text:
    (No. 5357
    Ernest DeWeese, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Dept. of Public Safety, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Wiseman, Hallett, Mosele, Shaikewitz and Struif, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Lee D. Martin, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This is an action for damages to compensate claimant for permanent personal injuries he suffered while he was an inmate at Menard Penitentiary, injuries allegedly caused and aggravated by negligence of the respondent.

The accident which resulted in claimant’s injuries occurred on a Sunday morning, May 29,1966, in the vegetable house of the penitentiary at Chester. Claimant was then and there assigned to the job of operating and then cleaning a potato dicing machine. The accident happened while he was cleaning the machine.

Claimant contends that he was following the proper method of cleaning the machine as he had previously been instructed; that he had just turned off the master switch located on an angle iron frame near the machine; pulled the plug, and wrapped the cord around a pipe. Then he stuck his hand into the chute to clean out potatoes lodged there so they wouldn’t fall on the floor when he disassembled it. As his right hand was up into the chute, the machine suddenly turned on, seriously injuring claimant’s right hand.

Claimant states that the machine was about four feet beyond the angle iron frame where the plug and switch, were, and he did not see who plugged in the machine and turned on the switch.

Claimant said that on several previous occasions, and twice within the month before his injury, he had complained to the guards that various inmates were attempting to turn on the machine while he was cleaning it. Other claimant inmate witnesses, and even one of the respondent’s witnesses, state that there was this type of horseplay carried on in the vegetable house. The claimant ■ and two of his witnesses testified that the guards had knowledge of this, but permitted it to continue. It was undenied that Officer Grecco, who had charge of the vegetable house, had answered claimant’s complaints by laughing and stating, “You guys have got to learn to look out for yourselves.”

Claimant contends that the guard’s failure to heed his repeated complaints, and other inmates’ complaints, concerning the horseplay around the potato dicing machine and to take no steps to prevent such dangerous activities, displayed a lack of due care for the safety of the inmates; that respondent’s failure to supervise properly and to keep adequate control over the area to prevent other inmates from turning the machine on while claimant was cleaning it, constitutes actionable negligence on the part of the respondent.

Respondent denies that a prankster turned the machine on while claimant was cleaning it since no witness could or would testify that he actually saw this happen. Respondent argues that the only logical theory that can be assumed is that claimant caused his own injury by putting his hand into the potato slicer while it was in operation.

In support of its position, respondent relies heavily on the testimony of Officer Samuel Joseph Grecco who was in charge of the vegetable house where claimant was injured. Although Officer Grecco was not present or on duty on the day of the accident, he returned to his job the following day and made an investigation of the accident. Officer Grecco had been in charge of the vegetable house for a long time; had personally trained the claimant, DeWeese, in the proper method of operating and cleaning the potato dicing machine; and that he specifically ordered the claimant never to clean the machine or put his hand in the chute while the machine or the motor was running.

Officer Grecco testified that, in spite of his strict orders, five or six times before this accident, he found the claimant trying to clean the machine while it was still running by putting his hand up the chute. Each time, Officer Grecco said, he told the claimant he shouldn’t do this and each time the claimant would answer, “I know what I am doing.”

The court must first decide a disputed question of fact. Did the claimant cause his own injury by negligently putting his hand in the cutting chute while the machine was running? Or did some other person turn on the machine while claimant’s hand was in the chute to clean it?

Before resolving this question of fact in favor of the claimant, we carefully analyzed the voluminous record to determine the probable motives and the credibility of the witnesses as well as the fairness of the exhibits offered as evidence.

The six witnesses who testified for the respondent, on the question of the cause of the accident, were all to some degree under the control of the respondent. Four of the witnesses were inmates doing time and working under the supervision of Officer Grecco. There is a strong inference in the record that these witnesses had been coached by the respondent. Officer Grecco admitted that he talked to each inmate witness just before they testified. Respondent’s other two witnesses, on the question of cause, were Officers Grecco and Hasten. Neither were present in the room when the accident occurred. Both are employees of the respondent.

By contrast, two witnesses for the claimant were former inmates who worked in the vegetable house with the claimant at the time of the accident but had been discharged from prison prior to the hearing. They were under no duress "that might influence their testimony. Both former inmates, Everett Milligan and Willis Kissee, testified that, just prior to claimant’s injury, they had seen inmates turn on machines to frighten other inmates, including the claimant, on numerous occasions. They both said that this type of prank was a common occurrence in the vegetable house and that the guards knew it.

Milligan said he was standing 10 or 12 feet from the claimant when the accident occurred. Immediately before the injury, he saw the claimant standing by his machine and he knew the machine was stopped because he didn’t hear any noise from it. Milligan said the potato dicing machine is a noisy machine. He heard the machine click on, saw that claimant’s hand was in it. Milligan did not see anyone turn the machine on because his eyes were on the injured claimant. “The room was cluttered, and I jumped over some vats to get to claimant’s machine to unplug it or throw the switch,” Milligan said.

Further shaking the credibility of respondent’s theory were 3 enlarged photos of the potato dicing machine, the plug, the cord, the switch, and the surrounding area which respondent offered in evidence. These photo exhibits are deliberately misleading. They , do not show the machine in the same location that it was in at the time of claimant’s injury. This was admitted by most of respondent’s own witnesses. The photos show the machine touching the post to which the plug and switch are attached. At the time of the accident the machine was located three or four feet away from the switch and in such position that the operator would have his back towards the switch. In that location, it would have been nearly impossible for the claimant, while cleaning the machine, to observe a prankster turning it on.

We are also forced to take an incredible view of Officer Grecco’s testimony. He said, and we agree, it is not customary for an inmate to talk back to a guard who has given the inmate a warning for violating an order. Yet, this officer said that five or six times before the accident, he had seen the claimant violate his order not to clean the machine while it was running; that he warned the claimant not to do this each time he saw it; and that each time the claimant said, “I know what I am doing.” Nevertheless, Officer Grecco said that he doesn’t recall ever having punished the claimant or writing a ticket for him for talking back to an officer or for violating the rules. .If Officer Grecco’s statements are true, it would seem to compound and confirm claimant’s charge of negligent supervision of the vegetable house.

Finally, even if the guards are negligent in enforcing the rules, we find it hard to believe that an inmate, who has had adequate instruction and experience in operating a potentially dangerous machine, would intentionally put his hand in the cutting chute while the noisy machine is in operation, particularly when he could turn it off by a flip of the switch. It could hardly be seriously argued that the inmate was in a hurry to finish his job because he had someplace better to go.

On the first of claimant’s contentions, we conclude that the carelessness and negligence of the guards in the supervision of the vegetable house was the proximate cause of claimant’s injury in the potato dicing machine.

In Moore vs. State, 21 C.C.R. 282, we held that assigning a convict without proper instructions to work on a food grinder which was not equipped with a hopper amounts to actionable negligence. Following the same reasoning, the facts before us fully support an award to the claimant.

We do not follow Moore to the extent of holding that the doctrine of contributory negligence would not apply to inmates under certain circumstances. We specifically held that it did apply in Moe vs. State, 23 C.C.R. 14. In Moe the claimant filed to sustain burden of proof that he was free from contributory negligence when cleaning the rollers on a soap grinding machine with a brush while it was in operation.

Here the facts are clearly distinguishable. We find the claimant free from contributory negligence.

We also reject respondent’s argument that the “fellow servant rule” would relieve respondent from liability if we hold, as we have, that the machine was turned on in an act of horseplay by another inmate.

In Illinois the “fellow servant rule” applies only to employees “engaged in direct co-operation in the work of a common employer.” I.L.P. Employment §132. This court has held that a convict is not an employee within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Tiller vs. State, 4 C.C.R. 243; nor within the meaning of the Health and Safety Act, Moore vs. State, 21 C.C.R. 282. The basis of our ruling in these cases is that the employment relationship contemplated by the statutes [and in the case law cited in I.L.P. (supra)] is a voluntary one for wages, a relationship terminable by either party. A convict cannot meet such a test. He is an involuntary captive in the penitentiary. His life and movements are controlled by the respondent. We hold that the “fellow servant rule” is not applicable here.

We turn now to the nature, extent and permanency of claimant’s injuries.

When claimant’s right hand was removed from the potato cutting machine, his index finger was severed at the first joint, the skin on his middle finger and ring finger was ripped off to the bone; the fingers were badly mangled and he suffered a deep gash on his palm immediately below the fingers.

Claimant contends that the medical treatment and hospital care he received from prison officials and inmate nurses, following his injury, were so grossly negligent that his permanent injuries, disabilities and disfigurement were increased in severity; and that he endured unnecessary pain and suffering. If so, this would constitute a separate cause of action against the respondent even if we had held the respondent not liable for the claimant’s original injury. See Witte vs. State, 21 C.C.R. 173.

Having held that respondent’s negligence was the proximate cause of claimant’s injury in the vegetable house, it is not necessary for us to analyze in detail this voluminous record concerning his post-injury treatment in the prison hospital by the inmate nurse, and by the prison physicians. Suffice to say, claimant is entitled to an award for his total injury.

After the accident, claimant was taken to the prison hospital by inmate Charles Clutter. There, claimant’s wounds were sutured on the three fingers involved by Dr. Donald Wham, the prison physician. Dressing was applied and instructions were given to inmate nurse Hombuckle to change the bandages, cleanse the hand daily, and to give medication for pain. It appears from the record that nurse Hombuckle totally failed to follow any of these instructions and subjected the claimant to various forms of inhumane treatment. The State never called Hombuckle as a witness to deny these charges. Three days after the lacerations were sutured by Dr. Wham, a surgeon from Chester, Dr. Milton Zemlyn, amputated the three middle fingers. This left the claimant with a thumb and little finger on his right hand plus the stumps of the three middle fingers which were amputated.

Some three months later, on September 20, claimant was released from prison. Five months after his release, on .February 11, 1967, claimant’s hand was examined by a private physician and surgeon, Dr. Robert Tatkow of St. Louis. Dr. Tatkow, whose qualifications as an expert in orthopedic surgery is stated in the record, testified for the claimant by deposition taken at his office. In his practice Dr. Tatkow has had experience in evaluating hand and finger, injuries for workmen’s compensation cases. When Dr. Tatkow examined the claimant nearly 10 months after the fingers were amputated, claimant was complaining of sensitiveness of the hand, particularly in cold weather, and pain in the stumps of the second, third and fourth fingers of the right hand. We quote the following questions and answers from the doctor’s testimony:

“Q Doctor, medically, what do you attribute this pain to in the various portions of claimant’s hand?
“A There is usually varying amounts of sensitivity at the end of stumps from amputated fingers for a long period of time, until the bone ends seal off and until the tissues at the end of the stumps become soft and malleable enough to withstand the pressures of use.
“Q Do you have an opinion, based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to how long it will take the stumps to become more immune to the touch? In other words, so there will be less pain?
“A This is impossible to say.”

The doctor also said, “There was also a brownish coloration of the entire palm of the hand and right thumb, the etiology of which I’m not certain.” Dr. Tatkow especially mentioned the smallness of the webbing between the fingers on the injured hand as being significant. “The combination of the short stumps and the decreased depth of the web space made picking up objects difficult, if not impossible.” Claimant is right handed. The permanent loss of function of his right hand is approximately forty to fifty per cent, according to Dr. Tatkow.

There is no doubt that claimant’s earning power has been affected and that he has lost some job opportunities as a result of his injury, as he alleges.

This brings us to the difficult question of determining the amount of claimant’s award. Our courts have stated that “there is no fixed rule of compensation in damages for personal injuries, and that compensation is incapable of exact mathematical calculation.” Swearinger vs. Kinger (1968) 91 Ill.App.2d 251.

Our court follows the rule stated in I.L.P. Damages §140: “The measure of compensatory damages is such sum as will compensate the person injured for the loss sustained, with the least burden on the wrongdoer (State) consistent with the idea of fair compensation.” We must also bear in mind that, at the time of claimant’s injury, the legislature had fixed a limit of $25,000 on any award that may be allowed for personal injuries regardless of their severity.

For further guidance, we have reviewed a long list of cases from this and other jurisdictions containing court-computed damage awards for injuries similar to the claimant’s. The wide range in the amounts awarded confirms the statement in Swearinger (supra). In 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages §380, we find the following awards made to prisoners for hand injuries:

“ — $35,000 awarded by court without jury; 15-year-old boy; inmate of state correctional institution; right hand caught in electric printing press and crushed with loss of index, middle, and little finger; thumb stiff, tip of ring finger missing; loss of 70 to 80 percent use of hand; together with disfigurement of hand. MacDonald vs. State (RI) 187 A2d 519.”
“ — $6,000 awarded by court to 30-year-old prisoner who had worked as welder; traumatic amputation of all or part of four fingers causing 50 percent loss of use of right hand. Colley vs. State, 2 Misc 2d 545,152 NYS2d 968.”

Considering all of the facts and circumstances in the case before us, we conclude that an award for damages to the claimant in the amount of $17,500 would be fair and reasonable.

Claimant, Ernest DeWeese, is hereby awarded damages for his personal injuries in the total sum of $17,500.00.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Holderman, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 5598
    John E. Brownback, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    John E. Brownback, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant seeks to recover the sum of $124.90 for money allegedly due him for travel expenses while working for the Illinois Division of Highways in the Bureau of Materials.

In April, 1968, he was sent to the West suburban Chicago area for a field assignment. He stayed at a motel where he was charged $9.50 per day, which he claims to be -the cheapest rate in the area.

The Division of Highways takes the position that the claimant was limited to Class C expenses and that the claimant was well aware of the limitations in said Class C regulations. They further claim that he was paid in conformance with the existing policy of the Bureau of Materials and in conformance with Administrative Memorandum No. 32, which apparently are the guide rules fixed by the Department for this type of expense.

It appears to the Court that the claimant was paid the proper amount due him under the rules and regulations in force and effect, therefore nothing is due him at this time.

Claim is hereby denied.


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 5661
    Dennis Cook, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Smith & Gomien, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

Claimant seeks damages for a personal injury to his left hand allegedly caused by negligence of the respondent.

Claimant’s left hand was burned in a steam clothes presser in the laundry room of the Illinois State Penitentiary at Pontiac, on July 3, 1968. He was then an inmate at the prison.

Claimant contends that, while he was pressing a shirt on the steam presser, as he said he was authorized to do, the machine malfunctioned and the upper half of the press came down on his hand. He contends that the circumstantial evidence establishes respondent’s negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Claimant also charges respondent with negligence in permitting the claimant to be around a dangerous machine without proper supervision and training.

Respondent contends that the presser functioned properly at all times; that claimant was not authorized to operate the machine; and that his injury was caused, or contributed to, by claimant’s own negligence when he put his hand into a press which was being operated by another inmate.

The parties agree that claimant was authorized to be in the laundry at the time of the accident. He was there on an authorized errand, apparently to pick up clothes which he had delivered to the laundry early that same morning. After delivering clothes to the laundry, claimant went to school. He was attending classes at the prison to become a draftsman. (Incidentally, we were pleased to note claimant’s statement at the hearing 2 years later, “I am now employed by the State of Illinois as a draftsman.”)

After conceding that claimant’s presence in the laundry was authorized, the record shows that most of the relevant facts are in dispute. There were several people in the laundry at the time of the accident, but no known available eyewitness.

The claimant and the respondent each presented one witness at the hearing. Claimant testified on his own behalf; and William Dick Billerbeck, the officer in charge of the laundry at Pontiac Penitentiary, testified on behalf of the State. These two witnesses contradicted each other on almost every point essential to claimant’s case.

Claimant testified that, after school, he went to his cell to put his drawing equipment away and then went back to the laundry to pick up the clothes. He arrived at the laundry about 1:30 p.m.; was proceeding to gather up the clothes when Officer Billerbeck told him to help finish some laundry that was there. Claimant said he went to work on a mangier, finished the work on that machine in about 10 minutes and then went over to the steam press where there was still a pile of clothes.

Claimant described the steam presser as a large ironing board shape affair with a cushioned platform on which you lay the clothes. The top half, where the steam circulates, comes down on an air cylinder. Claimant had never operated a steam press, never been given any instructions on how to operate it, but knew that you had to push 2 buttons to close the machine. Claimant said the 2 buttons, a distance apart, were a “safety feature” because you had to use both hands to press the buttons and thus your hands had to be away from the press when it came down.

The steam presser was apparently being operated by another inmate, Richardson, when claimant arrived at this machine. Claimant said he stood at the pointed end of the machine and Richardson was standing at the other end. Richardson laid a pair of pants on his end of the cushioned board, while claimant was laying on a shirt at the other end. Both of claimant’s hands were in the machine. Claimant could see Richardson but could not see what position his hands were in. Claimant never touched the buttons to bring down the press. Claimant said that Richardson was looking the other way when tíie press came down on his hand. Claimant said, “I got one hand out and the other partially out. Richardson immediately got the press up. I don’t know how he did it, but he got it up. I backed away, held my hand up and they took me to the hospital.”

Respondent’s witness, Officer Billerbeck, gave a somewhat different version of the incident in his testimony. Officer Billerbeck had been in charge of the prison laundry for 7 years prior to this accident.

“In my capacity as laundry manager I did not at any time engage inmates not assigned to the laundry to assist in the laundry or to assist my inmates. It was never done,”

Officer Billerbeck said. We continue with direct quotations from Officer Billerbeck’s testimony as follows:

“Claimant was not assigned to the laundry. He was a runner for the vocational training classes.”

On the day in question,

“Claimant did not pick up anything from the laundry or deliver anything to the laundry. He came in for his shirt. He had permission to have his shirt and overalls pressed and he had come over to pick them up. He came in and spoke to me and he wanted to know whether his shirt was ready. I said that it was down being pressed, and he walked over to the press. Inmate Richardson was operating the press.
“I saw inmate Cook walk over to the presser. That was twenty feet from the area where he was supposed to pick up the laundry. I didn’t tell him that he shouldn’t be around the machines. I did advise him that the machines were dangerous. But I did not at any time order him not to go over to the machines.
“Cook’s shirt was being pressed at the time. Cook was standing there waiting for Richardson to finish his shirt. I heard Richardson scream out Cook was burnt, and by that time Richardson released the press. I covered Cook’s hand and sent him to the hospital. He was in such pain I couldn’t ask him what happened. I sent him directly to the hospital with Officer Sunnen.
“It was not unusual there would be a special order to press one inmate’s shirt and trousers specially. We did that regularly. It did not interrupt or interfere with our schedule. The inmates running the machines were authorized to be in the laundry. The runners were authorized to come in and pick up the clothes. Any outside unauthorized inmate is not supposed to be near any of these machines.
“There would be no way for these machines to malfunction. The only way these machines can function is when the compressor is running, there is a certain amount of air in there for them to work, and they just can’t drop by themselves, the buttons have to be pressed. From where Richardson was standing he could have reached both control buttons.
“It would be impossible for these pressers to malfunction.”

To sustain his action for damages the burden of proof is on the claimant. He must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent’s negligence was the cause of his injury and that he was free from contributory negligence. Moe vs. State, 23 C.C.R. 14.

We have here only the testimony of two witnesses, which we believe to be of equal credibility, and whose statements on several material issues are in flat contradiction. In such circumstances, we are bound to the following rule which is well established in Illinois case law and cited in Bradley vs. State, 22 C.C.R. 41:

“An affirmative statement by one witness, met by a flat categorical denial by another, of equal credibility, does not meet the elementary requirement of the law that a plaintiff must make out his or her case by a preponderance of the evidence.”

Applying the above rule to the record before us, there remains unchallenged sufficient evidence to find that both the claimant and the respondent were negligent. This, of course, would require a denial of the claim on claimant’s failure to prove that he was free from contributory negligence.

Respondent’s negligence is based on Officer Billerbeck’s admission that he saw the claimant walk over to the steam presser and, although he warned him that the machines were dangerous, he did not order claimant not to go over to the machines. We find this failure to enforce the penitentiary safety rules to be an act of negligent supervision.

On the other hand, the claimant has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety. The evidence does not support claimant’s contention that the presser malfunctioned and fell without being released by someone pushing the buttons.

Claimant urges us to conclude, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that the presser must have malfunctioned, citing the authority of Cobb vs. Marshall Field & Co., (1959) 22 Ill.App.2d, 143. The facts here are clearly distinguishable from the Cobb case and the analogy is very remote. In Cobb, a passenger elevator fell to the basement, an obvious malfunction. The inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur is especially strong in passenger-common carrier cases. Injured passengers in a case like Cobb are generally free from contributory negligence. Also, in such cases, the defective elevator or carrier is never used after the accident until it is repaired. In the case at bar, the steam presser was not even inspected after claimant’s injury but continued in daily use and service for another year after this accident. Officer Billerbeck’s unrefuted statement that it would be “impossible” for this presser to malfunction, as suggested by the claimant, further supports our conclusion on this point.

The presser had to be activated by an operator (Richardson) pressing the two buttons, or it would never have come down on claimant’s hand. Now visualize what the operator, Richardson, must have done to press both buttons. Richardson had to lift both of his arms wide apart, if standing in his normal position in front of the machine, and stretch quite a distance if he were standing to one side as claimant said. Either way, if claimant had been exercising reasonable care for his own safety, he would have seen Richardson’s movements and either removed his hands or called out for Richardson to stop.

Fortunately, claimant’s painful burn left him with only a scar on his injured left hand, and he now enjoys full use of the hand. Having found that claimant did not prove he was free from contributory negligence, this claim must be denied.

This claim is denied.


text:
    (No. 5911
    Robert Evans, Betty Evans and Linda Evans, A Minor, by Robert Evans, Her Father and Next Friend, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Jerry B. Lucas, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This case involves three claims for personal injuries arising out of a collision between an automobile driven by Robert Evans and an abandoned truck parked on the highway at the end of a dead end road. The collision occurred at night on January 29, 1970, on what used to be Route 45.

The liability of the State is predicated on the failure of the State to cause the abandoned truck to be removed and its failure to warn claimant of the dead end of the road.

Claimant, Robert Evans, his wife, Betty Evans, and his daughter, Linda Evans, were all injured in the collision. Betty Evans, his wife, was seated in the front seat on the passenger side. His daughter, Linda Evans, was in the back seat of the motor vehicle being operated by Robert Evans. The accident happened at or near Chebanse, Illinois, at approximately 10 o’clock in the evening.

Claimant had proceeded through Chebanse and had made a right turn on Oak Street after coming to a stop before entering. He then proceeded north on Oak Street which was a dead end street. The dead end was approximately six blocks north of the intersection at which claimant entered Oak Street. He was not familiar with Oak Street nor the dead end.

Oak Street was an undivided two lane street, 16M feet wide with a deteriorating concrete pavement. Running immediately parallel with it on the western side were the tracks of the Illinois Central.

Approximately three blocks before the dead end there was a speed limit sign reading 35 miles per hour. On the northeast corner of Oak Street and George Street, two blocks south of the scene of the accident, there was a square white sign with black letters reading DEAD END. At the dead end itself, there was installed a three section guardrail extending across both traffic lanes. In the back of the guardrail was a 30 inch standard stop sign mounted in the center of what would have been a road bed had the road bed continued. Parked directly in front of the guardrail was an abandoned truck facing south. There was no illumination at the dead end. The truck had been there since the summer of 1969, some six months prior to the time of the collision. It was parked in such a fashion that it completely hid the guardrail and the stop sign behind it from the view of oncoming traffic.

The weather on the evening of the occurrence was clear, the visibility good, and the pavement was dry. As claimant turned on to Oak Street, there was a train on the tracks coming toward him and also a car coming toward him. He later met another oncoming car. He testified that as he proceeded north on Oak Street his speed was approximately 30-35 miles per hour. He testified that he did not see the dead end sign and claimed that there was a sign which notified him to resume speed. However, the evidence is clear that there was no such resume speed sign. A trooper who investigated the accident immediately after it occurred, stated that he revisited the scene that evening to determine whether or not there was a resume speed sign, but found none. The claimant, Robert Evans, did not see the truck until he was approximately 50 feet or more from it. He then applied his brakes in an effort to avoid striking the truck but was unable to do so. The trooper investigating the accident measured skid marks of 68 feet; and basing his opinion on the length of the skid marks and the damage to claimant’s vehicle, stated that claimant must have been traveling between 40 and 50 miles per hour.

While the State may have given adequate warning of the dead end, nevertheless, this Court is of the opinion that the State was negligent in permitting the truck to stand abandoned in the middle of the road for at least six months. On occasions prior to the collision, an inspection was made of the area by a highway traffic department employee in charge of sign repairs. He failed to take notice of the truck standing on the road way.

The question arises as to whether or not Mr. Evans was guilty of contributory negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident. He apparently was driving at a speed greater than permitted and he failed entirely to see the posted sign that would have given him warning that the street came to an end. He claims that his failure to see the sign was due to a truck with lights on being parked in front of it. His alertness, however, is questionable when he testified to an imaginary resume speed sign.

The Court feels that Robert Evans’ conduct contributed at least in part to the collision which occurred, and, therefore, he is barred from recovering. He was at the edge of a town and if he was blinded by the lights of the train and oncoming traffic, then he should have either reduced his speed or become more alert in his driving. While the obstructions might tend to explain his failure to see the signs, nevertheless, it doesn’t entirely exonerate him.

However, his negligence is not imputed to his passengers, his wife and daughter. They conducted themselves in the ordinary manner of passengers and did nothing which could be held as being negligent on their own part.

Mrs. Evans had medical bills of approximately $3,400 plus $580 for nursing care, and $900 in lost earnings. A Dr. Lang testified that her condition was permanent and gave her a 35% disability of her left leg and a 25% disability to her right leg.

The disability of Mrs. Evans, according to the medical evidence, is severe on both her right and left leg, and it is our opinion that an award of $25,000 for damages sustained by her would be fair and just.

We believe that the award to Linda Evans should be in the amount of $400.00 as her injuries were of a comparatively minor nature.


text:
    (No. 5916
    James Castle, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Thomas Sweeney, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This claim, filed September 3, 1970, is based on a written contract dated 10 years earlier (October 7, 1960) between the claimant and the Illinois Department of Public Works and Buildings. It was a contract for land clearing in Marion County for a new state park north east of Salem with a manmade lake. Said agreement was identified as Contract No. 71321, Lake Project, Omega Site. The claimant-contractor was to be paid, and apparently was paid, an agreed sum for clearing a specified number of acres. The work was to have been completed by August 1, 1961, according to the written contract.

Now claimant contends that he should be paid an additional sum of $6,450 which he says was authorized by a “change order” covering an additional 50 acres cleared at $129 per acre.

An intensive examination of the record fails to show any change order signed by the respondent or by anyone other than the claimant himself.

Since respondent elected not to answer the complaint, a general traverse or denial of the facts as set forth in the complaint was considered as filed, pursuant to Rule 10 of this court. The issue being thus joined, it was incumbent upon the claimant to prove his claim by competent and admissible evidence. The record shows that he has failed to do so. We will comment on the only significant items of evidence on which this claim is based and on our reason for finding that, in any event, the claim is barred by the statute of limitation.

On August 4,1972, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint was not filed within 5 years after the causé of action first accrued as required by §22 of the Court of Claims Act in all cases arising out of contract. Respondent’s motion appeared to be well taken since there was nothing but unsupported allegations in the record to indicate that the cause of action first accrued after September 3, 1965. (The date September 3, 1965, being exactly 5 years before this complaint was filed, is the date on which this action is barred by the statute unless claimant proves that the cause of action first accrued after said date.)

Since the contract provides that payment for the work performed “shall be made within 30 days after completion,” the exact or approximate date of completion becomes a very material fact in determining the issue before us. Yet, nowhere in the record do we find a completion date stated. This is a serious defect in claimant’s pleadings. We think it can reasonably be inferred from the record that claimant must have completed all of his work by the end of 1962.

Claimant argued, in answering respondent’s motion to dismiss, that his cause of action did not first accrue before September 3, 1965, since he was, at that time, still negotiating with the respondent on the matter of his claim for additional compensation, and that the statute of limitations should not run while such “transactions” were in progress. In his brief filed August 29, 1972, claimant cited several • cases which the court considered somewhat relevant to claimant’s contention but not to the facts in the record.

On its own motion, the court ordered oral argument, pursuant to Rule 20D, and the parties were heard by the full court on November 14, 1972. At the hearing claimant reaffirmed his previous statements and argument but did not contribute anything new to the existing record nor which would even tend to support his contention that negotiations or transactions concerning his claim were still in progress as late as September 3, 1965. Claimant suggested that he could and would undertake to submit some written statement or memorandum from the respondent to support his contention within 30 days. The court granted claimant’s request for a 30 day continuance to produce such evidence.

On December 14, 1972, claimant filed a letter and memorandum acknowledging that, after exhausting his efforts and research, he was unable to submit any further written or oral evidence from an agent or employee of the respondent that would tend to support his contention that transactions were in progress within 5 years prior to filing his claim, and nothing at all in writing concerning the alleged “change order.” He referred us again to the documents and instruments previously filed.

Among the numerous documents and instruments previously filed, we find that the only instrument signed or written by the respondent was the original contract dated October 7, 1960. This contract contained the following paragraph on page 3 which we believe is determinative of claimant’s rights in this cause:

“The final payment shall be made within thirty (30) days after the completion in the manner, form and time required by this Contract, for the work included in this Contract, but no payment whatever, or at any time, shall be demanded or due, except upon the written certificates of the said Architect, to the effect that such payments have become due, and such certificates shall in each instance be a condition precedent to the right to require payment, and his decision thereon shall be final.” (Emphasis added)

There is no written certificate from any architect in the record. There is in the record, marked claimant’s Exhibit A, a copy of what purports to be a telegram to the claimant from the respondent’s architect which reads as follows:

“CK PAID SPRINGFIELD, ILL 11 321 PM.
JAMES CASTLE
PAWNEE, ILLINOIS
RE MARION COUNTY CONSERVATION LAKE.
THIS IS TO INFORM YOU THAT THE LAST 2 REMAINING TRACTS OF LAND HAVE NOW BEEN ACQUIRED AND THERE IS NO FURTHER REASON FOR NOT PROCEEDING WITH THE CLEARING WORK AS ORIGINALLY
CONTRACTED YOURS TRULY
R D HENDERSON
ACTING SUPERVISORY ARCHITECT”

The telegram bears no date. The only date is in claimant’s handwritten notation “Received January 11, 1962”.

Claimant contends that the above unauthenticated telegram amounts to an extension of the completion time stated in the original contract. If so, it appears that this would bring the agreement within the Statute of Frauds (Ch. 59, Sec. 1, Ill.Rev.Stat.) as “an agreement that is not performed within one year from the making thereof”. Hence claimant’s alleged “change order”, written by claimant himself, on which he claims additional compensation, would be unenforceable since it is not signed by the respondent. This merely adds additional weight to the specific language of the contract, quoted above, forbidding any payment, at any time, except upon the written certificate of respondent’s architect. Claimant could not furnish such a certificate.

Claimant also offered as evidence a state printed folder describing “Illinois State Parks and Memorials” which allegedly shows the area of the man-made lake in Steven A. Forbes Park to contain more acres than claimant was paid for clearing under the original contract. Obviously such evidence is not sufficient to prove that the state waived the provisions of its written contract requiring architect’s certificate as a condition precedent to payment.

The written contract is not ambiguous nor uncertain. The court cannot place a construction on the contract which is contrary to, or different from, the plain and obvious meaning of the language used. I.L.P. Contracts §216.

We find that claimant’s cause of action, if any, accrued when his work was completed; that completion must have been sometime in 1962; that he had 5 years after the completion in which to file his claim in this court for any unpaid compensation to which he believed he was legally entitled; that he did not file such action until 8 years or more after completion; that he failed to prove any facts that would toll the statute of limitation; but in no event could his claim for additional compensation be allowed without a certificate signed by respondent’s architect as stated in the written contract.

Finally, although in this case it is now a moot question, we do not agree that the authorities cited by the claimant support his contention that a cause of action does not accrue so long as “negotiations” are continuing. If such a position were tenable, a statute of limitations might never commence to run, and a party against whom a ólaim is being made would have no incentive to discuss any part of the case with the opposing party for fear of tolling the statute of limitations.

The purpose of a statute of limitations is to avoid the situation which claimant now says he has encountered in the offices of the respondent. The file cannot be located, and no one has any recollection of his alleged claim. The need for such statutes is stated in I.L.P. Limitations §2 as follows:

“Statutes of limitation are designed to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from springing up after the lapse of great periods of time and surprising parties or their representatives when all proper evidence or vouchers have been lost, or the facts have become obscure by reason of such lapse of time or the defective memory, or the death or removal, of witnesses. They are designed to afford security from stale demands, when the true state of transactions may be incapable of explanation and the rights of the parties cannot be satisfactorily investigated.”

For the above reasons, this claim must be and is hereby denied.

CLAIM DENIED.


text:
    (No. 6673
    Solomon Dawson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Jerome Kaplan and Arthur S. Gold, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of ■respondent to dismiss, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, FINDS:

That a Complaint was filed on behalf of Solomon Dawson on April 28, 1972.

Count I of said complaint sets forth the fact that the claimant was found guilty of possession of marijuana on January 11, 1966, and was sentenced to 7 to 20 years imprisonment. There is some discrepancy between the State’s position and that of the claimant as to whether the offense was for the sale or possession of marijuana and also as to the length of time of the sentence.

The statute under which the claimant was convicted was found unconstitutional in the case of People vs. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338 (1971) and on January 4, 1972, the claimant was released on a writ of habeas corpus and has brought this action.

Count I seeks to recover for wrongful imprisonment and asks damages in the amount of $30,000.00.

Count II of said complaint asks for an award of $25,000.00, alleging that while he was wrongfully imprisoned, he was abused both mentally and physically, which resulted in both temporary and permanent injuries to the claimant.

The State filed a motion to dismiss both counts. The grounds for dismissal on Count I are that the claimant was found guilty of an illegal act at the time he was tried and the fact that the Supreme Court later found the statute under which he was convicted unconstitutional does not entitle him to a recovery.

The State seeks dismissal of Count II on the grounds that proper notice was not filed as required by Chap. 37, Sec. 439.22-1, Ill.Rev.Stat., and sets forth that some of the acts of abuse were allegedly committed as long as fifty-one months before any effort to notify the State was made.

This cause was argued orally before the Court of Claims with counsel for both sides presenting their arguments in an unusually competent manner.

The claimant’s theory is that the law under which Solomon Dawson was convicted having been found unconstitutional, he was consequently never guilty of a crime and, therefore, should automatically be entitled to compensation for unlawful imprisonment. They assert that said decision is retroactive to the time of conviction and presented a fine Brief in support of their contention.

The State takes the position that “all claims against the State for time unjustly served in prisons in this State where the persons in prison prove they are innocent of the crime for which they were imprisoned” are the only cases in which compensation can be awarded.

This Court in the past has always taken the position that a claimant, to recover under the statute in which this proceeding was filed, must prove that the time he served in prison was unjust and that he was innocent of the crime for which he was imprisoned. Jonnia Dirkans vs. State of Illinois, 25 C.C.R., 343.

The Illinois Legislature in 1971, which was six years subsequent to the defendant’s conviction and before the McCabe decision, enacted the Cannabis Control Act, H.B. 788. This statute’s effective date was August 16, 1971. It provided for a substantially reduced penalty for the possession and sale of marijuana.

Section 18 of that Act also provides:

“Prosecution for any violation of law occurring prior to the effective date of this Act is not affected or abated by this Act. If the offense being prosecuted would be a violation of this Act, and has not reached the sentencing stage or a final adjudication, then for the purposes of penalty, the penalties under this Act apply if they are less than under the prior law upon which prosecution was commenced.”

The theory of retroactivity advanced by the claimant would open up an entirely new concept where the unconstitutionality of statutes is involved. The potentialities of such a theory are multifold.

This theory, followed to its logical conclusion, would allow every individual who had been convicted of a crime under a statute later ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court to sustain an action for recovery of damages from the State for illegal incarceration.

Included in this list could be estates of individuals who were executed while the death penalty was still the law of the State, to those convicted under obscenity laws, abortion laws, pornographic laws, local option laws, and a multitude of other criminal statutes that have been changed.

Every change in the penalty provision, such as in the present case, would also allow recovery by the individual. This would result in a flood of claims brought about by any change in punishment either by action of the Legislature or by the Courts, a change in personnel in the Courts, or a change in the mores of society.

The victims under this theory would not be the alleged criminals but society and the individual taxpayers who would have to assume this new and additional burden.

To advance this theory one step further, if the State and society have a responsibility to the freed individual because of a change in penalty under the laws or the finding of the laws to be unconstitutional, then does not the following automatically' take place — if, by a motion for rehearing or at a subsequent date, another Supreme Court ruling reverses the finding of the unconstitutionality of the statute in question and restores the penalty, do not the following events logically follow:

1. The person who was liberated under the finding of unconstitutionality be compelled to return to the penal institution to serve out the balance of his sentence, and;

2. The person who has secured an award or payment for illegal incarceration as a result of the first finding on unconstitutionality have to return, with interest, the amount received.

If the theory of retroactivity is to be applied for the benefit of the accused, it would seem necessarily to follow that the State and the individual members of society, the taxpayers, would be entitled to the same measure of protection.

This Court has consistently held that for a former prisoner to recover for illegal imprisonment, the applicant must prove he was innocent of the fact of the crime and that he was illegally incarcerated.

It is well to note here that in the McCabe decision, the guilt or innocence of the individual before the bar was not discussed, and the same situation applies in the present case. There is not any denial of the fact of the crime for which the applicant was originally convicted and for which he was sentenced, nor is there any question but that the law under which he was sentenced was valid at the time of his trial.

Findings of the Court in such matters as the present one are clearly set forth in the case of Munroe vs. State, 25 C.C.R. 286, 290, which says:

“It is the belief of this Court that the legislature intended only to provide a manner of recourse in the Court of Claims with the amount of recovery specified, for those who have been imprisoned for an act which they did not commit. The legislature did not intend to establish a means of recourse for an individual who in fact, committed a criminal act but an act for which he could not be held criminally responsible.”

This principle is reaffirmed in Volume 25, Page 343 which is the case of Jonnia Dirkans where the Court again stated that before an award can be made for wrongful incarceration “claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that the time served in prison was unjust, (2) that the act for which he was wrongfully imprisoned was not committed, and (3) the amount of damages to which he is entitled.”

The Courts have held that a statute found unconstitutional is an operative fact at least until it is declared invalid. Chicot County vs. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1939).

It is the opinion of this Court that the claimant has not produced the proof required to enable him to recover under the statute involved. He has not established his innocence of the fact of the crime for which he was convicted nor has he proved that his incarceration was illegal.

In Count II, which was for damages sustained by the claimant while incarcerated, the State moved to dismiss because the notice was not filed within the required six month period.

The State, as further grounds for dismissal, stated that the notice was vague and ambiguous.

The claimant’s notice did not contain any information concerning the specific dates or years as to his alleged injuries, and as to the place and location, it merely referred to two different penitentiaries.

The claimant in response to the arguments of the respondent stated that under the circumstances the notice he gave was sufficient. He cited cases dealing with notice and requirements by a minor and particularly the case of Robert vs. State, 24 I.C.C.R., Page 120 (1961) which holds that a minor is relieved from the requirement of giving notice within the time specified.

The claimant’s theory is that a convict who is incarcerated is in the same position as a minor or one who is mentally incompetent and that it would be impossible for him to file a notice and therefore should be given the same protection as either a minor or incompetent.

The objection by the State that the degree of specificity is insufficient as to places within the two penitentiaries is not necessary.

As to the dates, the claimant’s argument is that his notice is sufficient because the abuse to which he was subjected occurred throughout the entire period of time he was incarcerated.

There is not any law cited by the claimant to sustain his proposition that individuals who are incarcerated are entitled to the same protection as regards notice as is given to minors and incompetents.

It is a fact that individuals who are incarcerated are not deprived of their legal remedies.

This case itself is a specific example because the claimant had filed on his behalf a Writ of Habeas Corpus while he was still incarcerated. Access to the Courts’ legal procedures are constantly being used by inmates of various institutions and, therefore, we do not believe this argument is sufficient to overturn the laws already established as to requirements for notice and also as to the details as to the time and place of the incidents on which this claim is based.

The respondent’s motion for dismissal of Count I and Count II is hereby granted and said cause is hereby dismissed.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    (No. 6729
    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6765
    A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    A-1 Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6776
    Standard Oil, Division of the American Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Standard Oil, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6862
    Shirley H. Penick for St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Shirley H. Penick for St. Mary Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6919
    Smith Oil Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Smith Oil Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6923
    Suburban Transit System, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Suburban Transit System, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7063
    Mayfair Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    Mayfair Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7067
    International Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 22, 1973.

    International Business Machines Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—23
    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc. Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—27
    Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center, An Illinois Not-For-Profit Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—33
    Fehrenback Chevrolet, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Fehrenback Chevrolet, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—39
    Margaret A. McGrath, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Margaret A. McGrath, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—62
    Black and Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

      Black and Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—70
    Ralph Carson Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Ralph Carson Company, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—117
    Scientific Products, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Scientific Products, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—118
    Fisher Controls Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Fisher Controls Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—120
    The Florence Crittenton Peoria Home, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Westervelt, Johnson, Nicoll and Keller, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—125
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—134
    Passavant Memorial Area Hospital Association, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Passavant Memorial Area Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Perlin, C.J.

text:
    (No. 73—CC—141
    Arthur White, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Arthur White, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—148
    Richard W. Hinds, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Richard W. Hinds, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—149
    Clarence O. Scott, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Clarence O. Scott, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—150
    Richard R. Doyle, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Richard R. Doyle, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6268
    Dominic Roscetti, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Dominic Roscetti, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6532
    YMCA Hotel of Chicago, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    YMCA Hotel of Chicago, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6807
    Sears, Roebuck and Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Robert F. Vespa, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6935
    National Cash Register Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    National Cash Register Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6975
    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7042
    Motive Parts Company of America, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

      Motive Parts Company of America, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7081
    Frank Leavitt, Ph.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Frank Leavitt, Ph.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7093
    Dr. Gene J. Sbalchiero, D.D.S., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1973.

    Dr. Gene J. Sbalchiero, D.D.S., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—9
    Polaroid Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Polaroid Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—18
    Joseph Caten, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Dr. Joseph Caten, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—21
    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Texaco, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—32
    Fehrenbach Chevrolet, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Fehrenbach Chevrolet, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—35
    Information Design, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Information Design, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—53
    Covenant Childrens Home, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Covenant Childrens Home, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—61
    S & H Realty & Investment Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    S & H Realty Investment Co., Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—80
    Ludmila Siksna, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    James L. Dolan, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—84
    Paradyne Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Telecommunications, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Paradyne Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—89
    Rodi-Chris Craft, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Rodi-Chris Craft, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—93
    Browne-Morse Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Browne-Morse Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—99
    Dr. David J. Kass, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Dr. David J. Kass, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—110
    Metro Reporting Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Metro Reporting Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—119
    Advance Products Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

      Daniel I. Dollinger, Advance Products Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—126
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—127
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—132
    Singer Business Machines, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Singer Business Machines, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73—CC—136
    South Side Control Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    South Side Control Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6147
    William A. Randolph, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Jenner & Block, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Joint Stipulation of the parties hereto, and the recommendation of Commissioner Joseph P. Griffin, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

THIS COURT FINDS that this claim arises out of a construction contract dated on or about May 27,1966. The instant claim is for temporary steel sheet piling erected by the claimant as an incident to the contract between the claimant and the Department of Transportation, Division of Highways. On December 14,1972, at a hearing presided over by Commissioner Joseph P. Griffin, the parties answered ready for trial and at that time stipulated as to certain facts and made opening statements. Upon conclusion thereof the Commissioner recommended, and the parties agreed that the claimant was entitled to partial compensation for work performed. The parties agreed to settle the matter upon the recommendation and concurrence of the Commissioner.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sum of $25,000.00 (TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS) be awarded to claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Department of Transportation pay out the retainage held by them in the normal and ordinary course of business.


text:
    (No. 6489
    Nile Marriott, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Nile Marriott, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


text:
    (No. 6909
    Bernard C. Finley, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Bernard C. Finley, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7014
    Sears, Roebuck and Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Robert Vespa, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7027
    Michael Reese Hospital, A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    M. C. Elden, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7066
    Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7084
    E. A. Cook, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    E. A. Cook, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7087
    Doctors Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Doctors Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7094
    Key Equipment and Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1973.

    Key Equipment and Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-15
    R. Carreira, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Dr. R. Carreira, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-29
    Lt. Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., School For Exceptional Children, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Lt. Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., School For Exceptional Children, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-58
    G. Pierre-Jerome, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    G. Pierre-Jerome, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-78
    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-82
    Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-83
    Lakeview Anesthesia Associates, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Lakeview Anesthesia Associates, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-116
    Michael J. Schneider, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Michael J. Schneider, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-144
    Norwood Medical Center, S.C., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Norwood Medical Center, S.C., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-164
    Fisher Scientific Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Fisher Scientific Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-175
    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Xerox Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6861
    Booth Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Booth Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6962
    Judicial Inquiry Board, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Finance, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 26, 1973.

    Ray F. Breen, Judicial Inquiry Board, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-37
    University of Evansville, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    University of Evansville, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-104
    Union County Hospital District, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Union County Hospital District, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-109
    Estate of Samuel Yaksic, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Industrial Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Mrs. Julia Bedeselich Yaksic, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-115
    Condell Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Condell Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-121
    A. Zola Groves, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

      A. Zola Groves, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-131
    Capitol Ambulance & Oxygen Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Capitol Ambulance & Oxygen Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-139
    Suburban Door Check & Lock, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Suburban Door Check & Lock Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-163
    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Aero Ambulance Service, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-169
    Root Brothers Manufacturing and Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Korshak, Rothman, Oppenheim and Finnegan, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-171
    Nancy Moses, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Nancy Moses, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-172
    New Era Dairy, Division of Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Twomey and Hines, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-186
    Morton Salt Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Morton Salt Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6567
    De Kalb Public Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    De Kalb Public Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6759
    Lincoln Merchandising Company—Furniture, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Lincoln Merchandising Company—Furniture, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6798
    Angel Guardian, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Angel Guardian, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6885
    Mason-Barron Laboratories, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Mason-Barron Laboratories, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7032
    Smith Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 27, 1973.

    Smith Oil Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-10
    Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Finance, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-11
    E. R. Squibb and Sons, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    E. R. Squibb and Sons, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-59
    Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Environmental Protection, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    Sargent-Welch Scientific Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-100
    Columbia College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

      Columbia College, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-170
    Unicare Health Facilities, Inc., d/b/a North Aurora Center, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    Unicare Health Facilities, Inc., d/b/a North Aurora Center, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-197
    Charles McCorkle, Jr., (Court Reporters), Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    Charles McCorkle, Jr., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6471
    Merck, Sharp and Dohme, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    Merck, Sharp and Dohme, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6664
    John E. Reid and Associates, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    John E. Reid and Associates, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6930
    Rendel’s, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    Rendel’s, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6932
    Rendel’s, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    Rendel’s, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7002
    Walter C. McCrone Associates, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Attorney General’s Office, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    Walter C. McCrone Associates, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7073
    Riveredge Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

      Riveredge Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7085
    Ochs Electric Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 3, 1973.

    Ochs Electric Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-36
    Illinois Children’s Home and Aid Society, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Kirkland and Ellis, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-44 thru 73-CC-51—Consolidated)
    Visi Flash Rentals, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Visi Flash Rentals, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-97
    Globe Glass & Trim Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Cohon, Raizes & Regal, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-123
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler and Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-128
    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-143
    The Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    The Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-151
    Marsters Sign Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Marsters Sign Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-152
    Whalen Woods Vancil, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Philip Schickedanz, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-156
    Board of Trustees of the State Employees’ Retirement System of Illinois, on Behalf of the Participants, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Board of Trustees of the State Employees’ Retirement System of Illinois, on Behalf of the Participants, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-166
    Memorial Hospital of Springfield, Illinois, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Londrigan & Potter, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-209
    Helen M. Gregory, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Helen M. Gregory, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-237
    The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

      John W. Costello, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6228
    Rouse Brueggeman Lumber Company, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Lewis, Blickman, Garrison and Tucker, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6833
    Richard D. Corley, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Dr. Richard D. Corley, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6908
    Thomas A. Rose, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Thomas A. Rose, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6931
    Rendel’s, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Rendel’s, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 6999
    Klingberg Schools, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Klingberg Schools, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 7025
    Mason-Barron Laboratories, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1973.

    Mason-Barron Laboratories, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-135
    General Electric Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 17, 1973.

    M. W. Hoover, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-185
    Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Attorney General’s Office, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 17, 1973.

    Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-252
    Rock Island Franciscan Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 17, 1973.

    Rock Island Franciscan Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Douglas G. Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 73-CC-12
    Jubal W. McKee, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 24, 1973.

    Juergensmeyer & Zimmerman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This matter is now before the court on claimant’s motion, filed April 27,1973, for judgment on the pleadings. Respondent has filed no objections to said motion and has, in fact, acknowledged that this is a justifiable claim for the stated amount by filing a letter dated February 16, 1973, from Joseph S. Coughlin, Acting Director of the Department of Corrections, stating that all of the allegations in the complaint are true to the best of his and that department’s knowledge and belief. The file contains other supporting documents.

In granting claimant’s motion, it is necessary to restate the facts on which this award is based, as required by §18 of the Court of Claims Act.

Complaint was filed herein on January 8, 1973, by Jubal W. McKee for payment of excessive deductions withdrawn from his payroll checks by the Department of Corrections for Blue Cross and Blue Shield Health Insurance benefits.

From November 1, 1970, through and including July 31,1971, Jubal W. McKee was employed at the Valley View Boys’ School, Valley View, Illinois, by the State of Illinois, Department of Corrections. During the above specified period, claimant was covered under a group Blue Cross and Blue Shield Health Insurance program, Insurance Certificate No. 22852-40200.

Premiums on the above specified insurance policy were paid in part by the claimant, and were effectuated by bi-monthly deductions from his payroll check.

The above specified deductions from claimant’s bimonthly check were made in accordance with and were equal to the amount established for family rates which would provide protection for an entire family. In fact, claimant was single during the entire above specified time, and the deductions which should have been made, should have been calculated on the basis of individual rates which would provide individual coverage.

As a result of the above miscalculations, excessive deductions were made during the entire period of time from November 1, 1970, through and including July 31, 1971, and claimant has suffered a loss thereby in the amount of Two Hundred Twelve and 40/100ths ($212.40) Dollars.

The Department of Corrections, after discussing the matter with its chief personnel officer, its legal advisor and others, concluded that this was a payroll error for which the department was responsible.

There being no issue of law or fact before us, we conclude that claimant is entitled to an award for the amount claimed.

Claimant, Jubal W. McKee, is hereby granted an award in the amount of $212.40.