author: Berlin, C.J.

text:
    (No. 6325
    Illinois Power Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 14, 1975.

    Hatch, Corazza, Baker & Jensen, by William L. Hatch, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Howard W. Feldman, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Berlin, C.J.

This is an action to recover the sum of $783.92 which claimant asserts it is owed by respondent under the terms of a contract for electrical and gas utilities service.

The facts have been stipulated to by the parties. On December 22, 1967, the Department of Children and Family Services of the State of Illinois entered into two contracts with claimant for gas and electrical service at the Regional Office Building of the Department of Children and Family Services in Champaign, Illinois. Both contracts contained the following clause:

1. Terms of Payment:
(a) Customers’ bills will be rendered at net rates and will be distributed at monthly intervals bearing date on which net payments are due, namely not less than 10 days after date distributed. Accounts not paid in full within 10 days are subject to an additional charge of 2%.
(b) Upon request by customer, Utility will waive the additional charge of 2% on bills not paid within the net payment period, provided such requests are not made more often than once in each half-calendar year.
(c) Because of statutory or other requirements incidental to their fiscal operations, Federal, State, County and Municipal governments including public school districts or any other political subdivision created under Federal or State Laws and supported by public taxation, will be allowed a period of 30 days from date of bill during which time payment may be made on a net basis. Such accounts not paid in full within 30 days will be subject to an additional charge of 2%.
(d) The additional charge of 2% provided for in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) above shall not be in lieu of or affect the Utility’s right to collect interest as provided by law or by contract on account of failure of the customer to pay charges when they become due and payable.

It has been further stipulated that the additional charges of $783.92 have been correctly calculated by claimant.

The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent must pay the additional charge due under the contract, or whether, as asserted by respondent, the charge constitutes a penalty which is not recoverable by claimant.

In In re Gelino, 43 F.2d 832, at 833, (1930), the Court said:

"Whether a sum named in a contract to be paid by a party in default on its breach is to be considered liquidated damages or merely a penalty, is one of the most perplexing and difficult inquiries encountered in the construction of written agreements. (Citations omitted.) The question is one to be determined by the contract fairly construed.”

See also, Giesecke v. Callerton, 203 Ill.App. 287.

Section 1(d) of the rate structure states clearly that the 2% charge is not in lieu of interest due on the overdue payment. Further, while individual accounts are subject to the 2% charge after 10 days from distribution of the bills, governmental users are given 30 dáys in which to pay before the additional charge is applicable.

We therefore think it clear that the additional charges provided for in the contract are not intended to compensate claimant either for the cost of the power supplied, or for the "time value” of a late payment. Rather, the purpose of the 2% additional charge is to induce prompt payment of the utilities’ bills.

In Giesecke v. Callerton, 230 Ill. 570, at 574, (1917), the Supreme Court said:

"The Court has said more than once that the courts will look to see the nature and purpose of fixing the amount of damages to be paid, and if it appears to have been inserted to secure prompt performance of the agreement, it will be treated as a penalty and no more than actual damages proved can be recovered.”

The Court concludes that the sums sought to be recovered by claimant constitute a penalty.

Claimant argues, however, that in Stewart v. State, 21 C.C.R. 490 (1953), this Court held that the State could be held liable under a penalty clause in a contract. In Stewart, supra., the State entered into a purchase contract which provided for a 7% discount if payment was made within 20 days of delivery of the goods. Although the State did not pay within 20 days, it claimed the discount on the purchase. The Court held that the State was not entitled to the discount, and ordered it to pay the full purchase price.

That situation was substantially different from the case at bar, where claimant’s pricing schedule requires payment of a charge in addition to the base price if payment is delayed. In the former instance, the claimant offered a reward for early payment, to which the State was held not entitled. Here claimant did not offer a reduction in price for prompt payment, but rather punished late payment by providing for a charge over and above the cost of the service provided. The contract in Stewart did not contain a true penalty clause, and that case is not supportive of claimant’s position.

The claim herein is accordingly denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Perlin, C.J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 75-CC-682
    Lewis & Clark Community College, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Board of Vocational Education and Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 14, 1975.

    Lewis & Clark Community College, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C.J.


author: Per Curiam.

text:
    (No. 74-CC-843
    Springfield Anesthesia, LTD., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Board of Vocational Education and Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 15, 1975.

      Springfield Anesthesia, Ltd., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 6916
    Martha Burgett, Admr. of Estate of Edward A. Burgett, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, State Fair Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Frank S. Calandrino, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant, Martha Burgett, Administrator of the estate of Edward A. Burgett, deceased, filed a complaint against the respondent for the sum of $100,000.00.

The suit comes as a result of the death of Edward A. Burgett, the son of the claimant, who met his death on September 8, 1971 at the Illinois State Fairgrounds, Springfield, Illinois.

On that date, Eddie Burgett, age 9, and Ralph Singer, age 10, went to the grandstand at the fairgrounds after school, which they had done many times before. The boys went into the elevator located on the west side of the grandstand and began operating it. While operating that elevator hoist, Eddie Burgett was looking down the gap between the elevator cage and the shaft wall. As the elevator rose, it passed a concrete protrusion, which extended out of the shaft wall about 6 inches. As the elevator passed that protrusion, Eddie’s head was caught and smashed between the floor of the elevator and the protrusion. He was killed instantly as a direct result of the movement of the elevator and his position in the car. Ralph Singer then brought the elevator hoist down and summoned help.

The fairgrounds are open laté in the summer months and there is a playground on the premises where many children play, as well as other activities open to the public. Children were known to play afóund the/livestock barns and grandstand on the fairgrounds during the day and go into the grandstand itself. Children could get into the grandstand easily by several routes. Once inside the grandstand, children had ready access to the elevator hoist therein. On September 8, 1971, the grandstand and elevator were both open to anyone from the sidewalk in front of the grandstand because workmen were moving storage material into the grandstand.

At the time of the incident, the elevator hoist could be operated by merely pushing a button. There was no lock or power cut-off switch on the button panel nor was the outside door leading to the elevator even locked. Presently, the elevator hoist is on a key lock, so that it cannot be operated without the key. At the time of the accident, no warning signs were posted in or around the elevator and no security personnel were stationed in the grandstand. Prior to 1971, there had been a security force on the fairgrounds, but after that, the security duties were shifted to the firemen, eliminating many security personnel.

The evidence is clear and uncontradicted that the fairgrounds, and particularly the vicinity where the deceased met his death, were used by children at play.

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that the State knew or should have known that children frequented the area of the unguarded elevator. The condition was obviously a dangerous one due to the lack of an enclosure to one side of the cage, constituting the elevator, which exposed protruding concrete extensions which could strike passengers or pin them between the elevator and the shaft.

It was abundantly clear that agents of the State of Illinois knew or should have known of the dangerous condition of the elevator hoist and of the presence of children in and around the grandstand area.

Jeff Esselinger, a young man of the age of 12 years, testified that the elevator was never locked, and on one day, a lady, who said she worked at the fairgrounds, cautioned children not to be in the area of the grandstand. The evidence showed that police officers had been summoned to the fairgrounds several times prior to September 19, 1971, to investigate vandalism of children in the grandstand area. The security manager of the Illinois State Fair testified that he personally had chased children from the grandstand.

The elevator was accessable. There were never locks on the doors leading to the elevator. Power was always available for the hoist and there was no ready means of cutting that power off. There were no warning signs or instructions posted anywhere on or around the elevator doors. No periodic check was made of the area and no security personnel or elevator operators were stationed in the grandstand.

Claimant argued that the $100,000.00 limitation should apply and not the $25,000.00 limitation in effect at the time of the death of claimant’s intestate. It is the theory of the claimant that the change in the amount of limitation should be retro-active.

Claimant, in stating the law in support of the claim for damages, cites the following:

"The elements essential to base liability upon one in possession or control are:
1. That a condition dangerous to children existed on the premises;
2. That the Defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous condition;
3. That Defendant failed to correct the dangerous condition or to protect children from the danger;
4. That the dangerous condition caused the injury; and,
5. That damages were sustained as a result thereof.
(James Andrews v. General Contracting Company, 37 Ill.App.2nd, 131, 185 NE 2nd 354, 1962.)”

It is our opinion that the essential elements as set forth in the case cited by the plaintiff have been met for the following reasons.

Certainly an elevator that is unprotected, unlocked so that anyone can use it, and is not completely covered could be construed as a dangerous instrument, particularly where children the ages of the deceased and his companion were playing.

Testimony was given by the companion of the deceased to the effect that they had been in this vicinity at least thirty times, had played in the elevator numerous times, and that they had been warned by an employee of the State to stay out of the grandstand area. In this connection, it is well to note that the companion of the deceased stated there was a hole in the fence where they could get into the grounds and, in addition to that, the main gate was usually open. There can be little question that this dangerous condition caused the death complained of and that damages were sustained as a result thereof.

The State argued on the basis of Kahn vs. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2nd 614, NE 2nd 836 (1955), that the claimant, in order to recover under the doctrine of attractive nuisance must show that the attraction must "habitually” attract minor trespassers, and that the condition or attraction could forseeably cause injury, and that the expense or inconvenience of remedying the condition is not overly burdensome.

The uncontradicted evidence shows that this was an "attractive nuisance” and that the whole area was used by children and had been for a considerable period of time. The fact that after the accident this elevator was kept locked is an indication that the State finally recognized the situation and certainly the expense of locking the elevator so it could not be used was not considered any great burden.

The Illinois law, as cited in the case of Jung vs. Buelens, 77 Ill. App. 2nd 391, (1966), stated as follows:

"There is a presumption of a pecuniary loss in favor of the lineal heirs of the deceased in a wrongful death accident arising from the relationship alone. The decedent’s parents are, of course, lineal next of kin.”

The evidence shows that the deceased was a boy 9 years of age and an exceptionally bright boy. It is our opinion that the presumption of loss has been made by the claimant.

The question as to whether the $100,000.00 limitation should apply, and not the $25,000.00 in effect at the time of the death of the deceased has been argued by claimant. The general rule is that the statutory retro-activity is not to be given effect unless the Legislature intended.to do so. There is nothing in the record here to indicate that it was the intention of the Legislature when they changed the $25,000.00 limitation to $100,000.00 to make it retro-active. It would have been a very simple matter for the Legislature, if they had so intended, to insert this in the law when it was changed.

In deciding the amount of damages to be awarded to the claimant in this case, the Court can take into account only actual monetary damages and may not consider the personal losses of the claimant, based on love and affection.

The evidence shows that the deceased was 9 years old on September 8, 1971, the date of the accident. There was testimony that he was good-natured, a hard worker, and was quick and eager to learn. The evidence also shows that he was conscientious about helping his mother around the home, that he was a Boy Scout, and that he excelled in the projects in which he became involved. All of the evidence adduced indicated that the deceased was an above average youth in intelligence and endeavors.

It is our opinion, based upon the facts in this case, that an award should be entered in the amount of $20,000.00, and an award is hereby entered in that amount in favor of claimant.


text:
    (No. 6937
    M.S.P., Inc., Genesis Group, Inc., Illinois Corporations, Frank Kapple, and Dan Vernich, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Lawrence Walner, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause coming on to be heard on the Stipulation of the parties hereto, which reads as follows:

"1. The instant cause, filed on October 16, 1972, is based upon an alleged breach of contract by, and tortious acts of, agents and employees of the Illinois Department of Mental Health;
2. Prior to the filing of the instant cause, M.S.P., Inc., filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, number 72 CH 336, against the respondent and various employees of respondent; respondent filed an action in the same forum, number 71 Ml-155933, against the claimants;
3. The parties to the aforesaid action and suit agreed to mutually dismiss same with a credit due respondent from claimants in the amount of $4,066.94;
4. The parties hereby agree that respondent owes to claimants, and each of them, the cumulative gross amount of $18,000. (Eighteen Thousand Dollars) less the credit aforesaid, or a net amount of $13,933.06 (Thirteen Thousand, Nine Hundred and Thirty-Three Dollars and Six Cents);
5. The parties further agree that this Court may enter an award in the amount of $13,933.06 (Thirteen Thousand, Nine Hundred and Thirty-Three Dollars and Six Cents) without further notice, no hearings or further pleadings being necessary for a determination herein;
6. The parties, and each of them, agree that the entry of an award in the aforementioned sum shall waive, release, relinquish and forever bar all claims or causes of action by and between the parties hereto, including any and all claims or causes of action that claimants, and each of them, has or may have against any officers, agents and/or employees of the Department of Mental Health from the beginning of time to the date of these presents;
7. The claimants and the Illinois Department of Mental Health expressly agree to perform all acts that may be necessary to effect dismissal of any claims pending against each other in any other court or proceeding.”

and the Court being fully advised in the premises;

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $13,933.06 (Thirteen Thousand, Nine Hundred and Thirty-Three Dollars and Six Cents) be awarded to claimants in full satisfaction of any and all claims or causes of actions that claimants, and each of them, has or may have against any officers, agents and/or employees of the Department of Mental Health, from the beginning of time to the date of these presents.


text:
    (No. 7101
    Eleanor Liedberg, Admr. of Estate of Condley V. Liedberg, deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    McKenna, Storer, Rowe, While & Haskell, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This case is before the Court on a Stipulation of Facts, which Stipulation is as follows:

"Now comes the parties hereto, by their respective counsel, and stipulate to the following facts;
1. That claimant, Eleanor Liedberg, is the Administratrix of the Estate of Condley V. Liedberg, Deceased;
2. That the action is brought pursuant to a ruling by the Fair Employment Practices Commission that decedent was discriminated against in applying for a position with the Illinois Department of Corrections as an adult parole officer;
3. That said decision, a copy of which is attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herewith, indicated that the decedent’s race was one of the factors which resulted in his not being hired and that another factor was the decedent’s age and/or health;
4. That the party hired in place of the decedent, one Andrew C. Cullin, received gross earnings for the period in question, 8-16-68 to 6-24-70, or $14,416.00.
5. That the decedent, during this period of time, had gross earnings in excess of this amount, but that his principal employers paid him gross earnings of at least $12,917.32 for the years 1969 and 1970;
6. That the decedent’s tax returns and W2 forms for the period in question, some of which are incomplete, are submitted as Claimant’s exhibit.
7. That Condley V. Liedberg died on June 24, 1970;
8. That the claimant contends that she is due the amount of $2,182.00 which the Respondent denies;
9. That the respondent denies that the claimant is due any sum and further states that said claim does not survive the death of the aggrieved applicant, Condley V. Liedberg.
10. That the parties agree that the Court may make a determination in this matter without any evidence being presented herein.”

The action was brought pursuant to a ruling by the Fair Employment Practices Commission which held that the decedent, Condley Liedberg, was discriminated against when he applied for a position with the Illinois Department of Corrections as an adult parole officer.

It appears from the records that Condley Liedberg and Andrew C. Cullins both had applied for the position of Adult Parole Agent. The job required working in the area of 63rd Street and Cottage Grove in Chicago, a predominantly black area and considered one of the tough areas in Chicago. Liedberg was white and Cullins was black.

Both applicants were tested and Liedberg received a score of 77.60 while Cullins received a score of 70.80.

Cullins lived closer to the area and was 23 years younger than Liedberg. Both men were impressive from a physical standpoint and both appeared to be comparable in experience. Cullins was selected for the position because of his youth, size, and close proximity to the district. Liedberg contends that he failed to receive the job because of his race. He stated that the Superintendent remarked, "I guess you understand I am hiring nothing but shines for the black belt.” This statement was denied by the Superintendent. However, on cross examination, the Assistant Superintendent did state that "A negro would be more receptive with respect to the community.” His theory was that in a colored district a colored officer would be more acceptable.

The Commission concluded that race could not be considered a factor in any degree in an employment decision. Otherwise, the act could very well be circumvented. The Commission contends that it matters not whether an employer gives race, color, religion, little or no weight. The question is — were any of these factors given any consideration at all. The command of the Act states that race, color, religion, national origin, and ancestry cannot be considered at all nor could the degree of risk involved be considered a factor, as this is a factor for the employee to evaluate and assume if he so desires. Closeness to work cannot influence an employment decision, as this, too, could be used as a subtle discrimination in interpreting the Act. Those matters could be used as a smoke screen to accomplish what the Act prohibits.

The Commission reversed the order of the hearing examiner because the Fair Employment Practices Act was violated in refusing to hire Liedberg based to a certain extent on his being thought that a black would be more acceptable because of the neighborhood.

Liedberg brought a complaint for $2,182.00 being the sum he complained he lost by reason for not being hired. Andrew Cullins, who had been hired, was paid $14,416.00 for the period of time from August 16, 1968 to June 24, 1970, this being the period Liedberg was off the job. Apparently during that time, Liedberg earned less money. It is not clear how the claimant arrived at $2,182.00 as being the damages, but the respondent does not indicate why that sum is incorrect.

The complaint was actually filed by Eleanor Lied-berg, as Administrator of the Estate of Condley Lied-berg, deceased. The State contends that the action here does not survive. However, it is the opinion of this Court that the action is in the nature of a suit for breach of contract and such action does survive.

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $2,182.00 be awarded to the claimant in full satisfaction of any and all claims presented to the State of Illinois for the salary during the period for which recovery is sought.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-355
    Robert S. Maddox, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.
    Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Robert S. Maddox, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-394
    Dictaphone Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Governor’s Office of Human Resources, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Dictaphone Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-441
    Cities Service Oil Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-557
    Central Office Equipment Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Central Office Equipment Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-628
    Standard Rewashed Wipers Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Standard Rewashed Wipers Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-697
    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-709
    Michael Greaney, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Michael Greaney, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-715
    U.S. Geological Survey, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois State Water Supply, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    U.S. Geological Survey, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-751
    Central YMCA School, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Central YMCA School, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-795
    United Visual Aids, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    United Visual Aids, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-797
    Office Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Office Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-817
    Moore Business Forms, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Moore Business Forms, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-820
    W. B. Jackets Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    W. B. Jackets Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-849
    K. P. N. Rao, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    K. P. N. Rao, M.D., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-857
    County of Sangamon, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    County of Sangamon, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This cause comes before this Court on the Joint Stipulation of the claimant, County of Sangamon, and the respondent, State of Illinois. The claim stems from the expenses incurred by the County of Sangamon in the prosecution of defendants in the case of the State of Illinois v. William Earl Bassett, Robert Lee Brown, a/k/a Prentiss Ray Griffin, Alonzo Howard Jones, and John William Stamps. The specific expense from which claim is made is the expense incurred in providing court appointed legal counsel for the defendants which costs came to $23,022.37.

This claim for reimbursement of expenses is made pursuant to Chapter 38, par 1003-6-5 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973, which replaces a similar provision which was previously found in Chapter 108, par. 118 of the 1971 Illinois Revised Statutes. The statutes both provided, in essence, that when any person is charged with committing an offense while confined by the Department of Corrections, cognizance thereof shall be taken by the Circuit Court of the county wherein such crime was committed, and the court shall adjudicate and sentence the person charged with said crime in the same manner and subject to the same rules and limitations as are established by law for other persons charged with crimes. The statutes further provided that the expense of this prosecution would be paid by the Department. Also involved is chapter 146, par. 33 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, which provides that where a change of venue is requested and granted, the originating county will reimburse the county where the case is actually tried.

In this case, the prisoners were confined in Randolph County when the riot occurred at Menard Prison and the case was tried in Sangamon County pursuant to a change of venue.

Normally, the procedure set forth in the statues would be that the County of Sangamon would seek reimbursement of their expenses from the County of Randolph who in turn would seek reimbursement of their expenses from the Department of Corrections, or the County of Randolph would determine the cost expended by the County of Sangamon, and the County of Randolph would then seek this amount from the Department of Corrections. The Department of Corrections would pay that amount to the County of Randolph who would then pay it to the County of Sangamon. However, this case is being filed directly against the State of Illinois by the County of Sangamon, and this Court finds that inasmuch as the statutes provide that the ultimate cost shall be borne by the State, that the intent of the legislature was obvious and to require that this claim be honored only when presented by the County of Randolph, would be to require circuitous or multiplicity of claims.

This court finds that the expeditious handling of this matter requires that the State implement the intention of the legislature by awarding this claim directly to the County of Sangamon.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that the County of Sangamon be granted an award in the amount of $23,022.37 (Twenty Three Thousand Twenty Two Dollars and Thirty Seven Cents) in payment of their expenses incurred in the prosecution costs of the defendants above set forth pursuant to statutes previously cited.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-858
    Robert A. Lee, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Robert A. Lee, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-875
    Oberheide Coal & Oil Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Oberheide Coal & Oil Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-919
    Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Orkin Exterminating Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-922
    Mine Safety Appliance Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Mine Safety Appliance Co., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-928
    Paul D. McCurry, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Registration and Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 16, 1975.

    Paul D. McCurry, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-507
    Charles Edward Stade, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Registration and Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Charles Edward Stade, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-678
    Gracell Manor, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Gracell Manor, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-55
    Kroch’s & Brentano’s, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Kroch’s & Brentano’s, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-106
    Union Electric Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Union Electric Company, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-189
    Rush Presbyterian St. Lukes Medical Center, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Gardner, Carton, Douglas, Childron & Waud, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-564
    The Hub Clothiers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois State Fair Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    The Hub Clothiers, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-565
    The Hub Clothiers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois State Fair Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    The Hub Clothiers, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-599
    Irene Buchanan, Administrator of the Estate of Johnnye Mae Collins, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Irene Buchanan, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-664
    Central Illinois Public Service Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Central Illinois Public Service Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-698
    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-699
    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

      Motorola, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-719
    Eva M. Burns, etc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    J. David Bone, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-721
    Drapa Signs, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Drapa Signs, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-723
    Ziebart Auto-Truck Rustproofing, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Ziebart Auto-Trucking Rustproofing, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-780
    The Rockford Store, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    The Rockford Store, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-888
    Hires Trucking Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Hires Trucking Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-895
    Seminar Press, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Seminar Press, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-918
    Lois Moe, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Lois Moe, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-926
    Roy F. Weston, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Roy F. Weston, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-942
    John E. Meyer, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    John E. Meyer, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent..
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-943
    John E. Meyer, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    John E. Meyer, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-950
    Sears Roebuck and Co., A Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Sears Roebuck and Co., A Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General,. for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-971
    Commonwealth Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Motor Vehicles, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

      George O. Shaffner and Joseph C. Sibley, Jr., Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-992
    Utopia Enterprises, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Utopia Enterprises, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-994
    Bruning Division Addressograph Multigraph Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Bruning Division Addressograph Multigraph Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1013
    S G A Scientific, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    S G A Scientific, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1054
    Dominic Costelli, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Dominic Costelli, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1056
    George E. Inslee, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    George E. Inslee, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1057
    Kevin B. Harvey, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 28, 1975.

    Kevin B. Harvey, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-636
    Graphic Sciences, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

      Graphic Sciences, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-944
    Root Bros. Mfg. & Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    Root Bros. Mfg. & Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-966
    Commonwealth Edison Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    George O. Shaffner & Joseph C. Sibley, Jr., Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-982
    Michael R. La Copo, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    Michael R. La Copo, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-985
    Mid-City Typewriter Exchange, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Business and Economic Development, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    Mid-City Typewriter Exchange, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-1006
    Roger L. Thomas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 1, 1975.

    Roger L. Thomas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Perlin, C. J.

text:
    (No. 5643
    Valentine Harpstreith, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 8, 1975.

    Sprague, Sprague & Ysursa, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

Claimant, Valentine Harpstreith, seeks $35,000 in damages as compensation for 20 years of imprisonment which he asserts were unjustly administered as a result of an erroneous conviction. The claim is invoked pursuant to Section 8(c) of the Court of Claims Act, Ch. 37, Ill. Rev. Stat., Sec. 439.8(c) which grants exclusive jurisdiction to this Court over claims against the State for time unjustly served in prison.

Valentine Harpstreith was convicted of the murder of one Julius Nungesser in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County in 1929, and was imprisoned from April, 1929, to July 2, 1949. On December 30, 1968, he received a pardon from the Honorable Samuel H. Shapiro, the then Governor of the State of Illinois. Inquiry by the Court, has determined that the Board of Pardons advised Harpstreith that the ground for the pardon was his "twenty-years’ service on the life sentence before parole eligibility occurred, plus the good record maintained during the nineteen years since [his] release on parole.”

The record before this Court establishes that on September 9, 1929, one Julius Nungesser was shot to death on his farm outside of New Baden, Illinois. A man named Albert Kehrer, who was picking elderberries in the vicinity, heard the shots, drove to the farm and saw the victim lying on his back. He called to Nungesser but received no response so he proceeded to the farm of Frank Grimmer, a neighbor, and returned to the scene with Grimmer. Grimmer states that when he arrived at Nungesser’s farm, he asked the victim what had occurred, ". . . and he told me that a detective came out of the cornfield and shot him.” Grimmer then procured a glass of water for Nungesser, at the latter’s request, held his head, and gave him a drink. The victim then lapsed into unconsciousness and died. Grimmer has stated that at Harpstreith’s trial he was not allowed to testify concerning the aforesaid remark by Nungesser.

At the time of the murder, claimant operated an establishment in the area, colloquially known as a speak-easy. Several days after Nungesser’s murder, he was arrested on suspicion of possession of bootleg whiskey and was taken to the Clinton County Jail. Harpstreith was interrogated concerning the shooting, but denied having any knowledge of the incident. Subsequently, he was convicted on the bootlegging charge and fined $850. However, according to Harpstreith, the fine was reduced to $300 after a hushed conference between the judge and the Clinton County sheriff. On the way back to the jail the sheriff allegedly asked claimant for information on the Nungesser matter in return for the reduced fine. Again, claimant maintained his ignorance of the crime.

Harpstreith testified that during his stay in the Clinton County Jail he was repeatedly interrogated about the murder and subjected to physical and mental abuse in order to coerce a confession. No confession was forthcoming and after four days he was transferred to the St. Clair Jail, where he was confined in a "three foot square box with three holes for ventilation,” for over 90 hours. A written confession was repeatedly placed in front of him for his signature, but he continued to resist these and other pressures.

Finally, claimant was tried for the Nungesser murder with two co-defendants, Raymond Rensing and Elmer Lindner. Both Rensing and Lindner had signed confessions implicating Harpstreith, but at trial both Rensing and Lindner attempted to rescind these confessions as being the result of physical coercion. Both now state that these confessions were coerced and untrue.

The only other testimony at trial adverse to the claimant was that of George Shelton and Charles Pillows, two of claimant’s fellow inmates, who stated that they heard Harpstreith admit to the murder while in jail. Shortly after the trial, both of these men escaped from jail. When recaptured, both signed sworn affidavits stating their testimony about Harpstreith had been false and was induced by promises of freedom from the authorities.

Claimant has also brought to the attention of this Court the fact that the prosecuting attorney has expressed his doubts about Harpstreith’s guilt, and has stated that those doubts have existed since the time of the trial.

During the present proceedings, William Nettles, the former sheriff of Clinton County, testified for respondent that when claimant approached him seeking help in obtaining a pardon, Nettles went to speak to Raymond Rensing. Nettles said that Rensing told him not to bother to help because he [Rensing] had been at the farm with Harpstreith on the day of the murder, and Harpstreith had come from behind the farmhouse with a gun in his hand after shots had been fired.

Rensing denied making this statement to Nettles, saying that he told Nettles not to get involved because he [Rensing] was tired of having the matter repeatedly brought up.

As originally enacted, Section 8(c) of the Court of Claims Act, required a claimant seeking damages for unjust imprisonment to prove his innocence of the crime for which he was imprisoned. The section provided:

"(c) All claims against the State for time unjustly served m prisons of this State where the persons imprisoned proved their innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned . . .”

This provision gave rise to many problems. Often the Court was called upon to re-try criminal cases long dormant, after the memories of witnesses had faded, and evidence was no longer available or had changed with the passing of time.

Since the Court could not rationalize any intent by the Legislature to reward perpetrators of crimes who might allege and prove technical errors in their convictions, the Court adopted a rule requiring a claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not commit the act which constituted the crime for which he was convicted. Dirkins v. State of Illinois, 25 C.C.R. 343 (1965).

Subsequently, in order to obviate the problems inherent in the administration of the statute, the Legislature, amended Section 8(c) to require that one who seeks to recover for time unjustly served in prison must first have received a pardon on grounds of innocence. See, Ch. 37, Ill. Rev. Stat., Sec. 439.8(c). However, at the time claimant instituted this action, this amendment was not in effect, and claimant therefore bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his innocence of the "fact” of the crime for which he was imprisoned.

All four witnesses who tied Harpstreith to the crime at the original trial appear to have reversed their testimony. His two fellow inmates who said they heard claimant admit to the murder subsequently swore that they did so upon a promise of freedom, and Harpstreith’s alleged co-conspirators have also now stated that they lied under coercion when they implicated him in the matter. They manifest no apparent ulterior motive for these recantations.

It thus may well be that claimant could sustain his burden of proof as generally required in cases of this kind. However, before reaching this issue we must consider as a question of first impression the retroactive application of Section 8(c) of the Court of Claims Act, Ch. 37, Sec. 439.8(c), which was enacted July 9, 1959, thirty years subsequent to claimant’s conviction and ten years after his release from the penitentiary.

A "retroactive law” has been defined as one which "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past.” 82 C.J.S. Statutes, Sec. 412. There is no doubt that Ch. 37, Ill. Rev. Stat., Sec. 439.8(c) created a new obligation on the part of the State to compensate individuals wrongfully convicted and incarcerated, as no such duty existed at common law. See, Campbell v. State, 62 N.Y.S.2d (1946).

Section 439.8(c) is silent as to whether it is to be applied retroactively. By contrast, Art. 2, Sec. 9(3-a) of the Court of Claims Act of New York grants that court jurisdiction,

"To hear and determine the claim for damages against the State of any person heretofore or hereafter convicted of any felony or misdemeanor against the State and sentenced to imprisonment, who, after having served all or any part of his sentence, shall receive a pardon which is issued on the ground of innocence of the crime for which he was sentenced.” (emphasis supplied)

The Illinois statute contains no comparable language, and under general rules of statutory construction, such words are necessary if a statute is to be given retroactive application. In U.S. Steel Credit Union v. Knight, 32 Ill.2d 138, 204 N.E.2d 4 (1965), the court said:

"Retroactive legislation is not favored and as a general rule statutes are considered to operate prospectively unless the legislative intent that they be given retroactive operation clearly appears from the express language of the act or by necessary or unavoidable implication.”

See also, Quincy Trading Post v. Department of Revenue, 12 Ill.App.3d 725, 298 N.E.2d 789 (1973); People ex rel Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. 367, 21 N.E.2d 318 (1939); and 34 I.L.P. Statutes, §193.

We can find no clear direction from the Legislature in Section 8(c) of the Court of Claims Act that the statute is to be applied retroactively, and in the absence of such express direction we are compelled to give the statute only prospective application.

One additional aspect of this issue merits attention, although it has not been raised by either party. Section 22 of the Court of Claims Act, 37 Ill. Rev. Stat., Sec. 439.22, provides in pertinent part:

"Every claim cognizable by the court arising under subsection C of Section 8 of this Act shall be forever barred from prosecution therein unless it is filed with the Clerk of the Court within 2 years after the person asserting such claim is discharged from prison, or is granted a pardon by the Governor,***.” (emphasis supplied)

Since claimant did file this action within two years of receipt of a gubernatorial pardon, it may be contended that Section 22 authorized his cause of action.

The answer to any such contention is found, we believe, in the language of Section 22 referring to claims "cognizable by the court arising under subsection C of Section 8 of this Act.” We have concluded that Section 8(c) of the Act cannot be applied retroactively. Therefore, claimant does not have a "claim cognizable by the court.”

The Court must therefore deny claimant’s request for damages.


author: Burks, J.

text:
    (No. 74-CC-543
    Gale Williams, Claimant, vs. Board of Trustees, Southern Illinois University, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1975.

    Robert P. Schulhof, Attorney for Claimant.
    James B. Bleyer, Attorney for Respondent.
   Burks, J.

This matter comes again before the court for a ruling on respondent’s motion for summary judgment in the light of the briefs and replies filed by both parties pursuant to our prior order entered August 9, 1974.

This is an action for libel, based on alleged libelous statements contained in 2 paid advertisements published in Southern Illinois University’s "Daily Egyptian” on the first and third day of November, 1972. The second ad, substantially identical to the first, in space about 4 columns wide and 10" high, reads as follows:

"Q. WHAT’S WORSE THAN A BAD CARBONDALE LANDLORD?
A. A BAD CARBONDALE LANDLORD WHO VOTES IN THE ILLINOIS LEGISLATURE.
As a state representative, Gale Williams voted against the following bills:
HB 2600 (1969) authorizing tenants to bring action against landlords to enforce compliance with building codes.
HB 53 (1971) requiring payment of interest on security deposits.
HB 2700 (1972) allowing tenants to make necessary repairs and deduct the cost from one month’s rent when the landlord repeatedly refuses to do so.
H.B. 202 (1971) requiring installation of fire alarm systems in apartment buildings (Williams was one of only five representatives to vote against this bill which passed overwhelmingly).
Now Gale Williams wants to be a State Senator. The Student vote can make the difference.
GALE WILLIAMS HAS CONSISTENTLY VOTED AGAINST THE STUDENTS. THERE’S AN ALTERNATIVE TO GALE WILLIAMS. HIS NAME IS KEN BUZBEE.
Paid for by Better Housing thru Better Government, Doug Diggle, chairman (small type)”

Daily Egyptian, November 3, 1972, Page 17. [The court takes notice that the same ad published two days earlier is identical in content except for the omission of the last three words, "Doug Diggle, chairman”.]

Respondent’s motion for a summary judgment is a procedure established by §57 of the Civil Practice Act. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1973, Ch. 110§57. The statute provides for the entry of summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The worthy purpose of this statute is to facilitate and expedite litigation, a procedure encouraged by our courts.

From our search of the record in the case at bar, we find no genuine triable issue of fact. The only issues presented are questions of law. We have not overlooked claimant’s affidavit, the only affidavit in the record,' but find that it contains merely conclusions of law based on facts already in the record which speak for themselves. Carruthers v. B. C. Christopher Co., (1974) 57 Ill.2d 376.

The pertinent issues of law presented in this case, as we view them, are:

Whether the advertisements, even if libelous, come within the privilege rules concerning criticisms made of public officials.

Whether the advertisements were published with actual malice.

Whether the words “bad landlord,” as used in the advertisements, are libelous per se.

Claimant, at the time of the publications in question was a Representative in the General Assembly and a candidate for State Senator. For many years our courts have been creating exceptions to the common law rules of libel where the publications concern the conduct of a candidate for public office or a public official.

When a person becomes a candidate for public office, his qualifications and fitness for office are put before the public and are therefore made a proper subject for fair comment by the press and the public in general. Gogerty v. Covins, 5 Ill.App. 2d 74. This principle of law has been clearly defined in Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405 (1919) when at page 417, the Supreme Court of Illinois held:

"When anyone becomes a candidate for public office, conferred by the election of the people, he is considered as putting his character in issue, so far as it may respect his fitness and qualifications for office, and everyone may freely comment on his conduct and actions. His acts may be canvassed and his conduct boldly censored.”

In the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254; 11 L ed 686, at page 706, the U.S. Supreme Court said:

"The Constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice’ — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”

Thus, under the rules of law enumerated in the New York Times case, the claimant in the case at bar would not be entitled to recover from the respondent, even if matters contained in the published advertisements were false, unless they were made with "actual malice” or they were libelous per se. We turn first to the question of malice.

Claimant bases his charge of "malice” solely on the grounds that the advertisements in question violate the statute dealing with publication of political literature as stated in Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 46 §29-14. Without pointing out the alleged violation, claimant concludes that such disregard for the law shows respondent’s reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the entire content of the advertisements and proves malice. This conclusion is without merit.

Claimant apparently is referring to the fact that the advertisements in question do not contain the address of the organization or person who caused the ads to be published as required by the statute cited. The first advertisement merely states that it was paid for by "Students for Better Housing Through Better Government”. The second adds the words, "Doug Diggle, Chairman”. This apparently is not sufficient identification to satisfy the statute. Claimant does not allege that the said group or its chairman were unknown or could not be located. However, according to the statute, Chapter 46, Section 29-14, the omission of adequate names and addresses is a "Class A misdemeanor”. We do not equate this statutory penalty for such omission with grounds required to sustain an action for libel.

It should be noted that in the Sullivan case (Supra), the New York Times published an advertisement which contained 10 or 15 separate misstatements of fact. The evidence disclosed that the Times had in its own files information which would show the falsity of the allegations in the ad, and that they failed to search their own files. Yet the U.S. Supreme Court held the newspaper not guilty of libel. It follows, a fortiori, that the failure of the "Daily Egyptian” to notice the omission of adequate names and addresses on the political advertisements is not evidence that would remotely support claimant’s contention that the advertisements published were conceived or inspired by a malicious design to injure the claimant in his business. (See Lulay v. Peoria Journal-Star Inc., (1966) 34 Ill.2d 112, 116 and authorities therein cited.)

The final issue is whether the term "bad landlord,” which claimant was called in the advertisements, are actionable per se as being that type of statement which prejudices the claimant in his trade or profession if falsely communicated.

Claimant contends that the words "bad landlord” damaged his professional and business reputation which is unrelated to his conduct as a public official, or at least, not covered under the privilege rule in Times v. Sullivan (Supra).

We have carefully examined and will comment on the authorities cited in claimant’s brief as follows:

Stanley v. Taylor (1972) 4 Ill.App.3d 97 correctly states that Illinois courts have removed all distinctions between slander and libel, and that the same rules apply whether the offensive language is oral or written. However, the Stanley case gives no support to claimant’s position. There a school teacher in the presence of witnesses said to her principal in a loud voice that could be heard in nearby classrooms, "I think you are plain stupid. You are a disgrace to your profession. You are just like that old Lee Harvey Oswald that shot and killed President Kennedy, and that old Jack Ruby who shot and killed him in Dallas”. Yet the court held that this "slanderous” attack was not libelous per se.

In Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc., (1966) 99 Ill. App.2d 28 the newspaper published a rumor that the city attorney was "attempting to break the law”. The evidence showed that the rumor was false. The court held that the published language was not capable of an innocent construction, and that it was equally an attack upon his honesty and integrity as an attorney and as a city official. The facts have little resemblance to the case at bar.

We also fail to see any similarity in Cook v. East Shore Newspapers Inc. (1945) 327 Ill.App. 559. There liability was found against the newspaper which accepted as true statements of a discharged employee and published an article, covering half of the front page, charging a city judge with selling jobs and dishonesty in discharging duties of his office. The publisher had made no investigation of the facts, showing a reckless disregard for the truth. Even so, the decision might have been different if it were made 20 years later, after the New York Times v. Sullivan decision of 1964.

It is the respondent’s contention that use of the term "bad” is merely name calling and there is no specific act of which the claimant is accused. Respondent points out that use of the term in itself implies an opinion rather than a set of facts, and to say that someone is a bad person, a bad lawyer, or a bad landlord would not specifically accuse that person of any nefarious conduct or guilt.

We have noted in Delis v. Sepsis (1972) 9 Ill.App.3d 217 that the plaintiff [who was a candidate for office in a fraternal association] was described in a published letter as "dishonorable” and as "being a deliberate liar.” The court held that these words, somewhat stronger than the word "bad,” were not libelous per se, and amounted to no more than "name calling” where such remarks were made in connection with particular facts set forth in the letter.

We find much more objectionable words held to be unactionable name calling in McGuire v. Jankiewicz (1972) 8 Ill.App.3d 319, where the court said at page 320:

"Turning then to the words used in the instant case, it is readily apparent that the statement 'your lawyer is an ass hole’ is merely an example of objectionable but unactionable 'name-calling.’ ”

However, the court went on in McGuire to find that the following words were actionable slander, "You could not have chosen a worse attorney.” The court said that these words "had the effect of placing plaintiff as the least competent of all licensed and practicing attorneys.” This latter statement obviously is so much stronger than the words "bad landlord” that the ruling is not applicable to the case at bar.

In searching for authorities in which an action for libel or slander is based on words somewhat closer to the term "bad landlord,” we find in Valentine v. North American Life & Health Ins. Co., (1973) 16 Ill.App.3d 277 the expression "lousy agent” was held to be nothing more than harsh judgment as to why agency was being terminated, and that these words are not actionable under the "innocent construction rule” adopted in Illinois. John v. Tribune Co. (1962) 24 Ill.2d 437, 442.

In the John v. Tribune opinion at page 442, the Illinois Supreme Court cited many cases in which the "innocent construction” rule has been followed and restates that rules as follows:

"That rule holds that the article is to be read as a whole and the words given their natural and obvious meaning, and requires that words allegedly libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and declared nonactionable as a matter of law.”

Having previously stated that we find no showing of actual malice against the claimant by the "Daily Egyptian,” under the innocent construction rule in Lulay v. Peoria Journal (Supra) and John v. Tribune Co. (Supra), we now hold that the words "bad landlord,” as used in the case at bar, are not actionable as a matter of law. We find strong support in Watson v. Southwest Messenger Press Inc., (1973) 12 Ill.App.3d 968 in which published articles accused the mayor of Hickory Hills of criminal acts of official misconduct. In granting a summary judgment for the publisher, the court said at page 972:

"In the case at bar, even were we to assume that the newspaper articles are libelous per se and, therefore, actionable, we must conclude that these articles are conditionally privileged as a matter of law. There is a strong and necessary rule of law resting upon an ample foundation of state and federal constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press, that reports by a newspaper upon the activities of a municipal government or its officers are privileged, even though false and defamatory, and this privilege can be defeated only by proof that the particular publication was 'motivated solely by actual malice.’ ”

A summary judgment for the respondent is hereby granted and this claim is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-746
    Jean Rosenbaum, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 12, 1975.

    Jean Rosenbaum, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant filed her complaint alleging that she suffered damages as the result of occurrences in the Domestic Relations Court, Juvenile Court, and Chancery, and Divorce Court, all in Chicago, Illinois, and all a part of the Court system of that State of Illinois and for which the State is responsible.

The complaint alleges that in 1969, as a result of domestic difficulties, claimant went to Domestic Relations Court in an attempt to pursue her legislative right of support in accordance with her husband’s station-of-life, as a wife, and mother of minor children, as she did not want a divorce or separate maintenance.

Claimant alleges that various Assistant State’s Attorneys, on different occasions, refused to give her a complaint to sign, stating that this was a Court for the absolutely destitute wives only and verbally ordered her to go to work even though she had minor children.

Claimant further alleges that her husband had been in a condition of near-nervous breakdown for several years due to Urban Renewal and relocation in his business neighborhood, that he had left his wife and family, and had been behaving erratically for a long period of time.

She further states that she was shown Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 68-24,1969, entitled "Neglect to Provide for Destitute Wife or Children,” as justification for the policy of the State’s Attorneys office.

Claimant further alleges that when she suggested that perhaps a private attorney could aid her, she was told if she could afford an attorney, she was not destitute enough to qualify for entry into Domestic Relations Court.

She further states that after she spent a great deal of time, to the neglect of her home and family, she finally did secure a complaint to sign, at which time she attempted to strike the word "destitute” from the complaint, but was not allowed to do so by her Court advisor who stated "it was only a formality and would not make any difference.”

She further alleges, that the Court finally ordered her husband to pay her $25.00 weekly for approximately one year, and refused to renew the award at the end of that time, and also that the Court ordered her to "get a divorce or file for separate maintenance.”

Claimant further states that in January, 1973, the Legislative Reference Bureau in Springfield, Illinois, discovered the word "destitute” in the complaint at Domestic Relations Court was totally illegal. She alleges that for 22 years, the Domestic Relations Court had forced middle-class women into divorce or legal separation illegally.

She further complains that the Juvenile Court of Chicago, Illinois, and particularly Judge David Schaffer, had acted erroneously in some decisions and she further alleges that Judge Schaffer was found hung by the neck, an apparent suicide, and that she was eventually informed that the Judge had been under psychiatric treatment for a long time and that, due to his emotional condition, he was not capable of carrying on his responsibilities as a judge.

Claimant, at great length, further alleges other acts of the Court, to her detriment. She bases her claim upon Section 12 of the new 1970 Constitution of the State of Illinois, which is as follows:

"RIGHT TO REMEDY AND JUSTICE.. Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely and promptly.”

This Complaint is perhaps but a logical extension of the decision in the Molitor case and one which was foreseen by Judge Davis at the time the decision was rendered in that case. In his dissenting opinion, he made the following statements:

"This decision cannot but be the occasion for releasing a flood of litigation and legislation in order to establish new boundaries in this area of novel liability. During this period, school districts will be harassed by doubts and difficulties which will impair their ability to conduct an efficient system of free schools.
(Tort) liability should not be imposed upon the State or its governmental agencies without exploring and considering this complicated aspects of its impact, and without authorizing a tax levy and providing a tax rate for such purpose.”

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, citing the fact that "all of said alleged acts were judicial in nature and hence privileged from liability.”

There are two cases that seem to deal with the situation at hand.

The case of James Lusietto, Administrator of the Estate of Shirley Lusietto, Deceased vs. James Kingan, 107 Ill. App. 2d 239, 246 N.E. 2d 24 (1969), in which suit was brought by the administrator of the estate of the deceased against a State Highway Supervisor, alleged that the deceased met her death by reason of the failure of the supervisor of highways to have the road in proper condition, causing the fatal accident. The Court, in passing upon this case, laid down the rule that before recovery can be made when suit is brought against a State employee in his official capacity, it must be shown there was a violation of some duty owned to an individual and unless such violation was shown, it cannot give rise to legal liability of an individual employee. The Court, in citing the case of Nagle vs. Wakey, 161 Ill. 387, 393, 43 N.E. 1079, recognized the distinction between the duty which a Commissioner of Highways owes to an individual and that which he owes to the public in general, holding that for a violation of the former, he may be sued by an individual but not so for a violation of a duty he owes to the public in general.

The distinction seems to arise as to whether the matter was ministerial or whether it was one that required the exercise of discretion and judgment. It is a well-established principle of the common law that an immunity exists in favor of public officials when they are exercising their official discretion on matters which are discretionary in nature and not ministerial. People for Use of Munson vs. Bartels, 138 Ill. 322, 27 N.E. 1091; McCormick vs. Burt, 95 Ill. 263; Gilbert vs. Bone, 64 Ill. 518; Kelly vs. Ogilvie, 64 Ill. App. 2d 144, 212 N.E. 2d 279. Quite apart from the doctrine of governmental immunity, the case law in this State has developed the doctrine of public officials immunity. This doctrine is distinguished from and founded on a different rationale from the principle of governmental immunity. See note 1966 Illinois Law Forum 981 at 995.

In the present case, the actions of the various judges were discretionary and not strictly ministerial.

It is the law of this State that the principle of public officials immunity still exists. This was decided in the case of Kelly vs. Ogilvie, 64 Ill. App. 2d 144, 212 N.E. 2d 279. This case was decided almost six years after the Molitor case and the Court recognized that the principle of public officials immunity still existed and stated:

"This doctrine rests on the principle that the public decision maker, like the judge, ought to be shielded from personal liability or other factors extraneous to a judgment based on his best perception of public needs.”

It appears, therefore, that the doctrine of public immunity still exists as to acts of individuals where they have discretionary and ministerial duties to perform.

Respondent’s motion to dismiss is hereby granted and said cause is dismissed.


text:
    (No. 6155
    Mildred O’Hearn, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Carl J. Cipolla, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Edward L. Arkema, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

Claimant, Mildred O’Hearn, seeks payment for injuries she sustained on November 18,1970, while she was at the Illinois Division of Unemployment Compensation Office at 4082 North Milwaukee Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. She was at this office for the purpose of obtaining her unemployment compensation check.

Evidence discloses that she was in the office from early in the morning on the date of the accident until around 4:15 p.m.

The office contained many chairs, either aluminum or steel, and they were movable. The chairs were there for the benefit and convenience of the public, such as claimant. The evidence also discloses that she had been in this office on at least three previous occasions and, consequently, she was familiar with the contents therein, such as the seating arrangements, type of chairs, etc.

Claimant’s testimony is that she arrived at the office about 9:00 a.m. and, as the accident did not occur until after 4:00 p.m., she had been inidiis office for a full day and had a chance to observe the placing of the chairs, the moving of them, and the general picture of the area.

Claimant contends that the legs of the chair which caused her to fall were sticking out at an angle of approximately 45°. She claims that this chair had been pushed into the aisle by someone unknown and that she did not see the leg of the chair when she fell over the same.

Claimant sustained rather serious injuries and as a result of these injuries she underwent a surgical procedure and was on crutches until she returned to work on January 2, 1971, after which she used a cane until April 1971, when she was discharged by her doctor.

It is claimant’s contention that the rear legs of the chair in question, which was the ordinary type of office chair, were dangerous and defective in that the legs protruded into the aisle making it unsafe for her to pass. She further contended that the State was negligent in having such type of furniture in this office and, consequently, she is entitled to the money expended for medical care and attention, as well as compensation for the injury she sustained.

The respondent filed a motion to dismiss and, as grounds for said motion, stated that the claimant was in violation of Rules 16 and 18 of the rules of this Court because the claimant did not file an abstract of the evidence from the record, which was approximately 150 pages in length.

Claimant answered the motion to dismiss by stating that she did not file the abstract because of an agreement with the Assistant Attorney General. We accept claimant’s answer.

It is fundamental that the burden of proof is upon claimant to establish negligence on the part of respondent, as well as her freedom from contributory negligence, before recovery can be had. 26 C.C.R. Page 77, at Page 80.

The law in the State of Illinois is clear that, in order for claimant in a tort action to recover against the State, he must prove that the State was negligent, that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, and that claimant was in the exercise of due care and caution for his own safety. McNary vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 328, Bloom, et al vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 582, 585. It is a well-known proposition of law that the State is not an insurer against accidents occuring on its streets and highways. Manus vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 335; McNary vs. State of Illinois, 22 C.C.R. 328.

The record is completely devoid of any negligence on the part of respondent unless the fact that chairs were provided for the use of the public could be considered negligence. The evidence shows that the type of chairs used were ordinary type of office chairs used in business waiting rooms and that the claimant, having been there at least three times previously and having spent the day there on the day the accident occurred, consequently was thoroughly familiar with the area on the day in question.

It is the opinion of this Court that the claimant has failed to meet the requirements as to the burden of proof and this claim is hereby denied.


text:
    (No. 6830
    Mohammed Mostafa, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Mohammed Mostafa, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This was an action for compensation against the State of Illinois for time unjustly served in prison. The claim is made under provisions of Chapter 37, Article 439.8(C), Illinois Revised Statutes, which is as follows:

"All claims against the State for time unjustly served in prisons of this State where the persons imprisoned shall receive a pardon from the governor stating that such pardon is issued on the ground of innocence of the crime for which they were imprisoned; provided, the Court shall make no award in excess of the following amount: for imprisonment of 5 years or less, not more than $15,000; for imprisonment of 14 years or less but over 5 years, not more than $30,000; for imprisonment of over 14 years, not more than $35,000; and provided further, the Court shall fix attorney’s fees not to exceed 25% of the award granted.”

The effective date of this statute was October 1, 1973.

The claimant was imprisoned on May 5, 1969, by the Circuit Court of Cook County, on the charge of murder in the first degree. Thereafter, on May 23, 1974, the Governor of the State of Illinois granted the claimant a pardon on the ground of innocence of the crime of murder. The imprisonment lasted from May 6,1969, until February 2, 1972.

Under the Statute, imprisonment for five years or less, unjustly served is a basis for an award for not more than $15,000.

On September 23, 1974, a stipulation between the attorney for the claimant and the State of Illinois, respondent, by the Attorney General, was entered into and filed by this Court. This stipulation recites:

"That on May 5,1969, the Plaintiff herein was imprisoned by the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, in Cause No. 68-2829 upon which he was found guilty of first degree murder. The opinion of the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District Cause No. 55463 reversed the conviction of murder without remanding for another trial. A certified copy of the said opinion is attached to the^gomplaint herein.”

The amendment above referred to, changes the procedure before the Court of Claims and the previous contention that the claimant must prove his innocence of the crime he has committed, has been eliminated and claimant is allowed to file a claim, if he receives a pardon from the Governor stating that such pardon is issued on the grounds of innocence of the crime for which he was imprisoned.

On May 23,1974, Honorable Daniel Walker, Governor of the State of Illinois, granted a pardon to the claimant on the grounds that he was innocent of the crime of murder in Cause No. 68-2829, Cook County, Illinois.

Since the claimant in this instance has received such a pardon, the sole obligation of the Court is to find the amount that is due the claimant and also fix the attorney’s fees that should be paid by claimant.

Evidence was also introduced to show what the claimant earned in the years 1967 and 1968. Included in the evidence were the income tax returns for these years.

Based upon the evidence before the Court, the Court enters an award to the claimant for the sum of $15,000.00 and, in addition, sets the attorney’s fees at the sum of 25% of the award and payable from the award.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-373
    A & T Movers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    A & T Movers, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-492
    Foster G. McGaw Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Foster G. McGaw Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-655
    Anderson Witte Engraving Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Pollution Control Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Anderson Witte Engraving Co., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-663
    Bismark Hotel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Bismark Hotel, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-831
    Atlantic Richfield Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    D. K. McIntosh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-27
    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Union Oil Company of California, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-34
    Sheraton-Joliet Motor Inn, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Lieutenant Governor’s Office, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Sheraton-Joliet Motor Inn, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-60
    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Governor’s Action Office, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Kroch’s and Brentano’s, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-79
    Reliance Elevator Mfg. Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Reliance Elevator Mfg., Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-134
    Pitney Bowes, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Governor’s Action Office, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

      J. R. Woodsmall, Branch Manager, Pitney Bowes, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-186
    Sherman Hospital Association, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Sherman Hospital Association, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-204
    Pollution Control Board, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Pollution Control Board, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent. .
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-205
    Pollution Control Board, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Pollution Control Board, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-206
    Pollution Control Board, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Pollution Control Board, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-207
    Pollution Control Board, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Pollution Control Board, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-282
    Clark Equipment Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Clark Equipment Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-290
    Evan Gregory Moore, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

      Evan Gregory Moore, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-349
    Gallagher Asphalt Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Gallagher Asphalt Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-404
    Tenth Street Hardware, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Tenth Street Hardware, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-450
    Edgewater Hospital, A Non-Profit Ill. Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    William L. Silverman, Attorney for Claimant.,
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-506
    Madge Noble, Bureau County Treasurer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Local Government Affairs, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Madge Noble, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-619
    Royal Typewriter Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Royal Typewriter Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-655
    Nancy J. Ceja, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Nancy J. Ceja, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-669
    Federal Sign & Signal Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

      Federal Sign & Signal Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-679
    Federal Sign & Signal Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Federal Sign & Signal Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-685
    Donna McCarver, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Donna McCarver, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-687
    Federal Sign & Signal Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Federal Sign & Signal Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-691
    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-693
    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Motorola, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-700
    Family Service Winnetka-Northfield, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Family Service Winnetka-Northfield, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-701
    P-M Clinical Laboratories, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    P-M Clinical Laboratories, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-800
    Susan L. McConnell, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Susan L. McConnell, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-804
    Means Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

      Means Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-823
    Cargill, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Cargill, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-824
    Cargill, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Cargill, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-825
    Cargill, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Cargill, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-828
    Grand Spaulding Dodge, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Grand Spaulding Dodge, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-877
    Uargo Incorporated, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Uarco Incorporated, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-885
    Marie O’Neill, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Marie O’Neill, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-894
    Joe D. Angelo, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Joe Angelo, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-925
    William H. Swanson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    William H. Swanson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-939
    Bill D. Page, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Bill D. Page, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-941
    Linda S. Levy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Linda S. Levy, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-948
    The Flax Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of Education, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    The Flax Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-957
    Paul E. Stehman, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Paul E. Stehman, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-959
    Willis Russell Cosby, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed May 13, 1975.

    Willis Cosby, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.