text:
    (No. 5936
    Nathan Turkin, as Special Administrator of Estate of Sandra Turkin, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 14, 1975.

    Robert Simon, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

Nathan Turkin, as Special Administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Sandra Turkin, has brought this action to recover for personal injuries suffered by his wife on November 29, 1969, when she tripped on a depression in a street which was under the jurisdiction and control of respondent. Claimant seeks to recover the sum of $1,000 on a theory that respondent negligently permitted a dangerous condition to develop on Dempster Street at its intersection with Austin Avenue in Morton Grove, Illinois, which constituted a danger to pedestrians crossing the street, and which proximately caused the injury to Mrs. Turkin.

The facts are not in dispute. On November 29, 1969, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Claimant and his 52-year old wife were crossing Dempster Street at its intersection with Austin Avenue in Morton Grove, Illinois. Dempster Street at this point is State Highway 58, and the parties have stipulated that the State of Illinois was under a duty to maintain the roadway.

The deceased and her husband were crossing from the northeast to the southeast corner of the intersection, intending to enter a drug store located on the southeast córner. The weather was clear and dry, and the deceased and her husband were crossing with a stop light. They were generally unfamiliar with the area, and had never previously crossed Dempster Street at the point of the incident.

There was a marked crosswalk across Dempster Street leading from the northeast to the southeast corner. Claimant and his wife crossed within the crosswalk until they approached a point about 15 feet north of the south curb of Dempster Street, when they veered slightly outside the marked crosswalk in the direction of the door to the drug store on the southeast corner. At this point, claimant’s wife’s foot caught in a depression in the pavement, and she fell to the ground.

Photographs of the accident site introduced into evidence show that the depression was located just outside the marked crosswalk. The depression was about one to two inches deep, six feet long and one foot wide, and ran in an easterly direction.

After the fall, Mr. Turkin helped his wife to the sidewalk and called the Morton Grove Police who arrived shortly thereafter and took Mrs. Turkin to Skokie Valley Hospital. X-rays were taken at the hospital and she was examined by a physician. She suffered an injury to her right ankle and right foot, and was thereafter examined both by her family physician and an orthopedic surgeon. The orthopedic surgeon diagnosed her condition as periosteitis, an inflammation of the membrance which surrounds the bone of the foot and leg. Mrs. Turkin walked on crutches for about 30 days after the incident and used a cane for about three months thereafter. Her mobility was limited for about seven months after the incident, and she incurred $155 in medical expenses as a result thereof.

Mr. Howard Plebin, employee of the drug store located on the southeast corner. of Dempster Street and «Austin Avenue, testified that he was familiar with the depression into which Mrs. Turkin fell, and that the depression had existed at least since the early part of 1969.

Joseph J. Kostur, Jr., the regional safety claims administrator for the State of Illinois, testified that he was familiar with all complaints received by the State pertaining to defects in Dempster Street at Austin Avenue, and that there were no records of the State having received actual notice of the condition of the roadway prior to November 29, 1969.

On May 3, 1971, Mrs. Turkin died of causes unrelated to this incident and Nathan Turkin was appointed as Special Administrator to prosecute her claim.

Respondent is not an insurer of either the condition of all roadways within its jurisdiction and control, or the safety and well-being of all persons traveling thereon. Rather, the respondent is chargeable only with maintaining its roads in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose for which they are intended. Schuck v. State of Illinois, 25 C.C.R. 209; Weygandt v. State, 22 C.C.R. 498. In order for claimant to prevail on his claim, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent breached his duty; that the breach proximately caused the injuries to his intestate; and that his intesstate was free of contributory negligence.

Photographs of the accident site introduced by both parties show a wide, shallow depression in the pavement. At most, the depression was two inches deep, and was located wholly outside the marked pedestrian crosswalk. After a careful examination of these photographs, and a consideration of the testimony describing the accident scene, we conclude that the defect in the roadway was not so marked as to constitute a danger to pedestrian traffic. Respondent thus did not breach its duty of maintaining the roadway in a reasonably safe condition.

We also conclude that at the time of the accident, Mrs. Turkin was not in the exercise of due care and caution for her own safety. The accident occurred on a clear, dry day, and the depression in the street, while shallow, was clearly visible. Mrs. Turkin apparently walked outside the pedestrian crosswalk directly into the depression, whereas it would appear that a person acting with due care should have seen the depression. The Court must conclude from the evidence before it, that decedent was not free from contributory negligence.

This claim is accordingly denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Perlin, C. J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 5877
    Ethel H. Emerson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 19, 1975.

    Cohn, Korein, Kunin & Brennan, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

This is an action to recover for water damage to the interior of claimant’s home, incurred on July 9, 1969. Claimant charges that in grading a hill to the rear of her home while constructing a right of way for an interstate highway, Respondent negligently altered the natural flow of rainwater on claimant’s property, causing water to accumulate in her back yard and flood her house.

In early 1969, respondent began construction of Interstate 64 to the rear of claimant’s property at 8904 Meyer Drive in St. Clair County, Illinois. Claimant had lived at that address since 1962, and her house had never previously flooded. During the course of constructing the highway, respondent graded a hill on claimant’s property behind her home. The hill, which had been approximately 30 feet high, was covered with vegetation and rainwater draining off the hill had always flowed away from claimant’s home in a westerly direction.

Claimant testified that in regrading the hill, respondent left large quantities of excess dirt in her back yard to the south and west of her house. This dirt compacted and caused rainwater, which would otherwise have flowed away from her house to the west, to accumulate in her back yard and ultimately flood her house through a rear window.

Claimant stated that her basement flooded after heavy rains on both June 22, 1969, and on July 9, 1969. Claimant specifically complains of the damage ca,used by the July 9 flooding when she said approximately two inches of water and a yellow, clay-like substance accumulated in her basement. Claimant testified that as a result of the flooding on July 9, the vinyl tile in two rooms of her home was ruined, and various furnishings were damaged. It is estimated that installing a new vinyl floor would cost approximately $650 and claimant alleges additional incidental damages. There is no testimony as to the depreciated value of the items involved.

Claimant introduced into evidence several photographs showing damage to the interior of her home, as a result of the flooding, as well as photographs showing the effects of respondent’s grading on the terrain surrounding her home. Claimant said that after the flooding on July 9, she herself dug a trench through the dirt which respondent had permitted to accumulate in her yard. This permitted the water to run off from her yard and she said that she thereafter had no more problems with flooding.

Richard Straub and Carl Schlosser, engineers working on construction of Interstate 64, inspected claimant’s home in response to her complaints of flooding. Straub testified for respondent that after claimant experienced flooding on June 22, he had ordered the grade of the hill to the rear of her property reduced an additional two feet to the approximate level of the grade of her back yard.

Both Straub and Schlosser testified that when they visited claimant’s home on the evening of July 9, 1969, they found the basement flooded, but they attributed the flooding to a drainpipe which was discharging into the window well of claimant’s home. Straub and Schlosser also said that they felt that the grading of the hill had improved the drainage on claimant’s land.

Testifying in rebuttal, claimant said that the flooding could not have been caused by the drain discharging into the window well, because a drain in the window well carried the water underneath her home through a system of tiles.

It has long been established that one who negligently alters the natural flow of water on the property of an adjacent landowner, and thereby causes damages, is liable to the adjacent landowner. See, Eimes v. Cleve land, Cincinnati, Chicago, and St. Louis Railroad, 158 Ill.App. 557; Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railroad Company v. Stewart, 128 Ill.App. 270. Respondent does not contest this proposition, but argues that claimant has failed to establish either that respondent did alter the natural flow of water on her property, or that respondent’s negligence caused injury to claimant. In substance, respondent asserts that the testimony of Straub and Schlosser to the effect that the flooding was not caused by the grading, but by the downspout discharging into claimant’s window well, establishes respondent’s freedom from fault.

We find, however, that claimant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that in grading the hill to the rear of claimant home, respondent negligently altered the natural flow of rainwater off claimant’s land, and that this was the proximate cause of the damage to her house. Claimant had lived in her home for seven years without incident prior to the construction of Route 64, and it was only after respondent began grading the hill to the rear of her property that she experienced flooding. The photographs introduced into evidence by Claimant demonstrate that soil was permitted to accumulate in Claimant’s yard, blocking the natural flow of water away from her property. Further, claimant testified that after she dug a channel through the accumulated soil for the rainwater, she was not thereafter troubled with floodings. Claimant also stated that a drain at the bottom on the window well, into which rainwater flowed, carried water away from the home. The conclusion is compelling that respondent’s grading of the hill behind claimant’s home caused the flooding.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $700.00.


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 5886
    Helen Clare Fain, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 19, 1975.

    Murphy and Pearson, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. S. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

Claimant in this action seeks damage for breach of a contract which the respondent had entered into with her under which the state leased a 3-story and basement brick building to be used by the Illinois National Guard for military purposes. Claimant, the lessor, brings this action in her capacity as trustee of a certain land trust covering title to the premises involved.

The facts are not in dispute. They are contained in a joint stipulation filed in this cause on August 29, 1974, in which the Adjutant General joined with the Attorney General in accepting the facts as stated in the complaint. By the same stipulation, the claimant conceded that the total damages she had actually sustained amounted to $3,800.00, an amount stipulated to by the respondent. The agreed facts are summarized as follows:

On October 1, 1921, the respondent, acting through the Adjutant General, leased premises located at 2667 W. Madison Street in Chicago, and from that time up to the first day of July, 1969, the respondent occupied said premises under a lease that was periodically renewed.

Under the terms of said lease, the respondent was to maintain the premises in accordance with requirements of any applicable ordinance or law, and to pay all expenses for the upkeep of the premises.

On September 23, 1968, the claimant was notified by the Department of Buildings of the City of Chicago, that the building was in a dangerous condition and a menace to public safety; and that said building was being maintained in violation of Sections 39-12, 41-9, 78-3 and 99-4 of the Municipal Code of Chicago, and Chapter 24, Section 11-30, 1-1 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. Whereupon, the claimant demanded that the respondent make the necessary repairs as required by the lease.

Respondent refused to make any repairs and terminated the lease as of June 30, 1969.

On February 16, 1970, the City of Chicago filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook County for a fine and other relief against the claimant because of said building violations.

On March 5, 1970, Harold R. Patton, respondent’s Acting Adjutant General, was notified of the aforementioned litigation and a demand was made of him to remedy the building in conformity to the terms of the lease. General Patton referred the matter to Mr. James T. Ryan, attorney for the Department of General Services. On March 27, 1970, Mr. Ryan informed the claimant that he had advised the respondent that it had no apparent liability.

On June 2, 1970, the Circuit Court of Cook County ordered that the building be demolished and a lien be placed against the building for the cost of demolition.

Following the hearing held in this matter, the parties stipulated that damage did occur to this building as a result of its use by the State; that responsibility for the condition of the building rested upon the respondent under the terms of its lease; and that the amount of claimant’s damage is $3,800.00. The court finds the said stipulation to be fair, reasonable and consistent with the facts.

Claimant is hereby awarded damages for breach of contract in the sum of $3,800.00.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    (No. 73-CC-177
    Avery Gravel Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Avery Gravel Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-271
    Delmont E. Surratt, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Kleiman, Cornfield & Feldman, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-757
    Halsted & 69th Currency Exchange, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Halsted & 69th Currency Exchange, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-200
    Alberta M. Clayton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Alberta M. Clayton, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-233
    Virginia MacLeish Jones Exec. of Estate of John E. MacLeish, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Price, Cushman, Keck, Mahin & Cate, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-254
    James E. Barnes, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    James E. Barnes, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-336
    MacMurray College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    MacMurray College, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-345
    Daily Courier News, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Daily Courier News, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-382
    Charles Baker, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Charles Baker, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-414
    Ray Maass, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Ray Maass, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-416
    Edward Don & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Edward Don & Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-442
    Reeves Walgreen Agency, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois. Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Reeves Walgreen Agency, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-444
    Reeves Walgreen Agency, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Reeves Walgreen Agency, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-445
    Reeves Walgreen Agency, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Reeves Walgreen Agency, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-520
    Helen J. Scrutchions, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Labor, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Helen J. Scrutchions, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-534
    John Dolio & Associates, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    John Dolio & Associates, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-593
    Amoco Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Amoco Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-608
    Wilkens-Anderson Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Wilkins-Anderson Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-613
    Multigraphics Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Multigraphics Division, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-614
    Hobart North Welding Supply Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Hobart North Welding Supply Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-624
    Murphy, Timm, Lennon & Spesia, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Murphy, Timm, Lennon & Spesia, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-625
    Lora J. Svaniga, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Lora J. Svaniga, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-635
    Henry S. Keller, Deceased, by Neva Keller, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Henry S. Keller, deceased, by Neva Keller, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-638
    Cenco Medical Health Supply Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Cenco Medical Health Supply Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-641
    Fishbach Brothers, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Fishbach Brothers, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-658
    William T. Regas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Fair Employment Practices Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

      William T. Regas, Claimant, pro se.
    Wiilliam J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-665
    Reaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Alan Kanter, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-666
    Reaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Alan Kanter, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-729
    Caldwell Electric Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Caldwell Electric, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-732
    Bankers United Life Assurance Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Bankers United Life Assurance Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-736
    Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-741
    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-747
    United Parcel Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    United Parcel Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-761
    Telemed Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Telemed Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-793
    The Baker & Taylor Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    The Baker & Taylor Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-831
    Bruce Electronics, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Bruce Electronics, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-835
    Harvard Educational Review, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Harvard Educational Review, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-851
    James W. Sanders, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    James W. Sanders, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-856
    Heinemann’s, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Heinemann’s, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 6281
    Jenkins, Merchant & Nankivil, a partnership composed of Carter Jenkins, and Charles Merchant, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings and Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 26, 1975.

    Sorting, Catron & Hardin, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This action arises out of two contracts entered into between Jenkins, Merchant, and Nankivil, consulting engineers sometimes referred to as Associate Engineers, and respondent State of Illinois.

One contract was for professional engineering services for road improvements at Manteno State Hospital. The amount earned and owing is $12,081.27. The State admitted this amount was due and owing in its Departmental Report and at the time of the hearing. There is no dispute as to the amount of $12,081.27.

The second contract was for structural and professional engineering services for air conditioning various buildings at Anna State Hospital, Anna, Illinois. Jenkins claims that there is $2,696.06 earned and owing on this contract. The State acknowledges and argues that there is only $1,282.51 due and owing on this contract.

Thus the amount in dispute in this case is $1,413.55.

This difference of $1,413.55 arises because the claimant and the State disagree on the manner in which claimant’s fee was to be computed under claimant’s contract with the State.

The contract between the State and claimant provides how claimant was to be paid for the engineering services rendered. Both the State and claimant agree that compensation was to be based on 8% of the amount of the construction contract if the amount was under $200,000.00 and 7% if the amount was over $200,000.00.

In accordance with the contract, claimant submitted an estimate on the "Anna State Hospital Job” of $167,000.00 on January 16, 1967. On March 18, 1967, after bids on the job were received, claimant submitted another estimate on the same job due to the great disparity between the estimates and the bids received. The March 18, 1967, estimate was in the amount of $212,000.00. Claimant asserts that he should be paid on the basis of a percentage of the March 18,1967, estimate; the State argues that claimant should be paid on the January 16, 1967 estimate. Claimant also asserts that the contract does not cover the factual situation here present, and that claimant should be paid for an "extra”.

It is clear that the contract between claimant and the State dated July 20, 1966, calls for the computation of claimant’s fee to be made upon the basis of a "revised final estimate upon completion of drawings and specifications and prior to advertising for bids”. Due to the foregoing provision in the contract between claimant and the State, claimant is compelled to argue that the claim of claimant for additional compensation is due to extra work not contemplated by the parties or an implied modification of the contractual terms between the parties since the March 18, 1967, estimate was prepared and submitted after the bids were received.

With respect to claimant’s first contention, claimant argues that it is entitled to compensation for extra work done when the extra work is authorized and requested by the owner. However, only proof with respect to any requests for a revised estimate came through the testimony of claimant’s witness, Mr. Carter Jenkins, who testified that the State requested the second estimate by telephone. On cross-examination, Mr. Jenkins testified, with respect to the great disparity between the original estimate and the bids received, that claimant was asked to give its opinion as to what the cause may have been for the disparity, and in so doing claimant submitted a revised estimate. It is clear that the contract between claimant and the State contemplated that the State could require claimant, after bids had been received, to examine the bids and receive requests for approval of materials and equipment and forward recommendations to the Supervising Architect.

Mr. Volk of the Supervising Architect’s office testified that when the bids came in, it was "quite evident that the bids were very much in excess of the Associates final estimate”. Volk went on to testify that the Supervising Architect’s office requested the analysis of the Associate and reasons why the bids were so high so that it could be determined whether the biding contractors were "way out of range” or whether the "estimate was too low.” At first, claimant submitted a letter of March 4, dealing with the disparity between the estimate and the bids received. This was deemed to be insufficient by the Supervising Architect’s office and the Supervising Architect requested a further explanation as to why the prices were so high compared to the estimate. It was at this point in time that the March 18, 1967, estimate was submitted by claimant.

There was no proof that the State at any time prior to the receipt of the March 18,1967, estimate had agreed to pay claimant additional compensation for the March 18, 1967, estimate. Therefore, claimant’s first assertion that the "extra” consisting of the March 18, 1967, estimate should be paid for must be denied for the reason that there was no agreement shown on the part of the State to pay for the extra services, if indeed the revised estimate of March 18,1967, was, in fact, an extra service.

Claimant’s second contention, that there was a modification of the contract, must also be denied for the reason that the contract specifically requires that payment of the Associate be based upon the final estimate prior to the receipt of bids. There was no testimony that it was the intention of either the State or claimant, either by expressed acknowledgement or by necessary implication, that claimant’s payment would be based on an estimate prepared after bids were received. There is nothing in the record to show that it was the manifest intention of the representatives of the State or of claimant to adjust claimant’s payment on the basis of the March 18, 1967, estimate. Claimant failed to prove original agreement for compensation in excess of that agreed upon in the contract.

The State’s argument, that if the Associate Engineer was to be paid on the basis of estimates revised after the receipt of bids it would encourage associate engineers to make high estimates and defeat the purpose of obtaining estimates prior to the receipt of bids, must be accepted as valid in light of the contract and in light of the specific requirement of the contract that the Associate’s fee be calculated on the basis of the esimates submitted prior to the opening of bids.

At best, the evidence showed a misunderstanding between the office of the Supervising Architect and claimant that would not have occurred if claimant’s original estimate submitted on January 16, 1967, had not been grossly in error.

It is, therefore, the opinion of this court that claimant should be awarded the sum of $12,081.27 which is unpaid on the Manteno contract because of the lapsing of the appropriation; and, in addition, the sum of $1,282.51 which is the amount claimant should be paid on the Anna State Hospital contract under the express terms of the contract. Claimant’s additional claim of $1,413.55 must be denied.

Claimant is hereby awarded the total sum of $13,363.78 in full settlement of this claim based upon a contract.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-307
    Edgewater Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Healt, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    Edgewater Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-35
    Glenn Oliver Decker, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    Kleiman, Cornfield & Feldman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-413
    Delbert P. Shroyer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Aeronautics, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

      Brunsman, Crain & Kenney, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-659
    Andrews University, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    James D. Thompson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-560
    Bismark Hotel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Governor’s Office, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    Bismark Hotel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-629
    Barco Video, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    Barco Video, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-670
    Radio Shack, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    Radio Shack, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-716
    John E. Jacobsen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    John E. Jacobsen, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-754
    Milton Roy Company, Hays Republic Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    Milton Roy Company, Hays Republic Division, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-803
    Fishbach Bros., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    Fishbach Bros., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-836
    American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    American Cystoscope Makers, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-841
    St. Louis Paper and Box Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    St. Louis Paper and Box Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-866
    Frye Williamson Press, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    Frye Williamson Press, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-868
    North Greene Unit District #3, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    North Greene Unit District #3, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-905
    Quality Lime Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 31, 1975.

    Quality Lime Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 5668
    Hoeffken Bros., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 1, 1975.

    Hoeffken Bros., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This cause coming on to be heard upon the petition of claimant for rehearing, and the Court having examined said petition and the file in said cause of action, and having heard the oral argument of both the respondent and the claimant, and having carefully looked into matters that were supposed to have been overlooked or misapprehended by the Court, the Court FINDS:

That both the north and south roads were built by the claimant and were constructed at or about the same time, that the same method of construction was used in both sections, and that the material used in both sections was taken from the same borrow pit designated by the State.

It appears further from the record, that there was a period of heavy rainfall at the time of the construction of the section complained of and that, despite this condition, the claimant was ordered to proceed by the respondent.

It is abundantly clear from the record, that the State desired to complete this entire section of road as soon as possible. This is evidenced by the Order directing the claimant to work six days per week instead of five, and also by the Order of the engineer, even while recognizing the condition of the fill, which ordered the claimant to proceed.

The record is also clear that there was a Change Order as to the material to be used in the construction of the road so that better drainage could be obtained.

The respondent alleges that the damage, in part, was caused by the method of construction used by the claimant, despite the fact that both sections were constructed in the same manner.

This Court has held on many previous occasions that where evidence disclosed that there was a change in plans, or delays resulting in a change of plans because of action by the State, then the contractor is entitled to extra compensation. 25 C.C.R., Page 139, 24 C.C.R., Page 419, 24 C.C.R., Page 451.

It is the belief of this Court that the only place it erred in its original opinion was in the amount of damages awarded to the claimant. A very careful re-reading of the entire record and an examination of the exhibits indicates that the total claim of the claimant, as finally submitted, was in the amount of $49,688.59.

The Court is still of the opinion that there was some fault on the part of the claimant in proceeding under the conditions they did, even though being pressed by the State.

Therefore, instead of allowing the entire amount of $49,688.59, the Court believes an award of $24,844.29 is an equitable amount.

An award is hereby entered in that amount.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-879
    Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1975.

    Kelly D. Long, State’s Attorney of Montgomery County, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This claim, filed on June 24, 1974, seeks payment of the sum of $158.20 for Sheriff’s fees allowed by law for conveying the following 4 persons to the penitentiary on the dates stated below:

August 6, 1968
Danny Robinson 35210
to I.S.P., Menard Branch
113 miles at 35 cents per mile ............................ $39.55
July 1, 1968
John E. Gordon 35121
to I.S.P., Menard Branch
113 miles at 35 cents per mile ............................ $39.55
August 29, 1969
Norman Garwood 36194 and
Roger Gruen 36193
to I.S.P;, Menard Branch
113 miles at 35 cents per mile x 2.......................... $79.10
Total ............................................$158.20

Respondent’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the aforesaid services were performed more than two years before the claim was filed will be denied.

The court is of the opinion that the 2-year statute of limitations on which respondent relies, as stated in §22 of the Court of Claims Act, should not apply to this'claim under either of the following theories: (a) The services were rendered by the sheriff under an implied contract imposed by law, or (b) the cause of action did not accrue until the claimant received a letter from the Department of Corrections dated June 17, 1974, which reads in pertinent part as follows:

"We regret that these vouchers did not reach us in time to be scheduled for payment from our appropriations for fiscal years 1969 and 1970. We are prohibited, by law, from paying these charges from our current appropriations. The proper way for you to request payment is by presenting a claim to the Illinois Court of Claims.”

We accept claimant’s statement that, "Any delay in filing the claim herein has been the direct result of a delay of the said Department of Corrections in either allowing or disallowing said claim, and that this claim was filed within seven days after the denial of the claim by the Department of Corrections.”

It is apparent that this claim was not approved by the Department only because funds appropriated for such payment had lapsed.

The claim will be allowed. The claimant, Montgomery County sheriff, is hereby awarded the sum of $158.20 as the fees allowed by law for conveying prisoners.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-686
    James R. Salzman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1975.

    James R. Salzman, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 5691
    James O. King, Individually and as Administrator of Estate of Rhoda King, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Highways, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 7, 1975.

    James Walker, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

Claimant’s wife was killed as a result of a collision at an intersection where a village street crosses U.S. Highway 150 in the Village of LeRoy in McLean County.

The claimant, James O. King, brings this action individually and as administrator of the estate of his wife, Rhoda King, deceased. The complaint seeks damages for the wrongful death of the deceased, and for reimbursement of her medical and funeral expenses.

Claimant alleges that the proximate cause of his wife’s death was the State’s negligence in failing to replace a downed stop sign within a reasonable^ .time after having actual or constructive notice of the.i.$tef6ct.

Respondent denies that the state had any prior notice of the downed stop sign, but bases it’s denial of liability primarily on the alleged contributory negligence of claimant’s decedent.

The accident occurred on October 20, 1967, at about 5:30 p.m. The deceased, Rhoda King, was driving her car south on Hemlock Street in the Village of LeRoy and, seeing no stop sign, drove her automobile onto U.S. Highway 150, without stopping, into the path of and in front of a semi-trailor truck which struck her car broadside causing Mrs. King’s serious injuries from which she died three days after the accident.

Although the village streets within the Village of LeRoy are not under the jurisdiction of the State’s Division of Highways, respondent did erect the numerous stop signs within the village to command all traffic on village streets to stop before entering or crossing U.S. Highway 150, the only thoroughfare running through the village. Respondent was also responsible for maintaining such stop signs, including the one on Hemlock Street, which was down at the time of Mrs. King’s accident. The "Report of the Division of Highways”, cited by the claimant, acknowledges the respondent’s duty to maintain the stop sign, but states that it had no notice from any source that the sign was down.

It is apparent that the stop sign was down at the time of Mrs. King’s accident, but it is equally apparent from the record that the respondent had no actual notice of this fact. This was confirmed by a witness for the claimant, Mr. Eugene Lyons, who was at the time of the accident the state employee who had the responsibility for the erection and maintenance of this stop sign. This witness for the claimant stated positively that there had been no report to the Division of Highways of this sign being down prior to the accident. None of the other witnesses who had noticed the sign being down prior to the accident had reported this fact to anyone.

In the absence of any actual notice to the respondent that this stop sign was down, respondent cannot be charged with negligence in failing to replace the sign, unless the evidence shows that the respondent should be charged with constructive notice of this defect and failed to take appropriate remedial action within a reasonable length of time.

Under certain circumstances, "a lapse of time of sufficient duration to permit discovery of a defective or dangerous condition may constitute constructive notice thereof to the state. "I.L.P. Roads and Bridges §154. In Dockery v. State (1949) 18 C.C.R. 177, we held that there was constructive notice of a large hole that had existed for three weeks in the pavement of a state highway. In that case, it was obvious that the state should have had actual notice of such a defect in the middle of its highway.

The absence of a stop sign on a village street is not likely to be as readily noticed as a large hole in a highway. Nevertheless, we have considered the evidence as to the length of time this particular stop sign was down.

The evidence on this point is contained in the testimony of three witnesses for the claimant which is summarized as follows: William Litherland, a LeRoy resident, testified that he noticed the sign was down two or three days prior to the accident. O. J. Lere, a LeRoy resident, testified that he and his wife noticed thaisign was down the Sunday before the accident occurred ion Friday, indicating that the sign was down at least six days. Junior Sigler, who was employed at the Victory Inn, located on the southeast corner of the intersection, testified that the sign had been down for three weeks prior to Mrs. King’s accident. He said his attention was called to the fact that the sign was down when a truck had knocked it down.

Another witness called by claimant was one Ralph Duvick, a school teacher and editor of the village newspaper, the LeRoy Journal. He took a photograph, claimant’s Exhibit 1, showing the stop sign still lying in the ditch nine days after the fatal accident. This contradicts the report of the Division of Highways which states that the stop sign was replaced on the day after the accident. Since the point has little relevancy, we need not attempt to resolve the apparent conflict by considering, as respondent suggests, that the sign may have been knocked down again by vandals after it was replaced, after the accident. Both of the LeRoy policemen testified that there had been a lot of vandalism in and around LeRoy about that time.

Mr. Duvick explained that he took the picture [claimant’s Exhibit 1] which he published, "to remind people that, if they see a sign down, they should notify proper authorities.” He said there had been two or three other signs knocked down in the area of this rural community.

Mr. Lyons, the state employee responsible for maintaining this stop sign and claimant’s witness, described the respondent’s procedures for making periodic inspections to discover such defects as a downed stop sign. He said that his maintenance crews report such defects as do the State Police, County Police, and sometimes farmers repórt, "if they happen to bust one.”

Both of LeRoy’s policemen, Russell Builta and Robert Rice, state that they would have notified the state if they had been aware that the stop sign was down. They both said that the streets of LeRoy were patrolled every night, and that Hemlock Street, being on the outside edge of town, was patrolled at least twice every night. Yet, they had not noticed the sign being down. Neither could say positively that they remembered seeing the sign erect in the three weeks prior to the accident. Mr. Rice said he thought he would have noticed it if it had been down. He saw it down at the time of the accident.

Considering all of the above testimony in a light most favorable to the claimant, we conclude that the stop sign in question had been down for a period of three weeks prior to Mrs. King’s accident. The evidence is clear that respondent had no actual notice of this fact, and we do not believe that a finding of constructive notice is justified under these facts and circumstances. If the two village policemen, who patrol the streets every day, were so oblivious to the existence or non-existence of this particular sign, it would seem unfair to impute constructive notice of the defect to the respondent for the failure of its agents and employees to discover the down sign within three weeks.

Claimant relies on the rule in Buckley v. City of Chicago (1954) 3 Ill.App. 2d 39, contending that its facts are nearly identical to those in the case at bar. Some of the facts are similar, but the significant and distinguishing difference is the length of time the stop sign had been missing from the city intersection. In Buckley the stop sign, required by city ordinance, had been missing for "many months.” This contrasts sharply with the three weeks the sign had been down on a less busy intersection in the village. Even so, Buckley did not hold the city negligent as a matter of law. It merely upheld the jury’s finding of negligence under the facts and circumstances in that case. Indeed, in its discussion of questions of negligence, due care, and proximate cause, the court siaid in Buckley at page 42:

"Questions which are composed of such qualities sufficient to cause reasonable men to arrive at different results should never be determined as matters of law. The debatable quality of issues such as negligence and proximate cause, the fact that fair-minded men might reach different conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness and necessity of leaving such questions to a fact-finding body.”

Claimant also relies heavily on the ruling in Johnson v. City of Moline (1949) 338 Ill.App. 220, holding the city liable for negligence where a traffic light was knocked down, promptly removed by the city, but not replaced for a period of six days. During that 6-day period, several accidents had occurred at this busy city intersection. In Johnson, the city had actual notice of the traffic light the city had removed and of the dangerous condition it created. In the case at bar, unlike the facts in Johnson, the state had no actual notice of the downed stop sign, and the evidence as to constructive notice is weak. The instant cause further differs from Johnson in that here, there had been no previous accidents at this intersection.

It is not necessary for us to conclude that the respondent was in no degree negligent in this matter, since the evidence indicates that Mrs. King must be charged with some degree of negligence which contributed to her fatal accident.

This court has always followed the rule that contributory negligence on the part of a claimant [or, as here, the claimant’s intestate] is a bar to recovery of damages. The contributory negligence rule was carefully reconsidered and reaffirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Maki v. Frelk (1968) 40 Ill. 2d 193.

Several facts in this case preclude our finding that Mrs. King was free from, any negligence that contributed to her accident.

The various photo exhibits of both parties show the view of the intersection as Mrs. King must have seen it from her approach. It can readily be observed that U.S. Highway 150, which she was approaching, is a 2-lane concrete pavement and obviously a main highway. The village street, on which she was driving, was a narrow oiled street and obviously a road of secondary importance to the highway she was approaching. We believe that, if Mrs. King were exercising due care and caution for her personal safety, she would have seen and known that she was approaching an intersection with a preferential highway even though she saw no stop sign.

An even more important fact suggesting a lack of ordinary care for her personal safety on this occasion was her appatent failure to observe the large semi-trailer truck on the highway approaching the intersection coming from the left.

The Departmental Report, filed in this cause under Rule 14, makes the following assertion:

"The driver of a southbound vehicle on Hemlock, [as the decedent was] upon approaching U.S. Route 150, has a clear and unrestricted sight distance to the east at the intersection.”

This conclusion is born out by the photographs introduced by both claimant and respondent. Respondent’s Exhibit C gives a particularly clear picture of Mrs. King’s sight distance to her left as she approached the intersection.

It is further stated in the Departmental Report:

"The deceased, Rhoda L. King, would have had a clear view, gf- .the approaching westbound truck and had a duty to take appropriate action for her own safety.”

Yet, the State Highway Police "Traffic Accident Report” offered in evidence by the claimant and also attached to the Departmental Report, states that Mrs. King "pulled into the path of Unit #2 and was struck broadside in the left side”.

The decedent did not live long enough to explain why she proceeded into the path of the truck and into such obvious danger. The most plausable theory is that she failed to see the truck, even though she had an unobstructed view of the highway in the direction from which the truck was coming. Such failure to see would be contributory negligence.

We have also considered the theory that, even if she saw the truck, she might have assumed that it would yield the right-of-way to her since it was approaching on her left. We have taken judicial notice, as. claimant requested at the hearing, of the provision in Ill.Rev.Stat. (1967) Ch. 951/2 §165 relating to right-of-way. We find that the statute is not applicable to the case at bar under the ruling in the similar case involving a downed stop sign, Vierke v. Sunset Valley Creamery Co. (1965) 58 Ill.App.2d 323.

Even if Mrs. King had the right of way, as she may have erroneously assumed, this does not relieve a driver from the duty to exercise ordinary care in approaching, entering and driving through the intersection. (Waldren v. Hardwick, (1968) 99 Ill.App.2d 36.) Rather, as the court stated in Conner v. McGrew, (1961) 32 Ill.App.2d 214:

"... a driver [even] on a preferential highway does not have an absolute or unqualified right-of-way that can be asserted regardless of circumstances, distances or speed. Such a driver may not plunge blindly ahead in reliance upon an assumption that the other motorist will obey the law and yield the right-of-way, nor may be heedlessly proceed into obvious danger. Rather, there is a duty upon such driver to observe due care in approaching and crossing the intersection and to drive as a prudent person would to avoid a collision when the danger is discovered, or by the exercise or reasonable care, should have been discovered.” (Emphasis added)

The above rule is restated in the well known booklet, "Illinois Rules of the Road’, as follows: [This booklet was offered in evidence by the claimant as good authority for claimant’s assertion that traffic signs and signals are of utmost importance.]

"It must be understood that, in every situation, the right-of-way is something which is to be given, not taken. If the other driver is not following the rules, let him have the right-of-way even if it really belongs to you. Otherwise, you will be gambling with the lives of yourself and your passengers.” [Such gambling is negligence.]

It is well settled that a driver approaching an intersection, who fails to look as he approaches, to ascertain whether there are other cars in proximity, especially those which might have the right of way over him, is guilty of want of ordinary care and contributory negligence. (Touhey v. Yellow Cab Company, (1962) 33 Ill.App.2d 180.)

There is considerable testimony in the record which attempts to cast some light on the probable reasons why Mrs. King drove into the path of the truck as she did, other than the fact that the stop sign was down. It is unnecessary to comment on this evidence since the inferences that could be drawn would not be conclusive and would not alter the decision in this case.

Mrs. King was an experienced driver with a good driving record, according to claimant’s testimony. Yet, on this particular occasion, the weight of the evidence shows that she was negligent and that her negligence contributed to her fatal accident. Hence, this claim must be and is hereby denied. , xoH


text:
    (No. 73-CC-85
    Allstate Insurance Company, as Subrogee of William E. Masters, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 7, 1975.

    Robert E. Pederson, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

This Court Finds that, based upon the report of the Department of Transportation filed with the Court on June 20, 1973, as well as Claimant’s paid bill in the amount of $166.36, Claimant’s subrogee, William E. Masters, Jr., sustained damage to his vehicle when it was struck by a falling ladder owned by Respondent;

It Is Hereby Ordered that Claimant be awarded the sum of $166.36 (One Hundred and Sixty-Six Dollars and Thirty-Six Cents) in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above-captioned cause.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-812
    Holder Moving and Storage, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 7, 1975.

    Holder Moving and Storage, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This matter is now before the court for a ruling on respondent’s motion to dismiss [filed August 21, 1974]. Respondent states in its motion that this claim has been satisfied, and should, therefore, be dismissed pursuant to §48(f) of the Civil Practice Act.

Although claimant has filed no objections to respondent’s motion, we find nothing in the record to support respondent’s contention that this claim has been satisfied. It is apparent to the court, however, that there are other good and sufficient reasons for. dismissing this claim.

It appears from the report from the Department of Public Aid dated August 12, 1974, that this particular claimant has not been paid for moving and storage services rendered to the public aid recipient, Margaret Lampkin. The Department states that it did authorize $86.24 for moving expenses in the case and did pay this amount to the aid recipient for this purpose. The Department further states that apparently the recipient did not pay the claimant. Under these circumstances, the court must assume that there was no privity of contract between the Department and this claimant, asi sometimes does exist between this Department and a ^endor of moving services to a public aid recipient. Hence, the claimant must look to the public aid recipient for payment of its claim.

Unless a claim is properly presented to this court, it is not our function to mediate contractual matters between the Department of Public Aid and vendors of goods or services to public aid recipients.

In the instant cause, no copy of a contract was attached to the complaint as required by Rule 5C in all claims based on an alleged contract. Moreover, claimant admits in its invoice attached to the complaint, that Margaret Lampkin was personally responsible for the payment of $93.35 on its total bill for moving and storage, and that only $86.24 was chargeable to the state in any event.

Payment of the $86.24 was not refused on the grounds that funds appropriated for such payment had lapsed, as claimant stated in its complaint. Payment in this amount was paid to the public aid recipient, Margaret Lampkin. The claimant could have collected the said amount from the aid recipient before it released the goods which it moved and stored.

It Is Hereby Ordered that this claim be and the same is hereby dismissed.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-167
    William R. Wallin, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

      William R. Wallin, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-334
    The County of Randolph, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Herbert J. Lantz, Jr., State’s Attorney of Randolph County, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the claimant, County of Randolph, and the respondent, State of Illinois, and the Court being fully advised in the premises find that this case arises pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 65, Pars. 37, 38, 39 being:

"An Act to provide for the imbursement (reimbursement) of counties within the State of Illinois for expenses, costs and fees incurred in Habeas Corpus proceedings and the courts of such counties, involving non-residents of such counties who may be confined in State penal or charitable institutions.”

and that claimant is entitled to reimbursement of expenses, costs and fees as follows:

A. 31 Habeas Corpus filing fees for FY '73 for á total of . $ - 930.00 and ,-oboB ,,
50 Habeas Corpus filing fees for FY ’74 for a reimbursement of 1,500.00
Total filing fee $2,430.00
B. State’s Attorney fees for defending 5 Habeas Corpus suits in FY ’74 at $20 ea. $ 100.00 and
State’s Attorney fees for defending 15 habeas corpus suits in FY.’74 at $20 ea. 300.00
Total reimbursement of expenses for the two years $ 400.00
C. Sheriff’s fees for FY ’73 as set forth in the Complaint and Joint Stipulation of the parties of $ 89.00 and
Sheriff’s fees for FY ’74 of 267.00
for a total of $ 356.00
D. A total of 81 library fees for the fiscal periods at $1 ea. $ 81.00

As set forth in the departmental report and the Joint Stipulation of the parties, the portion of the claim for reimbursement of the last five cases listed on the Bill of Particulars falls within the current fiscal year and are not a proper subject for a claim in this Court. Accordingly, the claim is reduced by $268.40.

It Is Hereby Ordered that an award be entered for claimant in the amount of $3,267.00, Three Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Seven and 00/100 Dollars.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-413
    Carl F. Hardiman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Carl F. Hardiman, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per.Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-447
    Bismark Hotel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Bismark Hotel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-493
    Hallett & Sons Expert Movers, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Chicago State University, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Francis X. Riley, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-504
    Cecilia Costanzo, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

      Daniel R. Fusco, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-511
    Booth Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Booth Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-582
    Ben Courtwright, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Ben Courtwright, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-612
    Nariman Solhkhan, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Jerome Goldberg, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-640
    Victor L. Bigford, D.D.S., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Victor Bigford, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-676
    City National Bank of Kankakee, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    City National Bank of Kankakee, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-677
    Spoon River College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Spoon River College, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-680
    Forestry Suppliers, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Forestry Suppliers, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-681
    Fontainbleau Hotel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Fontainbleau Hotel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-718
    P. H. Broughton & Sons, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    P. H. Broughton & Sons, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-739
    Proviso Association of Retarded Citizens, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Proviso Association of Retarded Citizens, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-753
    Chicago Avenue Motors Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Chicago Avenue Motors Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-755
    Great Lakes Fire and Safety Equipment Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Lewis, Overbeck & Furman, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-768
    Grand Valley State College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Board of Vocational Education and Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Grand Valley State College, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-839
    Clearbrook Center, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Clearbrook Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-840
    Xonics, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Xonics, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-848
    International Harvester Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    International Harvester, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-862
    Curtin Matheson Scientific Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Curtin Matheson, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-863
    Curtin Matheson Scientific Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent. Board of Vocational Education and Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-864
    Curtin Matheson Scientific Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Curtin Matheson Scientific Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-872
    Mental Health Center, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Board of Vocational Education and Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Mental Health Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-873
    Reliance Electric Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Reliance Electric Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-880
    Pfaltz & Bauer Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

      Pfaltz & Bauer, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-881
    Capitol Publications, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Capitol Publications, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-886
    Teledyne Philbrick, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Teledyne Philbrick, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-902
    Redactrom Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Redactrom Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-907
    Victor H. Beinke, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 9, 1975.

    Victor H. Beinke, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-106
    Fairbanks Morse Weighing Systems Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Fairbanks Morse Weighing Systems Division, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-8
    St. Mary of Providence School, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    St. Mary of Providence School, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-300
    St. Mary of Providence School, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Clarke C. Robinson, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-317
    Professional Audit Bureau, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Professional Audit Bureau, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-340
    Buske Lines, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Buske Lines, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-343
    Wheeler’s Farm Home School, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Wheeler’s Farm Home School, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-365
    Lawson Products, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Lawson Products, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-418
    Gast International, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Gast International, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-454
    Central Office Equipment Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Central Office Equipment Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-462
    Lester P. Watland, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Lester P. Watland, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-514
    Mose Farris, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Mose Farris, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-515
    William S. Kerr, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    William S. Kerr, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-530
    Leonard C. Buchanan, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

      Leonard C. Buchanan, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-533
    Lambert Beastall, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Lambert Beastall, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-602
    Instant Printing Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Local Government Affairs, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Instant Printing Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-609
    Federal Sign & Signal Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Federal Sign & Signal Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-611
    Turner Construction Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Turner Construction Co., Claimaint, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-615
    Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-656
    Charles H. Bartlett, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Barbara J. Hillman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-688
    The McHenry County Association for the Retarded, Etc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

      The McHenry County Association for the Retarded, Etc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-692
    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-695
    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-696
    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-703
    Mildred C. Jamison, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Mildred C. Jamison, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-705
    Ruth Barrash, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Ruth Barrash, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-706
    Zygmunt Staszewski, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Zygmunt Staszewski, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-707
    Eleanor Harris, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Eleanor Harris, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-708
    Tanalayo Leonardz, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Tandalayo Leonardz, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-712
    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-724
    Marshall Field & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Marshall Field & Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-738
    Proviso Association of Retarded Citizens, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Proviso Association of Retarded Citizens Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-742
    Henke Manufacturing Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Henke Manufacturing Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-778
    Grand Spaulding Dodge, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Grand Spaulding Dodge, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-790
    Golden Dragon Restaurant, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Golden Dragon Restaurant, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-796
    Wishnick Pharmacy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Wishnick Pharmacy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-798
    Office Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Office Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Per Curiam.-

text:
    (No. 75-CC-799
    Frank J. Cimoski, James R. Cimoski, Jerome J. Cimoski, d/b/a Val-A-Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Frank J. Cimoski, James R. Cimoski, Jerome J. Cimoski, d/b/a Val-A-Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.-


text:
    (No. 75-CC-805
    Northern District Reporters, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Northern District Reporters, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-806
    J. P. Ruklic Screw Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    J. P. Ruklic Screw Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-807
    J. P. Ruklic Screw Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    J. P. Ruklic Screw Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-808
    J. P. Ruklic Screw Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    J. P. Ruklic Screw Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-809
    J. P. Ruklic Screw Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    J. P. Ruklic Screw Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-829
    Grand Spaulding Dodge Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Grand Spaulding Dodge, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-837
    Addressograph Multigraph Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Addressograph Multigraph, Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-852
    Monroe the Calculator Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Bureau of the Budget, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Monroe the Calculator Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-854
    News Sun, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

      News Sun, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-870
    Orlando Cabrera, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Orlando Cabrera, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General,, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-887
    Midlothian Pharmacy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Midlothian Pharmacy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-889
    Brinkmann Instruments Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Brinkmann Instruments Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-890
    Brinkmann Instruments Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Brinkmann Instruments Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-900
    Irwin S. Thornton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Registration and Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

      Irwin S. Thornton, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-908
    Campbell GMC, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Campbell GMC, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-910
    Service-All Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Service-All Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-917
    Randolph Paper Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Randolph Paper Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-930
    Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 3205
    Elva Jennings Penwell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 14, 1975.

    Gosnell, Benecki & Borden, Ltd., Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.