text:
    (No. 85-CC-2647
    Tredis McMahon, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 28, 1986.

    Tredis McMahon, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (John R. Buckley, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This is a claim brought by Claimant, Tredis McMahon, a resident of Stateville Correctional Center, for personal injuries sustained when an electronically operated gate closed on him, breaking his left arm.

The testimony in this matter was extremely conflicting. Claimant testified that on June 5, 1984, at approximately 5:15 p.m., he was in the tunnel outside E House. He had a job sweeping the tunnels and he wanted to go into E House to get a buffer brush.

To get in or out of E House, you must go through a large steel gate operated from a control center which is a considerable distance from the gate. The operators in the control center have no direct visual contact with traffic going through the gate but instead they watch the traffic on a camera, and they press buttons to open and close the gate.

Claimant testified there was a line of residents going into E House through the gate and the operator, Shirley Robinson, had opened the gate just far enough so only one person could go through at a time. Claimant testified when he got into the gate, the operator closed it on him, breaking his left arm.

The testimony in this case was that the gate closes with considerable force. Claimant stated the gate was not moving when he began to enter it and it was open enough for him to walk through without turning sideways. He testified that as he began to enter the gate, it was stationary, although not open all the way, and that as he began to go through the gate, it began to move. He testified that the moving gate covered the space of 1M to two feet so quickly that he could not make it through.

A shift supervisor, Captain Raymond E. Hall, testified that he was standing close to the gate in question at the time of the incident. He testified that the gate is made out of steel, has two sections — a stationary section and a moving section — and that the section that moves is approximately 4M feet wide. He testified when the gate is fully opened, the aperture is approximately 4% feet, and that it would take the gate about five to six seconds to traverse that distance, but only about one second to traverse two feet. He further testified that Claimant was not going into E House, but was coming from the Unit E door to the gate; that when he saw Claimant, the gate was already moving, that Claimant was 30 feet from the gate and running fast, that he tried to go through the gate sideways but the gate caught him.

Respondent introduced into evidence its departmental report consisting of a statement by Officer Wayne B. Lane. This report stated that no one was trying to go in or out of the gate and that the operator started to close it. It further states that the gate was approximately 12 inches from being closed completely when Claimant ran forward and tried to get through before it closed.

Claimant, on returning to the witness stand, denied that Captain Hall’s testimony was true and denied that Officer Lane’s affidavit was true.

Claimant attached to his complaint an affidavit of a fellow inmate, Joe Woods, which stated that the control officer was playing with the inmates going through the gate and as a direct result, the control officer slammed Claimant’s arm up and left his arm in the gate for approximately three minutes, and that Claimant was free of fault.

Mr. Woods, who had not heard Captain Hall testify, was called as a rebuttal witness, and he testified in contradiction to Officer Hall. He testified that Claimant was on the outside of E House trying to get in, and that he was on the inside wanting to go out. Woods stated that as he was trying to get out, the control center operator slammed the gate and he had to jump back to escape injury. He further stated that the operator in charge of the gate opened up the gate again and as Claimant entered the gate, she kept playing with the switch and the gate slammed Claimant’s arm up in the gate. This inmate testified that several inmates tried to pull the gate back to relieve some of the pressure on the arm but were unable to do so. He stated positively that Claimant was not trying to run through the gate but was standing in front of it waiting to go through.

The Court is of the opinion that the incident occurred because of the action of the operator in the control center in operating the gate. The hearing officer in this case thought the testimony of Officer Hall did not rebut the testimony of Claimant and that it was as a result of the action of the control center operator that Claimant was injured.

Award is hereby made in favor of Claimant in the amount of five hundred ($500.00) dollars for the injuries sustained by him.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Holderman, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 85-CC-2982
    Anthony Johnson, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 17, 1985.

    Anthony Johnson, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Respondent’s stipulation and the Court being duly advised in the premises finds that this is a claim for a refund of a $15.00 reinstatement fee paid as the result of an order of suspension on the Claimant’s driver’s license. The order of suspension was ordered “expunged” from the Claimant’s driving record by a court of competent jurisdiction, and therefore, the collection of the fee was made in error, and in accordance with the provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the application for refund having been made more than six months following the payment of the fee, the fee must be refunded and the refund must be made by the Court of Claims. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 95½, pars. 3 — 824(b), (d).

It is therefore ordered that this Claimant be granted an award in the amount, as claimed, of $15.00.


text:
    (No. 86-CC-0148
    James Newsome, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed April 24, 1986.

    James Newsome, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This matter comes before the Court as a result of a claim brought by Claimant, a resident of Stateville Correctional Center, for the loss of a trial transcript when the toilet in his cell overflowed.

On October 16, 1984, at approximately 8:00 a.m., Claimant states he left his cell in cell house B-East to go to work. He had no cellmate. He states his cell was in order when he left. On the day in question, between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m., he was notified to return to his cell because it was flooded. Sewage had come up out of the toilet bowl, water had run onto the floor of the cell and was one to two inches deep, and water had run out of the cell and flooded half the gallery. Claimant testified he had not left the cell with water running in the toilet bowl.

Claimant testified all the property he had stored on the floor beneath his bunk was ruined by the sewage, the principal loss being his trial transcript of 1,574 pages. A letter from a clerk of the circuit court of Cook County to Claimant states the cost of replacing this transcript would .be $2,046.00. A copy of said letter was attached to the commissioner’s report.

Respondent called as a witness one Robert Oliver, a case work supervisor, who saw the flooding, called Claimant to return to his cell, and called for a plumber. He testified the flooding could have been caused by a pipe behind the toilet or could have been sabotage by other inmates.

Claimant testified he had no cellmate and that when he left the cell water was not running in the toilet bowl. Respondent offered no proof of inmates sabotaging the plumbing system.

It is the opinion of the Court that Claimant’s loss was occasioned by the facilities of Respondent and their failure to maintain their equipment.

Award is hereby entered in favor of Claimant in the amount of $2,046.00.

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, CIVIL DEFENSE WORKERS, CIVIL AIR PATROL MEMBERS, PARAMEDICS AND FIREMEN COMPENSATION ACT

Where a claim for compensation filed pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers, Civil Defense Workers, Civil Air Patrol Members, Paramedics and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.), within one year of the date of death of a person covered by said Act, is made and it is determined by investigation of the Attorney General of Illinois as affirmed by the Court of Claims, or by the Court of Claims following a hearing, that a person covered by the Act was killed in the line of duty, compensation in the amount of $20,000.00 or $50,000.00 if such death occurred on or after July 1, 1983, shall be paid to the designated beneficiary of said person or, if none was designated or surviving, then to such relative(s) as set forth in the Act. The following reported opinions include all such claims resolved during fiscal year 1986.


author: Montana, C.J.

text:
    OPINIONS PUBLISHED IN FULL FY 1986
    (No. 84-CC-1130

      In re Application of Billie Jean Erickson.

      Opinion filed November 18, 1985.

    Peter F. Ferracuti, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, C.J.

This claim is brought by Billie Jean Erickson who seeks an award pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers, Civil Defense Workers, Civil Air Patrol Members, Paramedics and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), due to the death of her husband, David O. Erickson, who was a fireman for the City of Ottawa, Illinois. Firefighter Erickson died on November 8,1983, from cardiopulmonary failure due to or as a consequence of acute myocardial infarction. Mrs. Erickson was designated as the sole beneficiary of any award authorized by this Court.

The record consists of the application for benefits, the statement of the decedent's supervising officer, the report of the Attorney General, and evidence presented in the form of evidence depositions upon stipulation of the parties. Based on the record the Commissioner has duly filed his report and the matter is now before us for a decision.

The evidence depositions of the following persons were submitted to the Court: Michael Jobst, a fireman with the city of Ottawa, who described events that occurred on October 30,1983; Francis Newell, a captain in the Ottawa Fire Department who was in charge of the fire on October 30, 1983; Dr. Anton Giger, a general practitioner who was the Ericksons’ family physician and who described in some detail Firefighter Erickson’s history of heart failure; and Billie Jean Erickson, the surviving spouse, who also described her husband’s prior heart attack as well as the events immediately preceding his death.

The evidence indicates that Firefighter Erickson suffered his first heart attack on August 8, 1983. Mrs. Erickson described that heart attack, their trip to the emergency room of the county hospital in Ottawa, and his recuperation during the late summer of 1983. Dr. Giger described in greater detail the tests and treatment undertaken during this same period. Mr. Erickson’s condition apparently improved sufficiently so that he was eventually released to full duty in October of 1983.

His very first shift back to work was October 30, 1983. On that date, he attended two calls, the first being an ambulance call. Later that day there was a fire at 554 Congress Street in Ottawa. It was a basement fire with a buildup of heavy smoke. Both Firefighter Jobst and Captain Newell were with Firefighter Erickson at that time.

During the course of their firefighting, Erickson was asked to locate the “hot spot” where smoke was coming from. He performed this task using a fire ax to chop down a bathroom wall. Both Newell and Jobst described Erickson’s condition during this period as being “pasty” in color. Captain Newell stated that Erickson looked like he was about ready to pass out. At this time, Erickson complained to Jobst of a pain in his chest.

Despite his obvious pain, Erickson finished his shift. In fact, he served two subsequent shifts during which time he continually complained of the pain in his chest. He called in sick on November 7, 1983, and died of a heart attack the next day.

For an award to be granted under the Act it must be shown that the fireman was killed in the line of duty as defined by the Act. Section 2(e) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that “ ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 282(B).) Coverage under the Act is not limited to healthy firemen. An award may be granted even though a preexisting condition may have contributed to the decedent’s death. See Macek v. State (1974), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1071; Finlen v. State (1974), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1076.

Based on the record before us, we find that Firefighter Erickson was killed in the line of duty and that this claim is therefore compensable.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that an award of $50,000.00 be, and is, hereby awarded to Billie Jean Erickson, the surviving spouse and sole designated beneficiary of Firefighter David O. Erickson.


text:
    (No. 84-CC-2030

      In re Application of Connie A. Turpin.

      Opinion filed July 3, 1985.
    William J. Anaya, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, C.J.

Claimant seeks an award pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers, Civil Defense Workers, Civil Air Patrol Members, Paramedics and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

The Court, having reviewed the record in this matter, finds as follows:

1. The claim herein was filed by Connie A. Turpin, the surviving spouse of Volunteer Firefighter Wayne M. Turpin of the Vance Township Fire Department in Fairmont, Illinois.

2. The statement of Chief David Ferber, the decedent’s supervising officer, indicates that Firefighter Turpin was helping to start a pump on a fire truck at the scene of a residential fire at approximately 12:30 p.m. on December 1, 1983, when he complained of chest pains and then fell to the ground. He was thereafter taken by ambulance to St. Elizabeth Hospital in Danville where he was pronounced dead at 1:30 p.m. due to having suffered a myocardial infarction.

3. The facts of this claim indicate that Firefighter Turpin was “killed in the line of duty” as defined by section 2(e) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 282(e).

4. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all the requirements of the Act and an award should therefore be granted.

5. Since a designation of beneficiary form has not been submitted to the Court, the Claimant, as the surviving spouse, is entitled pursuant to section 3(a) of the Act to receive the entire amount of benefits payable thereunder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 283(a).

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that an award of $50,000.00 be, and is, hereby granted to Connie A. Turpin, the surviving spouse of Firefighter Wayne M. Turpin.


text:
    (No. 84-CC-3043

      In re Application of Linda Ford and Beverly McGee.

      Opinion filed March 18, 1986.

    Bilandic, Neistein, Richman, Hauslinger & Young, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, C.J.

This is a claim for compensation arising out of the death of Julian W. Ford, Jr., a City of Chicago Police Officer, pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers, Civil Defense Workers, Civil Air Patrol Members, Paramedics, and Firemen Compensation Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). A hearing was held before Commissioner Martin Ashman and he has duly filed his report. The matter now comes before the Court for a decision.

The evidence is undisputed that on March 27,1984, Officer Ford was assigned to the 14th District in the City of Chicago and was assigned a foot patrol through Pulaski Park located at 1419 West Blackhawk. He commenced working his beat at 1:30 p.m. on that date. He was temporarily taking this beat patrol from the regular officer so assigned, Officer Howard J. Kilroy. The beat was patrolled alone.

The basic concern of the beat was to keep gangs out of the park. Gangs encountered there were the Milwaukee Kings, Latin Kings, Disciples, Jousters and Greenview Boys. Shootings were encountered by Officer Kilroy at times in the past on this beat. Officer Kilroy testified that the beat would be more difficult for an officer new to the area such as Officer Ford, since the gangs might try to harass him.

At 7:15 p.m. Officer Ford, while walking across the basketball floor in the park during the course of his foot patrol, collapsed and died later that date. The cause of death according to the medical examiner’s office was acute myocardial infarction.

The issue presented to the Court, in this case, is whether Officer Ford was “killed in the line of duty.”

The Act, at section 2(e) provides the following definition:

‘Killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer ... if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 282(e).

There is no question that Officer Ford died while in the course of his duty as a law enforcement officer and that the death occurred within one year from the date of the injury. There is no evidence that the officer died as a result of violence. Thus, the issue is whether he died from “other accidental cause.”

In the case of Georgean v. State (1973), 28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 408, this Court, while finding that the Claimant there was not a law enforcement officer, stated that since there was some ambiguity in the statute, it would be helpful to set out some general guidelines and principles regarding heart attack cases and in so deciding concluded at page 413:

“In summary, it is our opinion that the legislature intended to compensate the survivors of law enforcement officers and firemen who were exposed to risks greater than those to which the public is exposed. There is no rationale for compensating survivors of policemen or firemen who died as a result of mundane activities which did not involve special risks to their decedent’s persons.”

Officer Ford was exposed to risks greater than those to which the public in general is exposed. He, on foot and alone, patrolled an area in which gang activities were a concern and in which shootings had occurred in the past. He was new to the beat and unfamiliar with the gang members. He collapsed approximately six hours after commencement of his work.

It is our opinion that the stress associated with the risks Officer Ford was exposed to contributed to his death. We therefore find that he died as a result of an “other accidental cause” and thus was “killed in the line of duty.” This claim accordingly is compensable.

The application for benefits submitted in this claim indicate the decedent did not execute a designation of beneficiary form showing who should receive an award under the Act. Section 3(a) of the Act therefore requires that Linda Ford receive the entire amount payable since she is the surviving spouse of the decedent. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 283(a).

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that an award of $50,000.00 be, and is, hereby granted to Linda Ford, the surviving spouse and statutory beneficiary of Police Officer Julian W. Ford, Jr.


text:
    (No. 85-CC-1987

      In re Application of Debra Harbison.

      Opinion filed July 3, 1985.

    Edward J. Fisher, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, C.J.

Claimant seeks an award pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers, Civil Defense Workers, Civil Air Patrol Members, Paramedics and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

The Court, having reviewed the record in this matter, finds as follows:

1. The claim herein was filed by Debra Harbison, the surviving spouse of Correctional Officer Cecil Harbison, an employee of the Illinois Department of Corrections at the Menard Correctional Center.

2. The statement of Correctional Captain Dwayne Clark, the decedent’s supervising officer, and exhibits submitted in support thereof indicate that on the evening of November 30, 1984, Officer Harbison was assigned the duty of locking inmates in their cells in south cellhouse after the supper meal. At approximately 5:00 p.m. he was attacked and stabbed numerous times by a prison inmate. Officer Harbison was pronounced dead less than an hour later at the Chester Memorial Hospital in Chester, Illinois, due to the stab wounds suffered in the attack.

3. The facts of this claim indicate that Officer Harbison was “killed in the line of duty” as defined in section 2(e) of the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 282(e).

4. The proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all the requirements of the Act and an award should therefore be granted.

5. Since a designation of beneficiary form has not been submitted to the Court, the Claimant, as the surviving spouse, is entitled pursuant to section 3(a) of the Act to receive the entire amount of benefits payable thereunder. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 48, par. 283(a).

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that an award of $50,000.00 be, and is, hereby granted to Debra Harbison, the surviving spouse of Correctional Officer Cecil Harbison.


author: Per Curiam Holderman, J.

text:
    OPINIONS PUBLISHED IN FULL FY 1986
    (No. 79-CV-0297

      In re Application of Cleather Brown.

      Opinion filed April 8, 1980.

      Order filed November 7, 1985.

    Charles Stegmeyer, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sue Mueller and William E. Webber, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 16, 1979, in East St. Louis, Illinois. Cleather Brown, for Tameaka Wells, minor, mother of the deceased victim, Cheryle Ramsey, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased daughter, Cheryle Ramsey, age 16, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1).

2. That on March 16, 1979, Cheryle Ramsey was sent by Illinois Job Service to a home in East St. Louis, Illinois, to babysit. This was the victim’s first job assignment. The subject who ordered the baby-sitter immediately attacked her, beat and stabbed her to death.

3. That the Claimant, Cleather Brown, did not incur funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death. They were billed to a third party.

4. That the Claimant, Cleather Brown, seeks compensation for loss of support for Tameaka Wells, age 2, daughter of the victim.

5. That the Claimant, Cleather Brown, has not submitted any evidence before the Court to substantiate the fact that Tameaka Wells was dependent upon the victim for support. The Claimant has produced no evidence to substantiate income of the victim for six months preceding the incident.

6. That section 7(d) of the Act provides for a deduction of $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the “Workmen’s Compensation Act,” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 48, par. 138.1, et seq.), from local governmental, State or Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

7. That the Claimant, Cleather Brown, having not submitted the necessary evidence needed to support her claim for loss of support, has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of Cleather Brown be and is hereby denied.

ORDER

Holderman, J.

This is a claim under the Crime Victims Compensation Act for funeral expenses incurred by the mother of the deceased, Cleather Brown, and for loss of support for decedent’s child, Tameaka Wells.

Cheryle Ramsey, age 16 years, was sent by the Illinois Job Service in East St. Louis to a location at which she was to be employed as a baby-sitter. The incident occurred on May 16,1979. When she arrived at the place where she was to be employed, she was beaten and stabbed to death by one Sylvester Davis, who had previously called the Job Service to request a baby-sitter be referred to him.

The evidence shows that the decedent was the mother of a child, Tameaka Wells, who was 16 months old at the time of her mother’s death.

At Claimant’s request, a hearing was held in this matter, at which time certain evidence was introduced showing that the mother of the decedent had paid $750.00 for the funeral bill of Cheryle Ramsey and that decedent had been employed as a baby-sitter and at a drive-in movie facility prior to her death, earning approximately $120.00 per month.

Under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, the Court must consider the following:

1. What amount, if any, should be awarded to the mother of the decedent for the funeral bill;

2. What amount, if any, should be awarded to the child of decedent for loss of support; and

3. What amount, if any, should be awarded to the attorneys for the claim for fees under the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

The commissioner, in his report, finds that the evidence regarding the payment of $750.00 on the funeral bill by the mother of decedent is uncontradicted. He also finds that the evidence the decedent provided the minor child with some support is uncontradicted. The amount of the support provided is somewhat uncertain and ranges from $120.00 per month to $240.00 per month over the period of time of two years prior to decedent’s death. The commissioner has recommended an award of $5,000.00 to the minor child for loss of support. The Act limits recovery to $15,000.00 and it is obvious from the evidence that the employment history of decedent makes a maximum recovery difficult to justify.

The court hereby orders that Cleather Brown be awarded the sum of $750.00 for funeral expenses, that Tameaka Wells, decedent’s minor daughter, be awarded $5,000.00, and that counsel for Claimant be awarded $500.00.


author: Poch, J. Roe, C.J.

text:
    (No. 80-CV-0841

      In re Application of Steven Hogan.

      Order filed March 17, 1981.

      Opinion filed July 27, 1984.

      Amended opinion filed August 7, 1985.

      Order filed November 27, 1985.

    Jeffrey Goldberg and Stephen N. Novosad, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Maureen Cain and Alison P. Breslauer, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on May 27,1979. Steven Hogan, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Steven Hogan, age 18, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 12— 3).

2. That on May 27, 1979, the Claimant was intentionally struck by a car driven by the offender, whom he did not know. The incident arose from a dispute between the offender and Mr. Darryl Gordon, the driver of the car in which the Claimant was a passenger. The offender’s car repeatedly tried to pass Mr. Gordon’s car as both were northbound on Pulaski Avenue. Mr. Gordon stopped his car at 800 S. Pulaski, Chicago, Illinois, to inquire as to why the offender was driving in this manner. The Claimant asked Mr. Gordon to open the trunk of his car and he then went to the trunk. At this time, the offender’s car, which was behind Mr. Gordon’s vehicle, lurched forward striking the Claimant and pinning him between the cars. The Claimant was taken to St. Anthony’s Hospital for treatment. The Claimant suffered the loss of his left leg above the knee as a result of this incident. The offender was charged with reckless conduct and battery but he has fled the jurisdiction of the court.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for loss of earnings only. All medical/hospital expenses were covered by the Illinois Department of Public Aid.

4. That section 2(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

5. That the Claimant alleges that he was employed by Mr. Booker T. Parrow, 4049 W. Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, during the six months prior to the incident. The Claimant has submitted an employer report allegedly completed by Mr. Parrow, listed as Exhibit A, which is attached hereto and made a part thereof. The Attorney General’s office has been unable to contact Mr. Parrow to verify the information on the report. The attorney for the Claimant is unable to provide any further proof, in the form of the Claimant’s income tax return, W2 forms, or a contact with Mr. Parrow, to verify the information on this report. Based on the lack of verification of the employment information, the Claimant has failed to provide sufficient evidence that he had any earnings in the six months prior to the incident upon which to base loss of earnings.

6. That section 6.1(b) of the Act limits the right of compensation to persons who have suffered a pecuniary loss of $200.00 or more attributable to a violent crime resulting in the injury or death of the victim.

7. That by reason of the Claimant’s failure to substantiate his claim for loss of earnings, he has failed to show a pecuniary loss of $200.00 or more as required by section 6.1(b) of the Act.

8. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Roe, C.J.

The applicant, Steven Hogan, is seeking compensation for loss of earnings pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

In an order dated March 17, 1981, this Court, while finding that the applicant had been a victim of a violent crime on May 27,1979, and had suffered the amputation of his left leg as a result of the crime, also found that the applicant had failed to provide sufficient evidence that he had any earnings in the six months prior to the crime which could form the basis of an award for loss of earnings. We specifically noted that the applicant had been unable to provide proof, in the form of the applicant’s income tax return, W2 forms, or a contact with the applicant’s alleged employer to verify his alleged employment during the requisite time period. Since the applicant failed to substantiate that he was employed and had earnings during the relevant time period, he failed to prove his claim for loss of earnings and was therefore denied compensation for failing to show a pecuniary loss of $200.00 or more as required by section 6.1 of the Act.

Following the issuance of the March 17,1981, order, the applicant timely filed a petition pursuant to the Act requesting a hearing before a commissioner. Hearings were subsequently held and the commissioner has duly filed his report with the Court.

The issue before this Court is whether the applicant, through evidence presented following the issuance of the March 17, 1981, order denying this claim, has now sufficiently substantiated that he had earnings during the six months prior to the crime which may form the basis for an award for loss of earnings. The Court has carefully considered the commissioner’s report, briefs filed by both parties, the evidence deposition of the applicant’s alleged employer and other documents submitted concerning this claim.

The applicant contends that sufficient proof of earnings during the relevant time period has been presented to merit the granting of an award. This contention primarily relies on information set forth in the evidence deposition of Booker T. Parrow, the applicant’s alleged employer. On direct examination in the deposition Mr. Parrow stated that he was engaged in the business of wrecking and scavenging, had employed the applicant for approximately a year prior to the crime which caused the applicant’s injury, and had paid the applicant about $150.00 a week in cash while the applicant was in his employment. Mr. Parrow further revealed that he did not withhold any taxes from the wages payed to the applicant and did not keep any books or records in his business.

Cross-examination at the deposition primarily dealt with discrepancies between testimony of Mr. Parrow on direct examination and an employer documentation form bearing Mr. Farrow’s signature which was dated October 25, 1980. The discrepancies concerned the period of time the applicant allegedly worked for Mr. Parrow and the rate of wages the applicant was paid. While attempting to explain the discrepancies, Mr. Parrow revealed that he had signed the form, but that his daughter had filled it out at his direction because he had difficulty reading.

The State first contends that the primary issue before the Court is whether the Attorney General, pursuant to his statutory authority to investigate crime victims’ claims, can require official documentation of past earnings to substantiate a claim by a crime victim. It is the State’s position that substantiation of a claim for loss of earnings requires official documentation of past earnings pursuant to section 4 of the original Crime Victims Compensation Act and sections 7.1(a)(8), (a)(9), and (b) of the amendatory provisions of the Act. Said section 4 merely defines pecuniary loss. Nothing therein can be construed to require any type or amount of documentation of past earnings. Sections 7.1(a)(8), (a)(9), and (b) read as follows:

“77.1. Contents of application for compensation 7.1(a). The application shall set out: # O #
8. releases authorizing the surrender to the Court of Claims or the Attorney General of reports, documents and other information relating to the matters specified under this Act and rules promulgated in accordance with the Act.
9. such other information as the Court of Claims or the Attorney General reasonably requires.
b. The Attorney General may require that materials substantiating the facts stated in the application be submitted with the application.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, pars. 77.1(a)(8), (a)(9), (b).)

It seems abundantly clear to us that the above quoted provisions of the Act refer to what the application shall contain and what the Attorney General may seek and obtain in conducting his investigation. Nothing therein can be construed as specifying what constitutes the applicant’s burden of proof. There is no issue, the State’s statement in its memorandum to the contrary, as to whether the Attorney General can require official documentation of past earnings to substantiate such a claim. The Attorney General can. However, what the Attorney General can require and what the sufficiency of proof of entitlement is are two different things.

The State essentially raised four arguments in support of its contention that official documentation is required. First, it argued that the principles of federalism and policy require that income produced in violation of Federal tax laws be denied recognition by a State judicial body. We would tend to agree with that argument. However, it has not been shown conclusively that the applicant here violated any Federal tax laws. Many scenarios can be envisioned based on the evidence in the record, and without more, which totally exculpate the applicant.

Second, it was contended that the legislative history of the Crime Victims Compensation Act evidences the preference of the legislature to confine awards to law abiding citizens. We cannot deny this, but do question its relevancy here. Nowhere is it alleged or implied that the applicant’s alleged job was anything but lawful. It is still legal to be paid in legal tender for services rendered. Again, the Respondent has not shown that the applicant has violated any law. Moreover, if it is the Attorney General’s position that the applicant violated a State tax law, it is within his powers and duties to seek enforcement through prosecution and/or collection. Governmental liens have been upheld in proceedings under the Act. Gettis v. State (1975), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 922.

The third argument made was that previous decisions of this Court have demonstrated a preference that official documentation of past earnings be utilized in loss-of-earnings and loss-of-support claims. This Court, however, has not heretofore required that such official documentation must be submitted in support of a claim for loss of earnings. We have determined that “competent evidence” must be submitted to support an award for loss of earnings. (In re Application of Johnson (1975), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 803.) However, “competent evidence” is simply upon what we base our decisions as to issues of fact.

Adequacy of tendered proof in loss-of-earnings claims is a question of fact for this Court to determine. While the Act is silent concerning the degree of proof required to prove a claim for loss of earnings, this Court has said that such a claim must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Application of Sole (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 713.) A proposition proved by a preponderance of the evidence has been described as one that is probably more true than not. (Estate of Ragon (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 8, 398 N.E.2d 198, 203.) The presentation of official documentation of past earnings makes it easier for the Court to determine whether an applicant has proved a claim for loss of earnings by a preponderance of the evidence. However, other evidence may be considered in deciding whether an applicant has met his or her burden of proof. Indeed, this Court has previously made an award for loss of earnings without requiring the presentation of official documentation. In re Application of Moy (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 733.

The last argument in support of the contention that official documentation is required was that denial of the Attorney General’s right to require official income documentation will vitiate his ability to fulfill the statutory mandate for complete investigations of claims. This opinion is not to be construed in any way as limiting the Attorney General’s authority to require any documentation. Again, that is not at issue here. We are not requiring the Attorney General to accept any type of evidence. If the Attorney General feels, after due investigation, that the claim has not been substantiated to his satisfaction he may say so in his report and recommend denial. The applicant has a right to have this Court hear what evidence he or she has, and, based on that evidence, render a decision on what must be a factual determination. All we are saying is that the inability of the applicant to supply what the Attorney General has a statutory right to request in the course of his investigation is not per se grounds for denial of the claim.

The Respondent also contends that even if presentation of official documentation is not required, we should reject the deposition testimony of Mr. Parrow because of discrepancies between that testimony and the previously submitted employer documentation form. We disagree with this contention. Mr. Parrow did attempt to explain that the discrepancies were due to his inability to read well and to his poor memory regarding dates. It should be noted that the employer documentation form was filled out more than a year after the applicant was employed by Mr. Parrow. This lapse of time, along with Mr. Farrow’s failure to keep accurate business records, his poor memory, and his inability to read well, may explain the inaccuracies on the employer documentation form. Furthermore, that Mr. Parrow testified subject to penalties regarding his failure to keep accurate business and tax records is a persuasive reason to not reject his testimony outright.

As was stated earlier in this opinion, claims for loss of earnings must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence and a proposition proved by a preponderance of the evidence is one that is probably more true than not. While the deposition testimony of Mr. Parrow, concerning his employment of the applicant and the discrepancies regarding the employment documentation form, was not always clear, we are pursuaded that it is more true than not that the applicant was employed by Mr. Parrow during the six months prior to the crime and earned approximately $150.00 a week during the relevant period of employment.

Having determined that the applicant was employed and had earnings during the six months prior to the crime, which may form the basis of an award for loss of earnings, an issue still exists regarding the amount of compensation for loss of earnings that should be awarded. The record fails to indicate the length of time the applicant was unable to work due to his injury and whether the applicant received unemployment compensation or other benefits that could be set off from an award for loss of earnings. We therefore find that this matter must be sent to a commissioner for the purposes of hearing evidence and making a recommendation concerning the amount of compensation for loss of earnings the applicant is entitled to receive.

It is hereby ordered that this cause be set for hearing before a commissioner for the purposes set forth above.

AMENDED OPINION

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on May 27,1979. Steven Hogan, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

On March 17, 1981, this Court entered an order dismissing the Claimant’s cause for Claimant’s failure to provide sufficient documentation to establish a loss under the Act. The Claimant filed a timely petition requesting a hearing before the Court of Claims. Both parties filed briefs as to the issue of employment subsequent to the evidence deposition of Mr. Booker T. Parrow. On July 27, 1984, this Court issued an order in which it found the Claimant had established that, during the six months immediately preceding the incident, he had been employed and earned approximately $150.00 per week.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Court, an investigatory report submitted by the Attorney General of Illinois, this Court’s previous opinion, and the stipulation entered into by the Claimant and the Attorney General following an investigation, all of which substantiate the matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant for compensation is Steven Hogan, of 1617 South Drake, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant was 18 years of age at the time of the incident.

2. That on May 27, 1979, the Claimant was intentionally struck by a car driven by the offender, whom he did not know. The incident arose from a dispute between the offender and Mr. Darryl Gordon, the driver of the car in which the Claimant was a passenger. The offender’s car repeatedly tried to pass Mr. Gordon’s car as both were northbound on Pulaski Avenue. Mr. Gordon stopped his car at 800 South Pulaski, Chicago, Illinois, to inquire why the offender was driving in this manner. The Claimant asked Mr. Gordon to open the trunk of his car and he then went to the trunk. At this time, the offender’s car, which was behind Mr. Gordon’s vehicle, lurched forward striking the Claimant and pinning him between the cars. The Claimant was taken to St. Anthony’s Hospital for treatment. The Claimant suffered the loss of his left leg above the knee as a result of this incident. The offender was charged with reckless conduct and battery but he has fled the jurisdiction of the court.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for loss of earnings and medical expenses.

4. That per this Court’s opinion of July 27, 1984, it has been established that the Claimant was employed by Mr. Booker T. Parrow, 4049 West Monroe, Chicago, Illinois, prior to the injury and that his average monthly earnings were $600.00.

5. That the Claimant began working for Central Orthopedic Appliances one year subsequent to his injury.

6. That section 4 of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 74) states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.

7. That based upon $500.00 per month, the maximum compensation for loss of earnings for one year is $6,000.00.

8. That at the time of his injury, Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses which were paid by public aid. Claimant subsequently incurred a medical expense of $1,200.00 for a prosthetic appliance necessitated by the incident. Claimant has paid $1,200.00 towards this balance.

9. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims, (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older) and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dramshop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

10. That the Claimant has received nothing in reimbursements that can be counted as an applicable deduction.

11. That all necessary documents were timely filed.

12. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Compensable Loss of Earnings $6,000.00
Net Medical/Hospital Expenses 1,200.00
Total $7,200.00
Less $200.00 Deductible — 200.00
Total $7,000.00

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $7,000.00 (seven thousand dollars and no cents) be and is hereby awarded to Steven Hogan, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

ORDER

Poch, J.

This cause coming to be heard upon the petition of Jeffrey M. Goldberg, Ltd., attorney, for the Claimant, Steven Hogan, seeking fees in the above-captioned matter for services rendered on behalf of the Claimant, due notice being given and the Court being fully advised finds:

That this Court on August 7, 1985, awarded the Claimant, Steven Hogan, seven thousand ($7,000.00) dollars as an innocent victim of a violent crime.

Pursuant to section 12, of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 70, par. 82) no fee may be charged to the Claimant under the Act except that the attorney may charge the Claimant for representing the Claimant at the hearing an amount to be determined by the Court as reasonable.

The Court has carefully reviewed the petition for fees and the report of the Commissioner and finds that the sum of fourteen hundred ($1,400.00) dollars is a reasonable amount pursuant to the work performed in preparation for and representation at the hearing.

It is hereby ordered:

That Jeffrey M. Goldberg, attorney for Claimant, Steven Hogan, be compensated in the sum of fourteen hundred ($1,400.00) dollars out of the award to Claimant, Steven Hogan, of seven thousand ($7,000.00) dollars.


author: Poch, J. Patchett, J.

text:
    (No. 82-CV-0433

      In re Application of Janice Wintrol.

      Order filed October 18, 1983.

      Opinion filed October 18, 1985.

    Janice Wintrol, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 25, 1981. Janice Wintrol seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based on these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on August 25, 1981, the Claimant fell from the second story window of an apartment building as she attempted to escape from three offenders who had sexually assaulted her. The incident occurred at 4934 North Kedzie, Chicago, Illinois, and the Claimant was treated for her injuries at Swedish Covenant Hospital. The Claimant related to police officers investigating the incident that she had gone to the above location with the intent to purchase narcotics for some acquaintances. It was during this transaction that she was forced into a second floor apartment and sexually assaulted.

2. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses and loss of earnings.

3. That section 10.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced according to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

4. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the Claimant’s injury was substantially attributable to her involvement in the illegal act of distributing narcotics.

5. That without addressing the merits of other issues raised in the investigatory report, the Claimant’s conduct in distributing narcotics contributed to her injury to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

6. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Patchett, J.

This is a claim brought by Janice Wintrol, Claimant, under the provision of the Crime Victims Compensation Act. Findings of fact: On August 25,1981, Claimant fell from the second story of a building located at 4934 North Kedzie, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. She fell as she was attempting to escape three offenders who had sexually assaulted her.

There is little evidence as to why the Claimant was at the vicinity of the crime prior to her injuries. She testified that she had gone there in the course of her employment to run errands for her employer, Attorney Marshall Teichner. Detective Stone of the Chicago Police Department testified that he interviewed the Claimant in the emergency room of the hospital on the morning of August 26, 1981. At that time the Claimant indicated that she had been in the vicinity of the crime in order to purchase drugs or narcotics.

From examination of the Claimant’s testimony, and the impeachment brought out during the hearing before the commissioner, it was apparent that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of the Claimant. We believe that the preponderance of the evidence indicated that the Claimant was engaged in the act of purchasing illegal drugs immediately prior to the criminal assault upon her. Section 10.1(d) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, as it was in force at the time of the incident, reads as follows:

“(d) an award shall be reduced according to the extent to which any criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim;”

We feel that the prior criminal conduct of the victim either directly or indirectly contributed to her injuries in this case. We feel that the award should be reduced completely, and in effect denied, because of the Claimant’s prior criminal conduct.

Therefore, it is the judgment of this Court that this claim be and hereby is denied.


author: POCH, J. Patchett, J.

text:
    (No. 82-CV-0721

      In re Application of James Powell.

      Order filed March 28, 1983.

      Opinion filed October 24, 1985.

    James Powell, pro se, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 16, 1981. James Powell seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on March 11, 1982, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant alleges that on August 16, 1981, he was stabbed in the eye by two unknown offenders during the course of a robbery. The alleged incident occurred on the street at 56th and Racine, Chicago, Illinois. Medical records from Cook County Hospital indicate the Claimant was brought into the hospital on August 16,1981, for treatment of a laceration to the face.

However, records from the Chicago Police Department indicate that the police were summoned twice to the Claimant’s home on the evening of the alleged incident in answer to complaints. The police department has no record that a crime occurred and the Claimant has failed to furnish proof that a crime has been committed.

2. That in order for a Claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence of one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 2(c) of the Act.

3. That the Claimant has failed to show that the injuries sustained were as a result of one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 2(c) of the Act.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered, that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Patchett, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 16, 1981. James Powell seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court entered an order on March 28, 1983, denying the claim. The Claimant thereafter requested a hearing.

The parties agree that on August 16,1981, Claimant was stabbed in his right eye by an unknown offender. He was hospitalized from August 16,1981, to August 21, 1981. All of his medical bills were paid by the Illinois Department of Public Aid.

The sole issue presented to this Court is the amount of time Claimant was disabled and incapable of working as a result of the crime.

The evidence clearly shows that the Claimant suffered a permanent injury to his right eye. This injury was a very serious one, leaving him with poor vision in his eye and a loss of depth perception.

Prior to the incident, Claimant worked occasionally, on a part-time basis, for the Pepsi-Cola Company. Pepsi’s practice was to call persons, such as the Claimant, for work during busy times. They would employ them for less than 30 days and then lay them off. Claimant had been called to work at Pepsi on seven different occasions prior to the incident on August 16, 1981. The parties agree that Pepsi was not required to employ the Claimant at any time, since Claimant never obtained union seniority.

The parties further agreed that the Claimant was totally disabled and unable to work from August 16, 1981, to October 10, 1981. This was a period of two months and 16 working days. During the six months immediately preceding the crime, Claimant’s average monthly earnings were $229.63. His loss of earnings during the agreed period was $626.30 based on the immediate six months prior.

The Claimant’s doctor, Dr. Stephen Lewin, wrote a letter on November 10, 1981, stating that the Claimant “is fully able to return to his duties at his job.”

Since his medical treatment has been concluded, the Claimant returned to work for Pepsi in November 1981 for 2/2 to three weeks; in December 1981 for two weeks; in February 1982 for two weeks; and in April 1982 for two weeks. From April 1982, to March 1984, Claimant received unemployment compensation benefits. He drove an automobile during this period.

The Claimant has admitted that the Pepsi supervisors had failed to call him back to work as a matter of preference and not because of a lack of physical ability.

Therefore, the Court feels that the Claimant has failed to prove that he is unable to work because of physical inability.

Therefore, this court awards the Claimant his lost earnings of $626.30, less the $200.00 deductible required by section 10.1(e) of the Act. This will make a net award of $426.30.


author: Roe, C.J. Poch, J. Montana, J.

text:
    (No. 83-CV-0262

      In re Application of Delbert Davis.

      Order filed October 20, 1982.

      Order filed November 19, 1982.

      Opinion filed April 6, 1984.

      Opinion filed January 21, 1986.

    Bruce D. Wellman, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the petition of Delbert Davis for an extension of time to file documents to claim benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

The Court hereby finds:

1. Section 6.1 of the Act provides in pertinent part that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if:

“(a) within 6 months of the occurrence of the crime he files a notice of intent to file a claim with the Attorney General and within one year of the occurrence of the crime upon which the claim is based, he files an application, under oath with the Court of Claims.. . . Upon good cause shown, the Court of Claims may extend the time for filing the notice of intent to file a claim and application for a period not exceeding one year;”

2. The crime was alleged to have occurred on August 5,1978.

3. The notice of intent was filed on August 30,1980.

4. The application was filed on September 20,1982.

5. The petition at bar was filed on September 20, 1982.

6. Pursuant to the section of the Act quoted above we have authority only to extend the filing time for a period not to exceed February 25,1980, for the notice of intent and August 25,1980, for the application.

7. We are therefore constrained by operation of law to deny this petition.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that this petition be, and hereby is, denied.

ORDER

Roe, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Court’s own motion and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

It is hereby ordered that the order entered in this cause on October 20,1982, be, and hereby is, vacated; it is further ordered that applicant’s petition for an extension of time to file documents to claim benefits under the Act be, and hereby is, granted.

OPINION

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 25,1978. Delbert Davis, husband of the deceased victim, Clifty Davis, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims. Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on September 20, 1982, on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Eased upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Clifty Davis, age 43, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, eh. 38, par. 9 — 1).

2. That on August 25, 1978, the victim was abducted during the course of an armed robbery of The Other Place Tavern that she and her husband operated. The victim’s body was found in her car several hours later. The coroner found that the victim’s death resulted from a fractured skull and multiple gunshot wounds to the head. The offender was apprehended and convicted of murder. A second offender was convicted of a lesser charge.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral and burial expenses and for loss of support for himself and the victim’s children, Theresa, age 13, Debbie, age 16, and Tom, age 8.

4. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $4,649.75, of which $2,000.00 is compensable under the Act.

5. That the Claimant has not submitted any evidence before the Court to substantiate the fact that he and the victim’s children were dependent upon the victim for support.

6. That pursuant to section 7(d) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, eh. 48, par. 138.1 etseq.), from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousands dollars) of life insurance paid or payable to the Claimant.

7. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

8. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

9. That the Claimant is entitled to the maximum statutory award of $2,000.00 for funeral and burial expenses.

10. That the Claimant, having not submitted the necessary evidence needed to support his claim for loss of support, has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under that provision of the Act.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $2,000.00 (two thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Delbert Davis, husband of Clifty Davis, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

OPINION

Montana, J.

This claim is before the Court on review of the opinion rendered on April 6, 1984. In said opinion the Claimant, Delbert Davis, was granted an award pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, of $2,000.00 for funeral expenses incurred due to the death of the crime victim, his wife, Clifty Davis. The opinion denied the Claimant’s request for loss of support for himself and the couple’s minor children due to his failure to submit the necessary evidence needed to substantiate the alleged loss of support. The Claimant thereafter requested that a hearing be held concerning the claim for loss of support. The request was granted and a hearing was held before a commissioner on September 13, 1984. Both parties have filed briefs and the commissioner has filed his report. The matter is now before the Court for a decision.

On August 25, 1978, Clifty Davis was abducted during the course of an armed robbery at The Other Place Tavern. The Other Place Tavern was a restaurant/ tavern owned and operated by the Claimant and the victim. The victim’s body was found in her car several hours later. The coroner found that the victim’s death resulted from a fractured skull and multiple gunshot wounds to the head. The two offenders were subsequently apprehended. One offender was convicted of murder and the other of a lesser charge.

The documentation submitted in support of the Claimant’s application for benefits showed that the Claimant had incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $4,649.75. Section 2(h) of the Act provides, in part, that Claimants may recover for “Funeral and burial expenses to a maximum of $2,000.00.” Claimant was, pursuant to this Court’s opinion of April 6, 1984, awarded the maximum available amount for funeral and burial expenses, $2,000.00.

The tax return for the year of 1978 submitted by the Claimant relevant to his claim of loss of support for himself and the couple’s minor children showed that the business owned by the victim and Claimant had sustained a loss in 1978 and reported no other source of earned income. Since the victim had no earnings during the six months prior to the crime, the claim for loss of support was denied pursuant to section 4 of the Act.

Subsequent to the April 6, 1984, opinion the Claimant provided information which showed that the victim had earned $56.00 during the six months preceding the crime. The State has agreed that Claimant is, therefore, entitled to a sum of $1,909.65 under the Act for loss of support based on applicable provisions of the Act.

The sole question remaining is whether or not the accounting computations as made by Mr. Gerald Medlar, an accountant residing in Oregon, Illinois, should be given consideration to reflect a greater profit margin earned by the victim during the six months preceding the crime. The accountant’s analysis of the tax returns and monthly profit-and-loss statements of the business for the years prior to and subsequent to the incident resulting in the death of Mrs. Davis, revealed that said returns and statements did not follow generally accepted accounting practices and that certain items of expenditures were written off as ordinary expenses instead of allocating the same to real or personal capital assets, whereby they could have been depreciated in the normal fashion. Claimant and his accountant maintain that the net result of the improper accounting method was to understate profits, and now propose to correct the alleged error in order to support the claim before the Court. There is no evidence that amended income tax returns were filed reflecting the correct accounting procedure.

This Court has found that a Claimant has the burden of proving dependency and the income of the decedent by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Application of Sole (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 713, 715.) As a general rule in Illinois, the party seeking to recover damages has the burden of establishing both the fact that he has been injured and a reasonable basis for determining the money value of those injuries. (Ashe v. Sunshine Broadcasting Corp. (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 97, 101, 412 N.E.2d 1142, 1145; Brewer v. Custom Builders Corp. (1976), 42 Ill. App. 3d 668, 677, 356 N.E.2d 565, 573.) Further, damages may not be awarded on the basis of conjecture or speculation. Alover Distributors, Inc. v. Kroger Co. (1975), 513 F.2d 1137, 1141; Schoeneweis v. Herrin (1982), 110 Ill. App. 3d 800, 443 N.E.2d 36.

It is the opinion of this Court that the evidence does not support Claimant’s allegation that the maximum award for loss of support under the Act should be awarded in this claim. To make such an award the Court would have to engage in speculation since there is no way for the Court to determine the exact amount of business profit that was reinvested by the victim that would have, in the future, been used to support her dependents. We do find, however, that the Claimant is entitled pursuant to the stipulation made by Respondent at the time of the hearing and reaffirmed in the brief filed herein by the Respondent, to an award for loss of support in the amount of $1,909.65.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that Delbert Davis, be and hereby is awarded for the loss of support incurred by him and his children, the sum of $1,909.65.


author: POCH, J. Montana, J.

text:
    (No. 84-CV-0015

      In re Application of Donald Bolte.

      Opinion filed January 17,1984.

      Amended Opinion filed June 20,1984.

      Order filed February 14,1986.

      Order filed May 23,1986.

    Donald Bolte, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on April 28,1983. Donald Bolte, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 6, 1983, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Donald Bolte, age 41, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: aggravated battery. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4.

2. That on April 28, 1983, the Claimant was shot during an apparent robbery attempt by an unknown offender. The incident occurred while the Claimant was on the porch of 652 Henry, Joliet, Illinois. The Claimant was taken to Silver Cross Hospital for treatment of a severe gunshot wound. The Claimant is quadriplegic as a result of the injuries suffered in this shooting. A suspected offender has been apprehended and is being prosecuted.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses and for loss of earnings.

4. That as of September 2, 1983, the Claimant had incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $90,347.39, $74,384.95 of which was paid by insurance and $9,895.89 of which will be covered by Public Aid, leaving a balance of $6,066.55. To date, the Claimant has paid $317.37 of this balance, leaving $5,749.18 due. All other medical expenses will be covered through Public Aid.

5. That the Claimant was employed by Joyce Beverages Company prior to the injury and his average monthly earnings were $1,148.22. The Claimant suffers from quadriplegia as a result of the incident and is permanently disabled and unable to return to work.

6. That section 2(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

7. That the Claimant was 41 years of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1978, life tables, volume II, his life expectancy would have been 73.3 years. Based on $750.00 per month, the projected loss of earnings for 32.3 years is $290,700.00.

8. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

9. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dramshop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

10. That the Claimant has received disability benefits in the amount of $2,300.00, which can be counted as an applicable deduction. Also, effective November 3, 1983, the Claimant was entitled to an amount of $538.00 per month from social security disability benefits, which must be counted as a deduction. This amount may increase over the course of the Claimant’s entitlement to these benefits, which can be projected over his life expectancy of 73.3 years.

11. That after considering the applicable deductions against the Claimant’s loss of future earnings, his loss is in excess of $15,000.00, which is the maximum amount compensable under section 10.1(f) of the Act.

12. That pursuant to section 18(c) of the Act, the Court may order that all or a portion of an award be paid jointly to the applicant and provider of services. In the instant case, the Court finds this section applicable and orders that joint payment be made.

13. That, as the Claimant’s full award exceeds the $15,000.00 maximum compensable award, the Court orders that the award be paid pursuant to section 18(c) as follows:

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $9,250.82 (nine thousand two hundred fifty dollars and eighty-two cents) be and is hereby awarded to Donald Bolte, an innocent victim of a violent crime, to be paid and disbursed to him as follows:

(a) $2,250.82 (two thousand two hundred fifty dollars and eighty-two cents) to be paid in a lump sum;
(b) fourteen (14) equal monthly payments of $500.00 (five hundred dollars) each.

It is further ordered that the sum of $3,807.96 (three thousand eight hundred seven dollars and ninety-six cents) be and is hereby awarded to Donald Bolte and Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago.

It is further ordered that the sum of $210.22 (two hundred ten dollars and twenty-two cents) be and is hereby awarded to Donald Bolte and Northwestern Memorial Hospital, account N13045085.

It is further ordered that the sum of $460.00 (four hundred sixty dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Donald Bolte and Dr. Paul Meyer.

It is further ordered that the sum of $250.00 (two hundred fifty dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Donald Bolte and Northwestern Medical Faculty Foundation.

It is further ordered that the sum of $366.75 (three hundred sixty-six dollars and seventy-five cents) be and is hereby awarded to Donald Bolte and St. Joseph’s Hospital.

It is further ordered that the sum of $120.00 (one hundred twenty dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Donald Bolte and Dr. Steven Nemeth.

It is further ordered that the sum of $534.25 (five hundred thirty-four dollars and twenty-five cents) be and is hereby awarded to Donald Bolte and Medical Personnel Pool of Joliet.

AMENDED OPINION

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on April 28, 1983. The Claimant, Donald Bolte, sought compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

The Claimant was awarded compensation by order of the Court issued on January 17, 1984. At the time of that award, the Court found that the Claimant was entitled to the maximum award of $15,000.00 under the provisions of section 10.1(f) of the Act. This claim is now before the Court pursuant to a check for part of the award which was returned to the Court.

The Court has carefully reviewed its prior order in this cause and the returned check. Based upon this review the Court finds:

1. That in the Court’s order of January 17,1984, the amount of $366.75 was ordered paid in a joint check payable to the Claimant and St. Joseph’s Hospital.

2. That upon the Claimant’s receipt of this check, he attempted to sign this check over to St. Joseph’s Hospital and found that this amount has been written off by that institution.

3. That the Claimant has returned this check to the Court and this check has been redeposited with the Comptroller’s office.

4. That the Claimant is permanently disabled and eligible for the maximum award under section 10.1(f) for both medical expenses and loss of earnings. Therefore, this amount of $366.75 should be considered within the Claimant’s loss of earnings and should be reissued in a check payable to him.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $366.75 (three hundred sixty-six dollars and seventy-five cents) be awarded to Donald Bolte.

ORDER

Poch, J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Court’s own motion;

On January 17, 1984, the applicant was awarded $15,000.00 in benefits, $9,250.82 of which was payable to him on account of his disability. He received a lump sum of $2,250.00 and was to receive 14 monthly installments of $500.00 for the balance, pursuant to our opinion. To date, all but $1,000.00 has been disbursed.

By telephone call the clerk’s office was notified that the applicant is now deceased. Written verification was requested, but as of the time this order was prepared none has been received. The time for vouchering the next installment has passed with none having been vouchered and no contact made by the applicant.

It is hereby ordered that the periodic payments be discontinued until further notice.

ORDER

Montana, J.

This cause coming to be heard on the Respondent’s motion for payment, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

It is hereby ordered that a check in the amount of $1,000.00 shall be issued as the final installment of the award to Mr. Donald Bolte.


author: POCH, J.

text:
    (No. 84-CV-0533

      In re Application of Henry Bryant.

      Opinion filed July 22, 1985.

    Henry Bryant, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Alison P. Breslauer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 8, 1983. Henry Bryant, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on December 9, 1983, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Henry Bryant, age 57, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: arson. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 20 — 1.

2. That on September 8, 1983, the Claimant suffered from smoke inhalation as the result of an arson fire. The incident occurred in an apartment building where the Claimant resided, located at 7924 South Ashland, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that an unknown offender poured a flammable liquid up and down a staircase and hallway and set it on fire. The Claimant was taken to Holy Cross Hospital for treatment of smoke inhalation. The offender has not been apprehended.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses only.

4. That section 2(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

5. That the Claimant was not employed for the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident out of which this claim arose and therefore suffered no loss of earnings compensable under section 2(h) of the Act.

6. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $5,992.64, $560.00 of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $5,432.64. To date, the Claimant has paid $1,885.64 towards this balance.

7. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

8. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dramshop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

9. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

10. That pursuant to section 18(c) of the Act, the Court may order that all or a portion of an award be paid jointly to the applicant and provider of services. In the instant case, the Court finds this section applicable and orders that joint payment be made.

11. That after applying the applicable deductions, the Claimant’s loss for which he seeks compensation is $5,232.64, based upon the following:

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $1,816.24 (one thousand eight hundred sixteen dollars and twenty-four cents) be and is hereby awarded to Henry Bryant, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that the sum of $3,416.40 (three thousand four hundred sixteen dollars and forty cents) be and is hereby awarded to Henry Bryant and Holy Cross Hospital.


text:
    (No. 85-CV-0922

      In re Application of Rita Johnson.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1985.

    Rita Johnson, pro se, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Alison P. Breslauer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on May 13,1984. Rita Johnson, wife of the deceased victim, Robert Johnson, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on March 22, 1985, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased husband Robert Johnson, age 44, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: voluntary manslaughter. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 2.

2. That on May 13,1984, the victim was shot by his brother-in-law during the course of an argument. The incident occurred in the offender’s apartment at 4601 South Indiana, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation determined that as the victim and the offender were arguing, the offender obtained a gun from a briefcase. Although he left the room for a short time, the offender returned to the room with the gun. As the victim attempted to leave, the offender shot him twice. The victim was taken to Michael Reese Hospital where he expired from his injuries. The offender was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral and medical/hospital expenses and for loss of support for herself and the victim’s minor children, Recco Johnson, age 16; Nathaniel Johnson, age 15; Robert Johnson, age 14; and Tasha Johnson, age 8.

4. According to section 10.1(c) of the Act, a person related to the victim is eligible for compensation for funeral and medical/hospital expenses provided that such expenses were paid by him.

5. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $2,420.00. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum award of $2,000.00.

6. The Claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $6,213.83 none of which was paid by insurance leaving a balance of $6,213.83. This amount has not been paid and therefore cannot be considered for compensation at this time, pursuant to section 10.1(c) of the Act.

7. That the Claimant and the victim’s four minor children were totally dependent upon the victim for support.

8. That prior to his death, the victim was employed by the Chicago Housing Authority and his average monthly earnings were $686.45.

9. That section 2(h) of the Act states “. . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.”

10. That the victim was 44 years of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1978, life tables, volume II, his life expectancy would have been 73.6 years. The projected loss of support for 29.6 years is $243,827.04 which is in excess of $15,000.00, the maximum amount compensable under section 10.1(f) of the Act.

11. That this claim complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

12. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dramshop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

13. That the Claimant has received $30,728.33 from life insurance policies, $5,728.33 of which can be counted as applicable deductions.

14. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss resulting from the victim’s death is in excess of the $15,000.00 maximum allowed in section 10.1(f) of the Act.

15. That the Claimant’s interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 11.1 of the Act.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $15,000.00 (fifteen thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Rita Johnson, wife of Robert Johnson, an innocent victim of a violent crime to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $2,670.00 (two thousand six hundred seventy dollars) to be paid to Rita Johnson in a lump sum;
(b) 18 (eighteen) equal monthly payments of $685.00 (six hundred eighty-five dollars) each to be paid to Rita Johnson for the use and benefit of Recco Johnson, Nathaniel Johnson, Robert Johnson, Jr., and Tasha Johnson;
(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimant or the Claimant’s children, it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.


text:
    (No. 86-CV-0400

      In re Application of Mary A. Smith.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1986.

    Ernest T. Rossiello, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sallie Manley, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of incidents that occurred from September 18, 1984, until September 24, 1984. Mary A. Smith, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on October 1, 1985, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Mary A. Smith, age 24, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: assault. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 1.

2. That beginning on September 18, 1984, until September 24, 1984, the Claimant was fondled and repeatedly sexually harassed by a co-worker. The incident occurred while the Claimant was working at a restaurant located at 7516 West Diversey, Elmwood Park, Illinois. As a result of the incident, the Claimant needed and received psychological counseling. The offender was apprehended, prosecuted and convicted of criminal sexual abuse.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses only. The Claimant does not seek compensation for loss of earnings.

4. That the Claimant incurred psychological counseling expenses in the amount of $2,025.00, none of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $2,025.00. To date, the Claimant has paid $100.00, towards this balance.

5. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

6. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dramshop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

7. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

8. That the Claimant has filed a civil action against the offender, Smith v. Comacho, No. 85 L 8295, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, County Department, Law Division, as a result of the incident. The Claimant, by informing the Attorney General of her pending civil suit, has acknowledged her responsibility to further notify the Attorney General of the final disposition of the civil action, pursuant to section 17 of the Act.

9. That the Claimant has indicated that she may incur additional counseling expenses as a result of the incident. Should the Claimant incur such additional expenses, she may petition the Court to reopen her claim for consideration of these expenses, pursuant to section 16 of the Act.

10. That pursuant to section 18(c) of the Act, the Court may order that all or a portion of an award be paid jointly to the applicant and provider of services. In the instant case, the Court finds this action applicable and orders that joint payment be made.

11. That after applying the applicable deductions, the Claimant’s loss for which she seeks compensation is $1,825.00, based upon the following:

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $90.00 (ninety dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Mary A. Smith, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that the sum of $270.40 (two hundred seventy dollars and forty cents) be and is hereby awarded to Mary A. Smith and Ner Littner, M.D., S.C.

It is further ordered that the sum of $1,464.60 (one thousand four hundred sixty-four dollars and sixty cents) be and is hereby awarded to Mary A. Smith and Joan Collins Thompson, A.C.S.W.


author: Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 86-CV-0788

      In re Application of Lillian Kosrow.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1986.

    Lillian Kosrow, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sallie Manley, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 2, 1985. Lillian Kosrow, sister of the deceased victim, Mary Ann Hoffman, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on January 21, 1986, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased sister, Mary Ann Hoffman, age 44, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: reckless homicide. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3.

2. That on March 2, 1985, the victim was killed as the result of a head-on automobile accident. The incident occurred at Route 12 and Bonner Road, Wauconda, Illinois. Investigation by police officials revealed that the offender drove his vehicle into the path of the automobile in which the victim was traveling, killing the victim and two other passengers. The victim was transported to Good Shepherd Hospital where she expired. The offender was apprehended and charged with reckless homicide. The criminal proceedings against him are currently pending.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and for loss of support for the victim’s minor children, Lawrence William Hoffman bom April 23,1970, and Julie Ann Hoffman bom May 9,1971.

4. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $525.00. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum award of $2,000.00.

5. That the victim’s minor children were dependent upon the victim for support.

6. That on November 1,1985, under No. 82 D 1213, in the Circuit Court of Lake County, State of Illinois, the Claimant, Lillian Kosrow was granted custody of Lawrence William Hoffman and Julie Ann Hoffman.

7. That the youngest of the victim’s minor children, Julie Ann Hoffman, born May 9, 1971, was 13 years 10 months of age at the time of the incident. Julie Ann Hoffman will attain the age of majority on May 9,1989, which is 50 months after the incident.

8. That prior to her death, the victim was employed by Town Hall Estates and her average monthly earnings were $711.73.

9. That section 2(h) of the Act states “. . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.”

10. That based on $711.73 per month, the maximum compensation for loss of support for 50 months, which is the maximum period for loss of support for the victim’s youngest child, is $35,586.50, which is in excess of the $15,000.00 maximum allowed in section 10.1(f) of the Act.

11. That this claim complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

12. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dramshop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

13. That the Claimant has received nothing in reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as an applicable deduction under section 7.1(a) (7) of the Act.

14. That the Claimant has indicated that a civil action may be filed as a result of the incident. The Claimant, by informing the Attorney General’s office of the possibility of a civil action, has acknowledged her responsibility to further notify the Attorney General of the filing of the civil action and of its final disposition, pursuant to section 17 of the Act.

15. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss resulting from the victim’s death is in excess of the $15,000.00 maximum allowed in section 10.1(f) of the Act.

16. That the Claimant’s interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 11.1 of the Act.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $15,000.00 (fifteen thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Lillian Kosrow, sister of Mary Ann Hoffman, an innocent victim of a violent crime, to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $1,000.00 (one thousand dollars) to be paid to Lillian Kosrow;
(b) 20 (twenty) equal monthly payments of $700.00 (seven hundred dollars) each to be paid to Lillian Kosrow for the use and benefit of Lawrence William Hoffman and Julie Ann Hoffman;
(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimant or the Claimant’s children, it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.