author: Montana, C.J. Frederick, J. Frederick, J. Frederick, J. Frederick, J. Frederick, J. Frederick, J.

text:
    (No. 93-CC-0238
    Larry Bruce Rubin, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed November 5, 1992.

      Order on petition for rehearing filed July 14, 1993.

      Order filed September 27, 1993.

      Opinion filed March 3, 1995.

      Opinion filed May 5, 1995.

      Order filed May 22, 1995.

      Order filed May 22, 1995.

    Larry Bruce Rubin, pro se, for Claimant.
    Dunn, Ulbrich, Hundman, Sanczak & Ogar (Helen Ogar, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Respondents motion to dismiss and the Claimant’s response thereto, due notice having been given, and the Court being advised, it is hereby ordered that the Respondent’s motion is granted and this claim is dismissed for the reasons stated in the motion.

ORDER

Frederick, J.

This cause coming on Claimants motion for rehearing, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, wherefore, the Court finds:

(1) That Claimant filed his complaint against the board of governors on August 7, 1982, claiming damages for alleged actions occurring in 1977 through 1980 at Western Illinois University.

(2) That the Court entered an order dismissing the cause on November 5,1992.

(3) That Claimant has failed to provide to the court any documentation to show the Court that Claimant was adjudicated an incompetent for any period from 1980 until August 7, 1992, sufficient to toll the statute of limitations in regard to the applicable notice and filing provisions of the law.

Therefore, it is ordered that the motion for rehearing is denied.

ORDER

Frederick, J.

This cause coming on for hearing on Claimants motion to reopen case due to “Significant” evidence, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, wherefore, the Court finds:

(1) That Claimants complaint alleges that the acts complained of occurred from 1977 to 1980.

(2) That from Claimants allegations, it is impossible to tell when the two-year statute of limitations would have run but it appears it would have been some time between January 1, 1982, and January 31,1982.

(3) That section 13 — 211 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 — 211) controls the tolling of the statute of limitations for persons under legal disability. Estate of Rika v. Christ Hospital (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 752.

(4) That on July 1, 1982, the legislature changed the language of the tolling provision from persons who are "incompetent” to persons “under legal disability.” (Pub. Act 92-280, eff. July 1, 1982.) See Peach v. Peach (1966), 73 Ill. App. 2d 72.

(5) That Claimants pending motion raises an issue of whether he was under a legal disability beginning in 1980 through 1982.

(6) That depending on when Claimant’s alleged claim began, the standard for tolling the statute may differ because of the amendment to the statute.

Therefore, it is ordered:

(A) That the Commissioner assigned to the case shall hold a hearing solely on the issue of whether the statute of limitations has been tolled.

(B) The Claimant has the burden of proving when the statute of limitations began running, when it began to be tolled, when any “incompetency” or “legal disability” ended, and that he filed his claim within the statute of limitations or within a period when the statute of limitations was properly tolled.

(C) The Commissioner shall report to the Court as to the issues herein sought to be resolved.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

The Claimant filed his complaint sounding in tort on August 7, 1992. On September 27, 1993, the Court entered an order requiring the Commissioner to hold a hearing solely on the issue of whether the statute of limitations had been tolled. The Claimant had the burden of proving when the statute of limitations began running, when it began to be tolled, when any incompetency or legal disability ended, and that he filed his claim within the statute of limitations or within a period when the statute had been tolled. The inartfulness of the allegations of the complaint made it difficult for the Court to determine when the statute of limitations started and ended.

The allegations indicate the alleged occurrence happened at some point between 1977 and 1980. The complaint was filed on August 7, 1992. The cause was heard before the Commissioner. The medical records of Dr. Buchanan presented by Claimant were admitted into evidence. The Commissioner also heard testimony from the Claimant. Because this is a tort claim, without tolling the latest the statute of limitations would have run would have been January 31, 1982. See section 8(d), 22(g), Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS 505/1, et seq.

Therefore, the only issue before the Court is whether Claimant was under a legal disability that prevented the statute of limitations from running. Section 22(g) also indicates that tort claims must be filed within two years after it first accrues saving to minors and persons under legal disability at the time the claim accrues, in which case the claim must be filed within two years from when the disability ceases.

We have scrupulously reviewed the medical records of Dr. Robert W. Buchanan and the testimony of Claimant. Dr. Buchanans records indicate he saw Claimant on August 22, 1984. At that time, Claimant presented “himself in a clean manner, dressed appropriately, and is somewhat hyperactive in his motor activity.” Dr. Buchanan also related that Claimant had no history of psychiatric hospitalizations. His diagnosis was severe borderline personality with paranoid ideation. Dr. Buchanan also gave an opinion that Claimant was disabled and unable to work during the years 1980 through 1982. Claimant testified that he became better in 1988. Claimant believed he had five years from 1988 to file his claim. He testified his disability ceased in 1988.

There was no medical evidence that Claimant was disabled after August 22, 1984. However, even if the Court were to accept Claimants version of when his alleged disability ended, the statute of limitations expired on January 2, 1991. As Claimant filed his claim beyond the expiration date of the latest statute of limitations date, the Court is without jurisdiction to hear his claim. See section 22(h) of Court of Claims Act. 705 ILCS 705/ 22(h).

For the foregoing reasons, the Claimants motion to reopen case due to significant evidence is denied and this cause is dismissed with prejudice.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

On September 27, 1993, this Court entered an order directing the Commissioner to hold a hearing in regard to whether the statute of limitations had been tolled and when any incompetency or legal disability ended. The Commissioner held the required hearing on August 8, 1994. In reviewing all of the evidence and testimony, we find as follows:

(a) This is a claim sounding in tort.

(b) The Claimant never filed a notice of intent to sue pursuant to section 22 — 1 of the Court of Claims Act. 705 ILCS 505/1, et seq.

(c) That Claimant was admitted to the McDonough District Hospital on September 11, 1980, complaining of a multitude of strange persecutory delusions. He was discharged on September 15,1980.

(d) That in September of 1980 Claimant was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.

(e) That Claimant had been previously admitted to McDonough District Hospital on October 27, 1979, for an acute psychotic reaction and was discharged on October 31, 1979.

(f) Claimant was hospitalized at McDonough District Hospital on December 12, 1977, for a seizure disorder and thoracic kyphoscoliosis and released on December 12, 1977.

(g) Claimant was hospitalized at Grant Hospital from January 30, 1988, to February 9, 1988, and from April 21, 1988, through May 6, 1988, for delusional disorder and seizure disorder.

(h) Claimant was treated by a Dr. Robert Buchanan intermittently between December 16, 1976, and December 2, 1986. Claimants diagnosis was DSM III-R 301.83.

(i) Claimant has had treatment at the counseling center from December 17,1988, through August 5,1993.

(j) Dr. Robert W. Buchanan, a psychiatrist, gave the opinion that for the years 1980 through 1982, Claimant was disabled and unable to work during that period.

(k) The complaint seeks damages for “injury” and “medical services” from a period of 1977 through 1980.

(l) Claimant testified he became better in 1988.

(m) Claimant filed his complaint on August 7, 1992.

The statute of limitations would normally have run at the very latest on January 2, 1983. We gave the Claimant the opportunity to present evidence that he was disabled during a sufficient time between January 2, 1980, and August 7, 1992, to toll the statute of limitations. The only evidence presented by Claimant which indicated Claimant was disabled in any way was the document from Robert W. Buchanan, a psychiatrist, who indicated that for the years 1980 through 1982, Claimant was disabled and unable to work during that period. There is no other evidence before the Court that even comes close to establishing a legal disability. The statute of limitations would, therefore, have run on January 2, 1984. Even if the Court were to accept Claimants testimony that he became better in 1988, the statute of limitations would run no later than January 2, 1990.

Claimant misapprehends the applicable statute of limitations. This is a tort claim. The Courts tort claim jurisdiction falls under section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act. (705 ILCS 505/8(d).) The statute of limitations for all claims arising under section 8(d) is found in section 22(h) of the Act. Subsection (h) states: “All other claims must be filed within 2 years after it first accrues, saving to minors, and persons under legal disability at the time the claim accrues, in which case the claim must be filed within 2 years from the time the disability ceases.” All time limitations under the Act are binding on the Court as jurisdictional. 705 ILCS 505722(h).

As Claimant failed to file his claim within the statute of limitations, the cause must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, it is the order of the Court that this claim be and hereby is dismissed.

ORDER

Frederick, J.

This cause comes before the Court on Claimants motion to appeal the decision to reopen cause due to significant evidence, which the Court will consider as a motion for rehearing, and the Court having reviewed this cause and the pleadings and evidence, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, wherefore, the Court finds:

(1) That Claimant filed his complaint on August 7, 1992.

(2) That Claimant had a hearing with the opportunity to prove the statute of limitations was tolled sufficiently to file his claim on August 7, 1992, while alleging a possible tort claim occurring some time between 1977 and 1980.

(3) That Claimant failed to meet his burden of proof to prove that he was legally disabled from filing a claim for a sufficient period to allow the August 1992 filing.

(4) That the Courts decision was correct and nothing in Claimants motion to reconsider leads the Court to reconsider its decision.

Wherefore, it is ordered that Claimants motion filed March 29, 1995, is denied.

ORDER

Frederick, J.

The Court has previously dismissed the claim of Claimant, Larry Bruce Rubin, as the claim was filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations. Claimants motion to reconsider was denied.

On April 6, 1995, Claimant filed in this cause an inch-thick stack of papers which are copies of pleadings in lawsuit filed by Claimant in the circuit court of Cook County, Illinois entitled: Larry Bruce Rubin v. Thresholds, et al., No. 86-L-19451. As the Court has found that Claimant failed to prove that he had a legal disability after 1988, none of the documents filed on April 6, 1995, involving a 1986 lawsuit are relevant.

We also find that a claim must have finality at some point and that point has been reached in the instant case.

Therefore, it is ordered:

(A) That the documents filed by Claimant on April 6, 1995, are stricken.

(B) That the clerk is directed not to accept any more filings from Claimant in this case, 93-CC-0238.

(C) That this case is closed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Raucci, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 93-CC-0318
    First Baptist Church of Lombard, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Order filed January 4, 1995.

    Johnson, Westra, Wittaker & Austin, P.C. (John J. Westra, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Robert S. Graettinger, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Respondents motion to dismiss, and the Claimants motion for change of venue, the Court being fully advised in the premises finds:

(1) The Respondent has moved to dismiss on the grounds that the Illinois Department of Transportation had no involvement in the construction of Interstate 355 in the Village of Lombard, Du Page County, Illinois, and that Claimants claim should be directed against the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority. The Claimant has not responded to the motion to dismiss, but in its motion for change of venue, Claimant asserts that the Illinois Department of Transportation:

“was incorrectly named in said complaint in that the real party in interest is the State Toll Highway Authority, Illinois which entity is immune from liability in the Court of Claims.”

(2) Claimants motion for change of venue seeks an order transferring venue to the circuit court of the 18th judicial circuit. No authority is cited for such an action, and we are not aware of any such authority.

(3) The complaint names only one Respondent, namely “State of Illinois, Department of Transportation (I.D.O.T.).” Jurisdiction of claims against the Illinois Department of Transportation resides in the Court of Claims and not the circuit court. Accordingly, there is nothing to transfer to the circuit court.

(4) Based on the uncontested allegations of the motion to dismiss, we find that we do not have jurisdiction of this matter.

It is therefore ordered that

(1) The Claimants motion for change of venue is denied.

(2) The Defendants motion to dismiss is granted, and this claim is dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.


author: Frederick, J.

text:
    (No. 93-CC-0958
    Jose Olivares, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 4, 1995.

    Jose Olivares, pro se, for Claimant.

      Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Chad Fornoff, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Frederick, J.

Claimant filed his claim in the Court of Claims on November 13, 1992. This is a claim for personal injury pursuant to section 8(c) of the Illinois Court of Claims Act. (705 ILCS 505/8(c).) Claimant alleged that he was injured as a result of negligence in the treatment of a broken leg from May 4, 1992, through August 11,1992, at St. Marys Hospital in Centralia, Illinois, where employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections transported him after a soccer accident at the Centralia Correctional Center on May 4, 1992.

Claimant contends that after he was transported to St. Mary’s Hospital for emergency medical treatment, the hospital staff failed to perform an operation on his left leg until 18 days later, when the leg became infected and swollen.

Claimant alleged in his complaint that as a result of the delay in treatment, he experienced severe pain, sleeplessness, and a loss of appetite. His complaint also states that Claimant can no longer use his leg, preventing him from returning to his occupation as a construction worker, resulting in a loss of earnings of $18,200 per year.

The only evidence produced at the trial before the Commissioner on May 25, 1994, was the testimony of Claimant that the hospital failed to treat his injuiy properly by delaying treatment. Claimant also stated that he now can walk but has a limp and no longer can play soccer. Claimant contends he is entitled to damages of $100,000 from Respondent for negligence.

This Court has held that the State owes a duty to provide inmates with reasonable medical care to its prisoners. (Bynum v. State (1992), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1.) The Court also has held that failure to provide timely medical attention may constitute negligence. (Davidson v. State (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 825.) In the instant case, the Respondent has complied with both mandates. Respondent transported Claimant to St. Marys Hospital for treatment on the same day as his accident and therefore fulfilled its duty to procure reasonable medical treatment for Claimant in a timely fashion. There is no evidence that Respondent delayed procuring medical care for Claimant.

In order to sustain a negligence claim against Respondent for substandard medical care, Claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the standard of care, that Respondent deviated from the standard of care, and that the deviation from the standard of care was the proximate cause of the Claimants injury. These matters usually must be proven by medical evidence. Claimant has failed to prove the standard of care and that Respondent deviated from the standard of care. (Davis v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 185.) As in Davis, supra, the Claimant herein has adduced no proof of the States alleged negligence other than the Claimants own conclusory testimony. No expert testimony was presented. Pink v. State (1991), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 295.

Although there is mention in Claimants complaint that his broken leg was caused by poor construction of the yard in which he was playing soccer, Claimant has not produced any evidence to establish that such a dangerous condition existed, that it was the proximate cause of his injury, or that Respondent had notice of such dangerous condition. In fact, at the hearing held in this matter, this claim was not mentioned.

Claimant has failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. For the foregoing reasons, it is the order of this Court that Claimants claim is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 94-CC-0454

      In re Application of Joanne E. Conklin

      Opinion filed May 10, 1995.

    Clark & DeGrand, for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Frederick, J.

This claim is before the Court by reason of the death of Edwin R. Conklin, who was a firefighter with the Earl-ville Fire Protection District. The decedent’s widow, Joanne E. Conklin, seeks compensation pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. 820 ILCS 315/1, et seq.

On November 16, 1993, the Court delivered an opinion finding that the Court could not determine if firefighter Conklin was “killed in the line of duty” as contemplated by the Act and directed that the issue be tried before a Commissioner of the Court. The Court made findings in its November 16, 1993, opinion as follows which we confirm:

(a) Firefighter Edwin R. Conklin died on July 1, 1993, while testifying in a Federal arson trial;

(b) The cause of death as stated on the certificate of death was listed as cardiac arrhythmia, due to or as a consequence of coronary artery disease;

(c) The decedent is survived by his wife, Joanne E. Conklin, the Claimant herein and she was designated by the decedent as the sole beneficiary of any benefits under the Act;

(d) There is nothing in the circumstances to indicate firefighter Conklin’s death was caused by willful misconduct or intoxication.

The Court found all the requirements for an award under the Act except the required finding that the decedent died in the line of duty.

The parties, in lieu of a trial, have filed with the Court Stipulation No. 1, Stipulation No. 2, and related materials. The Court has reviewed the report of the Attorney General, the application for benefits, the statement of supervising officer Fire Chief Larry O. Simpson, the letter of Frederick Mende, president of the Earlville Community Fire Protection District, the letter of assistant U.S. Attorney Susan E. Cox, the medical certificate of death, the letter of Frank Lefevre, M.D., the autopsy report, the designation of beneficiary, Stipulation No. 1, Stipulation No. 2, and all of the materials attached to the stipulations. The facts appear to be uncontradicted. On June 29, 1993, fireman Conklin was called to testify at an arson trial regarding a resident of Earlville who was accused of setting fire to his own restaurant in order to collect insurance proceeds. Firefighter Conklin rarely traveled to Chicago and appeared to be under stress regarding his testimony and role in the trial. Within one half hour of being called to the witness stand, he had a heart attack. He never regained consciousness and died two days later on July 1, 1993, at Northwestern Memorial Hospital.

The issue before the Court then is whether or not this death, under these circumstances, constitutes being “killed in the line of duty” as contemplated by the Act. The Court hears many cases regarding this issue and the issue is perhaps the most difficult for the Court. There is always considerable sympathy for the claimants in such cases because these cases generally involve an untimely death of a loved one who has died in the service of the public. As sympathetic as the claimants may be in these cases, the Court has always remained strict in its determination of whether a decedent was killed in the line of duty.

Section 2(e) of the Act (820 ILCS 31572(e)) provides, in relevant part: ‘“killed in the line of duty’ means losing ones life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a 4 4 8 or fireman if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if the injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.” (In re Application of O’Gara (1991), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 288.) When determining whether an officer was killed in the line of duty where the fatal injury suffered is a heart attack, the standard of review of the evidence was established by this Court in In re Application of Smith (1990), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 183. The Smith decision states at page 186:

“Cases involving heart attacks are among the most difficult presented to this Court. The Court recognizes that police work involves stress and strain which can lead to heart attacks. In deciding whether an award should be granted an effort is made to determine whether the activities the decedent was performing precipitated the heart attack. In cases where a decedent is performing strenuous physical activities at the time the attack is suffered, the Court has consistently granted awards. However, in cases where the decedent was not performing strenuous physical activities when the heart attack was suffered, the Court must closely examine whether the circumstances surrounding the decedents performance of duties prior to the time the fatal heart attack was suffered may have precipitated the attack.”

We realize that the work of firefighters involves stress and strain which can lead to heart attacks. We must also note that in this case, firefighter Conklin was not involved in strenuous physical activity at the time the heart attack was suffered. We must, therefore, look very closely at the circumstances surrounding the decedents performance of duties prior to the fatal heart attack to determine whether the activities the decedent was performing precipitated the heart attack. The uncontradicted evidence before the Court is the medical opinion of Dr. Frank Lefevre, a board certified medical examiner and doctor of internal medicine. In Dr. Lefevre s letter of September 26, 1994, the doctor states “It is further my opinion, again based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the stress associated with appearing in Federal court in Chicago and giving testimony at that trial contributed to the onset of cardiac arrhythmia that led to Mr. Conklins death.” Dr. Lefevres opinion was based on the fact that there was no evidence or prior signs of significant cardiac disease present that would account for the cardiopulmonary arrest that Mr. Conklin had even though there was some evidence of underlying heart disease in this 65-year-old man; that firefighter Conklin was under a high level of stress at having to testify in Chicago in Federal court with that stress releasing large amounts of stress hormones in the blood system thereby predisposing a person to cardiac arrhythmias; that such stress has a deleterious effect on ones health; and the total absence of any prior significant medical problems for firefighter Conklin.

Based on the unique facts of this case where testifying would be a very unusual event, we find that the stress of testifying in the arson trial in Chicago precipitated the heart arrhythmia in firefighter Conklin thereby leading to his death. Based on this finding, we further find that Edwin A. Conklin was killed in the line of duty and the claim of Claimant is therefore compensable.

It is therefore hereby ordered that Claimant, Joanne E. Conklin, is hereby awarded fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) pursuant to the provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act.


author: Raucci, J. Raucci, J.

text:
    (No. 94-CC-0579
    William McNeil, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois and Judge Vincent J. Cerri, Respondents.

      Order filed February 1, 1995.

      Order on petition for rehearing filed April 12, 1995.

    William McNeil, pro se, for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Anneliese B. Fiertos, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondents.
   ORDER

Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Respondent State of Illinois’ motion to dismiss, the Court having considered the memoranda of both parties and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds:

(1) Claimant filed a complaint against Respondents alleging judicial misconduct by Judge Vincent J. Cerri. The Respondent State of Illinois has filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the actions of Judge Cerri are not cognizable by virtue of the doctrine of judicial immunity. Claimant maintains that since the General Assembly has passed an indemnification statute (5 ILCS 350/2), therefore the doctrine of judicial immunity does not apply.

(2) Claimant also filed an action against Judge Cerri in the circuit court of the 12th judicial circuit, Will County arising from the same acts. That action was dismissed, and the dismissal affirmed by the appellate court for the 3rd judicial district in McNeil v. Cerri, No. 3-93-0719 (unpublished opinion, July 25, 1994). As stated by Justice Breslin:

“As long as a judge is acting within his jurisdiction, he enjoys absolute immunity for acts performed in his judicial capacity irrespective of whether the act was done mistakenly, maliciously or in excess of authority. (Illinois Traffic Court Driver Improvement Educational Foundation v. Peoria Journal Star, Inc. (1986), 144 Ill. App. 3d 555, 494 N.E.2d 939; Stump v. Starkman (1978), 435 U.S. 349, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331, 98 S. Ct. 1099.) Since the trial judge in the present case was acting within his jurisdiction, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County ° ° * ”

The issue of indemnification of the judge is not raised in a case in which there is no liability.

(3) While not urged by Respondent in its motion to dismiss, we also note that this claim would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

It is therefore ordered that the motion to dismiss is granted, and this claim is dismissed and forever barred.

ORDER

Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Claimants petition for rehearing, the Court having considered the petition and the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds:

The petition for rehearing is without merit and should be denied.

It is therefore ordered that the petition for rehearing is denied.


text:
    (No. 94-CC-1273
    Edward Hall, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed February 1, 1995.

      Order filed May 9, 1995.

    Krohn Jenkins & Anderson (Robert J. Jenkins, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (David S. Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Respondents motion to dismiss, the Court being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds:

(1) Respondent has moved to dismiss this action on two grounds, namely (1) failure to exhaust remedies and (2) failure to state a cause of action for defamation per se. We find that Respondents motion to dismiss should be granted.

(2) Claimant was employed by the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities at the Madden Mental Health Center as a lieutenant in the security service. He claims that he was improperly suspended for 10 days. Count I claims $1,100 for lost wages, and Count II is for damages of $500,000 or more for alleged “defamation per se” wherein Claimant alleges that the mere fact of suspending Claimant for these charges was “willful, malicious and wanton.”

An administrative grievance procedure applicable to this employment action is provided for by law. The procedure is described in 80 Ill. Adm. Code section 303.20. A predisciplinary hearing was held. Claimant failed to submit a grievance or appeal within the time provided although Claimant states he unsuccessfully attempted to have an appeal heard.

The complaint does not allege with specificity what administrative steps he took, and he did not file an action in the circuit court pursuant to the Administrative Review Law. He failed to exhaust his remedies.

(3) Claimant alleges that “disciplining him for alleged mistreatment of service recipients was tantamount to allegations of criminal misconduct and malfeasance in job performance.” He alleges no specific defamatory statements, who made them, that there was an unprivileged publication to a third party, and how he was specifically damaged. The complaint fails to state a cause of action.

It is therefore ordered that the Respondents motion to dismiss is granted, and this action is dismissed, and forever barred.

ORDER

Raucci, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Claimants motion for new trial, the Court being fully advised in the premises, it is ordered that the motion for new trial is denied.


author: Mitchell, J.

text:
    (No. 94-CC-1769
    William Fellion, Claimant, v. Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, Illinois State Toll Highway Authority Defined Benefit Pension Plan, and John W. Kiep, Robert L. Hickman, Richard W. DeRobertis and Nicholas W. Jannite Individually and as members of the Pension Plan Committee, Respondents.

      Order filed February 24, 1995.

    Cotiguala & Mennes (Jac A. Cotiguala, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Robert Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondents.
   ORDER

Mitchell, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of the State of Illinois to dismiss the claim herein; due notice having been given the parties hereto, and the Court being fully advised in the premises:

The Court finds that Claimant herein has filed a multiple-count complaint for, essentially, alleged wrongful denial of his pension benefits by the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority Defined Benefit Pension Plan, and certain individuals as members of the committee of that pension plan.

The Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, including its subdivisions and its employees, is an entity which is not amenable to suit in the Court of Claims and over which this Court has no jurisdiction. This Court has consistently dismissed all such cases properly lying against the Illinois State Toll Highway Authority, and we hold that the instant claim should likewise be dismissed.

It is therefore ordered that the motion of the State of Illinois be, and the same is, hereby granted, and the claim herein is dismissed, with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 94-CC-3085

      In re Application of Janet Drury

      Opinion filed August 16, 1994.

    Gallagher, Klein & Brady (Daniel J. Berens, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Chad D. Fornoff, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Frederick, J.

This claim is before the Court by reason of the death of James D. Drury, who was chief of police of the Village of Shabbona, Illinois. Chief Drury’s widow, Janet Drury, seeks compensation pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. 820 ILCS 315/1, et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the claim for death benefits submitted herein, together with the written statements of the mayor of Shabbona, Illinois, Dr. Robert Purdy, the family physician of Chief Drury and the documentation submitted therein, the autopsy report, the order of heirship, the coroner’s certificate of death, the police report, and the report of the Attorney General. Pursuant to the order of heirship, the applicant, Janet Drury is entitled to benefits as the only other heir is an adult daughter.

The record reveals that on December 10, 1993, in the late evening and the early morning of December 11, 1993, the decedent, James D. Drury, responded to a call concerning a domestic dispute in progress within the Village of Shabbona. When Chief Drury arrived at the scene, the husband and wife engaged in a verbal confrontation with him. When county deputies arrived, Chief Drury was informed of an outstanding warrant on the husband, and the husband was arrested. When Chief Drury returned to his squad car, he began having difficulty breathing. One of the deputies recommended calling an ambulance, but Chief Drury requested that he be taken to the residence of Dr. Purdy, who lived only a few blocks away. Chief Drury had suffered asthma attacks in the past when exposed to cats, and Dr. Purdy had successfully treated him for these attacks in emergency situations. Chief Drury was exposed to cats only minutes earlier when making the arrests at the domestic disturbance.

Before Dr. Purdy could retrieve medication from his house, Chief Drury collapsed on the driveway and rescue attempts to revive him were not successful. Chief Drury was pronounced dead at 1:00 a.m. on December 11, 1993. The decedent died within one year of the injuries he sustained from an accidental cause. The certificate of death indicates that the cause of death was respiratory failure due to an acute asthma attack.

Chief Drury is survived by his wife, Janet Drury, and an adult daughter so that the Claimant herein is the sole beneficiary of any benefits payable under the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. 820 ILCS 315/1, etseq.

We find that there is nothing in the circumstances to indicate that Chief Druiys death was caused by willful misconduct or intoxication. We further find that the foregoing circumstances fall within the terms and provisions of the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act, supra, and the facts reported herein comply with the requirements for an award under the Act. Chief James D. Drury was killed in the line of duty. Because of the listed cause of death, the Attorney General did an extensive investigation and concluded the decedent was killed in the line of duty. We concur.

It is therefore ordered that the claim of Janet Drury, the surviving spouse of Chief James D. Drury, be, and the same is hereby allowed, and Claimant is hereby awarded the amount of $50,000, pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act.


author: Sommer, C.J. Sommer, C.J.

text:
    (No. 95-CC-0610
    Lucky Stores, Inc., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed December 16, 1994.

      Opinion filed April 14, 1995.

    Frederick J. Czerwionka, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Michael F. Rocks, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Sommer, C.J.

This matter coming before the Court on the stipulation of the Respondent, due notice having been given the Claimant, and the Court being fully advised in the premises; the Court finds: that warrant number TB0865320 was issued to Lucky Stores, Inc. in the amount of $108,451.49 and escheated by operation of law because it was held more than six months before it was presented for payment.

We further find that the Court of Claims can only replace warrants if suit is filed within the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 22 of the Court of Claims Act. (705 ILCS 505/22.) Claimant filed suit on October 11, 1994, and was thus within such statute.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and the same is hereby granted, and Claimant is awarded $108,451.49.

OPINION

Sommer, C.J.

This matter arises upon the Claimants request for the payment of interest on an award entered by this Court on December 16, 1994.

The Claimant in this matter sought replacement of a warrant dated July 5, 1990, that was not negotiated and ultimately escheated to the State. The request to replace this warrant was made on October 11,1994, and the award was made in a timely manner on December 16,1994.

The long-standing precedent in this Court is that interest is available only so long as the original agency had a legal ability to pay. (OK Electric v. State (1984), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 155.) However, absent a statute expressly subjecting the State to liability, there is no liability for interest.

Though the general interest statute on late payments may have caused the original warrant to bear interest, there is no statute expressly subjecting the State to liability for interest on Court of Claims awards. Branch-Nicoloff Co. v. State (1988), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 253, 254; Centola v. State (1988), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 121, 122.

It is therefore ordered that the Claimants request for interest is denied.


author: Sommer, C.J. Frederick, J.

text:
    (No. Unassigned

      In re Application of Pamela J. Curry

      Order filed January 26, 1990.

      Opinion filed August 26, 1994.

    Pamela J. Curry, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   ORDER

Sommer, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the petition of applicant, Pamela Jean Curry, for an extension of time to file necessary documents in submission of application for benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

Based upon the information contained in said petition and by the Crime Victims Compensation Act, we find that the crime in question occurred more than 18 months before the filing of the application, and as Crime Victims Compensation Act requires filing of notice within six months which can be extended for one year on good cause, we find that we are unable to extend the filing deadline under the law.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that said petition be denied.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

The Claimant, Pamela J. Curry, filed her notice of intent to file a claim pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act on December 14, 1989. (740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.) On its face, the application indicated the Claimant was an adult (date of birth: 1/4/56) and that the alleged crime had occurred on June 28, 1986. On January 26, 1990, the Court properly denied Claimants petition for an extension of time to file necessary documents in submission of her application for benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act. Pursuant to statute, the absolute filing deadline, including an extension for good cause, was 18 months from the date of the crime. The application of the Claimant was filed more than two years and five months from the date of the alleged crime.

The Claimant was notified of the Courts decision on January 30, 1990, and advised of her right to a hearing. Claimant timely filed a request for hearing on February 16, 1990. The case was assigned to a Commissioner to take evidence on the sole issue of whether Claimant had a legal disability which would excuse the filing of the application within the limitation period which expired on December 29, 1988. The Claimant was unable to attend the scheduled hearing and requested that she be allowed to submit her evidence by written evidence. We grant that request and accept the filing of Claimants exhibits in support of her assertion for an extension of time to file the claim for evidentiary purposes. We also waive Claimants appearance as requested. We accept all of Claimants exhibits as evidence to be considered in deciding this case.

The Court has revised the entire file, including all of Claimants exhibits and all of Claimants pleadings and motions. The Court is duty-bound to follow the statute of limitations. A statute of limitations can only be extended if the Claimant is under the age of 18 or under a legal disability. (735 ILCS 5/13 — 211.) The record is clear that Claimant was over the age of 18 on June 28, 1986. The only other issue is whether Claimant was under a legal disability from June 28, 1986, until December 14, 1989, or any time during that period for a sufficient period to extend the limitations period to December 14,1989. This statute has generally been construed to toll a statute of limitations during a party’s infancy or mental incapacity or incompetency. (Girman v. Cook County (1981), 103 Ill. App. 3d 897.) A formal legal adjudication is not required to show that a person is under a “legal disability.” Estate of Riha v. Christ Hospital (1989), 187 Ill. App. 3d 752.

The evidence presented by Claimant was that she was detained for three days in a mental health facility. She was discharged on June 30, 1986, without any diagnosis of a mental disease. The affidavit of Patricia Jean Curry of July 17, 1989, indicates Claimant had not previously been counseled at Peace River. The Federal court order of December 31, 1990, is also important in that the Court denied a motion for a mental exam of Claimant in unrelated litigation as such exam was not warranted.

The record is therefore devoid of any evidence that Claimant was suffering from any legal disability from at least July 1, 1986, until December 14, 1989. Claimant has made it clear that she is not suffering from any mental disease or disorder in her pleadings.

This Court has consistently strictly construed the statute of limitations in crime victims compensation cases. The Crime Victims Compensation Act does not grant an exception to the limitations period as an excuse that the Claimant lacked information from police or hospitals regarding the Act. (Schenk v. State (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 437.) We have consistently refused to extend the filing period where no disability is proven. (In re Application of Geraghty (1989), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 388.) The Crime Victims Compensation Act is a secondary source of compensation. A claimant must prove the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Application of Bavido (1992), 44 Ill. Ct. Cl. 449.

The Court of Claims is bound by the acts of the legislature and all procedures set forth by the legislature must be followed by the Court before benefits can be awarded. In re Application of Hutcheson (1985), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 491.

The facts are clear that Claimant failed to file her claim within the time limits established by law. While we are sympathetic to the traumatic experience alleged by Claimant, we are constrained by law to deny her petition for extension of time to file. The claim is therefore denied as time barred.


author: Per Curiam Frederick, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CV-0027

      In re Application of Sadie Stewart

      Opinion filed October 19, 1993.

      Opinion filed January 30, 1995.

    Sadie Stewart, pro se, for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (James Maher, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Per Curiam

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on October 28, 1987. The Claimant, Sadie Stewart, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740ILCS 45/1, etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 6, 1988, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

(1) That on October 28, 1987, the Claimant, Sadie Stewart, age 65, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit: aggravated battery. 720 ILCS 5/12 — 4.

(2) That the crime occurred in Chicago, Illinois, and the Claimant has complied with all of the eligibility requirements of section 6.1 of the Act.

(3) That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses.

(4) That after considering insurance and other sources of recovery, the Claimants net compensable loss for medical/hospital expenses is based on the following:

Compensable Amount

Associates In Rehabilitation

Medicine, S.C. $460.00

Friedell Clinic 313.00

Jackson Park Hospital 38.59

Total $811.59

(5) That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions under section 80.1(e) of the Act.

(6) That the Claimant has complied with pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

(7) That pursuant to section 88(c) of the Act, the Court may order that all or a portion of an award be paid jointly to the applicant and provider of services. In the instant case, the Court finds this section applicable and orders that joint payment be made.

(8) That the claim for $3,134 appears to be for a ramp to accommodate a wheelchair which is not a specifically-enumerated pecuniary loss pursuant to sections 72(h) and 80.1 of the Act.

(9) That this issue of wheelchair ramps is an issue of first impression for the Court and we invite the Claimant to request a trial and a hearing before the full Court to consider this issue.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $460 be and is hereby awarded to Sadie Stewart and Associates in Rehabilitation Medicine, S.C.

It is further ordered that the sum of $313 be and is hereby awarded to Sadie Stewart and Friedell Clinic.

It is further ordered that the sum of $38.59 be and is hereby awarded to Sadie Stewart and Jackson Park Hospital.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

This claim arises out of a violent crime against Ray A. Drake which was committed on October 28, 1987. Claimant, Sadie Stewart, seeks compensation pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). 740 ILCS 45/1, et seq.

This Court issued an initial opinion in this case on October 19, 1993, ordering that $811.59 be awarded for medical and hospital payments. We denied the portion of the claim totaling $3,134 which appeared to be for a ramp to accommodate a wheelchair. A ramp to accommodate a wheelchair is not a specifically-enunciated pecuniary loss pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act. Claimant requested a hearing on the issue of payment for the ramp.

At the hearing, the Claimants daughter testified that Claimant did not have access through the front or back of her home. A door was constructed on the side and a ramp and railing were installed.

The Law

This is the second time this Court has had to address the issue of home improvements in regard to crime victims compensation claims. (See In re Application of Drake (1994), 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 563.) These are very difficult, heartrending decisions. We would gladly order awards if we had the authority to do so. Section 2(h) of the Act defines pecuniary loss as:

“* ° ° appropriate medical expenses and hospital expenses including expenses of a medical examination, medically required nursing care expenses, appropriate psychiatric care or psychiatric counseling expenses, expenses for care or counseling by a licensed clinical psychologist or licensed clinical social worker and expenses for treatment by Christian Science practitioners and nursing care appropriate thereto; prosthetic appliances, eyeglasses, and hearing aids necessary or damaged as a result of the crime; replacement services loss, to a maximum of $1,000 per month; dependents replacement services loss, to a maximum of $1,000 per month; ° ° ° ”

As defined by the legislature, pecuniary loss does not include a ramp for a wheelchair. The Court can award no more compensation than the Act allows. In re Application of Johnson (1992), 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 562.

For the foregoing reasons, the claim for the wheelchair ramp is denied.


author: Patchett, J. Patchett, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CV-0179

      In re Application of Yolanda D. Richardson

      Order filed May 14, 1992.

      Order filed April 28, 1995.

    Yolanda D. Richardson, pro se, for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Paul Cho, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Patchett, J.

This crime victims compensation claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 25, 1987. The Claimant, Yolanda D. Richardson, was then a victim of criminal sexual assault, and now seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

This Court issued an earlier order denying her claim. That order was based on the fact that the Claimant did not report this incident to the appropriate law enforcement officials until October 5, 1987. The Claimant requested an opportunity to present evidence on this issue.

A hearing was then conducted at which the Claimant appeared and testified. Ms. Richardson testified that she made a telephone call on August 26,1987, to the De Kalb city police department. She testified that she reported the crime at that time, but did not give her name. She was not in the proper state of mind to discuss the crime with police at that time, and knew several people on the police department. In addition, Ms. Richardson testified that the offender was an acquaintance and co-worker. She also produced an affidavit at the hearing stating that she reported the crime within 72 hours.

In addition, the Claimant presented a signed affidavit by Michael P. Coghlan, State’s attorney of De Kalb County, which stated that an anonymous report of sexual assault had been made to the De Kalb police department on or about the time of the incident in question. She also provided a letter by the State’s attorney of De Kalb County stating that the crime was reported on August 26, 1987. Claimant stated that she also reported the incident to the De Kalb County sheriff’s office on August 30, 1987.

The Claimant then called Ms. Danise Habun, who has a degree in psychology from the University of Wisconsin, Plattville. She is employed by the Community Crisis Center as a legal advocate for sexual assault and domestic violence victims and also does counseling with sexual assault victims.

Ms. Habun testified that she met Ms. Richardson at the emergency room of Sherman Hospital in Elgin on the 27th or 28th of August 1987. Ms. Habun testified that Ms. Richardson was extremely distraught and in pain. Ms. Habun testified that she spent approximately four hours with the Claimant at the hospital, and did some counseling over the telephone the next day. She testified that Ms. Richardson told her at the time that she was feeling very confused about what to do since the offender was a friend and co-worker. Ms. Habun suggested three different ways of reporting the crime, one of which was to make an anonymous police report. Ms. Habun also testified as to the degree of stress and trauma associated with this type of crime.

Section 6.1(b) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (740 ILCS 45/6.1(b)) requires a person otherwise entitled to compensation under the Act to notify appropriate law enforcement officials of the perpetration of the crime within 72 hours, or show that notice subsequent to 72 hours was timely under the circumstances. There is in the record an August 30, 1990, letter from the De Kalb County States attorney indicating that the offender was convicted in the criminal case which arose out of this incident. Therefore, Claimant is a victim of a crime covered by this Act, and is entitled to compensation if the notice provision has been complied with.

We do not hold that anonymous reports within 72 hours are necessarily sufficient to comply with section 6.1(b), but we do hold that Ms. Richardson has presented evidence to show that her notice was timely under the circumstances surrounding this crime.

Therefore, the previous order of this Court denying her claim is hereby reversed, and this matter is remanded to a Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ORDER

Patchett, J.

The parties to this proceeding have entered into a stipulation whereby the Attorney Generals office has recommended that a payment of $875.49 be paid to the Claimant, Yolanda Richardson, for paid medical expenses and for loss of earnings.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that a payment of $875.49 be paid to the Claimant, Yolanda Richardson, for paid medical expenses and for loss of earnings.

It is further ordered that this case be closed but Claimant may request to reopen her claim if additional expenses are incurred.


author: Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 89-CV-1402

      In re Application of Cheryl Ross

      Order filed October 28, 1991.

    Cheryl Ross, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Rurris, Attorney General (James Maher, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 30, 1988. Cheryl Ross, applicant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1, et seq.

On January 26, 1990, based on an investigatory report from the office of the Attorney General, this Court denied compensation on the grounds that applicant was a knowing participant in a cocaine transaction with her boyfriend on June 30, 1988. During the alleged cocaine transportation, she was shot in the head and suffered partial blindness. Applicant filed a timely petition for a hearing, objecting to the conclusions in the order.

At the hearing on November 16, 1990, applicant testified that she was not a knowing participant in any narcotics transportation on the day she was shot. In addition, applicant’s testimony was corroborated by a witness, Deborah Bates, who testified that she had known applicant for 20 years and that she had never known her to be involved in the sale of narcotics.

The State of Illinois did not present any testimony to contradict the testimony of Ross and her witness. The State introduced police reports on the incident to which the applicant voiced no objection. The reports contained hearsay evidence of individuals involved in and charged with the shooting. Such reports are admissible in claims under the Act in the discretion of the Commissioner hearing the case. (740 ILCS 45/13.1.) However, the Court will only give such reports the weight they deserve under the circumstances and with knowledge of their technical legal deficiencies.

Having weighed the evidence in this case, it is hereby ordered that the order of January 26, 1990, is reversed with a finding that the applicants conduct did not contribute to her injuries.

Applicant also presented information regarding her losses which include medical expenses and possible lost wages. As the primary focus of the hearing was the grounds for the initial denial of benefits, this issue was not fully litigated. The record does indicate that $1,071 is owed to Michael Reese Hospital, that $1,200 is owed to an ocularist, Robert B. Scott, and that $203 is owed the City of Chicago for ambulance services. The record is inconclusive as to expenses covered by public aid and lost wages.

It is hereby ordered that awards are made to the applicant and the providers noted above and co-payable in said amounts. It is further ordered that the claim is referred to the office of the Attorney General for further investigation and report on the issues of public aid coverage and lost wages. This order will not become final for 30 days during which time any objections hereto on this issue of public aid coverage must be raised.


text:
    (No. 90-CV-0367

      In re Application of Birdie Drake

      Opinion filed October 19, 1993.

      Opinion filed November 7, 1994.

    Brick, Gentry, Bowers, Swartz, Stoltze, Schuling & Levis (Thomas J. Levis, of counsel) and Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon (Louis R Vitullo and Richard P. Glovka, of counsel), for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (James Maher and Paul H. Cho, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Per Curiam

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 7, 1989. The Claimant, Birdie Drake, mother of the victim, Ray A. Drake, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1, et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on September 19, 1989, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

(1) That on August 7, 1989, the Claimants son, Ray A. Drake, age 20, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: aggravated battery.

(2) That the crime occurred in Maywood, Illinois, and all of the eligibility requirements of section 6.1 of the Act have been met.

(3) That the victim is permanently disabled as a result of the incident and is confined to a wheelchair.

(4) That the Claimant seeks compensation on behalf of the victim for wheelchair accessories and for adaptions/ additions to her residence for wheelchair accessibility.

(5) That the expenses for which Claimant seeks compensation are not specifically enumerated as a pecuniary loss under section 2(h) of the Act.

(6) That section 10.1 of the Act states that a victim may be compensated for his pecuniary loss.

(7) That the wheelchair accessories may possibly be considered prosthetic appliances pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, but the Court is not advised as to the amount of or nature of the accessories and requires such information to substantiate the claim.

(8) That Claimant has indicated that she may incur medical/hospital expenses in the future as a result of the incident. Should the Claimant incur these expenses, she may petition the Court to reopen consideration of this claim for additional compensation, pursuant to section 16 of the Act.

(9) That this is a case of first impression in this Court as to adaptions of a residence.

(10) That the Court has consistently strictly construed the Act.

(11) That the Court invites the Claimant to properly substantiate the wheelchair accessories portion of the claim for the Court and to request a trial so that the full Court can consider these issues.

It is therefore ordered that this claim is denied.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

This claim arises out of a violent crime that was committed on August 7, 1989. The victim, Ray A. Drake, was 20 years of age at the time of the incident. The Claimant, Birdie Drake, is the victims mother and is seeking compensation pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act (hereinafter the “Act"). 740 ILCS 45/1, et seq.

Claimant, a resident of the State of Iowa, has made an application for a total of $22,348.80 in compensation for two major expenditures incurred on behalf of the victim. Claimant seeks: (a) the sum of $19,000 for remodeling and structural adaptions made to the house owned by her and her husband, Earl Drake; and (b) the sum, of $3,348.80 for the installation of a wheelchair lift and strap-down accessories for a 1978 van owned by her and her husband.

Procedural Background

The office of the Attorney General filed an investigatory report with the Court, recommending payment of the sums requested. Paragraph 6 of the recommendation states that the expenses incurred are not specifically enumerated as a pecuniary loss under section 2 of the Act. The paragraph supports the recommendation by concluding that the expenses were incurred directly as a result of the victims injuries and are necessary for the victims welfare.

On October 19, 1993, the Court issued an opinion finding that Ray A. Drake was a victim of a violent crime, but denied the claim. The Court stated that it has consistently strictly construed the Act and the expenses are not specifically enumerated as a pecuniary loss in section 2(h) of the Act, pars. 5 and 10 of opinion. The Court indicated that wheelchair accessories may possibly be considered prosthetic appliances pursuant to section 2(h) but no information was available in regard to the amount of, or nature of, the accessories, par. 7 of opinion. The Court found the case to be one of the first impression and invited the Claimant to request a trial to enable the Court to consider these issues.

Claimant filed a six-page request for hearing, together with four exhibits, detailing the basis of her claim. A hearing was conducted on October 14, 1994, at which Claimant appeared and testified. Claimant was represented by her counsel from the State of Iowa and two co-counsel from the State of Illinois. Claimant presented four exhibits and all four were admitted into the record. The exhibits are as follows:

(a) an affidavit by Deb Mau, social worker at Des Moines General Hospital. Claimants Exhibit No. 1;
(b) an affidavit by Daniel Rruflodt, social worker at Younker Rehabilitation Center in Des Moines. Claimants Exhibit No. 2;
(c) an affidavit by Charles W. Ruperto, owner of Complete Line Remodeling, Inc. Claimants Exhibit No. 3;
(d) an affidavit by Leonard Stevenson, owner of Thomas Bus Sales of Iowa, Inc. Claimants Exhibit No. 4.

The office of the Attorney General called David Ubell, deputy chief of the crime victims office, as a witness. At the conclusion of the hearing, the office of the Attorney General recommended that the award not be made because the expenses were not expressly covered by the Act.

Upon request by Claimant, the Commissioner indicated that the record would remain open for one week to allow submission of further documents. Claimants counsel forwarded four additional exhibits. On October 24, the Commissioner called Mr. Cho, assistant Attorney General, to determine whether he received copies and whether he objected to their admission into the record. Mr. Cho stated that he received the exhibits and did not object to them being made a part of the record. The Court considers the following exhibits as part of the record:

(a) an affidavit by Ronnie Hawkins, M.D., a doctor for Ray Drake. Claimants Exhibit No. 5;
(b) A copy of the Iowa crime victim s statute. Claimants Exhibit No. 6;
(c) a copy of the relevant portion of Iowa Policy Index. Claimants Exhibit No. 7;
(d) a copy of the relevant portions of the Federal Victim Compensation Grant Statute. Claimants Exhibit No. 8; and
(e) a copy of the decree of foreclosure on the Drake s house. Claimants Exhibit No. 9.

Testimony of Claimant

At the hearing, Claimant testified that she resides at 1613 West 12th Street, Des Moines, Iowa. (R. 2.) Her son was going to college in Illinois. On August 7, 1989, he was shot in the head in Maywood, Illinois. After staying at Loyola Hospital for two weeks he was flown to Des Moines General Hospital (hereinafter “DMGH”) in Iowa. He was in DMGH for seven to eight months. (R. 8.) Ray Drake is a quadriplegic, and confined to a wheelchair. R. 11.

Deb Mau, the social worker at DMGH, contacted Lisa Smith, of the Illinois Attorney Generals office, and was “assured” that Ray Drake had $25,000 available. (R. 8-9.) See Claimants Exhibit No. 1, pan 4.

Ray Drake was moved from DMGH to Iowa Methodist Medical Center in Des Moines for rehabilitation. Dan Bruflodt, a social worker, contacted Lisa Smith and she “assured” him that the funds were available for Ray Drake. (See Claimants Exhibit No. 2, par. 11.) The social workers contacted Charles Ruperto to construct adaptions to the Drakes house. Ruperto told Claimant that he had the approval to build the bathroom for Ray Drake. R. 9.

Ruperto “put in a real expensive shower” to protect Ray Drake from changes in water temperature. R. 10.

Claimant talked to Lisa Smith and she told Claimant that the funds were available for both the hydraulic lift on the 1978 van and the adaptations to the house. R. 12 and 17.

At the time of Ray Drake s injury, Claimant was employed at Younkers department store in Des Moines. Her husband, Earl, was retired. (R. 13.) She and her husband do not have the ability to pay Complete Line Remodeling and Thomas Bus Sales. Claimant stated that she would not have agreed to allow Mr. Ruperto to do the work had the Attorney Generals office indicated that there was a chance that she might have to pay for the work by Complete Line Remodeling and Thomas Bus Sales. R. 14-5.

Claimant’s house is a two-story structure without bathroom facilities on the main floor or an elevator. (R. 15.) If the bathroom was not added, Claimant stated that her son would be in DMGH or Iowa Methodist. (R. 15-6.) Ray Drake is incapable of caring for himself, and would be hospitalized and incurring medical bills. Without the lift, there would be no other way to transport her son. He needed the lift to travel for additional rehabilitation. (R. 16.) The bathroom and lift were medically required by the doctors. R. 17.

Claimant stated that her house has been foreclosed upon to satisfy the debt owed to Complete Line Remodeling, and an Iowa court has ordered the house sold at a sheriff’s sale. (R. 18.) See Claimant’s Exhibit No. 9.

On cross-examination, Claimant agreed that no one from Thomas Bus Sales told her that she would not be responsible for payment. She also said that no one from Thomas Bus Sales told her that the responsibility would fall on her if the bill was not paid by the State of Illinois. (R. 22.) Although Claimant agreed that she saw the proposal by Complete Line Remodeling before any work was commenced on her home, she maintained that she was verbally told that the State of Illinois was going to pay the costs. R. 23.

On redirect examination, Claimant stated that she did not participate in the selection of the contractor who did the work on her house. R. 25.

Although Claimant indicated that the work was medically required by doctors, she did not recall the name of the doctor and stated that she was unaware whether the requirement was put in writing. R. 27.

Claimant signed the contract with Complete Line Remodeling but did not sign the contract with Thomas Bus Lines. R. 27-8.

Testimony of David Ubell

The office of the Attorney General called David Ubell, assistant division chief of the crime victims division of the Attorney Generals office, as a witness. He oversees the daily operations of the division. (R. 36.) He was not aware of Lisa Smith, a claims analyst, making any promises to the Drake family. (R. 38-9.) A claims analyst does not have the authority to promise payment. (R. 40.) He acknowledges that the Drake claim did not meet all of the statutory guidelines, but indicated that the recommendation was made because the Attorney Generals office was “moved by their plight.” He believed wheelchairs might be considered prosthetic devices. R. 41-2.

Ubell recalled speaking to Deb Mau and telling her the procedures for filing an application. He specifically rejected her statement included in her affidavit (par. 4 of Claimants Exhibit No. 1), denying that he assured her that up to $25,000 was available to assist the Drakes. (R. 44-5.) He explained to Deb Mau that the role of the Atr tomey Generals office is to make a recommendation and the Court of Claims makes the final decision. (R. 46.) He did not recall having a conversation with Daniel Bruflodt, Charles Ruperto, Leonard Stevenson or anyone from the Drake family. R. 46-7.

Ubell was not aware of any case in which an award was made for making homes handicapped-accessible or for making vans wheelchair-accessible. R. 48.

On cross-examination, Ubell acknowledged that he did not know what Lisa Smith said to the individuals involved. (R. 51.) Although speculative in nature, he agreed that a claims analyst might make promises of awards. (R. 51-2.) Lisa Smith told him that she did not guarantee anything. R. 52.

Additional Facts

The work performed on the house was to construct a wheelchair-accessible bathroom, widen the door, and build a ramp. (R. 57.) The work included the conversion of a porch into a bathroom and added a special rolling toilet and a scald-proof shower device. Although the first floor dining room was converted into a bedroom, the cost is not included in the claim. (R. 58-9.) The contract does not provide a detailed itemization of cost for labor, supplies or equipment. Claimants Exhibit no. 2.

The bill for the work on the van does not include the cost of the wheelchair and no claim is made for the wheelchair. (R. 59.) Claimant is not seeking any compensation for medical or hospital bills. R. 60.

The Iowa court acting on the mechanic’s lien by Complete Line Remodeling did not question the dollar amount sought and found that $19,000 was owed to the contractor. Neither the contractor nor Thomas Bus Sales filed a lawsuit against anyone other than the Drakes. The Drakes have not filed a lawsuit against anyone. R. 60.

Bids were not sought from any contractor other than Ruperto (Complete Line Remodeling). The hospital staff met with Ruperto and made a determination as to the cost. R. 61.

No bids were sought for work on the van other than the one from Thomas Bus Sales. Des Moines does have taxi service and a mass transportation district. Claimants counsel stated that the taxi service did not provide transportation for persons with disabilities, but he did not know whether the mass transit district provided such service. R. 62-3.

Claimants counsel indicated that the State of Iowa has a Crime Victim Compensation Act. He stated that the Iowa Act provides for the type of compensation which is claimed in this case. He discussed the instant claim with Kelly Brody, director of Iowa Crime Victims Fund, and was told that the claim would not be covered by the Iowa Act. R. 67-8.

Claimants Argument

Claimant prayed for compassion. Deb Mau, Dan Bruflodt and Charles Ruperto were assured of payments by Lisa Smith for making the house and van handicapped accessible. (R. 30-2 and 69; see Claimants exhibits nos. 1, 2 and 3.) Ruperto wrote to Smith indicating that he would not begin work until he was assured of payment. Smith called Ruperto and told him to go ahead. (R. 70.) See Claimants Exhibit No. 3.

Claimant argues that the work falls within the definition of pecuniary loss because it is a medical necessity for Ray Drake. (R. 70.) See Claimants Exhibit No. 5.

If the work was not performed, Ray Drake would be in a hospital and the State of Illinois would pay $25,000 for doctor bills. The purpose of the Act is to help victims with medical problems. R. 70-1.

Claimant provided a copy of a document apparently produced by the U.S. Department of Justice in 1991, entitled Voca Victim Compensation Grant Program Technical Assistance Document. (Claimant's Exhibit No. 8.) Claimant highlighted two provisions. The first provision specifies that state crime victim compensation programs must make awards to non-residents on the same basis awards are made to resident victims. (Claimants Exhibit No. 8, pg. 3.) The second highlighted provision indicates that some states award compensation for expenses that are not required by Federal law including, “building adaption for those disabled by a compensable crime.” (Claimants Exhibit No. 8, pg. 5.) Neither of the provisions impact the statutory interpretation of the Illinois Act.

Assistant Attorney General s Argument

The assistant Attorney General argues that there was never a contract established between the contractors and the State of Illinois. Dan Bruflodt made all of the arrangements with the contractors. (R. 72.) The question of whether compensation should be paid for making the home and van handicapped accessible should be taken up by the Illinois Legislature and not decided in this proceeding. The assistant Attorney General stated that the Courts decision should be affirmed. R. 74.

Issues

Neither Claimant or the Attorney General’s office filed a memorandum in support of their positions. No cases have been cited in support of either’s position.

There are several issues raised by this claim. Although the office of the Attorney General argues that no contract was made between the State of Illinois and the contractors (or the Drakes) that does not appear to be one of the issues. Neither the Drakes or the contractors have filed an action to enforce a contract. Therefore, the issue central to a decision revolves around the interpretation of certain language in the Act.

Section 10.1(a) of the Act provides that, “a victim may be compensated for his pecuniary loss.” Pecuniary loss is defined in section 2(h) and includes a wide range of expenses including medical/hospital expenses; prosthetic appliances; paid tuition; and loss of earnings. Prior to addressing whether the expenses are a recoverable pecuniary loss pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, we point out that there is an issue as to whether Claimant has standing pursuant to the Act to recover any expenses. This issue was not raised in the Attorney Generals' investigatory report. Ray Drake was 20 years of age and not a minor, under Illinois or Iowa law, at the time of the incident. (R. 65.) (See 755 ILCS 5/11 — 1.) He was not suffering from any disability prior to the incident. (R. 66.) Although the Crime Victims Compensation application is signed as follows: “Ray A. Drake by Birdie M. Drake (mother),” it lists Birdie Drake as the applicant. In this case the victim is not seeking any compensation. The expenses claimed are expenses apparently incurred or owed by Birdie Drake. Because Birdie Drake is not a victim, as defined by section 2(d) of the Act, the authority for her to recover is provided by section 10.1(c). Section 10.1(c) states that any person related to the victim may be compensated for reasonable funeral, medical, and hospital expenses of the victim to the extent to which he has paid or become obligated to pay such expenses. Subparagraph (c) does not specify recovery for the broader “pecuniary loss” but instead limits recovery to three items: funeral, hospital, and medical expenses.

Claimant argues that the expenses claimed are medically necessary. The affidavit of Dr. Hawkins states that Ray Drake has been and continues to be a patient of his. He states that the handicapped bathroom and the wheelchair lift were “medically necessary in the care and treatment of Ray Drake s post-gunshot condition.” (Par. 4 of Claimant’s Exhibit No. 5.) Dr. Hawkins does not state that such adaptions were prescribed by him or any other doctor. There is no statement that such adaptions were made as a condition of Ray Drake’s release from any hospital.

A functional analysis may be applied to the issue of whether to compensate for work performed on the house. Regardless of the distinctions made in the analysis below, which are only logical assumptions and are not argued by the Claimant or specifically supported by the record, the expenses for these adaptions to the house are not expressly contained in the definition of pecuniary loss in the Act. Part of the expenses incurred in the remodeling of the residence was to construct a bathroom on the first floor, where one did not previously exist, including the cost of the special rolling toilet and the scald-proof shower. The other portion of the expenses is for the construction of a ramp and the widening of the door. Both expenses appear to make the quadriplegic’s life, and the family’s, more convenient. The record does not reflect whether these expenses enable the victim to become more self sufficient. The ramp and widened doorway presumptively allow the victim to have ingress and egress to his residence, which may be important on the issue of his safety in cases of an emergency and potentially help make the victim more self sufficient.

The expenses incurred in the installation of a wheelchair lift and strap-down accessories for the van are not specifically included in the Act. The work performed assumptively makes transportation more convenient for Ray Drake and his family, but it does not make him more self sufficient.

In the event the work was not performed, the record does not indicate that Ray Drake would be deprived of a shower, bathroom facilities, shelter or transportation. The lack of statutory authority supports a denial of the claim by the victim s mother because the work performed is not a funeral, medical or hospital expense. The Act does not allow compensation for expenses that are “medically necessary.” Claimants counsel expressly stated that Claimant was not seeking medical or hospital expenses. (R. 60.)

If Claimant had standing to claim “pecuniary loss” pursuant to this application, then a determination whether this Claimant qualifies should be made. Section 2(h) of the Act authorizes victims to receive compensation for prosthetic appliances. It is not clear whether any of the adaptions or accessories could be considered a prosthetic appliance. The general definition of prosthetic, or prosthesis, is the replacement of a missing part of the body, such as a limb, eye, or tooth by artificial substitute (Webster’s New World Dictionary), or a fabricated substitute for a diseased or missing part of the body (Stedmans Medical Dictionary).

The Court’s opinion raised the issue of whether wheelchair accessories qualify as prosthetic appliances. The contract provides limited detail on what accessories were provided. It appears that a total net cost of $250 was charged for “Aeroquip 4 point tie down” and “Cam lock tie down and labor.” ($400 in charges minus a credit of $150 for a net charge of $250.)

Strictly construing the Act, we conclude that no compensation should be awarded. None of the work performed involved the replacement of any limb, eye, tooth or other body part. We cannot find that the items for which compensation is sought are prosthetic appliances. Not only would such a construction make it extremely difficult to draw the line in this and future cases, we find that consideration of such an expansion of the coverage of the Act should only be undertaken by the General Assembly.

It is clear that Claimant is not eligible for compensation pursuant to the Act. Although counsel for Claimant has indicated that Claimant would not be eligible for compensation under the Iowa Act, that question is not clear. Section 912.5(4) of the Iowa Act specifies that an Iowa resident injured in another state may file for compensation in Iowa if the other state, “does not have an eligible crime victim compensation program as such is defined in the Federal Victims of Crime Act of 1984.” Illinois has such a program, but its program does not allow compensation for these expenses. Apparently, the Iowa Act has been interpreted to allow recovery for these expenses. (Claimants Exhibit No. 6.) The Iowa Act does not specifically state that adaptions to a house or a van are compensable, but the Iowa policy index provided by Claimants counsel would appear to allow compensation for expenses incurred for work performed which is medically necessary equipment and property alterations. The language is as follows:

“The program will pay for ‘medically necessary’ equipment and property alteration which is prescribed by the victim’s physician. Medically necessary is defined as items necessary to facilitate the physical recovery and well-being of the victim. Reimbursement is allowed for, but not limited to the following: wheelchairs, wheelchair ramp, life line support system, TENS unit, crutches, telephone equipped for the hearing impaired or physically disabled if the handicap is the result of the crime. All requests for medical equipment and property alteration must be reviewed and approved by the Deputy Director.” (Claimant’s Exhibit No. 7.)

A reasonable interpretation of section 912.5 of the Iowa Act would lead to the conclusion that compensation in the State of Iowa could not be awarded because Illinois has a victim compensation program as defined by Federal law. The language in the Illinois Act, section 2(d), pertaining to Illinois residents who are victims in other states is different and may be interpreted to allow coverage even if the other states’ laws did not. However, that issue is not before us now and we do not make that holding here. The fact that Claimant, her counsel or the' director of the Iowa program assumed that the State of Illinois would cover the expenses, regardless of what anyone from the Attorney General’s office might have said, is not relevant.

This is an unfortunate set of circumstances. It is one that should be addressed by the legislature. The Illinois General Assembly may determine whether the Act should expressly cover the type of compensation sought in this claim. The assistance of the General Assembly could be requested by Claimant by either seeking a pecuniary award or by having the language of the Act revised to permit recovery. We will advise the appropriate members of this decision. We will, however, not make a recommendation.

The Court also finds the manner in which the scope and costs of the work performed was determined to be questionable. The record indicates that third parties determined who the contractors would be, and together with the contractors decided on the scope and costs of the work to be performed. The applicant’s participation in the process appears to be minimal and limited to only consenting to the work. In the event public funds are utilized in work performed on real property, it is generally accepted, and required, that agents of the public entity responsible for expending the funds perform a role in the selection of contractors, determination of scope and costs of work, and supervision of the project. This role is recognized in the Iowa Policy Index. (Claimant’s Exhibit No. 7.) These safeguards do not exist in this case. Because the Illinois Act does not recognize these expenses, no such safeguards are established in Illinois. Until the Illinois General Assembly determines that property alterations are permitted, and estabhshes safeguards for the protection of pubhc funds, awards for property alterations will not be made.

We are mindful of the extremely tragic circumstances and are very sympathetic but we are constrained to follow the law. It is hereby ordered that this claim is denied.


author: Per Curiam Epstein, J.

text:
    (No. 91-CV-0827
    Fannie Ford, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 3, 1992.

      Opinion on reconsideration filed June 9, 1995.

    Fannie Ford, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris and Jim Ryan, Attorneys General (Charles A. Davis, Jr. and Paul H. Cho, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 19, 1990. Fannie Ford, mother of the deceased victim, Ellery R. Ford, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereby referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1, et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on October 18, 1990, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

(1) That on August 19, 1990, the victim was shot by the alleged offender. The incident occurred near 842 North Springfield, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the alleged offender was selling narcotics for the victim, who had a history of drug-related offenses, and that the victim owed the alleged offender money as a result of their transactions. The alleged offender confronted the victim about this debt and during an ensuing argument, shot the victim. There is currently a warrant for the arrest of the alleged offender.

(2) That section 10.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victims acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

(3) That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim was shot as a result of his involvement in the illegal sale of narcotics. Further, the victim had a history of drug-related offenses.

(4) That the victim’s conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

(5) That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION ON RECONSIDERATION

Epstein, J.

This claim under the Crime Victims Compensation Act (the “Act”) is before this Court for the third time. The Court denied this claim in 1992 on the papers filed and the recommendation of the Attorney General, finding that the claim was barred under the Act because the victim was murdered as a result of his involvement in illegal narcotics dealings such that his own conduct substantially contributed to his death. At the Claimant’s request, the court in 1994 ordered reconsideration and a hearing, which was held before Commissioner Michael D. Fryzel on April 8, 1994. This claim is now before us for reconsideration on the hearing record and the report of our Commissioner.

The victim, Ellery R. Ford, was shot to death on August 19, 1990, on North Springfield Street in Chicago, Illinois, by a man named Desi Smith. The victim’s mother, Fannie Ford, filed this $2,750.80 claim for funeral expenses under the Act on October 18,1990.

The facts and the immediate circumstances of the victims death are undisputed. The causal connections between his death and his own conduct, based on the evidence and on inferences drawn from the evidenced facts, are less clear. The backdrop to this tragedy, also undisputed, is that the victim had a history of drug-related offenses, had been convicted, and had served time in prison. His killing followed his release from prison, at a time when the Claimant and several witnesses contend the victim had abandoned his involvement with drugs and had undergone “rehabilitation.”

The police investigation report indicated that the killer, Desi Smith, had sold narcotics for the victim. The victim reportedly owed Smith money as a result of prior drug dealings. On the critical occasion, Smith confronted the victim about the debt. The victim left his companion and went to talk to Smith privately. An argument ensued. Smith shot the victim. An arrest warrant was issued for Smith. (The Court is not advised of the disposition, if any, of the charges against Smith, which in any event is irrelevant to our determination under the Act.)

In the hearing before Commissioner Fryzel, Ms. Caprice Morales, a friend of the victim and a witness to the shooting, testified that the victim appeared to be rehabilitated after his release from prison and that he was substantially a changed person. She testified that he had stopped using drugs, was engaged to be married, that he spent time motivating kids and engaging in other salutary activities, and was no longer involved with drugs. Ms. Morales also testified that the argument that led to the shooting was about a drug debt that the victim owed his killer from previous drug deals. She testified that the two men asked her to leave so that they could have privacy while they talked.

Other testimony and several written submissions support the view, articulated most strongly by the Claimant, Mrs. Ford, that the victim was genuinely rehabilitated and had abandoned his prior involvement with the drug trade. This evidence was uncontradicted.

Given the undisputed facts, it is clear that this claim meets the threshold requirements of the Act for an award for losses caused by a qualified violent crime, and murder is clearly a covered crime under the Act. The focus of the inquiry in this case is the victim s contributory guilt or causation to his own death. This issue derives from section 10.1(d) of the Act, which provides as follows:

“(d) an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim’s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of die victim;”

Under this statutory standard, the dispositive issue before us is the extent, if any, that the victim s “acts or conduct” or his “prior criminal * * * conduct” contributed, directly or indirectly, to his death. As applied to the facts of this case, the statute requires us to determine the extent to which two factors may have “provoked or contributed” to the argument and shooting that caused the victim s death: (1) the victims prior involvement in illegal drug sales, and (2) his own conduct at the time of the shooting.

Because the argument and shooting arose out of a drug debt, we must conclude that the victim s prior illegal activities were a causative factor. On the other hand, because it was the killer rather than the victim who invoked (and plainly sought to collect) the illegal drug debt, because there is no evidence that the victim provoked the argument with his murderer or that he was involved in illegal activities at the time of his death or after his release from prison, and because the court is persuaded that the victim was in some measure rehabilitated, we find that the victim's conduct at the time of the violent crime did not contribute to his death.

Accordingly, the award must be reduced by a factor reflecting the contributory involvement of the victim’s prior involvement in the drug traffic. After due consideration of the facts presented, in light of the victim's later apparent rehabilitation, we conclude that the award should be reduced by 25%. Our determination is supported and influenced by our view that the public policy underlying the Act’s contributory reduction requirement is to discourage, and to avoid State support for, illegal and violence-provoking conduct. That policy has reduced application in the case of a victim like Mr. Ford who appears to have surmounted his illegal past or at least to have been in the process of doing so. Such rehabilitation, in the words of the Claimant, is to be encouraged not discouraged. Nevertheless, the statute requires a measured reduction, and we have settled on 25% as the appropriate measure to reflect and balance the foregoing considerations.

The prior order of this Court is reversed, and the claim of Fannie Ford is allowed in the amount of $2,750.80, reduced by 25%. Claimant Fannie Ford is awarded the sum of $2,063.

Claim allowed. Claimant awarded $2,063.