text:
    (No. 2689
    Chicago Park District, a Body Politic and Corporate, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 15, 1939.

      Rehearing denied November 1, 1939.

    James M. Slattery, for claimant.
    John E. Cassidy, Attorney General; Glenn A. Trevor, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Per Curiam:

The complaint in this case was filed June 19, 1935, and charges that claimant is a body politic and corporate and that pursuant to the provisions of “An Act in relation to the creation maintenance, operation and improvement of the Chicago Park District” (approved July 10,1933, in force May 1, 1934) it became vested in and to the choses in action of the South Park Commissioners, a body politic and corporate; and the South Park Commissioners on the thirty-first day of December, 1930, granted a permit to the State of Illinois, Division of Architecture and Engineering, which permit was attached to and made apart of the complaint as Exhibit “A”; that pursuant to the terms of this permit, the State of Illinois had the right to construct six driveway entrances from Cottage Drove Avenue to the building of the 124th Field Artillery Armory in the northeasterly corner of Washington Park as shown on drawings: Plat plan sidewalk layout, Sheet 31 and Revised Memorial Square and Terrace Layout, dated November 14,1930, submitted to the commissioners. The most northerly of these driveways was to be extended to the west across the north front of the building and connected with the existing park driveway, said driveway to be proper drainage inlets connected to the existing sewers in the manner approved by the commissioners. It was also provided that trees, electric light posts and other fixtures or appurtenances belonging to the commissioners shall be removed at the expense of the grantee wherever said fixtures or appurtenances fall within the lines of said driveways. The actual work, however, of the removal of electric light posts, etc. and such trees as can be replanted to be done by the park forces and the cost thereof charged to the grantee. The electric duct transmitting* current and supplying the lights of the commissioners exists in the space between the curb and the sidewalk, and said conduit and the cables contained therein were to be carefully protected by the grantee in the manner provided in the permit.

It is stipulated that the State proceeded and did receive the grant and that it was necessary to make certain changes in the lighting system, remove and relocate cables and conduits and do other work as provided for in said permit, and that the South Park Commissioners did make certain changes in the lighting* system to remove and relocate cables and conduits, and to do other work.

The following is an itemized statement of the work done by the South Park Commissioners in connection with the aforesaid permit agreement hereinabove referred to:

j 24tli Field Artillery Bldg., Washington Park, Chicago.
To construct six driveway entrances.
Expense incurred by the South Park Commissioners in connection with change in lighting system necessitated by driveway changes to remove and relocate cables and conduits:
Labor, Mechanical and Electrical Division................. $150.37
Labor, Maintenance and Repair........................... 10.14
Materials from South Park Stores,.......'................. 11.06
$171.59
15% Overhead and Supervision............................ 25.74
Electrical Maintenance Expense........................... 10.84
Paving Equipment Expense............................... 1.03
Auto Trucking Expense................................... 13.99
Total ................................................ $223.19

Claimant alleges that there is due the Chicago Park District from the State of Illinois, the sum of $223.19 for the work done by said South Park Commissioners under said permit. The payment has never been made. Claim was presented to the State of Illinois, Division of Architecture and Engineering, and the Adjutant General on the 12th day of September, 1934.

All of these facts appear by stipulation.

The Attorney General opposes the payment of this bill because there was laches in presenting the bill for payment.

It appears from the stipulation that the claimant herein is a public body. While it is the rule that an award will not be made where the claimant is guilty of laches and an appropriation is allowed to lapse, we are of the opinion that where a public body has made certain beneficial grants to the State of Illinois, which have been received, and the public body in carrying out the grant was put to certain expenses which had been agreed to by the proper officials of the State, and because public bodies are subject to change and the contracting members of such public bodies become different individuals, the rule of laches should not apply. It is admitted that the expenditures were made, that the State received the benefits and that the charges were fair and reasonable.

We, therefore, make an award in favor of the Chicago Park District, in the sum of $223.19.

Opinion on Rehearing.

A Petition for Rehearing has been filed by respondent in the above entitled cause, and it is urged as grounds for a rehearing that the claimant was guilty of laches, and that the appropriation from which the money was payable, was exhausted. This was given consideration in the original opinion and because the Chicago Park District, etc. is a municipal body, we held that the defense of laches did not apply. The reason for this is that the heads of municipal bodies, whose duties might require them to act promptly in certain instances, are frequently changed, through no fault of the municipal body. It would, therefore, be an injustice to such municipal body, to hold it strictly to the doctrine of laches.

It is a familiar doctrine that, apart from any question of statutory limitation, courts of equity will discourage laches and delay in the enforcementof rights. The general principle is that nothing can call forth the court of chancery into activity but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence. Where these are wanting, the court is passive and does nothing. The doctrine is founded principally on the equity maxims, “he who seeks equity must do equity, ” “ he who comes into equity must come with clean hands,” and “the laws serve the vigilant, and not those who sleep over their rights,” and is based on consideration of public policy. Its object is in general to exact of the claimant fair dealing with his adversary, and the rule was adopted largely because after great lapse of time, from death of parties, loss of papers, death of witnesses, change of title, intervention of equities, or other causes there is danger of doing injustice, and there can be no longer a safe determination of the controversy.

The same rule it would seem, would apply to the other defenses.

The Chicago Park District, being a municipal body, we hold does not come within the rule. The motion for a rehearing is, therefore, denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Justice Yantis.

license: Public Domain

text:
    Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, No. 3.
    M. Pauline Orr, Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 14, 1937.

   Supplemental Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission:

Following the rendition of an Advisory Opinion heretofore rendered by this court in the above entitled matter on or about the 14th day of January, A. D. 1937, wherein a settlement for $109.00 by the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission with claimant was approved, there was filed with the Clerk of this Court an Amended Statement of Facts, wherein it appears that the original Statement submitted was erroneous in that it stated that the medical, dental and hospital bills incurred by claimant had been paid. Contrary thereto, it appears that subsequent to the rendering of such Opinion, the claimant has become a voluntary bankrupt, and in the Schedules in Bankruptcy filed by claimant, she included such medical, dental and hospital bills as unpaid debts owing by her.

In the Supplemental Statement now filed, it is suggested that payment of the amount of the award heretofore rendered would therefore have to be made to her Trustee in Bankruptcy, and if so made that the award wonld not discharge or pay the medical, dental and hospital bills in question as contemplated by Section 8, Sub-section (a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Wherefore, a Supplemental Opinion is asked of this court as to the propriety of paying the said sum of One Hundred Nine ($109.00) Dollars heretofore awarded, and if to be paid, with whom should settlement be made.

Section 21 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides as follows:

“No payment, claim, award or decision under this Act shall be assignable or subject to any lien, or garnishment, or be held liable in any way for any lien, debt, penalty or damages.”

Based upon the statements submitted herein, and under the law pertaining thereto, the court is of the opinion that the award heretofore made to claimant in the sum of One Hundred Nine ($109.00) Dollars for medical, dental and hospital bills is not subject to lien, and that such award is not payable to Claimant’s. Trustee in Bankruptcy, and the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission is authorized to pay to claimant for the use of the several persons and institutions furnishing such medical, dental and hospital service, the said sum of One Hundred Nine ($109.00) Dollars. As such payments are for the specific purposes set forth, receipts should be obtained from the individuals and institutions furnishing such medical, dental and hospital service.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, No. 21.
    The Trust Company of Chicago, A Corporation, Administrator of The Estate of Edward V. Chapman, Dec’d., Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 16, 1937.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of The Trust Company of Chicago, a Corporation, Administrator of the Estate of Edward V. Chapman, Deceased vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon the aforementioned statement:

From the statement submitted it appears that Edward V. Chapman was assigned on Construction Project S1-B4-398 of the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, at 1319 S. Michigan Avenue, Chicago; that on the 11th day of June, 1934, while so employed he was sent to 758 W. Harrison Street to do certain repair work. That while in the course of Ms work a scaffold on wMch he was standing collapsed and he fell approximately six (6) feet to the floor, thereby suffering a fracture of the left Tibia and Oscalcis. Payment of medical and hospital bills appear to have been made by the I. E. R. C. and the statement further indicates that Chapman suffered a specific partial loss of tMrty-five (35) to fifty (50) per cent of the use of his left foot.

It further appears that Edward V. Chapman filed application for award in the Court of Claims, same now appearing as C. of C. No. 2510; that he thereafter died on October 27, 1935 of chronic Myocarditis. From the statement filed it appears that The Trust Company of CMcago, a corporation has been appointed Administrator of the Estate of Edward V. Chapman, Deceased, and that it is with such Company, as personal representative of Edward V. Chapman, Deceased, that your Commission is now dealing, and that such Administrator and its Attorneys have agreed to accept Three Hundred Fifty-four ($354.00) Dollars in full settlement for the Edward V. Chapman claim.

It does not appear from the statement that Edward V. Chapman left surviving any widow, child or children whom he was under legal obligation to support at the time of his injury, or any parent, child or children, grandparent or grandchild or collateral heirs who were wholly or partially dependent upon him.

The Workmen’s Compensation Act contains the following provision:

“Any right to receive compensation hereunder shall be extinguished by the death of the person entitled thereto, subject to the provisions of this Act relative to compensation for death received in the course of employment, and subject to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Section 8 of this Act reldr tive to specific loss; provided, that upon the death of a beneficiary, who is receiving compensation provided for in Section 7, leaving surviving a parent, sister or brother,” etc., etc. “the latter shall receive,” etc., etc. (Sec. 21, W. C. A.)

In reading the foregoing we find that the extinguishment of the right to receive compensation is made subject to two conditions, the second being the provisions of Paragraph (e) of Section 8 of the Compensation Act, relative to specific loss.

The claim in question as now submitted is for a specific partial loss of thirty-five (35) to fifty (50) per cent of the use of the employee’s left foot, and the proposed settlement is on the basis of the first figure, i. e. thirty-five (35) per cent.

Settlement with claimant is apparently authorized under the several provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the amount for which such settlement is to be made i. e. Three Hundred Fifty-four ($354.00) Dollars, is the sum to which plaintiff would be entitled under the minimum of Seven and 50/100 ($7.50) Dollars per week for thirty-five (35) per cent specific loss of use of his left foot. We are of the opinion that settlement may be properly made by your Commission for the latter sum under the statement of facts heretofore submitted by you.


author: Mr. Justice Tantis.

text:
    Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, No. 22.

    Frank Disko, Administrator of the Estate of George Kuhtock, Deceased, Claimant vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 22, 1937.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Tantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of Frank Disko, Administrator of the Estate of George Kuhtock, Deceased vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon the aforementioned statement:

From the Statement submitted it appears that George Kuhtock was assigned to work, on November 28, 1934, on Construction Project S1-B20-820 of the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, and was directed by those in charge to go to 849 Townsend Street, Chicago, where some steel lockers were to be moved. While he was moving* same down the steps from the fourth floor to the basement, a locker slipped' and fell against his left side. He was taken to the Cook County Hospital, and the records of that Institution show that he received a fracture of his left wrist and lacerations of his left leg. The statement further shows that a thirty-five (35) per cent loss of use of the left hand of the employee resulted. George Kuhtock filed an application for an award in the Court of Claims on or about December 12,1934, the case being C. of C. No. 2554 That claim has never been disposed of and he died March 25, 1937, from bronchial asthma and arteriosclerosis. Claimant herein was appointed Administrator of the Estate and he and his attorney according to the statement have agreed to accept Two Hundred Fifteen ($215.00) Dollars in full settlement of the injuries sustained by him. It is further noted that you have agreed to pay the Cook County Hospital Forty-Two ($42.00) Dollars for services rendered. The payment of this item and any first-aid appear fully justified from the record. From the statement it appears that George Kuhtock did not leave surviving him any widow, child or children or others who would be entitled to an award in case of his death.

The Workmen’s Compensation Act contains the following provisions:

“Any right to receive compensation hereunder shall be extinguished by the death of the person entitled thereto, subject to the provisions of this Act relative to compensation for death received in the course of employment, and subject to the provisions of Paragraph fe) of Section 8 of this Act relative to specific loss; provided, that upon the death of a beneficiary, who is receiving compensation provided for in Section 7, leaving surviving a parent, sister or brother,” etc., etc. “the latter shall receive,” etc., etc. (Sec. 21 W. C. A.)

In reading the foregoing* we find that the extinguishment of the right to receive compensation is made subject to two conditions, the second being the provisions of paragraph (e) of section 8 of the Compensation Act, relative to specific loss.

The claim in question as now submitted is for a thirty-five (35) per cent specific partial loss of use of the left hand of the employee, George Kuhtock. Payment under the terms of the Act to the claimant herein as Administrator of the Estate of George Kuhtock, deceased is apparently authorized under the wording* of the several provisions of the Compensation Act, and in the opinion of this court settlement by your commission with the claimant for the sum of Two Hundred Fifteen ($215.00) Dollars may properly be made.

As it appears that the Cook County Hospital rendered services to George Kuhtock at the request of the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, and has submitted its bill in the sum of Forty-Two ($42.00) Dollars for such services, payment thereof direct to such Hospital may be legally made.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, No. 23.
    Harry K. Steelman, Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 1, 1937.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of Harry K. Steelman vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon the aforementioned statement. From same it appears that claimant resides in Springfield, Illinois and was employed to work as a music and dramatic teacher on Project No. 1513, inaugurated by the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission as a part of the Civil Works Educational Service. In connection with his activities, he with three other teachers, directed and supervised the work of six hundred fifty (650) transient men who were housed in the Springfield Service Bureau. Classes were held twice a day from Monday to Friday of each week. On February 1, 1935 claimant, under instructions from his Superintendent, was engaged in directing a dramatic play for the transient men. About thirty-five transients took part in the festivities. One of the entertainers, name unknown, coughed a great deal. A few days after the entertainment he and his family left Springfield and although the State Health Department attempted to locate him throughout Missouri, Kentucky and Illinois, no later trace of him has been found.

The next day after the entertainment two residents of Springfield who had sat near the unknown transient and the claimant herein, Harry K. Steelman, were all stricken with spinal meningitis.

The statement discloses that prior to that date spinal meningitis carriers had been brought to the camp, and claimant predicates his claim upon the theory that these people and the unknown transient were carriers of spinal meningitis germs, and that these germs were communicated to the later victims from droplets of excretions from the nose and throat of such persons. The following appears from the statement of Dr. W. H. Tucker, Assistant Epidemiologist, in a report to Dr. Jirka, Director of Public Health:

“When the investigation was first started we were not sure that anyone in connection with the Transient Bureau had anything to do with the outbreak, but subsequent developments indicated that some one in the shelter most likely was the source of the first cases * * * when cultures were made from the throats of three hundred men who were thereafter quarantined in the transient camps at Springfield it was found that four of them were carriers of these germs. No carriers were found in a group of more than one hundred townspeople who had attended the program. The carriers were isolated and placed under medical treatment, and their carrier condition was overcome in one week * * * The quarantine of the two shelters and the isolation of the carriers was effective in checking the outbreak in the Federal Transient Bureau and no new cases have appeared in the shelters since that time.”

This is decidedly a borderline case. The claimant herein was in attendance at such camp because of his duties. Claimant and respondent at the time of the former’s employment were both within the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and bound thereby. Do the facts disclose “an injury resulting from an accident which arose out of and in the course of plaintiff’s employment?” No accident in the common acceptance of the term is shown to have occurred, hut under certain circumstances spinal meningitis, incurred in the course of the performance of one’s employment, has been held to constitute an accidental injury.

In the case of Arquin vs. Ind. Comm., 349 Ill. 220, we find that Dr. Arquin, while on duty as an interne in the Contagious Ward of the Cook County Hospital, contracted epidemic meningitis which caused his death. In submitting a claim in that case the widow contended that epidemic meningitis was an accidental injury for which compensation should be allowed. It was there said,

“The evidence is undisputed that epidemic meningitis is highly contagious and that Arquin was continuously engaged in the treatment of patients suffering from that disease, from December 1st to December 6th, when he himself contracted the disease. The origin of his illness and death arose while he was performing his duties in the regular course of his employment. The infection constituted his injury * * * The specific time when the meningitis germ entered his body is unascertainable, but since he was in constant contact with this dreaded disease for six days until he himself was stricken, the evidence seems reasonably sufficient to support a finding that he died as a result of an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment * * * The proof clearly shows his death was the proximate result of the infection with meningitis a few days prior. This case is therefore to be distinguished from those cases where the connection between the death and accidental injury is remote and difficult to trace as to time and place of origin.”

The following views were expressed in Rissman and Son vs. Ind. Comm., 323 Ill. 459:

“Typhoid fever has been regarded as accidental if the disease is contracted by accidental means; that an accident may be said to be ‘an unforeseen or unexpected event of which the party’s own misconduct is not the natural and proximate cause,’ and that the result ordinarily and naturally flowing from the conduct of the party cannot be said to be accidental.”

From the foregoing decisions it appears that meningitis, contracted under certain conditions may be said to constitute an accidental injury, as used in the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

As the statement herein submitted however discloses as a positive fact that carriers of the spinal meningitis germs were found to be present in the group of men among whom claimant worked in the course of his employment, and as tests made of more than one hundred townspeople who were not residents of such Transient Camps, disclosed no meningitis carrier among them, we believe the record sufficiently shows that claimant contracted the disease in the course of his duties and that same constituted an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment.

Plaintiff’s wages appear to have been Seventy-five ($75.00) Dollars per month at the time of his injury, or on the basis of Seventeen and 30/100 ($17.30) Dollars per week, of which Fifty Per Cent (50%) would be Eight and 65/100 ($8.65) Dollars. He remained in the hospital from January 26, 1935 until the 28th day of February, 1935 and was thereafter taken to his home, where he was bedridden for the following six weeks. While he was employed to some extent thereafter, the statement of Dr. Franklin Maurer, appearing in the record, states that claimant’s temporary disability terminated on or about December 1, 1935. An allowance at the rate of Eleven Dollars per week for forty-four (44) weeks to December 1, 1935 based upon 50% plus allowance on account of one child under sixteen years, would amount to Four Hundred Eighty-four ($484.00) Dollars. The record discloses that claimant is now employed by the Old Age Assistance Service at One Hundred Sixty ($160.00) Dollars per month, which is more than double the wages he was receiving at the time of his injury, and no award can be justified for any permanent disability. The only award that appears to be possibly justified is the allowance for temporary total disability, in an amount not to exceed Four Hundred Eighty-four '($484.00) Dollars. Your Commission would apparently be justified in paying such latter sum to claimant, but not in paying claimant the sum of Five Hundred Eighty-five ($585.00) Dollars, indicated in your statement as being the amount which claimant and his attorney have offered to accept in full settlement of his claim.

As it appears that the claim now under consideration is the same as that now filed in the Court of Claims under the title of Harry K. Steelman vs. State of Illinois, No. 2744, any settlement of the present claim should be conditional upon the dismissing of the latter entitled cause, and settlement should be made from any funds now held by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission and allocated for the payment of such claims.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, No. 24.
    Juls Lock, Claimant, vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 24, 1937.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of Juls Lock vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon the aforementioned statement:

We find that at the time of the accident in question, both employer and employee were operating under and bound by the provisions of the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act; that said accident arose out of and in the course of such employment.

The facts submitted in the statement show that Juls Lock was employed as a laborer on a project in which the I. E. R. C. was an interested party; that on August 23, 1934 he was engaged in hauling’ material, and while riding on an Illinois Department of Highways truck at the corner of Division and Harlem Avenue in the City of Chicago, he lost his balance and fell, striking the left side of his head on the. pavement. He was immediately taken to the State Hospital at Dunning, where he was found to have a slight skull fracture. He thereafter received X-ray examinations and treatment at the Cook County Hospital, and on May 7, 1937 was examined by Dr. G-eorge M. Hall of Chicago. From your statement' it appears that all of his medical and hospital bills have been paid by the I. E. R. C.; that claimant was unable to work for a considerable period following Ms accident, and is still suffering from the results thereof, having occasional headaches and a dizziness when bending over or suddenly turning. Dr. R. F. Mac-key states that it is better for the patient to do as much work as possible, insofar as same does not increase Ms disability. Your statement further shows that this is the same claim as that involved in the case of Juls Lock vs. State of Illinois, now pending in the Court of Claims under No. 2674; that claimant has been duly advised by his attorney, and that they have agreed to accept Six Hundred ($600.00) Dollars in full settlement of any rig’hts which he may have, growing out of said accident.

While no sufficient showing as to present earning* capacity appears, from which an accurate determination may be made as to the difference between what claimant was able to earn before the accident and the average amount which he is earning or is able to earn in some suitable employment since such accident, yet the facts are sufficient to show that both for the time lost by claimant following the accident and his present condition, such allowance would not be less than the Six Hundred ($600.00) Dollars which your report shows claimant and his attorney are willing to accept in full satisfaction.

We therefore find, that under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act claimant would be entitled to the sum of at least Six Hundred ($600.00) Dollars for injuries and loss of time resulting from said accident, and that a payment of said sum by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission in full settlement is fully authorized under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Payment of such claim should be subject: First, to a dismissal of the claim of Juls Lock vs. State of Illinois, No. 2674, now pending in the Court of Claims; and Second, the payment of such sum shall be made by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission out of any funds held by it and allocated for such purpose.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, No. 25.

    Dan Dunbar, Claimant, vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed, August 23, 1937.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of Dan Dunbar vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon the aforementioned statement:

We find that at the time of the accident in question, both employer and employee were operating under and bound by the provisions of the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act; that said accident arose out of and in the course of such employment.

The statement of facts submitted herein disclose that claimant was assigned to various duties as a carpenter, working approximately eight hours per day and receiving for his services Ten and 50/100 ($10.50) Dollars per week; that on April 16, 1934 while employed on a Project for the Illinois Emergency Eelief Commission at 1304 Indiana Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, a scaffold, upon which claimant was standing, broke, resulting in his falling about twelve feet, striking his right knee, hip and shoulder.

First-aid was rendered at St. Luke’s Hospital and he was thereafter confined to his home until May 31, 1934. Except for his own statement that he was unable to do any work until September 15, 1934, the only evidence in the record of continued disability is to the effect that same terminated May 31st. If the evidence remaining in your files or your further investigation discloses, that claimant was actually prevented by such accident from pursuing his usual and customary labors, until September 15, 1934, he would be entitled under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to One Hundred Fifty-Three and 75/100 ($153.75) Dollars, and you would therefore be fully justified under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in making settlement with him in the sum of One Hundred Thirty-One and 25/100 ($131.25) Dollars, that being’ the amount which he and his attorney have, according to your statement, agreed to accept in full settlement for injuries and loss of time resulting from such accident. Without such evidence and proof, and in the absence of a showing as to partial disability, the right to an award for temporary total disability would terminatel May 31st, and, would cover a period of six and one-half (6%) weeks, for such temporary total disability, in the sum of Forty-Eight and 75/100 ($48.75) Dollars.

Any settlement made should be from funds allocated to the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission available for such purposes, and if settlement is made it should be conditioned upon the dismissal of the case of Dan Dunbar vs. State, C. of C., No. 2516.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, No. 26.
    Arthur Edward Seeman, Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed. September 15, 1937.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the above entitled matter, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon said statement. It appears that Arthur Edward Seeman was employed by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission as a Financial Clerk in the Office of the Scott County Emergency Relief Committee at Winchester, Illinois; that in performing his service it was a part of his duty to interview work relief clients, prepare financial statements and to make reports of the progress of work relief throughout the County. It further appears that on the 13th day of July, 1936 while lowering a window in the Relief Office just prior to ending his day’s work, a glass panel fell out of the frame, struck claimant’s right forearm and wrist, and cut the extensor tendons of the five fingers of his right hand. He received first-aid, was thereafter taken to the Hospital at Jacksonville, Illinois, was placed under an anaesthetic and his wounds were dressed. Thereafter he was under the care of Dr. William O’Reilly until September 9, 1936. He was also examined by Dr. R. M. Norris of Jacksonville, Illinois, on August 17, 1936, and by Dr. Thomas D. Masters, an Industrial Surgeon of Springfield, Illinois. The statement submitted by the several doctors shows a partial permanent disability of ten (10) per cent of the right arm. Medical, hospital and surgical bills of One Hundred Thirty-four and 98/100 ($134.98) Dollars incurred by claimant, do not appear to have been paid, but claimant’s full salary was paid to him during the period of his temporary total disability, at the rate of Ninety ($90.00) Dollars per month.

The statement indicates that claimant was employed within the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; that the injury sustained arose out of and in the course of his employment, and that same is a compensable claim within the meaning of the Act. The required notices were given and application for payment was apparently made within a year as required by statute.

From the statement submitted, claimant is apparently entitled to an award for a ten (10) per cent permanent partial disability of his right arm.

Section 8, Par. 13 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Illinois provides:

“For the loss of an arm .or the permanent and complete loss of its use, fifty per cent of the average weekly wage during two hundred twenty-five weeks.”

Section 8, Par. 17 of said Act provides:

“For the permanent partial loss of use * * * fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during that portion of the number of weeks in the foregoing schedule provided for the loss of such member which the partial loss of use thereof bears to the total loss of use thereof.”

Claimant’s average weekly wage was Twenty and 76/100 ($20.76) Dollars. On such basis he would be entitled to ten (10) per cent total disability in the sum of Two Hundred Thirty-three and 55/100 ($233.55) Dollars. Added thereto, would be the sum of One Hundred Thirty-four and 98/100 ($134.98) Dollars for medical, hospital and surgical bills incurred by claimant in the legitimate care of his injury, making a total of Three Hundred Sixty-eight and 53/100 ($368.53) Dollars to which claimant would apparently be entitled. An award would not apparently be justified for the sum of Four Hundred Seventy-two and 48/100 ($472.48) Dollars which the statement indicates claimant has offered to accept in full settlement for his injury. Inasmuch as claimant received his full wages during the time of his total temporary disability, the difference between the fifty (50) per cent thereof which he was entitled to receive, subject to the maximum provided by the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the amount which he did receive would be ‘a proper deductible item from the amount of such settlement. As the facts are also incomplete as to his marriage status, we leave the computation of such deduction to be made by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Ho. 27.

    Frances Allen, Claimant, vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed October 12, 1937.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Tantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of Frances Allen vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon the aforementioned statement:

We find that Frances Allen was employed by the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission as a case worker on the 12th day of May, A. D. 1934; that as she entered the Belief Offices at 1701 String Street, Chicago, Illinois, on the morning of that date, one Andrew Guerriero, a relief client of that Office, approached from the rear and struck her across the neck with a razor, causing a deep laceration eight inches long, penetrating the muscles down to the bone; another severe laceration across the face piercing through the nostrils, the septum of the nose, and laying the nose almost backward on the victim’s forehead; another laceration on the right cheek about three and one-half inches long transverse across the level of the angle of the mouth. Another wound about two and one-half inches in length and about four inches above the wrist was inflicted across the right forearm, with cuts on the ring finger of the right hand. Claimant’s assailant was speedily brought to trial in the Criminal Court of Cook County, was found guilty of assault with intent to kill and sentenced from one to fourteen years in the penitentiary.

Immediately after the assault the patient was removed to the Presbyterian Hospital and placed under the care of Dr. Edwin M. Miller, as surgeon, and Dr. Frederick B. Moore-head, a specialist in plastic surgery. It appears that the surgeons’ bills and the hospital bill have been paid, in the sum of Five Hundred Fifty-two and 85/100 ($552.85) Dollars. Subsequent to such treatment, claimant moved to Fort Worth, Texas, where she has been under the care of Dr. E. P. Hall, to whom she has heretofore paid the sum of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars. An Opinion by Arbitrators Johanns en and Lisack, of the Illinois Industrial Commission, appearing in the record indicates their view that the scars on claimant’s neck, chin and cheek were permanent and that under the rules and practice of the Commission, a person in claimant’s walk of life would be entitled to Two Hundred Fifty ($250.00) Dollars as a result of such scars.

It further appears that the injury to claimant’s arm has not fully healed and has left her with limited motion in the right forearm and wrist, according to the statements by Dr. Hall. That in addition to this, she suffers more or less continuous pain in the right hand and same tires easily.

From a consideration of the entire record we believe your Commission would be entirely justified in allowing claimant reimbursement for the One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars heretofore expended by her, for additional medical services in care necessitated by such accident. The description of the disfigurations to claimant’s face and neck fully justify an award of Two Hundred Fifty ($250.00) Dollars. While the record is somewhat meager as to the percentage of lost motion and use of claimant’s right arm, such record indicates a partial permanent loss of use of such right arm at an estimated figure of fifteen (15) per cent.

We are therefore of the opinion that your Commission is fully justified and may properly make settlement with claimant for an adjustment of all her claims in connection with said accident, in the sum of Eight Hundred Fifty ($850.00) Dollars, which sum it appears that claimant, on advice of Counsel, has offered to accept in full settlement of her injuries. Such settlement if made should be made payable out of any funds held by the Commission and allocated for such purpose, and should be conditional upon the dismissal of the claim now pending in this court under the title of Frances Allen vs. State of Illinois, C. of C., No. 2667.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, No. 28.
    Edwin E. Denman, Claimant, vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 14, 1938.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Tantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of Edwin E. Denman vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission (No. 28), the court finds:

That on August 6, 1934 Edwin E. Denman of McHenry, Illinois, was assigned to work on Project No. S255-B16-41 for general repairs and alterations at the State Fish Hatchery at Spring Grove, Illinois. On the day stated claimant with other workmen was riding in a truck owned and operated by the Division of Highways of the State of Illinois, enroute from McHenry to the State Fish Hatchery at Spring Grove. As the truck neared the intersection with State Route No. 60 and the Johnsburg Road, it slowed down but did not stop. The front side of the left rear wheel was struck by an automobile that was traveling eastward on Route No. 60, driven by one George Stiener. The truck was turned over and the rear end swung around in a half circle in the ditch on the east side of the Johnsburg Road. Claimant was thrown into the ditch and sustained ‘ ‘ a fracture of the transverse process of first lumbar, with left shoulder showing separation of Acromeo Clavicular ligament; left elbow dislocated, lumbar region showing deep contusions and causing kidney injury resulting in passing of blood.” Various X-ray pictures were taken. Claimant was put on a fracture bed in the Hospital at Waukegan and was examined by Dr. Emil Hauser, Orthopedic Surgeon of Chicago.

From a supplemental statement filed herein, it further appears that Dr. C. W. Klontz, of Waukegan, who attended claimant during his convalescence, treated the patient on an average of twice a week from the date of the injury, that the latter was compelled to remain in the Hospital until the 1st day of September, 1934, and that he was temporarily and totally incapacitated from the date of the accident until the 15th day of November, 1935.

It further appears from the statement submitted that claimant was forty-two years of age and lived with his wife and three children, all of whom were under sixteen years of age at the time of the accident in question; further, that claimant has heretofore filed a claim in this court entitled, Edwin E. Denman vs. State of Illinois, Court of Claims, No. 2691; further, that he and his attorney have entered into a stipulation with your Commission that they will dismiss said claim upon a settlement by your Commission with him, in the sum of Eight Hundred ($800.00) Dollars in full satisfaction of all rights and demands which he might have growing out of said accident.

The court is of the opinion and we find that at the time of the accident in question, claimant and his employer were operating under and bound by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; that said accident arose out of and in the course of such employment; that the period of temporary total incapacity as shown by the statement submitted was in excess of sixty-four (64)' weeks, and that claimant would be entitled to not less than the said sum of Eight Hundred ($800.00) Dollars, in satisfaction of temporary total disability under the provisions of section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Illinois.

We therefore find that the proposed settlement may properly be made with the claimant. We are further of the opinion that such claim should be subject to the following provisions, to-wit:

First: That the claim of Edwin E. Denman vs. State of Illinois, Court of Claims, No. 2691, now pending in the Court of Claims should be dismissed.

Second: That payment of the above compensation shall be made by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission out of any funds held by it and allocated for the payment of' such claims.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, No. 29.
    John Scheuring, Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 14, 1937.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of John Scheuring vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon the aforementioned statement:

Such statement discloses that Claimant John Scheuring had been employed by the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission for approximately two years prior to May 1,1935, during which time he had worked on various Belief Projects, being-employed approximately thirty-two hours per week, at Forty (40) Cents per hour, or a yearly total of Six Hundred Twenty-four ($624.00) Dollars. On the date stated he was shoveling gravel from a pit at Fox Biver Grove, Illinois, into trucks belonging to the Division of Highways of Illinois, on road work in McHenry County on Project No. S255-B2-121. While so engaged a rock weighing approximately one hundred pounds rolled into the pit, pinning claimant against the truck and resulting in a fracture of both bones in his left leg. Immediate medical care was given, and claimant remained in the Harvard Community Hospital from the date of the accident until August 9, 1935. When discharged from the hospital he was still walking on crutches, and on March 24, 1937 Dr. C. J. Maxon who had assisted in caring- for the patient at the time of the injury, stated that X-ray pictures taken on May 1,1936, showed a perfect union of the broken bones, but that because claimant was seventy (70) years old, there was not much possibility of his having more than seventy (70) per cent use of his leg, and that a stiffness in the ankle and weakness in the leg would always exist.

The statement further shows that claimant has been unemployed since the accident, but that he and his wife had been receiving Old Age Assistance from the State of Illinois, in the sum of Twenty-eight ($28.00) Dollars per month since March 24,1937, and that he had no children at the time of the accident who were then under the age of sixteen years.

It further appears that all medical and hospital hills have been paid by the State and that claimant, by and with the advice of his Attorney, has agreed to accept Three Hundred Ninety ($390.00) Dollars in full settlement for the injuries sustained by him in the accident in question.

The statement sufficiently discloses:

That claimant sustained an injury while employed by the respondent;

That the injuries received are compensable under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act;

That the purported settlement of Three Hundred Ninety ($390.00) Dollars is -within the amount to which claimant would be entitled for temporary total disability and thirty (30) per cent specific loss of use of claimant’s left leg; all as provided for under Sections 8 (b), 8 (e), 15 and 17 of the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act.

We therefore find that such settlement by the I. E. R. C. with claimant is legally justified. While no claim has heretofore been filed by claimant in the Court of Claims, the release that will be obtained by the Commission in making the above settlement should be so drawn as to preclude the filing of any such claim hereafter.


author: Mr. Justice Linscott

text:
    Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, No. 30.
    Pearl Jenkins, Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 12, 1938.

   Mr. Justice Linscott

delivered the opinion of the court:

On November 20, 1934, claimants filed their claim against the State of Illinois under the Workmen’s Compensation Act claiming the sum of Forty-eight Hundred Dollars ($4,800.00) alleged to be due on account of the death of the hnsband and father, Frank Jenkins, which claim was known as No. 2541. Evidence was taken under this claim, briefs and arguments were filed by counsel for both sides, and thereafter, this court filed an opinion denying an award for compensation on the ground that the facts shown in the record were just as pertinent to show that Jenkins was an independent contractor as do prove that he was an employee, and for the reason that claimants did not show that Jenkins was an employee of the respondent, an award was denied.

A petition for rehearing was filed by claimants and on June 10, 1937, an order was entered in this court granting the petition and re-opening the case for further evidence.

On August 13,1937, a transcript of this new evidence was filed in accordance with the rules of this court.

It appears from the evidence that on the 18th day of October, 1934, Frank Jenkins died as a result of injuries sustained on that day while he was employed as a trucker for the Williamson County Emergency Belief Committee, which was under the direct supervision and control of the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission.

During the year 1934, the State of Illinois, through one of its agencies, the Illinois Belief Commission, operated a central food depot located in the Goddard Building in the City of Marion, Williamson County, Illinois. This commission was dispensing* food and other necessaries of life to the poor of Williamson County. The prosecution of this work required the transportation of surplus food supplies from railroads to the central food depot in Marion,- — -their storage warehouse — and from there a distribution was had to the relief clients throughout the county. The central commodity deposit was a three story and basement brick building, approximately 60 feet wide by 100 feet long, and between 75 and 1.00 men worked at the warehouse at different times, and the record shows that in the handling of the storage and distribution of these surplus commodities, trucks were used. The Commission did not own the trucks, but hired at least four men to carry out such trucking operations as were necessary. The deceased was one of those so employed: He furnished his own truck, receiving for the work done by him, checks averaging from $200.00 to $300.00 monthly from the State of Illinois. These checks were based upon the amount and kind of work he performed, payment for certain kinds of hauling being on a weight and mileage basis, payment for other kinds of hauling on a trip basis, while still other hauling was paid upon an hourly basis. Witnesses estimated his average annual income from the state for this work at $3,500.00. The respondent offered no evidence in denial of the earnings of the deceased.

Under the prevailing rates, one-half of the payment was for the use of the truck, and one-half for the services of the driver.

On the morning of October 18, 1934, Frank Jenkins and other employees of the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission were unloading his truck at the central food depot. A son of Jenkins was also employed in this work and worked along with his father. He got upon the truck to move it, and when he released the brake, the truck rolled backward, crushing Frank Jenkins betwéen the truck body and the wall of the building and injuring him so severely that he died twelve hours later.

The deceased was survived by Pearl Jenkins, his wife, the adult son, John, and the two minor sons, Frank Weaver Jenkins, age 13 and Billy Jean Jenkins, age 8.

The. additional evidence heard was upon the question of the degree of control exercised by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission over Jenkins’ activities in the trucking done by him.

At the time Jenkins received his injury and for a considerable time prior thereto, this warehouse or food depot was in charge of a Depot Superintendent, George Morris. Morris testified that he was superintendent and boss over the truck, and that he told the drivers what they should do, and how they should do it and when they should do it, and this was true with reference to Frank Jenkins. Morris testified that he required the drivers to assist in loading and unloading the trucks at- the food depot, and that the drivers did what he told them to do. There were various .doors at the food depot at which trucks could be loaded and unloaded, and drivers were required to load or unload at the particular door which Morris directed. When Jenkins’ services were needed, Morris would notify him, usually the day before, and would advise him at what time he should report, and Jenkins would report at the appointed time. Occasionally several car loads were standing on side tracks, waiting to be unloaded, and Jenkins would unload these cars under the direction of Morris, and when commodities were loaded onto Jenkins’ truck for distribution throughout the county, Morris directed how this work should be done, in detail as to each delivery, and he would take what really amounted to a receipt in triplicate for deliveries, and he was instructed that commodities for which orders were not signed must be returned to the food depot. Jenkins was not permitted to engage in hauling for others or obtaining private employment when he was making distribution of commodities. Distribution was made from Marion to smaller towns in that county, and in doing this, he was instructed as to the order in which distribution to these towns should be made, the time he should arrive at and how long he should remain in the various towns on the itinerary, and he followed these'instructions.

On the morning of October 18, 1934, Jenkins reported for work with a low stake body on his truck. Morris objected and Jenkins returned home for longer stakes and placed them in position on his truck before proceeding on the job which resulted in his death.

It has been repeatedly held that where the person for whom service is rendered retains the right to control the details of the work and the method or manner of its performance, the relation of employer and employee exists. It has also been held that when the party for whom trucking is performed controls the loading and unloading of the truck, the destinations of the loads, the manner of handling the loads at such destinations, the kind and quantity of material hauled, the distances travelled by the truck, the amount of pay received for the loads, the hours of employment, the time at which various deliveries shall be made and various trucking operations performed, and the manner in which the truck shall be equipped, the trudker is an employee and not an independent contractor. VanWatermullen vs. Ind. Com., 343 Ill. 73.

The fact that Jenkins owned his own truck is not inconsistent with an employee relationship, and the fact that he was paid for a part of his work on a weight and mileage basis does not make him an independent contractor.

Our Supreme Court has also held that in determining whether one is an employee, the Workmen’s Compensation Act is to be liberally and broadly construed, and the State of Illinois, in distributing surplus commodities by motor driven vehicles, and employing four truck drivers and at least fifteen laborers in connection with such distribution, was operating under and subject to the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The accident was witnessed by Tom Lewis, who was assisting Jenkins. Jenkins was instructed by George Morris to go back to the box car and secure another load. It was when the truck was about to be started that Jenkins received the injury which caused his death.

All medicine and hospital bills in the sum of $31.00 were assumed by Pearl Jenkins, wife of Frank Jenkins.

In view of the facts in this case, the court finds:

1. That the deceased and the respondent were on the 18th day of October, 1934, operating under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; that on the date last above mentioned, Frank Jenkins, the deceased, sustained accidental injuries which did arise out of, and in the course of his employment, resulting in the death of said deceased twelve hours later; that notice of said accident was given said respondent and claim for compensation on account thereof was made on said respondent within the time required under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

2. That the deceased at the time of injury had two children under sixteen years of age.

3. That the necessary first aid had not been provided by the respondent herein.

4. That said deceased left him surviving as his sole beneficiaries under section seven, paragraph (a) of said Act, as amended, his widow, Pearl Jenkins, the petitioner, and two minor sons, Frank Weaver Jenkins, age- 13 and Billy Jean Jenkins, age 8, all of whom were totally dependent upon the deceased.

5. That claimant has agreed to dismiss the claim which is known as Pearl Jenkins, widow, et al. vs. State of Illinois, No. 2541, which is now pending before this court, and has signed releases and waivers for the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, and has agreed to accept the sum of $3,000.00 in full settlement of her claim, upon approval of this court, and the court finds that the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission has agreed to pay said Pearl Jenkins, the said sum of $3,000.00.

Such amount is within the sum to which the said Pearl Jenkins and said minor children would be entitled under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Such settlement is therefore approved upon condition that said amount be paid in cash and that such portion thereof as would otherwise be paid to the minor children of said decedent shall be paid to their mother, Pearl Jenkins, for the support of said minors and npon the further condition that case No. 2541 now pending in this court shall be dismissed; such payment to be made out of funds allocated to the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission and now available for such payment.

Therefore, this court approves the settlement of this Cause known as No. 30 and directs the dismissal of cause known as No. 2541.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, No. 31.
    Clara E. Bailey, Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 20, 1938.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of Clara E. Bailey vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon the aforementioned statement:

In November, 1934 claimant was employed as an accounting supervisor for the Bond County Emergency Belief Committee, at 101 East Oak Street, Greenville, Illinois. From the statement of facts submitted by respondent, the following appears: On the 30th day of November, 1934 while performing her usual duties in and about the Belief Offices she arose from her chair to reach for certain papers which were on the far corner of her desk, and as she attempted to sit down claimant misjudged the position of her chair, striking the projection protruding from the side of the desk and the floor. She continued to work through that day and the following day, but complained to the Executive Director of the Bond County Emergency Belief Committee about soreness in her side and back. Mr. McLain apparently witnessed the accident, and made a report of same on December 3, 1934, showing that claimant had been directed to Dr. H. D. Cartmell. From statements attributed to Dr. Cartmell it appears that she went to him on December 3rd, complaining of soreness in her left side and back; that Dr. Cartmell taped her sides and told her to remain in bed; that she responded to treatment and that the last treatment he gave her was on the 27th day of December, 1934. His bill for such services was Fourteen ($14.00) Dollars and the record does not disclose whether same remains unpaid, or by whom paid.

After being discharged by Dr. Cartmell, claimant appears to have gone at her own accord to an osteopath by the name of Dr. A. M. Keith, who treated the patient until the 8th day of June, 1935, when he considered that she had recovered and was in need of no further services. It further appears that he rendered claimant a bill for Sixty ($60.00) Dollars, Forty ($40.00) Dollars of which has been paid by her. It further appears that her full salary at the rate of One Hundred ($100.00) Dollars per month was paid to her during the time of her disability; the total amount that was so paid to her for unproductive time being One Hundred Ninety-nine and 97/100 ($199.97) Dollars. Thereafter she filed a claim known as Clara E. Bailey vs. State of Illinois, No. 2739, in this court, and under your statement of facts submitted, indicates her willingness to settle whatever right she may have, including unpaid doctor bills, for the sum of Seventy-Four ($74.00) Dollars. By her statement, in a transcript of evidence submitted from the Attorney General’s office, it appears that she was incapacitated from work from December 2nd to December 27, 1934, and from February 9, 1935 to March 25, 1935, a total of nine (9) weeks.

There is considerable question in the court’s mind from the statement of facts submitted as to whether claimant’s accident is compensable. Her duties were apparently entirely clerical and there is nothing in the record to show that she was brought into contact with relief clients, or that any part of her work subjected her to hazardous exposure. However that may be, we are of the opinion that no compensation would be due, for it further appears that for the nine weeks during which she was absent from work during December, February and March, she was paid approximately One Hundred Ninety-nine and 72/100 ($199.72) Dollars. All of this was for unproductive time during which, compensation, if payable, would have amounted to only One Hundred Eight ($108.00) Dollars. Therefore, Ninety-one and 72/100 ($91.72) Dollars would be chargeable against any award to which she might be entitled for any additional time. There is nothing in the record to disclose that she would be entitled to an award in excess of such sum, and therefore in the opinion of the court payment of the further sum of Seventy-five ($75.00) Dollars to her by your commission, in settlement of her demands is not justified; nor would claimant be entitled to any award by this court upon the record before us. Her employment of Dr. Keith was without apparent authority from her superiors and was entirely upon her own initiative, and she would not be entitled, under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, to any award and payment for such services.

We therefore recommend that the proposed settlement be declined.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Ho. 32.
    John DeCosta, Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 20, 1938.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of John De Costa vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered,, based upon the aforementioned statement:

John DeCosta, 522 S. Aberdeen Street, Chicago, Illinois, was assigned to work for the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission on or about the 15th day of February, 1934, and on or about the 18th day of June, 1934 was assigned to Project l-D-1-348. His employment called for thirty (30) hours per week at Seventy (70) Cents per hour. Claimant was directed on July 17, 1934 to repair a sewing machine, same being one of a series which were mounted on a table forty-eight feet long. Under the table was a metal shaft which revolved about six hundred revolutions per minute, and on the shaft were twenty rollers and pulleys, over which leather belts operated to connect with the sewing machines on the table above. In making the repairs claimant removed the belt from the roller, it became tangled in the main shaft and claimant’s sleeve was caught and he was wound into the shaft; all of his clothing was torn from him; the entire skin was tom from his penis; the scrotum was tom open and his testicles were completely out of the scrotum. He was immediately taken to Mercy Hospital where he remained until the 14th day of September, 1934. He there had the services of several physicians and surgeons. Dr. Charles H. Connor states that on the 17th day of July, 1934 he saw John De Costa at Mercy Hospital; that claimant was suffering from shock due to trauma; that he found upon examination that the skin had been torn from claimant’s penis and that same was bleeding severely; the skin on the pubis to the extent of one-half inch was torn; there was also severe trauma to the scrotum, testis and vas deferens. Two operations were performed for skin graft and frequent daily dressings were made on the patient until the 14th day of September, when he was discharged from the hospital, but he continued under Dr. Connor’s care for a month thereafter. Dr. Michael I. Reiffel states, according to the record, that he examined claimant on the 19th day of July, 1935; that the scar resulting from the skin graft extended on the entire surface of the penis; that no erection could be had; that on examination of the scrotum he found the spermatic cord which contains the vas deferens, the artery, nerves and vas were all affected.

Dr. L. W. Riba, of the surgical staff of Passavant Hospital, testified that he examined claimant on the 21st day of April, 1936; that the shaft of the penis is shortened due to scar tissue on the ventral side; that the scrotal contents revealed that both testicles were of decreased size and the epididymis in the right scrotal sac was thickened and tender to palpation; further, that the prostrate contained a high secretion of pus cells and that the urethra had many ridges, due to scar tissue. Dr. Riba’s conclusion was that claimant has a loss of use of the testicles due to, first, multiple stricture of the urethra — second, infection of the prostate gland — third, scarring of the shaft of the penis and scrotum, and that claimant is impotent at the present time. Dr. Connor and Dr. Reiffel are of the opinion that his condition is permanent. At the time of the accident claimant was living with his wife and five children, three of whom were under the age of sixteen years. He filed a petition in the Court of Claims under the title of John Be Costa vs. State, No. 2652, said claim being made under the provisions of Section 8, Paragraph.(e), Sub-paragraph 163A, Workmen’s Compensation Act of Illinois which provides:

“For the loss of a testicle, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during fifty weeks, and for the loss of both testicles, fifty percentum of the average weekly wage during one hundred fifty weeks.”

The statement submitted here indicates that claimant and his attorney have now agreed with the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission to accept Nine Hundred ($900.00) Dollars in full settlement of his injuries, plus the payment of One Hundred Fifty ($150.00) Dollars to Dr. Charles H. Connor for the latter’s bill for services rendered.

The court finds that from the facts submitted claimant would be entitled to compensation in an amount not less than the sum indicated in the offer for settlement, and we are of the opinion that settlement with claimant under the facts stated is fully warranted under the provisions of said Section 8, Paragraph (e), Sub-Paragraph 16% of the Act.

In making* payment the following conditions should be observed: First, payment of compensation shall be made by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission out of any funds held by it and allocated for the payment of such claim. Second, that the claim of John De Costa vs. State of Illinois, Court of Claims, No. 2652, now pending, shall be dismissed.


author: Mr. Justice Yantis.'

text:
    Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, No. 33.
    Robert C. Eardley, Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 14, 1938.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.'

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of Robert C. Eardley vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon the aforementioned statement:

It appears from the statement of facts submitted that claimant was,' on the 25th day of January, A. D. 1938, employed as a legal representative for the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission.

That in addition to his duties of appearing and trying civil suits in the various courts of this State, he was required to assist the States Attorney’s Office in the prosecution of fraud cases involving relief clients, and in connection therewith to file claims in the Probate and County Courts where relief was charged to have been secured by fraud. His duties further necessitated investigation by him of improper actions committed by relief recipients throughout the State, and to interview such relief recipients who have threatened or intimidated case workers or caused disturbances in the District Offices of the Commission. That on the day stated Mr. Eardley, while in the course of his duties, was driving to Springfield, Illinois on State Boute No. 66 in the car then operated by his superior, Mr. B. M. Hilliard, approximately one mile North of Atlanta, Illinois, the car struck a thin sheet of ice, swerved to the lefthand side of the road, rolled over four times and was completely demolished. Claimant was rendered semi-conscious by the accident and was immediately taken to a Doctor’s Office at Atlanta, Illinois, where first-aid was rendered and sutures taken in the cuts in the forehead. From there he was taken by ambulance to the hospital at Lincoln, Illinois, and the following day was removed to Chicago Passavant Memorial Hospital, where he remained until January 30, 1938. It further appears from the supplemental statement filed herein that:

‘ ‘ The Illinois Emergency Belief Commission was created by an Act of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois effective February 6, 1932. Chapter 23, Section 464 of the Illinois Bar Statutes 1935 sets out the duties of said commission which are as follows:

“Poioers and Duties. It shall he the duty of the Commission until March 1, 1937, to provide relief to residents of the State of Illinois, who, by reason of unemployment or otherwise, are destitute and in necessitous circumstances. Such relief shall be provided by distributing funds or supplies and by any means deemed desirable by the Commission. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, the Commission may make use of and cooperate with counties, townships, and any other municipal corporations charged by law with the duty of poor relief and with other local relief agencies.”

The Illinois Emergency Relief Commission has created many Departments within itself since its creation through which relief is administered; such as Maintenance Departments, Furniture Shops, Mattress Factories, Canneries, Work Relief Divisions and other Divisions or Departments too numerous to mention. Said Maintenance Department has charge of maintenance work in all buildings operated by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission. Said work includes plumbing, carpentry, janitor work, engineering, and general repair work. Said Furniture Shop manufactures furniture which is used in relief offices throughout the State. Said Mattress Factories manufacture mattresses for relief recipients and for shelters operated by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission. Said Canneries preserve vegetables and fruits which have been grown by relief recipients on Illinois Emergency Relief Commission soil. Said Work Relief Division furnishes men .to the State Highway Departments, counties, townships, cities and parks for general maintenance work. All of the above enterprises or projects use sharp-edged cutting tools such as saws, chisels, mattocks and axes. Said buildings operate electric motors, elevators and boilers, all of which are governed by municipal ordinances.”

The records of the I. E. R. C. show that from September, 1933 to July, 1938 there have been five hundred thirty-two (532) disorderly conduct and assault and battery cases involving case workers and other employees of the I. E. R. C., said assaults being perpetrated by relief recipients in the course of their contacts with I. E. R. C. employees. Of this number four hundred ninety-nine (499) were prosecuted in the Criminal Courts of the State. Seventeen (17) were sent to psychopathic hospitals and three hundred sixteen (316) others found guilty of the charge.

We have heretofore held that case workers who have suffered accidental injuries in the course of the performance of their duties for the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission were engaged in work of a hazardous nature, and that injuries sustained by them arising out of and in the course of their employment were compensable. While claimant herein was engaged in the performance of legal duties, the actual services performed by him apparently necessitated the same contacts in many instances as those of case workers. From the statement of facts submitted we do not believe a distinction can properly be drawn between those cases in which payment of compensation has been approved, and the present case.

We are therefore of the opinion that the Commission is properly justified in recognizing Mr. Eardley’s claim for doctor, hospital and medical bills sustained by him, in the sum of Four Hundred Fifty-three and 75/100 ($453.75) Dollars for injuries incurred as the result of said accident. No question of compensation is raised in the statement submitted either for temporary or permanent disability. Payment of the claim as hereinabove stated is recommended, same to be made by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission out of any funds held by it and allocated for such purpose.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, No. 34.
    John W. Smith, Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 20, 1938.

   Advisory Opinion By

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you, in the above matter, an Advisory Opinion is hereby rendered, based upon said statement:

Such statement of facts contains the usual recital as to the creation of said Illinois Emergency Belief Commission, and of the powers and duties; also an account of the departments organized and created within itself and of the various activities carried on pursuant thereto. Claimant, John W. Smith, is shown to have been an employee of said Commission, assigned to work at the Will County Emergency Belief Office at 410 N. Ottawa Street, Joliet, Illinois, as a janitor. His duties were to fire and to take care of two boilers and to assist with the general maintenance work throughout the building. On February 6, 1935, while the employee was making certain repairs on a ventilating door at the grade level of the building, a derrick which was attached at the side of the ventilator and used for hoisting ashes and debris from the basement to the street, gave way and the employee was pitched fifteen feet to the concrete floor of the basement. He was knocked unconscious and had bleeding and hemorrhage from the nose and mouth. The Belief Administrator for the County was immediately notified and called an ambulance and arranged for the patient’s admission to St. Joseph’s Hospital in Joliet, where he received treatment until the 15th day of February, 1935. He thereafter remained under the care of Dr. Baymond Brown, an eye specialist, who was called into the case at the hospital, until the 5th day of May, 1935. Claimant had two children under the age of sixteen years at the time of the accident, and the statement discloses that his hospital and medical bills in the sum of One Hundred Twelve and 50/100 ($112.50) Dollars have been paid by the Will County Emergency Belief Commission; that he claims temporary total disability for a period of sixteen (16) weeks and has a claim pending in this court entitled J. W. Smith vs. State of Illinois, C. of C., No. 2718; further, that claimant through his Attorney has agreed to accept Fifty ($50.00) Dollars as settlement in full for any sums due bim growing out of said accident. The statement does not disclose at what wages he was employed, but on the settlement proposed the amount to be paid him would be within the minimum basis of Seven and 50/100 ($7.50) Dollars per week, so the wage rate is immaterial.

From a consideration of the statement we find that same discloses that at the time of the accident both employer and employee were operating under and bound by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; that claimant’s accident arose out of and in the course of his employment; that notice and demand for compensation were made within the requirements of said Act; that the proposed settlement of Fifty ($50.00) Dollars is within the limit to which claimant would be entitled under the terms of said Act for temporary total disability as shown herein. We are therefore of the opinion that settlement with claimant is proper in the sum of Fifty ($50.00) Dollars, in full satisfaction of all demands arising out of the accident in question. In making settlement the following conditions should be observed: First, that the claim of J. W. Smith vs. State of Illinois, C. of C., No. 2718, now pending in the Court of Claims should be dismissed and Second, that payment of the above compensation shall be made by the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission out of any funds held by it and allocated for the payment of such claims.


text:
    Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, No. 35.
    James O. Worthey, Claimant vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1939.

   Advisory Opinion by

Mr. Justice Yantis.

To the Illinois Emergency Relief Commission:

Pursuant to your request for an Advisory Opinion, based upon the attached statement of facts submitted by you in the matter of the claim of James O. Worthey vs. Illinois Emergency Relief Commission, the following Opinion is rendered, based upon the aforementioned statement:

It appears that James 0. Worthey was employed as a night cook in the shelter at 1210 S. Morgan Street, Chicago, Illinois, and that this shelter was operated by your commission; further, that while preparing a meal for the relief recipients, Mr. Worthey started an electrical grinder to grind a peck of onions; that in doing so his left hand became entangled in the blades of the grinder and as a result, the four fingers of the hand were severely cut and torn. He was rushed to the Cook County Hospital where surgical aid was given. Prom the accident and the resulting surgery, it appears that Mr. Worthey’s index finger was amputated in the distal third of the middle joint and the second, third and little fingers were amputated at the middle joints, and that said employee has lost the industrial use of these four fingers, and that there is considerable wasting of the muscles of the forearm due to the amputation of these fingers. It further appears that the X-ray pictures and hospital reports; of this case were shown to Anton Johannsen and Joseph L. Lisack, of the Industrial Commission, and that they have indicated their opinion that the employee has lost the industrial use of the four fingers in question".

It further appears that claimant had been employed at the shelter since the 19th day of January, 1934. The accident in question occurred on the 30th day of October, 1934. He was paid for his services at the rate of $5.00 per week and maintenance at the rate of $9.00 per month, making his total rate of pay $29.00 per month. Immediate notice of the accident was apparently had by the commission and a demand for compensation was made within six months after the accident. In the course of his employment sharp-edged tools and electrically-driven motors which operated grinders, meat-slicers, etc. were used, and it is apparent that the accident arose out of and in the course of plaintiff’s employment, and that the accident in question is compensable under the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

While claimant has filed a petition in the Court of Claims, entitled James O. Worthey vs. State of Illinois, C. of C., No. 2536, your statement is noted that he is not asking for temporary total disability, and that he and his attorney have agreed to dismiss said case upon payment of Seven Hundred ($700.00) Dollars in full compensation for all rights incident to said injury.

Under the provisions of Sub-sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Section 8, Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act, claimant would be entitled to compensation for specific loss of the four fingers described, in an amount not less than the sum which he and his attorney offer to accept, and a settlement in the sum of Seven Hundred ($700.00) Dollars by the commission is fully warranted and justified.

We are therefore of the opinion that claimant should receive settlement on said claim from the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission in the sum of Seven Hundred ($700.00), and that such settlement should be subject to the following conditions, to-wit:

1. That the case of James O. Worthey vs. State of Illinois, Court of Claims No. 2536, now pending in this court should be dismissed.

2. That payment of the above compensation shall be made by the Illinois Emergency Belief Commission out of any funds held by it and allocated for the payment of such claims.


author: Mr. Justice Yantis

text:
    (No. 3301
    James Caldwell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 16, 1939.

    R. C. Harmon, for claimant.
    John E. Cassidy, Attorney General; Glenn A. Trevor, Assistant Attorney General and Sveinbjorn Johnson, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Yantis

delivered the opinion of the court:

As originally filed, claimant in this case sought an award of Three Hundred Sixty ($360.00) Dollars for the partial loss of use of the first phalange of the first finger on his right hand, while in the course of his employment as a laborer at the Physical Plant at the University of Illinois. Under an amended complaint filed October 5, 1938, claimant increased the amount of his demand to Seven Hundred Twenty ($720.00) Dollars and alleged that he had lost the permanent and complete use of the first finger of his right hand, or “at least 25 per cent” loss of use of the entire right hand. The amended complaint was filed after the taking of evidence in the cause and was apparently the result of the testimony of Dr. Christie who testified he had examined claimant, and that he had almost a total loss of use of the finger in attempting many occupations. The record in this case consists of the original and amended complaints; the report of the University Committee on accident compensation for employees; reports of Doctors J. Howard Beard and John B. Christie as part of said University Committee’s report; a transcript of testimony taken at the University of Illinois; and the respective Statements, Briefs and Arguments of claimant and respondent. The record shows that claimant had been employed as a certified laborer at the Physical Plant of the University since May 27, 1936; that on January 11, 1938 about 3.30 P. M. he was doing some miscellaneous work in connection with the steam distribution system of the University of Illinois in the Materials-testing Laboratory. While closing the door of a freight elevator he caught the first finger of his right hand between the doors, severely mashing the first phalange of the finger. He gave immediate notice to his employer and was given medical and hospital service, the expense of which has been paid by respondent.

Claimant resumed work on January 24, 1938 and was paid the sum of Forty-eight ($48.00) Dollars flor the time he was disabled. At the time of the injury and for more than one year prior, his earnings had been Sixty (60c) Cents per hour for eight hours’ work per day, six days per week. At the time of the accident and now claimant has three children under the age of sixteen years, all residing with claimant, their ages being respectively seven (7), nine (9), and fourteen (14) years. His annual wage figures One Thousand Four Hundred Forty ($1,440.00) Dollars on the basis of $4.80 per day for three hundred (300) days and the average weekly wage figures $27.70.

Claimant having been injured on January 11th and having resumed work on January 24th, his temporary total disability extended through the 12th to the 23rd inclusive, or a matter of twelve days. As the temporary total disability did not extend for a period of thirty days, he was only entitled to compensation for temporary total disability for the time beginning on the 8th day of such temporary total incapacity. There should therefore be deducted from any amount found to be due him for specific loss, the sum of Thirty-four and 63/100 ($34.63) Dollars heretofore overpaid him for nonproductive time on the temporary total disability compensation. Claimant was entitled to a maximum of Eighteen ($18.00) Dollars per week compensation since he had three children under the age of sixteen years at the time of the injury, which entitled him to compensation at the rate of sixty-five (65) per cent of his average weekly wage instead of fifty (50) per cent. We have repeatedly held that the amount of overpayment for temporary total disability is allowable as a credit to the employer when called upon to pay specific loss or partial or total permanent disability, and such rule would apply in the present case. As ábove suggested, it was alleged in the orginal complaint herein filed that claimant had “severely mashed the end of the first joint of said finger and suffered the complete loss of the first phalange thereof.” Such was his own conclusion as to his injury at the time he filed his complaint. After hearing Doctors Beard and Christie express their opinion as to the percentage of disability which he had suffered, he concluded that he should amend his complaint and ask for partial loss of use of the entire finger. Dr. Beard and Dr. Christie each testified to a percentage of loss, the former stating that in his! opinion such loss amounted to sixty-five (65) or seventy (70) per cent of functioning of the finger. Dr. Christie testified that the finger is atrophied and that there is no use of the distal joint and that the finger is approximately fifty (50) per cent weak in the middle interphalange joint as far as functioning is concerned. Dr. Christie stated his final conclusion to be that claimant probably has only ten (10) per cent use of the index finger. The claimant himself testified (P. 4 of the Transcript) that he was doing the same kind of work which he did before this accident, and tihat the finger doesn’t seem to interfere with the kind of work he is doing at all, and that it doesn’t handicap him in any way. He was asked if he was able to make any use of this finger in connection with his work, and he stated “It doesn’t seem to bother me much; it doesn’t handicap me in any way.” He was also asked, “Do you use that finger?” and he replied, “To a certain extent. I can hold a pencil or pick up things or hold a pencil and write with it.” In answer to the question, “Is there any more use in that finger than if you had no finger there at all?”, he replied, “I believe there is. I would rather have it like it is than no finger at all.” Claimant also stated that if the work in which he was engaged required that the finger be in a flexible condition so it could be flexed at will, it would be a handicap as he cannot close the finger all the way down to the hand.

The Courts have held that an injured employee may testify how his injury affects him and as to his ability to use injured eyes or limbs, but neither a lay witness nor an expert can testify in direct terms that the employee has lost any stated per cent of the use of any member, as such conclusion must be made by the' Industrial Commission — or the Court— from the legitimate evidence in the record. (Pocahontas Mining Company vs. Industrial Comm., 301 Ill. 462.)

It has also been held that the loss of all four fingers where there is no loss or impairment of the hand itself, does not constitute the loss of a hand, and the award is limited to that for the fingers themselves. (Sykes vs. Industrial Comm., 314 Ill. 326.)

Dr. Beard testified as to the injury to the finger that the latter was severely mashed and cut down to the first joint; that the djstal half of the finger was mashed back as far as the second joint; that the joint between the middle and distal phalanx is practically functionless, and that the joint between the middle and proximal phalanx is about fifty (50) per cent impaired.

Under Section 8 (e-2) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, if claimant had suffered the entire loss of the first finger he would be entitled to Eighteen ($18.00) Dollars per week for a period of forty (40) weeks. Under Section 8 (e-17) he is entitled to such proportion of forty (40) weeks as the proportion of loss of use of his index finger bears to total loss. Under Section 8 (e-6) the loss of the first phalange is considered the loss of one-half of the finger.

The claimant has not lost the first phalange of, his finger. When the doctors looked at the finger and told him they would take it off, claimant insisted that they dress the finger and leave it on, and his testimony shows that he now uses the distal end of the finger to advantage in writing and picking up articles. We find from the record that the claimant has not lost the complete use of the first phalange of his index finger; that on the other hand there appears to be a partial loss of use of said finger from the second or middle joint to the distal end. The bone of the finger was not severed but the tendons were severed and were sewed back together. The injury, according to Dr. Christie, had taken place right in the distal inter-phalange joint, but because of the laceration and the injured tendon, there is some effect upon the entire distal half of the finger. The conclusion of the Court, from an examination of the record, is that an award of| fifty (50) per cent loss of use of the finger should be made to claimant; that is, an award of Eighteen ($18.00) Dollars per week for twenty (20) weeks, or Three Hundred Sixty ($360.00) Dollars. From this amount should be deducted the over-payment that has heretofore been made to him for non-productive time, in the sum of Thirty-four and 63/100 ($34.63) Dollars, making a net award of Three Hundred Twenty-five and 37/100 ($325.37) Dollars. The full amount of such award has accrued and is payable at the present time.

This award being subject to the provisions of an Act entitled “An Act Making an Appropriation to Pay Compensation Claims of State Employees and Providing for the Method of Payment Thereof,” approved July 3, 1937 (Session Laws 1937 Page 83), and being subject further to the terms of an Act entitled “An Act making appropriations to the Auditor of Public Accounts for the disbursement of certain moneys until the expiration of the first fiscal quarter after the adjournment of the next regular session of the General Assembly” (Senate Bill 123 as amended) approved July 8, 1939; — and being, by the terms of the first mentioned Act, subject to the approval of the Governor, is hereby, if and when approval is given, made payable from the appropriation from the General Revenue Fund in the manner provided for by the foregoing Acts.


author: Mb. Chief Justice Hollebioh

text:
    (No. 3371
    John McNeely, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 16, 1939.

    C. Ross Reynolds, for claimant.
    John E. Cassidy, Attorney General; Mitkray F. Milne, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mb. Chief Justice Hollebioh

delivered the opinion of the court:

Prior to and on May 9th, 1938 the claimant was employed by the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings of the respondent, as a laborer with Day Labor Unit B, which Unit was then laying concrete on S. B. I. Route No. 1 near Vienna, Illinois.

On the last mentioned date, while working as a puddler, and in the performance of hisf duties, the third finger of his right hand was accidentally cut by the sharp edge of a shovel blade in the hands of a fellow employee, causing a deep laceration. Claimant was given first-aid treatment by a division foreman, and went home for the remainder of the day. He returned to work the two following days, and at the end of the second day his services with the Division were terminated.

On May 25, 1938, at the instance of the Division, he was sent to Dr. J. W. Blanchard of Harrisburg for treatment. On June 3d the finger was operated and it was found that the extensor tendon had been severed and could not be sutured. Claimant continued to receive treatments from Dr. Blanchard until and including July 21, 1938. On August 5, 1938 claimant was sent by the Division to Dr. N. B. Thomas, orthopedic surgeon of Chicago, for examination and treatment, which treatment was continued to August 15th, when he was sent home. Claimant returned to Dr. Thomas for further treatment on October 4th, and on the following day the finger was amputated at the mid proximal phalanx. Claimant remained under the treatment of Dr. Thomas until October 13th when he again returned to his home. On November 15th he was again examined by Dr. Blanchard of Harrisburg and was pronounced able to report to work.

Respondent furnished all necessary medical, surgical and hospital services, the bills therefor aggregating $284.84, and also paid claimant compensation in the total amount of $117.85.

Upon a consideration of the facts before the court, and a,' personal inspection of the claimant who appeared in open court for the purpose, the court finds as follows:

1. That on May 9, 1938 claimant and respondent were operating under and bound by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of this State.

2. That on said date the claimant sustained accidental injuries which arose out of and in the course of his employment.

3. That notice of the accident was given and claim for compensation on account thereof was made within the time required by the Compensation Act.

4. That the claimant was in the employ of the respondent for less than one1 year prior to the date of the injury; that his annual earnings computed in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, were $800.00; and his average weekly wage was $15.38.

5. That claimant at the time of the injury was thirty-seven years of age, and had four children under the age of sixteen years.

6. ¡That all necessary first aid, as well as all medical, surgical and hospital services were furnished by the respondent.

7. That claimant was temporarily totally disabled from May 12, 1938 to November 15, 1938, and also sustained the loss, or the permanent and complete loss of the use, of the third finger of his right hand.

8. That claimant has been paid the sum of $117.85 to apply on the compensation due him.

9. That claimant is therefore entitled to have and receive from the respondent for temporary total disability as aforesaid, the sum of $14.00 per week for 26 5/7 weeks commencing May 12, 1938, to-wit, the sum of $374.00, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraphs (b) and (j) of Section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended; and is; also entitled to have and receive from the respondent the further sum of $14.00 per week for twenty-five weeks for the loss, or the permanent and complete loss of the use of the third finger of his right hand, to-wit, the sum of $350.00, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph (d) of Section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; — in all, the sum of $724.00; that respondent is entitled to a credit of $117.85 for compensation paid to the claimant as hereinbefore set forth; that the net amount of compensation due claimant as aforesaid is $606.15;! that all of such compensation has accrued prior to this date.

Award is therefore entered in favor of the claimant for the sum of Six Hundred Six Dollars and Fifteen Cents ($606.15.)

This award being subject to the provisions of an Act entitled “An Act Making an Appropriation to Pay Compensation Claims of State Employees and Providing for the Method of Payment Thereof,” approved July 3, 1937 (Session Laws 1937, page 83), and being subject further to the terms of an Act entitled “an Act making appropriations to the Auditor of Public Accounts for the disbursement of certain moneys until the expiration of the first fiscal quarter after the adjournment of the next regular session of the General Assembly” (Senate Bill 123 as amended) approved July 8, 1939; — and being, by the terms of the first mentioned Act, subject to the approval of the Governor, is hereby, if and when approval is given, made payable from the appropriation from the Road Fund in the manner provided for by the foregoing Acts.