author: Patchett, J. Patchett, J.

text:
    (Nos. 86-CC-1939, 86-CC-1940
    Audrey B. Ontis, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1987.

      Order on denial of rehearing filed November 10, 1987.

    Audrey B. Ontis, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Patchett, J.

These two causes are before the Court on Respondent’s motions to dismiss, and the Claimant, Audrey B. Ontis, having been given due notice of said motions, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, finds as follows:

The Claimant is an employee of the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA). In January 1986, she filed the two above-captioned Court claims as lapsed appropriation matters, under the “State law or regulation” category of this Court’s authority, as provided in subsection 8(a) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.8(a)). In No. 86-CC-1940, Claimant seeks to be reimbursed for department-related travel expenses which she had incurred during the period July 1981 through June 1982; and, in No. 86-CC-1939, she seeks similar reimbursement for department travel performed from July 1982 through June 1983.

Respondent challenges Claimant’s right to receive a Court award on either of these claims, on the ground that neither of these Court actions was commenced within the two-year period for filing with the clerk of this Court, as prescribed by subsection 22(g) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22(g)). The validity of Respondent’s challenge, and this Court’s jurisdiction in these matters, will depend upon when Claimant’s claims or causes of action “first accrue[d],” within the meaning of subsection (g).

Section 12 — 17.3 of the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 12 — 17.3) authorizes the department to pay its employees’ travel expenses from funds appropriated for that purpose. In its department report filed in response to these claims, IDPA notes: that its Employee Travel Regulations have been in effect since at least January 1980; and that these regulations have consistently required IDPA employees to submit all vouchers (reimbursement claims) for travel performed during a State fiscal year, by no later than the 31st day of July following the end of that year. The obvious purpose of this regulatory deadline is to allow time for processing and payment of such vouchers from currently-appropriated funds, which otherwise would lapse as of September 30 following the end of the fiscal year during which the employees’ travel occurred. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 161.

If Claimant had submitted her vouchers in accordance with this deadline, her fiscal year 1982 travel claim (for July 1981 through June 1982) could have been processed and paid, in accordance with section 12— 17.3, before that year’s appropriation had lapsed. Similarly, her fiscal year 1983 claim (for July 1982 through June 1983 travel), if timely submitted, could have been paid before October 1, 1983, when the fiscal year 1983 appropriation lapsed. In fact, neither of Claimant’s vouchers was prepared prior to July 1984.

In interpreting subsection 22(g) of the Court of Claims Act, we believe it reasonable to conclude that such an “other claim” cause of action “first accrues” as of the date of an agency’s established deadline, by which an individual is required to take a prescribed action. In any event, a cause necessarily “accrues” as of a date— here, the close of business on September 30 following the end of Respondent’s fiscal year, following which Respondent has no statutory authority to pay the claim from an expired appropriation. Postponement of “accrual” to an even later date would result in an interpretation which clearly could not be reconciled with either the provisions of these statutes and this regulatory deadline, or with their intended purpose.

We find that Claimant’s claim in respect to her State fiscal year 1982 travel, presented in No. 86-CC-1940, had accrued on or before September 30, 1982; and that her claim in respect to her fiscal year 1983 travel, presented in No. 86-CC-1939, had accrued on or before September 30, 1983. By delaying the filing of these claims until January 21, 1986, more than two years following such respective accrual dates, Claimant allowed her claims to be barred by the time limitation for commencement of such actions, imposed by subsection 22(g) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22(g)).

It is therefore hereby ordered that each of said actions is dismissed, this Court having no statutory jurisdiction to make an award or to take any other action with respect to them.

ORDER ON DENIAL OF REHEARING

Patchett, J.

This cause coming before the Court on Claimant’s petition for rehearing, this Court having reviewed and considered Claimant’s petition, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds that it is constrained by prior law on this matter and regretfully must deny the petition for rehearing and affirm the order dismissing the claim.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Patchett, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 86-CC-2102
    W. Paul Tedder, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 4, 1988.

    W. Paul Tedder, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Patchett, J.

Claimant in this case was a resident of the Illinois Department of Corrections. He is seeking to recover money damages from the Respondent on the basis that his personal property was either lost or converted by agents of the Respondent.

Claimant alleges that beginning on September 20, 1985, he was moved about by the Department of Corrections. He further alleges that his personal property was packed in boxes and later lost by agents of the Respondent. He claims that the property lost was worth two hundred seven dollars and forty cents ($207.40). That property included throw rugs, a Samsonite briefcase, keys, and a magnifying glass. These items had been confiscated by the Illinois Department of Corrections and held under their rules and regulations.

At the hearing in this cause before the Commissioner, there was virtually no dispute as to the factual basis of the Claimant’s complaint. Indeed, the Respondent admitted to the loss of Claimant’s property and further admitted that the throw rugs, Samsonite briefcase, keys, and magnifying glass were being held by the Respondent as “contraband.” Accordingly, there is no issue as to the Claimant’s entitlement to an award for that property other than the property being held by the Respondent was “contraband.”

Claimant asserted that the Respondent’s institutional regulations as to “contraband” were unconstitutional. In effect, the Claimant has asked the Court of Claims to declare that procedures of the Illinois Department of Corrections to be in violation of certain statutes in the constitutions of both the State of Illinois and the United States. Claimant is further asking to be awarded the fair value of such property removed from his ownership pursuant to such regulations.

The Court of Claims simply does not have jurisdiction to consider such a claim. This Court cannot consider the constitutionality or validity of either regulations or statutes.

Insofar as that part of the claim concerning property not being held as contraband, the Claimant describes the value for that part of his property as being $134.40. Since all of these items have been used, there will be some reduction in their value.

We therefore award the Claimant one hundred dollars ($100.00) to cover the value of that property which was indeed lost by agents of the Respondent.

We hereby deny the Claim as to those items of property which are being held by the Respondent pursuant to regulations of the Illinois Department of Corrections.


author: Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 86-CC-2187
    Harold L. Crosier, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order on motion to dismiss filed May 6, 1987.

      Order on motion to dismiss filed February 17, 1988.

    Harold L. Crosier, pro se, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Montana, C.J.

This cause is before the Court on Respondent’s motion to dismiss and Respondent’s second motion to dismiss. The Respondent contends in its motions that this claim should be dismissed because the Claimant failed to file a personal injury notice within one year as required by section 22 — 1 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 1), and a proper claim within two years after the cause of action accrued as required by section 22 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22), because a complete complaint had not been filed which had a timely, previously filed, personal injury notice attached.

There is no indication in the record that the Claimant has ever filed a personal injury notice. However, the Claimant did file a complaint on February 3, 1986. In said complaint the Claimant asserts he suffered his injuries on February 14, 1985, so his complaint was filed within one year after his cause of action allegedly accrued. This Court has held that filing of a complaint within the time period for filing the notice is sufficient compliance with the notice requirements of section 22— 1 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 1). (Johnson v. State, No. 87-CC-0105, opinion filed March 26,1987.) Since the filing of a complaint within one year that a cause of action accrues satisfies the personal injury notice requirement even though a notice has not been filed, it follows that the filing of the same complaint would satisfy the two-year statute of limitations requirement of section 22 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22), even though the complaint filed did not have a timely, previously filed, personal injury notice attached.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the Claimant has complied with the notice requirement of section 22 — 1 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 1) and the limitations requirements of section 22 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22). We therefore hereby order that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be, and is, hereby denied.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Montana, C.J.

Pursuant to Claimant’s motion, this claim is dismissed with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 86-CC-2230
    Calvin Madison, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 21, 1988.

    Calvin Madison, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Mitchell Wilneff, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, C.J.

This is a claim brought by Calvin Madison, a resident of Stateville Correctional Center, for electrical burns to his hands sustained on March 28, 1985, when he inserted the plug of a tailoring machine into an outlet and an explosion occurred.

At the time of the incident, Claimant was the electrician and chief mechanic in the tailoring shop, and had been so for approximately six months prior thereto.

On the day in question Merle Robinson, the supervisor of the garment shop, ordered Claimant to take a “butt” machine and interchange it with a surging machine. At that time between 20 and 30 machines were plugged in on a “line,” that is to say, machines approximately 12 inches off the floor, and with electrical outlets (receptacles) spaced at intervals on the pipe.

Claimant switched the positions of the two machines as ordered, but when he inserted the plug of the “butt” machine into its receptacle on the line, there was an explosion and Claimant was burned.

While the extent of Claimant’s injuries will be discussed later, it can be noted that the burns, especially to his right hand, were sufficient so that he was taken to the institution hospital.

A week after the accident, Claimant inspected the wiring in the line, and found that the wiring was rotten. He removed the plates from all of the receptacles on the line. As he testified:

“I took the plate off the receptacles that the plugs go into. And when you take the plate off them, you can see the wires. They are right there. They are right under there, coming through the pipe. And they were all rotten right down the line.”

Claimant testified that he was hired by the tailor shop not as a mechanic but to re-wire the shop. But Robinson did not order the materials for Claimant to do the job. Claimant wanted to run the lines overhead, because the residents using the machines used the line as a foot rest, causing the sockets to come loose.

Claimant testified that before switching the two machines, he could have shut the power off in the line. But that would have shut down 20 machines on which people were working. He also testified that as far as he knew, no one had ever experienced any problems when plugging and unplugging the machines.

Claimant also denied that he had been instructed to turn off the line switch before plugging in or unplugging a machine.

“Q. Isn’t it true, Mr. Madison, that you were instructed to turn off the line switch prior to plugging or unplugging the machine?

A. I was never asked to turn the power off to any line. The fact of the matter is I was told don’t turn the power off because he was not going to stop his production. That was his main concern in the tailor shop.”

He further testified that at the time of the explosion he was not holding a tool in his hand.

Respondent called Merle Robinson, the supervisor of the garment shop. Robinson testified that there are approximately 140 machines in the tailor shop with 20 to 30 machines on a line. He further testified that as a result of an incident at some unspecified time in the past, an explosion occurred when a mechanic holding a screw driver in his hand attempted to unplug a machine, he always instructed the mechanics to shut the power off before unplugging a machine.

“Q. Now, when you say they are told to turn the power off, you are talking about the line switch; is that the correct term?

A. The line switch. There is a switch there that turns off and on each line, see, and we’ve got a master switch that is locked up. That turns off the whole thing, see. But we leave it on and just turn off the line switch. Like if you happen to have a — If you want to work on the butt machine, you work on that line, you pull that switch.”

Mr. Robinson could not remember whether he had told Claimant to switch the two machines.

“A. You know, I can’t remember telling him to do that. I’m not going to deny that I did, but I can’t remember. I really think in my own mind that I didn’t but * °

He testified that he had talked to Claimant about rewiring the shop for the purpose of expanding it and putting in more machines. When asked whether Claimant had ever told him prior to the incident that there was a problem with the wiring he replied,

“A. Not to my knowledge, No.”

There is a direct conflict between the testimony of Claimant and that of Robinson as to whether Claimant had been instructed to shut off the power on the line before unplugging or plugging in machines. There is absolutely no evidence that Claimant was holding a screw driver or other metal tool in his hand when he plugged in the machine.

Claimant’s testimony was that he was told not to turn off the power:

“A. I was never asked to turn the power off to any line. The fact of the matter is I was told don’t turn the power off because he was not going to stop his production. That was his main concern in the tailor shop.”

Claimant further rebutted Robinson’s testimony when given an opportunity during rebuttal.

“A. Mr. Robinson told me ‘Madison, I want you to take that butt machine. I want it over here on the raised line. I went [sic] that surge — I want you to put it over there in that corner over there.’ I said okay.

I merely unplugged the butt machine. I unplugged the surge, moved the surge around where he wanted it, took the butt machine brought it around, plugged it in; and it blew up.

A. 0 0 ° nobody was ever told not to turn the power off on line until after I was injured, after I was injured [sic]. Then he said from now on I want all the power turned off if you work on any machine if it is plugged into the line. You unplug it, take it to the side and work on it.

Q. Did Mr. Robinson before this incident ever tell you to turn off the line before you moved—

A. No, no.

Q. Did you ever hear him tell anyone else to shut off the line?

A. No.”

Claimant’s testimony is more credible than Robinson’s somewhat vague, generalized testimony.

Respondent also called John McSweeney, the maintenance electrical foreman at Stateville. He had held that position for nine years and had been an electrician for 28 years.

McSweeney inspected the tailor shop the day before the hearing.

He gave expert testimony that even if the wiring in the receptacle was rotten, no flames would be able to come out because the metal cover over the receptacle would prevent them from doing so. He testified that the explosion was caused either by defects in the wires in the cord of the machine or in the three-pronged plug.

“A. You see that plug on the wall. A good example right here (Indicating). There is nothing — no way in the world you can make sparks if the wiring is even bad behind it. You cannot make sparks fly because that receptacle is supported by the cover.

If the wires were bare behind there, it still isn’t going to spark. Something had to be either in the cord of the machine or the plug itself had to be going to ground caused the explosion, like he said. Because it won’t — That plug won’t move.

COMMISSIONER SIMPSON: Because your theory is that no matter how defective the wires were, the defective wiring would not cause in and of itself an explosion?

THE WITNESS: No, it can’t come through the cover. See the cover around that receptacle right there (Indicating), it can’t come through there. If the wiring itself is bad, it can’t come through the cover. There’s no way for it to get between the cover and the receptacle to burn your hand. It would short out in the pipe and trip the breaker.

COMMISSIONER SIMPSON: So your position is that — We know an explosion occurred. Your position is there was a defect either in the plug of the butt machine or in the wiring of the butt machine?

THE WITNESS: I would think so.”

The foregoing testimony does not help Respondent.

The butt machine, its cord, its plug, the receptacle, the wiring in the receptacle, were the property of Respondent and were under the control of Respondent. Shifting the blame for the accident from the wiring in the receptacle to a defective plug simply reinforces Claimant’s prima facie case of negligence.

“eoo your position is there was a defect either in the plug of the butt machine or in the wiring of the butt machine?

THE WITNESS: I would think so."

Claimant offered some testimony as to the permanency of his injuries. But basically he has recovered from the painful burns he suffered in the incident.

“Q. Okay, For all practical purposes, you’re not in any way affected in your ability to use your right hand?

A. No, I could use my right hand.

Q. So essentially what we’re talking about is some temporary pain and suffering?

A. That’s right.”

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the Claimant, Calvin Madison, be and is hereby awarded the sum of $1,000.00.


author: Sommer, J.

text:
    (No. 86-CC-2869
    Robert J. Cullers, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 13, 1987.

    Sonnemaker, Sonnemaker & Vespa, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Claire Gibson Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Sommer, J.

This Court, having considered the Respondent’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, and being fully advised in the premises;

Finds that the Claimant was injured in an automobile collision when the automobile in which he was riding collided with an automobile coming onto a State-controlled road, the Osceola Spur in Stark County, from a driveway. Further, that the Claimant has recovered $100,000.00 from the insurer of the driver of the automobile in which he was a passenger. Further, that this Court has held on numerous occasions that recovery of the statutory limit of $100,000.00 or more from another party to an accident completely sets off any claim that may be had against the State.

It is therefore ordered that this cause is dismissed with prejudice.


author: Montana, C.J. Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 86-CC-3122
    DeWayne Moore, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order on motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss filed April 1, 1987.

      Order on stipulation filed August 27, 1987.

    DeWayne Moore, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER ON MOTIONS

Montana, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Claimant’s amended motion for summary judgment, Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and the Claimant’s response thereto, due notice having been given, and the Court being advised;

The Claimant, an inmate at a State penal institution brought this claim seeking compensation for certain property which was allegedly taken from him by agents of the Respondent and not returned to him. The Respondent moved to have the claim put on general continuance while the Claimant exhausted his administrative remedies as required by the Court of Claims Act and its rules. Even though Claimant clearly stated in his complaint that he had not pursued that avenue of relief, he immediately objected to the motion for general continuance stating that he had in fact filed a grievance. His grievance was acted upon at the first level two weeks before he filed his objection. The Commissioner did not rule on the motion.

Five months later Claimant filed a motion for summary judgment which was totally without merit and denied. Six weeks after that motion he filed an amended motion for summary judgment. While it is not clear, it appears that Claimant based his amended motion on the results of his efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Administrative Review Board of the Department of Corrections found in Claimant’s favor, but Claimant was dissatisfied with the amount of compensation he received. In his amended motion he argues that because the Department of Corrections found in his favor there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The Respondent then moved to dismiss arguing that the same facts and issues in the case at bar were heard by the Administrative Review Board which rendered a decision and the Court of Claims is not an appeals court for the Administrative Review Board.

Were we to grant the Respondent’s motion we would in effect be setting precedent for the proposition that prisoner property claims could never be pursued in the Court of Claims again. All inmates bringing such claims must pursue their administrative remedies. In every case a decision is rendered at the administrative level. According to Respondent’s reasoning we would have to dismiss each claim after the administrative remedies were exhausted.

We think that Respondent’s motion to dismiss would be more properly entitled an objection to the Claimant’s motion for summary judgment. Respondent is correct that this Court is not an appeals body for review of the Department of Corrections’ administrative decisions. Proceedings in the Court of Claims on this type of claim are de novo in nature. It is for that reason that Claimant’s amended motion for summary judgment must also be denied. Any finding of culpability on the part of the Department of Corrections by its Administrative Review Board is only relevant to a case here if compensation has been paid and then only to the extent that these damages will be used as a setoff to reduce an award from this Court if this Court decides to grant one.

For the reasons stated above, both the Claimant’s amended motion for summary judgment and the Respondent’s motion to dismiss are hereby denied.

ORDER ON STIPULATION

Poch, J.

This claim comes before the Court on a joint stipulation of the parties, which states as follows:

Claimant filed two claims concerning property allegedly lost on April 20, 1986, when Claimant was transferred from North segregation to the health unit and on July 29,1986, when he was transferred from West cell house to North segregation unit.

The Respondent does not admit liability, and the Claimant does not admit any lack of merit in these cases. The parties agree that it is desirable and in the interests of peace and economy that they settle these cases.

Both parties agree that the amount of $100.00 represents a fair settlement amount.

No other evidence, oral or written, will be presented to the Court, and both parties waive briefs. Both parties agree that a granting of an award to the Claimant for $100.00 will constitute full and final and complete satisfaction of these claims herein or any other claims arising out of the same occurrence.

While the Court is not necessarily bound by a stipulation such as the one presented to it in this matter, it has no desire to interpose a controversy where none appears to exist. The stipulation submitted by the parties appears to have been entered into freely and fairly, and its contents appear to be reasonable. The Court, therefore, finds no reason not to accept this stipulation and follow its recommendation of an award of $100.00.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be awarded the amount of $100.00 in full and final satisfaction of these claims.


author: Raucci, J.

text:
    (No. 86-CC-3378
    Joyce Molitor, Administrator of the Estate of Lawrence J. Molitor, deceased, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 2, 1987.

    Frank G. Schubert, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Daniel H. Brennan, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

This matter coming on before the Court upon the joint stipulation of the parties hereto and the Respondent’s supplemental stipulation. This claim sounds in tort and is brought pursuant to section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 439.8(d)).

Claimant is the administrator of the estate of Lawrence J. Molitor, deceased, who was killed on or about February 20, 1986, while operating his motor vehicle on a public highway maintained by Respondent, commonly known as the Hillsdale-Port Byron Road, .6 miles East of Port Byron, Rock Island County, Illinois.

We note that the parties hereto have agreed to a settlement of this claim, and that Respondent agrees to the entry of an award in favor of Claimant in the amount of fifty-seven thousand, five hundred and 00/100 dollars ($57,500.00).

The parties stipulate:

1. That on February 20, 1986, Lawrence J. Molitor, deceased, while operating his motor vehicle on a public highway maintained by respondent, commonly known as the Hillsdale-Port Byron Road .6 miles East of Port Byron, in Rock Island County, Illinois, hit a patch of ice on said roadway. The ice caused the deceased to lose control of his car, resulting in a collision with another vehicle, said accident causing decedent’s death.

2. The public highway in question in this lawsuit, commonly known as the Hillsdale-Port Byron Road, (hereinafter “the Road”), while under the maintenance jurisdiction of Respondent, was resurfaced with bituminous black-top along the entire length of the Road, including the area in question .6 miles East of Port Byron, in Rock Island County, Illinois.

3. That as a result of the aforementioned resurfacing, certain drainage channels along the outer curb-side edges of the Road were altered, pursuant to Respondent’s specifications, thereby affecting the normal drainage of the Road.

4. While not stipulating that the aforementioned alteration of the Road was the primary, or sole contributing factor in the underlying accident in this lawsuit, Respondent does admit that said alteration may have contributed to other factors which resulted in the aforesaid accident.

5. Respondent further stipulates that the deceased, Lawrence J. Molitor, was 16 years of age at the time of the underlying accident, and had a future life expectancy of approximately 56 years.

Based on the foregoing, Claimant, Joyce Molitor, as administrator of the estate of Lawrence J. Molitor, deceased, is hereby awarded the sum of fifty-seven thousand, five hundred and 00/100 dollars ($57,500.00) in full and final satisfaction of this claim.


author: Burke, J.

text:
    (No. 86-CC-3566
    Earl E. McMillan, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 4, 1987.

    March & McMillan, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Burke, J.

This cause coming to be heard upon the report of the Commissioner, after hearing before said Commissioner, and this Court being fully advised in the premises,

Finds that the Claimant, Earl E. McMillan, owned a grain auger which was parked on Ray Haney’s farm near Industry, Illinois. Claimant parked the auger in a mowed area which was placed in the government set-aside program in late summer 1985.

Thereafter, in the late summer or early fall of 1985, Respondent’s employees, in the course of performing highway maintenance work on U.S. Route 67 south of Industry, Illinois, parked and operated trucks and heavy equipment on Haney’s farm near Claimant’s grain auger.

On or about October 1985, Claimant discovered that the lower end of his grain auger was damaged. Upon discovery of the damage, Mr. Haney notified the foreman of the Department of Transportation crew that performed the highway work on or near the Haney farm. The foreman went to the Haney farm and inspected the auger, noting that the bottom of the auger was “smashed over.”

Respondent’s maintenance field technician inspected the auger and told Claimant that the auger “looked like it had been backed over.” The maintenance field technician directed the foreman to get an estimate of the damage and send it to him for submission to Respondent’s claims representative.

Claimant purchased the parts necessary to repair the auger, performed all labor necessary to complete the repair and submitted a statement to Respondent for the actual cost of the parts which amounts to nine hundred forty-five dollars and 78/100 ($945.78). Respondent refused to pay Claimant.

In order to prevail, Claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his auger was damaged by Respondent, acting through its agents or employees. Claimant must prove that it is more probably true than not true that the damage to his auger was caused by employees of Respondent.

Evidence presented at the hearing established the following facts:

1. The auger was last used in July or August, was in good condition when last used, and was in good condition when parked by the Claimant on the mowed and untilled set-aside acreage on the Haney farm;

2. The location of the auger in the field on the farm was a considerable distance from any roadway or driveway and normal vehicular traffic would come nowhere near the auger;

3. No farming operation of any type was conducted during the period of time the auger was parked in the location in which it was damaged and neither the farm landlord nor farm tenant (Claimant) operated or knew of the operation of any vehicles or equipment anywhere in the vicinity of the parked auger, with the exception of the Department of Transportation heavy-duty trucks and highway equipment;

4. The Department of Transportation employees were the only persons given permission by the landowner to operate any trucks or heavy equipment in the vicinity of the parked auger and the Department of Transportation employees were the only persons known to have operated any trucks or heavy equipment anywhere near the location of the parked auger;

5. The nature of the damage to the auger indicated the damage was caused by a large piece of equipment, most probably a large wheel or tire.

Claimant has met his burden of proof. The direct and circumstantial evidence shows it is more probably true than not true that Claimant’s auger was damaged by the negligence of the employees of Respondent.

It is hereby ordered that an award of nine hundred forty-five dollars and 78/100 ($945.78) is hereby entered in favor of the Claimant, said award being in full and complete satisfaction of Claimant’s complaint.


text:
    (No. 86-CC-3575
    Willie Wilson, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 2, 1988.

    Willie Wilson, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Jim Majors, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Burke, J.

This cause coming to be heard upon the report of the Commissioner, after hearing before said Commissioner, and this Court being fully advised in the premises,

Finds that on March 17, 1986, the Claimant, Willie Wilson, a prisoner at the Danville State Correctional Center, made a written demand on the warden of that institution for a copy of his mittimus on March 17,1986, at 8:00 a.m. A second request was made on March 19, 1986, at 8:00 a.m. Claimant requested his mittimus so he could file a petition for habeas corpus. The mittimus was delivered to Claimant on March 21, 1986, at 4:00 p.m. Therefore, it is undisputed that Claimant did not receive his mittimus papers in six (6) hours as required by statute.

Evidence from the employees of the institution indicated that Claimant’s request came shortly after the institution was opened and no procedures were in place to comply with mittimus requests within the six-hour time limit. Employees of the institution did not intentionally delay the delivery; they did not know of the statute or the six-hour time limit until this lawsuit was brought.

Claimant testified that he requested the mittimus on March 17, 1986. He wanted to file a writ of habeas corpus. In 1981, Claimant was incarcerated with the Illinois Department of Corrections out of Cook County. On January 23,1982, Claimant requested and received a copy of his mittimus papers while at the prison in Pontiac, Illinois. Claimant filed for a writ of habeas corpus prior to coming to Danville from Stateville Correctional Center. He never filed a writ after March 17, 1986, when he requested a copy of his mittimus papers. On November 25, 1986, at the time of hearing, Claimant was still working on his writ.

This is a case of first impression in the Illinois Court of Claims. There are four (4) cases in the State courts which have dealt with section 10 — 105 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, par. 10 — 105). They are: People v. Perfenbrink (1879), 96 Ill. 68, Reardon v. People (1907), 123 Ill. App. 81, People v. Green (1917), 281 Ill. 52, and Voss v. Brantley (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 672.

The Respondent argues the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction of this cause and that the claim must be brought by the Attorney General or State’s Attorney. Such a reading of the statute is too restrictive as the forfeiture is to inure to the benefit of the prisoner and any amounts recovered must without deduction be paid to the prisoner. The Claimant may proceed in the Court of Claims and may proceed pro se. For the Attorney General to represent Claimant would put Respondent in a position of legal conflict which is certainly not the intent of the law. The statute is clear that a sheriff or other officer or person having custody of any prisoner must deliver the mittimus to the prisoner within six (6) hours of demand. The purpose of the Act puts the onus of those incarcerating persons to get papers to prisoners in short order so they may seek habeas corpus relief, a relief specifically protected by the constitution.

In this case, the Claimant did receive his mittimus papers on his first request while he was in the custody of the Department of Corrections at Pontiac. His first petition for habeas corpus had been denied. The Claimant has suffered no real damages from the failure of the Danville administration to deliver the mittimus papers within six (6) hours as he had not even filed a writ by November 1986. The failure to comply with the statute was not intentional, but due to the newness of the institution and its employees who were developing procedures.

Under Voss v. Brantley (1973), 13 Ill. App. 3d 672, damages may be assessed from 01/100, ($.01) to five hundred dollars, ($500.00). Respondent’s violation of the statute was a mere technical violation, and Claimant has suffered no real damages.

It is hereby ordered that an award of one dollar and 0/100 ($1.00) is hereby entered in favor of Claimant, said award being in full and complete satisfaction of Claimant’s complaint.


author: Dillard, J.

text:
    (No. 87-CC-0024
    James Foster, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 19, 1987.

    James Foster, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Dillard, J.

This cause coming to be heard upon the report of the Commissioner, after hearing before said Commissioner and this Court being fully advised in the premises,

Finds that on October 10, 1985, Claimant was an inmate at Pontiac Correctional Center in Pontiac, Illinois. At 11:00 a.m. on that date, he left his cell and had it deadlocked. The Claimant was known by the institution to deadlock his cell whenever he was away for a lengthy period of time. On October 10, 1985 an officer deadlocked the Claimant’s cell when Claimant went to the Administration Building. When the cell door closes, it automatically locks and then an officer takes a key and double locks it. Claimant walked back to his cell to be sure the cell was locked. Approximately 2:00 p.m. that date, Claimant returned to his cell and he and an officer noticed Claimant’s cell had been taken off deadlock. When the Claimant entered his cell, he found that items of personal property were missing. He informed an officer immediately of what had happened and made out a claim and incident report.

The property taken was as follows:

(a) A Panasonic radio purchased in January of 1985 for $49.30;

(b) Stereo headphones purchased in February of 1985 for $26.35;

(c) Aim converter box purchased in July of 1985 for $30.00;

(d) Commissary items of food and cosmetics purchased that week for $30 to $50;

(e) Stereo tape player and three cassette tapes claimed in the Bill of Particulars belonging to another inmate. Claimant was repairing the tape player for the inmate. The Bill of Particulars indicates these were worth $56.00. Claimant testified he had to pay the other inmate for the property.

None of the property was ever returned to Claimant. Claimant believed he did everything he could to protect his property. Inmates don’t have keys to the cells, only officers have keys. All prisoners have ID’s and the officers had sheets showing who belongs in the respective cells. The case was presented to the Department of Corrections Administrative Review Board. The Board split with the majority voting to reimburse Claimant for his loss. The Director, however, overruled the majority.

The officers corroborated that the cell was double locked but when Claimant returned, the double lock had been taken off. This present case is factually similar to Blount v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 790.

There is no evidence before the Court that anyone else without a key could have taken the property. A presumption therefore arises that this is a constructive bailment which the State has not rebutted. (Owens v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 150; Lewis v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 254.) The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case as in Walker v. State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 286.

Claimant has proven his case, therefore, the issue remains as to damages. The Claimant proved what he paid for the radio, headphones, converter box, and the commissary goods. He failed, however, to prove the value of the stereo tape player and tapes or what he paid to another inmate for these items. (See Rivera v. State (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 272.) Furthermore, the items should be reduced for depreciation except those from the commissary. Therefore, it is

Ordered that an award of $125.00 is hereby entered in favor of Claimant, said award being in full and complete satisfaction of Claimant’s complaint.


text:
    (No. 87-CC-0051
    John Threzzy, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 23, 1988.

    John Threzzy, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Patchett, J.

Claimant in this case is a resident of the Illinois Department of Corrections and seeks recovery for personal property lost during a prison transfer.

Claimant alleges that on or about August 30, 1984, he was ordered to be transferred from Menard Prison to the Cook County Correctional Center. He stated he was subsequently transferred to the Shawnee Correctional Center and lost personal property outlined in his complaint with a value of $888.02.

At a hearing on this case before a Commissioner of this Court, the Claimant testified that his loss of property occurred during the transfer. The Claimant produced a personal property inventory record dated July 26,1985, which Claimant stated set forth all the property for which he is seeking a recovery. Claimant stated that he had lost all the property inventoried on the sheet dated July 26, 1985, and never recovered any of his property from anyone. He further claimed that none of the property was replaced by the Department of Corrections.

The Claimant testified that the personal property inventory previously referred to dated July 26,1985, was prepared at Joliet when he was scheduled to be transferred from Joliet to Menard. When he arrived at Menard, he claimed he got a box of personal property which was not his. In the box was the inventory to which the Claimant already referred. Claimant made a copy of the inventory for an agent of the Respondent. Respondent then made a search for the property and was unsuccessful in obtaining its return. Claimant was transferred to the Shawnee Correctional Center on September 12,1985.

The Claimant said that the value he stated for the property lost was established on the basis of cost. The Claimant offered into evidence an affidavit of inmate Edward Wegman, and the Respondent made no objection. Wegman’s affidavit stated that in August 1984 when the Claimant left Menard on a writ to the Cook County jail, Claimant left all his personal items and the State issued items in his cell at Menard. The affidavit went on to state that gang members looted the Claimant’s belongings. Wegman’s affidavit concluded by stating that he (Wegman) had ” * gathered what few remaining items Mr. Threzzy had left and placed in the shoe box which I sent to the personal property department.”

Claimant also offered into consideration a certain confidential memo of the Institutional Inquiry Board dated December 1985. This memo concerned a meeting of the Inquiry Board held on November 26, 1985, concerning the Claimant’s loss of personal property. That report characterized the Claimant’s statement before the Inquiry Board as follows:

“Inmate states when he was transferred here from Joliet Correctional Center that his property did not come with him.”

Minutes of a later meeting of the Administrative Review Board held on April 2, 1986, concerning Claimant’s grievance regarding the loss of his personal property characterized the Claimant’s statement to the Administrative Review Board as follows:

Inmate Threzzy (Claimant) indicated that the property was lost when he transferred from Menard to Shawnee Correctional Center on approximately August 14,1985.”

Those minutes of the Administrative Review Board went on to indicate as follows:

“The Panel reviewed a personal property inventory dated July 26,1985, prepared upon his return from Writ from Cook County which indicates Inmate Threzzy (Claimant) kept the alleged missing items with him. The personal property inventory dated August 13,1985, indicating packed (sic) at Joliet for transfer to Menard does not indicate the above items. The transfer occurred on August 14, 1985. The Panel verified that Inmate Threzzy (Claimant) went out on Writ on August 30,1984, and returned from Cook County to the Joliet Correctional Center on July 26,1985.”

The Administrative Review Board meeting report concluded that the Claimant’s property had been returned to him. It further concluded that staff negligence had not been substantiated.

In the present case there was simply no convincing evidence that the Claimant’s property had been placed in the possession of the Respondent. There was further no direct evidence of the Respondent’s negligence. Accordingly, the burden of going forward with the evidence with due care never shifted from the Claimant to the Respondent. Thus, there being no direct evidence of the Respondent’s negligence,

We will deny this claim.


text:
    (No. 87-CC-0204
    Anthony V. Horn, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1987.

    Anthony V. Horn, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Patchett, J.

This is a claim for compensation pursuant to section 8(a) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 439.8(a)). The Claimant, Anthony V. Horn, is an official court reporter for the fourth judicial circuit in the State of Illinois. He has brought this claim for compensation for preparation of one volume of a two volume transcript, pursuant to “An Act prescribing the duties of official court reporters * * *” (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, pars. 661-665).

The parties here stipulated that all allegations of the complaint were true and correct. At the trial of this claim, the parties waived a court reporter, as the parties agreed that the stipulation would serve in lieu of the presentation of testimony and evidence. Therefore, the only other evidence to be considered is the departmental report, pursuant to Rule 14 of the Illinois Court of Claims.

The Claimant reported the trial in a criminal proceeding in Marion County Circuit Court entitled People v. Wright. Pursuant to section 3 of the Act, Claimant transcribed an original and one copy of the trial proceedings. This was done after the presiding judge had entered an order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 607 (107 Ill. 2d R. 607) requiring the preparation of such a transcript without charge to the defendant. The total transcript consisted of 313 pages and was prepared in two volumes. The first volume contained pages 1-150, and the second volume contained pages 151-313. On January 22,1986, the Claimant filed both volumes of the transcript with the Marion County circuit clerk. The Claimant requested no receipt for the filing of the transcript, nor was any receipt prepared and given by the circuit clerk. Subsequently, the circuit clerk denied receiving volume 2.

While the criminal case was on appeal, the Appellate Defender’s Office discovered that the volume 2 was missing. The director of the Appellate Defender’s Office contacted the Claimant and advised him that the Claimant was still obliged to submit the full transcript regardless of how volume 2 disappeared. Based on this advice, the Claimant retyped and resubmitted a second volume 2.

At the times Claimant prepared the first transcript, he submitted a voucher to the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts for compensation pursuant to section 4 of the Act. He was paid in full for preparation of both volumes.

After Claimant retyped and resubmitted a second volume 2, which was filed with the Marion County circuit clerk on May 30, 1986, he then submitted an additional voucher for $272.25 for preparation of volume 2. Both parties agreed that this is the correct charge under the applicable statutes, but the State refused to honor this voucher. They did so on the ground that they had already paid for an original and one copy and that it was not authorized to pay for a replacement volume.

The Claimant is clearly entitled to payment under the Act for any transcript prepared pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 607 (107 Ill. 2d R. 607). Section 4 of the Act requires compensation to be paid “* * ” upon presentation of a certificate signed by the presiding judge setting the amount due said reporter.” It has been stipulated that the appropriate certificate by the presiding judge was presented for the preparation of the original transcript, but not for the replacement volume 2.

We hold that the State can pay for preparation of a transcript only upon presentation of a certificate signed by the presiding judge. Absent such a certificate, there is no statutory authority for payment of a voucher, whether for an original transcript or for a replacement transcript. Therefore, we must deny this claim.


text:
    (No. 87-CC-0399
    Alan T. Krakora, D.D.S., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 10, 1987.

    Alan T. Krakora, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Ralanda Webb, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Patchett, J.

This cause is before the Court on Respondent’s motion to dismiss. Claimant having been given due notice, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, finds as follows:

Claimant Krakora, a dentist, seeks a vendor payment; as provided in section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code (PAC) (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 13), from funds appropriated to the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) for medical services provided to IDPA’s “recipients,” as defined in section 2 — 9 of the PAC. The subject of Dr. Krakora’s claim is services provided to his two patients, Rose Biever (Carlino) and Chris Biever (Carlino), during the period March 1984 through July 2, 1984. His court action was filed on September 8,1986.

In its department report, the contents of which are prima facie evidence under Rule 14 of the rules of this Court, IDPA advises that there are certain requirements which all medical vendors must meet to be eligible to receive a vendor payment (defined in section 2 — 5 of the PAC) for their services. These requirements include the following:

a. The vendor must have been enrolled as a participant in IDPA’s Medical Assistance Program (MAP) at the time when the subject services were rendered. (IDPA Rules 140.11 through 140.19, 89 Ill. Admin. Code §§140.11 through 140.19.)

b. The vendor’s patient must have been a “recipient,” and eligible to receive such services at the Respondent State’s expense as determined by IDPA in accordance with applicable statutory requirements, as of the dates on which the services were rendered. See prior decisions of this Court, cited below in this opinion.

c. The services must have been “covered services,” eligible for payment in accordance with the requirements of IDPA’s MAP program. (See e.g., IDPA Rules 140.3, 140.5, 140.6, 140.7 and 140.9; 89 Ill. Admin. Code §§140.3,140.5,140.6,140.7 and 140.9.)

d. In certain situations, IDPA staff’s “prior approval” must have been obtained, for particular services, before the services are provided to the patient by the vendor. (See, e.g., subsection c of IDPA Rule 140.2; and IDPA Rules 140.40 through 140.42, id.)

e. The vendor must have invoiced his services to the department, on IDPA invoice-forms which have been properly prepared by the vendor and timely submitted to IDPA, in accordance with department Handbook instructions and regulatory requirements (IDPA Rule 140.20, id.).

The department advises that each of these requirements is explained in its provider (vendor) Handbooks, which are furnished, upon enrollment, to each participating vendor.

According to the department’s investigation, this claim is deficient in several respects, as compared with the above requirements. Respondent’s initial challenge concerns the complaint’s alleged failure to state a cause of action. The Claimant alleges that his payment demand for his two patients’ services was refused solely due to lapse of appropriated funds. His exhibits indicate that the subject of this lawsuit is medical services, and that Claimant is presenting a “vendor payment” claim, as defined in sections 2 — 5 and 11 — 13 of the PAC. Section 161 (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 161), authorizes IDPA’s payment of such claims “without regard to the fact that the medical services being compensated for by such payment may have been rendered in a prior fiscal year,” i.e., payments from the department’s medical payment fund are not denied by reason of lapsed appropriation. The complaint here is thus contradicted by section 161. As a result, Claimant’s allegations misstate Illinois statutory law and, for that reason, fail to state a cause of action. See this Court’s decisions in Midstate Anesthesiologists v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 442, Barnes Hospital v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 434, Rock Island Franciscan Hospital v. State (1982), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 377, Henrotin Hospital v. State (1984), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 351 (representing 67 Henrotin Hospital claims dismissed on that date), St. Anne’s Hospital v. State (1984), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 348 (representing 118 St. Anne’s Hospital claims dismissed on that date), Franciscan Medical Center v. State (1984), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 347 (representing four Franciscan claims dismissed on that date), and St. Elizabeth Hospital v. State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 325.

Second, IDPA reports that Dr. Krakora was not an enrolled participant in its Medical Assistance Program (MAP), in 1984, when the subject services were rendered. To be authorized to receive payment for services to IDPA recipients, a prospective participant must first apply to IDPA for enrollment in the department’s MAP program. Until accepted for participation, the applicant cannot be a “vendor,” and thus is not entitled to payment for services rendered prior to submitting an application for enrollment. See subsection d of IDPA Rule 140.13.

Third, Claimant has supplied no evidence that IDPA had determined either of his patients to be an eligible MAP recipient, with respect to the dates on which the subject services were rendered. As the department’s records indicate that neither patient was MAP-eligible on these dates of service, Respondent has no liability for payment of this claim for such services. See this Court’s decisions in Illini Hospital v. State (1977), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 115.

Fourth, Claimant offers no exhibit suggesting that he had ever invoiced his services to IDPA, on the forms prescribed by IDPA regulation (89 Ill. Admin. Code, §140.20), or within the time prescribed by that regulation. Section 447.45 of Title 42, Code of Federal Regulations (42 C.F.R. §447.45), also imposes a one-year deadline, following the date of service, for medical-vendors’ submissions of their invoices for adjudication by the State Medicaid agency, here IDPA. Completion of the prescribed invoice-forms, and their submission to IDPA prior to the prescribed deadline, are conditions which the enrolled vendor must meet in order to comply with the regulation, and thus to be eligible for vendor-payment consideration. This Court has previously so held. Good Samaritan Hospital v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 379. See also Rush Anesthesiology Group v. State (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 851; and Weissman v. State (1978), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 150.

A vendor’s entitlement to a “vendor payment,” enforceable under section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code and under sections 8 and 22 of the Court of Claims Act, may be “limited by regulations of the Illinois Department.” (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 13; ch. 37, pars. 439.8, 439.22.) Each of the regulatory requirements discussed above imposes a condition which the vendor must meet, if he is to receive a vendor payment for specified services to a named patient. In this instance, Claimant has failed to demonstrate that he has met any of such conditions.

As a fifth ground for dismissal, Respondent asserts that Claimant’s court action for these two patients’ services, when filed in September 1986, was already barred by the time limitations imposed by section 11— 13 of the PAC, and by sections 22(b) and 22(h) of the Court of Claims Act. Section 11 — 13 sets out the conditions and limitations applicable to a vendor seeking payment from IDPA for goods and services furnished to an IDPA recipient, i.e., to be paid a “vendor payment.” As is made clear in subsection 22(b) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, par. 439.22(b)), section 11 — 13 imposes certain limitations on the authority of this Court to entertain vendor-payment actions.

Section 11 — 13 provides that a vendor’s court action must be filed within one year after its cause of action accrues. As amended by Public Act 83-1410, this statute makes identification of the date of accrual turn on the vendor’s ability to prove that IDPA had received its invoice within six months for specified services following the date those services were rendered. The statute thus adopts, as one occurrence which causes its time period to begin to run, IDPA Rule 1450.20(c)’s requirement that the vendor’s initial invoice be received no later than six months following the date of service.

Respondent asserts that Claimant’s cause of action with respect to these two patients’ services was barred, at the latest, as of January 3, 1986, or 18 months following July 2,1984, the most recent date on which the subject services were rendered. Section 11 — 13 provides:

“(2) If the vendor cannot prove that he submitted a bill [or invoice, to IDPA] for the service within 6 months of the date the service was rendered, then [a cause of action accrues within the meaning of this Section] upon the date 6 months following the date the vendor rendered the service to the recipient;”

and that

”[v]endors seeking to enforce obligations of [IDPA] for goods or services (1) furnished to or in behalf of recipients and (2) subject to a vendor payment ° * * shall commence their actions “ ° ° within one year next after the cause of action accrued.”

As of January 3, 1985 — six months following the most recent date of service to these patients, Claimant had not prepared and submitted his invoice to IDPA for any of these services, although required to do so by Rule 140.20(c). As a result of his failure to comply with Rule 140.20(c)’s initial invoice-submittal deadline, Claimant’s cause of action “accrued,” with respect to these services, no later than January 3,1985. And, as his Court action in respect to those services had not been commenced within the ensuing year, Claimant’s cause of action in respect to those services was barred by the statute, effective January 3, 1986.

From the record presented, the Court concludes that it lacked authority to entertain this claim for payment of these services, as of the date on which it was commenced. This jurisdictional bar would apply, even if the complaint were amended, and Claimant were to allege some invoicing activity prior to his commencement of the subject Court act.

It is therefore hereby ordered:

That Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint herein as insufficient in form and substance, and as failing to state a cause of action upon which the relief can be granted, is hereby granted; and

That Respondent’s motion for an order dismissing the complaint and the underlying action under paragraph 2 — 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that this action was already barred by the limitation period imposed by section 22 of the Court of Claims Act when so commenced, is hereby granted.

This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.


text:
    (Nos. 87-CC-0408, 87-CC-0409, 87-CC-2593 cons.
    Effingham Builders Supply and First National Bank of Dieterich, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order on stipulation and motion for summary judgment filed May 23, 1988.

      Order on motion to amend stipulation and order filed June 17, 1988.

    Parker, Siemer, Austin, Resch & Resch, for Claimant Effingham Builders Supply.
    Eaton & Eaton, for Claimant First National Bank of Dieterich.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Christine Zeman, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER ON STIPULATION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Montana, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Respondent’s stipulation and motion for summary judgment, due notice having been given and no objection having been raised, and the Court being advised;

The Court hereby finds:

1. Respondent, State of Illinois, has responded to these claims.

2. In regard to the claim made in 87-CC-0408, Respondent admits that F & H Construction Company has completed the work on CDB Project No. 291-200-027. Respondent further admits that but for other claims for these same monies, $18,645.25 would be due and owing F & H Construction Company. In fiscal year 1984, $18,645.25 lapsed for this project.

3. Ray Kabbes, d/b/a Effingham Builders Supply seeks $8,893.87 against this lapsed amount in 87-CC-0408; First National Bank of Dieterich seeks $18,645.25 against this same lapsed amount in 87-CC-2593.

4. In addition the following parties are listed in count VII of First National Bank of Dieterich’s complaint as also seeking some or all of the same funds: William Flach, d/b/a F & H Construction Company, First National Bank of Effingham, R.W. Bradley, Jeff Stone and Nick Flach, d/b/a F & S Painting, and Norm’s Glass & Painting, Inc. The same parties are known to Respondent as seeking some or all of the funds claimed in 87-CC-0408 and count VII of 87-CC-2593.

5. In regard to the claim made in 87-CC-0409, Respondent admits that F & H Construction Company has completed the work on CDB Project No. 120-003-001. Respondent further admits that but for other claims for these same monies, $25,188.74 would be due and owing F & H Construction Company. In fiscal year 1984, $22,994.42 lapsed and $1,097.16 lapsed in fiscal year 1985, for a total lapsed amount of $24,091.58.

6. Ray Kabbes, d/b/a Effingham Builders Supply seeks $3,251.26 against this lapsed amount in 87-CC-0409; First National Bank of Dieterich seeks $25,188.74 against this same lapsed amount in count III of 87-CC-2593.

7. In addition, the following parties are listed in count III of First National Bank of Dieterich’s complaint as also seeking some or all of the same funds: First National Bank of Effingham, William Flach, d/b/a F & H Construction Company, and Bacon’s Painting & Construction Company. The same parties are known to Respondent as seeking some or all of the funds claimed in 87-CC-0409 and count III of 87-CC-2593.

8. In regard to count I of 87-CC-2593, Respondent admits that F & H Construction Company has completed the work on CDB Project No. 102-416-014. Respondent further admits that but for other claims for these same monies, $8,000.25 would be due and owing F & H Construction Company. In fiscal year 1986, $8,000.25 lapsed for this project.

9. In addition, the following parties are listed in count I of 87-CC-2593, First National Bank of Dieterich’s complaint as also seeking some or all of the same funds; First National Bank of Effingham, William Flach, d/b/a F & H Construction Company, and Dale Harris. The same parties are known to Respondent as seeking some or all of the funds claimed in count I of 87-CC-2593.

10. In regard to the count II of 87-CC-2593, CDB project No. 102-522-013, no money lapsed for this project.

11. In regard to the count IV of 87-CC-2593, Respondent admits that F & H Construction Company has completed the work on CDB project No. 120-260-012. Respondent further admits that but for other claims for these same monies, $12,955.48 would be due and owing F & H Construction Company. In fiscal year 1983, $8,316.48 lapsed and $4,639.00 lapsed in fiscal year 1984, for a total lapsed amount of $12,955.48.

12. In addition, the following parties are listed in count IV of First National Bank of Dieterich’s complaint as also seeking some or all of the same funds; Norm’s Glass & Paint, Inc., First National Bank of Effingham, and William Flach, d/b/a F & H Construction Company. The same parties are known to Respondent as seeking some or all of the funds claimed in count IV of 87-CC-2593.

13. In regard to count V made in 87-CC-2593, Respondent admits that F & H Construction Company has completed the work on CDB project No. 120-270-012. However, no monies lapsed. (A warrant for $6,745.43 was issued to F & H Construction Company for this project; this warrant remains in the possession of Respondent CDB but it was issued more than three years ago.)

14. In regard to count VI made in 87-CC-2593, Respondent admits that F & H Construction Company has completed the work on CDB project No. 120-270-013. Respondent further admits that but for other claims for these same monies, $12,519.48 would be due and owing F & H Construction Company. In fiscal year 1983, $8,371.48 lapsed and $4,148.00 lapsed in fiscal year 1984, for a total lapsed amount of $12,519.48.

15. In addition, the following parties are listed in count VI of First National Bank of Dieterich’s complaint as also seeking some or all of the same funds: First National Bank of Effingham, William Flach, d/b/a F & H Construction Company, and Norm’s Glass & Paint, Inc. The same parties are known to Respondent as seeking some or all of the funds claimed in count IV of 87-CC-2593.

16. In addition, Allied Fidelity Company was the surety on all of these projects; Allied Fidelity has since been liquidated by the Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Indiana.

17. As is indicated in 87-CC-2593 and by the departmental reports filed in 87-CC-0408, 87-CC-0409, and 87-CC-2593 there are competing Claimants seeking the sums identified above.

18. Not all competing Claimants have filed with the Court of Claims and this Court will not have jurisdiction over any competing Claimant which does not avail itself of the Court’s jurisdiction.

19. Respondent has filed an interpleader action in circuit court in Effingham County and asks the court to determine the proper distribution of the funds. The circuit court will have the benefit of having jurisdiction over all the parties and will have the authority to enjoin the named parties from filing suits concerning these funds in any other forum.

20. Respondent has recommended that the Court award the funds specified below with directions to the comptroller to pay the funds into the circuit court in which the interpleader is filed, for distribution by the circuit court.

21. Respondent has asked the Court to order the comptroller to reissue the warrant for $6,745.43 described in paragraph No. 12 above and to direct the comptroller to pay that amount into the circuit court in which the interpleader is filed.

22. The funds to be awarded in full and final satisfaction of these claims are:

87-CC-0408 $18,645.25 011-45402-1900-00-83-84

87-CC-0409 25,188.74 001-42601-1900-01-83-84 $24,091.58

141-51125-6600-82-84-85 $ 1,097.16

87-CC-2593 33,475.21 141-51122-6600-21-81-86 $ 8,000.25

001-42611-1900-00-00-84 $ 4,639.00

001-42617-1900-00-00-84 $ 4,148.00

001-42601-1900-00-00-83 $16,687.96

TOTAL:

$77,309.20

Based on the above, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. Count II of Claim No. 87-CC-2593 is denied.

2. Those amounts specified in paragraph 22 above are hereby awarded and should be paid with the funds indicated.

3. With respect to the previously issued warrant, we decline to order the comptroller to reissue it. The warrant was drawn on the Capital Development Board bond fund. By this time those monies have reverted to the State’s general revenue fund. The warrant is stale and can no longer be cashed or replaced. We award the sum of $6,745.43 payable from general revenue fund monies.

4. The awards made herein are to be paid into the circuit court of the fourth judicial circuit in Effingham County, Illinois, for distribution by that court in the interpleader action pending there under People ex rel. Peters v. Flach (No. 87-CH-21).

ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND STIPULATION AND ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This cause coming on to be heard on Respondent’s motion to amend stipulation and order so as to correct paragraph 22 thereof to accurately reflect the total lapsed balance for line item appropriation No. 001-42601-1900-01-83-84 and the total lapsed balance available for satisfaction of claims made against the Harrisburg Youth Center Project; CDB project No. 120-003-001, and the Court being fully advised, it is hereby ordered that paragraph 22 of the stipulation and paragraph 22 of the order entered May 23, 1988, are amended to read as follows:

87-CC-0408 $18,645.25 (011-45402-1900-00-83-84)

87-CC-0409 24,091.58 (001-42601-1900-01-83-84)- $22,994.42

(141-51125-6600-82-84-85)- $ 1,097.16

87-CC-2593 33,475.21 (141-51122-6600-21-81-86)- $ 8,000.25

(001-42611-1900-00-00-84)- $ 4,639.00

(001-42617-1900-00-00-84)- $ 4,148.00

(001-42601-1900-00-00-83)- $16,687.96

TOTAL: $76,212.04


text:
    (No. 87-CC-0961
    Nathan M. Simon, M.D., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 22, 1987.

    Nathan M. Simon, M.D., pro se, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Suzanne Schmitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

This cause coming on for the Court’s consideration on Respondent’s motion to dismiss, due notice having been given and the Court, being fully advised, makes the following findings:

Claimant Simon, a St. Louis, Missouri, psychiatrist, commenced this vendor-payment action by filing his complaint herein on November 14, 1986. In it, he seeks to be paid by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) Medical Assistance Program (MAP) for “psychotherapy” services rendered to patient Smith on nine dates of service during April 1982. He alleges that he prepared his invoice to IDPA on or about April 29, 1982, and that “[n]o IDPA vouchers [responding to his invoice] have ever been received.”

As noted in IDPA’s department report, Claimant’s allegations are deficient in a number of particulars closely paralleling IDPA vendor-payment requirements, and corresponding deficiencies, found to exist in Canias v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 150. Each such requirement represents an element of a proper “vendor payment” cause of action, filed pursuant to section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 13.

One such element is that the medical vendor must be enrolled as a participant in IDPA’s MAP as of the dates on which the invoiced services were rendered, in order for his invoice to receive IDPA’s payment consideration. IDPA reports that Claimant was first enrolled in its program in February 1983, over nine months after these services had been rendered.

Other elements are that the services be specifically “covered” services under the MAP, and that the vendor’s invoice be prepared in accordance with IDPA instructions. Here, the single invoice alleged identifies Claimant’s services only as “psychotherapy,” and lists no CPT code (corresponding to numeric Physicians’ Current Procedural Terminology designations, or procedure codes, of discrete forms of psychotherapeutic services) which would enable IDPA to establish whether Claimant’s services were in fact “covered.” IDPA’s MAP Handbook for Physicians, and Appendix A-19a, lists and identifies (by procedure, or CPT, codes) those psychiatric procedures which are MAP-covered. The lack of specificity in Claimant’s service identification would have made it impossible for IDPA to determine, from such invoice, whether MAP coverage existed for these services. IDPA’s report details other deficiencies in Claimant’s invoice, including the absence of a recipient identification number (or RIN), which was to be entered on the invoice, in order to identify the patient as an IDPA recipient. IDPA concludes, and we agree, that neither the patient nor the services were adequately identified on the invoice, as Claimant had omitted invoice-entries required to be made in accordance with MAP Handbook For Physicians instructions.

Still another element is that the vendor’s invoice be received by IDPA within the time prescribed by IDPA Rule 140.20 and by Title 42 of Code of Federal Regulations §447.45. Here, Claimant supplies no proof that his invoice was ever received by IDPA. The department advises that it has manually researched its microfilmed records of physicians’ invoices received during the period April through September 1982, and that it found no record of having received Claimant’s invoice. IDPA would have been unable to adjudicate any invoices received from Claimant during this period by use of automated processes, since Claimant was not then an enrolled MAP participant, and all such invoices would therefore have been ineligible for payment consideration. Claimant has not established his compliance with either the State regulation or the Federal regulation regarding timeliness of invoice receipt. Rock Island Franciscan Hospital v. State (1987), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 100.

IDPA also challenges this Court action on the ground that Claimant’s cause of action in respect to this patient account had already been barred, under the provisions of section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 23, par. 11 — 13) and of section 22(b) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 37, par. 439.22(b)), when Claimant commenced this action. We find that challenge to be valid.

Section 11 — 13 establishes a one-year limitation on the filing of court claims by vendors seeking State payment for goods and services furnished to or in behalf of IDPA recipients. A vendor’s cause of action “accrues”— and the running of the one-year limitation period begins — on the date of specified events; and the statute provides for alternate accrual dates, depending upon when IDPA received the vendor’s initial invoice. If the vendor proves that its initial invoice was received by IDPA within six months following the date of service, and if IDPA refused payment of that invoice, then the one-year limitation period begins to run on the date of IDPA’s notice to the vendor of such refusal. If, on the other hand, the vendor cannot prove that IDPA received its invoice within six months after the date on which the services were rendered, then the cause of action as to such services accrues six months following the date of service, and the limitation period runs from that date. Under this alternate situation, the vendor must commence its action in this Court within 18 months following the date of service, i.e., within one year following the date of accrual, if it is to avoid the bar of section 11- — 13’s limitation period.

In the instant case, the subject services were rendered on and before April 13,1982. Claimant alleges a single invoice, prepared in late April 1982, and reports having received no IDPA voucher-response to that invoice. IDPA denies ever receiving the invoice. IDPA’s MAP Handbook, at page 1-37, recommends to medical vendors that

“[i]f more than 60 days have elapsed since mailing of a claim [invoice] and the action taken on that claim by the Department has never been reported on a Remittance Advice [voucher], the assumption is to be made that the claim was not received by the Department.”

In such cases, the Handbook suggests that the vendor make a written inquiry to IDPA concerning the status of the unreported invoice, or that the vendor promptly resubmit its charges for the services on a second invoice. Written inquiries “must be made within 6 months of the date of service so that the time limits for resubmitted bills [invoices] can be met if resubmittal is necessary.” (Ibid.) This procedure, if timely followed, would allow the vendor to comply with the resubmittal deadline established in subsection (d)(2) of IDPA Rule 140.20. Claimant does not allege here that he submitted either a written inquiry or a rebill-invoice. He took no action regarding the Smith account until filing this action in November 1986, more than four years after rendering his services, and more than four years after October 14, 1982, when his cause of action accrued as to this account. We find that Claimant’s cause of action in respect to these services was barred by section 11 — 13 on October 14, 1983, one year following such accrual.

It is therefore hereby ordered:

That Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint herein, on the grounds that Claimant was not an enrolled participant in IDPA’s Medical Assistance Program when these services were rendered, that he has failed to establish that such services were MAP-covered, and that he has failed to prove that he submitted an invoice prepared in accordance with IDPA and Federal Medicaid requirements, or that IDPA received such invoice within the time prescribed by State and Federal regulations, is hereby granted; and

That Respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint and the underlying action, pursuant to paragraph 2 — 619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, on the ground that said action was already barred by section 11 — 13 of the Public Aid Code and by section 22(b) of the Court of Claims Act when so commenced, is hereby granted.

This action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.


author: Sommer, J. Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 87-CC-1073
    Branch-Nicoloff Company, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Stipulation filed June 15, 1987.

      Order filed July 9, 1987.

      Order filed May 23, 1988.

    Branch-Nicoloff Company, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   STIPULATION

Sommer, J.

This is a lapsed appropriation claim. The State agrees to an entry of an award based on the report filed in this matter which provides the following information:

Agency: Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities

Purpose: Toilet partitions for library building restrooms.

Fund No. 037-62001-2-25904-3000 Fiscal Year: 1986 Amount: $4,368.00

Claimant’s Social Security or Tax No. 36-0833665 Sufficient funds lapsed to cover this claim.

ORDER

Sommer, J.

The record in this cause indicates that this is a standard lapsed appropriation claim which should be paid in accordance with the above stipulation. It is so ordered.

ORDER

Montana, C.J.

Claimant brought this claim seeking $4,368.00 in payment for toilet partition materials which Claimant provided to the Respondent’s Northeastern Illinois University. In its standard “lapsed appropriation” form complaint Claimant alleged that it demanded payment from Northeastern Illinois University but its demand was refused on the grounds that the funds appropriated for the payment had lapsed.

The Respondent filed a stipulation agreeing that the amount claimed was due and owing and this Court entered the award in favor of the Claimant on July 9, 1987. The bill giving rise to this claim would not have been payable out of a fund which the Court has to pay lapsed appropriation awards. For that reason, this claim was presented to the legislature in the fall session of 1987. The legislature did not appropriate any funds to pay this claim.

On February 17, 1988, Claimant filed what we interpret to be an amendment to this claim seeking interest on the unpaid account citing the Prompt Payment Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 132.401 et seq.). We have previously ruled that Act does not authorize interest on claims in the Court of Claims which would accrue after the agency’s legal ability to pay has ended. (Way-Ken Contractors Supply v. State (1985), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 324; OK Electric v. State (1984), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 155). In this case, satisfactory delivery of the goods was not accomplished until after the funds appropriated for the expenditure had lapsed and the agency was no longer able to make the payment. While we understand that some of the delay in payment has not been caused by the Claimant, the legislature’s postponement of appropriating, or failure to appropriate, funds to pay the award does not change our previous position.

It is hereby ordered that Claimant’s claim for interest be, and hereby is, denied.


text:
    (No. 87-CC-1256
    Carlos Moore, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 6, 1988.

    Carlos Moore, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Karen Kepler and Erin O’Connell, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

This is a medical malpractice claim brought by Claimant, a resident of Stateville Correctional Center. The complaint alleges that Claimant suffered permanent injuries, as well as temporary pain and suffering, from delay in receiving medical treatment. While it appears on the face of the record that Claimant did not suffer any permanent injuries from the medical attention, or lack of medical attention, that he received, it appears by the preponderance of the evidence that Respondent failed in its duty to provide Claimant with medical care in a reasonable amount of time following an injury. As a result he endured eight days of unnecessary pain and suffering.

On the afternoon of Sunday, November 2, 1986, Claimant was playing football in the yard. He caught the ball and was running. He got tackled and three players fell on his left leg. When he tried to get up he couldn’t walk. His left foot had been twisted behind him and the ankle broken in two places. Two of the players carried Claimant to the cellhouse. From there he was carried on a stretcher to the emergency room. His ankle was swollen and discolored.

The doctor told him he had just twisted his ankle, gave him a cane and some aspirins and made him walk back to the cellhouse:

“A. Then they brought a stretcher from the hospital, and carried me to the emergency room, and the doctor started doing that, and it was swollen and different colors and stuff. And, I told him what happened, and he told me it ain’t nothing but twisted, and I told him I thought I heard a snap, and he gave me a cane and some aspirins and made me walk back to the cellhouse.”

The doctor told him that there was no X-ray technician on hand.

Claimant’s foot continued to swell and give pain, so that on Monday, November 3,1986, at about 9:30 in the morning, Claimant was again taken to the institution hospital. The doctor gave him pain killers, and told him there was nothing he could do because there was no X-ray technician available.

“A. They didn’t do nothing, but look at it, pull it up and look at it, you know, and say there ain’t nothing he can do until he can determine whether it’s broken or not; until we can take the x-rays.”

This time Claimant could not walk. So he was given crutches to get back to his cell. There he went to bed and his food was brought to him on trays.

Tuesday, November 4, 1986, he could not walk so he was taken on a wheeled cart to the emergency room.

He was again given pain killers and told that because it was election day there was no X-ray technician available. He was returned to his cell on the wheeled cart. His leg was swollen from his toes to the middle of his shin. You couldn’t see his ankle and his toes were swollen to twice their normal size.

The pain killer which he took every two or three hours did not relieve the pain.

Wednesday morning, November 5, 1986, he was taken to the emergency room in a wheel chair. X rays were taken which showed that his ankle was broken in two places. Thus, although the injury occurred on Sunday, there was no X-ray technician on duty until Wednesday. Considering the fact that Stateville maintains a hospital on the grounds, and considering the size of the inmate population, it does not seem reasonable that for three days there should be no X-ray technician available and no way for an injured inmate to get an X ray.

As a result of the X rays, Claimant was scheduled to go to an outside hospital in Joliet on Thursday, November 6, 1986, to have a cast put on the leg.

At about 7 o’clock in the morning on Thursday, November 6,1986, two officers came to Claimant’s cell to get him to go to the hospital. With assistance from the two officers to see that he wouldn’t fall, he walked to the gate on crutches. At the gate (which is immediately outside the room where Court of Claims hearings take place) he was told to sit down while he was handcuffed and chained to the crutches. Because of the manner in which he was chained to the crutches he found he could not maneuver himself through the gate. The crutches extended sidewards in such a fashion that he could not balance himself.

“A. As I was going out this gate here, they had handcuffed me to the crutches, and I was trying to walk. I’m telling them I can’t walk with handcuffs here like this, because the crutches are too far out. And so, the Captain and Price right here, told me if I can’t walk on my own I can’t go. I’m trying to explain to him that my leg is broken in two places, I cannot walk handcuffed to this. So, he said, if you can’t walk, send him back to the cellhouse. So, they sent me back to the cellhouse. I told the captain it was the best I could do. I explained to him my leg was broken in two places, it’s been broken since Sunday. I say, 1 can’t walk no faster, it’s hard for me to hold these crutches and trying to walk while I am handcuffed.’ ”

A counselor by the name of Melody Dunlap suggested that Claimant be put in a wheel chair to get him through the gate.

“A. She told Captain Price, ‘Why don’t you get the man a wheelchair,’ and that’s when he got mad, and told them to take me back to the cellhouse.

Q. So, a counselor, Melody Dunlap, suggested to Captain Price that he get you a wheelchair?

A. Yes.

Q. And he refused, and sent you back to the cell?

A. Yes.

Q. So then what happened?

A. Go back to the cellhouse, and I tell the Captain in the Cellhouse, and the supervisor what happened, and they said, I don’t believe that I said the man stopped me from going on my medical writ, because I wasn’t walking fast enough. So, they went up there, and talked to the captain, and talked to one of them staff workers in the hospital, and they told him that orthopedic was coming out here at 1:00 to put the cast on your leg. So, I come back up here at 1:00.

Q. With the crutches again?

A. No, I am in a wheelchair.”

In other words, because of the arbitrary and capricious refusal of the officer at the gate to let Claimant go through the gate chained to a wheelchair, even though Claimant had a medical writ, he was returned to his cell and the institution paid the orthopedic surgeon to come from his office in Joliet to examine Claimant at Stateville.

Since the emergency room is located inside the gate no new problem arose. Dr. Duffey got to the emergency room at about 1:45 p.m.

“Q. All right, What happened?

A. Then he looked at my leg, and was looking at the x-rays, and he asked me, why didn’t I come this morning, and I told him what happened. He told me, well, there ain’t no problem. So, he said I am going to reschedule me, so they are going to reschedule me in the morning now. He rescheduled me for next Tuesday.

Q. This was Thursday afternoon?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were rescheduled for next —

A. Tuesday.

Q. For the following Tuesday, nine days after the incident?

A. Nine days after my leg was broken.”

Dr. Duffey put a splint on Claimant’s leg. Claimant could not walk and his meals were still being brought to him in the cellhouse. He continued to take Motrins every three or four hours.

On Sunday, November 9, 1986, a week after the injury, Claimant’s parents came to visit him.

“A. My folks come out to see me, and wanted to talk to the Warden, and wanted to know why it took so long for me to get a cast put on my leg. And, the Warden told them that he didn’t know nothing about this, you know, and I explained to him what happened. So, instead of going Tuesday, Monday they finally took me out.”

So on Monday, November 10, 1986, Claimant, handcuffed and chained to a wheel chair, passed through the gate and was taken to Dr. Duffey’s office in a station wagon. Five days after the guard refused to let Claimant go through the gate he finally got to Dr. Duffey’s office.

Dr. Duffey put a cast on Claimant’s leg and gave him more Motrin. Claimant was returned to the institution, and put to bed in the institution hospital where he remained until Wednesday, November 12, 1986.

As a result of the failure of the institution to have available an X-ray technician until three days after Claimant broke his ankle, and as a result of the totally unreasonable refusal of the gate keeper to let Claimant pass through the gate handcuffed and chained to a wheel chair, when he could not handle crutches, Claimant did not get a cast put on his ankle until eight days after he broke it.

Claimant would not have had the cast put on until Tuesday, November 11, 1986, if Claimant and his parents had not managed to bring the matter to the personal attention of the warden. The appointment with the doctor was then changed from Tuesday to Monday.

For a period of six to eight weeks after the cast was put on Claimant did not go to the mess hall because he was on crutches. His food was brought to him. In December Claimant accidentally got the cast wet and it was removed in the emergency room. The swelling had gone down in the calf and X rays showed that the ankle was healing. Dr. Duffey made a couple of follow-up visits and prescribed therapy and special shoes.

Claimant has some residual complaints — the leg swells periodically and gets numb — but basically he has made a good recovery. He is the cell house painter in his cell house, that is to say he paints the cells on all five galleries. As the only cell house painter in B East he works seven days a week, eight hours a day, and is able to climb up and down ladders.

“Q. And then whatever discomfort you feel in your foot, hasn’t interfered with your carrying out your duties in working almost eight hours a day?

A. It don’t stop me from painting. It don’t stop me from painting.

Q. And describe for me the symptoms of discomfort that you have.

A. It gets numb at times, and if you walk too much or start jogging, and swells up, you know. I do it like that, and I hear the popping — the bone pops.”

When asked why being the cell house painter kept him occupied seven days a week, he replied

“A. You have 300 some guys in the one building, you know, putting their feet on the wall, putting their hands on the wall, throwing this and that. It’s constantly painting, you know.”

At the conclusion of Claimant’s case the assistant Attorney General moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that Claimant had not made a prima facie case of medical malpractice. The crux of the case is not permanency, i.e., the minor symptoms of discomfort Claimant experiences from time to time. The crux of the case is the fact that the institution was incapable of Xraying Claimant for three days after he was injured. He was initially misdiagnosed as having sprained his ankle, and thereafter for two days told that nothing could be done for him because there was no X-ray technician available. When it was ascertained that his ankle was in fact broken and he had a medical writ to leave the institution to see Dr. Duffey, a guard wilfully, in a fit of temper, refused to let him pass through the gate because he was not able to handle his crutches, thereby delaying him from getting a cast put on his leg for another five days. The warden, being informed of the matter, rectified it as best he could by moving up the medical appointment one day. But a week had already gone by when the warden heard about the matter.

Once Dr. Duffey put the cast on Claimant’s leg the pain started to subside.

It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that Claimant be awarded the sum of $1,000.00 for the eight days of needless pain and suffering he experienced until the cast was finally put on his leg.


text:
    (No. 87-CC-1736
    Gilbert Culver, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order on motion to dismiss filed August 13, 1987.

    Charles R. Douglas, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Claire Gibson Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Sommer, J.

This court being presented with the Respondent’s motion to dismiss,

Finds that the Claimant was injured when the motorcycle he was riding was pushed into a train by a pickup truck at a crossing on Edwardsville Road in Granite City. Further that the Claimant has received $100,000 from the insurer of the driver whose vehicle pushed the Claimant into the train. Further, that this Court has held on numerous occasions that recovery of the statutory limit of $100,000 or more from another party to an accident completely sets off any claim that may be had against the State. It is therefore ordered that this cause is dismissed with prejudice.


author: Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 87-CV-0229

      In re Application of Fern M. Seber

      Order filed April 22, 1987.

      Order filed September 2, 1987.

    Fern M. Seber, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Sallie Manley, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 24,1986. As a result of this incident, the Claimant, Fern M. Seber, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as “the Act” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on August 29, 1986, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on March 24, 1986, the Claimant was pushed down a stairwell by a group of unknown offenders. The incident occurred in a subway station located at 214 South Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois. On April 8, 1986, the Claimant notified the Chicago Police Department of the incident. The offenders have not been apprehended.

2. That according to section 76.1(b) of the Act a person is entitled to compensation under this Act if the appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime allegedly causing the death or injury to the victim within 72 hours or in the event such notification was made more than 72 hours after the perpetration of the crime, the applicant establishes that such notice was timely under the circumstances.

3. That the Claimant notified law enforcement officials 15 days after the perpetration of the crime.

4. That by reason of the Claimant’s failure to establish that such notification 15 days after the perpetration of the crime was timely under the circumstances, the Claimant is not eligible for compensation under the Act.

It is therefore ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

ORDER

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense which occurred on March 24, 1986. Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the applicable provision of the Crime Victims Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.). The application for compensation was filed on August 26, 1986.

On April 22, 1987, the court denied the claim for the reason that Claimant failed to notify the appropriate law enforcement officials within 72 hours of the perpetration of the crime. Claimant filed her objection to said order and requested a hearing.

The hearing was conducted by Commissioner Theodore Weinberg on July 7, 1987, at Chicago, Illinois and as a result of said hearing the court finds:

1. That on March 24, 1986, the Claimant was pushed down a stairwell by a group of unknown offenders. The incident occurred in a subway station located at 214 South Dearborn, Chicago, Illinois. On April 8, 1986, the Claimant notified the Chicago Police Department of the incident.

2. The Claimant offered two pieces of evidence to show that she had contacted proper law enforcement authorities prior to April 8, 1986. Specifically, she offered a list of officers within the Chicago Police Department whom she contacted by phone beginning on March 25, 1986. In addition, she offered a record signed by the manager of the emergency room of the University of Illinois Hospital in Chicago which indicated that the police were notified on March 25, 1986, when the Claimant appeared for treatment.

Although section 76.1(b) of the Act requires that the appropriate law enforcement authorities must be notified within 72 hours of the incident and the first official Chicago Police Department report of the incident was not made until April 8,1986, section 76.1(b) also provides that the Claimant may be eligible for compensation if she can show that notification made more than 72 hours after the incident was timely under the circumstances. The Court finds that the Claimant did make a good faith effort to notify the appropriate officials on a timely basis under the circumstances, and thus satisfies the requirements of section 76.1(b) of the Act.

3. Further, the parties agree and the Court finds that the Claimant has incurred hospital and medical expenses in the amount of $2,538.08. Of this amount $1,394.56 was covered by Medicare and $330.85 was covered by Allstate Insurance Company. The Claimant paid the remaining balance of $812.67 out of her own funds.

4. That the Claimant has complied with all the pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that the order of April 22,1987, is hereby vacated and that the sum of $812.67 be and is awarded to Fern Seber, an innocent victim of a violent crime.