text:
    (No. 85-CC-0036
    Raymond G. Romero ex rel. Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed December 6, 1984.

    Raymond G. Romero, pro se, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (H. Alfred Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Claimant’s Raymond G. Romero, acting on behalf of both the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., motion for summary judgment.

Claimant’s claim is founded upon an order of a three-judge district court in the northern district of Illinois in the consolidated cases of Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6030; Crosby v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6093; and DelValle v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6052. On April 27,1984, the three-judge court ordered that Respondent pay Claimant the amount of $81,180.00 as and for attorney fees as a prevailing party.

Claimant’s motion for summary judgment seeks an award in the amount of $81,180.00 plus 9% interest per annum pursuant to statute as attorney fees.

The affidavit of Claimant’s counsel represents that Respondent does not oppose the entry of an order in accordance with the relief sought, and Respondent in fact has not objected to the motion.

It is therefore ordered, that Claimant, Raymond G. Romero, acting on behalf of both the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., is awarded $81,180.00 plus interest at the rate of 9% per annum from April 27, 1984, in full and complete satisfaction of his claim.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Raucci, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 85-CC-0212
    Christine Miller, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed January 31, 1985.

    Raymond Funderburk, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Robert J. Sklamberg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

This claim is before the Court of Claims following the filing of a joint stipulation whereby the parties agreed as follows:

Respondent Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities is a body corporate and politic and an agency of the State of Illinois. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 144, par. 1001 et seq.

The claim in this cause is made against Respondent in its capacity as an agency of the State of Illinois and is brought under sections 8(a) and (b) of the Court of Claims Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 439.1 et seq.

The claim in this cause is not made under “An Act to Provide for Representation and Indemnification, etc.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 1301 et seq.

Claimant, Christine Miller, was employed by the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities as an Assistant Professor of Marketing at Chicago State University.

Chicago State University is an institution of higher education established by the State of Illinois; operated, managed, controlled and maintained by the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, the Respondent. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 14, par. 1101 et seq. and par. 1001 et seq.

During her employment as an assistant professor of accounting at Chicago State University, Claimant Christine Miller was allegedly discriminated against by reason of her sex in violation of Federal statutory and constitutional rights and prohibitions.

As a result of the alleged discrimination, Claimant Christine Miller filed a grievance against the Board of Governors pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement and filed charges with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Illinois Human Rights Commission.

After thorough investigation and careful consideration of the evidence and arguments in front of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Board of Governors determined that a settlement of the claim was in the best interest of all concerned. Therefore, a settlement agreement was entered into by and between the Claimant, Christine Miller, and the respondent, the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities. A copy of that agreement is attached to the complaint filed in this matter.

Among other things, said settlement provides for payment of $35,998.65 to Claimant Christine Miller in full and complete resolution of all claims arising out of the alleged discrimination.

We find that the payment provided for in said settlement agreement should be made and an award of said sum should be made by this Court.

It is therefore ordered that Claimant Christine Miller be, and hereby is, awarded the sum of thirty-five thousand, nine hundred ninety-eight dollars and 65/100 ($35,998.65).


author: Montana, J.

text:
    (No. 85-CC-0281
    Gary Green, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed January 8, 1983.

    Daniel E. Radakovich, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, J.

This claim is before the Court of Claims following the filing of a joint stipulation whereby the parties agreed as follows:

1. Respondent Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities is a body corporate and politic and an agency of the State of Illinois. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 144, par. 1001 et seq.

2. The claim in this cause is made against Respondent in its capacity as an agency of the State of Illinois and is brought under sections 8(a) and (b) of the Court of Claims Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 439.1 et seq.

3. The claim in this cause is not made under “An Act to Provide for Representation and Indemnification etc.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 1301 et seq.

4. Claimant, Gary Green, was employed by the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities as an assistant professor of accounting at Chicago State University.

5. Chicago State University is an institution of higher education established by the State of Illinois; operated, managed, controlled and maintained by the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, the Respondent. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 14, par. 1101 et seq. and par. 1001 et seq.

6. During his employment as an assistant professor of accounting at Chicago State University, Claimant Gary Green was allegedly discriminated against by reason of his race in violation of Federal statutory and constitutional rights and prohibitions, viz: (42 U.S.C. sec. 2000(e) et seq., 42 U.S.C. Sec’s. 1983 and 1988, and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution).

7. As a result of the alleged discrimination, Claimant Gary Green filed a grievance against the Board of Governors pusrsuant to a collective bargaining agreement and filed charges with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

8. After thorough investigation and careful consideration of the evidence and arguments in front of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Board of Governors determined that a settlement of the claim was in the best interest of all concerned. Therefore, a settlement agreement was entered into by and between the Claimant, Gary Green, and Respondent the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities. A copy of that agreement is attached to the complaint filed in this matter as Exhibit B.

9. Among other things, said settlement provides for payment of $35,914.65 to Claimant Gary Green in full and complete resolution of all claims arising out of the alleged discrimination.

10. The payment provided for in said settlement agreement and set forth in paragraph 9 above should be made and an award of said sum should be made by this Court.

We have reviewed the record. The stipulation is corroborated by the record. There is nothing more for us to consider. In matters such as the one at bar this court is but a vehicle for payment.


author: Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 85-CC-0351
    Ronald A. Liebman, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 10, 1985.

    Lawrence S. Adelson, of Isham, Lincoln & Beale, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, C.J.

This claim is before the Court of Claims following the filing of a joint stipulation whereby the parties agreed as follows:

1. Respondent Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities is a body corporate and politic and an agency of the State of Illinois. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 144, par. 1001 et seq.

2. The claim in this cause is made against Respondent in its capacity as an agency of the State of Illinois and is brought under sections 8(a) and (b) of the Court of Claims Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 439.1 et seq.

3. The claim in this cause is not made under “An Act to Provide for Representation and Indemnification etc.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 1301 et seq.

4. Claimant, Ronald A. Lieman, was employed by the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities as an assistant professor in the College of Business and Administration at Chicago State University.

5. Chicago State University is an institution of higher education established by the State of Illinois; operated, managed, controlled and maintained by the Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, the Respondent. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 14, par. 1101 et seq.

6. During his employment as an assistant professor in the College of Education and Administration at Chicago State University, Claimant was allegedly discriminated against by reason of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000(e) et seq.

7. As a result of the alleged discrimination, Claimant filed charges with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission having duly certified that it was unable to complete its investigation within 180 days from the date said charges were filed, the United States Department of Justice issued a Right to Sue Letter to Claimant, who, thereupon, filed his complaint for equitable, declaratory, monetary and other relief as a civil action in the United States District Court of the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, in Cause No. 79 CC 4256, naming the Respondent Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities et al. as defendant. Exhibit A to the complaint in this cause is a true and correct copy of said complaint.

8. On April 23, 1984, after a trial of the cause, the district court entered judgment for the Claimant consisting of an award of damages and attorney fees. Exhibit C to the complaint in this cause is a true and correct copy of said Court’s Order.

9. Claimant then attempted to collect his judgment in the United States District Court, but was ultimately required to file in the Illinois Court of Claims.

10. Among other things, the United States District Court judgment provided for:

(a) Payment of $35,879.16 to Claimant, Ronald A. Liebman and

(b) Payment of $20,000 as reasonable attorney fees and costs.

11. Additionally, the Claimant has here requested interest at the annual rate of 10.81% from the date the judgment was entered to the date the Court of Claims vouchers the award, all as provided for in 28 U.S.C. sec. 1961.

12. The payments provided for in said judgment and set forth in Paragraph 10 above should be made and an award of said sums should be made by this Court together with interest thereon as is provided for in 28 U.S.C. sec. 1961.

We have reviewed the record. The joint stipulation is corroborated by the record. There is nothing more for us to consider. In matters such as the one at bar this Court is but a vehicle for a payment. Actually, whether or not this Court concurs with the parties’ joint stipulation and enters an award is immaterial because if the Federal court has jurisdiction to enter an order which is the subject of this claim (and it unquestionably does) the Federal court can enforce its order and require the State to pay regardless of any action by this Court and/ or any action by the legislature.

It is hereby ordered that the Claimant, Ronald A. Leibman, be and is hereby awarded the sum of $35,879.16 plus $20,000.00 in attorney fees plus interest thereon from the date of the judgment entered in the United States District Court at the annual rate of 10.81%.


text:
    (No. 85-CC-0364
    Carol Moseley Braun, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed November 27, 1984.

    Carol Moseley Braun, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Harttgan, Attorney General (H. Alfred Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Claimant Carol Moseley Brauns motion for summary judgment.

Claimant’s claim is founded upon an order of a three-judge district court in the northern district of Illinois in the consolidated cases of Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6030; Crosby v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6093 and DelValle v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6052. On April 27,1984, the three-judge court ordered that Respondent pay Claimant the amount of $14,903.00 as and for attorney fees as a prevailing party, and to pay National Technologies Unlimited the amount of $50,000.00 for services.

Claimant’s motion for summary judgment seeks an award in the amount of $14,903.00 plus 9% interest per annum pursuant to statute as attorney fees, and the amount of $50,000.00 plus 9% interest per annum for National Technologies Unlimited.

The affidavit of Claimant’s counsel represents that Respondent does not oppose the entry of an order in accordance with the relief sought, and Respondent in fact has not objected to the motion.

It is therefore ordered, that Claimant, Carol Moseley Braun, is awarded $14,903.00 plus interest at the rate of 9% per annum from April 27, 1984, in full and complete satisfaction of her claim, and the amount of $50,000.00 plus interest at the rate of 9% per annum from April 27, 1984, in full and complete satisfaction of the amount due National Technologies Unlimited.


text:
    (No. 85-CC-0489
    Richard H. Newhouse, Jr., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed November 27, 1984.

    Jenner & Block, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (H. Alfred Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Raucci, J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Claimant Richard H. Newhouse, Jr.’s motion for summary judgment.

Claimant’s claim is founded upon an order of a three-judge district court in the northern district of Illinois in the consolidated cases of Rybicki v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6030, Crosby v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6093 and DelValle v. State Board of Elections, No. 81 C 6052. On April 27,1984, the three-judge court ordered that Respondent pay Claimant the amount of $11,600.00 as and for attorney fees as a prevailing party.

Claimant’s motion for summary judgment seeks an award in the amount of $11,600.00 plus 9% interest per annum pursuant to statute.

The affidavit of Claimant’s counsel represents that Respondent does not oppose the entry of an order in accordance with the relief sought, and Respondent in fact has not objected to the motion.

It is therefore ordered, that Claimant, Richard H. Newhouse, Jr., is awarded $11,600.00 plus interest at the rate of 9% per annum from April 27, 1984, in full and complete satisfaction of this claim.


author: Roe, C.J.

text:
    (Nos. 85-CC-0715, 85-CC-0586, 85-CC-0558, 85-CC-0554, 85-CC-0545 not cons.
    Aurora College et al., Claimants, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 21, 1985.

    Aurora College, St. Francis College, Roosevelt University, Governors State University, pro se, for Claimants.
    F. Anne Zemek, for Claimant Community College District 508.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien,, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

These five claims have been brought against the Respondent’s Illinois State Scholarship Commission for tuition payments for students with Illinois State Scholarships who were properly enrolled and certified for payment. All of the Claimants have alleged that they made demand for payment but that their demand was refused on the grounds that the funds appropriated for the payments have lapsed. The Respondent has stipulated to payment of one of the claims and has moved to dismiss the others. A departmental report, which is prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Court of Claims, was attached to and incorporated in the stipulation and the motion. None of the Claimants filed responses and the time for doing so has elapsed.

Aurora College filed its claim on October 26,1984, and it seeks $733.33. The reason stated in the departmental report why the college was not paid prior to the lapsing of the funds was that the student had filed an appeal and was then granted a scholarship for the third quarter of the 1983-84 school year (Respondent’s fiscal year 1984).

St. Francis College filed its claim on October 15, 1984, and it seeks $1,525.00. The reason stated in the departmental report why the college was not paid prior to the lapsing of the funds was that the college had incorrectly coded the students as having total refunds.

Community College District 508 filed its claim on October 11, 1984, and it seeks $13,066.00. The reason stated in the departmental report why it was not paid prior to the lapsing of the funds is that the Illinois State Scholarship Commission did not have the funds to pay the Loop College for the students for which reimbursement was sought for the 1983-84 school year.

Governors State University filed its claim on October 11,1984, and it seeks $473.00. The reason stated in the departmental report why it was not paid prior to the lapsing of the funds is as follows:

“Student was not included in the second semester payout in error. We owe $473.00 to the school.”

Roosevelt University filed its claim on October 10, 1984, and it seeks $1,100.00. The reason stated in the departmental report why it was not paid prior to the lapsing of the funds was that the student was coded by the university as not being registered.

The latest filed departmental report states that $2,100.20 of the line item appropriation for these scholarships was all that lapsed and that claims totalling $18,493.33 have been filed against that lapsed money. It is a long-standing fundamental rule of law in this Court that, barring certain extremely narrow exceptions not applicable here, an award cannot be made in a lapsed appropriation claim where no funds lapsed. Where an insufficient amount of funds lapsed, an award is made of the balance remaining only. It is not an infrequent situation that, as with the claims at bar, numerous claims are filed against a lapsed balance insufficient to cover all the claims. When this happens and the Court has actual knowledge of it, it has been our policy to make awards to the earliest filing Claimants until the lapsed balance has been exhausted. We have considered alternatives and have decided that, while this policy is not free from criticism, the alternatives are too impractical, unworkable, or too unfair.

Previously awarded claims have exhausted all but $504.20 of $2,100.20 which lapsed. Respondent stipulated to payment of that sum to St. Francis College and moved to dismiss the claims of the others on the grounds that insufficient funds lapsed to pay them. For the reason stated above we feel that said sum should be awarded to Roosevelt University which filed its claim the earliest. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that Roosevelt University, in claim number 85-CC-0545, be and hereby is awarded the sum of $504.20 and the other claims are hereby dismissed.


text:
    (No. 85-CC-1114
    Way-Ken Contractors Supply, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed March 20, 1985.

    Way-Ken Contractors Supply, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neel F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the motion by the Respondent to dismiss, due notice having been given, and the Court being fully advised;

The Court finds:

1. The motion at bar was brought pursuant to section 2 — 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 — 619(a)(9)).

2. Claimant filed this action as a lapsed appropriation matter and based its claim on “An Act to require prompt payments by the State of Illinois for goods and services” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 127, par. 132.401 et seq.).

3. Claimant seeks accrued interest on several outstanding bills for machine repair work done for the Illinois Department of Transportation. This claim is for interest on $2,180.30 and $24.00, the amounts of the outstanding bills, for the periods of September 7, 1983, and August 8,1983, to October 12,1984.

4. Claimant previously filed, on November 28, 1983, a claim with this Court for payment of those outstanding bills which the Department of Transportation was no longer able to pay due to the lapsing of the appropriation. An award was made on that action, docket number 84-CC-1221, on March 20, 1984. Claimant received payment of its award on October 12, 1984.

5. “An Act to require prompt payments . . .” authorizes payment of an interest penalty of 1% on the State’s bills unpaid after 60 days after the receipt of the bill.

6. The bills at issue herein were received by the Department of Transportation less than 60 days prior to the end of the 90-day grace period following the end of the fiscal year and the Department’s ability to pay those bills. After September 30 the Department was unable, by law, to pay any bills for the prior fiscal year and any vendors with unpaid bills had to file in the Court of Claims for payment.

7. This Court has previously ruled, in OK Electric v. State, 84-CC-2736 (order filed September 7, 1984), that “An Act to require prompt payments . . .” does not authorize interest on matters pending in the Court of Claims nor does it authorize interest after the agency’s legal ability to pay has ended.

8. The ability of the Department of Transportation to pay the bills at issue herein ended before the State’s obligation to pay a 1% interest penalty began.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the claim herein be, and hereby is, dismissed.


text:
    (No. 85-CC-1686
    Gregory Macon, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Order filed June 10, 1985.

    Gregory Macon, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (G. Michael Taylor, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Montana, C.J.

This cause having come for consideration on the Respondent’s motion to dismiss and the Court being duly advised in the premises:

Finds, that Claimant’s complaint states that the negligence of the Illinois Department of Corrections resulted in his not being allowed to attend his mother’s funeral. He seeks $15,000.00 as compensation for mental suffering. Respondent has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

While Claimant’s complaint does allege mental suffering, it does not allege any physical impact or symptom as a result thereof. No recovery may be had for the negligent infliction of mental distress, absent some physical manifestation of the distress. See Daniels v. Adkins Protective Service, Inc. (Miss. 1971), 247 So. 2d 710 (no recovery from mental distress absent physical injury or physical manifestation of distress).

Further, the granting of a funeral furlough is a matter of administrative discretion. Based upon Claimant’s record compiled during his incarceration, it cannot be said that the discretion of the Department of Corrections was abused. Hence, this Court will not review the exercise of such discretion. Holmes v. State (1978), 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 275.


author: Roe, C.J. Roe, C.J.

text:
    (No. 81-CC-2297

      In re Application of Margaret Watson.

      Opinion filed April 12, 1984.

      Order on denial of petition for rehearing filed July 11,1984.

    Michael B. McClellan, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Kathleen O’Brien, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

The Claimant seeks an award as the statutory beneficiary of Police Officer Curtis Watson pursuant to the provisions of the “Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act,” (hereinafter, the Act). Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits and documents submitted in support thereof, a written statement of the decedent’s supervising officer, a report by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office, an evidence deposition, and a commissioner’s report submitted following the filing of a joint stipulation in which both parties agreed to submit the matter to the Court on evidence depositions to be filed with the Court. It was also agreed in the stipulation that briefs were to be waived.

The record shows that the decedent, Curtis Watson, was involved with the arrest of a knife-wielding woman on April 4, 1980, and that in the ensuing struggle to subdue the suspect, he was cut on the finger. Immediately after the arrest he was treated at Mercy Hospital in Champaign, Illinois, and found to have high blood pressure in addition to the finger injury. On April 25, 1980, he collapsed while on duty at 11:01 p.m. and was declared dead at 12:16 a.m. on April 26,1980. The cause of death was “Acute Cardiac Failure” due to “Interstitial Myocarditis” (inflammation of the heart muscle).

In order to recover under the Act it must be shown that the officer was killed in the line of duty as defined by the Act. Section 2(e) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that “ ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer # * if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.”

The evidence deposition of Dr. Jose Racquel shows that he thought there was a possibility that an infection caused by the knife wound brought on the heart attack; however, he stated he could not be sure this is what happened and could not be sure that the incident of April 4, 1980, was the cause. Neither could the coroner nor the pathologist, in their reports, state with any certainty what caused the inflammation of the heart and the resulting heart attack.

While the death of Officer Watson was certainly unfortunate, we find that the Claimant has failed to show that Officer Watson was killed in the line of duty as required by the Act. It has not been proven that he lost his life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer because a causal connection has not been adequately shown between the incident of April 4, 1980, and the decedent’s death on April 26,1980. Therefore, this claim must be denied.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied.

ORDER ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

Roe, C.J.

This cause is before the Court on Claimant’s petition for rehearing.

In an opinion dated April 12, 1984, this Court determined that the Claimant was not entitled to compensation pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), because she had failed to show that the decedent was killed in the line of duty as required by section 2(e) of the Act. The Claimant contends in her petition for rehearing that we overlooked certain evidence in reaching our decision to deny compensation.

We disagree with the Claimant’s contention. All of the evidence which the Court supposedly overlooked was considered in reaching our decision to deny compensation. Since the petition for rehearing fails to state any points overlooked or misapprehended by the Court, the petition must be denied.

It is hereby ordered that Claimant’s petition for rehearing be, and hereby is, denied.


author: Roe, C.J. Montana, C.J.

text:
    (No. 82-CC-0483

      In re Application of Bertha Pappalardo.

      Opinion filed March 25, 1985.

      Order filed June 3, 1985.

    Tully, Roddy & Weinstein, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Saul R. Wexler, Special Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, C.J.

This is a claim for benefits filed pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers, Civil Defense Workers, Civil Air Patrol Members, Paramedics and Firemen Compensation Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 48, par. 281 et seq.) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) by Bertha Pappalardo, widow of Police Sergeant Carmen Pappalardo, who died of an acute inferior wall myocardial infarction due to or as a consequence of coronary heart disease after being on duty for the City of Chicago. Mrs. Pappalardo was named the sole beneficiary of any award authorized by this Court.

The record consists of the claim, designation of beneficiary, statement of supervising officer, certificate of death, Attorney General’s report, partial stipulation of facts, evidence deposition of Claimant’s expert witness, and briefs and arguments submitted by counsel for both parties. Based on the record, the commissioner has duly filed his report and the matter is now before us for a decision.

The sole issue is whether Officer Carmen Pappalardo’s death meets the requisite of being “killed in the line of duty” as defined in section 2(e) of the Act which provides, in relevant part, that “ ‘killed in the line of duty’ means losing one’s life as a result of injury received in the active performance of duties as a law enforcement officer * * * if the death occurs within one year from the date the injury was received and if that injury arose from violence or other accidental cause.”

The record reflects that Officer Carmen Pappalardo was an area administrative sergeant performing clerical duties prior to his death on August 19, 1981. On the Saturday preceding his death, he complained of chest pains and nausea. On August 17,1981, he was seen by his physician and given an EKG which was noted to be abnormal. On Tuesday, August 18, 1981, he continued to experience chest pains and left work early. The next morning he was taken by ambulance to Weiss Memorial Hospital where he was pronounced dead several hours later. The cause of death was acute myocardial infarction.

The record further reflects that Dr. William Wehrmacher, who testified as an expert witness for Claimant, did not establish a causal connection between the decedent’s duties as an area administrative sergeant and his death. The doctor noted that the decedent was both physically and emotionally predisposed to heart disease and that it was likely that he would have died of a heart attack in any job that subjected him to stress. In addition, he noted the likelihood of his dying of a heart attack was enhanced by the decedent’s cigarette smoking and being overweight. Finally, there is no evidence that unusual stress was present on the decedent’s last day of work.

Although coverage of the Act is not limited to healthy persons, the preponderance of the evidence shows that Claimant’s decedent was not killed in the line of duty, as defined under section 2(e) of the Act and the guidelines set forth by the Court of Claims, as his death did not arise from “violence or other accidental cause” since no injury, or other unusual force, has been shown which might have caused the heart attack. (See Wierciak v. State (1981), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 302; McNamara v. State, 81-CC-2814 (opinion filed August 23, 1982).) In the McNamara case, the Court said at page 3 of the opinion:

“Clearly there can be no recovery under the statute if Captain McNamara was not first injured. Death alone is not sufficient. It must be preceded by an ‘injury.’ In all cases involving death by ‘heart attack’ an effort is made to pinpoint injury which triggered the fatal attack.”

While the death of Sargeant Pappalardo was certainly unfortunate, we find that it has not been shown that he was killed in the line of duty as is required for recovery under the Act. Therefore this claim must be denied.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is, denied.

ORDER

Montana, C.J.

Claimant has filed a petition for rehearing. The Court has reviewed the petition, its original opinion and the record in this case. Unfortunately, no basis exists for the Court modifying its opinion filed March 25, 1985. The petition for rehearing is denied.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
      In re Petition of Louella Reaves.

      Order on petition for extension of time filed September 7, 1984.

      Opinion filed September 20, 1985.

    Louella Reaves, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Alison Breslauer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

      Roe, C.J.
   OPINION

Holderman, J.

The Claimant in this cause had filed a petition seeking a hearing on the Court’s order of September 7, 1984, for an extension of time in which to file a notice under the Crime Victims Compensation Act and was denied. The commissioner’s report indicates that a hearing was scheduled and presided over on March 13, 1985, at 10:00 a.m. The commissioner’s report is to the effect that the Claimant did not offer any oral or documentary evidence at that time to establish good and sufficient cause as is required by the Act to allow for an extension of the filing deadline.

The record in this case indicates that the incident in question took place on February 25,1983. The notice of intent to file the claim was filed on June 7,1984.

The explanation of the late filing was that the Claimant, who was the mother of the individual killed, was hurt and upset over her son’s death and that she was not aware of the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

This petition was filed some 18 months after the date of the incident in question.

The court is of the opinion that the explanation given for the late filing is not sufficient and therefore the petition is denied. Case dismissed.


author: POCH, J. Holderman, J. Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 82-CV-0377

      In re Application of Margaret Giddings and Floyd Giddings.

      Opinion filed January 24, 1983.

      Amended opinion filed January 11, 1984.

      Amended opinion filed September 19, 1984.

    Margaret Giddings and Floyd Giddings, pro se, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 18,1981. Margaret Giddings and Floyd Giddings, Claimants, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on November 4, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Floyd Giddings, age 37, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: aggravated battery. Ill. Rev. Stat., 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4.

2. That on March 18, 1981, Claimant Floyd Giddings and two other people were struck in the head with an axe during the course of an armed robbery by an unknown offender. The incident occurred in a hardware store located at 1500 South Grand Avenue East, Springfield, Illinois. The Claimant was initially taken to St. John’s Hospital for treatment of his injuries.

3. That the Claimants seek compensation for medical/hospital expenses and the Claimant, Floyd Giddings, seeks compensation for loss of earnings.

4. That the Claimant, Floyd Giddings, was self-employed as operator of Giddings & Son Sewing Machine Repair. Upon request, the Claimants submitted a copy of the Federal income tax return for 1980 to substantiate his earnings. This return shows that the Claimant’s business suffered a net loss of $657.00 for the year. Adding on non-cash deductions of $108.00 listed on the return results in a net loss of $549.00 for the year.

5. That section 2(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

6. That as the business of the Claimant, Floyd Giddings, suffered a net operating loss prior to the incident, the Claimant has not shown that he had earnings upon which to base loss of earnings pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act. The Claimant is receiving Social Security disability benefits as a result of the injuries suffered in this incident.

7. That the Claimant, Floyd Giddings, has not met a required condition precedent for loss of earnings under the Act.

8. That the Claimants have submitted medical/ hospital expenses in the amount of $41,223.40, $27,447.87 of which was paid by insurance and $6,591.62 of which is currently pending consideration by Medicare, and $200.00 of which was written off as an adjustment by one of the medical providers, leaving a balance of $6,983.91 for which the Claimant has thus far been responsible.

9. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

10. That the Claimants have received no reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

11. That the Claimants may incur additional medical/hospital expenses in the future as a result of the incident and may petition the Court for additional compensation for those expenses pursuant to section 16 of the Act.

12. That the Claimants are entitled to an award based on the following:

Net Medical Expenses $6,983.91
Less $200.00 Deductible — 200.00
Total $6,783.91

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $6,783.91 (six thousand seven hundred eighty-three dollars and ninety-one cents) be and is hereby awarded to Margaret Giddings and to Floyd Giddings, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

AMENDED OPINION

Holderman, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 18,1981. The Claimants, Margaret Giddings and Floyd Giddings sought compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.) The Claimants were awarded compensation by order of the court issued on January 24,1983. At the time of that award, the Court found that the Claimants may require additional compensation under the provisions of section 16 of the Act. This claim is now before the Court pursuant to a request by the Claimants for additional compensation.

The Court has carefully reviewed its prior order in this cause and the Claimants’ request for additional compensation. Furthermore, an investigation regarding the Claimants’ request for additional compensation was conducted by the Attorney General’s Office. Based upon the evidence of that investigation now before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Floyd Giddings, age 37, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4).

2. That on November 4, 1981, the Claimants filed an application for medical/hospital expenses in the Illinois Court of Claims pursuant to the provision of the Act.

3. That on January 24, 1983, the Court of Claims entered an order awarding the Claimants $6,783.91 for medical/hospital expenses, with a provision that the Claimants could petition the Court for additional compensation pursuant to section 16 of the Act in the event that additional medical/hospital expenses were incurred.

4. That on September 8, 1983, the Claimants requested the Court to reopen their claim for additional compensation for medical/hospital expenses.

5. That the Claimants incurred an additional net amount of $7,404.96 in medical/hospital expenses for which they seek compensation at this time.

6. That the Claimants have received no additional reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

7. That the Claimants may incur additional medical/hospital expenses in the future as a result of the incident and may petition the Court for additional compensation for those expenses pursuant to section 16 of the Act, up to the maximum compensable award of $15,000.00. As of this time, a total amount of $14,188.87 has been considered for compensation.

8. That the Claimants are entitled to a supplemental award based on the following:

Additional Medical/Hospital Expenses $7,404.96

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $7,404.96 (seven thousand four hundred four dollars and ninety-six cents) be and is hereby awarded to Margaret Giddings and to Floyd Giddings, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

AMENDED OPINION

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 18, 1981. The Claimants, Margaret Giddings and Floyd Giddings, sought compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

The Claimants were awarded compensation by orders of the Court issued on January 24, 1983, and on January 11,1984. At the time of these awards, the Court found that the Claimants may require additional compensation under the provisions of section 16 of the Act. This claim is now before the Court pursuant to a request by the Claimant for additional compensation.

The Court has carefully reviewed its prior orders in this cause and the Claimants’ request for additional compensation. Furthermore, an investigation regarding the Claimants’ request for additional compensation was conducted by the Attorney General’s Office. Based upon the evidence of that investigation now before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on March 18, 1981, the Claimant, Floyd Giddings was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: aggravated battery. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4.

2. That on November 4, 1981, the Claimants filed an application for medical/hospital expenses in the Illinois Court of Claims pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

3. That on January 24, 1983, the Court of Claims entered an order awarding the Claimants $6,783.91 for medical/hospital expenses which the Claimants had incurred up to that point with a provision that the Claimants could petition the Court for additional compensation pursuant to section 16 of the Act when additional medical/hospital expenses were incurred.

4. That on September 3, 1983, the Claimants petitioned the Court to reopen their claim for additional compensation for medical/hospital expenses.

5. That on January 11, 1984, the Court of Claims entered a supplemental order awarding the Claimants $7,404.96 for medical/hospital expenses which the Claimants had additionally incurred with a provision that the Claimants could petition the Court for additional compensation pursuant to section 16 of the Act when additional medical/hospital expenses were incurred.

6. That on February 2, 1984, the Claimants again petitioned the Court to reopen their claim for additional compensation for medical/hospital expenses.

7. That the Claimants incurred additional medical/ hospital expenses in the amount of $811.13, none of which was covered by insurance, leaving a balance of $811.13 for which they now seek compensation.

8. That the Claimants have received no additional reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

9. That the Claimants are entitled to a supplemental award based on the following expenses:

Additional Medical/Hospital Expenses $811.13

10. That with an additional award of $811.13, the pecuniary loss resulting from Floyd Giddings’ injuries is $15,000.00 which is the maximum allowed under section 10.1(f) of the Act.

11. That the Claimants have complied with all of the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act and are entitled to compensation thereunder.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $811.13 (eight hundred eleven dollars and thirteen cents) be and is hereby awarded to Margaret Giddings and to Floyd Giddings, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


author: POCH, J. Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 82-CV-0796

      In re Application of Mable Tigner.

      Opinion filed September 24, 1982.

      Supplemental opinion filed July 9, 1984.

    Monica Hyman Bullock, and Lauren B. Simon, of Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, for Claimant.
    Tyrone C. Fahner and Neil F. Hartigan, Attorneys General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 6, 1981. Mable Tigner, mother of the deceased victim, Willie Tigner, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on April 21, 1981, on the form prescribed by the Court, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Willie Tigner, age 22, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: voluntary manslaughter. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 2.

2. That on September 6, 1981, the victim was shot by an unknown offender during an attempted robbery of the victim’s motor bike. The incident occurred as the victim and several friends were walking through a playground at 1847 West Lake Street, Chicago, Illinois, where they encountered the offender, who was armed with a gun. The offender demanded that the victim relinquish his motor bike, and when the victim refused, a struggle ensued during which the offender produced his gun and shot the victim. The victim was pronounced dead at Cook County Hospital.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and loss of support for herself.

4. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of the victim’s death in the amount of $1,983.00.

5. That pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or death, or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

6. That the victim was not employed during the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident out of which this claim arose. The victim had been receiving monthly Social Security benefits during the six months prior to the incident. However, Social Security benefits do not constitute earnings of the victim upon which to base loss of support as required by section 2(h) of the Act.

In addition, the Claimant currently receives cash assistance from the Illinois Department of Public Aid, and has received such assistance since the date of the incident.

7. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

8. That the Claimant has not received any reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as applicable deductions.

9. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following.

Paid funeral expenses $1,983.00
Less $200.00 deductible - 200.00
Total $1,783.00

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $1,783.00 (one thousand seven hundred eighty-three dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Mable Tigner, mother of Willie Tigner, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION

Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 6, 1981. Claimant seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois Crime Victims Compensation Act; hereafter referred to as the “Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

On September 24,1982, Claimant was awarded the sum of $1,783.00 (one thousand seven hundred eighty three dollars) for funeral expenses, but was denied compensation for the loss of support on the basis that the deceased, Willie Tigner, was not employed for the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident out of which this claim arose and therefore Claimant suffered no loss of earnings compensable under section 2(h) of the Act.

Pursuant to section 9 of the Act, Claimant moved for a hearing.

The hearing was conducted by Commissioner Robert E. Cronin on September 13, 1983, where the following was established by stipulation and other documentary proof:

1. That Willie Tigner, age 22, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to-wit: voluntary manslaughter. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 9 — 2.

2. That on September 6, 1981, the victim was shot by an unknown offender during an attempted robbery of the victim’s motor bike. The offender demanded that the victim relinquish his motor bike; when the victim refused, a struggle ensued during which the offender shot the victim. The victim was pronounced dead at the Cook County Hospital.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and loss of support.

4. That the deceased, Willie Tigner, was not employed during the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident. The victim had been receiving monthly Social Security benefits during the six months prior to the incident.

The sole issue in this case is whether Social Security benefits constitute earnings which may form the basis of an award for loss of earnings within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Act.

Section 2(h) of the Act, in pertinent part provides as follows:

“. . . Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or death or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less . .

It is clear from section 2(h) of the Act that as a condition to the right of a Claimant to recover for loss of support in the case of death, the loss of support must be established, and it must further be established that the victim had some earnings during the six-month period preceding his death. It will be noted that the statute provides that loss of support “shall be determined” on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for that period.

The record is clear that the deceased had been unemployed for six months preceding his death. Claimant argues that the deceased was the recipient of Social Security benefits during said period, and that the Social Security benefits were “earnings” within the meaning of the Act.

This court has uniformly held that the word “earnings” is something earned as compensation for labor or the use of capital. (In re Cooper, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 400; In re Chandler, 32 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1084; In re Smith, No. 83-CV-0312, opinion 5-8-84). Social Security benefits cannot be considered as “earnings” within the meaning of the Act. The Act specifically states that the amount of any award for loss of support be determined solely upon the basis of the victim’s “earnings” for the six months preceding his death, and since Willie Tigner did not have earnings within that six-month period, the request for loss of support will be denied.

It is hereby ordered that the claim of Mable Tigner for compensation for loss of support be and the same is denied, and that the award to Mable Tigner, on September 24, 1982, in the sum of $1,783.00 (one thousand seven hundred eighty three dollars) for funeral expenses remain in full force and effect.


author: Roe, J. Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 83-CV-0089

      In re Application of Gary C. Ford.

      Order filed January 11, 1984.

      Order on denial of rehearing filed January 24, 1985.

    Gary C. Ford, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Roe, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 23, 1981. Gary C. Ford, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 27, 1982, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on September 23, 1981, the Claimant was shot by an offender who was known to him. The incident allegedly occurred on the street at 1733 East 75th Street, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant originally reported to police that the incident had occurred within his automobile and that a struggle for the weapon took place after which the offender exited the vehicle. The Claimant later stated that the struggle for the weapon continued on the street outside his automobile. A search of the Claimant’s automobile revealed no evidence of blood or of bullet damage to the vehicle despite the fact that three bullets struck and then exited the Claimant. The police were unable to find any evidence of a crime occurring at the scene. The Claimant identified the offender as an acquaintance whose address was unknown. During later questioning he identified another man as the offender and provided the police with the offender’s address. However, the Claimant refused to prosecute this individual.

2. That sections 6.1(c) and (d) of the Act state that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime and the applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the police report that the Claimant declined to cooperate fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension of the assailant, in that he made conflicting statements to police investigating regarding the circumstances surrounding the incident and refused to prosecute the assailant whom he identified.

4. That by reason of the Claimant’s refusal to fully cooperate with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant as required by the Act he is not eligible for compensation thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

ORDER ON DENIAL OF REHEARING

Holderman, J.

On February 14,1984, Claimant filed a petition for rehearing of the Court’s order of January 11, 1984, wherein the Court denied Claimant an award. Subsequent to the order denying award, the commissioner set a rehearing for November 13, 1984. Claimant was advised of the rehearing but failed to appear.

It appearing to the Court that Claimant has failed to cooperate in the procedures of this cause, the petition for rehearing is denied and the Court’s original order denying Claimant an award is hereby affirmed.


text:
    (No. 83-CV-0939

      In re Application of Nancy L. Henert.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1984.

      Order on request for review filed December 6, 1984.

    Nancy L. Henert, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on October 21, 1982. Nancy L. Henert, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on April 11, 1983, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Nancy L. Henert, age 25, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: aggravated arson. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 20 — 1.

2. That on October 21, 1982, the victim was overcome by smoke due to a fire which was set in her apartment building. The incident had occurred at the victim’s residence located at 1416 East State, Rockford, Illinois. Police and fire investigators had classified the fire as aggravated arson. The victim was taken to Saint Anthony Hospital for treatment. The offender in this case was apprehended and convicted of aggravated arson.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for loss of earnings only. All medical bills were paid by insurance.

4. That the Claimant was employed by Walter Lawson Children’s Home prior to the injury and her average monthly earnings were $667.47. Claimant was disabled and unable to work from October 21, 1982, to November 12,1982, for a period of 16 working days.

5. That section 2(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

6. That based on $667.47 per month, the maximum compensation for loss of earnings for 16 working days is $485.43.

7. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions- of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

8. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

9. That the Claimant has received $285.71 in disability benefits.

10. That the Claimant’s net loss for which she seeks compensation is $199.72.

11. That section 10.1(e) of the Act limits the right of compensation to persons who have suffered a pecuniary loss of $200.00 or more attributable to a violent crime resulting in the injury or death of the victim.

12. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

ORDER ON REQUEST FOR REVIEW

Poch, J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the petitioner’s request for a review óf our decision of August 29,1984.

On November 10, 1984, Claimant informed Commissioner Simpson that she did not wish to pursue this matter any further.

It is hereby ordered that said request be, and hereby is, denied.


author: Poch, J.

text:
    (No. 83-CV-0959

      In re Application of Richard G. Hutchins.

      Opinion filed July 9, 1984.

    Richard G. Hutchins, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   Poch, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 4, 1982. Richard G. Hutchins, father of Eric Hutchins, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on April 15, 1983, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Richard G. Hutchins, father of the minor victim, Eric Hutchins, age 2, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: reckless conduct. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 5.

2. That on July 4, 1982, the victim was shot during a random shooting incident. The incident had taken place in the middle of the State Street Bridge, Rockford, Illinois. The victim and his family were watching the fireworks display, when the victim was struck by a stray bullet. The victim was taken to Swedish American Hospital where he was treated and released. The offender in this case was never apprehended.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for hospital expenses only.

4.. That section 2(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

5. That the Claimant was not employed for the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident out of which this claim arose and therefore suffered no loss of earnings compensable under the Act.

6. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $7,118.12, $6,618.12 of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $500.00.

7. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

8. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

9. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

10. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on the following:

Net medical expenses $500.00
Less $200.00 Deductible - 200.00
Total $300.00

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $300.00 (three hundred dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Richard G. Hutchins, father of Eric Hutchins, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


author: POCH, J.

text:
    (No. 83-CV-0977

      In re Application of Norman Hamilton.

      Opinion filed April 18, 1985.

    Norman Hamilton, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Alison P. Breslauer, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 13, 1983. Norman Hamilton, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on April 19, 1983, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Norman Hamilton, age 45, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: aggravated assault. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 2.

2. That on March 13, 1983, the Claimant was injured while he was a passenger aboard a Chicago Transit Authority train. The incident occurred on an eastbound train near 530 South Kedzie, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that an unknown offender fired several shots at the passing train. The Claimant received a fracture of the cervical spine when he pulled his son to the floor of the train in an attempt to protect him. The Claimant was initially taken to Rush Presbyterian-St. Lukes Medical Center for treatment of his injuries.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for loss of earnings and for medical/hospital expenses.

4. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $4,579.10, $3,225.80 of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $1,353.30. To date, the Claimant has paid $271.00 towards this balance.

5. That section 2(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

6. That the Claimant was employed by the U.S. Postal Service prior to the injury, and his average monthly earnings were $1,523.54. Claimant was disabled and unable to work from March 13,1983, to September 4,1984. On September 4,1984, the Claimant’s physician released the Claimant to work on a part-time basis. The Claimant was then able to return to work on a full-time basis as of October 1,1984.

7. That the Claimant’s net earnings following his return to work on a part-time basis exceeded $750.00, the maximum amount compensable per month for loss of earnings under the Act. Therefore, the Claimant did not incur a net loss of earnings during his part-time absence.

8. That the Claimant is eligible for loss of earnings during his full-time absence, from March 13, 1983, to September 4, 1984, a period of 17 months and 16 working days.

9. That based on $750.00 per month, the maximum compensation for loss of earnings for 17 months and 16 working days is $13,295.44.

10. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

11. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

12. That the Claimant has received $3,230.36 in sick pay reimbursements that can be counted as an applicable deduction.

13. That the Claimant’s net loss of earnings can be determined as follows:

Compensable loss of earnings $13,295.44
Less disability benefits — 3,230.36
Total $10,065.08

14. That the Claimant, Norman Hamilton, has filed a civil action, Hamilton v. Chicago Transit Authority, No. 84 L 4494, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, as a result of the incident. The Claimant, by informing the Attorney General of his pending civil suit, has acknowledged his responsibility to further notify the Attorney General of the final disposition of the civil action, pursuant to section 17 of the Act.

15. That pursuant to section 18(c) of the Act, the Court may order that all or a portion of an award be paid jointly to the applicant and provider of services. In the instant case, the Court finds this section applicable and orders that joint payment be made.

16. That the amount of the $200.00 deductible should be prorated respectively in accordance with the percentage of the compensable loss.

17. That after considering the applicable deductions, the Claimant’s loss for which he seeks compensation is $11,218.38, based upon the following:

Compensable Less % of $200.00
Amount Deductible i Total
Net Loss of Earnings and Paid Medical/Hospital Expenses $10,336.08 90.5% $10,155.08
Lutheran General Hospital 402.30 3.5% 395.30
Victory V. Roman, M.D. 360.00 3.2% 353.60
Northwest Internal Medicine 150.00 1.3% 147.40
J. Ralph Seaton, M.D. 170.00 1.5% 167.00
Total $11,418.38 100% $11,218.38

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $10,155.08 (ten thousand one hundred fifty-five dollars and eight cents) be and is hereby awarded to Norman Hamilton, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that the sum of $395.30 (three hundred ninety-five dollars and thirty cents) be and is hereby awarded to Norman Hamilton and Lutheran General Hospital.

It is further ordered that the sum of $353.60 (three hundred fifty-three dollars and sixty cents) be and is hereby awarded to Norman Hamilton and Victory V. Roman, M.D.

It is further ordered that the sum of $147.40 (one hundred forty-seven dollars and forty cents) be and is hereby awarded to Norman Hamilton and Northwest Internal Medicine.

It is further ordered that the sum of $167.00 (one hundred sixty-seven dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Norman Hamilton and J. Ralph Seaton, M.D.


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    (No. 84-CV-0041

      In re Application of Anne Becker.

      Order filed October 30, 1984.

    Anne Becker, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on August 13,1982. Anne Becker, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 15, 1983, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Anne Becker, age 28, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: assault. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 1.

2. That on August 13,1982, the Claimant was struck in the face by a bottle thrown at her while driving from a baseball game. The incident occurred at 3700 State Street, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant was taken to Mercy Hospital for treatment of her injuries. The offender has not been apprehended.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses only.

4. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $995.44, all of which was paid by insurance, leaving no balance due.

5. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

6. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

7. That the Claimant has not suffered a pecuniary loss compensable under the Act.

8. That section 6.1(b) of the Act limits the right of compensation to persons who have suffered a pecuniary loss of $200.00 or more attributable to a violent crime resulting in the injury or death of the victim.

9. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

10. That in the event that the Claimant suffers a pecuniary loss of over $200.00 as a result of this incident in the future, she may petition the Court to reopen her case pursuant to section 16 of the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


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    (No. 84-CV-1233

      In re Application of Brett Harvey.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1984.

    David K. Grounds, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on September 25, 1983. Brett Harvey, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on June 12, 1984, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Brett Harvey, age 19, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: reckless conduct. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 5.

2. That on September 25,1983, the victim was shot by an offender known to him. The incident occurred at 1125 East Loop Road, Bethalto, Illinois, where the victim and offender were attending a party. During this party, the offender produced a rifle and fired it into the air. The victim attempted to disarm the offender, and during this struggle the rifle discharged, striking the victim. The victim was taken to Alton Memorial Hospital for treatment of his injuries. The offender was apprehended and was convicted of reckless conduct.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses only.

4. That section 2(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

5. That the Claimant was not employed for the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident out of which this claim arose and therefore suffered no loss of earnings compensable under the Act.

6. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $9,760.73, none of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $9,760.73.

7. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

8. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

9. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

10. That pursuant to section 18(c) of the Act, the Court may order that all or a portion of an award be paid jointly to the applicant and provider of services. In the instant case, the Court finds this section applicable and orders that joint payment be made.

11. That after applying the applicable deductions, the Claimant’s loss for which he seeks compensation is $9,560.73, based upon the following:

Com-Less % pensable of $200.00
Amount Deductible Total
Alton Memorial Hospital $8,358.20 85.7% $8,186.80
Wood River Township Hospital 167.40 1.7% 164.00
Daniel W. Platt, M.D. 184.00 1.9% 180.20
Alton Orthopedic Clinic, Ltd. 151.13 1.5% 148.13
Alton Surgical Clinic 900.00 9.2% 881.60
Total $9,760.73 100% $9,560.73

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $8,186.80 (eight thousand one hundred eighty-six dollars and eighty cents) be and is hereby awarded to Brett Harvey and Alton Memorial Hospital.

It is further ordered that the sum of $164.00 (one hundred sixty-four dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Brett Harvey and Wood River Township Hospital.

It is further ordered that the sum of $180.20 (one hundred eighty dollars and twenty cents) be and is hereby awarded to Brett Harvey and Daniel W. Platt, M.D.

It is further ordered that the sum of $148.13 (one hundred forty-eight dollars and thirteen cents) be and is hereby awarded to Brett Harvey and Alton Orthopedic Clinic, Ltd.

It is further ordered that the sum of $881.60 (eight hundred eighty-one dollars and sixty cents) be and is hereby awarded to Brett Harvey and Alton Surgical Clinic.


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    (No. 85-CV-0015

      In re Application of Eugene B. Finegan.

      Opinion filed August 29, 1984.

    Eugene B. Finegan, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on October 18, 1983. Eugene B. Finegan, husband of the deceased victim, Charlotte S. Finegan, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71, et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 9, 1984, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased wife, Charlotte S. Finegan, age 59, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: reckless homicide. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3.

2. That on October 18, 1983, the victim received multiple injuries when her vehicle was hit by another vehicle. The incident occurred at Wabash and Eighteenth Streets, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was taken to Michael Reese Hospital where she expired. The driver of the other vehicle was charged with reckless homicide.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation under the Act for medical/hospital expenses and for funeral expenses. The Claimant was not dependent upon the victim for support.

4. That the victim incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $3,952.78, which was paid by insurance, therefore leaving no amount due.

5. That funeral and burial expenses were paid by the Claimant in the amount of $4,769.20. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum amount of $2,000.00.

6. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

7. That the Claimant has received $61,647.07 from life insurance policies as a result of the victim’s death, $36,647.07 of which can be counted as applicable deductions.

8. That the Claimant’s net loss for which he seeks compensation is as follows:

Maximum funeral award $ 2,000.00
Less applicable insurance deduction — 36,647.07
Less $200.00 deductible — 200.00
Total — 0 —

9. That after making all the applicable deductions under section 10.1(e) of the Act, the Claimant did not suffer a pecuniary loss compensable under the Act.

10. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.


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    (No. 85-CV-0110

      In re Application of Lorine Blackman.

      Order filed October 30, 1984.

    Lorine Blackman, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 30, 1983. Lorine Blackman, mother of the victim, Iverson J. Blackman, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 27, 1984, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based on these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on July 30,1983, the victim was shot on the street at 5135 South Federal, Chicago, Illinois. The victim was pronounced dead on arrival at Provident Hospital. Police investigation revealed that the victim was involved in an altercation just prior to the incident. During the course of the altercation, the victim produced a gun and apparently threatened to shoot the other participants. A friend of the victim was able to wrestle the gun from the victim and they then left the scene together.

After the victim left, the other participants reported the incident and threat to police officers who were making an arrest in an unrelated incident. While they were speaking to the officers, the victim approached and began shooting. One of the officers then produced his service revolver and returned the victim’s fire. During this exchange the victim was shot. The State’s Attorney’s office found no basis for criminal charges against the police officer.

2. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral and burial expenses only.

3. That section 10.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 10.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced according to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

4. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim’s conduct directly contributed to his death. The victim possessed a gun and was shooting into a crowd of people when he was shot by a police officer who was attempting to protect himself and others in the immediate area of the shooting.

5. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $600.00 which was assumed by the Illinois Department of Public Aid. The Claimant, therefore, has sustained no pecuniary loss.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby, denied.


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    (No. 85-CV-0166

      In re Application of Nona Nash.

      Opinion filed October 31, 1984.

    Nona Nash, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Faith S. Salsburg, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on May 17, 1984. Nona Nash, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on August 15, 1984, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Nona Nash, age 74, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: assault. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12— 1.

2. That on May 17, 1984, the Claimant fell to the ground as a group of unknown offenders were attempting to rob her. The incident occurred on the street at 2800 North Cambridge, Chicago, Illinois. The Claimant was treated for her injuries at the nearby Diversey Clinic. The offenders were not apprehended.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses only.

4. That section 2(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.

5. That the Claimant was not employed for the six months immediately preceding the date of the incident out of which this claim arose and therefore suffered no loss of earnings compensable under the Act.

6. That the Claimant incurred medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $288.00, $192.40 of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $95.60.

7. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

8. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

9. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as applicable deductions.

10. That under section 6.1(b) of the Act, the $200.00 minimal loss requirement is waived for those applicants 65 years of age or older who meet the income eligibility requirement contained in subsection (f) of section 4 of the “Senior Citizens and Disabled Persons Property Tax Relief Act.” The Claimant meets those requirements and the deductible is, therefore, waived in this instance.

11. That the Claimant is entitled to an award based on her net medical expenses of $95.60.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $95.60 (ninety-five dollars and sixty cents) be and is hereby awarded to Nona Nash, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 85-CV-0317

      In re Application of Joyce A. Collins.

      Opinion filed December 11, 1984.

    Joyce A. Collins, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Hans G. Fladung, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on February 7,1984. Joyce A. Collins, wife of the deceased victim, John J. Collins, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on September 28, 1984, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased husband, age 41, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: reckless homicide. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3.

2. That on February 7,1984, the victim was fatally injured as the result of a hit-and-run accident. The incident occurred on the street at 2919 West Van Burén, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the victim, a Chicago police sergeant, was in pursuit of the offender when that offender forced the victim’s vehicle into a parked truck. The offender managed to flee the scene and has not been apprehended to date. The victim was pronounced dead at Mt. Sinai Hospital.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and for loss of support for herself and her minor son, Todd M. Collins, age 15.

4. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $1,012.00. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum award of $2,000.00.

5. That the Claimant and her minor son were totally dependent upon the victim for support.

6. That prior to his death, the victim was employed by the Chicago Police Department and his average monthly earnings were $2,000.95.

7. That section 2(h) of the Act states # * loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.”

8. That the victim was 41 year of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1978, Life Tables, volume II, his life expectancy would have been 73.3 years. The projected loss of support for 32.3 years is $290,700.00, which is in excess of $15,000.00, which is the maximum amount compensable under section 10.1(f) of the Act.

9. That this claim complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

10. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State public aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

11. That the Claimant has received the following in reimbursements as a result of the victim’s death that can be counted as an applicable deduction under section 7.1(7) of the Act.

Applicable life insurance deduction $ 9,302.00
Public Safety Officers Benefit Act 50.000. 00
Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen’s Compensation Act 50.000. 00
Total $109,302.00

12. That the Claimant’s net loss may be computed as follows:

Paid funeral expenses $ 1,012.00
Compensable loss of support 290.700.00
Total 291.712.00
Less reimbursements 109.302.00
Less $200.00 deductible 200.00
Total $182,210.00

13. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss resulting from the victim’s death is in excess of $15,000.00 maximum allowed in section 10.1(f) of the Act.

14. That the Claimant’s interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 11.1 of the Act.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $15,000.00 (fifteen thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Joyce A. Collins, wife of John J. Collins, an innocent victim of a violent crime, to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $1,500.00 (one thousand five hundred dollars) to be paid to Joyce A. Collins;

(b) eighteen (18) equal monthly payments of $750.00 (seven hundred fifty dollars) each to be paid to Joyce A. Collins for the use and benefit of Joyce A. Collins and her minor son, Todd M. Collins;

(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimant or the Claimant’s children, it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.


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    (No. 85-CV-0451

      In re Application of Malakeh E. MuFarreh.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1985.

    Malakeh E. MuFarreh, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General (Hans G. Fladung, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 12, 1984. Malakeh E. MuFarreh, wife of the deceased victim, Essam N. MuFarreh, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on November 1, 1984, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant’s deceased husband, Essam N. MuFarreh, age 30, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 2(c) of the Act, to wit: voluntary manslaughter. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 2.

2. That on July 12,1984, the victim was stabbed by the offender when he requested that the offender leave his establishment. The incident occurred in a tavern operated by the victim at 5001 North Broadway, Chicago, Illinois. After the offender and his brother created a disturbance in the tavern, the victim asked them to leave. During an ensuing scuffle, the offender stabbed the victim several times. The victim was taken to Weiss Hospital for treatment and expired shortly after arrival. The offender was apprehended and is presently being prosecuted for voluntary manslaughter.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for funeral expenses and for loss of support for herself and her minor children, Ramme MuFarreh, age 4, and Ghassan MuFarreh, 4 months of age.

4. That the Claimant incurred funeral and burial expenses in the amount of $3,445.00. Pursuant to section 2(h) of the Act, funeral and burial expenses are compensable to a maximum award of $2,000.00.

5. That the Claimant, Malakeh MuFarreh, and her minor children, Ramme and Ghassan MuFarreh, were totally dependent upon the victim for support.

6. That prior to his death, the victim was self-employed and his average monthly earnings were $650.00.

7. That section 2(h) of the Act states “* # * loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750.00 per month, whichever is less.”

8. That the victim was 30 years of age at the time of the crime. According to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States, 1978, Life Tables, volume II, his life expectancy would have been 75.7 years. The projected loss of support for 45.7 years is $356,460.00, which is in excess of $15,000.00 which is the maximum amount compensable under section 10.1(f) of the Act.

9. That this claim complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

10. That pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200.00 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dram Shop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars) of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

11. That the Claimant has received $100,000.00 in reimbursements from a life insurance policy as a result of the victim’s death, $75,000.00 of which can be counted as an applicable deduction under section 7.1(7) of the Act.

12. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss resulting from the victim’s death is in excess of $15,000.00 maximum allowed in section 10.1(f) of the Act.

13. That the Claimant’s interest would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 11.1 of the Act.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $15,000.00 (fifteen thousand dollars) be and is hereby awarded to Malakeh E. MuFarreh, wife of Essam N. MuFarreh, an innocent victim of a violent crime, to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $2,000.00 (two thousand dollars) to be paid to Malakeh E. MuFarreh in a lump sum;

(b) twenty (20) equal monthly payments of $650.00 (six hundred fifty dollars) each to be paid to Malakeh E. MuFarreh for the use and benefit of herself and minor children, Ramme and Ghassan MuFarreh;

(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimant or the Claimant’s children, it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.