text:
    (No. 1051
    Roy W. Harrell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    H. E. Mobgan, for claimant.
    Oscab E. Cablstbom, Attorney General; Fbank B. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Boy W. Harrell, filed his declaration.

The Attorney General, filed a demurrer.

Demurrer is sustained as a matter of law.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Mr. Chief Justice Clabity

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 1081
    Etta Trego, Administratrix of the Estate of John Trego, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Mabtin Petebson, for claimant.
    Oscab E. Cablstbom:, Attorney General; Fbank B. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clabity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears that John Trego, now deceased, was employed by the defendant, the State of Illinois, in the maintenance of a hard road east of Crestón and West of DeKalb, Illinois, and while thus engaged, it is complained that one of his eyes was injured in course of employment, by reason of a piece of rock flying into his eye.

It appears that there is some controversy as to which eye was injured and it is not altogether clear as to the cause of the injury.

The' defendant by the Attorney General comes and defends and sets up the question of doubt as to the facts in the case, and it appears to the court that the records do not disclose that Trego came to his death on account of this accident.

The issue appears to be damages on account of the loss of the sight of an eye, and the records do not show that he was deprived of wages during the time of his illness, on account of this accident, and ón the .face of the record, we do not believe the State of Illinois is responsible in the matter of damages.

Therefore, it is recommended that the claim be dismissed.


author: Mr. Justice Leech

text:
    (No. 1159
    John M. Lindberg, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Lagger & Blatt, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Gustar B. Erickson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, John M. Lindberg, in the fall of 1921, was engaged as carpenter working for the Prison Commission at the new prison at Statesville and was injured in the course of his employment.

The evidence shows that while the claimant was on a staging the staging broke and the claimant fell and was injured.

The Attorney General filed a demurrer setting forth that the statute of limitations had run against the claim.

The demurrer is sustained and the claim is denied.


text:
    (No. 1203
    Standard Oil Company (Ind.), Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    H. Gr. Griffin, for claimant.
    Oscar B. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank B. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Standard Oil Company of Indiana, claimant presents its claim which they hold against the Military and Naval Department of the State of Illinois, covering deliveries of Bed Crown gasoline and Polarine and were made at the claimant’s service stations No. 4 and No. 2. The employees of the State of Illinois, whose signatures are shown on the delivery tickets attached to the invoices. The amount of the claim is $18.09.

The Attorney General files his statement setting forth gasoline was furnished the Department of the Adjutant General and was not paid, for the reason that it was not presented before the appropriation lapsed out of which it could have been paid. Attached to the statement of the Attorney General is a letter from C. E. Black, Adjutant General of the State of Illinois in which he said in the second paragraph:

“I am pleased to advise that the bill in the total sum of Eighteen Dollars and nine cents ($18.09), as submitted hy the Standard Oil Company, is correct, and that payment has not been made.”

The court upon recommendation of the Adjutant General awards the claimant the sum of $18.09.


text:
    (No. 1210
    Dock Kenneth Jolly, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Clabence B. Davis, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by Dock Kenneth Jolly, claimant, alleging that he was on the 28th day of November, 1926, a regular and enlisted member of the military force of the State of Illinois, as a private in Troop “G”, One Hundred Sixth Cavalry, Illinois National Guard, and was on duty on the twenty-eighth day of November, 1926, at the Illinois State Fair Grounds near Springfield, Illinois, pursuant to orders from his troop commander.

That on the twenty-eighth day of November, 1926, while in the discharge of his regular military duties, the claimant was commanded by his troop commander, Captain Bert Bringle, to participate in the regular troop drill and while in the discharge of his duty the plaintiff while mounted on his horse was kicked by a horse ridden by Corporal Cummings of the same troop.

The claimant further alleges that the knee-cap of his left leg was broken causing the plaintiff great bodily injury and that he was disabled and so remained for a long time and does still suffer great pain by reason of such injury and that he has been incapacitated from his duties and business and is not able to work at the present time.

The Attorney General of the State of Illinois in his statement admits the injury.

The testimony shows that the claimant had no children under sixteen years of age. He now has a 25% partial permanent disability to his leg as a result of his injury. The claimant receives compensation from the Illinois National Guard except the partial permanent disability.

“In every case where an officer or enlisted man of the National Guard or Naval Reserve shall be injured, wounded or killed while performing his duty as an officer or enlisted man in pursuance of orders from the Commander-In-Chief, said officer or enlisted man, or his heirs or dependents, shall have a claim against the State for financial help or assistance, and the State Court of Claims shall act on and adjust the same as the merits of each case may demand. Pending action of the Court of Claims, the commander-in-chief is authorized to receive emergency needs upon recommendation of a board of three officers, one of whom shall be an officer of the medical department.” Smith-Hurd’s Illinois Revised Statutes, 1927, Chapter 129, paragraph 143, page 2677.

The Attorney General has computed the amount due the claimant in accordance with the Workmen’s Compensation Law.

We are of the opinion that this claim should be allowed, and therefore, allow the sum of $650.00.


author: Mr. Justice Thomas

text:
    (No. 1216
    Adolph Nierstheimer, Jr., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Scholes, O’Connor & Dougherty, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Boy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim is for six pure-bred cows which were tested and found to be affected with, tuberculosis. The test was made in November, 1922, and the cows ordered destroyed. In January, 1923, four of them were sent to the stockyards at Peoria and slaughtered, the salvage bringing claimant $141.45. These four cows had been appraised as the law required and claimant complied with all the provisions of the statute. The law in effect at that time was the Act for the Suppression of Tuberculosis Among Domestic Cattle, approved June 28, 1919. Section six of that Act provides that the owner of cattle destroyed under the provisions of the Act shall be paid one-third the difference between the appraised value of the cattle and the proceeds from the sale of the salvage, provided that in no case shall any payment exceed $25.00 for any grade animal or $50.00 for any purebred animal. The four cows slaughtered were appraised at $820.00, two of them at $200.00 each and two of them at $210.00 each. As one-third of the difference between the appraised value and the salvage is more than $50.00 for each cow, claimant can be awarded only the maximum sum of $50.00 per head for the cattle destroyed in compliance with the provisions of the statute.

Two of the cows were not appraised. One of them died soon after the test was made and the other one was shipped to Chicago and sold: As claimant did not comply with the ■law as to these two cattle he cannot be given an award for them.

It is therefore ordered that claimant be awarded the sum of $200.00.


text:
    (No. 1222
    Louis F. Freeman, Claimant vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Louis L. Cohen, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Caelstbom, Attorney General; Frank E. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by Louis F. Freeman, of Chicago, Illinois, for injuries sustained by him while in the State Militia or National Guard of the State of Illinois, on August 12th, 1926. The facts revealed by the evidence show that he was employed by the Western Electric Company at its Chicago office, in its assembling department, receiving a salary of $44.88 a week; that on August 12th, 1926, he was engaged in maneuvers ordered by his commanding officer in the Village of New Milford, a short distance from Camp Grant; that at that time, he was a staff sergeant in charge of a platoon consisting of a team of horses, a wire reel cart and four men; that about noon of that day Freeman’s platoon had completed the gathering up of wire. previously strung, in accordance with the orders of his commanding officers; that they had stopped to water their horses and Freeman- was about to secure lunch for the men of his platoon, when for some unknown reason the team of horses suddenly became frightened and bolted; that one man in the platoon in charge of the team had hold of the horses but was being dragged along by them; that close by was an orphanage, and in the road in front of which a group of small children were playing; that Freeman sensed the danger to those children and leaped for the horses and grasped hold of part of the harness; that the man in his platoon, who had previously held the horses was compelled to let go, and Freeman found himself alone trying to stop the team; that the team headed down the road in the direction of the children, but Freeman was able to deflect their course sufficiently to avoid running into the group of children; that during the progress of the team’s run Freeman was thrown against a tree; the reel cart swung around and caught his leg above the knee, breaking it; that no injuries were sustained by anyone other than Freeman; that he was incapacitated from performing his duties for over a year; that he suffered great pain and anguish during the time his leg was healing; that it was necessary to operate surgically on the leg upon two occasions, separated from each other by almost a year’s time, in order to make the recovery which has been made; that he is now suffering from a shortage of the leg about three-quarters of an inch and that in healing the leg became bowed to a marked degree, and that, he still suffers pain and has been left a virtual cripple by the accident.

A demurrer filed by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, is sustained as a matter of law.

We feel that an award in this case is justifiable, and accordingly award to claimant the sum of Four Thousand Dollars.


text:
    Alpha Portland Cement Company, a New Jersey Corporation, 1225; American Bank Note Company, a New York Corporation, 1249; Chicage Fuse Manufacturing Company, an Illinois Corporation, 1207; Lehigh Portland Cement Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation, 1228; North American Light & Power Company, a Delaware Corporation, 1198; North American Light & Power Company of Delaware, a Corporation and North American Light & Power Company of Maine, a Corporation, 1308; Republic Flow Meters Company, an Illinois Corporation, 791; The Yale and Towne Manufacturing Company, a Connecticut Corporation, 1238, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Defbees, Buckingham, Jones & Hoffman, for claimants.
    Oscab E. Cablstbom, Attorney General; David J. Kadyk, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clabity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears to be the desire of both parties to consider all of the above entitled claims jointly, and it being satisfactory to this court to consider all the claims in one opinion. All of the claims are based upon and arising out of the payment to and the collection by the office of the Secretary of State of Illinois, of certain franchise taxes, initial fee and penalty, it being the contention of claimants that the payments complained of were improper and illegal.

This court after a careful consideration of all the claims, is of the opinion that the principles involved in all these claims are the same as were discussed and decided by this court in the case of Moline Plow Company, Inc., v. State of Illinois, filed on March 10, 1927, and reported in volume 5 of the Illinois Court of Claims, page 277, and the case of Geo. P. Ide & Co., Inc., v. State of Illinois, No. 1215, Illinois Court of Claims, filed in this court on Oct. 24th, 1928.

The Attorney General comes and defends these cases citing the above opinions of this court and further that the moneys paid as complained of, were paid voluntarily. The court is of the opinion that the last contention possesses merit worthy of consideration from a legal viewpoint. However, it is the opinion of this court as stated in the Ide and Moline Plow Company cases, that where claimant has a remedy in courts of general jurisdiction and fails to pursue such remedy, that this court should not take jurisdiction. And it further appears to this court that it is not the intent and purpose of the Legislature of this State to hear and consider controversies between the claimants and the office of the Secretary of State of a nature that could and should be considered in courts of general jurisdiction. In other words, the Legislature does not desire to try lawsuits and as this court is in its very nature an advisory committee to the Legislature, it would not seem consistent for this court to invade the province of a court of general jurisdiction. The Constitution of the State of Illinois provides a method of determining legal and constitutional rights of individuals, corporations and State officers or other officials of State or local government created by Constitution or statute. Therefore it is the opinion of this court that claimants should have taken advantage of their remedies in the courts of general jurisdiction at the time the payments were made to the Secretary of State and thus determine in manner as provided by law the rights of the claimants and the duties of a State official.

For the reasons above set forth all of the above mentioned claims are disallowed..


author: Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

text:
    (No. 1237
    Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1929.

      Rehearing denied April 25, 1929.

    Charles P. Hamill, for claimant,
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; David J. Kadyic, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim brought to recover additional franchise fees and additional initial fees for certain increases in the authorized capital stock of claimant.

It appears to the court that this case is similar in principle to a case heretofore decided by this court and known as the Moline Plow Co. v. State of Illinois, reported in volume 5, Illinois Court of Claims, at pag’es 277 and 278. In said case this, court held that where claimant had á remedy in courts of general jurisdiction and fail to follow such remedy, that this court would not take jurisdiction.

It is contended by claimant in reply brief that where a payment is made under “circumstances of uncertainty as to what the law will finally be held to be, it would seem that equity and good conscience would entitle the tax payer to a refund after the law under which the assessment had been made and the tax paid has subsequently been held unconstitutional.” It is the opinion of this court that a rule of this kind would impose a hardship on the taxpayers of the State of Illinois. It would as a matter of fact impose a continuing obligation and doubt, wherein if the claimant was a private corporation or an individual, the fact that the claimant did not follow his legal remedy and afterwards a favorable construction was given by a court of general jurisdiction, the private corporation or individual would not be called upon to respond. It would therefore appear to the court that the Legislature in creating this court did not intend to impose a burden upon the people of the State of Illinois, greater than that assumed by a private corporation or individual. It must be admitted that the questions involved in these cases are sometimes complicated and vague. Yet it must be assumed that claimant corporations were properly and ably represented, fully capable of advising as to all legal remedies. Laws are continually changing. Courts at times change precedent as a matter of public policy or otherwise for the best interests of litigants or to meet the advancements and developments in business or public affairs. At any rate it is the opinion of the court that the Secretary of State should have equal opportunity in the review of his acts or judgment as if he were a private individual or if he acted for a private corporation. It is further the opinion of the court that it must be admitted that the Secretary of State in his endeavor to faithfully and efficiently perform the duties of that office, that he would naturally and properly perform his duties in behalf of his employers the defendant the State of Illinois. If a" claimant was dissatisfied in the payment of taxes or fees to the Secretary of State or exacted by the Secretary of State, would it be unfair to ask the claimant to summon the Secretary of State into a court of general jurisdiction and there have the question determined as was intended by the Constitution of the State and the Acts of the Legislature.

For the reasons above assigned, this court recommends that the claim be disallowed.

On April 25, 1929, upon petition for rehearing the following additional opinion was filed:

This matter coming on to be heard upon petition for rehearing and the court being fully advised in the premises finds that there is no cause shown for a rehearing.

Therefore, the petition for a rehearing is denied.


text:
    (No. 1250
    The Acme Rubber Manufacturing Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Coburn, Kearney & Coburn, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; David J. Kadyk, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the ■court:

This is a claim filed to recover for certain franchise tax alleged to have been wrongfully collected by the Secretary of State."

As heretofore held by this court the claimant had an adequate remedy in the courts of general jurisdiction and for a further reasoning this court cites the opinion filed by this court on Oct. 24th, 1928, Geo. P. Ide & Co., Inc., v. State of Illinois, No. 1215.

The Attorney General comes and defends and denies the right of claimant to recover.

This court is of the opinion that the law and the facts set out and as set forth and discussed in the Ide case controls.

Therefore it is recommended by this court that said claim be disallowed.


text:
    (No. 1259
    William Lane, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Art C. Johnson, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a case that comes under the Military and Naval Code of the State of Illinois.

It appears from the statement of the claimant that William Lane, a resident of Rockford, Illinois, was in the employment of the Military and Naval Department of the State of Illinois under the supervision of Adjutant General, C. E. Black, and was injured at Camp Grant, Illinois, on August 5th, 1927.

While employed as a lineman in the Electrical Division, the claimant was running a service to one of the tents used for a repair shop for motorcycles at Camp Grant and it was necessary to use a ladder to get to the top of the tent. This ladder was placed against one of the poles of the tent and while the claimant was on the ladder the stakes holding the guy ropes pulled out of the ground throwing the ladder and the claimant to the ground breaking the claimant’s arm just above the wrist. The break was set by Captain Stettauer, one of the army physicians at Camp Grant.

It appears from the evidence that Adjutant General Black was notified of the accident and the statement of the claimant sets forth the fact that there is now due him $1,521.50.

The Attorney General files his statement stating that the claimant has properly stated the facts and set out the law upon which his claim is based and on which the court can make an award. The Attorney General also says in his statement: “I, therefore, submit this claim to the court for its consideration for such' disposition as they care to make with a recommendation that if they make an award herein, it be allowed in the sum of $1,500.00.”

We are of the opinion that an award should be made and, therefore, allow the claimant the total amount due him, $1,521.50.


text:
    (No. 1275
    Marlin-Rockwell Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Ben M. Smith and John L. Davidson, for claimant.
    Oscab E. Cablstbom, Attorney General; David J. Kadyk) Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clabity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a case filed by claimant asking a return of initial fees and franchise taxes paid by it pursuant to a statement forwarded to it by the Secretary of State of the State of Illinois. The statement as forwarded by the said Secretary of State called for a total payment of Thirteen Thousand and Ninety-three Dollars and Thirty-eight Cents ($13,093.38) and was computed by the Secretary of State and determined by said officer by the application of the percentage factor of .40013 to the total authorized capital stock of said claimant.

The entire claim was denied by this court on the 24th day of October, A. D. 1928, as being controlled by the decision of this court in the cases of Moline Plow Company v. The State of Illinois, and Geo. P. Ide & Co., Inc., v. The State of Illinois.

Petition for rehearing was filed by claimant on the 19th day of November, A. D. 1928, which petition was subsequently allowed to consider the allegation of claimant that the percentage factor of .40013 was not the proper percentage factor to be nsed in the computation of its fees and franchise taxes.

Subsequent to the allowance of the petition for rehearing claimant filed its amended declaration and the case now comes before the court upon said amended declaration. Claimant alleges that the proper computation of its property and business done in the State of Illinois as applied to the total property and business of claimant everywhere would result in a percentage factor of .30856.

There appears no controversy as to the facts in this case and it appears to the court that the Secretary of State admits having made a mistake in its computation and that the correct percentage factor to be applied to the authorized .capital stock of claimant corporation should have been .30856 instead of .40013. The application of the highest percentage above named resulted in a franchise fee and initial fee being paid by claimant in the total sum of Thirteen Thousand and Ninety-three Dollars and Thirty-eight Cents ($13,093.38). The application of the lesser percentage factor would have resulted in the payment by claimant in the total sum for initial and franchise fees of Ten Thousand and Ninety-six Dollars and Ninety-six Cents ($10,096.96), a difference of Two Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety-six Dollars and Forty-two Cents ($2,996.42).

It appears to the court that the error in computation and in the application of the wrong percentage factor is admitted on behalf of the State by the Secretary of State and that there appears to be no objection to the allowance of the sum of Two Thousand, Nine Hundred Ninety-six Dollars and Forty-two Cents ($2,996.42) to claimant as a return of franchise fees and initial fees paid in error as a result of such mistake in computation.

It is therefore recommended by this court that claimant be allowed the sum of Two Thousand, Nine Hundred and Ninety-six Dollars and Forty-two Cents ($2,996.42).


text:
    (No. 1288
    Kinney-Rome Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    B. J. Coyle, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

From the statement of claimant filed by the claimant, it appears that on May 4th, 1926, a salesman of the Kinney-Borne Company, while driving on a road near Jacksonville, Illinois, was passing a truck belonging to the State of Illinois and operated by the Jacksonville State Hospital at Jacksonville, Illinois.

That while passing said truck two bales of hay or straw fell off said truck onto said car, damaging the hood, front bumper and right fender.

Claimant further states that they took affidavits of the salesman, copies of which are attached and marked Exhibits “A” and “B” and made a part of this statement.

The claimant alleges the automobile was damaged to the amount of $66.80, the cost of the repairs. A copy of repair bill attached hereto, marked Exhibit “C”.

The Attorney General in his statement says that no testimony has been taken in this case nor stipulation entered into, for the reason that the facts alleged in the claim are supported by the exhibits attached thereto. There are eighteen exhibits from which the court finds that there is a liability on the part of the State of Illinois and the court awards to the claimant the sum of $66.80. •


text:
    C. M. Cletcher, 1310; Addie Cletcher, 1311, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    A. Wayne Clemens, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank ft. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears that claimants were employed at the Chicago-State Hospital at Dunning, Illinois, an institution owned and operated by thq State of Illinois; that on Dec. 28th, 1923,, while the claimants were in the performance of their duties a: fire occurred in said hospital which destroyed clothing, wearing apparel, goods and chattels of claimants, which property was in the quarters of said claimants in said hospital. It: further appears that claimants had no opportunity to prevent the loss of their property; that the safety and control of such, property was under the control of the defendant.

The Attorney General comes and admits that claimants-did sustain the loss and the question to consider being the amount of the- loss.

The court after a careful examination of all the files- in thecas e is of the opinion and hereby recommends that the claimant C. M. Cletcher be awarded the sum of $390.00, and that said claimant Addie Cletcher be awarded the sum of $718.00..


text:
    (No. 1313
    Richard E. Sweet, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Henry Tiersicy, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank ft. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant in This case is Bichard E. Sweet, a Corporal in Co. F, 132nd Infantry, Illinois National Guard, having enlisted January 12,1925, for a three year period.

In August, 1926, he was chosen by the Adjutant General of the State of Illinois to attend a course given at Camp Grant, Bockford, Illinois, in the use of hand grenades, rifle grenades, tear gas bombs and smoke screens. On August 6, 1926, the claimant attended the class in the Chemical Warfare School, and after the class had been dismissed, was returning to his tent. ■ Before reaching his tent he noticed a box standing outside of the tent line with no markings on the box, and no one guarding it or in charge of it. The box contained several hand grenade detonators, and the claimant, assuming that the same were not dangerous, due to the fact that no markings were on tlie box advising of the explosive nature of the detonators, nor was anyone in charge of them, took two of the detonators and proceeded to the tent of the Supply Sergeant, Sergeant Aharonian, who had attended the Chemical Warfare School the year previous, and who knew more about the detonators than the claimant. The claimant told Sergeant Aharonian where he had obtained the detonators and asked him to explain the workings of the detonator to him. Sergeant Aharonian agreed to do so, and proceeded to extract the powder from the detonator he was holding, at the same time explaining to the claimant the mechanism of the detonator. The claimant was examining the detonator he held when it exploded. As a result of the explosion the claimant’s right leg was blown open, the bone broken, and two-thirds of the muscle blown away just above the knee, also the first joint of his right thumb and one and one-half joints of his index finger and one joint of his second finger were blown off. His whole left hand was torn and burned, and his body, right hand and face were burned in many places.

The claimant was given medical attention at the Regimental Infirmary, and was later removed to the Base Hospital where he remained from August 6, 1926, until September 6, 1926, on which date he was transferred to the Chicago Hospital at 49th and Drexel Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois, where he remained from September 6, 1926, until April 30th, 1927, at which time he was discharged from the hospital. During the time the claimant was confined to the hospital, he received the sum of $42.00 per month, the same being a corporal’s pay, and received no other compensation, all of his medical bills being paid by the State.

Prior to the injury he sustained by reason of the explosion, the claimant herein was a healthy and able-bodied man, employed as a typist and stenographer by Drs. Pox & Zimmerman, 4 South Austin Boulevard, Oak Park, Illinois, receiving a salary of $190.00 per month. After his discharge from the hospital he was unable to retain his position because of the loss of parts of his thumb, the second finger and the index finger, which loss made it impossible for him to operate a typewriter. He was not able to do work requiring physical exertion, and was, therefore, compelled to take a position as a file clerk at a salary of $100.00 per month which .position he now holds.

The claimant is a married man, having a wife and child dependent solely upon him for support. He has no trade or profession aside from that of typist and stenographer, for which he is now unfit because of the injuries he has sustained. The salary of $100.00 which he now earns is not sufficient to provide for himself and his family in the most modest manner. It is, therefore, necessary that the claimant learn another trade or profession which will increase his earning capacity.

The court has held in numerous cases and particularly in the case of Polion et al. v. State of Illinois, V. 5, Court of Claims Reports, page 353, that where a claimant is injured or disabled while in the performance of his duty, so as to prevent his working at his trade or other employment, he is entitled to an award pursuant to Section 10, Article XVI of the Military and Naval Code of the State of Illinois.

The claimant would be entitled to an award under the . Workmen’s Compensation Act and as a matter of equity and good conscience.

The Attorney General has filed a statement setting forth that the claimant in his statement properly sets up the facts; in his brief properly sets out the law, and in his argument properly applies the facts to the law.

As a matter of equity and good conscience and as a matter of law the court is of the opinion that an award should be made. We, therefore, award the claimant the sum of $1,650.00.


text:
    (No. 1390
    William C. Eichenold, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Woods & Bishop, for claimant.
    Oscae E. Cablstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The facts in this case show that claimant was in the employ of the State of Illinois on April 27th, 1928, in the capacity of sampler of grain in the Department of Commerce of the State of Illinois, at a salary of $150.00 per month; that he had been in that same employment for over three years, and is still retained by the State in that employment; that on said day he sustained an accident in the course of his employment, at 140th Street, about four blocks east of Western Avenue in the St. Paul Railroad yards, in Chicago. His work was getting samples of grain out of grain cars. He opened the door on the side of the car with a crow bar. He entered the car and was coming down when his hand slipped from the top of the grain door, and his foot slipped, and his jump landed him on the crow bar below, which punctured his rectum. He was taken to the Lakeside hospital where he remained about nine days. He was operated upon by Drs. Landau and Dr. Johnstone, both of whom attended him, and he had a private nurse for about a week. He was confined to his home for about seven weeks, during which time he received his salary from the State. He still goes to the doctor for treatment and is not entirely cured. He has not received any remuneration from the State of Illinois for hospital and doctor bills, etc., incurred during his illness, nor for the permanent injuries sustained.

While there is no legal liability on the part of the State of Illinois, to make an award in this case, we feel that inasmuch as claimant was injured while performing duties in the course of his employment by the State of Illinois, that he should be compensated in the same manner as if he were employed under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of the State of Illinois, and we accordingly award to claimant the sum of Fifteen Hundred Dollars.


text:
    (No. 1395
    Frank McCormick and Elizabeth McCormick, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    C. W. Burton, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Boy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimants, Frank McCormick and his wife, Elizabeth McCormick, in 1920 purchased a two and one-half acre tract at the junction of the Illinois Traction System with the Edwardsville-St. Louis Boad. The place was desirable and adaptable as a small country residence and the claimants built a porch on the five room frame house, built two chicken houses, a garage and greatly improved the premises at this time. The premises were fronted for a distance of 264 feet hy a concrete road known as Route No. 4.

The State of Illinois through the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, in order to secure a separation of grades, constructed an over-head bridge, thereby raising the road twenty-five (25) feet over the tracks of the Illinois Traction System, and constructed an approach on either side of the bridge, consisting of earth embankments, that said embankment extended entirely in front of the claimant’s premises and being about 18 to 20 feet high in front of claimant’s house.

The claimants further represent that because of the location and construction of said earthen embankment. immediately in front of the premises, that the premises and buildings are less desirable, less healthful and less valuable as a home and residence and that the fair cash market value of said premises has been depreciated in the sum of Twenty-five Hundred ($2,500.00).

The Attorney General files his statement stating that the claimants have made a fair presentation of the facts, and there appears to be no question but Avhat claimants are entitled to damages.

The court, therefore, allows the claim in the sum of Twenty-five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00).


text:
    (No. 1396
    C. A. French, Fred French and George E. Schopmeyer, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Virgil W. Mills, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears that claimants performed extra work not anticipating their bid on construction of a part of the hardroad system on Section 20, Route 15 of the State Highway System of Illinois. It is alleged that extra expense was due to the extra haul which was necessary on account of the grading of bridge and bridge operations of another contractor not being sufficiently advanced to permit the hauling over the new grade as understood the time the contract was entered. It appears that the claim is considered just by the State Highway Department.

And the Attorney General comes and recommends that the claimant? be allowed the sum of Two Thousand' Thirty-five Dollars and Six Cents ($2,035.06).

It is therefore recommended by this court that claimants be allowed the said sum of Two Thousand Thirty-five Dollars and Six Cents ($2,035.06).


text:
    (No. 1400
    William Woodrow, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    M. D. Morahn, Attorney, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claimant was injured on Sept. 9th, 1927, while in the employ of the State of Illinois as a teamster and the injury was occasioned through the course of employment. It appears that a foreman ordered him to drive his wagon on a certain point and while so .doing the wagon tipped over pinning the claimant beneath the wagon and dirt. It appears that claimant suffered a dislocated right shoulder and other bruises.

There is no dispute about the facts or that it is a case that should be measured under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The Attorney General comes and states that if claim is allowed it should he allowed in accordance with the amounts due under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and that would be in the sum of Twenty-five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars.

Therefore the court recommends that claimant be allowed the sum of Twenty-five Hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars.


text:
    (No. 1402
    Anthony G. Wittman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Geo. D. Carbary, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Boy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears that claimant was regularly employed by the State of Illinois as a staff physician in one of the State Hospitals. It appears that part of his duties was to perform autopsies and during the summer of 1913, he performed an autopsy on the body of a colored man. The body was embalmed but at the time of the autopsy the doctor did not know this. The doctor’s hands became infected and he lost both of his hands through this condition.

It appears from the record that the claimant suffered a great loss and it is urged by his attorneys that he should recover a gross sum of Nine Thousand Seven Hundred and Sixty-five ($9,765.00) Dollars.

The Attorney General comes and admits that under the Compensation Act that claimant should recover the sum of Three Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty ($3,750.00) Dollars.

This court deeply sympathizes with the claimant but it appears_ that to be in line with procedure of this court that the Workmen’s Compensation Law is the only measure upon which this court can consider damages in this case.

It is therefore recommended that claimant be allowed the sum of Three Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty ($3,750.00) Dollars.


text:
    (No. 1407
    William M. Scanlan, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    William M. Scanlan, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Boy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

On the 23rd day of June, A. D. 1925, claimant received a commission, confirmed by the Senate, as Officer and Chairman of the Industrial Commission of the State of Illinois, and served in that capacity until January 1st, A. D. 1929.

Prir to and on said June 23rd, 1925, the salary of said office was fixed by the Workmen’s Compensation Act at Seven Thousand Five Hundred ($7,500.00) Dollars per annum, and the term of said office was fixed by the Civil Administrative Code at four years.

Subsequent to June 23rd, 1925, and during claimant’s term of office, the Fifty-fourth General Assembly of the State of Illinois, by amendment effective July 1st, 1925, fixed the term of said office at two years and the salary of said office at Seven Thousand ($7,000.00) Dollars per annum.

Up to January 1st, 1927, claimant received salary at the rate of Seven Thousand Five Hundred ($7,500.00) Dollars per annum, and beginning January 1st, 1927, he received salary at the rate of Seven Thousand ($7,000.00) Dollars per annum, as appropriated by the Fifty-fifth General Assembly, leaving the balance of One Thousand ($1,000.00)- Dollars due him for service rendered during ■ those two years. He has filed his- claim for said sum.

An examination of the various provisions of the constitution with reference to a change of salary during a term of office discloses that the salary attached to any public office having a fixed term shall not be increased or diminished during that term.

The Attorney General recommends that the claimant recover the unpaid balance of his salary.

It is therefore ordered that claimant be awarded the sum of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars.


text:
    (No. 1409
    Herman Nofs, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    McCarthy & McCarthy, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Boy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a casé wherein the claimant is asking damages in' the sum of $313.95 for damages done to his own private automobile in the course of his employment as highway patrolman on the 16th day of February, 1927, between the City of Elgin, Kane county, Illinois, and the City of Maywood, Cook county, Illinois.

Claimant states in his declaration that on the 16th day of February, 1927, while under orders and instructions from his said superior officer and in the direct line of his duties, he was driving in a westerly direction on State Highway Number 5 at or near a point known as the Erbstein Hill, located about five miles east from the City of Elgin; that the weather was cold and the pavement was extremely icy; and that while he was driving around the curve at said hill, the car which he was driving skidded and swerved to the side of the road and overturned, crushing the roof, damaging the doors, fenders, running boards, upper panels and otherwise injuring and damaging said car; that it became necessary to have repairs to his car which were actually necessary as a result of the damages done in turning over his car.

Hon. H. H. Cleaveland, Director, Department of Public Works and Buildings, and Mr. Frank T. Sheets, Chief Highway Engineer, wrote a letter to Hon. Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, stating that in connection with the above mentioned case that they had received report from Mr. John Stack, Chief Highway Patrol Officer, stating that Mr. Nofs, was in the actual performance of his duties as a patrol officer, at the time of the accident. They further state that inasmuch as Mr. Nofs was performing his duties as a patrol officer at the time of the accident, and acting under instructions from his superior officer, that they believe he is justly -entitled to the cost of the repairs of his car, which amount should he $313.95.

The Attorney General recomemnds to the court that an award be made.

We, therefore, award the claimant the sum of $313.95.


text:
    (No. 1410
    Aaron P. Wells, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Habéis & Habéis, for claimant.
    Oscab E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank B. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a case where the claimant, Aaron P. Wells was in "the employment of the State of Illinois, under the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways. On May 20th, 1927, he was working as a laborer on the State Hard Road, Route No. 9, at a place north of Bushnell, Illinois, near the junction of that route and Route No. 41; and he was engaged in sweeping cracks in the concrete slab, preparatory to pouring tar in the same, This work was under the order and direction of his immediate superior, Clark Hanks, Maintenance Patrolman. Mr. Hanks with Ed. Osborn and Harvey Sanders, two other laborers, were working* a little distance away at other labor connected with the maintenance and repair of the hard road. In the claimant’s statement it is admitted that there were two signs on the road warning motorists to go slow because of these men at work on the highway. The claimant was at a point between these two signs and was facing west as he worked.

An automobile driven by Calvin Franks, in which John L. Hood and “Flem” Tannehill were riding, approached from the east on Route No. 9. The car struck the claimant and he was severely injured. The evidence shows that he was taken to a hospital for treatment and that he remained in a serious physical condition for sometime. The evidence further shows that Calvin Franks was a man who had property, having been paid within the time of this accident in the neighborhood of $2,500.00 for his interest in a restaurant in Bushnell, Illinois, and having during that time an undivided interest in a small farm near Bushnell, Illinois, his interest was of the value of $1,000.00.

There is apparently no evidence to show wherein the State of Illinois was liable. On the contrary the evidence is clear that Calvin Franks was liable for the injury sustained by the claimant.

The claimant assumed the ordinary perils of the work in which he was engaged and his injury does not come within the class mentioned in Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. This being true he would not be entitled to recover any money on account of his injury.

While this is a court of equity, social justice and good conscience, still we cannot go beyond the law and establish precedents, which we would be doing in this case if we made an award.

We are of the opinion that there is no liability on the part of the State of Illinois, and the claim is, therefore, denied and the cause dismissed.


text:
    (No. 1411
    Trompeter and Sons, a Co-Partnership, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Soanlan & Massieon, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Boy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for extra hauling of equipment which became necessary in order to take care of the construction and laying of extra pavement on Section 121 State Bond Issue Boute No. 89.

There is no dispute about the facts and the Director of the Department of Public Works and Buildings recommends the allowance of the claim, and in view of the record the Attorney General comes and recommends the allowance of the claim in the sum of Six Hundred and Ninety-five — 52/100 ($695.52) Dollars.

Therefore it is recommended that claimant be allowed the sum of Six Hundred Ninety-five — 52/100 ($695.52) Dollars.


text:
    (No. 1418
    Henkel Construction Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Scanlan & Massieon, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Prank R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The Henkel Construction Company of Mason City, Iowa, a co-partnership consisting of William Henkel and Carl Henkel, claimants set out in their declaration that .they have been engaged as general contractors in the business of building and constructing highway improvements in Illinois and other states, for several years. That the claimant submitted its bid to the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, at the letting held on January 17, 1927, for the building and constructing of sections 101 and 102, State Bond Issue Route 162, and were advised by the. Chief Highway Engineer, of the Division of Highways, of the State of Illinois, that claimants bid was the lowest, evidenced by a copy of a letter dated February 11, 1927, signed by Frank T. Sheets, Chief Highway Engineer. The claimant was also advised by a telegram from Frank T. Sheets, Chief Highway Engineer, that the contract for building and constructing said improvement was awarded to the claimant, which telegram was confirmed by letter, a copy of which telegram and letter are attached to the declaration.

That claimant within a few days after the award of said contract entered into a contract with the State of Illinois through the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, for the building and constructing of said sections 101 and 102 of said State Bond Issue Route 162, and executed and delivered the bond required by law and the rules of said Division of Highways. That the said improvement of sections 101 and 102, State Bond Issue Route 162, was located in Bureau county, Illinois, and extended from Route 7 at Spring Valley, passing through the villages of Ladd, Cherry and Arlington, to Route 18, at Lamoille.

That the claimant shortly after the notice of the award submitted to the Division of Highways, a progress chart of its proposed program for the improvement of said sections 101 and 102 and on this progress chart claimant indicated its intention to build its first set-up or proportionment plant at Ladd and from this set-up start paving operations at the south end of section 102, which was the southern most of the two sections, and work northerly to a point in the north edge of the Village of Cherry and then to establish its second set-up or proportionment plant in the Village of Arlington, and from this second set-up pave from the north edge of Cherry, northerly, to the end of section 101 at Lamoille.

That the claimant shortly after entering into said contract secured a location at Ladd, on which it located its camp and constructed its first set-up or proportionment plant, and from this set-up commenced the work of building and constructing said improvement at the south end of section 102, intending to carry on said work to the north edge of Cherry.

That the claimant on July 9, finished the work of constructing said improvement from Spring Valley north to Ladd and was ready to begin the work of laying down the concrete slab from a point north of Cherry south to Ladd, in accordance with the program for said improvement shown on the progress chart previously submitted to the Division of Highways but the said Division of Highways not having determined whether the pavement was to be built on location “A” or “B”, claimant began laying down concrete pavement on July 9th, at a point south of Cherry and paved south to Ladd, finishing same on July 22nd, 1927.

That on July 22nd, 1927, the claimant having completed all of the work from the south end of section 102 to the south end of location “A” near Cherry, and being still under orders from the Division of Highways to omit all work on location “A” tore down its set-up and proportionment plant at Ladd, and moved the lumber and material of which it was constructed and also its camp to a location selected at Arlington on which it located its camp and built and erected its second set-up or proportionment plant and from this set-up, began Avork at a point one and one-half (1%) miles south of Arlington, and commenced to lay down the concrete slab north to Arlington. Then claimant began at Route 18 at Lamoille and laid down the concrete slab south to Arlington.

The Division of Highways not having yet decided as between locations “A” and “B” claimant then began the laying down of the concrete slab at the north edge of Cherry where locations “A” and “B” intersect, and carried said work north to join up with the completed concrete pavement south of Arlington, finishing this stretch on September 24th,. 1927.

That claimant by the letter of February 11th, 1927, from the Chief Highway Engineer, a copy of which is set out in full above, was advised that it was the low bidder; was also-advised that all the right of way had not been secured.

That claimant expecting to be awarded the contract for said improvement became anxious about the right of way and on February 17th, 1927, wrote a letter to the District Engineer at Dixon, Illinois, who was in charge of the making of said improvement for the Division of Highways, asking what progress had been made in obtaining the necessary right of way.

The claimant received a letter from the said District Engineer, a copy of which letter is attached to the declaration, said letter being dated February 19, 1927; also a copy of a letter from District Engineer dated March 22, 1927, another letter from District Engineer dated April 1, 1927, and still another letter dated April 11th, 1927.

The claimant under date of April 18th, 1927, wrote to H. E. Surman, of the Division of Highways, at Springfield, advising that from information gathered at the Dixon office, claimant finds that the awarding of the contract on sections 101, 102 and 101B, is being held up due to relocation at Cherry, and that unless the bridges on section 101B are awarded at once the work on them will delay both the grading and slab work under the paving contract and would entail a serious loss to claimant if it would have to shut down both crews and wait for the completion of and curing of the bridges. The letter further stated that since there was no question about the right of way on section 101B claimant would like to have the award made as to the bridges on section 101B at once.

From the statement of the claimant and the copies of the letters thereto attached, there seems to he no question but what an award should be made.

The Attorney General has filed his statement of claim which is as follows:

“This is a claim for extra expenses that could not be paid by the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, under the contract entered into between the claimant and the respondent.
This claim was forwarded to the Division of Highways, Department of Public Works and Buildings, for report and advice as to disposition.
Said Department reported and advised by letter, a copy of which is hereto attached, marked “Exhibit A” and hereby made a part of this statement, advising that the claim was meritorious and should be allowed.
I therefore, submit this claim to the court „for such disposition as they ■care to make, with the recommendation of the Division of Highways of the Department of Public Works and Buildings that same be allowed.”

This case was submitted solely upon the statement of the claimant and the letter of C. M. Hathaway, .Engineer of Construction, and from the statement, letters and evidence we find that an award should be made. „

We therefore, award the claimant the sum of $2,894.00.


text:
    (No. 1430
    William C. Mooney, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    William C. Mooney, for claimant.
    Oscab E. Cablstbom, Attorney General; Boy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clabity

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant states that while employed by the defendant in the capacity as guard at the state prison at Statesville and while making his rounds at nine o’clock in the evening and the darkness occasioned by the turning out of cell lights, he struck his left foot against one' of the concrete steps and caused him to fall. It appears that claimant’s foot became infected and thereafter an operation was performed by removing the first phalanx of the big toe on the left foot which resulted in ankilosis of the second phalanx and according to the testimony of the physician of the State Prison claimant suffered a fifteen per cent loss of the use of his left fo,ot. The claimant’s doctor bill which is not disputed, amounted to One Hundred Ninety-five ($195.00) Dollars, and his hospital bill amounted to the sum of One Hundred Eighty-four 75/100 ($184.75) Dollars, these amounts in addition to the sum of $292.00 based on a fifteen per cent loss of foot making the sum of Six Hundred Seventy-one 75/100 ($671.75) Dollars. The claimant is also asking in addition thereto for loss of time and wages which the court is of the opinion not within the rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, and which additional amount is not recommended by the Attorney General. The Attorney General however does recommend that an award in the sum of $671.75 be made and which appears to be proper to this court.

Therefore the court recommends that claimant be allowed the sum of $671.75.


text:
    (No. 1433
    David Felmley, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    David Felmley, pro se.
    Oscab E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant in this case is David Felmley, President of the Illinois State Normal University and is based upon an advancement from his private funds to cover an equal sum stolen from the vault of the Illinois State Normal University on March 12-13, 1928, same being sum of $653.28.

It is not denied by the respondent that the money was stolen from the safe of the Illinois State Normal University and the Attorney General states that his office is not requiring claimant to submit evidence in this case as the facts are not disputed.

In a letter dated Springfield, Illinois, November 28, 1928, to Hon. Oscar Nelson, Auditor of Public Accounts, Springfield, Illinois, the same being written by the Attorney General, correspondence is as follows:

“State of Illinois, Law Department Springfield, November 28, 1928.
Oscar E. Carlstrom,
Attorney General Pile No. 1704 State Officers:
Liability for funds.
Hon. Oscar Nelson Auditor of Public Accounts Springfield, Illinois.
Dear Sir:
I have your letter of recent date, in which you state that on March 21, 1928, a remittance was received from the Illinois State Normal University, showing a deduction on account of money stolen from its vault on March 12th. Attached to the itemized remittance sheet is an affidavit of the President of the University in support of the claim that the combination of the vault had been broken off, the vault opened and the contents stolen. You desire to know if under the facts stated the deduction should be allowed.
In reply, I will say that the decisions of the courts in this country are somewhat conflicting on the question presented by your letter but the great weight of authority is in favor of holding public officers handling public funds to a strict accountability. In a majority of the jurisdictions the liability of a receiver of public moneys is that of an insurer. The basis of this rule is public policy. In the case of Tillinghast v. Merrill, 151 N. Y. 135, the Court said:
‘In the case of an officer disbursing the public moneys much may be said in favor of limiting his liability where he acts in good faith and without negligence, and a strong argument can be framed against the great injustice of compelling him to respond for money stolen or lost while he is in the exercise of the highest degree of care and engaged in the conscientious discharge of duty. When considering this side of the case it shocks the sense of justice that the public official should be held to any greater liability than the old rule of the common law which exacted proof of misconduct or neglect.
It is at this point, however, that the question of public policy presents and it may well be asked whether it is not wiser to subject the custodian of the public moneys to the strictest liability, rather than open the door for. the perpetration of fraud in numberless ways impossible of detection thereby placing in jeopardy the enormous amount of the public funds constantly passing through the hands of disbursing agents.
We think the weight of the argument, is in favor of the rule of strict liability which requires a public official to assume all risk of loss and imposes upon him the duty of account as a debtor for funds in his custody.’
In the case of People v. McGrath, 279 Ill. 550, 557, the court said:
“The rule of law is well settled in this state that a public officer and his sureties are liable upon his official bond for money received by him by virtue of his office as an insurer, and are not relieved from liability by the loss of the money without the officer’s negligence or default. It was so held in Estate of Ramsay v. People, Supra; Swift v. Trustees of Schools, 189 Ill. 584 ;Oeltjen v. People, 160 id. 409, and Thompson v. Board of Trustees, 30 id. 99. In those cases it was clearly decided that the liability of the officer was not that of a bailee but that he was an insurer of the funds coming to his possession, and could not be relieved from payment by unavoidable accident or by the misfeasance or negligence or felony of another, or by any other reason than the act of God or the public enemy. The same doctrine is held in United States v. Prescott, 3 How, 578, and Smythe v. United States 188 U. S. 156. The decisions of this court have settled the question in this State, and though there is a sharp conflict of decision in other states, are in accordance with the great weight of authority elsewhere.”
Prom a consideration of the foregoing, I am, therefore, of the opinion that the affidavit in question is insufficient for the purpose of allowing the deduction, and I am of the further opinion that the Legislature alone can afford relief in the premises.
Yours very truly,
Oscar E. Carlstrom, (Signed) Attorney General.”
The Attorney General in his statement further says:
“That from this correspondence, it will be noted that the Attorney General’s office has taken the position that the decisions of the courts in this country are somewhat conflicting on the question presented, but the great weight of authorities is in favor of holding officers, handling public funds, to a strict accountability, and that in a majority of the jurisdictions, the liability of a receiver of public moneys is that of an insurer; the basis of this rule being public policy.”

The court notes that Mr. Shelton recommends to the court that $653.28 which was stolen and afterwards advanced from private funds to cover an equal amount stolen from the State Normal University, he refunded to President Felmley.

However, in view of the cases cited by the Attorney General we are of the opinion that it would be against public policy for this court to establish a precedent and allow this claim. It would be opening the doors of carelessness and negligence on the part of the officers of the State Institution.

We, therefore, adhere to the law as laid down by the Attorney General and deny the claim.


text:
    (No. 1437
    Priscilla May Benson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.
    Gillespie, Burke & Gillespie, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim filed by Priscilla May Benson alleging that her claim arises by reason of an injury suffered by her in course of her employment while employed by the State of Illinois in the Illinois State Hospital for the Insane at Jacksonville, Illinois; that the injury of which she complains is the crushing, bruising and burning of her left hand which accidently and without fault on her part, became caught in a mangier in the laundry of said State Hospital, by reason of which injury she was and is now prevented and will be prevented from performing any service or entering into any employment which requires the use of her left hand.

This court has repeatedly held that in cases of this character, when an employee of the State of Illinois has been injured in line of duty that an award should be made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The Attorney General filed his statement in which he says this is a case which the Attorney General’s office is not opposing, in fact counsel for the State is of the opinion that this claim should be allowed, and recommends that an award of $1,902.30 be made in this case. We therefore make an award of $1,902.30.


text:
    (No. 1439
    Edgar Thomas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Reed Cutler, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank- R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears that claimant while employed by the defendant the State of Illinois on Dec. 31st, 1927, and in the course of his employment while assisting in loading concrete right of way marker into the back of a truck at a point just east of the hardroad on State Bond Issue Route No. 31 south of tlie city limits of Lewistown, Illinois, his hand and arm were caught and the right arm torn from the socket at the shoulder, it appearing the accident completely disabled his arm for many months. And it also appears from the record that claimant is generally disabled. It appears also that claimant is the father of five children all under the age of 16 years at the time of the accident. It also appears that there is a doctor and hospital bill accrued at the time of filing the claim of $170.25. • ,

This is a case where the injury occurred in the course of employment and should be considered under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Taking all the facts under consideration the court recommends that claimant be allowed the sum of Four Thousand Dollars.


text:
    Johanna Robeza, 1441; Pauline Grivetti, 1487; Mary Horn, 1486, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Hollerich & Hurley and Paul D. Perona, for claimants.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Prank R Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

These cases are consolidated by agreement between the parties with the consent of the court. The same facts, excepting as to amounts due being involved in each case.

It appears that the deceased in each instance, Joseph Grivetti, George Horn, and Peter Robeza, were employed in the maintenance of hard roads near the -Village of Depue, Bureau county, Illinois.

The deceased were, on the morning of January 23, 1929, about 3:30, returning with a load of cinders to the plant of the Mineral Point Zinc Company at Depue, Illinois, and had been during that night hauling cinders from this plant over this railroad crossing to the curves and hills and bad places in the road because of their slick and icy condition. While so operating this State truck they were struck by the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad passenger train traveling-west about 3:30 in the morning.

One of the deceased was killed instantly, and the other two died within a very short time.

The amount of damages in these cases following precedents and law must be measured under the Workmen’s Com-pen.sati.on Act. Therefore, the only controversy before the court is, did these deceased receive their injuries resulting-in death in line of duty in the course of their employment, and if so the amount due them under said act.

The court is of the opinion that the deceased re'ceived their injuries, resulting- in death, in line of duty in the course of their employment, and that these claimants were entirely dependent upon them for support.

It is further stated that the allowance of these awards is not in any way to affect any claim or right of action of any kind whatsoever, which the dependents and next of kin of these deceased or anybody else might have against the railroad company, whose passenger train was the direct cause of the accident and injuries resulting- in the death of these deceased.

It is, therefore, recommended that Pauline Grivetti, claimant in claim No. 1487, receive $4,000; that Mary Horn, claimant No. 1488, receive $3,625 and that Johanna Bobeza, claim ant in claim No. 1441, receive $3,600.


text:
    (No. 1442
    Edward J. Tobin, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Dean G. Cubby, for claimant.
    Oscab E. Cablstbom, Attorney General; Boy D. Johnson Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.'
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration in this case states that Edward J. Tobin is a resident of the City of Lincoln, County of Logan, State of Illinois, and has been for many years past; that he is an engineer and surveyor; that at the request of the State of Illinois lie performed certain surveying and engineering services for the State of Illinois, in connection with the State farm of the Lincoln State School and Colony, located in Logan county, Illinois.

The claimant further alleges that this fee for said services rendered was $362.00 and of this amount the State of Illinois had paid the sum of $132.00 for services rendered from October 19th, 1927, to October 29th, 1927, leaving a balance due said claimant of $230.00.

The petitioner submits a bill of particulars which is attached to the declaration setting out in detail the facts relative to the claim.

The Attorney General has filed a statement which contains copies of letters from C. H. Diehl, managing officer and R. W. Ide,' director.

It is admitted by the exhibits attached to the statement of the Attorney General that the claim should be paid and it is also recommended, by the Attorney General that the court make an award in this case.

We, therefore, award the claimant the sum of $230.00.


text:
    (No. 1449
    Marion C. Hayes, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Marion O. Hayes, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Marion C. Hayes, represents that he is a member of the Educational Department of the Northern Illinois State Teachers College, and that he assisted the physical director in coaching the football team, at the request of the president of the college. The claimant represents that he has served the college as a teacher since September, 1926, and he assisted the football coach for more than three weeks.

That on October 8th, while in the discharge of his duties on the football field he suffered a compound fracture of the clavicle and was, at the time, instructing some of the football squad in the throwing and receiving of forward passes. That during the course of his instruction of the football team he fell on his left shoulder incurring a compound fracture of the left clavicle. He was immediately taken to the office of Dr. Gr. H. Joost of DeKalb, Illinois, he attending to his injury. The broken bones did not grow together so after two weeks Dr. Joost put a valpeau bandage on the left shoulder and assured him repeatedly that the clavicle would be in good condition. After five weeks of suffering, X-rays showed that the clavicle was not knitting and that he was advised by Dr. Joost to go to Dr. A. H.' Conley, 4100 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. Dr. Conley set the broken bones and compelled him to go to bed with a “salt bag” between his shoulder-blades and in such position he remained for sixteen days. The claimant was compelled, by reason of his injury to go to the University Hospital in Chicago, under the care of Dr. Conley and to make numerous trips to Chicago to see the doctor. ’ Proof shows that the claimant is still suffering-pain from the clavicle which is broken and has not completely recovered the use of Jiis left arm and shoulder.

The claimant attaches to his declaration as exhibits the hospital bill and physician bills amounting to the sum of $392.20.

The payment of the claim is recommended by Dr. A. N. Shelton, Director of Registration and Education and also by the Attorney General.

We, therefore, award the claimant the sum of $392.20.


text:
    (No. 1457
    The Town of Normal, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Lester H. Martin, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

A claim has been filed by the Town of Normal for the sum of $2,642.83 for interest due on the paving assessment against the State of Illinois for paving streets adjacent to the property of the Illinois State Normal University.

Inasmuch as there were no funds available for the payment of the State’s share, which amounted to $21,990.00, at the time of completion of the work it was necessary to appropriate a sum for the specific purpose at the session of. the 55th General Assembly. Said sum was appropriated at that time and paid to the Town of Normal by the State of Illinois on the 30th day of August, 1927.

The ordinance for the paving specifically stipulated that interest at the rate of six percent per annum should be paid from the date of the issuance of the first voucher for work done, which was September 21st, 1925. However, the Legislature neglected to provide in the appropriation a sufficient sum to take care of the interest.

The Attorney General recommends that this claim be allowed.

It is therefore ordered that claimant be awarded the sum of $2,642.83.


text:
    (No. 1458
    Will Mullins, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Poust, Fisk & Moudby, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim.filed by Will Mullins of the Town of Shabbona, County of DeKalb, Illinois, representing that he is engaged in farming and that on March 14, 1928, was the owner of two thoroughbred cows, which were on the farm operated by him in said Shabbona Township; that said cows were tested for tuberculosis by the State veterinary and that they reacted and were appraised at $200.00 per head.

Claimant further alleges that on or about the 14th day of March, 1928, he shipped said cows to Stafford Brothers Commission Merchants at Chicago, Illinois, through the Lee Livestock Shipping Association and that said cows were sold by Stafford Brothers to D. Levy on March 15, 1928, at 9]/2c per pound, or $99.75 and $99.90 respectively..

Attached to the claimant’s declaration is an affidavit from Emery Johnson, setting forth that he is a resident of DeKalb County and that on March 14, 1928, the manager of the Lee Livestock Shipping. Association and that while acting in such capacity he shipped two cows to Stafford Brothers Commission Merchants of Chicago, Illinois, and that on March 15th, 1928, said cows were sold to D. Levy; that the affiant E. A. Johnson personally investigated this claim and knows of his own knowledge that these facts are true and correct.

We, therefore, award the claimant the sum of $133.60.


text:
    (No. 1459
    Burton Anderson, Henry Russell, A. G. Hasemann, Ernest E. Engel, Frank Hein, Arthur Bernardoni, Fred Stieg, W. E. Jackson, C. G. Brainard, John Shea, Peter J. Freiders, R. M. Bean, W. E. Sullivan, M. C. Wilcox, Henry Quedenfeld, Albert Ruth, Katy Schumacher, Chas. W. Fulton and Peter Benson, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Ray Paddock, for claimants.
    Oscar E. Carlstbom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim wherein all .the above claimants join in the same cause of action.

It appears that claimants had their cows tested for bovine tuberculosis and by result of such test certain of their cows were slaughtered to prevent the spread of the disease and to protect the consumers of the milk, and it further appears from the statement of Stillman J. Stanard, Director of Agriculture, which statements are in words and figures as follows: “While these tests were not performed under authority given by this department, the tests did serve to eliminate tuberculosis from the State of Illinois. The State therefore benefited by the elimination of the reactors from these herds.”

The said Director in words and figures further sets forth, in his statement the following: “The farmers did not receive the customary indemnity for their animals and since the spirit of the law has been served, the tuberculosis eradication program benefited and the individual herd owners damaged by not receiving their indemnity, and action in causing the cattle to be tested being caused by an emergency which was not of their making, I can see no reason why these claims should not be allowed as has been done in the past.” And it further appears that the Fifty-fifth General Assembly of the State qf Illinois made appropriations to the Department of Agriculture for the purpose of indemnity for eradication of bovine tuberculosis.

This court is of the opinion this is a program for the betterment of public health, and that in view of doing equity and justice to those who suffered a loss for the benefit of the public at large, this court is of the opinion that the claims should be allowed the reasonableness of which is not questioned.

Therefore it is considered and recommended by the court that the above claimants be allowed the following awards:

Name.

imber Head. Amount of Award.

Burton Anderson . 2 $ 60.00

Henry Russell 16 480.00

A. G. Hasemann.. 11 330.00

Ernest E. Engel... 7 • 210.00

Frank Hein ..... 4 120.00

Arthur Bernardoni 1 30.00

Fred Stieg ....... 7 210.00

W. E. Jackson.... 2 60.00

C. G. Brainard.... 22 660.00

John Shea ........ 6 180.00

Peter J. Freiders.. 13 390.00

R. M. Bean........ 7 210.00

W. E. Sullivan____ 4 120.00

M. C. Wilcox...... 1 30.00

Henry Quedenfeld 10 300.00

Albert Ruth ...... 17 510.00

Chas. W. Fulton... 5 150.00

Peter Benson ..... 28 840.00

Katy Schumacher.. 38 1,140.00


text:
    (No. 1464
    William Haak, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.
    Chas. E. Lee, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank B. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears that claimant on the 2nd day of November, 1928, and for some years prior thereto was engaged in operating a farm in Logan county, Illinois, and in conduct of such business he owned and used certain horses.

It further appears that the horses owned by claimant became infected with a disease called “glanders;” that on Nov. 2nd, 1928, W. V. Nesbitt, a licensed vererinarian residing at Lincoln, Illinois, examined five horses belonging to claimant and found all five horses infected with the disease called “glanders.”

It further appears that thereafter said five horses were ordered by the State veterinarian of the State of Illinois to be killed on account of their being diseased with glanders and for the prevention of the spread thereof.

It further appears that it is the rule and practice of the defendant the State of Illinois to reimburse the owners of . animals killed in manner as aforesaid to prevent the spread of a disease of this character, and it would appear that this is a reasonable and fair caution and for the best interests of the animal industry of the State. It appears that the fair, market value of the horses was $410.00.

The Attorney General comes and admits the facts set forth in said claim and that the claimant is entitled to the sum of $410.00.

It is therefore recommended that the claimant be allowed • the sum of $410.00.


author: . Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

text:
    (No. 1465
    William L. Hoyt, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    William L. Hoyt, pro se.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank B. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   . Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

It appears that claimant entered into the employment of the State of Illinois as custodian of Blackhawk State Park .and that as such custodian he was to receive from the State a salary of $100.00 per month, and that as a further consideration he was to be furnished with living quarters on said park for himself and family, and that until such time his living quarters could be furnished on said park, he was to receive in addition to his salary of $100.00 per month, the reasonable rental of living quarters for himself and family elsewhere; that there is now being repaired by the State for the living quarters of claimant and his family and such residence can and will not be completed and ready for occupancy until after the 8th day of April, 1929.

It appears that the fair rental value of a suitable residence would be Forty ($40.00) Dollars per month, making a total claim of Five Hundred and Sixty ($560.00) Dollars.

It further appears that H. H. Cleveland, Director of Public Works and Buildings of the State of Illinois, approved the claim as submitted.

In view of the foregoing this court recommends that claimant be allowed the sum of $560.00.


text:
    (No. 1466
    Edmund A. Hogan, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Michel & Barnes, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank B. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant in this case represents that he is a resident of 107 Harrison Street, Bartonville, Illinois, and that he has resided at Bartonville, County of Peoria, State of Illinois, for the past twelve years; that he is married and lives with his wife and nine children who are solely dependent upon him for their income, support and maintenance. Claimant further alleges that he was an employee of the State of Illinois as a stationary fireman at the Peoria State Hospital and was so employed for the past eleven years, receiving a compensation for his services at the rate of $140.00 per month.

That while the claimant was so employed, on August 30, 1928, he fell from a running board between two boilers, on the premises of the Peoria State Hospital, where he was doing some repair work; claimant alighted on a hard surfaced floor and by reason of the fall broke the bones in each foot and as a result of this injury claimant was confined to his home in bed for several months, from August 30, 1928 to March 1st, 1929; that during the time the claimant was injured he received compensation from the State of Illinois and was treated for said broken feet and fractures by George H. Weber, physician and surgeon of Peoria, Illinois. That the claimant, because of his injury is unable to pursue any gainful employment and is incapable of working. The claimant requests that he be allowed the full amount which would apply to cases of total disability.

The Attorney General files his statement in which he says that the claimant has properly stated the law and the facts, and properly applied the facts to the law.

We, therefore, award the sum of $2,067.00.


text:
    (No. 1475
    Arthur R. Clark, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 25, 1929.

    Charles H. Thompson, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Boy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a claim for $26.33 which represents one-third of the appraised value of a dairy cow which was slaughtered after a tuberculosis test had been made and which the said animal reacted. It appeared that the Director of Agriculture approved the claim as being just and on account of delay in mails or for other reasons the claim was not paid until the appropriation under which these claims are handled, had lapsed.

The Attorney General recommends an award in said amount, and therefore this court recommends that claimant be awarded the sum of $26.33.


text:
    (No. 928
    Federal Paving Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1929.

    Thomas M. Zasadil, Jr., for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; S. S. DuHamel, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Chief Justice Clarity

delivered the opinion of the court.

, It appearing to the court that the above entitled claim was filed on the 30th day of April, A. D. 1925, and that the claimant has taken no testimony in its behalf in support of said claim and that the Attorney General has been ready and ■willing to take such testimony at all times;

And it further appearing to the court that the Attorney General has filed a motion herein asking that said cause be dismissed for failure on the part of the claimant to prosecute same and that notice of such motion has been made by mail upon such claimant;

The court finds that the claimant has failed to obey the rules of said court in regard to the taking of testimony in said cause;

Therefore it is hereby ordered by the court that said cause be, and the same is, hereby dismissed.


author: Mr. Justioe Thomas

text:
    (No. 1158
    William Cox by Paul P. Thompson, his Conservator, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 28, 1929.

      Rehearing denied May 9, 1929.

    L. E. Stone, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Roy D. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justioe Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

This claim is for $554.53 paid by Frank J. Heinl, conservator of claimant, to the managing officer of the State Hospital for the Insane at Peoria. It is alleged that Heinl paid the money March 23, 1914, and that he was at that time the conservator of Cox and paid it for the maintenance of his ward at the hospital. It is further alleged that the law under which the payment was made was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on April 19, 1917, and that Heinl filed a claim in this court for an award against the State for the same money which was denied.

The Attorney General has filed a general and special demurrer to claimant’s declaration. The demurrer will have to be sustained, as the declaration does not state such facts as entitle claimant to an award. So far as this declaration shows, Heinl may not have charged claimant with the amount paid the hospital. If he did not, then there could be nothing-due claimant from the State. This court will not assume the facts necessary to support an award, they must be alleged and proven. The demurrer is sustained.

We will also say we are not impressed with the justice of this claim. Heinl filed suit in this court for an award in his favor for this same money. In that case he made oath that he paid this money himself and asked to be reimbursed for it himself. He did not claim it had been paid out of his ward’s funds and did not ask for' an award in favor of Ms ward. He alleged he had paid the money March 23,1914, and he did not bring suit in this court against the State until July 2, 1926, twelve years after the payment. The opinion denying his claim was filed January 19, 1927. He resigned as conservator in February, 1927, and this present suit was filed March 8,1927. No explanation of these facts is set forth in the declaration.

If Heinl paid the money out of his own funds, as he alleged in his suit, then the present claimant has suffered no loss and is entitled to no award. If he wrongfully paid the money out of claimant’s estate, he ánd his bondsmen are liable to claimant for it, and claimant is not injured thereby.

Claimant can not be used as a cat’s-paw to assist Heinl to get money from the State which, under the law he is not entitled to.

The cause is, therefore, dismissed.

On May 9,1929, upon petition for rehearing the following additional opinion was filed:

Per Curiam: This cause coming on for rehearing upon petition of claimant filed on April 22, 1929, and the court, having sufficiently reviewed the matter brought upon said petition, and that it appearing that said petition should be denied,

It, is therefore considered by the court, that the said petition be, and the same is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 1163
    Henry W. Conrad, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1929.
    John G. Friedmbyer, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney. General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Leech

delivered the opinion of the court:

The declaration filed in this case by the claimant, Henry W. Conrad, sets forth that on December 6th, 1926, one LeRoy DeYoung was employed by claimant as a bread salesman and truck driver, claimant being in the wholesale bread business; that he owned a Reo delivery truck which was a six cylinder truck with panel body, and was in good, first class condition, which truck was on that day being driven by said DeYoung on Route'17, being a State highway, towards routes 25 and 8, which lead to 17; that as DeYoung was driving east on route 17, which was the route between Kankakee and Momence in Kankakee County, and as he came opposite the farm buildings of the Huskins farm, located on route 17, where the cement road at that point is 18 feet in width, the farm being located about four miles east of the City of Kankakee, and while driving on the right hand side of the road, at about 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon, he noticed a truck about a block ahead of him, which was travelling at a speed of about 15 miles per hour; that he commenced blowing his horn while a block behind said truck, in the lead, and he turned north, or to the left, to go around it, when suddenly the driver of that other truck in the lead, giving no signal, turned directly in front of the Reo truck, throwing the Reo truck against a telephone pole at that point, and doing considerable damage to it. The truck so turning to the left was a Packard State truck, with platform on the rear and an enclosed cab, driven by Harry Goodknecht, who was in the employ of the State of Illinois in the Highway Commission service; there was no cross road where the State truck turned to his left across the road in front of the Reo truck and the driver gave no signal with an outstretched hand, or otherwise that he intended to make such a turn, the turn leading-into a private driveway leading to the farm buildings above mentioned. The damage to the Reo truck amounted to $351.51.

The demurrer filed by the State of Illinois, through the Attorney General, is sustained as a matter of law.

Although there is no legal responsibility on the part of the State of Illinois, in cases of this character, we feel that in equity and good conscience, an award should be made, and we accordingly award to claimant the sum of $351.51.


text:
    (No. 1195
    James Edward Fitzmaurice, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 9, 1929.

    John Broderick, for claimant.
    Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General; Frank R. Eagle-ton, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.
   Mr. Justice Thomas

delivered the opinion of the court:

It is agreed between the attorney for claimant and attorneys for the State that the facts in this case are as follows: that claimant was sentenced by one of the courts of Cook County to serve a term in the Pontiac Reformatory at Pontiac, Illinois, on the charge of burglary; that after he had served his term, or a sufficient part thereof, he was paroled subject to his being confined at the Dixon State Colony at Dixon, Illinois; that subsequently he was incorrectly adjudged a feeble minded person and sent to said school and colony for that condition, but that claimant was not a feeble minded person but was an epileptic; that the first few months he was in said colony claimant had more than twenty-five or thirty epileptic convulsions a month; that he responded very rapidly to treatment for his condition as an epileptic and within the course of about four months the convulsions ceased; that two months after the convulsions had ceased he was placed upon a work detail at the colony and while on said work detail worked with a concrete mixer making concrete for use at the colony; that, while working-on said concrete mixer, claimant, against the orders o.f the State employee in charge of said work detail, went to the opposite side of the machine, took a stick dipped in some grease and was attempting to put some grease on said mixer; and that, as a result of his efforts to grease the machine, his hand became caught in the gears of the machine, so mangling it that it was necessary to amputate most of the first or index finger and all of the other three fingers of his right hand; that all of the patients of said institution on said work detail, and the State employees in charge at the time of the accident, stated that claimant did not have any convulsions at the time the accident occurred and that the injury was not the result of any epileptic condition.

In his declaration claimant does not state the amount claimed but says that previous to his confinement in said institution he was employed as a teamster and received as wages approximately $36.00 per week.

The Attorney General has filed a general and special demurrer to claimant’s declaration. Claimant’s attorney has submitted the case without brief or argument.

Claimant was not an employee of the State at the time of the accident, but was an inmate of a State institution, and would not come under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. This court has repeatedly held that the State is not legally or equitably liable to an inmate who receives an injury while confined in one of its institutions.

The demurrer is therefore sustained and the cause dismissed.