text:
    (No. 5465
    Municipal Tuberculosis Sanitarium, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1968.

    Municipal Tuberculosis Sanitarium, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant, Municipal Tuberculosis Sanitarium, filed its complaint in the Court of Claims on February 2, 1968 in which it seeks the sum of $196.50 for services rendered.

A Departmental Report was filed, which stated in part:

“The total of $196.50 is due the vendor as all students received the services indicated on the voucher, and no payment was made to the vendor for the period shown.”

Subsequently a written stipulation was entered into by claimant and respondent, which reads as follows:

“The report of the Department of Vocational Education and Rehabilitation, dated March 13,1968, (a copy of which is attached hereto, marked exhibit A, and, by this reference, incorporated herein, and made a part hereof) shall be admitted into evidence in this proceeding without objection by either party.
“No other oral or written evidence will be introduced by either party.
“The Commissioner to which this case has been assigned and the Court may make and file their reports, recommendations, orders and decisions based upon the pleadings heretofore filed, and the evidence herein stipulated.
“Neither party objects to the entry of an order in favor of claimant and against respondent in the sum of $196.50.
“Neither party desires to file briefs in this proceeding.
“Both parties waive notice of any hearing, and agree that the aforesaid order may be entered without either party being present.”

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contracts were entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an award for the amount due. St. Mary’s Hospital, Decatur, of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, an Illinois Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, Case No. 5261, opinion filed February 24,1966. It appears that all qualifications for an award have been met in the instant case.

Claimant, Municipal Tuberculosis Sanitarium, is therefore, hereby awarded the sum of $196.50.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Perlin, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 5470
    Melvin Painter, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1968.

    Melvin Painter, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks from respondent payment of the sum of $51.92 for services rendered to the Department of Mental Health of the State of Illinois. The complaint alleges that such demand was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for such payment has lapsed. The parties have stipulated that claimant is entitled to the sum requested, and that, as a result of claimant’s delay in billing, payment was not made prior to the closing of the biennium appropriation.

Where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert Hodgman, Inc., vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509. It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $51.92.


author: Pezman, J.

text:
    (No. 5495
    Commonwealth Edison Company, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1968.

    Joseph C. Sibley, Jr., and Emmet T. Gallagher, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant seeks to recover for services rendered the office of the Secretary of State at its North Auto and Drivers License Division, 5401-5429 North Elston Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Prom the complaint it appears that a bill in the sum of $911.38 had been misplaced, and was not resubmitted within time to be paid from the appropriation for the biennium.

On September 9, 1968, an amended stipulation of facts was entered into by and between claimant and respondent, which reads as follows:

“That equipment was delivered to respondent at the special instance and request of the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois.
“That the statements attached to the complaint as exhibit A are due and owing in the sum of Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 38/100 ($911.38).
“That no assignment or transfer of the claim has been made.
“That there is rightfully due to claimant the sum of Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 38/100 ($911.38).
“That upon the foregoing agreed case filed herein, the Court shall decide thereon and render judgment herein according to the rights of the parties in the same manner as if the facts aforesaid were proved up upon the trial of said issue.”

It is clear that this is a matter of a lapsed appropriation. The statement for services of claimant was not received until the funds for the biennium when the services were rendered had lapsed.

This Court has consistently held that, when the appropriation for the biennium from which a claim should have been paid has lapsed, it will enter an order for the amount due claimant.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $911.38.


author: Dove, J.

text:
    (No. 5504
    Sinclair Refining Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1968.

    Sinclair Refining Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Etta J. Cole, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant, Sinclair Refining Company, seeks to recover the sum of $657.19 for fuel oil furnished to the Department of Mental Health.

A stipulation was entered into by claimant and respondent as follows:

“That claimant, Sinclair Refining Company, had furnished materials as alleged in claimant’s statement of claim.
“That there is lawfully due claimant the sum of Six Hundred Fifty Seven and 19/100 Dollars ($657.19).
“That, as a result of delay in billing by claimant herein, payment was not made prior to the closing of the biennium appropriation.
“That claimant continues to be the sole person interested in this claim, and that no assignment thereof had occurred.
“That upon the foregoing agreed case filed herein the Court shall decide thereon, and render judgment herein according to the rights of the parties in the same manner as if the facts aforesaid were proved upon the trial of said issue.”

This is a matter of a lapsed appropriation, and this Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been (1) properly entered into; (2) service is satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contracts were entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an award for the amount due.

Claimant, Sinclair Refining Company, is, therefore, awarded the sum of $657.19.


text:
    (No. 5528
    General Telephone Company of Illinois, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1968.

    Vernon C. Maulson, Attorney for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

General Telephone Company of Illinois, claimant, seeks judgment in the amount of $889.40 for telephone services rendered the Department of Mental Health during the period from August 1, 1965 through June 30, 1967 at the Jacksonville State Hospital, Jacksonville, Illinois.

The sole reason for nonpayment was that the statement for services was not received in time to process before the end of the 74th Biennium.

The parties have stipulated that the amount claimed herein is due, and that “neither party objects to the entry of an order in favor of claimant and against respondent in the sum of $889.40.”

Where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and, (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. National Korectaire Company vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 302; Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509. It appears from the record that all of the qualifications have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $889.40.


text:
    (No. 5536
    Kane County Service Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1968.

    Kane County Service Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Etta J. Cole, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Kane County Service Company, claimant, seeks judgment in the sum of $178.49 for 1,630 gallons of No. 2 grade fuel oil delivered to the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, St. Charles Maintenance Storage Building, 1425 South Avenue, St. Charles, Illinois, on March 22, 1967.

The parties have stipulated that “there is lawfully due claimant the sum of $178.49”, and that said sum would have been paid if claimant’s statement had been filed prior to the close of the biennium.

Where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and, (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. National Korectaire Company vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 302; Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509. It appears from the record that all of the qualifications have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $178.49.


text:
    (No. 5542
    Northwestern Business College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 25, 1968.

    Northwestern Business College, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Etta J. Cole, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks payment of the sum of $25.25 for materials furnished the ¡Division of Vocational Behabilitation of the State of Illinois. The complaint alleges that payment of claimant’s demand was refused on the ground that funds appropriated for such payment had lapsed. The parties have stipulated that claimant is entitled to the sum requested, and that, as a result of claimant’s delay in billing, payment was not made prior to the closing of the biennium appropriation.

Where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and, (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R 509. It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $25.25.


text:
    (No. 5254
    Mass Construction Company, a Delaware Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Carbary and Carbary and Thomas D. Dopler, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant, a Delaware Corporation, seeks to recover the sum of $69,454.00 alleged to be due and unpaid under a contract for the erection of two parallel seven-span bridges on Interstate Route No. 57 over the Little Wabash River in Effingham County, Illinois. The amount requested is for the construction of eight cofferdams (watertight enclosures from which water is pumped to expose the bottom of a river, and permit work to be done there) at the contract unit price of $8,000.00 each, and for 1,732 cubic yards of cofferdam excavation at the contract unit price of $7.00 per cubic yard.

The project involved the erection of twelve concrete piers to be erected as part of the substructure for the two bridges to support their superstructures. The piers, having the same general structural detail, were designated as follows:

Pier No. 1-East Pier No. 3-East Pier No. 6-East

Pier No. 1-West Pier No. 3-West Pier No. 6-West

Pier No. 2-East Pier No. 4-East Pier No. 5-West

Pier No. 2-West Pier No. 4-West Pier No. 5-East

The contract between claimant and respondent was executed on July 1,1963. Claimant was required to begin work ten days after execution and approval of the contract, and to complete performance prior to August 1, 1964, subject to certain provisions for extensions of time. Claimant’s bid was accepted in the amount of $486,454.80.

The evidence shows that at the time the contract was executed claimant and respondent anticipated that cofferdams would be required to be driven in connection with piers No. 3 and 4, which was stated specifically in the contract. Claimant’s witness, Walter C. Glaze, an engineer who prepared the bids for claimant, testified that the parties anticipated the possibility that cofferdams would also be required to be driven in connection with the construction of piers Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 6 (both East and West).

The language of the contract pertaining to the cofferdams and cofferdam excavation is as follows:

“Cofferdams: It is anticipated that cofferdams will be required for the construction of piers Nos. 3 and 4 of the bridges. Bid items for these cofferdams are included in the total bill of materials on the plans. . . .
“The contract unit price each for cofferdams at the piers designated will be payment in full for furnishing all materials and the construction of the cofferdams, its maintenance during construction of the pier, and subsequent removal; . . .
“Cofferdam Excavation: This work shall consist of all foundation excavation for the piers without classification except rock, within the limits of the cofferdams, and the disposal of all excess material obtained from such excavation as elsewhere specified. . . .
“This work will be paid for at the contract unit price per cubic yard for cofferdam excavation.”

The undisputed evidence further shows that construction was begun by claimant during the first week in July, 1963. Excavation for piers Nos. 3, 4 and 6 was commenced. Claimed encountered a “fine, runny, silty sand” at pier No. 6, and tried to carry out the excavation operation by using a crane with digging buckets, but, as fast as it dug, the soil would come in from the sides and both ends of the hole. A point was reached where the approach embankment constructed by another contractor was endangered. Claimant found it impossible to proceed without the construction of cofferdams.

On July 19, 1963, claimant wrote to the District Engineer for respondent as follows:

“In the contract covering the above Section, piers Nos. 3 and 4 of both structures call for cofferdams as payment items. After excavating at pier No. 6, we find that unstable subsoil conditions similar to that of piers Nos. 3 and 4 prevail; that is a running silt condition. At pier No. 5 we presently have an excavation approximately 40 feet wide at the top, and are still unable to get down to the footing elevation. The sides are filling in so badly that it is impossible to proceed on construction without cofferdams. Rather than delay construction and further disturb adjacent subsoil, we are preparing to drive a cofferdam at this location — pier No. 6.
“We are of the opinion the same condition will also prevail at several of the other piers.
“We invite your inspection of the aforementioned conditions, and, if you have any feasible solutions other than using cofferdams, we will cooperate in trying other suggested methods.
“Please let us know your findings as soon as possible.”

By letter dated July 22, 1963, the District Engineer, I. 0. Bliss, through his agent, Robert M. Gamble, replied:

“Replying to paragraph three of your letter, dated July 19, 1963, this is to inform you that an inspection has been made of the excavation for pier No. 6, and it appears that your only solution is to use sheeting or cofferdam. (Emphasis supplied)
“The plans and special provisions require payment for a cofferdam for piers Nos. 3 and 4 of both bridges. No cofferdam is required on the remaining piers, and no payment can be made if you decide to use cofferdams on these piers. The borings on the plans show that even though piers Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 6 are approximately 13 feet higher than piers Nos. 3 and 4, the excavation is well in waterbearing sandy loam, which would indicate that sheeting of some type would be required. tf

Mr. Herman Mass, president of Mass Construction Company, testified that upon receiving the letter he decided to proceed under protest. He further testified that he did not agree with the conclusion of the District Engineer that no payment would he made for cofferdams at piers Nos. 1, 2, 5 and 6, although they were necessary, because the plans and proposal state that they only estimate the amount of cofferdams, which may he required. Mr. Mass stated that he protested the conclusion, but decided to proceed because of the time limit and penalty clause for noncompletion.

Mr. Gamble, the only witness presented for respondent, testified that it would have been impractical to have constructed the bridge without the cofferdams, although he further stated that he did not make any recommendations to the State that they re-negotiate for new cofferdams on the balance of the piers.

A letter from claimant to Mr. Virden E. Staff, Chief Highway Engineer, Department of Public Works and Buildings, which was admitted into evidence without objection, summarizes claimant’s position in the instant proceedings, and states in part:

II
“In its Proposal to the Department, which was incorporated into the Contract, the Contractor was required to give the following assurances to the Department:
6. The undersigned declares that he understands that the quantities mentioned are approximate only, and that they are subject to increase or decrease; that he will take in full payment therfor the amount of the summation of the actual quantities, as finally determined, multiplied by the unit prices shown in the schedule of prices contained herein. (Underscoring supplied)
8. The undersigned further agrees that, if the Engineer decides to extend or shorten the improvement, or otherwise alter it by additions or deductions, including the elimination of any one or more of the items, he will perform the work as altered, increased or decreased, at the contract unit prices." (Underscoring supplied)
III
“The Contract Schedule of Prices for work to be performed provides in part:
Item Pay Item Unit of Number Description Quantity Measure Unit Total Price Price
050004 Cofferdams 4.00 EACH 8,000.00 32,000.00
050005 Cofferdam 1,800.00 CU YD Excavation 7.00 12,600.00
VI
“Provisions of the Contract Specifications pertinent to the issue between the District Engineer and the Contractor are:
4.1 INTENT OF THE PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS. The intent of the plans and the specifications is to prescribe a complete outline of work, which the Contractor undertakes to do in full compliance with the contract. The Contractor shall . . . construct all . . . structures, and such additional, extra, and incidental construction as may be necessary to complete the work ... in a substantial and acceptable manner.
4.3 ALTERATIONS, CANCELLATIONS, EXTENSIONS, AND DEDUCTIONS.
......“Should such changes in the plans result in an increase or decrease in the quantities of the work to be performed, the Contractor shall accept payment as follows:
(a) All such work as appears in the contract as specific items accompanied by unit prices shall ... be paid for at the contract unit prices.”
“Thereafter during the months of August, September, October, and November, 1963, work on piers Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 6 proceeded, and at each pier a cofferdam with the necessary excavation had to be erected and carried out in order to complete construction. At all times performance was under the constant inspection of the District Engineer and his forces. There was never any difference or dispute between the forces of the Contractor and the District Engineer over the question that the cofferdams and excavation therefor were absolutely necessary and essential as the only solution to provide for erection of all piers at the two bridges.”
The Issues
“During and after completion of the project the Contractor demanded payment for performance of cofferdam excavation and the erection of cofferdams, required as the only solution at piers Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 6, according to the unit prices fixed for these items in the Contract Schedule of Prices, i.e., $8,000.00 each for the eight additional cofferdams, and $7.00 per cubic yard for the cofferdam excavation.
“Over the repeated protests of the Contractor, the District Engineer took the position that, despite the requirement for cofferdams to making possible the completion of work at all piers, he had no authority to pay for either the cofferdams or the excavation in connection therewith other than for that done at piers Nos. 3 and 4.”

Respondent’s main contention deals with the following provision in the “ Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction ’ ’:

“9.4 PAYMENT FOR EXTRA WORK. Extra work, which results from any of the changes as specified in Article 4.3, shall not be started until receipt of a written authorization or work order from the Engineer, which authorization shall state the items of work to be performed, and the method of payment for each item. Work performed without such order will not be paid for.”

Respondent argues that the District Engineer did not give the required authorization; that claimant was warned that it would not be paid; and, that an engineer in charge of public construction work has no authority to modify a stipulation requiring a written order for alterations or extras.

Paragraph 4.3 quoted above, to which 9.4 refers also, states that a supplemental agreement will be required when such changes involve a net increase or a net decrease in the amount of the contract of more than 25% of the original contract price. However, the provisions of the specifications, which are most directly in point, may be found in paragraph 2.2 as follows:

“2.2 INTERPRETATION OF ESTIMATE OF QUANTITIES. An estimate of quantities of work to be done and materials to be furnished under the specifications is given in the proposal. It is the result of careful calculations, and is believed to be correct, but it is given only as a basis for comparison of proposals and the award of the contract. The Department does not expressly or by implication agree that the actual quantities involved will correspond exactly therewith; nor shall the bidder plead misunderstanding or deception because of such estimate of quantities, or of the character, location, or other conditions pertaining to the work.
“Payment will be based on the actual quantities of work performed in accordance with the contract, at the contract unit prices specified. No allowance will be made for any change in anticipated profits due to an increase or decrease in the original estimate of quantities. . . .” (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of Chism, Inc., vs. State of Illinois, No. 5313, which also involved interpretations of the above sections of the “Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction”, this Court held that claimant is not limited to the amount specified by the contract. The Court further stated that Section 9.3 of the Specifications provide that “if unit price bids are requested by the State, the contractor is to be paid for actual amounts used whether it be more or less than the total estimated by the State on the Schedule of Prices.”

In the instant case, the bid sheet called for bids on four cofferdams and on 1,800.00 cubic yards of cofferdam excavation. Claimant bid $8,000 per cofferdam and $7.00 per cubic yard of excavation. Claimant was not asked nor given the opportunity to bid on any other quantities than those specified. Therefore, respondent’s contention that claimant should have realized the need for the additional cofferdams, and should have so provided in its bid, must be rejected.

Respondent submitted no evidence to show that the cofferdams constituted “extra work”, and were not included within the scope of the original contract. The requirement of a supplemental agreement where the variation is more than 25% of the original contract price is not applicable in the instant case.

Claimant is entitled to $64,000.00 for eight additional cofferdams at the unit price of $8,000.00 each, and $5,454.00 for additional cofferdam excavation. Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $69,454.00.


text:
    (No. 5329
    Dominikas Giedraitis and Elena Giedraitis, his wife, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Gromer, Abbott and Wittenstrom, Attorneys for Claimants.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky and Arthur L. Berman, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimants seek recovery of $7,125.00 for damages sustained on February 14, 1966, as the result of a fire started by an escaped inmate of the Elgin State Hospital.

The evidence reveals the following undisputed facts:

On February 14, 1966, the Elgin State Hospital had two patients under its supervision and control, named Michael Schmitz, age 14, and Larry Fisher, age 12 or 14. Both boys were housed in Halloran Cottage, which was a ward locked 24 hours a day, and held teenagers who were behavior problems. The doors of Halloran Cottage are unlocked by the ward attendant only if a patient has a “ground pass.” Neither Michael Schmitz nor Larry Fisher had been granted a pass, and were not permitted to have keys to the outer doors in their possession. On the same date, one Ruth Bordsen was employed by the Elgin State Hospital as a psychologist and ward program coordinator, and was working in the Halloran Cottage as a ward program coordinator. Mrs. Bordsen testified that from his record she had personal knowledge that Larry Fisher had a history of setting fires. She further stated that she carried the key to Halloran Cottage on her key ring; that Halloran Cottage is locked 24 hours per day, and none of the rules allowed any inmates of that Cottage to have keys. Mrs. Bordsen further testified that, during a party for the inmates on February 14, 1966, she left her keys on a table in front of her, and Michael Schmitz removed the key to Halloran Cottage. After Michael Schmitz had secured the key to the outer doors of the building from Mrs. Bordsen’s key ring, he unlocked the west and south ward doors of the Halloran Cottage. Patient Fisher hid under a bed when the rest of the patients wert to the party, and, after Michael Schmitz unlocked the outside ward door, Fisher exited from the Halloran Cottage between 8:30 and 9:00 P.M. Fisher went directly to claimants’ building where he stuffed paper and cardboard in a hole in the building, and lighted this matter with a match. He then returned to the ward.

Respondent does not question the facts as set forth above, and specifically “does not contest the question of liability in this cause,” but raises objection to the claim as follows:

(1) Claimants’ wilful breach and violation of Rule 5 of the Court of Claims justifies dismissal of their complaint, and denial of their claim.

(2) Claimants have failed to sustain their burden of proof in relation to the damages incurred.

In support of its first objection to the claim, respondent contends that the original complaint as sworn to by Dr. Dominikas Gfiedraitis was for the amount of $16,478.11, representing $5,478.11 of personal property and $11,000.00 for the building. Respondent further contends that claimant stated upon oath that “he and his wife, Elena Griedraitis, are owners of the claim; that no assignment or transfer of the claim or any part thereof, or interest therein, have been made; that claimants are justly entitled to the amount claimed in the foregoing complaint from the State of Illinois, or the appropriate State Agency, after allowing all just credits; and, that this claim, or any claim arising out of the same occurrence has not been previously presented by claimants herein to any person, corporation, or tribunal, other than the State of Illinois.” The complaint was filed in the Court of Claims on July 25, 1966.

Respondent also sets forth Rule 6 of the Court of Claims, which provides as follows:

“If the claimant shall, subsequent to the filing of his complaint in the Court of Claims, commence a proceeding in another tribunal, or present a claim to any other person or corporation for damages arising out of the same occurrence or transaction, then, in that event, the claimant shall immediately advise the Court of Claims in writing as to when, where and to whom such claim was presented or proceeding commenced. The complaint then pending in the Court of Claims will be continued generally until the final disposition of said claim or proceeding. Failure of claimant to notify the Court of Claims, as provided herein, shall be ground for dismissal of the complaint.”

Respondent contends that claimants have violated Rule 5 and Rule 6 of the Court by having sworn to a complaint, which was filed on July 25, 1966, that they owned the claim, that no assignment or transfer of the claim or a part thereof had been made, and, that no claim arising out of this occurrence had been previously presented to any person, corporation or tribunal other than the State of Illinois. Because Dr. Griedraitis testified at the hearing that he had settled a claim for damage to the building and a claim for damage to personal property with the Royal Exchange Assurance Company in the amount of $5,000.00 on the building and $3,337.35 for the personal property in June, 1966, respondent alleges that claimant falsely swore to the affidavit attached to the complaint, and that the cause should, therefore, be dismissed.

The evidence shows that at the opening of the hearing in the instant case, the attorneys for claimants set forth the facts of the insurance claim as follows:

“MR. WITTENSTROM: Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Claims provides that, if claimant shall subsequent to the filing of his complaint present a claim to any other person or corporation for damages arising out of the same occurrence, then in that event the claimant shall immediately advise the Court of Claims in writing as to when, where and to whom such claim was presented.
“Now I have, subsequent '¿o the filing of the complaint, discovered that claimants have presented claims, and I ask permission at this time to file a letter setting forth the facts required by Rule 6.
“ (Whereupon document is marked claimants’ exhibit No. 5 by the Reporter.)
“MR. WITTENSTROM: Any objection?
“MR. ZASLAVSKY: No objection.
“THE COURT: Let the record show that claimants’ exhibit No. 5 is admitted into evidence without objection.”

Claimants’ exhibit No. 5 is a letter from Mr. Wittenstrom to Mr. Routman, dated March 8,1967, which states as follows:

“Pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Claims of the State of Illinois, this is to advise the Court of Claims in writing that claimants have presented a claim to the Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 309 West Jackson Blvd., Chicago, Illinois, for damages arising out of the same occurrence or transaction. Such claim has been finally disposed of, and such company has paid claimants $8,337.35.”

Dr. Giedraitis testified that a Royal Exchange Home Owner’s Policy, admitted into evidence without objection, was in force on his property at the time of the fire. He further testified that this policy insured his dwelling for $25,000.00, appurtenant private structures for $5,000.00, and unscheduled personal property for $10,000.00.

Dr. Giedraitis stated that the property destroyed was a combination barn, garage and summer house, which was just repaired, and items of personal property located within the structure of the building. Dr. Giedraitis testified that he notified the insurance company of the fire, and was paid $5,000.00 for the building, which was the total loss allowed under the policy, and $3,337.35 for the items of personal property.

It appears that the insurance company settled the claim in June, 1966. Dr. Griedraitis stated that he had not notified his lawyers that he had received a check, because he had not talked to them. Nowhere in cross-examination or elsewhere is there evidence to conclude that claimant wilfully, maliciously, or intentionally tried to mislead the Court by stating that the claim had not been submitted elsewhere, as charged in the brief of respondent. In fact, at the very start of the hearing, one of claimants’ attorneys called the insurance settlement to the attention of the Court, and introduced the letter explaining the settlement, and later, the insurance policy, without objection from respondent.

The next question to be decided is the amount of damage incurred by claimants in the burning of their building and personal property. Respondent contends that claimants have failed to sustain their burden of proof in relation to the damages incurred.

Real property consisting of a combination barn, garage, and summer house were insured for $5,000.00, which amount was received in full. Claimants contend that the total value of the real property destroyed was $11,000.00. Dr. Griedraitis testified that the summer house was attached to the garage. The barn was made of shingles over, wood, and had an electric garage door.

Claimants called two witnesses to testify as to the market value of the building when it was burned. Clarence Dietrich, a general contractor, testified that he rebuilt part of the building after the fire for $10,400.00, but did not rebuild the summer house. He stated that in his opinion the market value of the building was between $10,000.00 and $11,000.00 on February 14, 1966 before the fire.

Edwin Haas, a building contractor, who remodeled the structure before the fire, testified that the market value of the structure before the fire on February 14, 1966 was at least $10,000. Respondent presented no testimony on the question of the value of the real property.

Dr. G-iedraitis testified that he accepted the sum of $3,337.35 from the insurance company for personal property, but that did not include payment for an eighteen foot boat, two motors and a trailer. Claimant testified that he was paid about $500.00 for these items in the insurance settlement. Claimant stated that he brought the boat second hand, and paid the seller $500.00, and the promise of medical services, but he does not know exactly how much service he has since rendered the seller.

Claimants produced no other witness to testify as to the value of the boat, motors and trailer, and Dr. Giedraitis did not establish himself as an expert in this field. This Court has held that it is fundamental that the burden of proving the element of damages is upon claimants. “The proof required to establish damages must not be remote, speculative, nor uncertain. ’ * Frega vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 399, 400. Claimants have not sustained their burden of proof with regard to the value of the boat, motors and trailer.

It appears that the market value of the building was $10,000.00 immediately before the fire destroyed it. Claimants were paid $5,000.00 in insurance. According to the evidence, the foundation of the building remained. Therefore, claimants are awarded the sum of $4,000.00.


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    (No. 5368
    Alice Kelly, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    George B. Lee, Attorney for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant, Alice Kelly, seeks recovery of $5,609.00 for injuries sustained on May 1,1966, while attending an open house at the A. L. Bowen Children’s Center in Saline County, Illinois. Claimant alleges that respondent was negligent in conducting claimant, along with other people, onto a loading platform, which had an unprotected stairway from which she fell.

The undisputed facts reveal that there was an open house at the A. L. Bowen Children’s Center, which was attended by a large number of people. Groups consisting of twenty to thirty people each were formed to go through the Center. An employee of the Center conducted each tour, and was in charge of each group.

Claimant was in one of the groups described above, which started in the Administration Building, and, after going through the kitchen, the group was directed through a door onto a concrete loading platform where claimant fell. The evidence shows that there was no guard rail on an open stairway leading from the kitchen to the loading platform. She was toward the rear of a group of approximately thirty people when she fell. The same person conducted her tour throughout.

Other persons who were part of the group in claimant's tour testified that they did not see the stairway at the time because of the large group, and that there was no guard rail or protective device on the stairs.

Mr. Paul Tanner, an employee of the A. L. Bowen Children’s Center, testified that the public was invited to the open house, and that approximately 5,000 people attended.

Mrs. Kelly testified that she decided to take a tour of the Bowen Center after seeing an invitation in the newspaper.

Respondent contended that claimant was a licensee and not an invitee, and had failed to maintain the burden of proof that Respondent was guilty of wilful and wanton misconduct. Respondent cites several cases, which define “invitee” as one “on the premises by invitation to transact business in which the parties were mutually interested.”

Respondent quotes the Illinois Supreme Court in Ellguth vs. Blackstone Hotel, Inc., 408 Ill. 343, 347, 348, as follows:

“The materiality of the question of whether plaintiff was an invitee or licensee arises from the fact that a heavier duty of care is placed upon an owner of premises toward an invitee than toward a licensee or trespasser. Toward an invitee the owner of premises must use reasonable care and caution in keeping the premises reasonably safe for use by such invitee; while toward a licensee no duty is owed by such owner, except not to wantonly and wilfully injure him. ... To be upon premises by an implied invitation means that the person is there present for a purpose connected with the business in which the owner of the premises is engaged, or which he permits to be carried on . . .
“It is frequently a difficult question to decide whether the injured person is a licensee or invitee. The test is said to be whether one goes upon the premises of the owner by invitation to transact business in which the parties are mutually interested. . . .”

Respondent cites further cases to the effect that a social guest is treated as a licensee and not an invitee, and, therefore, must prove wilful and wanton misconduct in order to recover against the possessor of the land.

In the case of Levy vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 694, 696, this Court held:

“The fact that the State institutions have visitors’ days, and encourage visits with patients, would indicate that claimant was more than a ‘licensee’ and should be treated as an ‘invitee’.”

In the case of LeRoux vs. State, 307 N.Y. 397, 121 N.E. 2d 386, 46 A.L.R. 2d 1063, the court held that a person going upon land owned by the State, and maintained for public purposes and public use is not a mere licensee to whom the State owes no duty other than to refrain from wilful or wanton injury, but is an invitee entitled to the exercise of reasonable care to prevent or warn against dangers, which the State’s agents knew, or should have known, existed. In that case, the claimant fell into an uncovered abandoned well while on land in the State reforestation area for the purpose of berry picking. The signs posted in the area said “Public Hunting Ground. ’ ’ The court pointed out that the property upon which the claimant was injured was specifically maintained for public purposes and for public use. The court stated:

“In the case at hand claimant and her family had entered upon the preserve with knowledge gained from signs, which bore the legend ‘Public Hunting Ground’. They thus became entitled to expect that the State, as owner and maintainer of land for public use, would exercise reasonable care to prevent, or to warn against dangers to claimant and others coming upon the land, which the State’s agents knew, or should have known, existed.”

Respondent cites the case of Burris vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 282, to support its contention that claimant in the instant case was a licensee instead of an invitee. In that case the American Red Cross sponsored an event, which was held in the State Capitol Building. Neither the construction of the platform, nor the event in question was under the supervision of the State of Illinois. It had not invited claimant to its building, and she was there because of her activities in the American Red Cross. There was no question of the negligence of the State of Illinois.

The instant case presents a different factual situation. Both the event to which claimant was invited and the physical premises were under the control of respondent. Respondent specifically placed an invitation in the newspaper, and maintained control of the crowds, which appeared as a result thereof. There was nothing to warn of a dangerous stairway in the location where claimant was injured, and witnesses testified that they could not see the stairway because of the crowd of people. There is no question of claimant’s being contributorily negligent, since it is clear that she was in due care for her safety, and was merely following directions given by the tour leader.

The Court must conclude that respondent was negligent in failing to have guard rails on the stairway, failing to mark the dangerous condition with appropriate signs, and failing to adequately supervise the tour.

The evidence revealed that claimant suffered fractures of the radius and ulna of the right arm. She had a laceration of the scalp and right ear, which required twenty sutures in treatment. A closed reduction of the right colies was performed, and a circular plaster cast was applied. She was in the hospital for three days, and was then referred to a bone specialist for further care. Claimant was operated on by a specialist, and had a pin put through her thumb to hold the break in place. She was in a cast for six weeks. At the hearing claimant testified that, if she tries to turn her hand quickly, she is bothered, and there is some disfigurement. Dr. Frank P. Skaggs, who treated her, did not testify as to permanent disability.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $2,600.00.


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    (No. 5381
    Broadway Litho and Printing Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois and Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, Respondents.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Zelden and Lebold, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Dunn, Dunn, Brady, Goebel, Ulbrich and Hayes, Attorneys for Respondent, The Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant seeks to recover the sum of $365.00 from respondent for services rendered to Illinois Teachers College of Chicago-North in the publication of a school newspaper issued under the name “The Interim”.

Pursuant to stipulations made and entered into verbally before the Commissioner, the entire matter was submitted to the Court upon the basis of two exhibits, these exhibits being two copies of the newspaper in question, marked as joint exhibits Nos. 2 and 2a. The only issue in this case is whether or not claimant fulfilled his contract to perform the service of printing the newspaper, or failed to fulfill the same, because of the many errors in spelling, punctuation, quotations, and the nature of the work done and services performed.

This Court has examined both exhibits. Joint exhibit No. 2 is the product of claimant after all of the errors have been detailed and noted. Joint exhibit No. 2a is the issue of the newspaper in question without any notations or indication of error. There can be no doubt about the Court’s decision. The newspaper in question was poorly produced. Certain pages were printed upside down, and the entire issue is replete with errors in spelling, punctuation, and the nature and style of print required. This Court holds that the printing and production of the newspaper issue in question failed to meet the standards customarily found in the industry and required by the contract, and that such failure constituted a substantial breach of contract on the part of claimant.

Claim is, therefore, denied.


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    (No. 5386
    Marguerite White, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

      Seymour Scheffres and Samuel Allen, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky and Etta J. Cole, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks recovery of $10,000.00 for injuries suffered on January 31, 1965, when she fell on an icy sidewalk on the grounds of the Illinois State Training School for Boys. Claimant was employed as a foster mother by the City of Chicago, and had gone to the School for the purpose of visiting her foster son, Bhilip Swar.

The testimony showed that on the day in question claimant took a chartered Greyhound bus from the Chicago Loop, and was delivered to the gate of the School.

When the gates were opened, she walked on a long sidewalk from the gate to the administration building. The sidewalk was covered with two inches of snow and ice. After leaving the administration building she walked on another sidewalk to the cottage where her foster son was living. This sidewalk was clean. There was no snow or ice on it.

Claimant testified that she had visited her foster son the week before, on January 24, 1965, and there was a half inch of snow and a little bit of ice on the sidewalk leading from the gate to the administration building. The sidewalk from the administration building to the boy’s cottage was clean on that day also.

After leaving the boy’s cottage on January 31, 1965, claimant returned to the administration building to check out, and then entered the sidewalk to proceed to the gate. She was walking slowly, and fell about half way between the administration building and the gate.

Claimant further testified that she had been employed for eighteen years as a foster mother by the City of Chicago, Children’s Division; that her duties were to take care of the children, as if they were her own; that Philip Swar was about three days old when he came into her care. She stated that she still had custody of Philip Swar when he went to St. Charles, and that he had been there about four months at the time of her accident. She would visit him once a week on Sundays. She earned $150.00 per month as a foster mother. After taking a chartered Greyhound bus to the Training School she had to go into the office at the gate to get a pass, which was the only way she could get in, wait until the gates were opened, and walk up a sidewalk, which had about two inches of ice and snow on the day in question.

Respondent contends that claimant is not entitled to a recovery because (1) she was a mere licensee on the premises of respondent; (2) that claimant has failed to establish that respondent did not exercise ordinary care to maintain its sidewalks; and (3) respondent is not liable for injuries resulting from the general slipperiness of streets and sidewalks due to natural causes.

Respondent argues that a licensee may be inferred where the object of the visit is the mere pleasure or benefit of the visitor, and the duty owed by one to a licensee is the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly.

Claimant contends as follows: that she was engaged in the business of the respondent, since she had served in the capacity of foster mother for about eighteen years, and had the duty to “care for, assist, give material support, comfort and advice to the foster son. By visiting Philip Swar, the foster son, almost every week, she was assisting in the work of respondent by giving counsel to the boy, and assuring him that someone did care for him. She, therefore, assisted the State in the rehabilitation process. As a public foster mother, claimant was an invitee, and entitled to all the rights of an invitee. ’ ’

In the case of Levy vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 694, 696, this Court specifically held:

“The fact that the State institutions have visitors’ days, and encourage visits with patients would indicate that claimant was more than a ‘licensee’, and should be treated as an ‘invitee’.”

The Court must conclude that claimant was an invitee, and was entitled to have reasonable care and caution, used to keep the premises reasonably safe for her use.

The next question to be resolved is whether respondent exercised reasonable care in maintaining its premises. The Departmental Report states in part: “On January 31, 1965, we had a high temperature of 17 degrees and a low temperature of -7 degrees. One and one-half inches of snow fell between the hours of 6:00 A.M. and 10:00 P.M., and four inches of snow had accumulated on the ground during this day. At the time of this alleged accident, we were recovering from a very serious ice storm.” A letter from C. William Ruddell, Superintendent, states: “At the time Mrs. White fell and injured herself, the Training School was just recuperating from a very serious ice storm, during which time the institution itself was considerably crippled in its operation due to the severity of the storm.”

Respondent did not produce any witnesses at the time of the hearing. However, claimant introduced a copy of the U.S. weather reports for January, 1965, which showed that the ice storm, to which respondent was alluding, struck northern Illinois on January 23, 24, and 25.

Respondent cites several cases to the effect that respondent is not liable for injuries resulting from the natural accumulation of ice and snow on sidewalks. (Strappelli vs. City of Chicago, 371 Ill. 72; Graham vs. City of Chicago, 346 Ill. 638; Ritgers vs. City of Gillespie, 350 Ill. App. 485; Cronin vs. Brownlie, 348 Ill. App. 448.)

In the case of Levy vs. State of Illinios, 22 C.C.R. 694, the Court examined the majority and minority rules concerning liability for snow removal. It cited the case of Durkin vs. Lewitz, 3 Ill. App. 2d 481, 123 N.E. 2d 151. In that case the issue was whether a landlord had the duty to use reasonable care in the case of snow removal. The Court stated:

“Illinois has firmly and decisively fixed upon the landlord the duty to use reasonable care with respect to premises used in common, and its place logically and sensibly belongs in the so-called Connecticut line. That rule was interpreted in Goodman vs. Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co., 1938, 331 Pa. 587,200 Atl. 642,643, as follows:
‘It may be stated as á general rule that there is no absolute duty to keep outside steps free from ice and snow at all times. Where the precipitation is recent or continuous, the duty to remove such obstruction as it forms cannot be imposed, and the dangers arising therefrom are viewed as the normal hazards of life, for which no owner or person in possession of property is held responsible. It is only when the owner or possessor, having a duty to remove snow and ice, improperly permits an accumulation thereof to remain after a reasonable length of time for removal has elapsed, that liability may arise for the unsafe and dangerous condition thereby created.’ ”

The Court also stated that the general rule in Illinois exempts municipalities and owners of adjoining property adjacent to the public way from liability for injuries resulting from the natural accumulation of ice and snow. None of the cases cited in support of the statement is in point.

The more recent case of Sims vs. Block, 236 N.E. 2d 572 wavers between both rules. It stated that, where the owner-landlords did make an effort to remove the snow from a parking lot, they became charged with the duty of exercising ordinary care in accomplishing the clearing of the lot.

In the Levy case, recovery was denied because respondent submitted evidence showing that it had shoveled the walks on the day of the snowfall, four days before the accident, and had, therefore, discharged its duty of ordinary care in the maintenance of its premises.

The most reasonable reconciliation of the rules set forth above would be to apply the test of whether respondent exercised reasonable care in maintaining its premises. Application of the Sims rule would leave one with the conclusion that, if claimant had fallen on a patch of ice on the cleaned sidewalk leading from the administration building to the cottage, she could recover, but, having fallen on a sidewalk where no effort was made to remove the ice and snow, she cannot recover.

The case of Prater vs. Veach, 35 Ill. App. 2d 61, 181 N.E. 2d at 741, 739, while not specifically concerned with ice and snow sets forth the following guide for the duty owed by the owner of land to an invitee.

“The owner of land is subject to liability for bodily harm or wrongful death to invitees resulting from natural or artificial conditions only if he knows of the condition and realizes that it involves an unreasonable risk to invitees, or permits them to remain on the land without exercising reasonable care to make the conditions reasonably safe or to warn invitees of the condition and the risk involved therein.”

In the instant case, respondent has presented no evidence to show that it made any attempt to remove the ice and snow from the sidewalk in question. Respondent submitted that it had no time to do this. However, the weather reports showed that six days had passed since the precipitation had fallen.

It is not reasonable for the State of Illinois to invite visitors, and provide as the only access route a long sidewalk covered with ice and snow. The risk of injury was clearly foreseeable. It would appear that six days was enough time to clear the walk, since other walks on the premises were in fact cleared. Respondent was negligent in its failure to use ordinary care towards its invitees.

After claimant fell, she was taken by ambulance to Delnor Hospital where she was x-rayed and treated. She stayed from Sunday until the following Thursday. Her arm was in a sling, and a collar was put around her neck. Dr. Richard Grayson attended her at the hospital. After she returned home she received treatment from Dr. Charles Lee Williams. He found that she could not close her right hand, had no grip, and her shoulder pained her constantly. He diagnosed her condition as periarthritis of the right shoulder with partial Volkmann’s ischemic contracture over the right hand and forearm.

She was examined by respondent’s doctor, John F. Gleason, on June 21,1967. His finding was a well healed fracture of the greater tuberosity of the right humerus, and moderate restriction of motion of the right shoulder. He further found that the finger tips of the right hand lack one and one-half inches of touching the palm. Dr. Gleason found that she was unable to grip large diameter objects with the injured hand, that there is decreased sensation over the right arm and forearm as compared with the left, and stated: ‘ ‘ There is considerable limitation of motion in the metacarpal phalangeal joints and proximal and distal interphalangeal joints of all the fingers of the right hand.”

Claimant testified that she did not receive any money from the City of Chicago after Philip Swar was in St. Charles, and that the last time she received a check was the month before the accident. Prior to her accident claimant had been a foster mother for a period of eighteen years, and was earning $150.00 per month until the month before the accident. She was born in 1906. Claimant stated that she was unable to continue as a foster mother or to obtain other work, because her hand could not close.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $6,500.00.


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    (No. 5425
    Jack Kase, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Rinella and Rinella, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Morton L. Zaslavsky, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant, Jack Kase, is seeking recovery of $450.00, which was deposited with the Office of the Secretary of State pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Law (1959 Ill. Rev. Stats., Chap. 95½, Sec. 7-503) on January 27, 1961. The requirement of deposit arose out of an automobile accident, which involved a vehicle being driven by his wife, Gloria Kase. Claimant also requests 5% interest from September 19, 1960, and $152.00 for attorney’s fees.

The evidence shows that claimant received a receipt from the Safety Responsibility Division of the Office of the Secretary of State, together with a letter, dated January 30,1961, stating that he and Mrs. Kase were in full compliance with the provisions of the Illinois Safety Responsibility Law, and that the deposit would be returned on September 16, 1962 upon their application, if there was no unsatisfied judgment or court action pending, and before that date, if proof of settlement of all claims for damages and personal injury, or proof of final adjudication of non-liability was filed.

The evidence further shows that claimant received a letter from respondent, dated July 15, 1964, requesting information concerning whether a suit had been filed against claimant, and that claimant advised the Office of the Secretary of State on August 24, 1964 that such a suit had been filed. On June 5, 1967 and July 7, 1967, claimant sent letters requesting refund of the security deposit, and enclosed a release from the injured parties in the aforesaid suit. Claimant received a letter, dated July 11,1967, advising him that he had not replied to the letter from the Office of the Secretary of State, dated July 15, 1964, and that the money deposited had been transferred to the General Revenue Fund. On July 18, 1967, photostatic copies of the letters set forth above were sent to the Secretary of State, Safety Responsibility Division.

The parties have stipulated that the facts, as stated above, are undisputed. It appears that the funds were transferred to the General Revenue Fund through the error of respondent, and that claimant was in full compliance with the law at all times. It is not the practice of this Court to allow interest or attorney’s fees unless specifically authorized by statute.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $450.00.


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    (No. 5461
    Skelly Oil Company d/b/a Aurora Skelgas Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Skelly Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Etta J. Cole, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks from respondent payment of the sum of $162.54 for materials provided the Division of Highways of the State of Illinois. The demand for the payment was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for such payments had lapsed.

A stipulation submitted by the parties agree that the materials were furnished, and that there is lawfully due the amount requested by claimant.

Where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and, (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509. It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $162.54.


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    (No. 5484
    Donald S. Timmons, County Treasurer of Piatt County, Illinois, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    C. E. Corbett, Attorney for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant, Donald S. Timmons, County Treasurer of Piatt County, Illinois, seeks recovery of $36,113.76 due claimant from Adlai E. Stevenson, III, Treasurer of the State of Illinois. There are no disputed questions of law or fact in the instant case.

A stipulation submitted by the parties includes a report of the State Treasurer, which states in part:

“Paragraph 7. The Piatt County Treasurer’s report for the month of June, 1967, dated July 6, 1967, lists inheritance tax and interest collected in the estate of Robert Allerton totaling Nine Hundred Two Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-four Dollars and Eight Cents ($902,844.08). In compliance with Section 394 of Chapter 120, Illinois Revised Statutes of 1965, the State Treasurer allowed County Treasurer’s fees in the above captioned estate in the amount of Thirty Six Thousand One Hundred Thirteen Dollars and Seventy-six Cents ($36,113.76).
“Paragraph 8. The County Treasurer of Piatt County filed with the State Treasurer’s Office a petition for refund of fees in the amount of Thirty-Six Thousand One Hundred Thirteen Dollars and Seventy-six Cents ($36,113.76), inasmuch as he had not retained sufficient funds to cover his four (4) per cent County Treasurer’s fee from the deposits made June 22, 1966 in the Estate of Robert Allerton.
“Paragraph 9. Said claim for refund was thereafter disallowed by the Attorney General, State of Illinois, by opinion letter dated July 19, 1967. Said opinion letter stated that the fees were not payable from the State Treasurer’s appropriation for refund of Overpaid Inheritance Tax, 75th General Assembly. On July 20, 1967, the County Treasurer of Piatt County was notified by letter from the State Treasurer’s Office that his petition for refund of fees had been disallowed by the Attorney General, giving reason that his fees were not payable from the appropriation for inheritance tax refund.”

An amendment to the stipulation, which was filed in the Court of Claims on February 19, 1969, further provides :

“That claimant and respondent agree that by reason of the Departmental Report, heretofore filed herein, claimant is entitled to recover from respondent the sum of $36,113.76, as such sum is lawfully due and owing to claimant, and retention by the State of Illinois would constitute unjust enrichment.”

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $36,113.76.


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    (No. 5501
    Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center, An Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney, Brown and Platt, Attorneys for. Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Etta J. Cole, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks recovery for medical services rendered to one Norman Sailcir, a ward of the Division of Child Welfare, Department of Children and Family Services of the State of Illinois, in the amount of $366.50; and for medical services rendered in May and June, 1966 to one Dallas Kozfkay, also a ward of the Department, in the amount of $1,077.25. The reason for nonpayment is the lapse of the biennial appropriation.

The parties have stipulated that the amount of $1,443.75 is lawfully due to claimant.

Where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and, (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509. It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $1,443.75.


text:
    (No. 5514
    Commercial Light Company, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Condon and Hynan, Attorneys for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant corporation filed its complaint for the sum of $42,925.00, which it claimed represented additional costs incurred in the execution of a contract entered into with the Department of Public Works and Buildings in March, 1964, for electrical work at the Diagnostic Hospital, Tinley Park State Hospital, Tinley Park, Illinois.

The parties, have submitted a stipulation, which provides, in part, that claimant entered into the above mentioned contract in the net amount of $139,274.00 for the complete electrical work for the Diagnostic Hospital; that the contract required claimant to work “In progress with General Work and work of other contractors engaged on the project”; that the contractor for General Work agreed in its contract to complete construction within 370 days after date of notification of award; that due to material experimentation and other unforseen difficulties in enforcing and meeting contractual quality requirements on the part of all contractors, the contractor for General Work was not certified as completed until March of 1967, although claimant could reasonably have anticipated completion on or about April 1, 1966; that claimant’s work was thus delayed being dependent on the General Work Contractor.

The stipulation further states that “respondent, in the absence of a contractual agreement to the contrary, has been held liable for such a delay occasioned by one prime contractor to another. Kaiser vs. State of Illinois, 7, C.C.R. 99; Divane Bros. Electric Co. A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 546”.

The parties have agreed as to the amount of loss incurred by claimant, as follows:

“It is further stipulated by and between the parties by their respective attorneys that the filing of the briefs and abstracts and all notices with respect thereto be and the same are hereby waived, and that a judgment order be entered in the amount of Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Eight Dollars and Ninety Two Cents ($19,898.92) in favor of cláimant and against respondent.”

The stipulation is signed by Attorney General William J. Scott and the attorneys for claimant.

There being no further question to be determined by this Court, claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $19,-898.92.


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    (No. 5524
    St. John's Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, An Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Graham and Graham, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant seeks to recover, in three Counts, for services rendered at the request of The Department of Children and Family Services. Count I is for services rendered to one Frederick Oberlander, age nine (9), in the sum of $137.75. Count II is for services rendered to one Susan A. Oberlander, age seven (7), in the sum of $139.10; and, Count III is for services rendered to one William H. Jackson, age sixteen (16), in the sum of $212.90.

On September 16, 1968, a stipulation was made and entered into by and between claimant and respondent, wherein it was agreed that a report of the Department of Children and Family Services, dated August 28, 1968, attached to the stipulation as exhibit A by reference, and made a part of the record, be admitted into evidence without objection by either party. Exhibit A clearly and concisely states that all three of the statements on the part of claimant, shown in Counts I, II and III are correct, and claimant was entitled to payment. The same exhibit A also states that the appropriation for each of these statements had lapsed.

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contracts were entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an award for the amount due. American Oil Company, Inc., a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 492; The Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Company, a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 510.

Claimant, St. John’s Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of The Third Order of St. Francis, an Illinois Corporation, is awarded the sum of 489.75.


text:
    (No. 5531
    Blackmore and Glunt, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Blackmore and Glunt, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant seeks to recover for certain merchandise furnished pursuant to invitation to bid and purchase order. Claimant delivered the merchandise to the Department of Mental Health, Peoria State Hospital, Peoria, Illinois, on approximately August 7, 1967. On August 31, 1967, claimant’s invoice was presented to the State of Illinois Department of Mental Health and the Department of Finance for payment. On or about April 17, 1968, this invoice was returned to claimant with notification that payment was refused for the reason that the appropriation out of which the payment of said invoice would have been made had lapsed.

A Departmental Report was filed, and on the 20th of August, 1968, a stipulation was entered into by and between claimant and respondent, wherein it was stipulated that the report of the Department of Mental Health would be incorporated and admitted into evidence without objection by either party. The stipulation further indicates that the parties did not desire to file briefs, were waiving any notice of hearing, and did not object to the entry of an order in favor of claimant and against respondent in the sum of $1,620.00.

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contracts were entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an award for the amount due. American Oil Company, Inc., a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 492; The Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Company, a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 510. It appears that all qualifications for an award have been met in the instant case.

Claimant, Blackmore and (Hunt, Inc., is, therefore, hereby awarded the sum of $1,620.00.


text:
    (No. 5538
    McGraw-Hill Book Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    McGraw-Hill Book Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant, McGraw-Hill Book Company, filed its complaint against respondent for the sum of $31.94 for materials furnished to the Department of Mental Health of the State of Illinois.

Thereafter a stipulation was entered into by claimant and respondent as follows:

“The Report of the Department of Mental Health, dated February 17, 1969 (a copy of which is attached hereto, marked exhibit A, and, by this reference, incorporated herein and made a part hereof) shall be admitted into evidence in this proceeding without objection by either party.
“No other oral or written evidence will be introduced by either party.
“The Commissioner to which this case has been assigned and the Court may make and' file their reports, recommendations, orders and decisions based upon the pleadings heretofore filed, and the evidence herein stipulated.
“It is agreed between the parties hereto that the claimant’s claim will be reduced from the amount of $31.94 to $20.54, pursuant to the evidence presented by the Departmental Report hereto attached, and marked exhibit A.
“Neither party objects to the entry of an order in favor of claimant and against respondent in the sum of $20.54.
“Neither party desires to file briefs in this proceeding.
“Both parties waive notice of any hearing, and agree that the aforesaid order may be entered without either party being present.”

This is a matter of a lapsed appropriation, and this Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been (1) properly entered into; (2) service is satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contracts were entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an award for the amount due.

Claimant, McGraw-Hill Book Company, is, therefore, awarded the sum of $20.54.


text:
    (No. 5549
    SCM Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    SCM Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.

Claimant seeks from respondent payment of the sum of $347.08 for materials provided for the Department of Mental Health of the State of Illinois. The parties have stipulated that the report of the Department of Mental Health shall be made a part of the stipulation, and shall be admitted into evidence in the proceeding without objection by either party.

Said report includes the following statement:

“. . . The complaint, as submitted, is a legitimate complaint and request for payment for materials supplied to Dixon State School at a value of $347.08.”

Where a contract with the State has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; and, (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contract was entered into, this Court will enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509. It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $347.08.


text:
    (No. 5581
    The Salvation Army, An Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Kennedy, Golan and Morris, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant, The Salvation Army, an Illinois Corporation, seeks to recover from respondent the sum of $5,630.93, said sum of money having been advanced by claimant for support of indigent persons. Vouchers were submitted to the Department of Public Aid, but were refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for such payments had lapsed.

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contracts were entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., A Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509; American Oil Company, Inc., a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 492; The Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Company, a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 510; It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $5,630.93.


text:
    (No. 5585
    Eveready Manifold Corporation, An Illinois Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Eveready Manifold Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul B. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Pezman, J.

Claimant seeks to recover the sum of $1,596.83 for materials provided to the Office of the Secretary of State, and alleges that the demand for payment of said sum was refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for the Secretary of State for such payments had lapsed.

This Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been (1) properly entered into; (2) services satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contracts were entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an award for the amount due. Gilbert-Hodgman, Inc., a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 509; American Oil Company, Inc., a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 492; The Pittsburgh and Midway Coal Mining Company, a Corporation, vs. State of Illinois, 24 C.C.R. 510. It appears that all the requirements have been met in the instant case.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $1,596.83.


text:
    (No. 5601
    Eugene Dietzgen Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Eugene Dietzgen Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William G. Clark, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant, Eugene Dietzgen Company, a Delaware Corporation, filed its complaint against the respondent for the sum of $133.90 for materials furnished the Illinois Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, Springfield, Illinois.

A stipulation was was therefore entered into by claimant and respondent, as follows:

“That claimant, Eugene Dietzgen Company, had furnished materials as alleged in claimant’s statement of claim.
“That there is lawfully due claimant the sum of One Hundred Thirty Three Dollars and Ninety Cents ($133.90).
“That, as a result of delay in billing by claimant herein, payment was not" made prior to the closing of the biennial appropriation.
“That claimant continues to be the sole person interested in this claim, and that no assignment thereof has occurred.
“That, upon the foregoing agreed case filed herein, the Court shall decide thereon, and render judgment herein according to the rights of the parties in the same manner as if the facts aforesaid were proved upon the trial of said issue.”

This is a matter of a lapsed appropriation, and this Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been (1) properly entered into; (2) service is satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contracts were entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an award for the amount due.

Claimant, Eugene Dietzgen Company, is, therefore, awarded the sum of $133.90.


text:
    (No. 5612
    Max Gerber, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Max Gerber, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney Central, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant, Max Gerber, Inc., filed its complaint against respondent for the sum of $657.75 for materials furnished the Department of Mental Health, Peoria State Hospital, Peoria, Illinois.

Thereafter a stipulation was entered into by claimant and respondent, as follows:

“That claimant, Max Gerber, Inc., had furnished materials as alleged in claimant’s statement of claim.
“That there is lawfully due the claimant the sum of Six Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars and Seventy Five Cents ($657.75).
“That, as a result of delay in billing by claimant herein, payment was not made prior to the closing of the biennial appropriation.
“That claimant continues to be the sole person interested in this claim, and that no assignment thereof has occurred.
“That, upon the foregoing agreed case filed herein, the Court shall decide thereon, and render judgment herein according to the rights of the parties in the same manner as if the facts aforesaid were proved upon the trial of said issue.”

This is a matter of a lapsed appropriation, and this Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been (1) properly entered into; (2) service is satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contracts were entered into; and (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an award for the amount due.

Claimant, Max Gerber, Inc., is, therefore, awarded the sum of $657.75.


text:
    (No. 5614

      Callaghan and Company, An Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 17, 1969.

    Riordan, Malone and Schlax, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Dove, J.

Claimant, Callaghan and Company, an Illinois Corporation, filed its complaint against respondent for the sum of $14,365.00 for legal publications and books furnished the Secretary of State, Springfield, Illinois.

Thereafter a stipulation was entered into by claimant and respondent, as follows:

“That claimant, Callaghan and Company, an Illinois Corporation, had furnished materials as alleged in claimant’s statement of claim.
“That there is lawfully due claimant the sum of Fourteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Five Dollars and No Cents ($14,365.00).
“That, as a result of delay in billing by the claimant herein, payment was not made prior to the closing of the biennial appropriation.
“That claimant continues to be the sole person interested in this claim, and that no assignment thereof has occurred.
“That, upon the foregoing agreed case filed herein, the Court shall decide thereon, and render judgment herein according to the rights of the parties in the same manner as if the facts aforesaid were proved upon the trial of said issue.”

This is a matter of a lapsed appropriation, and this Court has repeatedly held that, where a contract has been (1) properly entered into; (2) service is satisfactorily performed, and materials furnished in accordance with such contract; (3) proper charges made therefor; (4) adequate funds were available at the time the contracts were entered into; and, (5) the appropriation for the biennium from which such claim could have been paid had lapsed, it would enter an award for the amount due.

Claimant, Callaghan and Company, an Illinois Corporation, is, therefore, awarded the sum of $14,365.00.