text:
    (No. 4089
    City of O’Fallon, St. Clair County, Illinois, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1948.

    Claimant, Pro Se.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, and Hon. C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Eckert, C. J.

The respondent, through its Department of Public Safety maintains a building at 9300 Saint Clair Avenue, East St. Louis, Illinois. Water service for this property is furnished by the City of O’Fallon, and is paid for by the respondent bn the same terms as that of a private consumer. Ordinarily bills are paid quarterly.

Through oversight the charges for the period of-November 1, 1945 to- June 30, 1947, were not paid prior to the lapse of the current appropriations. It is uncontradicted that the wat^r was furnished to the respondent by the claimant in the quantities shown in claimant’s statement. The charges are in accord with standard rates and aggregate the sum of $310.40. Sufficient funds remained unexpended in the appropriations to pay the claim in full.

An award is therefore entered in favor of claimant in the amount of three hundred ten and 40/100 dollars ($310.40).


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Damron, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 4090
    Hattie Hobbs, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1948.

    Roy A. Ptacin, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, for Respondent; William L. Morgan, Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
   Damron, J.

Hattie Hobbs, claimant filed this complaint on May 14, 1948 for an award under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. No jurisdictional questions are presented.

It was stipulated before the Commissioner on the basis of the Departmental Report as follows:

Claimant had been in the employ of respondent, Department of Public Welfare, Division of Hospitals in the capacity of institutional worker from June 24, 1947 to January 15,1948. Her salary was $140.00 per month. On the -last mentioned date she was injured by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. .

The only question to be determined is as to the extent of her disabilities and the amount, if any, to which she is entitled by reason thereof.

The record discloses that about 10:30 A. M. on January 15, 1948 while on her way to report for duty at the general dining room of the Chicago State Hospital, claimant fell down the steps of the employee’s building in which she resided. She was taken immediately to the employee’s hospital where Dr. Louis Olsman the staff surgeon and employee’s physician administered treatment and placed her right arm in a cast. The cast was retained for about six weeks. Before the accident her right! arm was in a good condition; but since then she can not hold heavy objects; cannot sweep; cannot flex it and. her arm pains her from the wrist to the elbow. Claimant returned to work on March 3, 1948 and since then has received a $5.00 salary increase.

D'r. Albert C. Field a witness for claimant testified that at the time of the hearing there remained a 25 degree limitation of extension in claimant’s hand; between 60 and 65 degrees limitation of flexion; 25 degree limitation of supination and in closing the palm the finger tips reached only within y2 inch of the metacarpophalangeal joint. There was a shortening of the radius with some deformity at the lower end of the ulna. In his opinion claimant had suffered between 40 and 50 degrees of the permanent partial loss of use of her right hand.

Dr. Louis Olsman, staff surgeon, at the Chicago State Hospital called a witness by respondent described claimant’s injury as a comminuted Colles fracture. He interpreted an X-ray taken a few days prior to the hearing as revealing a good union of the bone fragments with a widening of the distal end of the radius and with some posterior angulation of the radial angle. In his opinion claimant had sustained approximately 35 to 40 per cent loss of use of the right hand as the result of the Colles fracture.

After full consideration of this record, the Court finds that the claimant and respondent were, on the 15th day of January, 1948, operating under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act; that on the date last above mentioned said claimant sustained accidental injuries which arose out of and in the course of her employment; that notice of said accident was given the respondent and claim for compensation on account thereof was made on said respondent within the time required under the provisions of said Act. That the annual earnings of claimant next preceding the injury were $1680.00 and the average weekly wage was $32.30, and claimant had no children under sixteen years of age.

The Court finds that claimant suffered a 40 per cent permanent partial loss of use of her right hand due to said injury for which she is entitled to an award, therefore she is entitled to have and receive from the respondent the sum of $19.50 for a period of 68 weeks, amounting to the sum of One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-six Dollars ($1,326.00). Of this amount the sum of Eight Hundred and Nineteen Dollars ($819.00) has accrued as of November 5th, 1948, and is payable forthwith; the balance of said award, amounting to Five Hundred and Seven Dollars ($507.00) is payable to her at $19.50 per week in weekly installments.

The evidence discloses that A. M. Eothbart was employed to take and transcribe the evidence at the hearing before the Commissioner. For said services he made a charge of $34.85, which we find is fair, reasonable, and customary.

An award is therefore entered in favor of A. M. Eothbart, Court Eeporter, in the sum of $34.85.

These awards are subject to the approval of the . Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees. ’ ’


author: Bergstrom, J.

text:
    (No. 4091
    Bertha Millie Weaver, widow, et al., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1948.

    Joseph M. Williamson, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, and C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bergstrom, J.

Claimant, Bertha Millie Weaver, - filed her claim- on July 24, 1948 for compensation under the provisions,, of the Workmen’s Compensation Act as the widow of-Lee C. Weaver, who suffered a fatal accidental injury on May 28, 1948 while employed by the respondent in the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways. Decedent also left surviving him one son, Eugene F. Weaver, who was born on September 27, 1934.

The record consists of the Complaint, Report of the Division of Highways, Stipulation, Waiver of Brief and Argument by respondent and by claimant.

On May 28, 1948 decedent and his helper, -Mr. Gay-lord J. Weather aid, were cutting vegetation on- Route U. S. 45, north of Urbana. Shortly before 4:00 P. M, -that afternoon the tools were loaded into the truck and the two men started to the Division storage shed at Urbana. At approximately 3:50 P. M., while proceeding in a southerly direction on Route U. S. 45, approximately iy2 miles north of Urbana, Champaign County, a White semitrailer truck owned by Hartung and Burmeister, Foley, Alabama, and driven by Thomas S. Hedge, Ozena, Florida, overtook the Division truck from the north. Although U. S. 45 at this point is a four-lane 40 foot highway, Mr. Hedge failed to swing out far enough to clear the Division truck. The right front fender of the White truck grazed the left rear of the Division truck, and then the right front comer of the trailer struck the left rear of the Division truck, shearing the dump body off the chassis and catapulting the track 70 feet in a southwesterly direction into an adjoining field.

The sheared dump body pushed the Division truck cab forward crushing Mr. Weaver between the cab and the steering wheel. He suffered internal chest and abdominal injuries accompanied by internal hemorrhaging, multiple abrasions and lacerations, and a fracture of the skull. He was taken by ambulance to the Burnham City Hospital, Urbana, where Dr. Earl D. Wise was placed in charge of the case. Mr. Weaver died at 7:30 that same evening.

There is no jurisdictional question presented by the record, and we find from the evidence that Mr. Weaver died from an accidental injury which he sustained from an accident arising out of and during the course of his employment by respondent. However, from the evidence, it appears that the accident was caused by the negligence of a third party, and under Section 29 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, respondent has a right by subrogation to recover any amounts paid or payable under this claim.

Decedent’s earnings from respondent for the year preceding his death total $2225.16. He left a widow, and one child under sixteen years of age surviving him. Claimant is, therefore, entitled to an award under Paragraphs A and H-3 of Section 7 of the Act, in the sum of $4450.00, increased by 30% under paragraph L, or a total sum of $5785.00, payable at the rate of $19.50 per week.

In connection with this injury respondent paid $50.00 for medical, hospital and ambulance service.

An award is therefore made to claimant, Bertha Millie Weaver, in the sum of $5785.00, payable as follows;

$ 468.00 which has accrued, is payable forthwith;
$5,317.00 is payable in weekly installments of $19.50, commencing November 19, 1948 for 272 weeks, with a final payment of $13.00.

Jurisdiction is hereby specifically reserved in this cause for the entry of such further order or orders as may from time to time be necessary.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor, as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


text:
    (No. 4110
    Alonzo D. Wise, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 9, 1948.

    R. B. Thomas, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George P. Barrett, Attorney General, for Respondent; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
   Damron, J.

Claimant, Alonzo D. Wise, filed his complaint on July 26, 1948, for an award for permanent and total disability under the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act. The record shows that claimant’s injuries resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as an attendant by respondent in the Department of Public Welfare; that notice thereof and claim for compensation was made within the statutory period, as required under Section 24 of the Act.

On the afternoon of December 5, 1947, while claimant was attending patients in Ward 2 of the East Moline State Hospital he was attacked by a patient. He struck the end of a table and fell to the floor. Claimant was then eighty-three years of age.

Dr. Armin H. Wolff, assistant superintendent, arrived at the ward within a few minutes and made an examination of Mr. Wise, which revealed pain in the region of the right hip and shortening and eversion of the right leg indicative of possible fracture. Claimant was taken on a stretcher to the hospital ward. An X-ray taken on the same date was interpreted by Dr. Wolff as revealing* a fracture of the neck of the femur with impaction. Later X-rays showed slight callus formation but otherwise essentially the same condition. The witness further testified that prior to the accident claimant worked constantly and performed his duties in a satisfactory manner; he attended claimant since the accident and knows claimant is unable to walk without assistance, that he must use crutches, has limited motion in the right hip and shortening in the right leg. In his opinion claimant is unable to perform the duties assigned to him prior to December 5, 1947; his condition is due to the fracture; his present disabilities are permanent and claimant will be unable to walk sufficiently in the future to be gainfully employed.

Dr. P. S. Waters, superintendent of the hospital, testitled claimant prior to the accident was considered a ‘ ‘ number one ’ ’ attendant; that he has studied the X-rays; has observed Wise since December 5, 1947 and bis findings would substantially concur with the testimony of Dr. Wolff.

Claimant testified in his own behalf that prior to the accident he had no difficulty in performing his duties, could go up two steps at a time and worked regularly eight hours a day six days a week. At present he has a short leg, cannot dress himself or stoop, and requires someone else to put him in bed and get him out of bed. He has been in a wheel chair and cannot leave it without assistance. He can bear some weight since he has been walking on crutches, but when he gets up his knee gives out.

It was stipulated that hospital and medical services were provided by respondent to the date of the hearing.

The testimony of claimant, Dr. Wolff and Dr. Waters clearly establishes that claimant at present has wholly lost the normal use or function of his leg and that this incapacity in their opinion is permanent. The evidence further discloses' that the injury is confined to claimant’s leg, but that as a result of claimant’s condition he will be unable to engage in gainful employment.

On the basis of this evidence claimant contends that he is entitled to an award for permanent and total disability and pension, rather than an award for specific loss of the leg. Claimant’s counsel cites Chicago Journal Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 303 Ill. 443, as sustaining this position. He also argues that the exception in the specific loss schedule of the first provision of Clause 18, Par. (e), Sec. 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act shows the legislature intended that an employee is entitled to an award for total disability in every case where an injury renders the employee wholly and permanently incapacitated for work.

The Attorney General contends that the case of Penninger v. State, 16 C.C.R. 111, is controlling. The facts in that case were substantially identical with those in the instant case, and it was held that claimant was not entitled to an award for total and permanent disability but had sustained a specific loss only for which she was entitled to compensation.

The Chicago Journal Company and Heap cases relied upon by claimant do not directly pass upon the precise question presented in the instant case.

The evidence in this record discloses that claimant’s injuries and disabilities are limited to his leg. Except for this loss of use of his leg there is no evidence to indicate that other organs or members of claimant’s body were in any way affected as a result of the injury. Except for the specific injury claimant is otherwise normal for a man of his advanced years.

We do not believe this record sanctions an award for total and permanent disability. We do find that claimant has sustained a permanent and complete loss of use of his right leg.

Claimant was temporarily and totally disabled from December 5, 1947 to October 8, 1948, a period of forty-four weeks. His annual earnings were $1,827.58. His weekly compensation rate is, therefore, $19.50.

We find that claimant was entitled to the sum of $858.00 for forty-four weeks of temporary total disability, for which he was paid the sum of $757.45. He is, therefore, entitled to the further sum of $100.55 for temporary total incapacity.

We further find that claimant has suffered a permanent and- complete loss of use of his right leg for which he is entitled to an award for 190 weeks at $19.50 per week.

An award is, therefore, hereby entered in favor of claimant, Alonzo D. Wise, in the snm of three thousand, seven hundred and five dollars ($3,705.00), plus one hundred dollars and fifty-five cents ($100.55), amount due claimant for temporary compensation, or a total award of three thousand, eight hundred and five dollars and fifty-five cents ($3,805.55). Of this amount the sum of one hundred dollars and fifty-five cents, balance due for temporary compensation, is payable forthwith; as is the further sum of ninety-seven dollars and fifty cents ($97.50), representing accrued compensation for loss of use of leg, to November 12, 1948; or the total sum of one hundred and ninety-eight dollars and five cents ($198.05). The balance of the award in the amount of three thousand, six hundred and seven dollars and fifty cents ($3,607.50) is payable in weekly installments of nineteen dollars and fifty cents ($19.50) beginning November 19, 1948.

Arno N. Bufe was employed to take and transcribe the evidence in this case, and has made a charge for that service in the amount of forty dollars and eighty-five cents ($40.85). We find the charges fair, reasonable and customary. An award is, therefore, hereby entered in favor of Arno N. Bufe in the sum of forty dollars and eighty-five cents ($40.85).

These awards are subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees”.


author: Eckert, C. J.

text:
    (No. 3984
    Ruby Baker, widow of Frederick C. Baker, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 9, 1948.

    Paul F. Jones, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, and Hon. C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Eckert, C. J.

On April 24, 1947, an award was entered in this case in favor of the claimant in the amount of $5,340.00 (Baker vs. State, 16 C.C.R. 251.) At the time of the death of claimant’s husband, a daughter, Ruth Ann Baker, then fifteen years old, was dependent upon him for support. Because of the dependency of this child, claimant’s award was increased from $4,800.00 to $5,340.00.

On December 6, 1948, respondent filed herein its petition to modify the award heretofore entered, in accordance with the provision of Section 7 (a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Ruth Ann Baker having reached the age of eighteen years on December 1, 1948. Under that provision of the Act the death benefits, to the extent they were increased because of the existence of the child, insofar as they have not been paid, are extinguished when the child arrives at the age of eighteen years.

Of the original award of $5,340.00, $2,322.00 was paid to claimant prior to December 1, 1948, leaving a balance of $3,018.00 unpaid. This balance is .5651% of the original award. Since the sum of $540.00 represents the increase of claimant’s award for the dependency of her daughter, .5651% of $540.00, or $305.15, must now be deducted from the balance of the original award remaining unpaid.

The previous award is therefore modified accordingly, and the balance now due claimant, being the sum of $2,712.85, is hereby ordered paid to her in weekly installments of $18.00 per week, beginning as of December 2, 1948, for a period of 150 weeks, with an additional final payment of $12.85.

All future payments being subject to the terms and conditions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Illinois, jurisdiction of this Court is specifically reserved for the entry of such future orders as may from time to time be necessary.


text:
    (No. 4072
    Clara Welch, widow of Ezra Welch, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 9, 1948.

    Lawrence B. Moore, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, and Hon. C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Eckert, C. J.

On July 7, 1947, Ezra Welch, an employee of the respondent in the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, was engaged in moving machinery and equipment from the old State highway garage and warehouse to the new State highway garage and warehouse at Paris, Illinois. While resting during his lunch hour, at approximately 12:30 P.M., he suffered a coronary block. Mr. Welch was taken home immediately, where he was placed in the care of Dr. Francis M. Link. Mr. Welch was subsequently moved to the Paris Hospital, where he remained until July 14, when he returned home. He died the. following morning.

At the time Ezra Welch suffered the coronary block which resulted in his death, the employer and employee were operating under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of this State, and notice of the accident and claim for compensation were made within the time provided by the Act.

The deceased was first employed by the Division of Highways on May 1, 1941. His earnings during the year immediately preceding his death aggregated $2,043.84. He had no children under 16 years of age dependent upon him for support. The claimant has incurred, on account of the illness and death of Ezra Welch, medical and hospital expenses in the amount of $123.30. She seeks an award in this amount, together with death benefits under the Illinois Compensation Act in the amount of $5,200.00.

From the testimony taken before Commissioner Jenkins, it is clear that decedent’s usual work for the division, prior to the summer of 1947, being the erection and maintenance of highway signs, was comparatively light in nature. Decedent was then in excellent health. In the latter part of June, 1947, however, he was called in from his usual work to assist in moving the sign department at Paris, Illinois, from the old to the new warehouse. The two warehouses were about a quarter of a mile apart, and the move was made by truck and by a sled used for the heavier equipment which included, among other things, a buffing machine, weighing over one thousand pounds, a metal vat, kegs of nuts and bolts, drums of paint, large signs, a paint spray booth, and fan and motor. The morning decedent suffered the heart attack, he had been lifting paint drums, kegs of bolts, and heavy metal signs from a truck, handing them up to another employee in the upstairs loft of the new warehouse. From the medical testimony, it is clear that the coronary block, which caused decedent’s death, was the direct result of this heavy lifting.

The Court is of the opinion that the death of Ezra Welch, husband of claimant, was due to an accidental injury which arose out of and in the course of decedent’s employment, within the meaning of the Illinois Workmen’s Compensation Act. The words “accident” and “accidental injury,” as used in the Act, have been defined to mean an injury that happens without design and which is unforeseen and not expected by the person to whom it happens. (Fittro vs. Industrial Commission, 377 Illinois 532, 538; Marsh vs. Industrial Commission, 386 Illinois 11; Schierbaum vs. State, 14 C.C.R. 250.) This employee was so disabled, unexpectedly, and in the course of his employment, without any action or design upon his part.

The decedent’s earnings during the year immediately preceding his death being in excess of $2,000.00, claimant is entitled to the maximum award of $4,000.00. Since the death occurred subsequent to July 1, 1947, this must be increased 30%, making a total of $5,200.00. The compensation rate is the maximum of $15.00 per week, increased 30%, or $19.50. Claimant is also entitled to be reimbursed on account of medical and hospital expenditures made by her in the amount of $123.30.

The testimony taken at the hearing before Commissioner Jenkins was taken and transcribed by Helen Bell of Charleston, Illinois, who made charges therefor in the amount of $67.80. These charges appear reasonable and proper.

An award is therefor entered in favor of Helen Bell in the amount of $67.80, payable forthwith.

An award is entered in favor of the claimant, Clara Welch, in the amount of $5,323.30, to be paid to her as follows:

$ 123.30, reimbursement for medical and hospital expenses, is payable forthwith;
1.423.50, accrued, is payable forthwith;
3.776.50, is payable in weekly installments of $19.50 per week, beginning on the 15th day of December, 1948, for a period of 193 weeks, with an additional final payment of $13.00.

All future payments being subject to the terms and conditions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Hlinois, jurisdiction of this cause is specifically reserved for the entry of such further orders as may from time to time be necessary.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


text:
    (No. 4076
    Tide Water Associated Oil Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 9, 1948.

    Claimant, Pro Se.
    Hon. George P. Barrett, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Eckert, C. J.

Respondent, through its Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, made duly authorized purchases of four drums of lubricating oil from the claimant on June 30, 1947, at a cost of $180.40. The appropriation for the payment of these supplies lapsed before the invoices were cleared by the division. The invoices, however, were submitted within a reasonable time, and non-payment is without fault on the part of the claimant. Sufficient funds remained unexpended in the appropriations to pay for the same.

This Court has repeatedly held that where materials or supplies have been properly furnished to the State, and an invoice therefor has been submitted within a reasonable time, but the same was not approved and vouchered for payment before the lapse of the appropriation from which it is payable, an award for the reasonable value of the supplies will be made if, at the time the expenses were incurred, there were sufficient funds remaining unexpended in the appropriation to pay for the same. (Johnson vs. State, 16 C.C.R. 96). This case clearly comes within the rule.

An award is therefore entered in favor of the Tide Water Associated Oil Company, claimant, in the amount of $180.40.


text:
    (No. 4086
    Southern Coal Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 9, 1948.

    J. L. Tucker of Southern Coal Co., Inc., Pro Se.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, and Archie L. Bernstein, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bergstrom, J.

On August 24, 1945, the Southern Coal Company, Inc., claimant, and the State of Illinois, respondent, entered into a written agreement whereby claimant agreed to furnish quantities of coal, totalling an estimated 8,750 tons, to respondent for use of Kankakee, Dixon, Bast Moline, Elgin, and Manteno State Hospitals, Pontiac Penitentiary, State Farm at Kankakee, Dixon, East Mo-line, Manteno, Pontiac, and Vandalia, Illinois. It was agreed that respondent pay claimant a certain price F.O.B. mine, per ton of coal plus a stated freight rate, if delivered.

The sole question existing under this agreement, otherwise fully performed, relates to claimant’s claim for $138.36 for freight undercharges with respect to a part of the 1,000 tons of coal allocated under the agreement and shipped to claimant between July 25 and September 30, 1946, to the Dixon State Hospital. This sum, paid by the claimant, represents an unknown increase of freight rate over the amount of the freight rate set forth in the original contract as the same was orally amended.

It is not contested that at the time the contract was executed it was contemplated the 1,000 tons of coal allocated to the Dixon State Hospital would be furnished by claimant from a mine at Pana, Illinois. However, due to a subsequent interruption in the operation of this mine, an understanding was reached between the parties that the balance of the coal be shipped from a mine at Coulterville, Illinois. Accordingly, further oral agreement was reached between the parties that the freight rates under the contract be adjusted from $1.70 per ton (Pana) to $1.90 and $1.98 per ton (Coulterville) to allow for the change in distance of shipment. The new freight rates so agreed to were the only rates then known to the claimant and respondent, as well as the railroad on whose line the coal originated. Meanwhile, an unknown increase of freight rate had occurred — Ex Parte 148 increases allowed in Illinois intrastate rates, effective July 21, 1946. The undercharge due to the unknown increased freight rate of the Coulterville shipments was later brought to the attention of the railroad. The railroad, bound by law to collect the undercharge by the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, then issued the undercharge bills to the claimant early in 1948. The freight undercharges were paid by the claimant in the total amount of $138.36.

The arrangement between respondent and claimant was to adjust their contract to freight rates existing at time of shipment. This is substantiated by the change of freight rates upon the necessity of obtaining the coal in question from Coulterville instead of Pana, Illinois. Claimant contends, and respondent does not deny, that freight rates provided for in contracts, as in the case at hand, are quoted as a matter of information; that such prevailing practice is customary because of the uncertainty of quoting exact freight rates months ahead; that at no time, in the previous experience of claimant had the State ever refused, or failed, to amend a similar contract because of increase of freight rates for supplies furnished; that, however, the present undercharges have not been paid by respondent because they were unknown until after the applicable two year appropriation period had expired.

From the record, we are of the opinion that the contract in question contemplated payment for coal delivered thereunder at certain stated prices plus the amount of the applicable freight rate as it might be amended from time to time by the Interstate Commerce Commission. There is no question that the claim is a just one, and the material facts are admitted. The sole reason for non-payment is that the undercharges were incurred in a previous biennium appropriation.

This Court has repeatedly held that an award should be made where claimant has rendered service or delivered materials to the State in accordance with an authorized contract, has submitted a statement of costs and charges to the State within a reasonable time and was denied payment because of the lapse of the appropriation from which it was payable, provided there remained sufficient unexpended funds in the appropriation to pay the charge at the time it was made. Moline Consumers Co. v. State, 15 C.C.R. 100; Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. State, 15 C.C.R. 115; Johnson v. State, 16 C.C.R. 96, and Shell Oil Co., Inc., v. State, 16 C.C.R. 257.

An award is therefore entered in favor of claimant, Southern Coal Co., Inc., for the sum of $138.36.


text:
    (No. 4088
    George Walden, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 9, 1948.

    Oliver A. Burkhart, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, for Respondent; Archie I. Bernstein, Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
   Damron, J.

George Walden was employed by the respondent on the State Game Farm of the Department of Conservation. On July 25, 1947, while in the performance of his duties as such employee, he received an injury, while lifting fence posts.

The record discloses that he reported the accident to his superior immediately, who recommended that he go home and if necessary employ a physician. At that time he was suffering excruciating pain in his left groin; however, claimant reported for work next day and continued at his employment for the respondent until August 23, 1947, when he was examined by Dr. Lyman A. Perkins of Torkville, who diagnosed his disability as an indirect inguinal hernia. On August 26, 1947, the hernia was repaired by Dr. W. Gr. Eilert of Aurora, a specialist in surgery.

Claimant convalesced for eleven weeks thereafter, but never returned to his employment by the respondent, but workd at a restaurant which was owned and operated by his daughter. The record discloses that at the time of the injury the claimant was 69 years of age, had no children under 16 years of age dependent on him for support; that his annual earnings were $2,100.00; that his average weekly wage was $40.38 and therefore his weekly compensation rate is $19.50.

The record further discloses that the respondent paid Dr. W. G-. Eilert of Aurora the sum of $100.00 for surgery but that the hospital was not paid by respondent. Claimant testified that he expended $10.00 for medicine and $10.00 for a truss and that the hospital bill amounted to $95.20.

The departmental report shows that the hernia first appeared shortly after the accident; and that the appearance was accompanied by pain; that the hernia was caused by the nature of the work being done by the claimant and it did not exist prior to the date of the accident.

Beatrice M. Allen was employed to report the testimony in support of this claim and to transcribe six copies thereof for which she made a charge of $31.80 which we find is fair and reasonable.

Awards are hereby entered as follows: For a period of 11 weeks at $19.50 a week the sum of $214.50; for hospital, medicine, and truss the • sum of $115.20 amounting to the total of Three Hundred Twenty-nine Dollars and Seventy Cents ($329.70) payable to claimant George Walden forthwith in a lump sum.

A further award is entered in favor of Beatrice M. Allen for transcribing the testimony in the sum of Thirty-one Dollars and Eighty Cents ($31.80).

The above and foregoing awards are subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


text:
    (No. 4102
    Hersel L. Houghton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 9, 1948.

      Petition of Claimant for Rehearing denied January 11, 1949.

    Giffen, Winning, Lindner & Newkirk, Attorneys, for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, and C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bergstrom, J.

Claimant filed Ms complaint on July 8, 1948 to recover the sum of $1,035.00 as the value of phonographic records, albums, and equipment, damaged or destroyed by the alleged negligence of an employee of respondent.

The record consists of the complaint, departmental report, transcript of evidence, claimant’s waiver of brief, and respondent’s waiver of brief.

The two questions presented for determination are, whether the alleged damage was caused by the negligence of respondent, and if so, the amount of the damages sustained by claimant. The undisputed evidence shows that Robert Brown was employed by respondent as a jamtor in the Department of Public Health. It was part of Ms duties to fill a bottle with drinking water from an old fashioned bottle-type water cooler. He did tMs by connecting a rubber hose to the water faucet in the photographic dark room and inserting the other end of the hose to the bottle placed on the floor. He was in the midst of filling the bottle on the evening of September 9, 1947 when a fire broke out in the jamtor’s trash paper pickup box. He put out the fire but forgot about the running water, with the result that a considerable volume concentrated on the floor of the room where the bottle was being filled, seeped through the composition ceiling of the second floor, and then poured down in a considerable volume on to the phonograph records and equipment of claimant. From the record, we are of the opinion that the first question should be resolved in favor of claimant, and accordingly find that the damages sustained resulted through the negligence of respondent.

With reference to the question of damages — the burden of proof is upon the claimant. It must be established by evidence from which a court is able to ascertain the extent of such damages by the usual rules of evidence and to a reasonable degree of certainty. It is also a well established rule that the best evidence must be produced of which the nature of the case is capable. The only evidence of damage in th einstant case is the uncorroborated testimony of claimant without the production of any books, records, or paid bills. He testified that approximately 1,050 records were destroyed or damaged; that their individual cost varied somewhat, namely, 49 cents to 85 cents each, and he thought that about $619.00 would cover their cost; that as far as he could remember he paid $56.00 for the damaged rack, then when further questioned said he traded $65.00 worth of records for the two new racks and that the records cost him about $46.00; that 850 envelopes, or shirts, were destroyed, which cost $3.50 per hundred, for which he claimed $24.00; that 800 record cards were destroyed, which cost $2.50 per hundred, for which he claimed $18.00; that 85 albums were destroyed, which had cost him approximately $64.00 to replace; that claimant, his wife, and another party worked approximately 265 hours after store closing hours to clean up the mess, for which labor he claimed $264.00. Obviously, the rather indefinite testimony of claimant is not the best evidence to establish claimant’s damages to a reasonable degree of certainty from which the Court can make a just and fair award. The Court is also of the opinion that claimant did not use reasonable care and caution to mitigate or minimize the damage. He testified that immediately after he noticed the water leaking from above, it sprung a flood-gap through the ceiling and practically all the water came down at once; that the phonograph record rack was so constructed that it caught the water as it fell and held it in the rack; that a substantial part of the damaged records were in the rack; that the rack, which was made of wood, got pretty well saturated and expanded considerably, resulting in a good deal of breakage. He testified, on cross examination, that he removed the things from the rack as soon as he could. Ordinarily, it takes more than a matter of minutes for wood to absorb water and expand to a point necessary for the breaking of records. Claimant was present when the water fell and it would appear that had he exercised reasonable alert action in removing the records from the rack that a substantial part could have been saved from breakage.

For the reasons stated, the claim is hereby denied.


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    (No. 4111
    Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 9, 1948.

    Samuel M. Kane, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General; William J. Colohan, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Damron, J.

This is a claim for damages arising out of a purported collision between claimant’s tractor trailer and respondent’s snow plow on February 14, 1948, three miles north of Lincoln, Illinois, on State Route No. 121. The evidence in the case was taken before the commissioner on October 28, 1948.

Belmont Sheeley, the driver of claimant’s tractor trailer, was the only witness who testified on claimant’s behalf. He estimated the roadway at the point of the purported collision to be about 18 feet wide. He estimated the tractor trailer to be 8 feet wide with single wheels in front and dual wheels on the rear. He estimated the over-all length to be about 30 feet. Sheeley testified that the weather was clear but the roadway was icy.

He testified he was driving about 20 to 25 miles an hour northward on highway No. 121 and came up behind a snow plow which also was travelling north. He said he flashed his lights at the plow and waited until the lights on the plow were flashed back to him to proceed. When he first saw the snow plow, he said it was on the right side or east side of the highway. He estimated the shoulder on the east side to be about 6 feet wide and he said the plow was straddling the edge of the pavement with its left wheels on the pavement and its right wheels on the shoulder. Before passing, he said he moved over to the left side of the road with two wheels on the left shoulder. He said he did not know how many feet there were between the right side of his unit and the left side of the snow plow at the time he was passing the plow but estimated it might have been 5 or 6 feet between the two vehicles.

He said the cab of his tractor had passed on and had cleared the snow plow to his right when he felt an “awful jar”. This was the first and only knowledge he had of a collision. He said thereafter his tractor travelled about 20 feet and slid in the ditch on the right side of the road and when he came to a halt he was facing east. No one was injured.

Thereafter he inspected his unit and found the drive-shaft of his tractor in the center of the roadway, and the rear axle was broken and was setting at the rear of the trailer, the brakes and shackle were torn out of the unit and there was a sharp cut in the right inside rear tire of the tractor and also a cut on the rear frame of the tractor. The trailer was not damaged. He identified receipts evidencing $214.24 for repairs and testified the unit was out of commission for five days and that the fair and reasonable rental charge was $10.00 per day. He was not corroborated by other witnesses.

On cross examination he testified there was snow on the highway but as he approached the plow, he could see where the left of the highway had been cleared and the right side of road was then being cleared. He also testified on cross examination that he did not see the blade extending out from the plow. He felt no skid. He also testified there was no curve ahead of him when he came up behind the plow although he was watching the road ahead, yet he paid no attention to the lights of the plow. He testified he could not have been more than 2 feet ahead of the headlights on the snow plow when he felt a jar. This was all the testimony offered on behalf of the claimant before the commissioner.

William Awe, employee of the Division of Highways, was the driver of the snow plow in question, was the only defense witness. He testified that he was driving his truck in a northerly direction. There was a snow blade about ten feet wide attached to the front of the truck.

It was “stormy, snowing, and blowing” at the time. He was travelling on the right side of the road. The blade was at an angle of about 45 degrees to the front of the truck with the left end.of the blade extending forward about four feet from the truck throwing the snow into the ditch. The over-all width of his vehicle with the plow in that position was 8 feet 4% inches.

Awe further testified that immediately before the accident a vehicle approached from the rear and flashed a signal to pass but he did not return the signal because they were around a double curve at that point and the weather was such one could not see ahead. The vehicle coming from the rear followed him around the curve and after the snow plow came out of the curve and Awe had a clear view ahead he blinked his lights to indicate it was safe for the vehicle coming from the rear to pass.

Just as the vehicle was passing the plow there was a jar and the plow swung completely around going into the ditch on the west side of the road facing west. As the other vehicle was passing and at the time of the impact Awe was watching the left edge of the blade about eight inches to the right of the black center line of the road. He was travelling straight ahead not over ten miles per hour at the time; the truck not over twenty-five m.p.h. The truck travelled about 200 feet down the road after the impact. There was some ice on the pavement and at the point of passing a little snow over the ice. The front left end of the blade was damaged.

On cross examination Awe stated his truck was 6% feet wide. The road was nineteen feet wide. His left wheels were 2% feet to the right of the center line of the road and his right wheels were close to the edge of the road but not off the shoulder. The left edge of his snow blade was about six inches to the east of the center line. The snow was about one-half inch deep on the ice.

Sheely testified on rebuttal that before he got to the curve he met a car approaching from the opposite direction and dimmed his lights for this car and then flashed them on again. At that time he was about a quarter of a mile back of the snow plow.

The foregoing is a carefully detailed statement of the only two witnesses to this accident.

It is not possible to reconcile the indisputable fact of the collision with the testimony of the respective witnesses. If Sheely as he was passing the plow was proceeding straight ahead about five or six feet to the left of the plow obviously the latter must have veered left into Sheely’s unit. On the other hand if Awe was proceeding straight ahead at the time then claimant’s unit must have veered or skidded into the snow plow. There is no evidence in this record which justifies this Court in resolving that question of fact adversely to respondent. It is reasonable to surmise that both vehicles did proceed straight ahead as both witnesses say and that Sheely as he passed did have sufficient room to clear the truck body of the plow, but failed to observe the blade extending four feet to the left of the body of the snow truck. If so, he was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to see the blade directly ahead of him. On this state of the record we can merely speculate as to the proximate cause of this accident. No award of this Court can proceed from mere conjecture.

. The elements of proof necessary in claim under Section 8, Par. (c) of the Court of Claims Act as amended (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Chap. 37, Par. 439.8) are that claimant must prove by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence that the agent of respondent was guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the damages sustained by it and that claimant’s agent was in the exercise of due care at the time of the accident.

It is the opinion of this Court, therefore, that the claimant has not established a clear right to an award for damages as required by law. Award denied.


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    (No. 4115
    Phillips Petroleum Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 9, 1948.

    Blum and Jacobson, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Damron, J.

The claimant herein, Phillips Petroleum Company, Inc., was authorized by contract duly entered into by it and the respondent to furnish oil, gasoline, and other materials or services to the several code departments and divisions of the respondent.

Under said contract all materials listed on claimant’s exhibits “C” through “L” inclusive, being invoices Nos. 1055, $4.23; 2191, $2.84; 5259, $8.24; 6451, $2.46; 6441, $8.10; 8104, $3.79; 3535, $22.34; 8961, $1.43; 2539, $1.22; 5130, $1.67; 04058, $1.86; 4148, $1.77; 1849, $2.20; 1848, $3.59; 1847, $5.30; 1844, $2.16; and 1843, $2.12, totaling $75.32, were furnished to the departments and divisions as listed. The departmental report filed October 4, 1948, shows that the places and dates of purchases are correct; that the volumes shown on said invoices check with the records of the respective departments and divisions, and the prices are in accordance with those previously agreed upon by the parties. The report further shows that all purchases included in the above numbered invoices were made prior to July 1, 1947, but that the schedule of purchases were received by the several departments and divisions after appropriations made by the 64th General Assembly had lapsed. The above purchases amounted to the sum of $75.32.

Claimant also files its exhibits “A” and “B” which relate to materials and services furnished to the Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police, by the Zacearía Motor Sales, Coal City, Illinois, in the sum of $5.56.

Records of the Division of State Police show that the Zaccaria Motor Sales was paid for these items on invoice voucher Nos. P-19736 and P-19859. These claims therefore must be denied. Claims represented in exhibits “C” through “L” inclusive are allowed.

An award is hereby entered in favor of claimant, Phillips Petroleum Company, Inc., in the sum of Seventy-five Dollars and Thirty-two Cents ($75.32).


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    (No. 4118
    Nadine Burton, widow, et al., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 9, 1948.

    Nadine Burton, Claimant, Pro Se.
    Hon. George P. Barrett, Attorney General, and C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bergstrom, J.

Nadine Burton filed her complaint on September 8, 1948, as the widow of Marsh Burton, for compensation under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The record consists of the complaint, departmental report, stipulation that department! report shall constitute the record, claimant’s waiver of brief, and respondent’s waiver of brief.

Her husband, Marsh Burton, came to his death on April 27, 1948 due to the severing of the aorta near the heart, tearing of the pericardial sac and a small tear of the apex of the heart, sustained when a link at the end of a 15.2 foot long chain, weighing 42 pounds broke, which was attached to an empty railroad coal car on a spur track and being moved by a State of Illinois truck (1948 Illinois license M-7407, International) at the Elgin State Hospital in Elgin, Illinois, at about 2 P.M. when the chain whipped back with great force and struck Mr. Burton on his back, who was to release said chain from either the truck or the car, resulting in the above injuries and causing his sudden death, said injuries having been ascertained by an autopsy granted by the wife of the decedent. The said accident happened while he was performing his regular duties while employed by the Department of Public Welfare. Immediately following the accident he was removed to the Institution General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

There is no jurisdictional question presented by the record, and we find that the fatal injuries to the decedent arose out of and in the course of his employment by respondent.

At the time of decedent’s death he was married to Nadine Burton, and had one child named Dennis Gene Burton, nine months of age.

Decedent entered the service of the State on April 13, 1948 and sustained his fatal injuries on April 27, 1948, at which time his gross earnings amounted to $96.25 for 15 days, computed on Ms salary of $192.50 per month. His compensation rate, therefore, computed under See. 10, Par. (c) and Sec. 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, would be $19.50 per week.

Claimant is entitled to an award of $5,785.00 computed under Sec. 7, Pars, (a) (h) and (1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

An award is therefore made to claimant, Nadine Burton, in the sum of $5,785.00, payable as follows:

$ 624.00 which has accrued, is payable forthwith;
$5,161.00 payable in weekly installments of $19.50 commencing December 15, 1948 and continuing for 264 weeks, with a final payment of $13.00.

All future payments being subject to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, jurisdiction is hereby specifically reserved in tMs cause for the entry of such further order or orders as may from time to time be necessary.

TMs award is subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concermng the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


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    (No. 4042
    Amelia Ator, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 17, 1948.

    Sam Schneidman and Harold R. Clark, Attorneys for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General; Hon. William L. Morgan, Assistant Attorney General, and Hon. C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Eckert, C. J.

This action is brought under Section 3 of the Workmen’s Occupational Diseases Act (Illinois Revised Statutes 1947, Chapter 48, Section 172.3), by Amelia Ator, an employee of the respondent, for damages sustained as a result of contracting tuberculosis while working as. a cook at the Kankakee State Hospital at Kankakee, Illinois. Claimant is a woman 53 years of age, and she has been employed by the respondent since January 27, 1942. Prior to that time, she lived at Quincy, Illinois, and was-a strong,healthy woman, gainfully employed in various mercantile establishments.

From January 27, 1942, until January 1, 1945, the claimant worked in the kitchen of the tubercular ward, being Ward 15 South, of the Kankakee State Hospital, as a relief cook, at least once each week. There, she came in contact directly and indirectly with patients of the institution recovering from tuberculosis. She handled cooking utensils and dishes which had been washed and dried by patients having arrested cases.

The kitchen is located in the center of the ward, with an open entrance to serving rooms at each end. Swinging doors open from each of the serving rooms to a corridor. The dining rooms are immediately off the serving rooms with an open window or port between them. There is an outside door to the kitchen and this, together with the two openings into the serving rooms, furnish the only means of entering or leaving the kitchen. The food, after being prepared in the kitchen, was carried into the serving rooms and then passed to the dining rooms through the open port. Light switches were in the west serving room and the telephone was in the east serving room. Claimant was required to use these facilities daily. The doors connecting the serving rooms and hall corridor were frequently left open. A toaster in the kitchen and one compartment of the ice box were used at night by attendants who came directly from the tubercular ward to the kitchen.

From January 1, 1945, until June, 1946, claimant worked as a regular cook at the staff house, and as a relief cook at the superintendent’s residence. Nothing-in the record indicates any exposure to tuberculosis during this period.

At intervals during her employment at the institution, claimant was required to work more than eight hours in a day and more than forty-eight hours in a week. This is in violation of “An Act concerning the hours of employment of females in certain occupations” (Illinois Revised Statutes 1947, Chapter 48, Section 5), which provides:

“No female shall be employed.............................. in any public or private institution or offices thereof, incorporated or unincorporated in this State, more than eight hours during any one day nor more than forty-eight hours in any one week.........................”

The violation of this statute by the respondent is clearly the violation of a statute intended for the protection of the health of employees, and constitutes negligence under Section 3 of the Workmen’s Occupational Diseases Act. (Wheeler vs. State, 12 C.C.R. 254). Such a violation creates a cause of action in favor of an employee, against the State, where such employee sustains injury to her health by reason of disease contracted or sustained in the course of her employment, as a result thereof. (Wheeler vs. State, supra).

Claimant, however, had a routine X-ray examination at the Kankakee State Hospital in 1945, which showed no evidence of tuberculosis. This was subsequent to the period during which she alleges she was exposed to the disease. No exposure is alleged or proved subsequent to January 1, 1945. Claimant was first found to have tuberculosis in June, 1946.

The only medical testimony in the record is that of Dr. Emmett F. Pearson, of Springfield, Illinois. Dr. Pearson had not examined Mrs. Ator, nor had she been under his care at any time. Although she had spent nine months in a sanitarium at Quincy, Illinois, no member of that staff testified. Dr. Pearson’s testimony was confined almost entirely to answering a hypothetical question which included most of the facts in reference to her employment prior to January 1, 1945 and which were proved at the hearing before Commissioner Blumenthal. After a recital of these facts, the question concluded:

“If at a later date this woman developed pulmonary tuberculosis, Doctor, have you an opinion as to whether there might or could, with reasonable medical certainty, he a causal relationship between the employment and working environment which I have described in this question and the tubercular condition of this woman?”

To this question, Dr. Pearson replied:

“I believe that there is a probable causal relationship between the employment and working environment and the contraction of the disease by the woman.”

It is quite obvious that the question was misleading. “At a later date,” was ambiguous and indefinite. The question did not, in any way, take into account the fact that claimant, after January 1, 1945, did not work in the kitchen of the tubercular ward, and was not thereafter exposed to tuberculosis in the institution. It omitted any reference to her employment from January 1, 1945, to June, 1946, during which time she was found to be free of tuberculosis. Dr. Pearson answered a question which might sustain an award, if claimant, in January of 1945, had been found to be suffering from tuberculosis. There is not a scintilla of evidence that an exposure to tuberculosis between 1942 and 1945 would be the cause of tuberculosis appearing in June, 1946, an examination during 1945 having shown no tuberculosis.

Although the record discloses a clear violation of the statute in regard to female employment, and although the record discloses that claimant was exposed to tuberculosis during her employment prior to January 1, 1945, the record in no way sustains the necessary allegation that the tuberculosis contracted in June, 1946, was contracted or sustained in the course of claimant’s employment, as a result thereof.

Since claimant’s tuberculosis is not shown to have been contracted or sustained in the course of her employment, nor proximately caused by the negligence of the employer, she cannot recover under the provisions of Section 3 of the Workmen’s Occupational Diseases Act.

The testimony taken at the hearing before Commissioner Blumenthal, at Chicago, was taken and transcribed by A. M. Rothbart, who made charges therefor in the amount of $122.45. These charges appear reasonable and proper.

The testimony taken at the hearing before Commissioner Blumenthal, at Springfield, was taken and transcribed by Hugo Antonacci, who made charges therefor in the amount of $22.50. These charges appear reasonable and proper.

An award is therefor entered in favor of A. M. Rothbart in the amount of $122.45, and an award is entered in favor of Hugo Antonacci in the amount of $22.50, both payable forthwith.

An award to claimant is denied.


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    (No. 4077
    Herman Drezner, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1949.

    Joseph I. Bulger, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General; Hon. William J. Colohan, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Eckert, C. J.

Claimant, Herman Drezner, was certified on May 1, 1939, by the Illinois Civil Service Commission to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, and was thereupon employed by the Illinois Liquor Control Commission as a Field Investigator II. On June 2, 1945, the Liquor Control Commission filed notice of removal and discharge of claimant with the Illinois Civil Service Commission. A hearing was had before the Civil Service Commission, and on December 14, 1945, the charges against claimant were sustained, and claimant was discharged.

On January 15, 1946, claimant filed suit in Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, against the Illinois Civil Service Commission, to review the order of discharge. The Superior Court subsequently, on November 13, 1946, confirmed the order of the Illinois Civil Service Commission. Claimant thereupon took an appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois.

On September 18, 1947, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Superior Court of Cook County (Drezner v. Civil Service Commission, 398 Ill. 219), and the mandate of the Supreme Court was filed with the clerk of the Superior Court on November 25, 1947. Pursuant to this mandate, the Superior Court on December 19, 1947, entered an order in accordance with the mandate.

Claimant thereupon served a demand on both the Illinois Civil Service Commission and the Illinois Liquor Control Commission for reinstatement. On January 12, 1948, claimant not having been reinstated, he filed a petition for mandamus against the Illinois Civil Service Commission in the Superior Court of Cook County to restore him to his position and for payment of accrued salary.

In answer to the petition for mandamus, the Illinois Civil Service Commission alleged that the salary for the classified position of Field Investigator II as appropriated by the General Assembly for the biennium of July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, and for the biennium of July 1, 1945, to June 30, 1947, had lapsed and that no funds remained from which claimant could be reimbursed for the salary allegedly due.

On February 27, 1948, judgment was entered by the Superior Court of Cook County in the mandamus proceeding, ordering and directing that claimant be restored to his position, that he receive his salary as a classified civil service employee from July 1, 1947, to February 29, 1948, in the amount of $270.00 per month, that such salary be paid from the then current biennial appropriation, and that the judgment should in no way prejudice claimant’s right to salary due him from June 2, 1945, to July 1, 1947. Claimant was thereupon restored to his position.

On March 17, 1948, claimant filed suit in this Court to recover his salary from June 2, 1945, the date of his discharge, to July 1, 1947, in the sum of $196.00 for June, 1945, and in the sum of $5,880.00 for the period of July 1, 1945, to July 1, 1947. He alleges that during the period i nquestion he was illegally prevented from performing the duties of his position as Field Investigator II, and was illegally deprived of the salary accruing to that position; that during all of that time he was ready, able and willing to perform the duties of the position and was illegally prevented from doing so; that the salary of such Field Investigator, from June 2, 1945, to June 30, 1945, was $210.00 a month, and from July 1, 1945, to July 1, 1947, was $245.00 a month; that there is due and owing to him for salary for that period the aggregate sum of $6,076.00; that the salary appropriations for the period of June 2, 1945, to July 1,1947, have lapsed; and that there were sufficient funds on hand when the respective appropriations lapsed to pay the salary alleged to be due.

From the record it appears that claimant was a duly qualified civil service employee of the State of Illinois; that he was illegally discharged and wrongfully prevented from performing the duties of his position; and that he was subsequently reinstated by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. He has been diligent in the protection of his rights, and at all times for which he seeks payment of salary, he was ready, willing, and able to perform the duties of his position, tendered the performance thereof, and such tender was refused. A civil service employee, illegally discharged and subsequently restored to his position by judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction is entitled to the salary provided for said position for the period of the illegal discharge where he is ready, able, and willing to perform the duties of such position and tendered his services to his employer. (Wilson v. State, 12 C.R.R. 413; Drezner v. State, 15 C.C.R. 16). Respondent offered no proof that claimant’s salary had been paid to a de facto incumbent prior to claimant’s reinstatement, and offered no proof that any other agent or de facto incumbent performed the duties of claimant’s position during the period in controversy.

The Court, therefore, finds that claimant is rightfully entitled to an award for payment of his salary during the period of his allegal discharge, in the amount of $6,076.00.

An award is entered in favor of the claimant, Herman Drezner, in the amount of $6,076.00.


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    (No. 4096
    Julius Sbragia, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1949.

    Stephen M. Fleming, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, for Respondent; William J. Colohan, Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
   Damron, J.

This is a claim for benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. On December 19, 1946, the date this cause of action arose, Julius Sbragia, the above named claimant, resided at 3848 Newcastle Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. He was 64 years of age, married, but had no children under 16 years of age dependent .upon him for support.

He was first employed by the Division of Highways on June 1, 1945, as a common laborer at a wage rate of 65 cents an hour. He was employed regularly in this classification from the date of his employment until the date of his injury. His wage rate was increased to 75 cents an hour on July 1, 1945. Earnings exclusive of overtime in the year preceding his injury totaled $1,569.75.

December 19, 1946, claimant was one of a group of men assigned to remove ice from the surface of Forest Preserve Drive adjacent to Dunning State Hospital in Cook County. At the time of the accident, Mr. Sbragia was scattering salt on the ice to cause it to melt. Mr. Andrew Grafmiller was operating a motor patrol grader used to scarify and push the partially melted ice off the highway. At approximately 10:50 A.M., about one block south of Irving Park Boulevard, Mr. Grafmiller backed the motor patrol toward Mr. Sbragia. Mr. Grafmiller did not see Mr. Sbragia, and he in turn did not observe the approaching patrol grader until one of the wheels struck and knocked him down. The wheel of the vehicle knocked claimant to the ground where he received divers injuries to both legs.

Mr. Sbragia was taken to Dunning State Hospital where first aid was given. He was then taken to St. Luke’s Hospital, Chicago, and placed under the care of Dr. H. B. Thomas, professor emeritus of orthopedics, University of Illinois College of Medicine.

At the time of the taking* of the evidence, a stipulation was entered into by and between the parties hereto and the above facts were recited in the stipulation. In addition thereto it was further stipulated that respondent furnished all necessary medical and hospital care and no claim is made for the reimbursement to claimant in that regard. It is further stipulated that claimant was temporarily and totally disabled from December 20, 1946, to June 21, 1947, and that respondent paid the claimant during that period the sum of $475.70, representing 26 3/7 weeks at $18.00 a week.

It was further stipulated that respondent had immediate notice of the injury and the claim was filed in due time and no jurisdictional questions raised.

The report of the Division of Highways filed herein and made a part of this record shows that respondent’s Division of Highways paid the sum of $648.70 on behalf of the claimant’s medical expenses, which included the fees of Dr. H. B. Thomas, St. Luke’s Hospital, Chicago, and claimant’s expenses to Chicago.

Dr. Albert C.- Field was called as a witness on behalf of the- claimant. He testified that he had examined Sbragia on October 28, 1948 and found that his left knee was enlarged, the fossa on both sides of the patella rounded out with crepitation present in both knees. In supine position the right heel could be brought within two inches of the buttocks, the left within 6V2 inches. Plantar flexion was limited about twenty degrees, dorsal flexion about fifteen. Pronation and supination of the left leg in comparison with the opposite leg was limited about one-half the normal range over the malleoli. There was also some rigidity on dorsal and plantar flexion of the right ankle joint. He interpreted X-rays he had taken as confirming the fractures already described. In addition he found evidence of separation of the fragments, dislocation of the tip of the malleolus, and bony injury in the articulation of the astragulus. with the fibula. In his opinion, claimant has a permanent loss of use of 45% of his left leg and about 20% of his right.

Dr. H; B. Thomas had been called as a witness on behalf of .the respondent but was unable to be present because of operations scheduled at the time of the hearing. It was stipulated between the parties hereto that if Dr. Thomas was present, his testimony would be on the basis of the factual statements contained in his reports submitted to the Division of Highways on December 27j 1946; April 11, 1947; and August 4, 1947.

An examination of these reports show that X-rays taken at the St. Luke’s Hospital revealed a trimalleolar fracture of the left fibula, externally comminuted and somewhat impacted with lateral and posterior displacement of the distal fragment; a small chip fracture of the head of the astragulus and a similar fracture along the articular margins of the astragulus.

A reduction on December 20th was not satisfactory and another was made on the 24th. ¡

Dr. Thomas concluded that, as of August 3,' 1947, claimant, continued to have a 20% disability of the left ankle and 10% in the right with the prognosis fair to good.

Claimant testified that previous to the accident he worked 8 hours a day without any difficulty, but that at present his leg swells and he continues to suffer considerable pain in his left leg and some discomfort in his right foot.

It is to be noted that Dr. H. B. Thomas had not exaxmined the claimant since August 3, 1947. Dr. Albert C. Field, however, examined this claimant on October 28, 1948, and he found a far greater disability existing in claimant’s injured limbs than did Dr. Thomas more than a year prior thereto. It is apparent that claimant did not attain the amount of recovery anticipated by Dr. Thomas on August 3, 1947.

From the evidence, X-ray exhibits, reports of Dr. H. B. Thomas, and the testimony of Dr. Field and the claimant, we make the following findings: That claimant sustained a permanent partial disability of 35% in his left leg and 15% permanent partial disability in the right leg for which he is to be compensated under the provisions of Section 8, Par. (e) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

An award is hereby entered in favor of claimant for 35% permanent partial loss of use of his left leg for which he is entitled to be paid 66% weeks at $18.00 a week, amounting to the sum of One Thousand One Hundred and Ninety-seven dollars ($1,197.00); and, for 15% permanent partial loss of use of his right leg, amounting to the sum of Five Hundred and Thirteen Dollars ($513.00), representing 28% weeks at $18.00 a week or a total award of One Thousand Seven Hundred and Ten Dollars ($1,710.00).

Of this amount the sum of One Thousand Four Hundred and Sixty-five Dollars and Seventy-one Cents ($1,465.71) has accrued as of January 11, 1949. The remainder of said award amounting to the sum of Two Hundred Forty-four Dollars and Twenty-nine Cents $(224.29) is payable to him at $18.00 a week in weekly installments commencing January 18, 1949 for thirteen weeks with one final payment of Ten Dollars and Twenty-nine Cents ($10.29).

A. M. Eothbart was employed to take and transcribe the testimony at the hearing before the Commissioner for which he made a charge of $40.00. We find this sum reasonable, customary, and fair for the services rendered. An award is hereby entered in favor of A. M. Eothbart in the sum of Forty Dollars ($40.00).

These awards are subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


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    (No. 4103
    Mary Ann Clohsey, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1949.

    William A. Murphy, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General; Hon. William J. Colohan, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Eckert, C. J.

On April 5, 1947, William J. Clohsey, employed as an adult parole agent by the Department of Public Safety, Division of Supervision of Parolees, while returning a parole violator, Robert Concannon, from Detroit, Michigan, to Chicago, was attacked by the prisoner. The decedent and Concannon were traveling on the New York Central train No. 75 known as the Mercury. A short distance east of Porter, Indiana, the prisoner asked to go to the rest room, and requested the decedent to release one of his handcuffs. Mr. Clohsey complied with the request, and stood outside the partially closed rest room door, holding on to the ring end of the long chain attached to the handcuffs.

The prisoner emerged suddenly from the rest room and using the loosened handcuff, struck the decedent who was knocked unconscious. The prisoner then took the handcuff keys from the parole agent, loosened his other hand from the cuff, and escaped from the train as it pulled into Porter, Indiana. Mr. Clohsey was found unconscious by the conductor, and from the character of his injuries it appeared that he had been repeatedly kicked or struck by the prisoner after he lost consciousness.

The Chicago police were notified immediately upon the train’s arrival in Chicago. The Chicago office of the Department of Public Safety, Division of Supervision of Parolees, was also notified. Mrs. Clohsey called the family physician, Dr. Nicholas J. Balsamo, who removed Mr. Clohsey to the Loretto Hospital. There he was found to be suffering from a dislocation of the left humerus, a large, fracture of the humeral head, a fracture and dislocation of the left shoulder with multiple lacerations and severe contusions of his chin, face and ears.

On April 10, 1947, Mr. Clohsey returned to his home for convalescence, and during that period suffered an acute urinary retention. Dr. William J. Baker, of Chicago, performed an operation to relieve this condition at St. Luke’s Hospital, in Chicago, on May 3, 1947. Mr. Clohsey was hospitalized from May 1st to May 12th. . His post-operative recovery was never complete, however, but it was sufficient to allow him to return to light office work on July 1, 1947, where he performed limited duties until January 1, 1948. He was then advised to remain at home, and on January 18, 1948, a second operation was performed at St. Luke’s Hospital for the same urinary condition. He never recovered from this. second operation, and died on March 6, 1948.

Dr. William J. Baker, who performed the trans-urethral prostatic resections and revision of the bladder riéck, testified on behalf of claimant. Dr. Baker stated that in his opinion there was a causal connection between the injuries sustained by the decedent on April 5, 1947, and his death on March 6, 1948. He stated that the injuries precipitated decedent’s prostatic condition which was analogous to hyper static pneumonia developing after an injury occasioning bed rest.

At the time of the accident, decedent and respondent were operating under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of this State, and notice of the injury and claim for compensation were made within the time provided by the Act. The evidence is uncontradicted, and clearly sustains claimant’s contention that decedent’s death was a result of accidental injuries which arose out of and in the course of his employment.

Decedent’s annual earnings for the year next preceding his injury were $2,760.00, making an average weekly wage of $53.07. His compensation rate would, therefore, be the maximum of $15.00 per week. The injury having occurred subsequent to July 1, 1945, but prior to July 1, 1947, this must be increased 20%, making a compensation rate of $18.00. Decedent received on account of temporary total disability the aggregate amount of $1,011.02. Under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, however, he was only entitled to compensation at the rate of $18.00 a week for 21 5/7 weeks, or the sum of $390.85. Decedent thus received $620.17 in excess of the amount to which he was rightfully entitled, and this excess must be deducted from any award made to claimant.

Claimant is therefore entitled to an award on account of the death of William J. Clohsey, under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of this State, in the amount of $4,800.00, less the sum of $620.17 paid to decedent'for non-productive work, or the sum of $4,179.83.

A. M. Eothbart of Chicago, Illinois, was employed to take and transcribe the evidence at the hearing before Commissioner Blumenthai. Charges in the amount of $26.80 were incurred for these services, which charges are fair, reasonable and customary.

An award is therefore entered in favor of A. M. Eothbart in the amount of $26.80, payable forthwith.

An award is entered in favor of Mary Ann Clohsey, widow of William J. Clohsey, in the amount of $4,179.83, to be paid to her as follows:

$ 810.00, which has accrued, is payable forthwith;
$3,369.83, is payable in weekly installments of $18.00 per week, beginning on the 23rd day of January, A.D. 1949, for a period of 187 weeks, with an additional final payment of $3.83.

All future payments being subject to the terms and provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Illinois, jurisdiction of this cause is specifically reserved for the entry of such further orders as may from time to time be necessary.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


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    (No. 4108
    Faun E. Peterson, widow, et al., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1949.

    Josef T. Skinner, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, and Archie I. Bernstein, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bergstrom, J.

Claimant, Faun E. Peterson, is the widow of Harry D. Peterson, deceased, who was formerly employed by the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, of the State of Illinois. On the 3rd day of June, 1948, while engaged in the pavement repair of highway Illinois Route No. 26 approximately two to two and one-half miles south of Ohio, Illinois, he was struck by an automobile. He died that night. Claimant, as widow, seeks an award for the death of her husband under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

From the evidence and testimony, including the report of the Division of Highways which has been filed in this case, it appears that at the time of the accident the decedent was one of a group of employees engaged in filling pavement cracks with hot tar or bituminous material on Illinois Route No. 26 in Bureau County. At approximately 10:30 A.M. the decedent was filling a crack in the west (southbound traffic lane) half of the pavement. He had begun pouring at the westerly edge of the pavement and was proceeding easterly, in a stooped position, toward the center line of the pavement. At this time a southbound car driven by Mr. Henry C. Warner of Dixon, Illinois, struck the decedent. Mr. Warner had been driving in the east (northbound) lane when passing other employees working to the north of the decedent. He had turned back into the west or righthand lane of the highway when his car hit the decedent. Upon impact the decedent, was knocked unconscious ; he bled from his nose and the left side of his head.

Immediately following the accident Mr. Peterson was taken to the Julia Rackley Perry Memorial Hospital at Princeton, Illinois. He was placed under the care of Dr. Joseph W. O’Malley of Ohio, Illinois. Upon examining Mr. Peterson, Dr. O’Malley found he had a large soft tissue wound on the left temporal region of his head, marked ecchymoses on both eyelids, bleeding from the nostrils, and mouth and left ear. On palpation, he had a definite break in the outer skull table in the left temporal region. Mr. Peterson was unconscious and remained so until his death at 11:30 P.M. Dr. O’Malley, who continued to attend Mr. Peterson, stated his coma deepened until his death. It was Dr. O’Malley’s conclusion that a severe concussion of the brain and compound fracture of the skull in the left temporal region, together with severe hemorrhages in the cranial cavity, were the causes of death.

In his report to the division dated June 10, 1948, Dr. 0 ’Malley stated:

“Nature of Injury: 1. Concussion brain, severe. 2. Fractures skull,' severe — basal and linear in left temporal frontal region. Treatment: Wound cleansed and dressed. Patient put to bed and watched. One-half- hour blood pressure, pulse, and respiration readings. X-rays: Portable of skull. Patient died June 3, 1948, 11:25 P.M.”

At the time of the accident the decedent and respondent were operating under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of this State and notice of the accident and claim for compensation were made within the time provided in the Act. The accident arose out of and in the course of decedent’s employment. Decedent had been employed by respondent continuously since February of 1941. He received $2,418.90 as salary during the year preceding the accident. The decedent had no children under sixteen years of age dependent upon him for support at th time of his death.

Claimant is therefore entitled to an award under Section 7 (a) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, in the amount of $4,000.00, which must be increased thirty percent’ under Section 7 (1), making a total award of $5,200.00. ■ This is payable at a weekly compensation rate of $19.50. ' '

Frances E. Scott was employed to - take and transcribe the evidence at the hearings before Commissioner Young, and submitted her invoice for these services in the amount of $50.00, which charges are fair, reasonable and customary.

An award is therefore made to claimant, Faun E. Peterson, in the amount of $5,200.00, payable as follows:

$ 624.00 which has accrued, is payable forthwith;
$4,576.00 is payable in weekly installments of $19.50 commencing on January 21, 1949 and continuing for 234 weeks, with a final payment of $13.00.

An award is also entered in favor of Frances E. Scott, in the amount of $50.00, payable forthwith.

All future payments being subject to the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Illinois, jurisdiction of this cause is specifically reserved for the entry of such further orders as may from time to time be necessary.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor, as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”


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    (No. 4127
    Joseph Green, a minor, by and through his mother and next friend, Ruth Elizabeth Green, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1949.

    Reed F. Cutler, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, and C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Bergstrom, J.

Claimant, Joseph Green, a minor, by and through his mother and next friend, Ruth Elizabeth Green, filed his claim on October 15, 1948 for recovery of $2,500.00 damages for injury to claimant on February 10, 1948, caused by his being struck in the right eye by a door check under the operation and control of respondent, which resulted in the loss of the right eye of claimant and which had to be replaced by an artificial.eye.

The record consists of the complaint, departmental report, stipulation, waiver of brief of claimant, waiver of brief of respondent, and claimant’s exhibits 1 to 4 inclusive.

There is no disagreement with respect to the material facts. The complaint alleges that the State owns, operates and maintains the Illinois State Normal University at Normal, Illinois, and as part of the functions of the said Illinois State Normal University it also conducts and operates a University High School on the campus and in the buildings of the Illinois State Normal University; that claimant, Joseph Green, on February 10, 1948, was a pupil or student enrolled in the State University High School; that he was voluntarily serving as a monitor, and while performing the duties of a monitor, which were assigned to him, he was entering a door on the north side of a building which is known as the “Metcalf Building”; that while entering the said door he was struck in his right eye by a part of the said door or equipment attached thereto which had worked loose and functioned improperly; that as a result of said injury claimant suffered great pain, incurred extensive medical and hospital expense, and lost the sight of his right eye, it being necessary in the treatment thereof to have the said eye removed and replaced by an artificial eye. The departmental report concurs in the correctness of these allegations.

In the stipulation filed in this cause it is stated that the injury of claimant was caused by his being struck in the right eye by a door check. It is apparent, from an examination of claimant’s exhibits 3 and 4 which are true and correct photographic reproductions of the door check as presenently located and where previously located, that the screws holding the check had worked loose, causing it to fall. It was the duty of respondent to maintain this door check in a safe condition for ordinary usage so as not to injure persons who were continually passing through this entrance door which it held in check and, having failed in this duty, is guilty of negligence, and the Court so finds.

Claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses, as shown by claimant’s exhibits 1 and 2; to The Gailey Eye Clinic $315.00, and to The Mennonite Hospital $153.05. It will also be necessary for him to replace the artificial eye from time to time. Considering the nature and extent of the injury and the expenses incurred and to be incurred, the maximum award allowed under Paragraph (c), Section 7 of the Court of Claims Act of $2,500.00 is not an unreasonable sum to allow claimant for damages sustained as a result of this injury.

An award is therefore made to Ruth Elizabeth Green, as mother and next friend of claimant, Joseph Green, a minor, for his use and benefit, in the sum of $2,500.00.


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    (No. 4129
    Lawrence Landreth, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 11, 1949.

    Joseph B. Siemer, Attorney for Claimant.
    Hon. George F. Barrett, Attorney General, for Respondent; C. Arthur Rebel, Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel.
    Damron, J.
   Damron, J.

The claimant, Lawrence Landreth, on the 2nd day of December, 1947, was an employee of the respondent, in the Department of Mines .and Minerals, Division of Oil and Gas. On that day, he received orders from his superior to appear as a State witness in a trial at the Effingham County court house. He responded and testified. After testifying, the claimant immediately left the court house and started for his automobile which was parked a block west of the court house and one-half block south-on Fifth Street in Effingham.

At the place where his car was parked, an addition was being added to a building, and there a group of boys was playing in a sand and gravel pile; just as the claimant, who wore eye-glasses, was proceeding to unlock his automobile, one of the boys threw a stone, striking claimant, shattering the lens over his left eye, causing fragments of it to penetrate the pupil of his left eye. He was immediately taken into the office of an optometrist, who examined the injury and called Dr. Glen R. Marshall of Effingham, who removed the fragments of the lens from his eye.

On August 23, 1948, Dr. Glen R. Marshall filed a report relative to the injury of claimant which reads as follows:

“On examination, a piece of his lens was found to have penetrated the eyeball, cut in a rather large place at the limbus. The anterior chamber was completely collapsed. The iris was bulging through the hole.
The glass was removed. Patient was advised hospitalization but insisted on going home at which place he was treated with ice bags and penicillin. . . . His eye quieted down and appears to be fairly well healed. The last vision I have recorded is 20/20 and in the injured eye 20/400.”

■ On November 20, 1948, the claimant was examined by Dr. S. F. Henry of Effingham. His report is a part of this file. Part of said report reads as follows:

“I find by examination that the pupil of his left eye is elongated and a definite scar on the cornea, toward the inner canthus only partially over pupil. . . . The eyeball feels a bit harder, firmer than the right eye.
The pupil does not react to light, or accommodation. I can see a large dark area in the outer lower retina which is perhaps a detachment.
He says he cannot see out of this eye. Vision in the right eye ig 20/30 without glasses and 20/20 with y^ .50 for distance.
I used a red glass over his good right eye and all figures written on a card in red could not be seen by him yet black ones were; so from my examination I feel,sure this man is blind in his left eye and from the history of an accident on December 2, 1947, coupled with the fact that I have previously tested this man’s eyes for glasses on April 25, 1945 and then with y¿= .50 cylinder y¿= .75 axis 180 he had 20/20 vision in his left eye.
From the above, I conclude that this man now is blind in his left eye, which is due to an accident.”

The record discloses that since September 1, 1945 his annual salary amounted to $2,880.00. He is married, was 60 years of age and had no children under the age of 16 years dependent upon him. The record further discloses that the respondent had immediate notice of the injury and all provisions of Section 24 have been fully complied with.

On the basis of this record we make the following-finding : That on December 2, 1947, Lawrence Landreth, the above named claimant, was injured during the course of his employment for the respondent and as a result of said injury he is industrially blind in his left eye for which he is entitled to an award; that his average weekly wage was $55.38; and that his weekly compensation rate was $19.50.

An award is hereby entered in favor of Lawrence Landreth in the sum of Two Thousand Three Hundred and Forty Dollars ($2,340.00) to compensate him for the loss of vision of his left eye to be paid to him at $19.50 per week for 120 weeks, as provided under Sec. 8, Par. (e) of Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The record further discloses that claimant paid to Dr. Grlen E. Marshall the sum of Forty-two Dollars and Fifty Cents for medical treatment rendered by him, for which claimant is entitled to be reimbursed.

An award is therefore hereby entered in favor of Lawrence Landreth for Forty-two Dollars and Fifty Cents ($42.50) for that purpose.

Of the sum awarded him for the loss of vision of his left eye, there is now accrued as of January 11, 1949, the sum of One Thousand One Hundred and Thirty-one Dollars ($1,131.00) representing- 58 weeks, which together with the medical expenses totals One Thousand One Hundred and Seventy-three Dollars and Fifty Cents ($1,173.50) and is payable forthwith. The remainder of said award, amounting to the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred and Nine Dollars ($1,209.00), is payable to claimant at the rate of $19.50 per week beginning January 19, 1949, and continuing weekly thereafter for 62 weeks at said compensation rate until the last mentioned sum is fully paid.

Claimant herein having suffered the complete loss of vision of an eye, under Section 8, Paragraph (e), Sub-paragraph 20, requires that payment be made into the special fund in the amount of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00).

Award is therefore hereby made as follows:

To the State Treasurer of the State of Illinois, as ex-officio custodian of the Workmen’s Compensation special fund, the sum of One Hundred Dollars ($100.00); said sum to be held and disbursed by the said State Treasurer in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of this State.

This award is subject to the approval of the Governor as provided in Section 3 of “An Act concerning the payment of compensation awards to State employees.”