text:
    (No. 77-CC-1515 and 77-CC-1516
    Douglas Voll and Sharon Svoboda, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 19, 1979.

    Robert H. Gonzales and Vivien Hara Hersh, both for Claimants.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This case arises out of an incident which occurred on May 13,1977 in San Jose, California, some seven months following the escape of Walter Lee McCottrell from Joliet State Prison in October, 1976.

McCottrell was serving a term for armed robbery and had been assigned to the prison farm. At the time of his escape, he was driving a prison truck. The investigation of the prison authorities revealed that as the result of McCottrell becoming overly friendly with a female instructor at the prison school, it was decided by the administration that he should be removed from the farm and placed inside of the general prison population. A message was dispatched to the farm to have McCottrell brought inside. While verification was being obtained, McCottrell somehow apparently learned of the impending transfer back inside and simply took off with the truck.

Seven months later, and at a distance of some 3,000 miles from Joliet State Prison, the incidents occurred out of which this claim arises. At that time, McCottrell robbed the motel where he was staying and herded the manager and a female clerk into a bedroom where the manager’s wife was in bed and proceeded to shoot at all three with an obvious intent to murder. The wife was miraculously not hit by any of the shots, but the two Claimants were severely wounded. Claimant, Sharon Svoboda, suffered among other things, a temporary loss of sight which was restored by the removal of a cataract.

There are three issues involved in the present case: (1) jurisdiction; (2) Respondent’s negligence (a) proximate cause of Claimants’ injuries; and (3) damages and appropriate setoff.

Claimants rely on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 23, par. 4041, which provides as follows:

“Whenever a claim is filed with the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, the Department of Children and Fainily Services or the Department of Corrections, for damages resulting from personal injuries or damages to property, or both, or for damages resulting from property being stolen, heretofore or hereafter caused by an inmate who has escaped from a charitable, penal, reformatory, or other institution over which the State of Illinois has control while he was at liberty after his escape, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, the Department of Children and Family Services, or the Department of Corrections, shall conduct an investigation to determine the cause, nature, and extent of the damages and if it be found after investigation that the damage was caused by one who had been an inmate of such institution and had escaped, the Department may recommend to the Court of Claims that an award be made to the injured party, and the Court of Claims shall have the power to hear and determine such claims.”

Claimants assert the liability oí the State of Illinois under the above-quoted statute. Respondent vigorously argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction over this case. Respondent admits that the above-quoted inmate damage statute is a “law of the State of Illinois” and under Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. (1977), ch. 37, par. 439.8), this Court has jurisdiction. However, it is asserted that a Claimant, in relying upon a statutory cause of action such as the inmate damage statute, must precisely follow the provisions of the statute in asserting claims and if such procedures are not so followed, the claims must be denied.

Respondent argues that the evidence did not show and it is not alleged in the case at bar that claims were ever filed with the Department of Corrections. Thus, Respondent argues that the claims must be denied, and that this Court should not assume jurisdiction without a showing of strict adherence to the statutory procedures. We do not agree.

The record discloses that Claimant wrote certain letters to officials of the State of Illinois, including the governor and the attorney general, dated May 20, 1977 and July 13, 1977, copies of which letters are appended to Claimant’s reply brief as exhibits A-l and A-2. It is Claimant’s contention that these letters adequately satisfy the requirement of the statute that claims be filed with the Department of Corrections. It appears by these letters that the State was given notice of the pending action and that the Respondent’s contention that the failure of the Department of Corrections to conduct an investigation and recommend a settlement to the Court, procedures entirely within the control and purview of the Department of Corrections could not, if not followed through, constitute a bar to Claimants’ claim.

This Court has previously held in 22 Ill. Ct. Cl. 271 and 29 Rl. Ct. Cl. 71 that a favorable recommendation by the Department of Public Welfare is not a condition precedent to a recovery. To hold otherwise would put the Department of Public Welfare in a position superseding the Court of Claims and we do not believe it is the legislature’s intention that the act or failure to act by the Department of Public Welfare is binding upon the Court of Claims.

This Court has previously held that under this statute the State is not absolutely liable for acts of escaped prisoners, see 23 Ill. Ct. Cl. 47, and the State is not an insurer. See 22 Ill. Ct. Cl. 27.

This Court has also held that every case arising under this section of the statute must be decided on its own merits.

Former Chief Justice Perlin, in a well considered opinion in 26 Ill. Ct. Cl. 15 establishes the procedure that must be followed and the proof that must be made by Claimant before recovery can be had. A review of similar cases decided by the Court of Claims deals with claims that have arisen during an escape.

In the present case, the escape took place approximately seven months before and 3,000 miles away from the place where the injuries were sustained.

The State raises the issue that the injuries complained of were not the proximate results of the escape. The facts disclose that the escaped prisoner, while an inmate of the Joliet State Prison, had conducted himself in such a manner that he was given the special privilege of trustee. This would strongly indicate that his behavior at said prison was not such as to lead the State to believe that the acts complained of by Claimants would naturally and probably result if he escaped.

In virtually all of the escaped prisoner cases in which claims have been filed, the damages were the result of a continuous and unbroken series of events immediately following the escape and were not, as in the present case, entirely disconnected from the escape and completely remote from the act of escape itself.

This Court, in some of its decision, has held that the liability was limited to damages that were actively committed during the escape or the apprehension of the escaped prisoner and that it was directly related to the escape or apprehension.

It is the Court’s opinion that it was not the intention of the legislature to make the State of Illinois an insurer for every act of an escaped prisoner and the statute under which this claim is filed should be limited to damages occurring in the actual escape or matters directly related to said escape and not to matters so remote as seven months after the escape and 3,000 miles from the scene of the escape.

This Court has previously held in 23 Ill. Ct. Cl. 47 that there is not absolute liability upon the State under this section of the statute and the Court, in that case, further stated that the recommendations of the Department of Public Welfare are advisory only and not binding upon the Court.

The Court feels that there must be a showing of some connection upon which a finding may be made that the actual escape of the inmate and the damage or injury sustained by Claimants were related in the sense that the damage or injury was caused proximately by the act of escape and the reasonably foreseeable consequences falling therefrom.

The Court believes that Claimants in this case have not met the requirements of proof to establish their cause of action.

It is the Court’s opinion that the acts complained of were too remote from the actual act of the escape itself and that the acts complained of, based upon the history of the prisoner, were not foreseeable by the State of Illinois, and further that the escape itself was not the proximate cause of the injuries complained of.

Award denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Holderman, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 77-CC-1645
    William Wied, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 19, 1980.

    Donald J. Weaver, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Francis M. Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This is a claim for property damage to an automobile brought pursuant to the provisions of section 8(d) of the Court of Claims Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 439.8(d).

The incident in question occurred on January 14, 1977, on Route 25 in Geneva, Illinois, near the Geneva Girls School. On that date, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Claimant was driving in a northerly direction on Route 25. The highway is a two-lane road, but near the Geneva Girls School, it becomes a four-lane highway divided by a raised median strip nine inches high and three feet wide. Approximately 1,500 feet south of the median strip is a sign warning of a median strip and divided traffic ahead. Immediately preceding the median is a corrugated rumble strip approximately 150 feet in length. The rumble strip is a warning device to warn the traveling public of the divided highway ahead. On the night the accident occurred, the highway was clear but the rumble strip was covered with snow and the median strip itself was covered with one to two inches of snow.

On January 14, 1977, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Claimant was driving north on Route 25 and struck the median strip, causing extensive damage to his automobile. He was driving approximately 35 to 45 m.p.h. This is an unlighted area and his headlights were on casting a beam about 200 feet ahead of his car. Claimant did not see the median strip and drove onto it, straddling it for a distance of 100 to 200 feet, causing the damage complained of.

A regulatory sign ordinarily in place at the south end of the median advising motorists to keep right was down at the time of the accident.

It is Claimant’s contention that the accident was caused by the failure of the State to maintain the regulatory sign at the south end of the median strip. It is also his contention that the State had constructive knowledge of this sign being down.

The evidence in this case indicates that the State had no actual knowledge of this sign being down. There is evidence to the effect that the police officer of the City of Geneva had, on January B, 1977, noticed that the sign was down and made a report to that effect. There is no showing that the State ever received said report.

The evidence discloses that on the night in question, Claimant had done some drinking, just how much was not determined because claimant stated he did not remember how many drinks he had. He had been drinking beer but stated he did not remember how much he consumed.

Claimant testified his car went over the corrugated concrete rumble strip but, despite this fact, he still straddled the median strip. The evidence indicates that the median strip was approximately nine inches high and was covered by approximately two inches of snow and his headlights gave a clear picture of about 200 feet ahead.

This Court has repeatedly held that before there can be recovery in cases of this nature, it must be shown (1) that Claimant was free from contributory negligence; (2) that the negligence of the State was the proximate cause of the accident; and (3) the amount of damages sustained.

Geneva police officer John R. Malone testified that the sign was down on January 6, 1977, and that he had made a written report of this fact. He made the conjecture that the sign must have been put back up between January 6 and January 14, because otherwise he would have reported it missing again. This strengthens the position of the Respondent that it had no notice of any kind or character that the sign was down at the time the accident occurred.

It is the opinion of this Court that the fact that the warning sign located approximately 1,500 feet from the place of the accident was ignored by Claimant and the rumble strip was also ignored by Claimant would indicate he was not free from contributory negligence.

The record is devoid of any evidence that would indicate the State failed to replace the sign alleged to have been down at the time of the accident and was the decisive factor in causing the accident.

Award is denied and this causé is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1802
    George Ellis, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 13, 1979.

    George Ellis, pro se, for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This is a claim brought by Claimant, an inmate of Stateville Correctional Center, for compensatory pay for certain periods of time commencing with the month of December 1973.

This claim is brought under the provisions of section 8(a) of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 439.8(a)), and specifically is grounded on the provisions contained in Article 12, Correctional Employment Programs, of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections, effective January 1,1973. See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, pars. 1003 — 12—1, 1003 — 12—2, 1003 — 12—5.

Claimant works with psychiatric patients in a department of the institution called Control Segregation, formerly known as Detention Hospital. He was assigned to Detention Hospital as a medical nurse in November 1973 and has been there ever since, although all nurses are now civilians, and technically Claimant is classified as a janitor. Claimant is paid $21.00 per month, and his pay started January 1,1976, exactly one year after the institution began paying inmate nurses in the general hospital.

Other inmates working in Detention Hospital filed grievances and were awarded retroactive pay for calendar year 1975, but Claimant filed his grievance too late, after the appropriation had lapsed.

Claimant’s claim is for two time periods: Calendar year 1975 for which period his fellow employees in Detention Hospital were awarded retroactive pay; and the 13 months from December 1973 through December 1974, before the institution commenced paying inmate nurses in either the general hospital or Detention Hospital. This latter claim is based on the fact that the statute, approved July 26, 1972, became effective January 1, 1973, and makes inmates pay mandatory for persons engaged in work assignments.

Section 3 — 12—5 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat., eh. 38, par. 1003 — 12—5) was amended in certain particulars not applicable to this immediate case by P.A. 80-1099, effective February 1, 1978, but the editorial comment found in Smith-Hurd Annotated Statutes following section 3 — 12—5 as originally enacted remains pertinent: “This Section makes compensation in some form mandatory for all persons working in the regular employment programs of the Department.”

Claimant seeks pay based on the $14.00 per month paid inmate nurses in the general hospital during 1975, for a five-day week. Because Claimant worked at Detention Hospital on a “live-in” basis and was on 24-hour call seven days per week, he asks that the $14.00 per month be adjusted to reflect a seven-day work week.

This claim was not contested by Respondent, either by evidence or briefs.

An award is hereby entered in favor of Claimant in the amount of $476.40.


author: POCH, J.

text:
    (No. 77-CC-1930
    Aileen Neely, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 2, 1980.

    Richard A. Hollis, for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

Claimant, Aileen Neely, has brought this action against the State of Illinois to recover back-pay in the amount of $48,819.41. Miss Neely had been employed by the State of Illinois since 1934 and was “laid off” from her position as Social Worker VI in the Department of Children and Family Services on October 15, 1973. The Civil Service Commission of the State of Illinois determined that Miss Neely should not have been removed from her position as Social Worker VI, rather that she was entitled to continue her employment in the position of Child Welfare Administrator II.

The State of Illinois appealed the Civil Service Commission decision to the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of Sangamon County, Illinois. Said Court then affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Commission. Again, the State of Illinois filed an appeal, to the Fourth District Appellate Court, and during the pendency of that appeal, the director of the Department of Personnel reversed the decision to lay off the Claimant, thus making effective said decision retroactive to October 15, 1973, with restoration of full rights and benefits, subject to mitigation from that date. The Appellate Court proceeding was thereafter dismissed, and the State took no further steps to appeal. Miss Neely was reinstated as an employee effective July 1, 1977, in the position of Child Welfare Administrator II, Department of Children and Family Services. Miss Neely has not been paid salary from October 15,1973, through June 30, 1976, which she would have received had she been employed during that period, and has not been reimbursed medical insurance premium which would have been paid by the State as a benefit of employment, for the period October 15, 1973, through July 1, 1977.

The Respondent does not dispute the fact that Miss Neely was wrongfully discharged from her job. Therefore, the sole issue before this Court is whether the efforts exerted by Miss Neely to find alternate employment amounted to reasonable mitigation efforts on her part.

The evidence at the hearing disclosed that Miss Neely applied for a position with the Senior Citizens Group in Carbondale, but was not employed at that position because she was “over-qualified.” Claimant also applied for the personnel code position of Social Services Coordinator with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, took a competitive examination, received the highest grade possible, and was not hired by the State of Illinois. Ultimately, Miss Neely was hired to teach courses at Logan College in Carbondale for the years 1974-1975 and 1976.

The Court finds that Miss Neely did make a reasonable effort to mitigate her losses, and that Miss Neely is entitled to full compensation which she would have earned in the position classification during the period of discharge. This includes both salary and medical insurance premiums.

Claimant would have received $58,075.00 in salary and $390.96 in medical insurance premium payments. The State is entitled to a set-off of $9,646.55 which comprises unemployment compensation received by the Claimant and the amounts earned by the Claimant during the period of discharge. This leaves a balance of $48,819.41 plus contributions to the State Retirement System due and owing to Claimant.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant, Aileen Neely, be and is hereby awarded the sum of $48,819.41.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-1981
    Robert McGraw, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois Department of Local Government, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 24, 1980.

    Michael A. Myers, for Claimant.
    William J.. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

On October 20,1977, Claimant filed his complaint in this Court seeking recovery for loss of wages for the period of February 20, 1974, through June 30, 1976, during which time he alleges he was laid off and prevented from performing his duties as a Community Representative II with the Department of Local Government Affairs, State of Illinois.

On February 20,1974, the Claimant was laid off and said layoff was approved by the director of the Department of Personnel, State of Illinois. The reason given for the layoff was material reorganization and budgetary limitations. Claimant requested a layoff reconsideration hearing as provided for by personnel rules, but the director of personnel upheld the layoff.

Claimant filed a petition with the Illinois Civil Service Commission alleging that his layoff was a subterfuge for a discharge and that a probationary employee within the same organizational unit had not been laid off prior to laying off a certified employee.

On October 15,1975, the Civil Service Commission ruled that Claimant was wrongfully laid off from his position with the Department of Local Government Affairs, State of Illinois and ordered his reinstatement.

On November 5, 1975, the Department of Local Government Affairs filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County for an administrative review of the decision of the Civil Service Commission. On October 18, 1976, the Circuit Court entered an order upholding and affirming the decision of the Civil Service Commission. The State of Illinois on November 8,1976, filed a Notice of Appeal.

While the appeal was pending, the director of the Department of Personnel, State of Illinois, decided to reconsider the original layoff decision and upon such reconsideration, determined that Robert Me Craw’s rights as a certified employee had in fact been violated, and revised the layoff decision retroactive to February 20, 1974, with full restoration of rights to that date.

After Claimant made demands for full back pay and such demand was refused, he has made a claim for the period from February 20, 1974, through June 30, 1976, with the total claim being in the sum of $33,402.91, including mitigation of his losses.

During the layoff the Claimant was engaged in the real estate business, thereby mitigating his losses.

From the record in this case, the Court is of the opinion that Claimant is entitled to an award of $29,241.43 which represents his mitigated losses for the years 1974, 1975 and 1976.

An award is, hereby, made to Claimant, Robert Me Craw, in the sum of $29,241.43 less deductions for Federal and State Income Taxes, State Employees Retirement System and Social Security.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-2199
    E. L. Schmidt, d/b/a Schmidt Towing Service, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 3, 1979.

    Rurdit, Clakins and Immel (Dale R. Turner, of counsel), for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

Claimant filed a claim for the moving and storage of certain auto bodies and parts under the direction of the Illinois State Police from Neville’s Auto Salvage to the State Fairgrounds in the City of Springfield. On the date of the hearing in this matter, held on April 5, 1978, the Claimant testified that said items were stored by him from and since November 7,1973, and would be offered for sale pursuant to an order of the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, in Cause No. 672-77, which said sale was scheduled to be held on May 5, 1978. He further testified that the net proceeds received from said sale would become the property of the Claimant herein, to apply to his storage lien against the items held in storage and be set off against any amount which may be found due Claimant in this cause. A breakdown of Claimant’s claim is as follows:

1. 1,411 days storage at $48.00 per day $67,728.00

2. Moving stored items 1,700.00

3. Interest at 9.5 percent compounded annually to April 5,1978 22,172.86

Total amount claimed $91,600.86

Net proceeds of sale setoff (7,497.04)

Net amount of claims $84,103.82

Claimant testified that when said items were originally moved on November 7, 1973, to the State Fairgrounds, he submitted a bill for moving, in the amount of $1,700.00, which was paid partly by the Illinois State Police and partly by the Office of the Secretary of State. Following the payment of the aforesaid amount, the Claimant was requested to return some of the items to Neville’s Auto Salvage and instructed that the balance of the stored items be removed from the State Fairgrounds pending disposition of criminal proceedings then pending in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County. No evidence was introduced as to any arrangements having been made concerning payment for moving said items and for the storage thereof.

Claimant testified that the items to be stored pending disposition of the criminal proceedings were then removed to an unheated rental metal building, measuring approximately 40 feet by 70 feet, with approximately 30 percent of the floor being cement and the balance dirt, and for which he obligated himelf to pay the sum of $150.00 per month. The Claimant’s position in billing the State of Illinois is that there were the equivalent of 16 units which at a charge of $3.00 per unit would come to $48.00 per day, as above noted, for a monthly charge of $1,440.00.

It is the position of the Claimant that he entered into an oral contract with an agent of the State of Illinois and that since Claimant has performed under the alleged contract he is entitled to his ordinary and customary charges for towing and storage.

It is the position of the Respondent that the State did not enter into an enforceable contract since there was no showing that Claimant had dealt with anyone authorized to enter into such a contract and incur an obligation for towing and storage on behalf of the State of Illinois, and that the State, therefore, should not be held liable for unauthorized acts of its employees. Respondent further takes the position that the items were held in storage for the purpose of being available in the prosecution of criminal charges by Sangamon County and that the arresting officers were acting on behalf of the Sangamon County State’s Attorney when Claimant was instructed to hold the items as evidence in anticipated criminal proceedings.

The issue before the Court is whether the State of Illinois, through its employees, entered into a contract for towing and storage with the Claimant, and specifically, whether or not the State Police Officer was authorized to enter into a building contract on behalf of the State of Illinois.

There is no evidence in the record that the State police officer had the authority to bind the State of Illinois to such a contract and it was incumbent upon Claimant to ascertain the extent of the authority of said officer. Without evidence of such authorization, the State of Illinois cannot be bound by any such agreement.

Busekrus v. State, 13 Ill. Ct. Cl. 59;
Arthur Frantzen Company v. State, 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 274;
Chicago Serum Company v. State, 4 Ill. Ct. Cl. 64;
Fisher v. State, 1 Ill. Ct. Cl. 270;
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. State, 18 Ill. Ct. Cl. 214;
Lord and Bushnell Company v. State, 13 Ill. Ct. Cl. 189;
Fell v. State, 22 Ill. Ct. Cl. 74.

The Illinois Central Railroad Co. case held that the acting managing officer of the Lincoln State School and Colony who entered into the contract with the Illinois Central Railroad for the payment of demurrage charges had no authority to make the agreement. It was also held that whoever deals with a State agency does so with notice of the limitations on it or its agent’s power, and those who contract with it or furnish it supplies, do so with reference to the law, and if they go beyond the limitations imposed, they do so at their peril.

In the instant case, the Claimant has totally failed to prove to the Court that the alleged contract was made by one authorized to enter into contracts with the State of Illinois and on this sole issue, the claim should be denied.

It is, therefore, ordered that the claim of E. L. Schmidt, d/b/a Schmidt Towing Service, be and it is hereby denied.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    (No. 77-CC-2502
    Sue C. Christian et al., Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 30, 1979.

    Sue C. Christian, Kathleen A. Smith, and Mariella Metz, pro se, for Claimants.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This is a claim for retroactive payment for half-hour lunch breaks which were by contract to have been uninterrupted but which, by admission of the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, were in fact not uninterrupted. The period of time in question for which claim is being made was November 1,1976, through June 30, 1977.

The issues to be decided by this Court are whether this amounts to a claim for additional payment for work already performed for which remuneration had already been made contrary to section 9 of the Finance Act (111. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145), and if this is such a payment as to whether the statute excludes this payment from its general prohibition against back pay.

In the course of this claim, the Attorney General submitted a comprehensive stipulation which points up the many areas for consideration in a claim of this nature. Rather than elaborate ourselves on these areas, the stipulation is reproduced in full as follows:

“Now comes the Respondent, by William J. Scott, Illinois Attorney General, William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General of Record, and stipulates to the following:
1. This claim is for retroactive payment for half-hour lunch breaks which were by contract to have been uninterrupted but which by admission of the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities were not in fact uninterrupted, said lunch breaks having occurred between the dates of November 1, 1976 and June 30, 1977.
2. Section 8 of the Personnel Code provides that the director (Personnel) shall prepare, and submit to the Civil Service Commission, rules for all positions and employees subject to the Act. The rules so promulgated do not deal with the subject of this claim (uninterrupted lunch breaks).
3. Section 9(7) of the code empowers the director to conduct negotiations as to pay, hours of work, or other working conditions of employees subject to the Act. It, therefore, follows that the question of paying additional straight time for interrupted lunch periods is a proper subject for negotiation and inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement.
4. The contract of employment in question was an agreement by and between the Illinois Nurses Association on behalf of the Claimants and the Illinois Department of Personnel, said contract being commonly known as RC-23.
5. The effective date of the RC-23 contract, as evidenced by the excerpts from the Agreement attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit A, was November 1,1976.
6. Article V, Section 2 of said contract provided as follows:
‘Work schedules shall normally provide for the work day to be broken at approximately midpoint by an uninterrupted, unpaid meal period of not less than 30 minutes and no more than one hour. However, this shall not preclude work schedules which provide for a working paid meal period. Employees who normally receive an unpaid meal period and are required to work during that period and receive no equivalent time off during the same shift, shall have such time treated as hours worked and shall be paid at the appropriate straight or overtime rate, whichever is applicable.
Present practices regarding eating while on duty during paid meal periods shall remain in effect.’
7. The departmental report which is being simultaneously submitted with this report pursuant to Rule 14 of this Court states that the employees in question ‘grieved that they were not provided an uninterrupted one-half hour lunch period and the result of the grievance was that they should be paid.’
8. Answer No. 6, of the departmental report establishes that there was an insufficient amount of money returned to the Treasury in the line item out of which this would normally have been paid but that funds were available in other line item appropriations which could have been transferred for the payment of these claims.
9. Section 9 of the “Finance Act” (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145) provides, in part, as follows: (paraphrased)
‘Amount paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of this State 0 0 0 shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll 0 0 0 and no additional sum shall be paid ° ° ° which payments would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments * ° ° based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group,shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’
10. The issues to be decided by this Court are as follows:
A. Does this claim amount to a claim for ‘an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made.’
Respondent thinks not.
B. Does the exception stated in Section 9 of the Finance Act pertaining to claims based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement exclude this claim from the prohibition against retroactive pay contained in the first part of the statute?
Respondent thinks that it does.
11. Historically this Court has interpreted this statute in such a way as to enunciate the principle that acceptance of a payroll warrant for a given payroll period precludes further payment for that payroll period. This principle has been enunciated by this Court in at least the following cases:
John W. Clayton v. State, 21 Ill. Ct. Cl. 321;
Shields & Gruber v. State, 14 Ill. Ct. Cl. 136;
Klapmen, et al. v. State, 13 Ill. Ct. Cl. 139;
Agsten, et al. v. State, 13 Ill. Ct. Cl. 7;
Hollander, et al. v. State, 14 Ill. Ct. Cl. 40, 43;
Gholsen v. State, 12 Ill. Ct. Cl. 26;
Smith v. State, 11 Ill. Ct. Cl. 374;
Novak v. State, 10 Ill. Ct. Cl. 258;
Broderic v. State, 9 Ill. Ct. Cl. 69;
Mills v. State, 9 Ill. Ct. Cl. 69;
Hunter v. State, 9 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1.
The Attorney General has, however, in opinion S-643 held that a claim for overtime pay not included on the payroll warrants for a given period was not excluded, because it did not constitute ‘an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made’.
Respondent suggests that the pay sought in this claim is analogous to straight rate overtime.
Wherefore, Respondent respectfully suggest that an award in this case would not be contrary to any of the above considered rules or statutes of this State.
NOTE: This stipulation refers only to the Claimants’ claims for overtime pay, and the claims of Kathleen Smith (now renumbered as 77-CC-2502A) and Mariella Metz (now renumbered as 77-CC-2502B) for temporary assignment pay are not affected thereby.”

We agree with the position taken by the Attorney General that the subject matter of the claim is analogous to straight time overtime, that it is not additional payment for work already performed for which remuneration had already been made, inasmuch as they were not paid previously for each of these overtime periods, that it was therefore not prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat., eh. 127, par. 145, and that it was a proper subject for collective bargaining by the director of personnel.

It is therefore ordered that an award be granted to each of the Claimants as set forth in the Departmental Report subject to appropriate legal additional benefits for retirement and FICA along with the appropriate and legal deductions and withholdings for retirement, FICA and Federal and State taxes.


text:
    (No. 77-CC-0034
    Kathy Tice, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed November 8, 1979.

    Kathy Tice, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This is a claim for retroactive salary based upon a reconsideration opinion as a result of the Claimant’s request for a job reallocation. The original request for audit and reallocation was denied by the agency and in March of 1977 the Claimant filed a request for reconsideration with the Department of Personnel. The procedure involving a reconsideration is commonly referred to as a fourth level grievance procedure and is governed by Rule 1 — 30 of the Department of Personnel. The procedure under Rule 1 — 30 is for the back pay to be granted retroactive to the date of application for reconsideration.

This case is analogous to the situation that was brought before this Court in the case of Claire Crawford v. State of Illinois, No. 77-CC-1790, in that the claim is for retroactive salary back to the date of the application for reconsideration. In Claire Crawford (supra) this Court held that the retroactive salary was not prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, which generally prohibits back pay except in cases involving the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement. This case happens to be neither of the above but as in Claire Crawford (supra) we find that the fact that the Claimant was paid at a rate less than that called for by the duties being performed by the Claimant takes it out of the prohibition of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, in that the retroactive payment would not be a payment which “would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made,” which is prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145.

Therefore, inasmuch as this retroactive salary payment is not prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, and it is not in violation of Rule 1 — 30 as interpreted by the director of personnel, we hereby grant an award to this Claimant in the amount of $108.00 subject to the appropriate additions and withholdings as required by the State Employees’ Retirement System, F.I.C.A. and State and Federal income tax requirements.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0174
    Container Transit, Inc., and Marine Office-Appleton & Cox Insurance Company, Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 23, 1979.

      Rehearing denied October 22, 1979.

    Conklin, Leahy & Eyensberg, for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General of Illinois (John R. Fanone, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant filed its claim as a result of an accident which occurred on February 1, 1977.

Claimant was operating a tractor and trailer combination in a northerly direction on Route 51 passing under the overpass of Highway 6 at or near Peru, Illinois. As the trailer passed under said overpass, it struck a piece of metal projecting downward approximately 14 inches to 16 inches over Highway 51. The top of the trailer was peeled off and the material being hauled was damaged in the amount of $2,977.32.

The Marine Office-Appleton & Cox Insurance Company reimbursed Container Transit for this loss and is subrogated in the amount of said payment. No claim is made for the damage to the trailer.

The departmental report shows that approximately six months prior to the date of the accident, the bridge in question had been damaged and that to temporarily repair this damage, a steel plate was welded onto the ceiling of the bridge to reinforce the break caused in the bridge. Evidence further discloses that this steel plate was damaged sometime prior to January 30, 1977, and evidence shows that approximately 27M hours prior to the accident in question, a truck and trailer operated by United Transport, Inc., was also damaged when it struck the downward protruding steel plate.

The sole question before the Court is whether or not the prior accident, as set out, did constitute actual or constructive notice of a defective condition to put liability upon respondent, the State of Illinois.

This Court has repeatedly held that when the State has actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition and it fails to act, then it is responsible for any damages incurred by Claimant if Claimant was free from contributory negligence.

It appears in the present case that Claimant was free from contributory negligence, that the State did have actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, and that the proximate cause of the accident was the failure of the State to remedy the dangerous condition.

As was held in 33 Ill. Ct. Cl. 410, “the State is not an insurer of the condition of highways under its control but does have duty to public to use reasonable care in maintaining roadways.”

It is the opinion of this Court that the bridge in question is under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the Respondent, and under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the State should be responsible for damages sustained as a result of the existence of the aforesaid dangerous and defective condition, and that Claimant was free from contributory negligence.

An award is hereby made in favor of Claimant in the amount of $2,977.32.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0344
    Wilder Mobile Homes, Inc., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, State Fair Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 18, 1980.

    Hull, Campbell, Robinson & Gibson, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

Claimant was the owner of four model 11-70-23 Monarch Industries mobile homes. Ry an instrument dated May 16, 1974, Claimant leased to Respondent these mobile homes for a 12-month minimum period commencing June 1, 1974, for $2,100.00 per month (attachment 2 of Departmental Report). It was provided in this agreement that upon termination of this agreement that the Respondent would have the option to renew this agreement on a monthly basis or should the Claimant decide to abandon their property the parties could agree upon a price for the property at which time ownership would pass to the Respondent. On August 18, 1975, Mr. Paul H. King, State Fair Manager, sent a letter to Claimant in which he authorized Claimant to extend the lease on these buildings. On September 2,1975, Mr. Paul H. King executed an affidavit confirming the contract extension as an emergency. On October 22, 1975, the audit of the Auditor General regarding the State Fair Agency revealed that the contracts at that time were in violation of the State Purchasing Act inasmuch as there were no competitive bids and there was no advertisement for bids. On July 1,1976, Claimant and Respondent entered into a new written agreement whereby Claimant leased the four mobile homes to Respondent for a period commencing July 1, 1976, and ending June 30, 1977. Respondent agreed to pay $2,100.00 per month. Also on July 1, 1976, Mr. King executed an affidavit wherein he defined the new lease agreement as an emergency extension contract. On July 1, 1977, Nicholas L. Stone, State Fair Superintendent, initiated an agreement whereby Respondent would agree to lease these homes for another twelve months commencing with July 1,1977, through June 30,1978, if at the end of this period Claimant would agree to convey the titles to the homes to Respondent. This contract was signed by the State Fair Superintendent but not by Claimant. In all of the leases entered into for these mobile homes between Claimant and Respondent the leases were not awarded pursuant to competitive bidding and there were no advertisements for bids. The leases were, therefore, in violation of section 10 of the State Purchasing Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 127, par. 132.10). Respondent paid Claimant rental at the agreed rate of $2,100.00 per month until June 30, 1977. By letter dated January 19, 1978, Grady E. Holley, as attorney for Respondent, notified Claimant’s attorney, John K. Greanias, that Respondent had vacated the mobile homes and that the same were to be removed by Claimant as soon as possible.

Mr. King did not have the legal authority to lease the mobile homes since there had been no compliance with the bidding procedures required by the Illinois Purchasing Act. A contract which is in violation of the Purchasing Act is null and void and no recovery can be had under it. Dement et al. v. Rokker et al., 126 Ill. 174. The State is not estopped from denying the legality of a contract even though it has accepted the benefits. Dement, supra; Schuenig v. State, 11 Ill. Ct. Cl. 634. Where an express contract is prohibited by law, an action will not be on quantum meruit. Green and Sons Co. v. State, 9 Ill. Ct. Cl. 218. It is also well settled law that one dealing with an agent of the State is bound to know the extent of his authority. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. State, 18 Ill. Ct. Cl. 214.

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the claim be and the same is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0351
    David Michael Andrysiak, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 1, 1980.

    George F. Galland, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Paul W. Sengpiehl, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This is a claim for retroactive salary based upon a reconsideration opinion as a result of the Claimant’s request for a job reallocation. The original request for audit and reallocation was denied by the agency and in December of 1976 the Claimant filed a request for reconsideration with the Department of Personnel. The procedure involving a reconsideration is commonly referred to as a fourth level grievance procedure and is governed by Rule 1 — 30 of the Department of Personnel Rules as interpreted by the director of the Department of Personnel. The procedure under Rule 1 — 30 is for the back pay to be granted retroactive to the date of application for reconsideration.

This case is analogous to the situation that was brought before this Court in the case of Claire Crawford v. State of Illinois, No. 77-CC-1790, in that the claim is for retroactive salary back to the date of the application for reconsideration. In Claire Crawford (supra) this Court held that the retroactive salary was not prohibited by section 9 of the Finance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145), which generally prohibits back pay except in cases involving the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement. This case happens to be neither of the above but as in Claire Crawford (supra) we find that the fact that the Claimant was paid at a rate less than that called for by the duties being performed by the Claimant takes it out of the prohibition of section 9 of the Finance Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145), in that the retroactive payment would not be a payment which “would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made” which is prohibited by section 9 of the Finance Act.

' Therefore, inasmuch as this retroactive salary payment is not prohibited by section 9 of the Finance Act, and it is not in violation of Rule 1 — 30 as interpreted by the director of personnel, we hereby grant an award to this Claimant in the amount of $572.54 subject to the appropriate additions and withholdings as required by the State Employees’ Retirement System. F.I.C.A. and State and Federal income tax requirements.


author: Roe, C. S.

text:
    (No. 78-CC-0628
    John D. Knippenberg, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed August 13, 1979.

   Roe, C. S.

This matter coming on to be heard on the Claimant’s motion for default judgment and the Court being fully advised in the premises.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be granted an award in the amount of $954.21, and that the Claimant’s claim for interest is denied.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-0955
    Richard Ramos, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 3, 1980.

    Lawrence Ordower, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Paul Sengpiehl, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

From the evidence introduced at the hearing, it appears that Claimant, Richard Ramos was discharged from his position with the Fair Employment Practices Commission of the State of Illinois. Subsequent to his discharge, he filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court claiming he was wrongfully discharged. His lawsuit was assigned to Judge Joseph Sam Perry. After a hearing, a settlement agreement was worked out with the Court’s approval. As a result of the settlement agreement, Claimant was to be paid the sum of $5,800.00 in wages allegedly owed him as a result of his alleged wrongful discharge.

The settlement agreement was signed by Richard Ramos the Claimant, Lawrence Ordower, his attorney, Carol M. Frederick, Chairperson of Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission and William J. Scott, Attorney General, State of Illinois.

The agreement was approved by Judge Joseph Sam Perry and filed in the U.S. District Court proceedings. An order was entered dismissing the lawsuit with the provision that it may be reinstated if the Court of Claims does not allow such claim and if the claim is not paid.

Claimant, Richard Ramos, called as a witness on his own behalf testified as to the contract, and as to the signatures thereon. He testified that the settlement contract released the State of Illinois and the Officials of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, who were named in the lawsuit. Also introduced into evidence were letters from the Assistant Attorney General setting forth that the Court of Claims division of the Attorney General’s Office would not oppose Claimant’s claim. The Respondent, State of Illinois, is now opposing this claim setting forth that there was no appropriation in effect to pay this claim for the wages in question and that the Attorney General, William J. Scott, and Carol M. Fredericks of Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission had no authority to bind the State of Illinois in this settlement agreement.

The Court does not agree with the views and arguments of the Assistant Attorney General. The Court finds that there was a proper settlement agreement entered into with the purpose of doing justice to both parties involved and with the further purpose of disposing of litigation.

That the State acted properly in settling this claim.

It is therefore ordered that 'Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $5,800.00.


author: Roe, C. J.

text:
    (No. 78-CC-1104 and 78-CC-1058
    James L. Sims, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed August 9, 1979.

   Roe, C. J.

The Court having read the arguments of counsel and the report of the Commissioner and being fully advised in the premises.

It is hereby ordered that Claimant, James L. Sims, be awarded a judgment in the amount of $173.45.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1177
    Carolyn Oliver, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1980.

    Cornfield and Feldman, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Paul M. Sengpiehl, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This is a claim for retroactive salary based upon a reconsideration opinion as a result of the Claimant’s request for a job reallocation. The original request for audit and reallocation was denied by the agency in July of 1976 when the Claimant filed a request for reconsideration with the Department of Personnel. The procedure involving a reconsideration is commonly referred to as a fourth level grievance procedure and is governed by Rule 1 — 30 of the Department of Personnel rules as interpreted by the Director of the Department of Personnel. The procedure under Rule 1 — 30 is for the back pay to be granted retroactive to the date of application for reconsideration.

This case is analogous to the situation that was brought before this Court in the case of Claire Crawford v. State of Illinois, 77-CC-1790, in that the claim is for retroactive salary back to the date of the application for reconsideration. In Claire Crawford (supra) this Court held that the retroactive salary was not prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, which generally prohibits back pay except in cases involving the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement. This case happens to be neither of the above but as in Claire Crawford (supra) we find that the fact that the Claimant was paid at a rate less than that called for by the duties being performed by the claimant takes it out of the prohibition of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, in that the retroactive payment would not be a payment which “would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made” which is prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145.

Therefore, inasmuch as this retroactive salary payment is not prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, and it is not in violation of Rule 1 — 30 as interpreted by the director of personnel, we hereby grant an award to this Claimant in the amount of $839.50 subject to the appropriate additions and withholdings as required by the State Employee’s Retirement System, F.I.C.A. and State and Federal income tax requirements.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1192
    United States of America, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1979.

    Nancy K. Neeles, Assistant U.S. Attorney, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (Francis Donovan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause comes before this Court on the following:

1. Complaint filed on July 14, 1978;

2. Joint stipulation by all parties;

3. Departmental reports from the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities dated August 4, 1978, December 15, 1978 and March 5,1979.

The Claimant, United States of America, seeks to recover overpayments of monies on a child’s insurance annuity paid out under Section 5(c) of the “Railroad Retirement Act” of 1937 (45 U.S.C. par. 228e(c), hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). The facts, as set forth below, are not in dispute and have been stipulated to by all parties.

On or about August 24, 1967, David Edelson, the superintendent of the Dixon Developmental Center (hereinafter referred to as “Dixon”), a facility of the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (hereinafter referred to as the “Department”), filed applications for benefits from the Railroad Retirement Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”), on behalf of Fred Pellegrino (hereinafter referred to as the “annuitant”) for a child’s insurance annuity under the Act (45 U.S.C. par. 228a et seq.). At the time of the filing and at all times thereafter relevant herein, the annuitant was a ward of the State of Illinois under the care and supervision of the Department.

Upon receipt of the applications and after determination of eligibility, the Board began paying a monthly annuity in 1968 to David Edelson as representative payee of the annuitant. It was the policy of the Department that where a ward of the State had no relative or other interested, competent individual to serve as representative payee, then the superintendent of the facility where the ward resided would be so designated. Such was the case here.

The Board continued paying monthly annuities to Edelson on behalf of the annuitant through April 30, 1976. However, under Sections 5(c), (j) and (1) of the Act, the marriage of an annuitant terminated his eligibility for further payments.

By applying for the benefits under the Act, the superintendent had a duty to notify the Board of the occurrence of several events, including the marriage of the annuitant. The superintendent was aware of this responsibility since it was clearly spelled out on the applications submitted to the Board.

“APPLICANT’S AGREEMENT #00

III. A child’s insurance annuity ends with the month before the month in which the child ...(d) marries . . .
22. Do you agree to notify the Railroad Retirement Board promptly of the occurrence of any of the events described in I, II, and III above?
Yes.” (Emphasis in original)

On or about August 26, 1972, the annuitant unbeknownst to the superintendent married. The superintendent was unaware of this occurrence because the annuitant had been released from Dixon on a conditional discharge to a long-term care facility supervised by another administrative unit of the Department. It is noted that at the time the superintendent made the applications to the Board, the annuitant was then residing in a community placement facility in Sterling, Illinois. It appears that the superintendent at Dixon was named the representative payee for the annuitant because his discharge was conditional in that he required close supervision in the community and was still under the jurisdiction of Dixon at all times relevant to this case.

Despite this discharge from Dixon, however, the superintendent was still under a duty to keep track of the annuitant in order to be able to report to the Board any event which would have terminated his eligibility for his annuity. It is plain that this duty was breached and damages resulted.

On July 13,1976, the annuitant, on his own initiative, contacted the Board informing it of his marriage.

Because of the lack of a timely notice of this event, the Board had made payments of the monthly annuity between August 1,1972 and April 30,1976 resulting in an overpayment of $8,980.20.

However, during this period, the Department, in its reports, indicated that the superintendent at Dixon had received only $8,751.12. Pursuant to departmental policy, $8,512.90 was forwarded by Dixon to the facility in Sterling for the use and benefit of the annuitant. The remaining $238.22 is currently being held in a Dixon Trust Fund Account for the annuitant who has since died.

Upon learning of the annuitant’s marriage, the Board terminated payment of the benefits and requested a refund from the Department of the overpayment. After being advised that no payment would be forthcoming, a suit was filed in Federal Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

The filing of this lawsuit resulted in a compromise agreement between the Claimant, the Respondent and the Department that the Respondent would pay and the Claimant would accept $7,500.00 in full satisfaction of its action in the Federal action. The agreement further provided that the Claimant would file the instant action to recover that amount which the department would not oppose. The Federal action was dismissed with prejudice with leave to reinstate should the agreement not be honored.

Based on the facts presented to this Court, it appears that the Respondent is liable under a breach of contract theory. At all times relevant hereto, the superintendent at Dixon was acting within the scope of his employment with the Department. As such, his requesting benefits from the Board on behalf of the annuitant imposed duties upon him as an agent of the State of Illinois. These duties were clearly spelled out in the agreement he executed as an agent. There is no contention here that the superintendent was unaware of the responsibilities imposed by the agreement.

It is also noted in the record of this case that the Claimant and the Respondent have previously entered into a binding agreement based on valid consideration to compromise the amount of recovery in this case. While the Claimant, on the basis of the record herein, had a claim against the Respondent for an amount greater than presented in this case, this Court will not disturb prior agreements regarding possible claims against the State where good faith negotiations have resulted in a compromise settlement figure which thereafter becomes the amount sought in the Court of Claims.

The compromise settlement was worked out between the parties and agreed to by the Claimant and the responsible agency of the State; to-wit, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. At the time of the making of this agreement, all parties were represented by competent counsel; to-wit, the United States Attorney’s Office and the Attorney General’s Office of the State of Illinois. That both sides had authority to enter into such an agreement is admitted. This Court sees no abuse of discretion or authority nor any fraud inherent in the compromise settlement which is the basis of the instant claim.

This Court finds, therefore, that the Claimant, United States of America, is due the sum of $7,500.00 for overpayments of monies by an agent of the Claimant, the Railroad Retirement Board, to Respondent’s agent, the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, on a child’s insurance annuity under the “Railroad Retirement Act” of 1937 (45 U.S.C. par. 228a et seq.)

The Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $7,500.00 in full satisfaction of its claim herein.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1196
    Elizabeth Josephine Busch, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed December 3, 1979.

   POCH, J.

This cause coming to be heard on the motion of the Respondent to dismiss, due notice being given and the claimant filing her objections thereto and the Court being fully advised;

FINDS:

1. The Claimant’s complaint alleges she was injured on July 20,1976.

2. The Claimant concedes that she did not file notice of intention to bring an action for personal injuries within six months of the occurrence as required by the provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 1. Failure to file such notice requires that the claim be dismissed and barred. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 2.

The Claimant responds to the motion to dismiss for failure to file a timely notice on two grounds. First the Claimant alleges the Respondent had actual notice of the injury without the statutory notice requirement being fulfilled. This contention is without merit because the General Assembly of this state has seen fit to enact mandatory notice requirements to be met by all Claimants. Furthermore there is no proof of actual knowledge on the part of the State of all the matters that must be included in complying with the statutory notice requirements of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 439.22 — 1.

The Claimant also argues that the notice requirements of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, pars. 439.22 — 1 and 439.22— 2 are unconstitutional as being special legislation and violation of the equal protection provisions of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. This argument must fail because this Court has no authority to rule on the constitutionality of the Court of Claims Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 439.1 et seq.). On issues identical to the instant case the Court in Gossar v. State (1962), 24 Ill. Ct. Cl. 183, said at pages 197-198:

In addition to the foregoing, there is another reason why this Court should not attempt to invalidate an act of the Legislature as expressed in the Court of Claims Law. No Claimant has a constitutional right to reimbursement from the State for a claim, regardless of its merits. The Legislature can create or abolish the Court of Claims at its pleasure. Having created the Court, it may also establish rules, regulations and procedures for the consideration of such claims, and such rules, regulations and procedures may not be questioned by anyone, including the Court, which has the responsibility of administering the law.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that it does not have the jurisdiction, power or authority to rule on the constitutionality of the Court of Claims Law.

Therefore this Court cannot pass on the constitutionality of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 37, pars. 439.22 — 1 and 439.22— 2. Since the constitutionality of the Court of Claims Act is not subject to ruling by this Court the Act as drafted must stand and the six-month notice requirement is binding on this Claimant.

Even if this Court could rule on the constitutionality of the challenged victims of the Act the Supreme Court of Illinois has found the six-month notice requirement of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. Ill 2/3, par. 341 (applying to the Chicago Transit Authority) constitutional and not violative of equal protection. Fujimura v. Chicago Transit Authority (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 506, 368 N.E.2d 105. In Fujimura that Court found that the difference between the six-month notice of claim applicable to suits against the Chicago Transit Authority and the one-year requirements applicable to other local government units did not deny equal protection. See also, Reposky v. Chicago Transit Authority (1973), 9 Ill. App. 2d 897, 293 N.E.2d 440, 443. The reasoning of the Courts in Fujimura and Reposky would apply to the claim of denial of equal protection raised in the instant case.

The admitted failure of the Claimant to file the required statutory notice bases the prosecution of her claim and requires dismissal of her complaint with prejudice.

It is hereby ordered that the motion of the Respondent to dismiss be, and the same is hereby granted, and the cause is dismissed with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1310
    James L. Gray, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed September 13, 1979.

    James L. Gray, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This is a claim brought by Claimant, an inmate of Stateville Correctional Center, for loss of compensatory pay while wrongfully placed in segregation.

In April 1975, Claimant was assigned to work as a bricklayer. He was thereafter placed in segregation and denied pay for the months of September, October and November 1975.

Subsequently, the institution’s Administrative Review Board found that the segregation and loss of pay were wrongful, which finding was concurred in by the department director.

The departmental report shows that Claimant was to be entitled to $20.00 per month for compensation for the months of September, October and November 1975.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $60.00 for the three months of wrongful loss of pay.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1343
    Lola Krotser, Administrator of the Estate of Steven Krotser, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 29, 1980.

    Lee Phillip Forman, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (John R. Fanone, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

The Claimant, Lola Krotser, seeks a recovery based upon tort against the Respondent through the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, for the death of her son Steven.

Both the Claimant and Respondent have entered into the joint stipulation of facts which follow:

Steven Krotser was born August 15,1968, and sometime thereafter suffered serious physical impairment which required placing him under the care of the Respondent.

1. The Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities assumed the care and treatment of Steven Krotser in 1971. He was placed at Lincoln Center and on February 19, 1975, he was transferred from Lincoln Center to William W. Fox Developmental Center in Dwight, Illinois.

2. While at Fox Center a conventional child’s wheelchair was acquired for Steven’s use. Over a period of time, based upon recommendations of doctors, nurses, technicians, and therapists, that wheelchair was altered and modified to meet the specific and individual needs of Steven Krotser. Based upon the written report of Claimant’s wheelchair expert and based upon the report and discovery deposition of Respondent’s wheelchair expert, said chair, with its design changes and modifications, was safe for its intended use and specifically safe for the use of Steven Krotser.

3. On March 1, 1980, Steven Krotser was fed, and placed in his wheelchair awaiting his turn for bathing. Another patient was brought to the bathing area first, leaving Steven Krotser unattended for a short period of time. Later Steven was discovered slumped down in the wheelchair strangling by the upper chest belt. The medical staff made prompt and proper attempts to resuscitate Steven Krotser, to no avail.

4. Based upon the beforementioned expert reports, Steven Krotser would not have been able to slip down in his wheelchair if the lap belt was securely in place. Furthermore, based upon the physical condition of Steven Krotser, and the design of the wheelchair, the experts’ opinions indicate that it would have been impossible for Steven Krotser to unbuckle or loosen the lap belt himself. The instrumentalities which caused Steven Krotser’s death were at all times in the exclusive control of Respondent.

5. Based upon the above stipulated facts Respondent agreed to the entry of an award of $23,126.37 less the set-off as stated below:

At the time of Steven Krotser’s death his family pursuant to the financial responsibility statutes of the State of Illinois were indebted to Respondent for the care and treatment of Steven.

A judgment had been entered based upon said debt in the amount of $4,323.04 in Municipal Department of Cook County case number 77M1145857, and from the time of that judgment until his death, an additional $803.33 obligation was incurred, resulting in a total unpaid balance of $5,126.37.

The parties agreed that the unpaid obligation of $5,126.37 shall act as a set-off against the agreed settlement of $23,126.37, resulting in a net award to Claimant in the amount of $18,000.00.

In the case of Mazurch v. State of Illinois (1975), 30 Ill. Ct. Cl. 247, also involving mental health, the Court addressed itself to a similar legal situation at page 250:

“At all times the instrumentalities which caused the injury were under the exclusive control of Respondent, and the injury is one which ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence. This is, therefore, a proper case for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which allows proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning the cause of an injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the respondent.”

The Court has reviewed the facts set forth in the joint stipulation and considered the legal conclusions. It appears that the stipulation is accurate, thorough, and that it has been entered into legitimately. It also appears that the facts agreed upon are legally sufficient to sustain Claimant’s cause of action and the granting of an award would be fair and consistent with the findings.

While the Court is necessarily limited, in its findings of fact, to those facts presented to it by the parties, it is not bound by a stipulation between the parties as to the amount of an award to be granted, just as it is not bound by such a stipulation in its findings of law.

It is the opinion of the Court, however, that based upon the undisputed facts before it that the Respondent is liable to the Claimant.

The Court is also of the opinion that an award of $23,126.37, less a set-off of $5,126.37, is fair and reasonable compensation for the losses suffered by Claimant.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $23,126.37 be awarded Claimant, less a set-off of $5,126.37, resulting in a net award of $18,000.00.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1359
    The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed February 19, 1980.

   Holderman, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of the Respondent, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, having reviewed the departmental report submitted pursuant to Rule 14 of this Court, this Court finds as follows:

1. The departmental report previously submitted into the record pursuant to Rule 14 of this Court stands as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

2. The funds, Federal/State matching grant #1778D, totalling $259,779.00 were received for a period covering September 1975 through June 1977 and the expenditures from this grant totally dissipated the grant. This Court in the case of the City of Carbondale v. State of Illinois, 76-CC-2336, recently ruled in an analogous case that unless Federal funds are available or unless State funds having been appropriated were sufficient upon the lapsing of the fund, this Court may not indulge in deficiency appropriating to correct the deficiency.

3. There were no Federal funds available nor were there matching State funds available at the time of the lapsing of the funded period out of which this obligation could have been paid.

It is, therefore, ordered that this case be and the same is hereby dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1406
    Harry A. Dougan, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 21, 1980.

   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the stipulation of the Respondent and the Court being fully advised in the premises finds that this is a claim for bonus payment pursuant to Amended Section 11.00 of the Department of Personnel Pay Plan.

Section 11.00 as amended reads as follows:

“Those employees on the payroll as of June 30,1977 who were at Step 5 or 6 with 12 months or more creditable service as of December 1, 1976 shall receive a single payment equal to the value of a step increase multiplied by the number of months, commencing December 1, 1976 and ending June 30, 1977, in which they remained on Step 5 or 6. Creditable service dates will be changed to reflect that, as of December 1, 1976, employees on Step 5 or 6 with 12 months creditable service were advanced to the next higher step.”

In opinion S-1285, the Attorney General rendered his opinion as to the applicability and validity of Section 11.00 at the request of the Comptroller. In part that opinion states as follows:

“Section 11.00 became effective on June 30,1977. All payments provided for in the section are effective on or after June 30. In order to receive these payments employees must be on the State payroll on either June 30 or July 1, depending on the type of payment. It is obvious that the payments in section 11.00 are not intended to remunerate employees for past services. For example, the $100.00 payment is made to all affected employees on July 1, even though they may have no prior service. While the five percent payments and step increase payments provided for in the first and second paragraphs of section 11.00 are conditioned on the fact that some service was rendered prior to June 30 or July 1, employees who were on the payroll during this time, but who no longer are, receive no payments under this provision.
The director of the Department of Personnel, under section 8a of the Personnel Code, has authority to establish a pay plan. This is what the director has done. The prior service criterion for determination of the amount of pay may be viewed similarly to prior service requirements for longevity or step increases. Prior service or past experience is a well recognized criterion for determining basic salary and pay increases. While a lump sum payment is not a traditional form of a pay increase, it is within the range of the Director’s discretionary power to establish a pay plan.”

Therefore, this Court grants this Claimant an award of $287.00 with appropriate additions for employer contributions to employee retirement and/or FICA and appropriate deductions and withholdings for employee contributions to employee retirement and/or FICA and State and Federal taxation.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1518
    Joseph M. Krause, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed December 28, 1979.

   POCH, J.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Respondent’s motion and the Court being fully advised in the premises finds as follows:

1. That Rule 14 of the Court of Claims states that all records maintained in the regular course of business by any department, and any departmental reports made by any officer thereof relating to a matter pending before this Court shall be prima facie evidence to the facts stated therein.

2. That the departmental report issued by the Department of Public Aid, and the memorandum of August 25, 1978, issued by the director of personnel states that the Claimant, as a Technical Advisor II, was employed under a classification not covered by any bargaining unit agreement eligible for payment or this salary increase.

3. That Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 145, states that no additional sum shall be paid to any employee which would constitute payment for work already performed and for which remuneration has already been made except wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based on the effective date of a bargaining agreement.

4. That the departmental report issued by the Illinois Department of Public Aid and the memorandum issued by the director of the Department of Personnel on August 25, 1978, are prima facie evidence that the Claimant was not a member of a bargaining unit eligible for any payment.

5. That Claimant’s claim does not come under the exception noted in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 127M, par. 145.

It is, therefore, ordered that the motion of the Respondent be granted and the claim is hereby dismissed.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1560
    Rayburn Rhodes, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 8, 1979.

    Rayburn Rhodes, pro se, for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

In the case of John J. Beard v. State of Illinois, 78-CC-1385, the Respondent stipulated, in part as follows:

“This case arises out of an RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The effective dates of the agreement are July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1979. The relevant provision is found in Article XXXIII, Section 4 on page 62 of the Agreement which reads as follows:
‘All employees in the bargaining unit shall receive a lump sum payment of $10.00 per month for each $10,000,000.00 “excess” of actual revenues over projections as determined under Section 3, up to a maximum of $50.00 per month (a maximum payment of $600.00 for the year).
Any such payment shall be applied retroactively to all employees for all time paid during Fiscal Year 1978, and the monthly increase shall be added to the base rates for all classifications and steps set out in Appendix A, effective July 1,1978. Employees not on the active payroll for the full 12 months of FY 1978 shall be entitled to the lump sum retroactive payment on a pro-rated basis. Any employee who has voluntarily quit or been discharged during FY 1978 will be required to make claim for retroactive payments due within 60 days of the end of the Fiscal Year to the employer.’
Pursuant to said Article XXXIII, Section 4 the employees’ union demanded a lump sum payment to the employees. The Department resisted the amount of the increase demanded and the matter was eventually settled by an arbitrator who ruled that $40.00 per month was to be paid retroactively to each employee for each month of service served during the Fiscal Year 1978. Subsequently, the 80th General Assembly passed House Bill 3237 which provided the funds for the payment of the retroactive lump sum payment to the employees.
The issues before this Court are as follows:
1. Does Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, prohibit the retroactive pay envisioned by Article XXXIII, Section 4 of RC 14 Collective Bargaining Agreement?
2. May the director of personnel agree to and abide by an arbitrator’s decision?
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145 paraphrased provides in essential part as follows:
‘Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State, ° " °, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll * * ° which payment would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments made pursuant to the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.’
In view of the fact that the retroactive pay provided for in the collective bargaining agreement was based upon the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement, the relevant section does not violate 111. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145.
As to the second issue, as to whether the Director of Personnel has the authority to agree to and abide by arbitration, Respondent would like to point out the following. Nowhere in the personnel code is the director given the authority to delegate or relegate his powers or responsibilities to determine or negotiate working conditions, etc. However, as set forth earlier, the facts in this claim are that the General Assembly passed an appropriation bill for the sole purpose of the payment of this lump sum retroactive payment to these employees, thereby ratifying and thereby validating by subsequent legislation the actions of the director of personnel and making moot the question as to his authority to submit to arbitration.
The Claimant in the instant case, John Heard, was employed by the Department of Public Aid during Fiscal Year 1978 from July 20, 1977 to January 31, 1978 as a Clerk II, á classification on the RC-14 bargaining unit. Inasmuch as this Claimant was not in active status for all twelve months of Fiscal Year 1978, Article XXXIII Section 4 of the RC 14 contract agreement provides that such employees are entitled only to a lump sum retroactive payment on a prorata basis for the number of months worked contingent upon their making claim for the retroactive benefits within 60 days of the end of Fiscal Year 1978.
This Claimant filed his claim on October 6,1978 (not within the original 60 days), however, the director of personnel extended the filing date to October 14,1978.”

This Court adopts the comments of the Respondent, in the above situation, insofar as the Beard case is analogous to the present case, as the position of this Court on the law.

The Claimant in this instant case, Rayburn Rhodes, was employed by the Department of Public Aid. This Claimant, as was Mr. Beard, was employed for only a portion of the period of the retroactive benefits and is, therefore, entitled to only a pro-rata payment.

Accordingly, there is hereby awarded to Claimant the amount of $380.00 plus the State’s contribution to the State Employees’ Retirement System and the F.I.C.A. From the aforesaid award to Claimant there shall be deducted amounts for the Claimant’s contributions to the State Employees’ Retirement System and to F.I.C.A.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1658
    Richard Gramley, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 27, 1979.

    Richard Gramley, pro se, for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This is a claim for retroactive salary adjustment based on the facts as set forth in the narrative submitted by the Claimant as follows:

“I began employment with the former Department of Public Safety in February of 1969. On August 1, 1975 I received a superior performance increase to Step 6 ($1,863.00 monthly) of pay grade 21 (position title — Assignment Coordinator II). I received no adjustments in salary until February 16,1977, at which time I was reallocated to Executive IV, Pay Grade 23, Step 5 ($1,937.00). However, an amended pay plan went into effect on July 1, 1977, which applied retroactively to December 1,1976. One provision of this amended pay plan specified that persons in Step 5 or 6 of their Pay Grade who had been on that step for 12 months or longer as of December 1, 1976, must be given a one step increase. Because I had been in Step 6 of Pay Grade 21 for 17 months as of December 1, 1976, this provision applied to me. Therefore, I should have been compensated at the rate of $1,950 beginning December 1, 1976, instead of $1,863.00, a difference of $87.00 per month. Also, this additional money should have been paid for January of 1977, and for one pay period of February of 1977, for a total of $217.50 for the two and one-half month period.”

A joint stipulation submitted by the parties for $1,176.00 is based on the following statement of the law. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 145, provides in part as follows:

“Amounts paid from appropriations for personal service of any officer or employee of the State, 0 ” °, shall be considered as full payment for all services rendered between the dates specified in the payroll or other voucher and no additional sum shall be paid 0 ** ° which payments would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made, except that wage payments “ ° ° based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement between the State, or a State agency and an employee group shall not be construed as an additional payment for work already performed.”

In July of 1977, there were negotiations culminating in the adoption of a collective bargaining agreement known as RC-14-OCB between the State of Illinois and the Department of Personnel pertaining to all recognized collective bargaining units subject to the personnel code and whose vouchers were subject to approval by the Department of Finance. Simultaneously the director of personnel promulgated significant changes in the pay plans for code employees subject to the “Schedule of Salary Grades”. These significant changes in the pay plan were identical with corresponding provisions in the RC-14 agreement. The purpose of the change in the pay plan was to equalize all employees whether members of a union, whether members of a recognized collective bargaining unit or nonmembers of either. The pay plan provisions were to affect all employees subject to the “Schedule of Salary Grades” and were to become effective simultaneously with the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement. The purpose here was to equalize all State employees, granting to all equal benefits to those negotiated by the union negotiators for their members. The provision in question is found in Section 6 of Article XXXIII of the RC-14 contract. The benefits provided by this section are those set out in the Claimant’s narrative of benefits to which his complaint alleges him to be entitled.

The prohibition against retroactive salary adjustments found in Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, above quoted, raises a two pronged question as to the eligibility of this Claimant for a back salary award. The first question is whether an award can be granted to anyone for a period of time prior to the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement. The answer to this question is an obvious no, inasmuch as such a payment “would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made”, which payment would not be “based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement.”

The second question to be dealt with has to do with whether or not an individual employee must be either a union member or a member of a recognized collective bargaining unit. A careful examination of the prohibition contained in Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145 fails to reveal any requirement that an employee actually be a member of the union or that he actually be a member of a collective bargaining unit. The requirement is that the retroactive salary adjustment be “based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement.”

The director of personnel is mandated by statute to prepare rules and regulations and to promulgate a pay plan to be uniformly applied to all employees subject to the personnel code. He is also granted the authority to negotiate wages and working conditions. Having negotiated the wages and working conditions, there appears to be statutory authority for the promulgation of the pay plan to be universally applied. This Court does not deny the director’s right to promulgate a pay plan which would rectify a situation which would otherwise deny to one employee the benefits granted through the collective bargaining negotiations on behalf of another employee.

Although this Claimant is not in a “recognized exclusive bargaining unit”, he is, nevertheless, “subject to the Schedule of Salary Grades” and is, therefore, subject to the pay plan provisions set forth in the director of personnel’s memorandum of July 7, 1977, and July 25, 1977 both of which are attached to the joint stipulation as Exhibits “A” and “B”, respectively. Having established the right to benefits pursuant to the pay plan, the ultimate question is the extent of the benefits to be awarded. As stated above the collective bargaining agreement carried an effective date of July 1,1977. Therefore, any benefits to be derived by any person whether union member, nonunion member, member of a collective bargaining unit or otherwise must be “based upon the effective date” of the collective bargaining agreement. It should be noted that there is no prohibition in the statute against step adjustments being altered to reflect a retroactive recognition. The only prohibition is against retroactive compensation. Therefore, it follows that the step adjustments can be reflected in an employee’s service record but carry with them no retroactive compensation that can be recognized other than prospectively from the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement upon which the benefits are based. Therefore, the Court recognizes the step increases granted to the Claimant but subject only to retroactive salary adjustments back to July 1, 1977. The amount of compensation due this Claimant is, therefore, correctly stated in the joint stipulation of the parties and amounts to $98.00 per month for the period of time from July 1, 1977, through June 30, 1978, for a total amount of $1,176.00 with no compensation due prior to July 1, 1977.

It is, therefore, ordered that this Claimant is hereby awarded the amount of $1,176.00 subject to appropriate additions for retirement and F.I.C.A. and withholdings.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-1676
    Geoffrey Cornog, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed December 13, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

The record in this cause indicated that the purpose of the claim is for reimbursement for Claimant’s property which was lost while in the proper possession of the Respondent. The record also indicates that the Attorney General has entered into a stipulation based on the information forwarded to his office by the attorney for the Board of Regents of the Regency Universities as is evidenced by the letter marked Exhibit A attached to the stipulation. Furthermore, there is attached to the stipulation, marked Exhibit B, a bill of particulars submitted to the Respondent by the Claimant which lists the items lost and their reasonable value.

Accordingly, this Court finds that this is a proper claim, and the values given are reasonable, usual and customary for the items lost. No part of this claim has been paid and the total sum outstanding is $354.49.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be awarded, in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause, the sum of $354.49.


text:
    (No. 78-CC-2073
    Roosevelt Braswell, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed June 25, 1980.

   Roe, C. J.

A complaint has been filed by Roosevelt Braswell, who was a certified employee in the Illinois Department of Mental Health, for $56.25 which represented a pay differential between the straight time rate for one holiday worked, and the double time rate to which Claimant alleges entitlement. The Department paid claimant the equivalent of the straight time rate based upon the provision of Rule 3 — 200 and Rule 3 — 220 of the personnel code, which was authorized pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 63bl08, and these rules have the force and effect of law. Claimant alleges entitlement to double time pay for one holiday worked based upon the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. VI, Sec. 6.4(E) effective July 1, 1977, which authorized union employees to elect to receive double time pay for working legal holidays.

The issue before the Court is what provision will prevail when there is a conflict between a collective bargaining contract and rules of the Department of Personnel. The rules, pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 127, par. 63b 108, have the force and effect of law, and are binding as if made directly by the Legislature. City of Chicago v. Bullis, 77 N.E. 575, 221 Ill. 379. Any contract provision which is in conflict with existing law cannot prevail, and, is invalid.

The Personnel Rule 3 — 200 and Rule 3 — 220 specifically provided for equivalent time off or an additional vacation day which also amounts to equivalent time off. Article VI, Section 6.4(E), of the Collective Bargaining Agreement effective July 1, 1977 provided for union employees to secure double time pay for working holidays, which is in direct conflict with the rules of the Department of Personnel which still affect all civil service employees whether union members or non-union members.

It is therefore the opinion of this court that the claim for double time pay should be denied, and it is the order of this Court that the complaint herein should be dismissed with prejudice.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0067
    Sheila L. Arth, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed August 15, 1979.

    Sheila L. Arth, pro se, for Claimant.
    William L. Scott, Attorney General (William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This is a claim for retroactive salary based upon a reconsideration opinion as a result of the Claimant’s request for a job reallocation. The original request for audit and reallocation was denied by the agency and in April of 1978 the Claimant filed a request for reconsideration with the Department of Personnel. The procedure involving a reconsideration is commonly referred to as a fourth level grievance procedure and is governed by Rule 1 — 30 of the Department of Personnel rules as interpreted by the director of the Department of Personnel. The procedure under Rule 1 — 30 is for the back pay to be granted retroactive to the date of application for reconsideration.

This case is analogous to the situation that was brought before this Court in the case of Claire Crawford v. State of Illinois, 77-CC-1790, in that the claim is for retroactive salary back to the date of the application for reconsideration. In Claire Crawford (supra) this Court held that the retroactive salary was not prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, which generally prohibits back pay except in cases involving the application of the prevailing rate principle or based upon the effective date of a collective bargaining agreement. This case happens to be neither of the above but as in Claire Crawford (supra) we find that the fact that the Claimant was paid at a rate less than that called for by the duties being performed by the Claimant takes it out of the prohibition of Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, in that the retroactive payment would not be a payment which “would constitute in fact an additional payment for work already performed and for which remuneration had already been made” which is prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145.

Therefore, inasmuch as this retroactive salary payment is not prohibited by Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 127, par. 145, and it is not in violation of Rule 1 — 30 as interpreted by the director of personnel, we hereby grant an award to this Claimant in the amount of $116.00 subject to the appropriate additions and withholdings as required by the State Employees’ Retirement System, F.I.C.A. and State and Federal income tax requirements.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0072
    Marshall Mulis, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed September 7, 1979.

   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the stipulation of the Respondent and the Court being fully advised in the premises find that the State of Illinois wrongfully held over the occupancy of the premises previously under lease for a three month period in May, June and July of 1978. We further find that under the law of the State of Illinois set forth in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 80, par. 1 that the owner of lands may sue for and recover rents therefore, for a fair and reasonable satisfaction for the use and occupancy thereof in cases where the lands are held and occupied by any person without any special agreement for rent. This statute applies directly in the situation now before this Court and we find that in the absence of an agreed monthly rental, the Claimant is entitled to a reasonable rent or a satisfaction for the occupancy. We further find that the Bureau of Employment Security and the Claimant agreed to the reasonableness of $13,750.00 for the rental of the premises in question for the months of May, June and July, 1978. We find this to be reasonable rent, having been agreed to by the parties.

Claimant is therefore awarded the amount of $13,750.00.


text:
    (No. 79-CC-0084
    Marietta Hamilton, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1980.

   Per Curiam.

The record indicates that the damages in this matter occurred when employees of the State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, were removing a tree from a parking lot of the Lincoln Developmental Center. In the process of the removal, the tree fell on Claimant’s car causing the damages which are the subject of this complaint.

The record also indicates that the Attorney General has submitted a stipulation by Respondent.

Claimant has submitted billings which indicate what the reasonable, customary and usual amount of these damages were.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant be awarded, in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois under the above captioned cause, the sum of $1,717.00.