text:
    (No. 75-CV-172
    Evelyn Williams, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    Evelyn Williams, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on August 15, 1974, at 2456 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois. Evelyn Williams, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Evelyn Williams, age 51, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on August 15,1974, the claimant was shot twice during a robbery at Eiland’s Liquors, 2456 West Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, her place of employment.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from August 15,1974, to August 30,1974, and received treatment for injuries sustained in the shooting. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is contained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this Opinion by reference.

5. That the two assailants have not been identified or apprehended. The case remains under investigation by the Chicago Police Department.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and her assailants were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding her injuries were $584.29, but earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of earnings, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

". . . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

That, based on this formula, the loss of income sustained by the claimant due to lost work days totals $2,000.00. [Four months loss of time.]

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of pecuniary loss as computed before setoffs and deductions is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$4,963.35
2) Anesthesia ...................................$ 190.00
3) X-Rays ......................................$ 149.00
4) Orthopedics...................................$ 450.00
5) Medical......................................$ 830.00
6) Loss of salary .................................$2,000.00
$8,582.35

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State, or Federal funds or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefits of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the claimant received no benefits from other sources, as contemplated by Sec. 7 (d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in ¶9, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant as $8,382.35.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $8,382.35 be awarded to the claimant, Evelyn Williams, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 75-CV-182
    Michael Peterson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    Michael Peterson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on September 8,1974, near Dam 1 of the Forest Preserve in Wheeling, Illinois. Michael Peterson, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims’ Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stats., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Michael Peterson, age 26, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on September 8, 1974, the claimant was beaten and robbed in the Wheeling Forest Preserve by two men that he had met a few minutes earlier in the Foremost Liquors Tavern, Wheeling.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries for which he was hospitalized. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That one of the two assailants, Daniel Krueger, was convicted of Aggravated Battery in the Arlington Heights Court on October 15,1974, (Indictment #74-VC-254806). The other assailant has. not been identified.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding his injury were $464.00.

9. That the victim, as a result of his injuries, was unable to work during the period of September 8, 1974, through October 7, 1974, a period of one month. In accordance with the statutory limit of compensation of $500 per month, the victim is entitled to $464.00.

10. That in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

1) Hospital.......................................$553.50
2) Radiologists....................................$ 48.00
3) Doctors........................................$100.00
$701.50

11. That there is no evidence that claimant has received any compensation from local, state or federal funds, or insurance of any kind, but that claimant was awarded $250.00 circuit court ordered restitution from assailant. [Arlington Heights Court]

12. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $250.00. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in ¶9 and ¶10 leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the claimant of $715.50.

13. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of this act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $715.50 (Seven Hundred Fifteen Dollars And Fifty Cents) be immediately paid to the claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime, from the Court of Claims fund as a complete payment of the total amount of this award.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-198
    Laurel Beth Marmel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    Laurel Beth Marmel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on April 27, 1974, in a parking lot near 2237 N. Sheffield Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Lauren Beth Marmel, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71 et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based on these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Laurel Beth Marmel, age 22, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, See. 12-4).

2. That on April 27, the claimant was stabbed several times after having been propositioned by her assailant.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from April 28, 1974, to May 5,1974, and received treatment for injuries sustained in the stabbing. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant has not been identified or apprehended. The investigation of the case has been suspended by the Chicago Police Dept.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and her assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and the claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding her injuries was $700.00, but earnings of only $500.00 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of earnings, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of The Act:

. . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim is average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.”

That, based on this provision, the claimant’s compensable losses due to a month of lost work days may be determined to total $500.00.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1. Hospital......................................$2,661.55
2. Medical...................................... 494.00
3. Loss of Salary................................. 500.00
$3,655.55

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of The Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments, or awards, payable under the ’Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State, or Federal funds, or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000.00) Twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from her loss, as contemplated by Sec. 7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $3,060.62. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in |9, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $394.93.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $394.93 be awarded to the claimant, Laurel Beth Marmel, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-45
    Gaspar Rodriguez, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 6, 1975.

    Gaspar Rodriguez, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 1, 1974, at 3935 West Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Gaspar Rodriguez, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based on these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Gaspar Rodriguez, age 47, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2 (c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on March 1, 1974, the claimant was shot in the neck during a robbery attempt at the "El Tanampa” club, 3935 West Chicago Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

3. That the victim was hospitalized from March 1, 1974, to March 13, 1974, and received treatment for injuries sustained in the shooting. A further , and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

4. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and the claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the investigation.

5. That the assailant has not been identified or apprehended. The investigation of the case remains open.

6. That statements, taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

7. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

8. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his injuries were $585.98, but earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of earnings, pursuant to the following provision in Sec. 4 of the Act:

. . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim is average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.”

That the claimant has demonstrated that, due to injuries sustained in the incident, he missed 18 days of work. By using the court-accepted method of computing lost wages — Number of lost work days (18) multiplied by the average monthly income ($500) divided by the average number of days in a month (30.4) — the claimant’s compensable losses due to lost work days may be determined to total $295.92.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$4,458.55
2) Medical......................................$1,457.00
3) Loss of salary .................................$ 295.92
4) Records......................................$ 3.00
$6,214.47

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments, or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State, or Federal funds, or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by Sec. 7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $5,758.85. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in ¶9, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $255.62.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $255.62 (Two Hunderd Fifty Five Dollars And Sixty Two Cents) be awarded to the claimant, Gaspar Rodriguez, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-41
    Tressa Young, on behalf of Michael Unger, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 6, 1975.

    Benjamin And Shapiro, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred November 5, 1973, at 116th & Lafayette Avenue, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Tressa Young, mother of the victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased son, Michael Unger, age 17, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1.)

2. That on November 5, 1973, at approximately 10:50 P.M., the victim was shot in the face and killed by the assailant, James J. Perry. The assailant had accused the victim of breaking into his house prior to the shooting. The victim denied he had anything to do with breaking into the assailant’s home.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any wrongful act or provocation by the claimant for the attack.

4. That the victim died on November 5, 1973 as a result of the injuries he received in the shooting. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

7. That the assailant has been identified as James Perry, Jr., of 11565 South Lafayette, Chicago, Illinois. He has been indicted for the murder of the victim and is scheduled for trial in Cook County Criminal Court, May 5, 1975, in the Courtroom of Judge Porter.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and loss of support.

9. That the victim was unemployed for a period of at least 6 months prior to his death and, therefore, no loss of support would be shown as a result of his death.

10. That the claimant has incurred expenses for the funeral and burial of the victim as a result of his death, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

Funeral.........................................$1,274.00’
Burial .......................................... 389.00
$1,663.00

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) . . . "shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

12. That, in the claim before us, the claimant has not received any benefits from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 119 and 10, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $1,463.00. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $1,463.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of One Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-Three ($1,463.00) Dollars be awarded to the claimant, Tressa Young, as mother of an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-122
    Matthew Bevens, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 6, 1975.

    Matthew Bivens, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred December 7, 1973, at 15267" Vincennes Road, Cook County, Phoenix, Illinois. Matthew Bivens, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Matthew Bivens, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on December 7, 1973, the claimant was shot in the chest by one of three men who were in the process of robbing a tavern at 15267 Vincennes Road, Phoenix, Illinois. Prior to the shooting, the claimant was doing some work in the back of the tavern.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence that the claimant’s injuries were in any way attributable to his wrongful act or the substantial provocation of his assailant.

4. That the claimant was transported by police ambulance to Ingalls Memorial Hospital in Harvey, Illinois where he was treated for his injuries by Dr. Frederick Weiss. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailants.

7. That three men have been charged with attempted murder of the claimant and armed robbery. One of them, Michael Anderson, has pled guilty and was sentenced to five years. The other two, Herman Perrian and Johnny Proctor are scheduled for trial May 28, 1975, in the Circuit Court of Cook County in the Courtroom of Judge Wendt.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation for hospital and medical expenses.

9. That the claimant has incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital ......................................$1,610.60
2) Medical................'...................... 220.00
3) Carfare/Outpatient treatment...................... 25.60
$1,856.20

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

11. That, in the claim before us, the claimant has not received benefits from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 1Í9, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $1,656.20. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $1,656.20.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $1,656.20 be awarded to the claimant, Matthew Bivens, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-150
    Esther J. Anderson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 6, 1975.

    Esther J. Anderson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 28,1974, at 11:00 p.m., at 5420 South Blackstone Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Esther Anderson, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "Act.”)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates these documents, and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Esther J. Anderson, age 67, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stats. 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on March 28, 1974, the claimant was beaten and robbed of her purse in the elevator of her apartment building at 2851 South King Drive, Chicago, Illinois, by an unidentified assailant.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries for which she was hospitalized, including a broken jaw, a broken nose, loss of eyesight to her left eye, a detached retina, facial nerve dysfunction, an orbital floor fracture, a left vitreous hemorrhage, and a dislocated lens. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related to sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. The assailant has not yet been identified, and the investigation is ongoing.

7. That the victim was fully paid during her absence from work. Therefore, she makes no claim for loss of earnings.

8. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses as a result of her injuries and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

1) Hospital (Michael Reese) ........................ $2,743.98
2) Radiologists .................................. 15.00
3) Doctors...................................... 990.00
4) Opticians .................................... 69.75
5) Dentist...................................... 20.00
6) Drugs....................................... 43.12
$3,881.85

9. That the claimant has received compensation from Blue Cross/Blue Shield in the amount of $2,629.33. She has not received any other insurance or disability benefits as a result of the injury.

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from her loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $2,629.33. This amount plus the statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in !8, leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the claimant of $1,052.52.

11. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of the act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $1,052.52 be awarded to the claimant, Esther Anderson, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-159
    Irene H. Miller, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 6, 1975.

    Irene H. Miller, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 8, 1974, at approximately 9:00 p.m. at 8152 South Kingston Avenue, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Irene Miller, claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims’ Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, §7, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on July 8,1974, at approximately 9:00 p.m., the assailant, Leon Stewart, came to the claimant’s house. An argument ensued and the assailant started beating the claimant. The claimant stated that in self-defense she picked up a knife and stabbed her assailant. The claimant then called the Chicago Police. A report was made by the Chicago Police Department, giving the name of Irene Miller of 8152 South Kingston, as the offender and Leon Stewart, also of 8152 South Kingston, as the victim. Neither party signed a complaint regarding this incident, and, therefore, no criminal charges were brought. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

2. That since the claimant has not signed a complaint, she has not cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

3. That the report of the Chicago Police Department shows that the assailant and the claimant were sharing the same household.

4. That the claimant has not met all the requirements of the Act.

Therefore, the Court finds that no compensation is authorized under the Act. Accordingly, this matter is closed.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-175
    Catherine Petty, on behalf of Timothy Petty, a minor, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 6, 1975.

    Catherine Petty, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on August 7, 1974, in a park at 52nd Street and Racing Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Catherine Petty, mother of the victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,’ Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the victim, Timothy Petty, age 17, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on August 7, 1974, the victim was stabbed in the back while walking through Sherman Park, 52nd Street and Racine Avenue.

3. That the victim was hospitalized from August 7, 1974, to August 9, 1974, and received treatment for injuries sustained in the stabbing. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

4. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the victim for the attack upon him.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and the claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the investigation of this case.

7. That the assailants have not been identified nor apprehended.

8. That the victim was unemployed during the 6 months preceding the incident, and thus he has incurred no loss of earnings, as he was a student at the time.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses on behalf of her son which were not covered by insurance benefits or benefits of any other kind, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital ..................................... $279.15
2) Medical...................................... 85.00
$364.15

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds, or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the claimant received no benefits from other sources as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in ¶9, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $164.15.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $164.15 be awarded to the claimant, Catherine Petty, as the mother of the minor, Timothy Petty, the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-176
    Corrine Gonzalez, on behalf of Roberto Gonzalez, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 6, 1975.

    Corrine Gonzalez, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred April 3, 1973 at 2625 West Cortland, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Corrine Gonzalez, wife of the victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70 §71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Roberto Gonzalez, husband of the claimant, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on April 3,1974, at approximately 10 p.m., the victim was beaten and stabbed to death by Gilberto Rodriguez when he went to Rodriguez’s apartment at 2625 West Cortland, to collect money owed to him by Rodriguez.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any wrongful act or provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him by Gilberto Rodriguez.

4. Victim’s body was discovered by police on April 4, 1974, in the trunk of his car. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. The assailant, Gilberto Rodriguez, has been indicted for the murder of the victim. At the trial, December 16, 1974, Rodriguez pled guilty and was sentenced from seven to twenty years.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses as follows:

Johnsons Mortuary
813 Diversey Parkway
Chicago, Illinois...................................$2,050.00

8. That in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7 (d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

9. That in the claim before us, claimant has not received any benefits from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7 (d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from -the gross amount of loss as calculated in paragraph seven (7), leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $1,850. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $1,850.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,850.00 (One Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Dollars) be awarded Corrine Gonzalez as the wife of an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-217
    Marie Landers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 6, 1975.

    Marie Landers, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on August 17, 1974, at 2630 North Clark, Chicago, Illinois. Marie Landers, a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "Aci”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Marie Landers, age 46, 917 West Dakin, Apt. 308, Chicago, Illinois, was a victim of a violent, crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, Ch. 38, §12-14).

2. That on August 17, 1974, the claimant was pushed off a 9-inch curb into the street by Donald Johnson, age 45, 538 Wrightwood, Chicago, Illinois.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries to her face and a broken wrist for which she received emergency first aid treatment at Illinois Masonic Medical Center and for which she received outpatient treatments for three months following her injury. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant, Donald Johnson was convicted of Aggravated Battery in the Cook County Criminal Court on October 15, 1974, (case #74-MC-692).

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and her assailant were related or were sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant was unable to work from August 17,1974, through November 21, 1974, a period of three months and three days. The claimant has not received any compensation for her lost wages. Her average monthly earnings for the six months prior to the injury were $231.85 per month. The Court accepted method for determining the wages lost is as follows: The total monthly wages ($231.85) divided by the number of days per month (30.4) and multiplied by the number of days missed (3) are then added to the monthly wages multiplied with the number of whole months of work missed (3). The total amount of lost income is therefore equal to the lost income for three months ($695.55) plus the lost income for three days ($22.89), or $718.44.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not and will not be reimbursed by any insurance or disability benefits. The gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

Hospital (Illinois Masonic Medical Center, Chicago, Illinois) . . . $292.75
Doctor (Louis Kolb, M.D., Chicago, Illinois)................$200.00
Optician (Lamar Tracy, Chicago, Illinois) .................$ 55.00
TOTAL MEDICAL EXPENSE ......................$542.75

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which a claimant is entitled, §7 (d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That in the claim before us, the claimant received no benefits whatsoever from other sources that may be deducted from her loss, as contemplated by §7 (d) of the Act. Therefore, after the statutory deduction of $200 is deducted from the gross amount of loss ($1,266.19) as calculated in ¶8 and ¶9, an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $1,066.19 is left.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,066.19 be awarded to the claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-173
    Bruce C. Levine, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Amended opinion filed May 7, 1975.

   Per Curiam.

This claim comes for rehearing upon the motion of the claimant pursuant to §9 of the "Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 70 §79 (hereafter referred to as ’’The Act”), under which a claim was made by the claimant and denied by this Court.

In that opinion, compensation for loss of earnings for the time of claimant’s disability as a result of his injury was denied pursuant to the standards set down by the General Assembly in §4 of the Act. In that section, the Act states that, "Loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.” The claimant being a student immediately prior to the injury had worked only two weeks during the six-month period. The court determined that this two weeks earnings was insufficient to project a loss of earnings for the time of the claimant’s disability.

However, re-evaluation of the legislative intent of this section, as interpreted by the Court, will permit loss of earnings for such employment when established by competent evidence. Upon investigation by the Attorney General, such competent evidence of lost earnings has been established by the claimant.

Accordingly, this Court hereby supplements and amends the order previously filed in this claim with this modified opinion.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, the original order made by this Court denying this claim; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates matters set forth in the application and petition. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Bruce C. Levine, age 25, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2 (c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Assault.” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-2).

2. That on June 23, 1974, the claimant was returning to his apartment after an errand. Upon reaching the second flight of the stairwell on his way to the third floor, he was confronted by his neighbor waving a hunting knife and threatening to kill him. The claimant, while trying to escape, fell down the stairs and broke his ankle. The claimant was taken to the Bethany Methodist Hospital, Chicago, and then to Billings Hospital, Chicago, where he received subsequent surgery and treatment. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators after the crime was committed, present no substantial evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the Chicago Police Department was contacted promptly. The claimant cooperated fully in the subsequent investigation and prosecution that led to the conviction of Daryl Griffin of Aggravated Assault on October 15, 1974, in Cook County under indictment #G-1190 515.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the period immediately preceding the injury were $640.00. Claimant was unable to work from July 1,1974, to September 30, 1974, a period of three months. Claimant’s loss of earnings for this period can be calculated to be $1,920.

7. That pursuant to §7 (d) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from the pecuniary loss to determine the basic compensable loss.

$1,920.00
- 200.00
$1,720.00

8. That when compensating loss of earnings the Court may only compensate up to $500.00 per month, pursuant to §4 of the Act. Claimant’s maximum allowable compensation for lost earnings for the period of his disability is $1,500.00.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses, but these expenses were paid completely by insurance benefits and are therefore not claimed.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,500.00 be awarded to the claimant, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-7
    Ninus Ushana, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Ninus Ushana, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on February 21, 1974, at Winnemac and Glen-wood Streets in Chicago. Ninus Ushana seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Ninus Ushana, age 21, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on February 21, 1974, at approximately 11:00 p.m., the claimant was riding in a car with two friends, Simon Pera and Ashour Badalpour, in the area of Glenwood and Winnemac when a 1969-70 brown Buick pulled up beside them, blocking their lane of traffic. After some obscenities were exchanged, both drivers and passengers got out of their cars. The driver of the Buick went back to his car, grabbed a baseball bat and struck the claimant. A fist fight ensued among all occupants of both cars.

When the fight was over, the claimant, who was unconscious, was driven to Edgewater Hospital by his friend, Ashour Badalpour. The assailants jumped in their car and sped away as the police approached the scene in response to a call of a disturbance in the area.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials. That claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance, but has not been able to make a positive identification of his assailants.

5. That the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the claimant was hospitalized at Edge-water Hospital from February 21, 1974, to March 4, 1974, where he was treated for swelling of the occipital region and a cerebral concussion.

7. That the claimant was unable to work as the result of his injury from February 22, 1974, until March 18, 1974, a total of 24 days. The claimant’s average earnings immediately preceding his injury was $616.42 per month.

That based on a 30.4 day month, claimant’s pro rata loss is $486.65. Claimant received $257.13 in the form of disability benefits which must be deducted from his actual loss. Therefore, claimant’s compensable loss is $229.55. This being less than the statutory maximum, the amount of $229.55 is totally compensable.

8. That the claimant has incurred medical, hospital expenses and loss of earnings as follows:

1) Hospital......................................$1,658.80
2) Doctor....................................... 400.00
3) Loss of Earnings............................... 229.55
$2,286.35

9. That the claimant received insurance benefits from the United Founders Insurance Company in the amount of $1,618.80 and is not entitled to additional compensation therefrom.

10. That in determining the amount of compensation to which the applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source . . .”

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00 and the insurance benefits of $1,618.80, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $467.55.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $467.55 (Four Hundred Sixty-Seven Dollars And Fifty-Five Cents) be awarded Ninus Ushana, as an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-18
    Diane Sheer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

      Diane Sheer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of a criminal battery on February 2, 1974, at 11:15 a.m. at 38th & Caseyville Avenues, East St. Louis, Illinois. Diane Sheer seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stats., 1973, ch. 70, par. 71, et seq. (Hereafter referred to as the "Act”.)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates the matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant was a victim of a violent crime covered under the Act, to wit:

"Battery”, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973, Ch. 38, Par. 12-3.

2. A detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in an Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file is this matter and the facts as reported herein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That said crime occurred at 11:15 a.m. at 38th & Caseyville Avenues, East St. Louis, Illinois, at which time claimant was struck in the mouth by the assailant.

4. That said crime wás reported to East St. Louis City Police promptly and claimant at all times has cooperated with law enforcement officials.

5. That the assailant, Alfonso Hughes, pled guilty to battery in St. Clair County on April 16, 1975.

6. Claimant, as indicated by the report of the Attorney General, did not provoke the incident nor is the incident a result of any wrongful conduct of the claimant.

7. Claimant is not a relative or a member of the same household as the assailant.

8. Claimant has suffered pecuniary loss in excess of $200 compensable by Section 74 of the Act, to wit:

Dental .............................................$626
Hospital ........................................... 78
$704

9. Claimant has not received nor is she entitled to any sums of money as a result of this injury which would be considered a set-off of any award.

10. Pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Par. 71, this Court must deduct the first $200 in expenses.

11. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of this Act and the claim is, therefore, compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $504.00 be awarded Diane Sheer as a victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-37
    Eddie Norman, on behalf of Patricia M. Norman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Eddie Norman, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 24, 1974, in the 1400 block of West 64th Street, Chicago, Illinois. Eddie Norman, the victim’s mother, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s minor daughter, Patricia M. Norman, age 16, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

“Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1972, ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on March 24, 1974, the victim was shot in the 1400 block of West 64th Street, Chicago, while walking to church.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the victim for the attack upon her.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from March 24, 1974, to March 29, 1974, and received treatment for injuries sustained in the shooting. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is contained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this Opinion by reference.

5. That the Chicago Police Department has arrested Kent Richardson, 6638 South Bishop, Chicago, Illinois, and Johnny, Johnson, 6509 Marshfield Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Richardson has been subsequently discharged, but Johnny Johnson was indicted in Cook County on a charge of Aggravated Battery (Indictment No. 74-2959). He is presently awaiting trial.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and her assailants were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant and the victim have fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of this case.

8. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses as a result of her daughter’s injuries which were partially covered by Public Aid and the gross amount of pecuniary loss as computed before setoffs and deductions is as follows:

1) Hospital.......................................$664.90
2) Medical ....................................... 121.90
$786.80

9. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from her loss were shown to be in the total sum of $229.80 as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act. The statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 118, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant as $357.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $357.00 be awarded to the claimant, Eddie Norman, as the mother of a minor child, Patricia M. Norman, the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-37
    Emma B. Ruehl, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Emma B. Ruehl, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on June 10,1974, in a parking lot at 7601 South Cicero Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Emma B. Ruehl, the victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat, 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the victim, Emma B. Ruehl, age 81, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on June 10, 1974, the victim was knocked to the ground during a purse-snatching attempt at the Ford City Shopping Center parking lot, 75th Street and Cicero Avenue.

3. That the victim was hospitalized from June 10, 1974, to July 4,1974, and received treatment for injuries sustained in her fall. She also received post-operative care at a nursing home. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated by this opinion by reference.

4. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the victim for the attack upon her.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and her assailant were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and the claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the investigation of this case.

7. That the assailant has not been identified nor apprehended.

8. That the victim was not employed during the 6 months preceding the incident, and thus has incurred no loss of earnings.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits or benefits of any other kind, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$3,775.61
2) Medical......................................$1,175.00
$4,950.61

10. That in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State of Federal funds, or from any other source (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits, and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the claimant received medicare benefits in the amount of $3,759.61, and insurance payments from CNA Insurance totalling $240.00, and from the Prudential Insurance Company totalling $573.00. These amounts, plus the statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in ¶9, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $178.00.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $178.00 (One Hundred And Seventy Eight Dollars) be awarded to the claimant, Emma B. Ruehl, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-64
    Helen Niemotka, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Helen Niemotka, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on May 22,1974, at 2234 West Cortez, Chicago, Illinois. Helen Niemotka, a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents atid other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Helen Niemotka, age 54, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38 §12-3).

2. That on May 22, 1974, the claimant was thrown down a flight of stairs while she was being robbed at 2234 West Cortez in Chicago. After a foot chase, the offenders were apprehended.

3. That statements taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of provocation by the victim for the attack upon her.

4. That the victim was hospitalized on May 22, 1974, as a result of the incident. A further and more detailed investigation considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and her assailant were related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. The criminal prosecution is presently continuing.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of earnings as a result of her injuries.

8. That the victim was unable to work during the period of May 23, 1974, to July 1, 1974, as a result of her injuries; that the sustained loss of earnings during this period is in the amount of $700.00, based on her average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding her injury. This amount is compensable pursuant to the following provision in §4 of the Act:

"Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

The amount of actual loss of earnings sustained by the claimant is greater than $500 per month. In accordance with §4 of the Act, the $500 per month limit is controlling, and, using this rate for 22 days, the total compensable loss of earnings sustained by the claimant is $361.84.

9. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses and the gross amount of all pecuniary losses as computed before deductions and set-offs is as follows:

1) Loss of Earnings................................ $361.84
2) Medical....................................... 453.25
$797.09

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,” or from local government, State or Federal funds, or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

11. That in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be:

Gross Losses ..................................... $797.09
Less Statutory Deduction ........................... -200.00
Net Compensable Claim.............................. $597.09

It is to be noted that there was a deduction from the gross figure; this is the statutory deduction of $200. This leaves a total of $597.09 as the actual amount of loss sustained by the claimant. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $597.09.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $597.09 (Five Hundred Ninety Seven Dollars And Nine Cents) be awarded to the claimant, Helen Niemotka, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-70
    Calvin Johnson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Calvin Johnson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on January 5, 1974, at 1403 S. Mohawk, Chicago, Illinois. Calvin Johnson, age 27, of 1457 S. Hamlin, Chicago, Illinois, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates the matter set forth in the application. Based upon the documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant was a victim of a violent crime covered under Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 72, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4.

2. That said crime occurred at approximately 5:45 p.m. on January 5, 1974, at 1403 S. Mohawk, Chicago, Illinois, at which time claimant suffered a gunshot wound to the arm.

3. That said crime was reported to the Chicago Police Department immediately. Claimant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the investigation and prosecution of this case.

4. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

5. That the victim sustained numerous injuries to his arm that required two operations and extensive hospitalization. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

6. That the assailant, Willie Simmons, age 29, of 1368 N. Mohawk, Chicago, Illinois, was convicted of Aggravated Battery in the Cook County Criminal Court on July 26, 1974 (Indictment #74-3511).

7. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

8. That the Claimant incurred medical expenses which were partially covered by his Blue Cross and union insurance. The total medical expense is as follows:

HOSPITALIZATION
Henrotin Hospital (surgery),
Univ. of Illinois Medical Center (surgery)............$ 9,526.55
DOCTOR
Homer Graves, Skokie, Ill........................ 920.00
OUTPATIENT CARE
Union Health Service, Chicago, Ill.
(Riad Barmada, M.D.)........................... 583.00
$11,029.55

9. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000.00) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $10,109.55. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the total pecuniary loss as calculated in 1Í8 leaves a total unreimbursed medical loss of $720.00.

10. That the claimant’s average monthly earnings for the six (6) months immediately preceding his injury were $600.

11. That, as a result of his injuries, Claimant was unable to work from January 5, 1974, to April 5,1975, a period of sixteen (16) months. Claimant continues to be unable to work as of the date of this opinion. The claimant received disability benefits of $60.00 per month for six months. Thus, the loss of earnings for the first six months of his disability was $540.00 per month, and the loss of earnings for the following ten months was $600 per month. The maximum compensation for loss of earnings in one month is $500, pursuant to §4 of the Act. Therefore, the claimant is entitled to the maximum compensation of $500 per month for sixteen (16) months, or $8,000.00.

Furthermore, the claimant’s physician, Raid Barmada, M.D., has determined that the claimant will be unable to ever resume employment because he has permanently lost all use of his right hand as a result of his injuries. Therefore, it can reasonably be assumed that the claimant will be unable to work during the next four months. Taking $500 per month as his average compensable earnings, he is expected to lose at least another $2,000 in income. Thus., the Claimant will incur a total loss exceeding $10,000, the maximum statutory compensation.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000 be awarded to the Claimant, Calvin Johnson, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-78
    Jerome Slad, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Jerome Slad, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 17, 1974, at 309 East 51st Street, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Jerome C. Slad, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70 §71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Jerome Slad, age 29, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on March 17, 1974, claimant was shot while walking through a tavern.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no substantial evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries for which he was hospitalized and received surgery. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s filed in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailants have not been identified and the case is still pending.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. No evidence was presented to indicate that the claimant’s injuries were attributable to claimant’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailant.

9. That the victim’s total loss of wages can be determined by using the Court accepted method of calculating salary losses over a portion of a month average monthly income ($1,219) divided by the average number of days in a month (30.4) multiplied by the number of days out of work (14 days) to be $561.38. From this amount the statutory deduction of $200 pursuant to Section 7(d) of the Act is deducted leaving a resulting salary loss of $361.38. However, earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the maximum compensation allowable under the Act.

10. That, based upon the maximum allowable compensation of $500 per month and the Court accepted method of calculating salary losses over a portion of a month (maximum monthly compensation $500) divided by the average number of days in a month (30.4) multiplied by the number of days out of work (14 days) the claimant’s compensable losses due to lost work days may be determined to total $230.26.

11. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital (Provident) ............................$1,408.10
2) Medical......................................$ 765.00

12. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct. . . the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim.before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $2,173.10. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the claimant of $230.26.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $230.26 be awarded to the claimant, Jerome Slad, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-146
    Robert J. Sims, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Robert J. Sims, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

The claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on June 17, 1974, at 420 East 69th Street, Chicago, Illinois. Robert Sims, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stats., 1973, ch. 70, §71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act’).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Robert Sims, age 23, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on June 16, 1974, the claimant was shot by two unidentified assailants during the course of an attempted robbery as the claimant walked to the bus stop at 420 East 69th Street, Chicago.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained a gunshot wound to his left buttock for which he was hospitalized three times. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. As of this time, no assailants have been identified, and the police investigation has been suspended.

7. That the victim’s average monthly earnings as an employee of Presbyterian St. Lukes Hospital for six months immediately preceding his injury were $550.16.

8. That the victim, as a result of his injuries, was unable to work during the period of June 16, 1974, through September 16, 1974, a period of 3 months. The claimant received disability benefits from the John Hancock Insurance Company of. $300 per month. Thus, the claimant sustained a compensable loss of earnings of $250.16 per month for three months, or $750.48.

$ 750.48

9. That in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

1) Hospital (Jackson Park Hospital)..................$ 8,763.75
2) Doctor (George Gertz, M.D.)......................$ 1,670.00
$10,433.75
NONCOMPENSABLE PERSONAL AND
TELEPHONE CHARGES .......................-$ 5.40
$10,428.35

10. That the claimant has received insurance benefits from Blue Cross totalling $8,626.75. He is also insured through his employer with the Blue Cross Anchor Organization for Health Maintenance, and has received benefits of $1,670.00.

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $10,296.75. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 18 and 1Í9 leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the claimant of $682.08.

12. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of this Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $682.08 (Six Hundred Eighty-Two Dollars And Eight Cents) be immediately paid to the claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime, from the Court of Claims fund as a complete payment of the total amount of this award.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-148
    Lillie Barrage, on behalf of Edward Barrage, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Nicholas Zagone, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on November 17, 1973, at 6233 South Honoré, Chicago, Illinois, 60636. Lillie L. Burrage, wife of the deceased victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the “Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the “Act.”)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court, and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband, Edward Burrage, age 33, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder,” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1).

2. That on November 17, 1973, the claimant’s husband was shot in the basement of his home at 6233 South Honoré, Chicago, Illinois, 60636, during a robbery.

3. That the statements taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of any provocation or wrongful act on the part of the decedent.

4. That the victim died on November 17,1973, as a result of the wounds he received in the shooting of the same day. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant, Travis Porter, of 6306 South Hermitage, Chicago, Illinois, was indicted in Cook County on a charge of murder (Indictment #74-462). That he was subsequently found guilty and sentenced to 14 to 20 years.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was reported promptly to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of this case.

8. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act, for loss of support to herself and her child, Patricia Ann, age 8.

9. That at the time of his death, Edward Burrage was 33 years old, and had a life expectancy to age 67.2, according to Vital Statistics of the U.S. 1970, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare Public Health Service Mortality Table for the U.S. population. Therefore, we must conclude that the decedent’s family has lost his financial support for the remainder of his normal life expectancy, computed to be 34.2 years.

10. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding his death were $1,064.00, but earnings of only $500.00 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of support, pursuant to the following provision in §4 of the Act:

. . loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500.00 per month, whichever is less.”

11. That based upon the victim’s normal life expectancy of 34.2 years, and taking $500.00 per month as his average monthly earnings, the loss of support to his family is computed to be an amount far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded as compensation under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

12. That, in addition to loss of support, the claimant incurred funeral and medical expenses which were covered by insurance benefits and other compensation programs, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Funeral......................................$1,691.00
2) Medical...................................... 500.00
$2,191.00

13. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200.00 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act;’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .).”

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death, and deduction of $200.00, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point, we are following an opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth (1973) 296 N.E. 2d 477.

14. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $2,500.00. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss shown in Ull and 12, leaves the amount of the actual loss sustained by the claimant and her child far in excess of the $10,000.00 maximum amount that can be awarded under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime. Hence, the claimant and her child are entitled to an award in the maximum amount payable under the Act, $10,000.00.

The Court takes notice of the fact that the daughter of the deceased victim, who is named in H8 of this opinion, was also dependent on Edward Burr age, as was his surviving spouse, Lillie L. Burrage, the claimant, and the mother of the decedent’s said child.

Under these circumstances the Court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in §8(b):

"(b) If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for (her) support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it (the court) shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled, and (3) order that those amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor or incompetent, to his (her) guardian or conservator, as the case may be.”

To comply strictly with the above legislative directive, it would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution of the $10,000.00 award in accordance with the rule of distribution stated in §11(1) of the Probate Act. This rule would allow one-third ($3,333.33) to the victim’s surviving spouse, and the remaining two-thirds to the victim’s child. This would create a separate estate in the amount of $6,666.66 for Patricia A. Bur-rage, age 8.

However, to make distribution in this matter, we believe would impose an undue hardship on the mother. If the $10,000.00 award were paid to her in a lump sum, she would be holding $6,666.66 in trust for her child. Although she is guardian of her daughter’s person, she would have no power to administer her child’s estate, nor use her child’s funds unless she is duly appointed guardian of the daughter’s estate as provided by law. Perry v. Carmichael (1880) 95 Ill. 519. After such appointment, she would be required to manage her child’s funds frugally under the direction of the appointing Court and present periodic accounts of her guardianship to such court. She would also be responsible for court costs and any legal expenses required in filing her petition for appointment, oath, surety bond and accounts.

To obviate the necessity of the claimant being appointed guardian of her daughter’s estate and considering all facts in this case, the Court believes that the best interest of the victim’s family would be served by our ordering that this award be disbursed to the claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized in §8(a) (4) of the Act. As the natural guardian of her daughter, the month has a legal obligation to provide for the child’s suitable support and education. In fulfilling this obligation, we believe she would necessarily be required to expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and nurture of her daughter as well as for her own necessities.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $10,000.00 be awarded to the claimant and her daughter, collectively, as persons who were all dependent for their support on Edward Burrage, the deceased victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the aforesaid award be paid to the claimant, Lillie L. Burrage in twenty (20) equal monthly installments of $500.00 each. The court directs that said monthly payments shall be made from the Court of Claims insofar as it is legally possible to do so.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-211
    Charles R. Thomas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Charles R Thomas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on September 24, 1974, in a building at the corner of 24th Street and Trumbull, Chicago, Illinois. Charles R. Thomas, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Charles R. Thomas, age 28, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on September 24, 1974, the claimant was beaten and stabbed in a building on the corner of 24th Street and Trumbull Avenue, Chicago, by nine men who were allegedly members of the Latin Kings Street gang.

3. That statements taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained numerous stab wounds and injuries for which he was hospitalized for five days. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. As of this time, no suspects have been identified and the police investigation has been suspended.

7. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding his injury were $400.00.

8. That the victim, as a result of his injuries, was unable to work during the period of September 24, 1974 through October 21, 1974, a period of 26 days. In accordance with the Court accepted method of determining compensation for portions of a month, (the average monthly income ($400) divided by the number of days per month (30.4) and multiplied by the number of days of work missed (26)), the claimant sustained a gross loss of income of $342.11.

9. That in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

1) Hospital (St. Anthony’s) .........................$1,925.35
2) Radiologists ..................................$ 35.00
3) Doctors......................................$ 506.00
4) Plastic Surgery................................$ 400.00
$2,866.35

10. That the claimant received medical insurance benefits of $1,976.38 and disability benefits of $95.50 from the UIU Health and Welfare Fund, 25 North 4th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 19106. This insurance is provided through the claimant’s union, Local 18-B.

That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) twenty-five thousand dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefits of the applicant. . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $2,071.88. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200.00, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 119 and 1110 leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the claimant $936.58.

11. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfied all of the requirements of this act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $936.58 (Nine Hundred Thirty Six Dollars And Fifty Eight Cents) be immediately paid to the claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime, from the Court of Claims fund as a complete payment of the total amount of this award.