989.

      Order filed January 9, 1991.

    Homero Rodarte, pro se, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (James Maher, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 24, 1984. Homero Rodarte, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71, et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on April 5, 1984, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on March 24, 1984, the victim and five others died of extensive burns as the result of a fire. The incident occurred in the apartment where the victim resided, located at 4448 South Hermitage, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at Mercy Hospital. The investigation conducted by the police concluded that, due to the extensive burning and the collapse of the building, the cause of the fire could not be determined. Police records indicate that the incident was classified as an apparent accidental fire death. In addition, the medical examiner’s Certificate of Death classified the victim’s death as an accident.

2. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses of the deceased victim, Santos Lupercio, age 10.

3. That funeral expenses of the six deceased victims in this incident totaled $10,394.64, or $1,732.44 for each victim’s funeral. A donation of $333.33 was made toward each victim’s funeral by Midwest Nut and Seed Company, leaving a balance of $1,399.11, which was paid by an unknown person or persons.

4. That the Claimant has submitted no substantiation to indicate that he incurred or paid for any portion of the funeral expenses of the deceased victim, Santos Lupercio.

5. That in order for a Claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence of one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act.

6. That an accidental fire is not one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act.

7. That the Claimant has not met the required conditions precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

ORDER

Poch, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the petition for extension of time to file necessary documents to claim compensation under the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.).

The crime was committed on March 24, 1984. The notice of intent to file claims was filed July 14, 1988, more than four (4) years after the crime. Since the maximum amount of time to file the notice of intent is eighteen (18) months, including any extension, we have no alternative but to deny the petition.

Petition is denied.

ORDER

Sommer, J.

This cause coming to be heard on the petition of the Claimant, Homero Rodarte, to reopen the above claims, and this Court being fully advised in the premises:

Finds that the above claims were denied on May 10, 1985 because the fire that caused the injuries and deaths was held to be accidental. It is alleged that a person now has been arrested and indicted for starting the fire. (The Claimant filed new claims on July 14, 1988, which this Court denied on January 24, 1989, on the grounds that the statute of limitations for filing had run.) Section 86 of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.) states that this Court may reconsider a denial of compensation upon the appearance of newly discovered facts.

It is therefore ordered that the order of May 10, 1985, denying benefits is hereby reconsidered and vacated and that these claims be returned to the Attorney General for investigation and recommendation.

ORDER

Poch, J.

This matter coming to be heard upon the Court’s own motion, this Court hereby finds as follows:

The parties have entered into a stipulation whereby the Attorney General’s Office recommends that the sum of $7,194.66 be paid to Homero Rodarte, the uncle of the deceased victims all of whom were the innocent victims of a violent crime.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that;

1. The sum of $7,194.66 be paid to Homero Rodarte.

2. It is further ordered that this case be closed.


author: Per Curiam Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 86-CV-0796

      In re Application of Lillie Cage

      Order filed August 7, 1986.

      Opinion filed October 25, 1990.

    Devereux Bowley, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (James A. Tyson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on February 7, 1985. Lillie Cage, grandmother of the deceased victim, Donna Marie Tolliver-Cruse, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71, et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on January 24, 1986, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s granddaughter, Donna Marie Tolliver-Cruse, age 26, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit: murder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1.

2. That on February 7,1985, the victim was stabbed by an offender who was known to her. The incident occurred in an apartment which they shared at 8008 S. Ridgeland, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the incident occurred following a verbal dispute between the offender and the victim over rent money. The offender then produced a knife and stabbed the victim several times. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at Jackson Park Hospital. The offender was apprehended, prosecuted and convicted of murder.

3. That section 76.1(e) of the Act states that the Claimant is eligible for compensation if the victim and the assailant were not sharing the same household at the time the crime occurred.

4. That it appears from the investigatory report that the victim and the assailant were sharing the same household at the time the crime occurred.

5. That the Claimant has not met required conditions precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on February 7,1985, in the city of Chicago. The Claimant’s granddaughter, Donna Marie Tolliver-Cruse, was the victim of a homicide occurring at 8000 South Ridgeland Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

The Claimant, Lillie Cage, filed an application for benefits in a timely manner seeking reimbursement of funeral expenses for the decedent in the sum of $3,059.00.

The claim was actually denied based upon the investigatory report of the Attorney General. The Claimant objected and the claim was assigned to a Commissioner of this Court for a hearing and recommendation.

The evidence is undisputed that the decedent was the victim of a violent crime to wit: murder. The assailant, Lamont Brown, was convicted of the murder. The funeral bill is not disputed.

The dispute concerns whether or not the decedent and her assailant were sharing the same household at the time the crime occurred. Pursuant to section 76.1(d) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 76.1(d)), a Claimant is not entitled to compensation if the victim and the assailant were sharing the same household.

Both the Claimant and her daughter, Emma Hammons, testified that the assailant did not live in the same household as the victim. Ms. Hammons stated that she resided with the decedent until approximately two weeks before her death.

The victim’s sister, Lolita Tolliver, testified that she was the girlfriend of the assailant and was a witness to the decedent’s death. She also resided with the decedent and testified that Lamont Brown never resided in that household.

Respondent sought to introduce evidence that the decedent and assailant resided together by the offer of Chicago police department reports. No police officers were called to testify. The reports that Respondent sought to introduce into evidence stated in part that the decedent and assailant resided together. The Claimant objected to the offer of this evidence.

Supreme Court Rule 236(b) provides that police accident reports are not admissible as a record or memorandum made in the regular course of business.

It is well-settled that police reports are generally not admissible into evidence. People v. Morris (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 155, 382 N.E.2d 383; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 115 — 5(c)(2); People v. Watkins (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 889, 424 N.E.2d 701.

Police reports are not admissible as business records pursuant to Court of Claims Regulations, sec. 790.140 (74 Ill. Admn. Code 790.60). See, Tam v. State, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 805.

The police reports in this case are inconsistent concerning the address of the assailant.

The credible evidence supports the conclusion that the Claimant is entitled to compensation in the form of reimbursement for the payment of the decedent’s funeral expense. The evidence adduced at the hearing supports the Claimant’s contention that the victim and the assailant did not live in the same household.

Pursuant to section 76.1(e) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, the Claimant is eligible for compensation where the victim and the assailant were not sharing the same household at the time of the crime. The victim and the assailant were not sharing the same household at the time the victim was murdered by the assailant.

The Claimant has met the required conditions precedent for compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

It is hereby ordered: that the Claimant, Lillie Cage, be awarded the sum of Three Thousand Fifty-Nine ($3,059.00) dollars as and for the costs paid to the Williams Funeral Home for the burial costs of the deceased victim, Donna Marie Tolliver-Cruse.