text:
    (No. 95-CV-0137

      In re Application of Carmen Melendez

      Order filed December 6, 1994.

      Order filed July 9, 1996.

    Carmen Melendez, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris and Jim Ryan, Attorneys General (Paul H. Cho, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on November 2, 1992. Carmen Melendez, mother of the deceased victim, Juan A. Melendez, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 19, 1994, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on November 2, 1992, the victim was shot by an offender who was known to him. The incident occurred at 3049 West Belden, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the victim and his companion, both known members of a street gang, went to this area to confront members of a rival street gang over a previous fight between their gangs. A verbal altercation ensued between the members of the opposing gangs. During this dispute, the offender, a member of the rival street gang, approached the group, produced a handgun and shot the victim and his companion. The offender was apprehended, prosecuted and convicted of first degree murder.

2. That section 10.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim and the offender were members of opposing street gangs. This incident occurred as a result of their gang affiliation, gang rivalry and face to face provocation.

4. That the victim s conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Sommer, C.J.

By an order dated December 6, 1994, this Court denied the claim of Ms. Carmen Melendez for funeral benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act for the death of her son, Juan. Ms. Melendez requested a hearing, and a hearing was held by Commissioner Griffin on December 18, 1995. Additionally, the Claimant appeared before Commissioner Kane on March 11, 1996, subsequent to Commissioner Griffins retirement. At that time, Ms. Melendez was allowed to supplement her testimony with any documents she felt were relevant to the issue.

By our previous order, this Court denied an award to the Claimant because the victims actions contributed to his death: specifically, his involvement in a street gang. While Ms. Melendez maintains that the shooting of her son was a random isolated incident which was not the byproduct of rival gangs, she admits that her son was, in fact, a member of a street gang; and the witnesses interviewed by the police confirmed this fact.

Ms. Melendez lost her son in the cycle of violence which is self-perpetuating in the city of Chicago. Both her son and the other young man who was shot, had gone to the location of the shooting to discuss a previous gang fight with members of an opposing gang. It was during this discussion which became heated that Juan Melendez was shot to death by a member of the other gang. The victim was a member of a street gang, and it was his participation in gang activities which led to his death. Thus, the victims conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant denial of this claim.

It is therefore ordered that the order of this Court dated December 6, 1994, is affirmed and this claim is dismissed.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam. Frederick, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 95-CV-0298

      In re Application of Margaret Schlotmann

      Order filed March 2, 1995.

      Opinion filed November 6, 1996.

    Margaret Schlotmann, pro se, for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Paul H. Cho and Donald C. McLaughlin, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on January 22, 1994. Margaret Schlotmann, mother of the deceased victim, Linda Schlotmann, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740ILCS 45/1, et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on August 1, 1994, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on January 22, 1994, the victim was shot by an unknown offender. The incident occurred on Laura Lee Street, Cahokia, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the victim and a companion went to this area to purchase'illegal narcotics. While driving along the street, the victim and her companion allowed the offender to enter their vehicle in order to complete the drug transaction. The offender then produced a handgun and announced a robbery. The offender then fatally shot the victim and fled the scene. The offender has not been apprehended.

2. That section 10.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim’s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that at the time of the incident, the victim and a companion were attempting to purchase illegal narcotics from the offender. During a subsequent robbery attempt, the offender shot the victim.

4. That the victim’s conduct contributed to her death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and. is hereby denied.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

This claim is before the Court on an application for compensation filed by the Claimant, Margaret Schlotmann, under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. (740 ILCS 45/1, et seq.) The Claimant filed an application alleging she was entitled to compensation for funeral and burial expenses resulting from the homicidal death of her daughter, Linda Schlotmann, on January 22, 1994.

An order was entered by this Court on March 2, 1995, denying the claim due to the victims conduct contributing to her death to such an extent as to warrant the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation pursuant to section 10.1(d) of the Act. The Court found the victim contributed to her death by going to the area in which she was killed for the purpose of purchasing narcotics. The victim was shot to death when the narcotics seller robbed the victim and her companion. The Claimant made a timely request for a hearing pursuant to section 13.1 of the Act. A hearing was held before the Commissioner on April 30, 1996. The evidence consists of the testimony of the Claimant.

According to the Claimants testimony, her daughter, the victim, was not purchasing narcotics herself but her companion was. The Claimant stated that the victim was attempting to get treatment for substance abuse and was assisting the United States Drug Enforcement Administration by turning in crack houses. However, there was no evidence that at .the time of her death, the victim was assisting authorities. The victims assailant was charged with first degree murder and armed robbery and was sentenced to 35 years in prison.

Section 10.1 of the Act provides that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victims acts or conduct provoked or contributed to her injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim. This Court has denied awards where the death of a victim was immediately preceded by a drug transaction involving the victim. (In re Application of Martinez (1981), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 525; In re Application of Wintrol (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 409.) In Martinez, the victim was killed in an area where he went to buy heroin. (Martinez, 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 526.) In Wintrol, the victim went to an apartment building to buy narcotics for an acquaintance, was sexually assaulted, and fell from a second-story window attempting to escape from her attackers. Wintrol, 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. at 410.

The only apparent differences between these cases and the instant case appear to be that a companion, not the victim, was purchasing narcotics and that the victim may have assisted authorities in investigating drug dealers. However, there was no evidence presented that the victim was unaware that she was going to an area where drug trafficking was prevalent for the purpose of purchasing narcotics. In addition, there was no evidence presented that this trip by the victim was in any way related to any assistance she was providing law enforcement authorities. The Act was meant to lessen the hardship on the innocent victims of crime and their families. The victim here was not a totally innocent victim but was present at an unlawful drug transaction. Therefore, due to the fact that the victims actions contributed to her death, it is the opinion of the Court that the claim be denied.

The Claimant did submit an affidavit by one David M. Kahn indicating he had knowledge that the decedent cooperated with law enforcement officials. There is nothing in the affidavit to indicate that Mr. Kahn is with a police agency. In fairness, we will grant Claimant 60 days to file with the Court an affidavit, signed by a law enforcement official on official letterhead, indicating that the decedent was assisting police at the time of her death. In the-event such an affidavit is filed, the Court will reconsider the claims denial. In the event such affidavit is not filed, then and in that event, this claim is dismissed with prejudice on the sixty-first day following the entry of this opinion without further order.


author: Per Curiam. JANN, J. Jann, J. Jann, J.

text:
    (No. 95-CV-1334

      In re Application of Marie Moore

      Order filed January 27, 1995.

      Opinion filed December 4, 1995.

      Order filed February 22, 1996.

    Marie Moore, pro se, for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Paul H. Cho and Donald McLaughlin, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on October 10, 1994. Marie Moore, mother of the deceased victim, Louis Jackson, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1, et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on November 9,1994, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on October 10, 1994, the victim was shot, allegedly by an offender who was known to him. The incident occurred near 6419 South Hamilton, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that prior to the incident, the victim and the alleged offender were involved in a dice game and were gambling for money. After the dice game concluded, the alleged offender initiated a verbal dispute with the victim over the money he had lost. During this dispute, the alleged offender produced a handgun and shot the victim. The alleged offender has been apprehended and charged with first degree murder. The criminal proceedings against him are currently pending.

While removing the body of the victim from the scene, the investigating police officers discovered a large plastic bag containing several smaller plastic bags in which a crushed green plant substance was observed. An investigation by the Chicago Police Crime Lab determined that this substance was marijuana.

2. That section 10.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victims acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that prior to the incident, the victim and the alleged offender were gambling. As a result of these actions, the alleged offender shot the victim during a dispute concerning the money he lost. Further, the victim was in possession of an illegal narcotic at the time of the incident.

4. That the victims conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and is hereby denied.

OPINION

JANN, J.

Marie Moore, mother of deceased victim, Louis Jackson, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1, et seq.

Claimant’s application was denied by order of the Court on January 27, 1995. Louis Jackson had been engaging in illegal gambling just prior to his death. Jackson was shot and killed by the person with whom he was gambling. The investigating police officers discovered a large plastic bag containing several smaller plastic bags in which a crushed green plant substance was observed. Testing at the Chicago Police Crime lab determined that the substance in the decedents possession was marijuana.

Claimant Moore requested a hearing which was held on July 10, 1995, before Commissioner Whipple. Claimant presented no witnesses to the incidents leading to her sons death. She testified that her sons friend had picked him up to go “partying” at 7 p.m. in a black car. The friend was not identified by name.

Understandably, Claimant was devastated by the death of her 16-year-old son. Claimant testified to her love and affection for her son and was proud that he had enrolled in college. Unfortunately, Claimant was unable to provide any evidence which would justify an award in this case. The police investigation clearly indicates that Louis Jackson was involved in illegal conduct which contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that Claimant be denied compensation.

It is hereby ordered that this claim is denied.

ORDER

Jann, J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the applicants request for reconsideration, due notice having been given, and the Court being advised.

It is hereby ordered that the applicants request is denied and this matter is closed.

ORDER

Jann, J.

This cause was presented for rehearing before Commissioner Whipple on December 9, 1996. Claimant’s petition for compensation pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act (740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.), was denied hyorder of the Court on December 4, 1995. Claimant was advised that in order to prevail at rehearing, the assertions and conclusions raised in her petition must be supported by evidence, relevant testimony and/or documentation. (See order of 8/1/96.)

The rehearing transcript and commissioners recommendation submitted herein clearly demonstrate that Claimant has failed to meet her burden of proof. Claimant presented absolutely no evidence to support her claim.

We must therefore deny this claim with prejudice and order this cause closed by the clerk of the Court.


author: Mitchell, J.

text:
    (No. 96-CV-1025

      In re Application of Priscilla Nelson

      Order filed January 17, 1997.

    Priscilla Nelson, pro se, for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Donald McLaughlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Mitchell, J.

This claim is before the Court on an application for compensation filed by the Claimant, Priscilla Nelson, under the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. (740 ILCS 45/1, et seq.) The Claimant filed an application alleging she was entitled to compensation for funeral and burial expenses resulting from the homicidal death of her son, Ricky Nelson, on September 4,1995.

An order was entered by this Court on January 11, 1996, denying the claim due to the victims conduct contributing to his death to such an extent as to warrant the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation pursuant to section 10.1(d) of the Act. The Court found the victim contributed to his death by becoming involved in an altercation with his assailant, in which he swung a bat at his assailant. The Claimant made a timely request for a hearing pursuant to Section 13.1 of the Act. A hearing was held on April 30,1996. The evidence consisted of the testimony of the Claimant and Vanessa McDonald, the victim’s sister; a letter from L. King Funeral Chapel in East St. Louis, Illinois; and a bill for funeral expenses totaling $3,174.72.

According to the testimony, the altercation involving the baseball bat occurred a couple of days or the day before the victim was shot to death. The witnesses stated that, at a coroner’s inquest into the death of the victim, law enforcement officials did not mention an altercation involving a baseball bat. The letter from the funeral home stated that according to the victims death certificate, the cause of death was homicide. The Attorney Generals office produced no evidence to rebut this testimony and evidence nor to impeach the witnesses.

Section 10.1 of the Act provides that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victims acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim. This Court has denied an award where, a short time before the victim was shot and killed, the victim and another person had attacked and severely beaten the offender. (In re Application of Anaya (1981), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 540.) In another case, this Court reduced an award by 25% where the victim was shot as the result of a dispute between the victim and the offender’s brother, whom the victim believed stole his brother’s car radio the night prior to the incident. (In re Application of Hodge (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1016.) That dispute resulted in a fight between the victim and the offender’s brother. During the course of this fight, the offender came out of an apartment and shot the victim. Id. at 1017.

The instant case appears to be more similar to Hodge than Anaya. Here, the original confrontation between the victim and the offender apparentiy did not result in physical harm being done to the offender, as had occurred in Anaya. Furthermore, according to unrebutted testimony, the original confrontation occurred at least one day before the shooting in which the victim was killed. Therefore, due to the fact that the victim’s actions indirectly contributed to his death and because there was a lapse of time between the original confrontation and the shooting, the Claimant, whose funeral expenses claimed exceeded the $3,000 statutory limit, is awarded the $3,000 limit for funeral expenses reduced by 50% due to the victim’s contributing acts, for a total award of $1,500.


author: Sommer, C.J.

text:
    (No. 96-CV-1195

      In re Petition of Maria Lukas

      Order filed June 17, 1997.

    Maria Lukas, pro se, for Claimant.
    Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Donald McLaughlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Sommer, C.J.

This claim was heard on the Claimant’s petition for extension of time to file a claim under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 740 ILCS 45/1 et seq.

The victim, the Claimants husband, was injured in a fight in a supermarket on May 2,1987, and the Claimants petition was filed on October 16, 1995. The petition recited that the victim was comatose after the incident and died on December 12, 1994. The Court referred the Claimants petition to a Commissioner for hearing to determine whether the victim was “legally disabled as a result of the occurrence,” such that he could not file an application under the Act. 740 ILCS 45/6.1(a).

At the hearing, the Claimant testified that the victim was seriously injured in the incident and spent 18 days in intensive care during which time he was in a coma. The victim did come out of the coma and on May 30, 1987, was transferred to the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago where he received treatment for six months. Additionally, in 1987 or 1988, the victim sought counsel as to whether to file under the Act and was advised not to do so by his attorney. The victim died of a heart attack in 1994.

The victim was declared disabled by the Social Security Administration as a result of his injuries incurred on May 2, 1987. The Claimant argues that the victim, therefore, was “legally disabled” for purposes of extending the statute of limitations for filing of claims under the Act. Persons have one year after the incident of violent crime to file under the Act. This one year period may be extended by an additional year by the Court. 740 ILCS 45/6.1(a).

For purposes of extending the time for filing, a person must be “legally disabled,” that is, the person must be an infant or suffering from mental incapacity or incompetency. In re Application of Curry (1994), 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 550, 553.

The victim may have been impaired, but it does not appear that he was incompetent. In the discharge summaiy from the hospital from which the victim was discharged in late May of 1987, the victim was described as alert, walking about, and able to answer questions. The victim discussed filing under the Act with an attorney. This presumes that the victim could understand the availability of the Act and the requirement for filing thereunder. We find that the victim was not incompetent during the period when he could have filed for benefits under the Act.

The Claimant also is alleging that the victim died as a result of the 1987 incident, which occurred six to seven years previously. The victim died in 1994 of a heart attack. There is absolutely no evidence that the 1987 incident caused the victims death other than the Claimants belief.

It is therefore ordered that the Claimants petition for extension of time to file a claim under the Crime Victims Compensation Act is denied, and this Claim is dismissed.


author: Mr. Justice Phillips

text:
    (No. 95
    Claimant awarded $289.30)
    The Importers & Exporters Insurance Company of New York, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 18, 1923.

      • Privilege tax — mistake of fact — when refund may be made. Where the tax is paid and' through an oversight claimant failed to make proper deductions or procure proper credits it is entitled to a refund of the amount of the tax over paid.
    The Importers & Exporters Insurance Company of New York, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; Floyd E. Britton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Importers & Exporters Insurance Company of New York, doing business in this State, filed with the Department of Trade and Commerce its annual report of premiums collected in this State during the calendar year . 1920, as provided by statute.

Pursuant to this report, the Department of Trade and Commerce assessed a privilege tax of $289.30 and allowed no deduction therefrom on account of “Fire Department Taxes” paid in 1920 in Chicago, to-wit: $804.52. The claimant was entitled in law to have the deduction of the $289.30, but neglected to take credit for that sum as it might have done.

It therefore claims that the failure to deduct the same was a mistake of fact and that it is entitled to refund of the $289.30 Privilege Tax so overpaid.

The tax receipt from the City of Chicago dated June 21, 1920, for the taxes imposed under the city ordinance then in force, to-wit: $804.52, is submitted in evidence with other evidence supporting the contention and declaration of claimant. There is no dispute as to claimant’s right to have had or to have taken credit for the said. Privilege Tax at proper time, and no dispute as to the sufficiency of the evidence of the facts; but the defendant insists that said tax was voluntarily paid without protest and that claimant is therefore not entitled to refund of the $289.30, and cites numerous authorities in support thereof.

The claimant contends that by oversight it neglected, as a matter of fact, to procure a proper credit for the said Privilege Tax, as it might under the law have done, and that in consequence thereof it is entitled to a refund as aforesaid.

The claimant cites a case in point in support of its contention, the case of The Firemen’s Insurance Company v. State, 2 Court of Claims, page 220, wherein the court in a parallel case held that “money paid under a mistake of fact may be recovered back, but not so if paid under a misapprehension as to what the law really is.” In this same case the court held that failure to have the proper deduction made in the payment of its taxes was clearly a mistake of fact, caused by forgetfulness, and that the claimant therein was entitled to an award for the amount over paid and claimed as refund.

We have considered all the law cited by the counsel of the respective parties, and without attempting to enter into an elaborate discussion of the law, we are of the opinion that the over payment in the ease at bar was a mistake of fact and that the claimant is entitled to an award for the amount claimed. And we further find that said claim is equitable and that in equity and good conscience it should be paid. We accordingly award the claimant the sum of $289.30.


author: Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

text:
    (No. 29
    Claim denied.)
    Ralph H. Tuttle, by George Tuttle, His Father and Next Friend, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 15, 1924

    Respondeat superior — when State not liable. The State is not liable for the negligence of its employees.
    ' Governmental function — hard, road — construction of. The State in the construction of its Hard Roads exercises a governmental function and is not liable for the negligence or torts of its employees in its construction.
    Harrington Wood and Miles Gray, for claimant.
    Edward J. Britndage, Attorney General; Floyd E. Brit-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim brought for personal injuries sustained by claimant while riding in an automobile on July 18, 1922, on what is known as the Peoria Road north of Springfield. It appears from the declaration of claimant that while he was riding in the car driven by another person, the car collided with a concrete mixer and barricade forming an obstructioii over a portion of the highway while a bridge was being repaired by the agents of the defendant.'

- The claimant sets up and offers evidence to sustain such contention that they were driving along said road at a moderate speed; that the lights on their car were dimmed and in consequence before they struck the obstacles they were unable to observe same on account of the failure of the defendants’ agents to maintain lights on such obstruction.

The defendant coming into court alleges that there were lights burning and offers evidence to sustain such contention.

The defendant also comes and files demurrer setting up in such demurrer the following contentions:

First: That the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to the. State;

Second: That in the absence of statute, the State is not liable for the torts of its officers, agents or employees;

Third: That in constructing, owning, maintaining and operating the concrete mixer complained of, the State was and is exercising a governmental function and is not liable for the torts of its agents in that behalf.

It is the opinion of the court that the demurrer should be sustained as we believe that as the law now stands there can be no construction placed upon our laws that would cause the ' court to consider this action as a legal liability.

It is however urged by the claimant that the doctrine of equity and good conscience should be applied. It is the opinion of this court that this rule should not be invoked in this particular case because in the first instance it does not appear to the court that the legislature intended to have it so considered. As a matter of fact if the legislature intended that this court should be the medium through which the State becomes liable, for this class of cases, then the legislature should so specifically state. It is the opinion of the court that it is without the province of this court to indulge in presumptions. The court is aware of the fact the State has now under way a great hard road building program through which a great multitude of actions, will naturally arise through personal injuries and otherwise. Of this situation the legislature was fully advised. Yet no law was made by that bod; to alter, vary or contradict the principles announced and set forth in the demurrer filed herein by the defendant.

It is further the opinion of the court that there is a matter of controversy as disclosed by the evidence filed herein as to whether or not the proper care was exercised by the claimant or the driver. It would seem to the court that the car must have been driven at a rather violent speed to run 150 feet after striking such a heavy obstacle as the cement mixer and barricade. Of course the mixer might have been near the embankment, yet it would seem that it would require considerable impact to have turned it as the evidence disclosed.

Therefore for the reasons stated this court is of the opinion that the State is not liable either as a matter of law or under the rule of equity and social justice. The claim is therefore disallowed.


author: Mr. Justice Leech

text:
    (No. 649
    Claimant awarded $25.00)
    Atlas Mills (Corp.), Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 15, 1924.

    Pure food act — when moneys paid under may he refunded. When moneys have been paid to the State, that claimant was not required by law to pay, a refund of the amount paid will be awarded.
    Atlas Mills, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by the Atlas Mills, claimant, against the State of Illinois, setting forth that the Atlas Mills has paid into the state treasury of the State, of Illinois through the Department of Agriculture the sum of $25.00 under the erroneous impression that said claimant was obliged to make this payment under the Pure Pood Law; that under the laws of the State of Illinois said claimant was not obliged to pay said amount for the reason that the commodities sold by said Atlas Mills, claimant, was a pure wheat middling and that no amount was required to be paid by the claimant to the State.

The Department of Agriculture admits that the above payment was made and that the same was turned over to the State Treasurer.

The Attorney General filed a statement consenting to an award of $25.00.

The court therefore awards the claimant the sum of $25.00.


text:
    (No. 737
    Claimant awarded $2208.39 with interest.)
    W. H. Clayberg, Adm. of the Estate of Albert B. Tompkins, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 15, 1924.

    Inheritance tax — where an estate has -been appraised and the tax assessed, and is paid, and deductions allowable were not made before the tax was assessed, and upon a petition to reopen the case and a hearing thereon the deductions were made and the tax reassessed and reduced: Held. Claim-
    ant entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount of the tax paid and the amount found due upon the reassessment of the tax.
    J. E. Houston and Charles C. Craig, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by W. H. Clayberg, administrator of the estate of Albert B. Tompkins, deceased, late of the County of Fulton, State of Illinois, who departed this life on the 20th day of December, A. D. 1918, intestate.

Letters of administration were issued to W. H. Clayberg in the County Court, in the County of Fulton, State of Illinois; that after the issuance of letters of administration the county judge of Fulton County, Illinois,, appointed an appraiser to conduct an appraisement of all property, subject to appraisement, of said Albert B. Tompkins, deceased, under and pursuant to the1 statutes of the State of Illinois relating to the taxation of gifts, legacies, inheritances, transfers, appointments and interests in such cases, for the purpose of fixing the fair market value of the property subject to said appraisement.

That afterwards on, to-wit, the 13th day of June, 1919, the said appraiser filed his report with the county judge of Fulton County,. Illinois, which said report was on the 16th day of June, A. D. 1919, duly confirmed and approved by the said county judge, and on the same day said county judge entered an order fixing the tax payable to the State of Illinois in said matter; that the property so appraised and the interests of the heirs of said decedent and the tax so fixed were as follows:

Upon the interest of Ethel Tompkins Clayberg, daughter of decedent, the valuation was $374,882.41 and the tax was $7,709.65.
Upon the interest of Nelle Tompkins Clayberg (now Nelle Tompkins Ross), daughter of decedent, the valuation was $374,882.41 and the tax was $7,097.64.

It appears to the court here that said county judge erroneously fixed the fair market value of the property at the sum aforesaid and the tax payable with respect thereto, that said administrator filed a petition to re-open the original hearing relative to said appraisement for the reason that certain deductions allowable, under the law, from the value of the gross estate had not been allowed by the appraiser or the said county judge, and that there were additional assets which ' should be added; that said county judge, after due consideration of said petition and the allegations therein contained, having found there were liabilities which should have been allowed against the gross estate, did re-open the original hearing and after a full hearing was had thereon before said county judge, the value of the property so appraisable in said estate, after the allowance of all property deductions from the gross value thereof, and the tax payable with respect thereto were found to be as follows:

Upon the interest of Ethel Tompkins Clayberg, daughter of the decedent, the valuation was found to be $316,776.30 and the tax payable with respect thereto $5,935.33.
Upon the interest of Nelle Tompkins Clayberg (now Nelle Tompkins Ross), daughter of the decedent, the valuation was found to be $316,766.29, and the tax payable with respect thereto $5,935.33.

The court finds that said W. H. Clayberg’, administrator as aforesaid, on, to-wit, the 4th and 14th day of June, respectively, A. D. 1919, and prior to the order of the county judge of Fulton County aforesaid, re-determining and re-assessing said tax, paid to the county treasurer of said Fulton County, Illinois, the amount of the tax levied by the order fixing the tax entered by said county judge (less the discount of 5% allowed by law for payment of said tax, within six months following the death of the decedent), which said payment was made by said administrator pursuant to the statute of the State of Illinois and for the said beneficiaries, Ethel Tompkins Clayberg and Nelle Tompkins Clayberg (now Nelle Tompkins Boss); which said payment was $13,485.53, being $6,742.77 for the account of Ethel Tompkins Clayberg, and $6,742.76 for the account of Nelle Tompkins Clayberg (nowNelle Tompkins Boss).

The county treasurer of said Fulton County admits the payments of the aforesaid amounts.

It appears that the legal amounts which should have been paid by said beneficiaries are as follows:

Ethel Tompkins Clayberg ......................................$5,638.57
Nelle Tompkins Clayberg (now Nelle Tompkins Ross) ............$5,638.57

It further appears to the court, under the evidence presented, that said beneficiaries each overpaid the county treasurer of Fulton County, Illinois, as follows:

Ethel Tompkins Clayberg .......................................$1,104.20
Nelle Tompkins Clayberg (now Nelle Tompkins Ross) ............$1,104.19

The Attorney General files a demurrer, which as a matter of law is sustained. The Attorney General, however, admits the facts in this case as they are alleged in the declaration filed herein and consents to an award in favor of the claimant in the sum of $2,208.39, with interest on said sum from June 14, 1919.

The claimant is therefore awarded the sum. of $2,208.39 with interest.


text:
    (No. 744
    Claimant awarded $45.21.)
    Maryland Assurance Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 15, 1924.

    Insurance tax — when award for overpayment may he made. There being no objection interposed by the State, the court may enter an award for a refund of an overpayment of the tax.
    Maryland Assurance Corporation, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for an overpayment made by the claimant to the Division of Insurance, Department of Trade and Commerce, for which a refund of $45.21 is claimed.

The defendant by the Attorney General, comes and states that the claim has been approved by the Director of the Department of Trade and Commerce, and consents to the allowance of the claim.

It is therefore recommended by the court that said claimant be allowed the sum of $45.21.


text:
    (No. 745
    Claimant awarded $75.00.)
    Ira A. Erwin, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 15, 1924.

    Funeral director — when claim of may he allowed — inmate of institution. Where a funeral director furnishes casket, robe and embalms the body of an inmate of a state institution, the court as a matter of social justice and equity may enter an award to claimant for the amount of his claim for material furnished and services rendered.
    Ira A. Erwin, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the Court:

This is a claim filed by claimant, Ira A. Erwin, funeral director, of Pontiac, Illinois, for casket, box, embalming, robe, opening grave and transfer of the body of Jesse Jones.

There is absolutely no evidence before this court, except the sworn statement of claimant, as to material furnished or services rendered and we therefore accept the said statement as true and correct, although we do not know whether or not the deceased" was an employee, ward of the State or what not.

The Attorney General of the State has filed a demurrer,' which as a matter of law is sustained.

The Attorney General also files a statement and consents to an award which is as follows: “The Director of the Department of Public Welfare having made a report of his investigation of the facts set forth in the claim filed herein, showing said facts as alleged by the claimant in this case as they are alleged in the claim filed by the claimant herein and consents to an award in favor of the claimant in the sum of $75.00.”

As a matter of equity and social justice we therefore allow the claim in the sum of $75.00.


text:
    (No. 604
    Claim denied.)
    Leonard Ryan, a Minor, by John S. Ryan, His Father and Next Friend, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 14, 1924.

    Respondeat superior — when State not liadle. The State is not liable for the negligence of its agents, officers or employees in the absence of a statute.
    Board of education — not an agency of the State. The Board of Education in the city of Chicago in conducting and maintaining the Carter Public School is not acting as an agent of the State.

      Same — State not Haile for negligence of municipal corporations. The State is not liable for the negligence of the officers and agents of a municipal corporation.
    John A. Brown, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim brought by Leonard Ryan, a minor, by John S. Ryan, his father and next friend. The claimant alleges that while he was attending the Carter Public School maintained by the State of Illinois in and through the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, on the 5th day of June, 1918, a coping and ornament over the entrance to said school building fell upon said plaintiff on the said sidewalk and ground adjacent to said school, causing the right eye of the plaintiff to be jammed ou,t of its socket, breaking his right ° leg, fractured and splintered from his knee to his ankle, and caused his right foot to be bruised and smashed, his fight arm to be fractured, and his left arm was broken about five inches above the wrist, and that he was otherwise injured, maimed and disabled. It was further alleged that said coping was insecurely fastened.

The defendant by its Attorney Gfeneral comes and files a demurrer, and for the special cause of demurrer defendant sets up:

First: That the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to the State.

Second: That in the absence of statute the State is not liable for the torts of its officers, agents or employes.

Third: That the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, in owning, conducting and maintaining the building alleged to have been the cause of the injury complained of, was not at the time of alleged injury, nor is it now, acting as the agent of the State of Illinois.

Fourth: That the State of Illinois is not liable for the torts of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago; nor is it liable for the torts of any of the officers, agents or employes of the said Board of Education of the City of Chicago.

Fifth: That the State of Illinois did not through the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, or otherwise, at the time of the alleged injury, have possession, control or management of the said public school building, known as the Carter Public School, nor did it own, operate or maintain the same or any of its appurtenances; nor was it, the said defendant, under a duty, at the time of the alleged injury, to keep the said building or any part thereof in good and safe repair and condition.

Sixth: That if, as alleged in said declaration, the defend-, ant owned, possessed, controlled, maintained or managed the said public school building, it, the said defendant, was, in so doing, exercising a governmental function and would not be liable for the torts of its officers, agents or employes.

This court realizes that the claimant was seriously and grievously injured and that his pain and discomfort, agony of mind and body cannot be measured by dollars, but it is the opinion of this- court that the State of Illinois is not legally liable and that this court is without jurisdiction under the Act of 1917 in making allowance of this case, and it is our belief that it was not the intention of the legislature to clothe this court with extraordinary power to obligate the people of the State of Illinois in this class of cases. The court has ruled that as a matter of equity and good conscience an allowance .would be made for injuries sustained by employes in the course of their employment or wards of the state or others who are injured through negligence of employes in the various departments of the State, but if the court drifted further afield and assumed obligations of municipalities or divisions of the State, then it would be the opinion of this court, the State would be burdened with a multitude of obligations far beyond those considered by the legislature in the establishment of this court.

The' court would therefore sustain the demurrer of the defendant and disallow the claim.


text:
    (No. 720
    Claim denied.)
    Thomas D. Fitzgerald, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 14, 1924.

    Non-liability of state — forfeiture of appearance hond. There can be no legal liability against the State to refund to a surety of moneys paid by him into court upon a forfeited recognizance.

      Same — conviction of defendant no ground for refund. The fact that the defendant was convicted and sentenced by the court creates no liability" or obligation on behalf of the State to refund to his surety moneys paid by him into court upon the forfeiture of the appearance bond.
    Thomas D. Fitzgerald, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration in this case was filed by Thomas D. Fitzgerald, claimant, setting forth that he is a resident of Franklin Park, Cook County, Illinois; that Thomas J. Fitzgerald, son of the claimant, was arrested in the County of DuPage, Illinois,' in the year of 1920 on charges of burglary and larceny, and that he was convicted, and' that on the 13th day of November, A. D. 1920, was sentenced to the Illinois State Reformatory; and that said defendant prayed an appeal from the Circuit Court of DuPage County, and that the defendant, Thomas J. Fitzgerald, did give a good and sufficient bond of One Thousand Dollars ($Í000.00) to the People of the State of Illinois to secure his appearance from time1 to time at the said court, with the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company as surety.

■ It further appears from the declaration filed herein that Thomas D. Fitzgerald, claimant, and father of said Thomas J. Fitzgerald, -did at that time agree to idemnify the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company and save it harmless from any loss it might sustain by virtue of becoming surety for his son, Thomas J. Fitzgerald; that in the circuit court of DuPage County, Illinois, on the 31st day 'of December, A. D. 1920, Thomas J. Fitzgerald was called three times and he failed to appear, and the bond was therefore declared to be forfeited; that on January 31, A. D. 1921, judgment was entered against Thomas J. Fitzgerald and the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company in the amount of One Thousand Dollars ($1000.00), and execution was issued therefor; that Thomas D. Fitzgerald, father of Thomas J. Fitzgerald, by his agent, came and in open court, in the circuit court of DuPage County, Illinois, on the 3rd day of February, A. D. 1921, and did then and there satisfy the said judgment against said Thomas J. Fitzgerald and the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company in the amount of $1000.00.

Thomas J. Fitzgerald, the accused and convicted, was apprehended in the'year 1922, and on the 1st day of February, 1923, was taken from the county jail at Wheaton, Illinois, to the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac, Illinois, and there incarcerated until the 1st day of January, A. D. 1923.

The Attorney General of Illinois files a demurrer to the declaration herein filed, and as a matter of law said demurrer is sustained by the court.

The court therefore disallows the claim, as there is no legal liability against the State of Illinois.


text:
    (No. 728
    Claimant awarded $120.90.)
    American Bottle Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 14, 1924.

    Franchise tax — when award may he made. There being no dispute as to the facts and law in this case the court recommends an allowance to claimant of the amount of its claim.
    Brown, Geddes, Schmettau & Williams, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

This is a claim for the payment of fees to the Secretary of State by the claimant corporation on the matter of franchise taxes amounting to $120.90. The Attorney General, coming into court, files a .consent to an award stating that the Attorney General’s office had investigated the facts in the case as they appear of record in the office of the Secretary of State and he represents to the court that from such investigation he finds the facts alleged in said claim and that the sum of $120.90 is now due the said claimant.

It is therefore recommended by the court that said claimant be allowed the sum of $120.90.


text:
    (No. 733
    Claimant awarded $3,020.00.)
    Wolff Manufacturing Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 14, 1924

    Franchise tax — tax paid under duress will he refunded. Where the tax assessed is in excess of the amount legally due the State, and is paid under duress and' protest, claimant is entitled to a refund for the amount of the excess paid.
    Moran, Paltzer & O ’Donnell, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by the claimant corporation for moneys paid to the State under duress and protest as and for its franchise fax for the year beginning July 1,1922, in excess of the amount legally due to the State under the provisions, of the General, Corporation Act. The claimant alleges that' the excess amount paid by them would amount to $3,020.00.

The Attorney General files his statement herein and admits the facts in this case as they are alleged in the declaration filed by the claimant in this court and consents to an award in favor of the claimant in the sum of $3,020.00.

It is therefore recommended by the court that said claimant be allowed the sum of $3,020.00.


text:
    (No. 752
    Claimant awarded $232.00.)
    Grinnell Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 14, 1924.

      Contract — when State liable — supplies furnished. The State is liable for supplies furnished to the Department of Public Works and Buildings for the use of the Illinois State Reformatory.
    Grinnell Company, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by Grinnell Company, Inc., in the sum of $232.00, for material sold and delivered by the claimant to the Department of Public Works and Buildings of the State of Illinois, and for the use of the Illinois State Reformatory at Pontiac, Illinois, a State institution under the supervision and control of the said State of Illinois.

This claim has been investigated by the superintendent of the Division of Purchases and Supplies, Department of Public Works and Buildings, of the State of Illinois, and has been approved by that official.

The Attorney General of Illinois consents to an award in this case im the sum of $232.00.

The court therefore awards the claimant the sum of $232.00 in settlement of this claim.


text:
    (No. 755
    Claimant awarded $1020.00.)
    City of Pontiac, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 14, 1924.

    Municipal corporation — when claim in favor of may he allowed. There being no dispute as to the facts in the case, and no objection made by the State, the court enters an award in favor of claimant for the amount of its claim.
    Robert M. Niven, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by the City of Pontiac, a municipal corporation, of the State of Illinois, in the sum of $1,020.00, due to said city from the State of Illinois, as a part of the cost of operating and maintaining a septic sewerage disposal plant located near the" City of Pontiac and through which all of the sewage of the Illinois State Reformatory, a State institution, is disposed of.

The claim has been investigated and approved by the Department of Public Welfare. The Attorney General of the State of Illinois consents to an award in the above amount, from February 1, 1922, to June 30, 1923, at the rate of $60.00 per month.

The court therefore awards' the claimant the sum of $1,020.00.


text:
    (No. 770
    Claimant awarded $333.75.)
    St. Joseph’s Hospital of Belvidere, Ill., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion, filed May 14, 1924.

    Social justice and equity — eleemosynary corporation — award may he made. Where no objection is made by the State, and the circumstances of the case warrant it, the court may recommend an award upon the ground of social justice and equity.
    Alexander J. Strom, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim brought by St. Joseph’s Hospital of Belvidere, Illinois, an eleemosynary corporation, organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, for services rendered one Eev. Alfred Bruhn, who, together with members of his family, was brought to the hospital by a Dr. Hartman of Garden Prairie, Illinois. It appears that the said Alfred Bruhn was driving a Ford automobile on the Grant highway near the Village of Garden Prairie, located in Boone County, Illinois, on or about September 1, 1923. It further appears that an army truck under the control of the National Guard unit drove against the Ford automobile of the said Eev. Bruhn and caused the Eev. Bruhn and members of his family injuries which they sustained and that the accident was without fault of the Eev. Bruhn. After the Eev. Bruhn sustained the injuries he and his family were taken to the hospital, receiving care and treatment there,' upon which this-claim was based. It further appears that the claim has been referred to Adjutant General C. E. Black of Springfield, who referred it to the Attorney General of this State.

The Attorney General, coming into court and alleging that the claim had been thoroughly investigated finder the direction of the adjutant general of the State of Illinois, and as the result of such investig'ation, states that the claim is just and entitled to compensation in the sum of $333.75.

It is therefore recommended- by the court that said claimant be allowed the sum of $333.75.


text:
    (No. 780
    Claimant awarded $101.00.)
    W. D. Doying, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 14, 1924.

      Services — when State liable. The State is liable for services rendered for labor and material furnished for the repair of its linotype machines in the printing department of the Illinois School for the Deaf.
    W. D. Doying, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant files his declaration herein setting forth that his claim is based upon labor performed and for material furnished in connection with the overhauling and repairing of a linotype machine in the printing department of the Illinois School for the Deaf, in August, 1920, at Jacksonville, Illinois, the amount of the claim being for the sum of $101.00.

The Attorney General filed a statement herein consenting to the award, stating that the investigation made by his office shows that the facts as alleged in the declaration of the claimant are true and that the claimant is lawfully entitled to compensation for services rendered and materials furnished.

The court therefore allows the claim of $101.00.


text:
    (No. 782
    Claimant awarded $167.38.)
    Central Illinois Public Service Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 14, 1924.

      Coxtract — when State Haile. The State is liable for electric lights and water furnished in armory used by a company of the Illinois National Guard.
    Central Illinois Public Service Company for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for electric light and water service furnished by the claimant while Company “E” Fifth Regiment Illinois Reserve Militia was stationed at Carbondale, Illinois, and occupying and using the Armory Hall in said city.

The Attorney General files a statement consenting to the award and that the claim has been thoroughly investigated and found to be true and correct, with the recommendation that an award be made.

The court therefore awards the claimant the sum of $167.38.


text:
    (No. 5.
    Claim denied.)
    George Wolfe, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Governmental function — State not liable for injuries to inmates of institutions. The State in conducting the Illinois State Reformatory exercises a governmental function and is not liable for injuries sustained by an inmate thereof.

      Same — not liable for torts of officers. The State is not liable for the torts of its officers or agents.
    Rules of court — must be complied with. Rule 5 of this Court must be complied with in all statements of claims against the State.
    Statute of limitation — when a defense. The statute of limitations is a complete defense in this case.
    Blanksten & Freeman, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; Floyd E. Britton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant in this case styles himself as 1 ‘ George Wolfe, petitioner,” but in his declaration he.signs and swears to it as ‘ ‘ George J. Stone. ’ ’

The declaration alleges that he was committed to the Illinois State Beformatory under the name of George Wolfe; and brings this suit for the recovery of $15,000.00 for alleged injuries sustained while an inmate of said State institution under circumstances as follows:

. First: That on the 12th day of June, 1912, the second day of his arrival in said institution, the guard on- duty at the doctor’s office of said institution assaulted claimant with a deadly weapon, being a “black-jack” or billy, with which he struck him, claimant,- across the forehead, knocking him unconscious.

Second: That on or about September 12, 1912, he was again assaulted and beaten by a teacher in the school of said institution.

Third: That about May, 1913, he was again assaulted and beaten about the face by a guard on duty in the paint shop of said institution.

Fourth: In August, 1913, with “rubber squeegee” about his hands and arms by a guard on duty at the cell house.

Fifth: That he suffered other wrongs and injuries not mentioned.

That all of said injuries were sustained during the first eighteen months of his stay at said institution.

That, as a result of such injuries he suffered impaired health, causing insomnia, instability, anemia, depression, amnesia, general debility, frequent inability to continue at his , occupation; that these troubles existed after his release on parole from said institution on June 29, 1915, and continued after he was drafted into the army, where he was placed in modified service, etc.

He was discharged in 1919, and up to the time of filing his claim in 1921, his mind was such that he had no knowledge of how -to secure or prosecute a claim for redress of said wrongs, etc.

He 'files his claim in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Dollars.

The defendant, State of Illinois, demurrs and pleads the Statute of Limitations.

The declaration is a rather vague, loose, disconnected statement of what purports to be the facts, upon which claimant bases his claim, and covering a period of some two or three years. He was eventually paroled some time in 1915, and later was drafted into U. S. service in the “World’s War,” and discharged therefrom in 1919, he says.

The declaration alleges that during all the time between the time he claims he was first assaulted and the date of filing suit, he was not, in consequence of such injuries.so received, mentally capable of bringing a suit or knowing what his rights really were.

There is no evidence on file to support his sworn statement, but, assuming that the facts are true as alleged, the claimant in our opinion is not entitled to the relief claimed. The cause of action, if any he had, had occurred nearly ten years prior to the filing of the suit in 1921, thus making the claim an unusually stale one.

■ ' Claimant has not complied with the rules of the court in his declaration. Buie 5 requires that he shall state in his declaration whether his claim has been presented-to any State department or State officer, or to any person, corporation or tribunal, etc.

It is always important that Rule 5 should be complied with in all statements of claims.

The entire circumstances and statement of the case, in connection-with its staleness is not very satisfactory, and not looked upon with favor by the court. This court has repeatedly held that the State is not liable for the torts of its officers or agents, and the rule applies in this case.

While the claimant presents a statement that elicits the sympathy of the court, yet in view of the foregoing conclusions reached by the court, the demurrer will be sustained; while the plea of the Statute of Limitations, properly .pleaded, is sustained, the suit is accordingly dismissed. ■


text:
    (No. 709
    Claim denied.)
    Mary O’Brien, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Statute of limitations — when a defense. Claimant must file his claim within a reasonable time in order that the tax payers may have notice of whatever liability, if any, exists against them.
    Municipal corporation — State not liable for negligence of. The State is not liable for an injury sustained by claimant who by reason of an accumulation of ice and snow upon a sidewalk, fell and was injured — the sidewalk being under the control of a municipal corporation.

      Same — social justice and equity — lohen court without jurisdiction. In a claim of such character the Court of Claims Act does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court to allow it under the rule of social justice and equity.
    Goss & Rooney, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; Floyd E. Britton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is á claim filed on account' of alleged injury of the claimant, who slipped and fell on an accumulation of ice and snow upon the sidewalk at a point along West Jackson boulevard in Chicago, Illinois, on the 19th day of January, 1918.

It appears that claimant instituted her suit for damages in the Circuit Court of Cook County; that said suit was dismissed on the ground that said sidewalk was under the control of the West Park Commissioners.

The claimant filed this claim on June 30, 1922, and it has been urged by the State that a great deal of time has elapsed before the claim was filed in this court, setting up as a contention the position of this court as heretofore taken that demands against the State should be filed within a reasonable time so that the taxpayers may' know whatever liability may be determined against them at the earliest possible moment.

It is the opinion of this court that independent of the question of the Statute of Limitations, that as a matter of law, the demurrer of the defendant should be sustained and therefore the same is sustained.

The court is further of the opinion that it has not been heretofore the practice of this court to make an allowance in a case of this character on the ground of equity or social justice, and it is further the opinion of the court that under the Act creating it, it was not intended that the court would have the power to make awards in a case of this character, and as it has been held heretofore by this court that in taking jurisdiction of these classes of cases it would open up the way of an endless number of claims and place an obligation upon the State and the taxpayers that in the mind of this court was not intended by the legislature in the Act that brought the court into being.

Therefore, for the reasons stated, this court is of the opinion that the State is not liable either as a matter of law or under the rule of equity and- social justice. The claim is. therefore disallowed.


text:
    (No. 759
    Claimant awarded $498.22.)'
    Peoples Bank & Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, Executor Estate of Sarah Winn, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Inheritance tax- — when claimant entitled to refund — Sec. 10. There being no dispute as to the facts, and no objection by the State, the court will enter an award in favor of claimant.
    Early & Early, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Peoples Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, a corporation, was duly appointed executor under the last will and testament of Sarah Ann Winn, who died testate in Winnebago county, Illinois, November 28, A. D. 1919. The entry of an order was made in due time and assessing the inheritance tax, which was paid by the executor.

Later on, a re-hearing was shown by the records and other evidence that the executor had paid the State an excess on said taxes to the amount of $498.22, and an order made by the court ordering a refund of said sum erroneously paid.

The Attorney General in writing consents to this and a claim of $498.22 is accordingly awarded claimant.


text:
    (No. 760
    Claimant awarded $8,564.08 with interest.)
    Libby B. Hill et al., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Inheritance tax — when refund will be made. Sec. 25. Where an inheritance tax is assessed under Sec. 25, Inheritance Tax Law, and is paid, and afterwards certain contingencies mentioned in the will become extinguished and the estate becomes vested in the devisee, and the court in a proper proceeding reassessed and fixed the tax upon all succession under the will: Held — claimants are entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount of the tax paid on the original assessment and the amount fixed on the reassessment of the tax with interest at 3%.
    Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The petitioners, Libby B. Hill, Watson B. Hill and Jean Patterson Hill, who are respectively the widow, son and daughter of Watson Hill, late of Cook county, Illinois, deceased, represent that said Watson Hill died a resident of Chicago in said Cook county, May 17, 1913, leaving a last will and testament, dated April 27, 1910, and a codicil thereto dated February 6,. 1912, which were duly admitted to probate in said county of Cook June 27,1913; that in and by said will the Northern Trust Company was appointed executor thereof, and said estate was by him duly administered, declared settled and the executor discharged March 12, 1915. °

On October 30, 1913, the county court fixed the total inheritance taxes upon all successions under said will at the aggregate sum of fourteen thousand two hundred forty-five dollars and seventy-eight cents ($14,245.78), pursuant to which order the executor paid the county treasurer of said county the sum of thirteen thousand' five hundred thirty-three and 49/100 dollars ($13,533.49) being the amount so found due after the deduction of the statutory 5%.

By the 36th clause in his said will the testator directed that in the event all the aforesaid petitioners should die before the expiration of the term of ten years after his death, leaving no issue of a deceased child of his living at the time of the death of the last survivor of said petitioner, then and in that event the residue of the trust estate should be divided; transferred and delivered as follows: one-fourth to the testator’s sister, Emily Hill; if she were not living then to her heirs at law; one-fourth thereof to testator’s niece, Mattie H. Wright, and if she were not living then to her heirs at law; one-fourth thereof to Jennie S. Walts, sister of the petitioner, Libby B. Hill, and if said Jenny S. Walts were not living, then to her heirs at law and the remaining one-fourth to DePauw university of Greencastle, Indiana.

This was all that part of the will that is material in the issues of this case. That in fixing and assessing the inheritance taxes at the said sum of $14,245.78 one-half of the remainder of the entire estate of the deceased, subject to certain equitable estates by said will devised for the term of ten years after the death of said decedent, was taxed at the rate of 4 per cent and the other half of such remainder was taxed-at the rate of 6 per cent, by reason of the aforesaid contingent devices made under the 36th clause of said will and pursuant to the provisions of section 25 of the Inheritance Tax Laws of this State in force July 1, 1909, and at the highest possible rate thereunder, upon the assumption that the contingency specified in the 36th clause would occur, namely that the petitioners would all die before the expiration of the term of ten years after the death of the testator leaving no issue of a deceased child of the testator living at the time of the death of the last survivor of the three petitioners. The petitioners aforesaid did and have survived beyond the term of ten years after the death of the testator, hence all the aforesaid contingencies mentioned in said clause 36, contemplated in and by the original appraisement and assessment of inheritance taxes herein have become.and are now extinguished; and under said clause 36 in the will, wherein certain estates were subject only to the life- estate of said Emily Hill in a certain parcel of real estate therein described, and on May 17, 1923, each of the three petitioners became and are now séized and possessed of the one-third part of the residuary estate of the testator, and are entitled to enjoy the same free from any contingency.

On October 3, 1923, the county court of Cook county, witli the consent and approval of the Attorney General of this State, re-assessed and fixed the total inheritance taxes upon all the successions under the said will at the aggregate sum of $5,230.96.

From the evidence on file the three petitioners, Libby B. Hill, Watson B. Hill and Jean Patterson Hill,' are entitled to a refund of $8,564.08, on computation as follows:

Original tax ................................................... $14,245.78
Less 5% statutory discount .................................... 712.29
Net tax ................................................... $13,533.49
On re-assessment less 5% ...................................... $ 4,969.41
Amount of refund due petitioners ............................... $ 8,564.08

Accordingly an award is made to said petitioner in said sum of $8,564.08, with 3 per cent interest per annum from November 10, A. D. 1913.


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    (No. 771
    Claimant awarded $3,673.15.)
    Donald S. Boynton et al., Executors of the Estate of Charles T. Boynton, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Inheritance tax — xohen refund may be made — modification of order. Where an inheritance tax has been assessed and is paid, and afterwards upon proper proceeding, the county court modifies its order and allows a deduction of the amount of a claim against the estate, which through an oversight or inadvertence, was not taken into consideration in the original assessment of the tax, claimant will be entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount of the tax paid under the original order and the amount found due under the order of the court as modified.
    Everett L. Millard, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

Charles T. Boynton of Lake . County, Illinois, died February 27, 1923, leaving a last will and testament, and claimants were appointed and qualified executors of said will and testament.

In August, 1923, the county judge of Lake County entered an order fixing the inheritance tax in said estate at $32,045.04 and the same was paid. This was based upon a valuation of the estate at $1,006,065.85, and the total deductions were found to be $262,025.73, leaving a fair value of the appraisable property to be $744,040.12, and an order was entered fixing the tax at said last named sum. At the time of the death of deceased he was guarantor on a demand note of $85,000.00 executed by C. D. Caldwell, payable to the order of the Continental and Commercial Trust and Savings Bank of Chicago, dated January 24, 1921. That $42,500.00 of said note was a primary liability of the decedent, which was paid in due course of administration by claimants, but by inadvertence was not taken into consideration when credits or charges against the estate were deducted as heretofore stated. A petition was later filed by the claimants in the county court showing the facts and the original order was modified ordering a deduction of the last named amount, and a total tax of $28,371.89 in place of the tax as originally fixed. This makes an over-payment by claimants of $3,673.15 which claimants contend should be refunded to them. The Attorney General states that he has investigated the facts and evidence, finds them to be true and consents to an award for the amount claimed. From the statement of the facts, supported by proper evidence and consent of the Attorney General, the court awards the sum of $3,673.15 payable to the claimants.


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    (No. 778
    Claimant awarded $915.20 with interest.)
    Anna M. Morris, Executrix of the Estate of Lewis Morris, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Inheritance tax — when claimant entitled to refund. Sec. 25. Where an inheritance tax has been ássessed, and paid, under Section 25, Inheritance Tax Law, and upon the extinguishment of all contingencies and conditions contemplated in the original appraisement and assessment of the tax, the tax is re-assessed, claimant is entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount of the tax originally assessed and the amount of the tax found to he due upon the re-assessment, with interest at 3%.
    Julius Stern, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

Claimants, Lottie Nath, Rose Nath Dresser, Kathryn Nath Greenblatt and Bernard Nath, petition for a refund of $915.20 with interest thereon at the rate of 3% per annum from the 24th day of May, 1921, and represent to the court that Louis .Nath, a resident of Cook County, Illinois, died in Chicago on November 27, 1920, leaving a last will and testament which was duly admitted to probate January 3, 1921.

After providing for the payment of his debts, said decedent in and by second clause of his will devised and bequeathed unto Foreman Bros. Banking Company, á corporation of Illinois, all the rest, residue and remainder of his estate in trust to hold and control the same upon certain trusts, purposes and conditions as in said will set forth; and in and by the tenth clause of the said will the testator provided that when his youngest surviving child should re'ach the age of twenty-five years the trust should terminate and the trustee should distribute all the property then in its hands and not previously paid or distributed to his widow, Lottie Nath, or to certain legatees as provided in said will, to Kathryn Greenblatt, Rose Nath (now Rose Nath Dresser) and Bernard Nath in equal parts, share and share alike. Lottie Nath is the widow and Kathryn Nath Greenblatt, Rose Nath Dresser and Bernard Nath are respectively the daughters and son of the decedent. •

On April 19th, 1921, an order of record was made by the judge of the county court, based on the appraisement, fixing the cash value of the successions, interests, estates, legacies, transfers,- gifts and property which the parties interested under the will were entitled to receive by reason of the death of the said decedent, and fixed the amount of tax to which same was liable at the total sum of $2,199.13.

Pursuant to said order fixing the amount of the inheritance tax, Foreman Bros. Banking Company, as executor of the said last will of said Louis Nath, deceased, paid to the-county treasurer the sum of $21,088.18, being the amount in full of such taxes after deduction of the statutory 5% discount, and on March 27,1922, final report was made by the executor, the estate declared closed and the executor discharged.

On February 23, 1923, Bernard Nath, the youngest surviving child of the testator became 25 years of age; and on that date the said claimants, Bose Nath Dresser, Kathryn Nath G-reenblatt and Bernard Nath, became and now are each seized and possessed of an equal undivided one-third (1/3) part of the residue of the said trust estate and entitled to enjoy the same free from any contingencies whatever, and subject only to the dower interest of the widow, Lottie Nath.

By reason of the survival of the petitioners (the claimants) beyond the date when Bernard Nath reached the age of 25 years; and by reason of the termination of the said trust and the extinguishment of all contingencies and conditions contemplated in and by the original appraisement and assessment of inheritance taxes, the said claimants under.and by virtue of said Section 25 of the Bevenue Act became and were entitled to a reassessment of the inheritance taxes assessed against the various persons taking under the said will; and thereupon the 25th day of March, 1924, by proper order reassessing all inheritance taxes in said estate, which reduced the tax to 1,235.77.

By reason of such, entry of said last order, the amount of said inheritance taxes which should be paid is $1235.77, less 5%, the statutory discount, making, a total sum which properly should be paid of $1173.98.

The original amount of inheritance paid to the county treasurer as aforesaid was $2089.18. This leaves due claimant the sum of $915.20 with interest as claimed.

It is therefore ordered that the claimant recover from the defendant, State of Illinois, the said sum of $915.20 with 3% interest thereon per annum from the 24th day of May, A. D. 1921.


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    (No. 783
    Claimant awarded $350.15.)
    Anna M. Morris, Executrix Estate of Lewis Morris, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Inheritance tax — when claimant entitled to refund. Where an inheritance tax has been fixed, and paid, and an appeal is taken from the order of the county judge and upon a hearing thereon the tax is re-assessed and reduced, claimant is entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount of the tax paid and the amount found due upon the re-assessment on appeal.
    Julius Stern, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Anna M. Morris, executrix of last will and testament of Louis Morris, deceased, on petition to county judge of Cook County, had the inheritance tax fixed, amounting to $3215.59, less the usual statutory 5% discount, allowed, making a net tax of $3054.81, which she paid to the State.

An appeal was regularly presented from such order to the county court, which upon a hearing, re-assessed and fixed amount to be paid to be $2847.01, less 5%, leaving $2704.66, which findings show that claimant erroneously paid to the defendant $350.15, which amount the Attorney General admits is just and should be refunded.

The court accordingly awards claimant the sum of $350.15.


author: Mr. Justice. Phillips

text:
    (No. 789
    Claimant awarded $2,009.49 with interest.)
    Continental Trust and Savings Bank, Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Margaret True Bland, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Inheritance tax — when refund awarded. When an inheritance tax has been assessed and paid, and an appeal is taken to the county court, and upon a hearing thereon, the tax is reassessed and reduced, claimant is entitled a refund of the difference between the amount of the tax paid, and the amount found due upon appeal.
    Robert D. Elder, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice. Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for refund of inheritance taxes. The claimant, the Continental and Commercial Trust and Savings Bank, a corporation of the State of Illinois, was duly appointed executor of the estate of Margaret True, who died testate October 29,1919, and her will was admitted to probate in the Probate Court of Cook County, Illinois, December 15, 1919.

On 24th day of April, 1920, an order was entered fixing the inheritance tax at $40,088.84, which was paid by the executor, less a discount of 6%, to-wit, the sum of $2004.44, leaving a net payment of $38,084.40 so paid.

On May 10th, 1920, a petition was filed in the county court praying an appeal from the final order fixing tax above set forth. A hearing was had thereon March 26, 1924, and terminated in the county court entering an order fixing the tax at $37,973.59 and that 5% should be deducted therefrom so that the net amount of tax going to the State would be $36,-074.91.

The claimant therefore claims the difference between the said amount of $38,084.40 so paid and the sum of $36,074.91, to-wit, $2009.49, with 3% interest per annum thereon from April 27, 1920.

All the necessary proof in support of said claim is produced and the Attorney General states that he has duly investigated the claim and consents to its allowance.

The court accordingly awards the claimant the sum of $2,009.49 with interest to be computed thereon from April 27, 1920.


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    (No. 803
    Claimant awarded $175.00.)
    Central Illinois Public Service Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

      Contract — when State liable — switching cars. The State is liable under its contract for switching cars to its State Institutions, although the funds for such purposes are exhausted.
    Fred L. Shimer, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Central Illinois Public Service Company, a corporation, under the laws of Illinois, prosecutes this claim for a recovery of $175.00 alleged to be due it for services performed by it for the State.

The facts, as disclosed -by the evidence, show that during the months of October and November, 1918, claimant switched certain cars from the Illinois Central R. R. track at Anna, Illinois, to the Anna State Hospital, in accordance witli a written contract with the State, which contract is on file in evidence in this cause, and that the claimant’s total claim for said service is $175.00. The funds of the Anna hospital for such purposes were exhausted and no funds were available to pay same, nor for any bills of like character prior to 1921.

C. H. Anderson has O.K.’d the bill and the Attorney General recommends its allowance as claimed. The evidence sustains the claim and claimant is accordingly awarded the said sum of $175.00.


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    (No. 804
    Claimant awarded $203.46 with interest.)
    First Trust & Savings Bank as Executor and Trustee Under the Last Will and Testament of Anthony H. Reed, Deceased Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Inheritance tax — when refund may be awarded — See. 25. Where an inheritance tax has been assessed against an estate at the highest rate > possible under Sec. 25, Inheritance Tax Law, and is paid, and afterwards a contingency happens whereby the estate is transferred to persons taxable at a less rate, and upon a petition being filed praying for the re-assessment of the tax it appeared that the state was not subject to a tax: Held, claimant entitled to a refund of the tax paid.
    Moses, Rosenthal & Kennedy, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

First Trust & Savings Bank, a corporation of Chicago, Illinois, as executor and trustee under the last will and testament of Anthony H. Reed, deceased, brings this suit for a refund of inheritance taxes, and alleges in its declaration that an inheritance tax was assessed against the said estate by the county court of Cook county, Illinois, in the sum of $185.92, that the said tax was assessed at the highest possible rate, in accordance with the provisions of. Section 25 of the Illinois Inheritance Tax act; that on May 20, 1920, claimant, as executor and trustee, paid to the county collector of- said county the amount of said tax, together with interest at the rate of six (6) per cent per annum thereon, from the date of the death of said deceased to the date of payment, or a total of $203.46; that thereafter a contingency happened whereby the assets of said estate were transferred to persons taxable at a rate less than the rate imposed by the county court in arriving at the tax assessed as above indicated and set forth; that by reason of said contingency, the said estate became, and is subject to no inheritance tax.

On June 19,1924, the claimant filed a petition in the county court aforesaid asking for a re-assessment of the tax in said estate, and an order was accordingly entered on said date, re-assessing the inheritance tax in said estate, and finding the estate subject to no inheritance tax; that the following persons are entitled to such refund: Robert B. Reed, Ernest C. Reed, Elbert E. Reed, Hazel Robinson (formerly Hazel Reed) and Harold M. Reed, the children and heirs at law of said decedent, and beneficiaries of the trust created by the last will and testament of said decedent. It is clear from the reading of the copy of. the will and testament filed, and the findings and orders of the county court.of Cook county that the claimant is entitled a refund of amount claimed with interest as claimed.

The Attorney General filed demurrer, and also his consent in writing that claim be allowed as prayed for by claimant.

The court accordingly overrules demurrer and awards the claimant the sum of $203.46.


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    (No. 807
    Claimant awarded $130.34 with, interest.)
    Lilian C. Emery, Executrix, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Inheritance tax — when refund may be made — Sec. 25. Where an inheritance tax has been assessed under Section 25, Inheritance Tax Law, and is paid, and upon the happening of certain contingencies expressed in the will, a petition was filed praying for the re-assessment of the tax, and upon a hearing thereon the tax is assessed at a less rate, claimant is entitled to a refund of the difference between the amount of the tax paid and the amount found due upon the re-assessment.
    Sonnenschein, Berkson, Lautmann & Levinson, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Phillips

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is for claim for refund of inheritance tax erroneously paid to the State of Illinois. William R. Emery died March 13,1919, leaving a last will and testament with codicil thereto, which were admitted to probate in Cook County, Illinois.

The petitioner is the widow of said deceased. In an order duly entered of record by the county judge September 19, 1919, fixing amount of inheritance tax to be paid at $1304.20, being the amount less 5% discount allowed by statute, July 21, 1920, the estate was declared closed and executrix discharged.

On account of the happenings of certain contingencies expressed in the will, a copy of which is filed as evidence in the case, under Section 25 of Revenue act, the claimant became entitled to a re-assessment of the inheritance taxes. Thereupon June 17,1924, the claimant filed her petition in said ■ county court of Cook County, praying for a re-assessment in accordance with the statute in such case made and provided; and ah order was made re-assessing said inheritance tax at $1235.64 less the 5% discount allowed by statute, which equaled $1173.86. The amount of tax actually paid therefore was $1304.20. It is therefore clear that the claimant is entitled to a refund of $130.34, with interest thereon from September 19,1919, at 3% per annum.

The claimant is accordingly awarded the sum of $130.34 with 3% thereon per annum from September 19/1919.


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    (No. 809
    Claimant awarded $3,149.74 with interest.)
    Gustave C. Strauss, Executor of the Estate of Louis Stern, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 16, 1924.

    Inheritance tax — when claimant entitled to refund for overpayment. Where it clearly appears that an inheritance tax has been erroneously assessed, and is paid, claimant will be entitled to a refund of the overpayment.
    Stein, Mayer & David, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; George C. Dixon, Assistant. Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration in this case shows that the plaintiff, Gustave C. Strauss, executor in the estate of Louis Stern, deceased, a resident' of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, died testate, leaving a last will and testament dated the 27th day of October, 1921, that thereafter Gustave C. Strauss filed his petition in the probate court of Cook County, praying that the last will and testament of Louis Stern be admitted to probate and that letters testamentary in the estate of Louis Stern, deceased, be issued to the plaintiff,.Gustave O. Strauss, that thereafter on March 14, 1922, the said last will and testament duly admitted to probate in the probate court of Cook County, Illinois, and letters testamentary were duly issued by said court to said plaintiff.

The plaintiff alleges that on or about January 24, 1922, the Honorable Edmund K. Jarecki, judge of the county court of Cook county, appointed an appraiser to conduct an appraisement and to assess and fix the fair market value of the property appraisable by reason of the death of said Louis Stern and to fix the tax thereon under the inheritance tax laws of the State of Illinois; that the appraiser afterwards • came into court and presented his appraisement and an order was entered by said court finding that the fair market value of the estate or interest of Mathilda Stern, widow, be fixed at $40,147.36 and that the taxable cash value of said interest be assessed at $20,147.36, and that the inheritance tax for which said estate or interest of Mathilda Stern is liable, be fixed at $402.95, that the said order further finds that the fair market value of the estate or interest of Alfred Friedlich, growing out of the said estate of Louis Stern, deceased, be assessed at $77,086.65 and the taxable cash value of said interest be assessed at $76,986.65, and that the inheritance tax for • which said estate or interest of Alfred Friedlich is liable be fixed at $9,917.86 making a total amount of inheritance tax due the State of Illinois from said estate of Louis Stern of $10,320.81.

The plaintiff further avers that the sum of $10,320.81 fixed by the county court of Cook County as the inheritance taxes due the State of Illinois from the estate of Louis Stern, deceased, was and is erroneous in that the said tax was predicated upon the fact that the securities representing the sum of $26,740.00 as set forth in said declaration is a part of the estate of Louis Stern, deceased, that in truth and in fact was due the State of Illinois from the assets or interest growing out of the estate of Louis Stern, deceased, as inheritance taxes, only the sum of $7,171.07; that the payment by the plaintiff to the State' of Illinois of the said sum of $10,320.81 was an erroneous over-payment of inheritance taxes to the State of Illinois* to the extent of $3,149.74.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois, in behalf of the State, files his consent in writing to an award and says that the claim as set forth in the declaration filed in this cause has been given thorough investigation’ by the Attorney General.

The Attorney General finds that the facts in this case are • as alleged in said declaration.

The Attorney General further finds that the claimant is entitled to a refund in the sum of' $3149.74 with interest • thereon at the rate of 3% from May 21, 1923, and he accordingly hereby consents to an award in favor of the claimant for said sum.

It is therefore ordered by the court that said claimant be allowed an award in the sum of $3,149.74 with interest thereon • at 3% from May 21,1923.


text:
    (No. 22
    Claimant awarded $30.50.)
    Blake Grover, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 17, 1924.

      Services — when claim for, allowed. Where services have been faithfully performed’, in good faith, under belief that compensation will be paid therefor, the court will enter an award in favor of claimant for such services.
    Blake Grover, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General; Floyd E. Britton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed to recover Thirty Dollars and Fifty Cents ($30.50) for services rendered to the State for issuing 122 crow foot bar licenses for the Division of Fish and Game of the Department of Agriculture of the State of Illinois, from November 21, 1920, until November-21, 1921, collecting from the several licenses the total sum of $305.00.

It appears from the record that the claimant received no compensation for this service, either dir.ectly on, indirectly.

It is further, however, the opinion of the court that as a matter of law that the claimant could not recover, but it is the opinion of the court that the claimant performed the service faithfully and made return of the funds collected by him without malting any deduction for his services, in good faith and with the belief that he would be compensated.

Therefore, it is the opinion of the court that under these circumstances and from evidence offered in open court that as a matter of equity and good conscience this claim should be allowed, and it is recommended that the claimant be allowed the sum of $30.50.


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    (No. 795
    Claimant awarded $12.58.)
    World Book Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 17, 1924.

      Payment — moneys paid by mistake of fact may be refunded. Where - moneys have been paid to a State Institution under a mistake bf fact it may be refunded.
    World Book Company, for claimant.
    Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General ; George C. Dixon, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court: This is a claim filed amounting to the sum of $12.58. The declaration' shows that during July, 1923, the World Book Company received a remittance of $12.58 from the Illinois State Normal University, warrant number 39870, that the claimant had the impression that this amount was to be applied on the account of the University of Illinois, and that both institutions were one 'and the same.

The claimant discovered the error and wrote to the Illinois Normal University, Normal, Illinois, requesting that a duplicate be issued, that the president of said institution informed the claimant that since the order had been returned to the State Auditor instead of the university, another appropriation would have to be made from the school funds, which they could not afford. ■

The Attorney General filed a demurrer, which as a matter of law will be sustained by the court.

The Attorney General also filed his consent to an award stating that the Attorney General has made a thorough investigation into the merits of this claim, that it appears that in July, 1923, as a result of voucher issued by the official of the State Normal University, warrant number 39870 for the sum of $12.58 was issued to the claimant, that subsequently through a mistake in the office of the claimant, the said warrant was returned to the Auditor of Public' Accounts.

Through error this amount was deposited to the Revenue funds of the State and said money is not now available for . payment of this claim.

The.Attorney General therefore consents to an award in this case in favor of the claimant in the sum of $12.58.

The Court therefore recommends an award in the sum of $12.58.