text:
    (No. 88-CV-0070

      In re Application of Helen L. George

      Order filed August 19, 1988.

      Order filed March 4, 1993.

    Helen L. George, pro se, for Claimant.

      Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (James A. Tyson, Jr., and James Maher III, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on June 23, 1985. Helen L. George, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 17, 1987, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Helen L. George, age 26, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit, battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 3).

2. That on June 23, 1985, the Claimant was injured when the alleged offender pushed over the lifeguard’s chair in which she was sitting. The incident occurred at a beach located near 1600 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that while the victim and a companion were sitting in the lifeguard’s chair, the alleged offender pushed it over for no apparent reason, causing the Claimant to injure her back. The Claimant was transported to Augustana Hospital for treatment of her injuries. The alleged offender was apprehended and charged with battery. However, he later failed to appear in court and there is currently an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses and loss of earnings.

4. That section 72(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $750 per month, whichever is less.

5. That the Claimant has not submitted sufficient documentation to substantiate the amount of her net earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of her injury. Therefore, the Claimant is not eligible for compensation for loss of earnings under the Act.

6. That the Claimant submitted medical/hospital bills in the amount of $1,995.93, none of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $1,995.93. To date, the Claimant has paid $60 towards this balance.

7. That pursuant to section 80.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct $200 from all claims (except in the case of an applicant 65 years of age or older), and the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dramshop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000 of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

8. That section 80.1(g) of the Act states that compensation under this Act is a secondary source of compensation and the applicant must show that she has exhausted the benefits reasonably available under governmental or medical or health insurance programs, including, but not limited to Workers’ Compensation, the Federal Medicare program, the State Public Aid program, Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits and health insurance.

9. That the Claimant filed an application for medical assistance with the Illinois Department of Public Aid on June 26, 1985. This application was denied on July 29, 1985, due to the Claimant’s failure to keep appointments with the Department of Public Aid. Therefore, her eligibility for assistance could not be determined and the application was denied. On September 26, 1985, the Claimant filed a written notice with the Department of Public Aid appealing the denial of her medical assistance application. On November 25, 1985, the Department of Public Aid reaffirmed its initial decision in denying the Claimant’s application for medical assistance.

10. That by reason of the Claimant’s failure to exhaust the remedies reasonably available to her through public aid, the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation for medical/hospital expenses under the Act.

11. That this claim does not meet required conditions precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby, denied.

ORDER

Patchett, J.

On June 23, 1985, the Claimant was injured when an alleged offender pushed over the lifeguard’s chair in which she was sitting. The incident occurred at a beach located near 1600 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Illinois. A police investigation revealed that while the victim and a companion were sitting in the lifeguard’s chair, the alleged offender pushed it over for no apparent reason, causing the Claimant to injure her back. The Claimant was transported to Augustana Hospital for treatment of her injuries. The offender failed to appear in court and there is currently an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

On July 17, 1987, the Claimant filed a claim under the Crime Victims Compensation Act seeking medical and hospital expenses and loss of earnings.

On August 19, 1988, the Court denied the claim citing the fact that the Claimant did not exhaust the benefits reasonably available under governmental or medical or health insurance programs, including, but not limited to, Workers’ Compensation, the Federal Medicare program, the State Public Aid program, Social Security Administration program, Veterans Administration and health insurance.

The Claimant did file an application for medical assistance with the Illinois Department of Public Aid on June 26, 1985. This application was denied on July 29, 1985, due to the Claimants failure to keep appointments with the Department of Public Aid. The Department was unable to determine her eligibility for assistance and the application was denied. On September 26, 1985, the Claimant filed a written notice with the Department of Public Aid appealing the denial of her medical assistance application.

On November 25, 1985, a hearing was held by the Department of Public Aid. The Claimant appeared at the hearing, with counsel, and testified that she did make application for benefits to the Department and was refused for failure to attend an interview for which she said she did not receive notice. Following the hearing, the Department of Public Aid reaffirmed its initial decision in denying the Claimants application for medical assistance.

On August 29, 1988, the Claimant requested an opportunity to appeal the Court of Claims decision. On July 20, 1990, a hearing was held before Commissioner Michael E. Fiyzel.

At the hearing, the Claimant did not provide any testimony or evidence showing additional attempts to secure public aid or any other type of available benefits. The claim still does not meet required conditions precedent for compensation under the Act by reason of the Claimants failure to exhaust the remedies available to her. See In re Application of Goff (1986, 1989), 41 Ill. Ct. Cl. 320; In re Application of Hamilton (1983), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1023; In re Application of Dickey (1981), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 514.

The Court has not been presented with any evidence to cause alteration of the previous order. It is hereby ordered that the decision of August 19, 1988, is affirmed and that the claim is denied.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Burke, J. Burke, J. Burke, J.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 89-CV-0017

      In re Application of Marvin Lewis III

      Order filed January 30, 1989

      Opinion filed October 21, 1991.

      Order filed July 10, 1992.

    Daniel Nagle, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (Richard J. Krawkowski and Charles A. Davis, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Burke, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on January 16, 1988. Marvin Lewis III, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 6, 1988, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on January 16, 1988, the Claimant was stabbed, allegedly by an unknown offender. The incident occurred at the Claimant’s residence, located at 5722 South Maryland, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the Claimant’s account of the incident and his description of the alleged offender has varied during interviews with the investigating officers. As a result of the Claimant’s failure to cooperate fully with the Chicago Police Department, their investigation was suspended.

2. That sections 76.1(b) and (c) of the Act state that a person is entitled to compensation under the Act if the appropriate law enforcement officials were notified of the perpetration of the crime and the applicant has cooperated fully with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant.

3. That it appears from the police report that the Claimant declined to cooperate fully with the law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant, in that his account of the incident and his description of the alleged offender varied during interviews with the investigating officers. As a result, the Chicago Police Department suspended their investigation.

4. That by reason of the Claimant’s refusal to fully cooperate with law enforcement officials in the apprehension and prosecution of the assailant as required by the Act, he is not eligible for compensation thereunder.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Burke, J.

On January 30,1989, this Court issued an order denying Marvin Lewis’ request for compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.) In the January 30, 1989, order, this Court, in summary, stated that no compensation would be granted to Mr. Lewis because he failed to cooperate with law enforcement authorities. During the investigation of this matter by the Chicago Police Department, Claimant provided to the police contradictory descriptions of the assailant who stabbed him.

On July 14, 1989, the matter came before a commissioner for hearing. Mr. Lewis appeared with his counsel, Daniel Nagle, and the Illinois Attorney General through Assistant Attorneys General Daniel Brennan and Richard Linden. Mr. Lewis presented evidence that he did fully cooperate with the law enforcement officers in their attempt to ascertain the identity of the individual who stabbed him approximately eight times in the course of robbing him. After being stabbed, Claimant was taken to a hospital emergency room and several surgeries were performed on various parts of his body, including abdominal surgery and the insertion of a tube to alleviate the problem caused by the collapse of his right lung. As a result of the surgeries, Claimant was heavily sedated. After he had undergone several extensive surgeries and while he was sedated, a police officer attempted to talk to him. The interview of Claimant under the circumstances did not yield highly probative evidence. In addition, Mr. Lewis did not know the identity of his attacker, although he attempted to be helpful. In addition, the evidence indicated that he was interviewed by law enforcement officers at his apartment while he was hemorrhaging. The police never contacted Mr. Lewis again after the last interview at the hospital.

The Respondent produced no contradictory evidence except a conclusory hearsay statement from a Chicago police officer through an investigator in the crime victims section of the Attorney Generals Office. The hearsay statement that the Claimant was uncooperative with the police gave no basis for its conclusion and the investigator stated that the Claimant was completely cooperative with her.

Based upon the evidence elicited at the hearing of this matter, Claimant did cooperate with law enforcement authorities to the best of his ability under the circumstances and he should be compensated for the injuries he suffered as a result of the stabbing.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered:

1) That the Claimant be awarded just compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act.

2) That Claimant is given 30 days from the date of entry of this order to submit to Respondent proof of medical expenses and loss of earnings.

ORDER

Burke, J.

This cause coming to be heard upon the Courts own motion, it is hereby found that the parties have entered into a stipulation whereby the Attorney Generals Office has recommended that the sum of $9,801.50 be paid to Claimant, Marvin Lewis III, the innocent victim of a violent crime.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that;

1) The sum of $9,801.50 be made payable to the Claimant, Marvin Lewis III.

2) This case be closed.


author: Patchett, J. Frederick, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CV-0139

      In re Petition of Syed Muqeemullah Shah

      Order filed September 29, 1988.

      Order filed April 6, 1993.

    Edward R. Davis, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (James Maher III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Patchett, J.

This cause coming on to be heard upon the petition of the applicant for an extension of time to file necessary documents in the submission of application for benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act;

Based upon the information contained in said petition and by the Crime Victims Compensation Act, we find that the crime in question occurred more than 18 months before the filing of the application, and as the Crime Victims Compensation Act requires filing of notice within six months, which can be extended for one year on good cause, we find that we are unable to extend the filing deadline under the law;

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that said petition be denied.

ORDER

Frederick, J.

This cause coming on for hearing on the stipulation of the Claimant, Syed M. Shah, and the Respondent, and the Claimant, Shahid Hussain, in cause No. 87-CV-0653, and the Court having reviewed the stipulation, and the Court being fully advised in the premises,

Wherefore, the Court finds:

1. That Claimant, Syed M. Shah, is the brother of the decedent.

2. That Claimant, Shahid Hussain, is the cousin of the decedent.

3. That the victim, Syed K. Shah, was murdered on June 18,1986.

4. That Claimant, Shahid Hussain, originally filed his application pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act on December 8,1986.

5. The claim of Shahid Hussain was denied by the Court on February 24, 1987, on the grounds that Mr. Hussain was not a relative of the victim within the meaning of the Act and therefore not eligible for compensation.

6. Claimant, Syed M. Shah, filed his application for the same funeral expenses on August 5,1988.

7. The claim of Syed M. Shah was denied by the Court on jurisdictional grounds in that the crime occurred more than 18 months prior to the filing of the application.

8. That the parties are requesting that Claimant, Syed M. Shah, be substituted for Claimant, Shahid Hussain, in cause No. 87-CV-0653 so that he can recover. It is stipulated that Mr. Hussain has been reimbursed by Mr. Shah for the funeral costs and Mr. Hussain assigns his rights to Mr. Shah.

9. The Court of Claims is not bound by stipulations. Schroeder v. State (1984), 36 Ill. Ct. Cl. 3; Goodwill v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 303.

10. Claimant Syed Shahs claim was filed more than two years after the crime and there is before us no evidence of disability or other possible legal exception to the filing requirements. Schenck v. State (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 437.

11. That the parties seek the Court to substitute Mr. Shah for Mr. Hussain in the case that was denied on February 24,1987.

12. That even liberally construing Claimant Shahs application of August 5, 1988, as a motion to substitute for Mr. Hussain, such motion was not timely.

13. To make an award to Mr. Shah would be to find jurisdiction where the claim is barred.

Therefore, it is ordered:

A. That the stipulation of the parties filed March 30, 1990, is rejected.

B. That the cause is dismissed and stricken.


author: Burke, J. Patchett, J. Patchett, J.

text:
    (No. 88-CV-0348

      In re Application of Roger Cook

      Opinion filed May 3, 1989.

      Order filed February 26, 1990.

      Opinion filed October 20, 1992.

    Roger Cook, pro se, for Claimant.
    Richard F. Plachta, for Methodist Hospital.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (James A. Tyson, Jr., James Maher III, and Andrew Levine, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Burke, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on May 28, 1988. Roger Cook, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on October 9, 1988, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant, Roger Cook, age 33, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit, aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4).

2. That on May 28, 1988, the Claimant was stabbed, allegedly by an offender who was known to him. The incident occurred at 4701 North Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that after the Claimant left a tavern, the alleged offender approached him from behind, produced a knife and stabbed the Claimant several times. The Claimant was taken to Bethany Methodist Hospital for treatment of his injuries. The alleged offender has been apprehended and charged with aggravated battery. The criminal proceedings against him are currently pending.

3. That the Claimant seeks compensation for loss of earnings and medical/hospital expenses.

4. That the Claimant has submitted medical/hospital expenses in the amount of $21,025.55, none of which was paid by insurance, leaving a balance of $21,025.55. To date, the Claimant has paid nothing towards this balance.

5. That section 72(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $1,000 per month, whichever is less.

6. That the Claimant was employed by Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., prior to the injury and his average monthly earnings were $1,080.30. Claimant was disabled and unable to work from May 28, 1988, to January 16,1989, for a period of 7 months and 12 working days.

7. That based on $1,000 per month, the maximum compensation for loss of earnings for 7 months and 12 working days is $7,545.40.

8. That the Claimant has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

9. That pursuant to section 80.1(e) of the Act, this Court must deduct from all claims the amount of benefits, payments or awards payable under the Workers’ Compensation Act, Dramshop Act, Federal Medicare, State Public Aid, Federal Social Security Administration burial benefits, Veterans Administration burial benefits, health insurance, or from any other source, except annuities, pension plans, Federal Social Security payments payable to dependents of the victim and the net proceeds of the first $25,000 of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant.

10. That the Claimant has received no reimbursements that can be counted as an applicable deduction.

11. That the Claimant has indicated that a civil action may be filed as a result of the incident. The Claimant, by informing the Attorney General’s Office of the possibility of a civil action, has acknowledged his responsibility to further notify the Attorney General of the filing of the civil action and of its final disposition, pursuant to section 87 of the Act.

12. That pursuant to section 88(c) of the Act, the Court may order that all or a portion of an award be paid jointly to the applicant and provider of services. In the instant case, the Court finds this section applicable and orders that joint payment be made.

13. That after making all the applicable deductions under the Act, the pecuniary loss resulting from the Claimant’s injuries is in excess of $25,000, the maximum amount allowed in section 80.1(f) of the Act.

14. That the Claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $25,000 which is prorated as follows:

It is hereby ordered that the sum of $6,600 be and is hereby awarded to Roger Cook, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It is further ordered that the sum of $17,800 be and is hereby awarded to Roger Cook and Methodist Hospital of Chicago.

It is further ordered that the sum of $600 be and is hereby awarded to Roger Cook and Knit R. Joshi, M.D.

ORDER

Patchett, J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the motion of Methodist Hospital of Chicago, a co-payee of a portion of a previously granted award herein, and the Court being advised;

On May 3, 1989, an award was made in this claim, a portion of which, $17,800, was made co-payable to the applicant and Methodist Hospital of Chicago. On October 23, 1989, Methodist Hospital of Chicago filed a motion seeking to have the payment made to it directly.

Section 18(a) of the Crime Victims Compensation Act provides that an award is not subject to enforcement, attachment, garnishment, or other process, except that an award is not exempt from the claim of a creditor to the extent that he or she provided products, services, or accommodations, the costs of which are included in the award. Methodist Hospital of Chicago is a creditor who has provided medical services, the costs of which were a portion of the award. Records in the clerks office indicate that the warrant previously issued to the co-payees has not been cashed.

Rut for certain allegations in the motion by Methodist Hospital of Chicago, the circumstances would suffice for us to order direct payment. In its motion the hospital noted the availability of health insurance coverage for Claimant which would potentially cover at least a portion of the expenses incurred. An applicant does not have an option to collect under the Act or an insurance program. Any health insurance coverage available must be deducted from an award pursuant to section 10.1(e) of the Act, regardless of whether an applicant chooses not to use it. The investigatory report made no mention of available insurance coverage.

It is hereby ordered that the clerks office take necessary steps to stop the payment on the warrant at issue here and, if possible, any of the other warrants issued in payment of the previously made award; it is also ordered that the office of the Attorney General further investigate this matter and that it be assigned to a commissioner for the purpose of conducting a hearing. Methodist Hospital of Chicago is to be given notice of and an opportunity to participate in the hearing.

OPINION

Patchett, J.

This case was initially before the Court on Claimant’s application for compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.) On May 3, 1989, the Court, in reliance upon the Attorney General’s report, issued an opinion awarding $25,000, which was prorated as follows:

a. $ 6,600.00 to Roger Cook for loss of earnings;

b. 17,800.00 to Roger Cook and Methodist Hospital; and

c. 600.00 to Roger Cook and Kirit R. Joshi, M.D.

$25,000.00 Total Award

On February 26, 1990, the Court issued an order directing the Clerk of the Court to stop payment on the $17,800 warrant, directing the Attorney General to further investigate this matter, and assigning this cause to a commissioner. A hearing was conducted by a commissioner on September 20, 1991, without Roger Cook in attendance. Three attempts were made to notify Roger Cook of proposed pretrials and the hearing. All three notices were returned by the U.S. Postal Service with notations that no forwarding address was available for Cook. Prior to the presentation of this report, a fourth attempt to reach Roger Cook was unsuccessful.

Roger Cook has not filed a notice of current address with the Clerk of the Court. The only witness present at the September 20, 1991, hearing was Richard Plachta from Masters Collectors on behalf of Methodist Hospital of Chicago.

On October 23, 1989, Methodist Hospital of Chicago filed a motion for substitution of payee, seeking to have the $17,800 sum made payable directly to it. A warrant had been issued payable jointly to Claimant and to the hospital. According to the hospital, Roger Cook offered to endorse the warrant on the condition that the hospital agree to refund $3,800 to him. The hospitals bills totalled $20,335.55 and the hospital did not agree to the arrangement. Roger Cook did not endorse the warrant and it was subsequently cancelled.

The hospital stated that Claimant was initially hospitalized on May 28, 1988, and released on June 6,1988. He was hospitalized again on June 7 and released June 16, 1988. The hospital stated that Roger Cooks health insurance coverage was terminated on May 31, 1988, and he did not provide accident data relating to his hospitalization to his insurance carrier. According to the hospital, Cook gave incorrect third-party insurance billing information. Therefore, none of the hospital expenses were paid by insurance. Roger Cooks Crime Victim Compensation application shows that he indicated that no private accident or health plan was available to cover the medical bills.

On January 24, 1991, the hospital filed a notice of hospital lien against Cooks claim. At the hearing, Richard Plachta stated that he believed the total of all bills owed the hospital from Roger Cook because of treatment of services arising out of the incident is $20,223.00 (sic). The Court previously found, based upon the Attorney Generals report, the sum to be $20,335.55.

An employee of the hospital, Delores Smith, appeared at a pretrial on January 22, 1991. The Assistant Attorney General stated that he and Ms. Smith agreed that the sum of $6,854.25 was the amount that would have been paid by insurance. The record does not, other than the representations of the Assistant Attorney General and the facts stated in the hospitals motion, indicate whether insurance coverage was in place and to what extent the policy would cover Cooks medical expenses. There is reference in the hospitals motion and in the comments by the Assistant Attorney General that insurance would have covered only three days, May 28 to May 31, 1988. The Attorney General does not object to the motion.

The Assistant Attorney General stated that the sum of $6,854.25 should be deducted from the $17,800, thereby leaving the sum of $10,945.75 due the hospital. At the conclusion of the September 20, 1991, hearing, Mr. Plachta indicated that the hospital would agree to receiving $10,945.75.

Roger Cook has not communicated with the Court, the Clerk of the Court, a commissioner, the Attorney General or the hospital since the date he attempted to obtain the refund from the hospital from the sums included in the $17,800 warrant.

In light of Claimants lack of cooperation since the initial opinion of April 4, 1989, the Court could rule that Claimant has failed to substantiate, or otherwise proceed with, his claim and deny the balance of the claim pending. The Claimant may have misrepresented facts, may have decided not to file a claim with an insurance carrier, and may have tried to convince the hospital to compromise its claim against him by sharing some of the proceeds due it. Because Roger Cook chooses not to participate further in the processing of his claim, we will rely upon the representations and recommendations of the Assistant Attorney General and grant the motion to substitute payees.

Further, we rely on the representations of the Assistant Attorney General regarding the sums purported to be potentially reimbursable from insurance. We therefore find that the sum of $6,854.25 is the sum that would have been reimbursable from insurance.

The Court previously determined the total of all compensable expenses was $28,570.95 but prorated the award. In the event $6,854.25 is deducted from $28,570.95, the total of all compensable damages is less than the maximum award permitted by the Act. In this event such deduction is made, there is no need to order a pro rata distribution to the hospital.

The Court therefore deducts the sum of $6,854.25 from the total hospital bill of $20,335.55, and therefore awards $13,481.30 directly to the hospital.


author: Burke, J. Sommer, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CV-1314

      In re Application of Beatrice Rodriguez

      Order filed November 13, 1989.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1992.

    Beatrice Rodriguez, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (Daniel Brennan, Jr., Charles Davis, Jr., and Andrew Levine, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Burke, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that was discovered on March 31, 1989. The Claimant, Beatrice Rodriguez, mother of the minor, Lisa Rodriguez, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on May 22, 1989, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on March 31, 1989, it was discovered that one of the Claimants daughters had been sexually abused by the Claimants husband. The incident occurred at their residence located at 3136 South Emerald, Chicago, Illinois. The offender has been apprehended, prosecuted, and convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. It has been determined that Lisa Rodriguez was not sexually abused by the offender.

2. That in order for a Claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence that one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act occurred.

3. That it has been determined that the minor was not sexually abused by the offender. Therefore, the minor is not a victim of one of the crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act as no crime occurred.

4. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Sommer, J.

The Claimant, Beatrice Rodriguez, brought this Crime Victims Compensation claim for medical bills incurred as a result of physical examinations and hospital tests that were done on her two children, Lisa and Ruben Rodriguez, Jr.

There is no dispute that Beatrice Rodriguez’ husband, Ruben Rodriguez, Sr., had been charged with the sexual abuse of one of Claimant’s daughters, Crystal. When that abuse was brought to the attention of the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, an assistant State’s Attorney told Ms. Rodriguez to have Lisa and Ruben evaluated by appropriate medical authorities to determine whether either of those children had been sexually abused. Evidently, the prosecution would have utilized that evidence in their criminal prosecution of the defendant, Ruben Rodriguez, Sr. Fortunately, as it turned out, neither of these two children showed any medical signs of sexual abuse and, therefore, there were no additional charges brought against Ruben Rodriguez, Sr.

Ms. Rodriguez incurred bills of $150 for each child as a result of these examinations which took place at the behest of the prosecution. There was no evidence presented to contradict the evidence of Ms. Rodriguez, and the scenario is perfectly logical in light of the nature of the criminal justice system. Eventually, Mr. Rodriguez was convicted of a felony and sentenced. Ms. Rodriguez brought this matter after the State’s Attorney’s Office failed to pay for the examinations.

In order to recover under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, an applicant must have been injured or potentially injured as a result of a crime perpetrated against that person, or be the parent of a child so injured or potentially injured. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 72 2(d)7.) As no crime was perpetrated against the children in this claim, there can be no recovery. In other words, Lisa and Ruben Rodriguez, Jr., were not crime victims and their parent cannot recover under the Crime Victims Compensation Act.


author: Burke, J. POCH, J. Sommer, J.

text:
    (No. 89-CV-1315

      In re Application of Beatrice Rodriguez

      Order filed November 28, 1989.

      Opinion filed March 13, 1992.

      Opinion filed July 31, 1992.

    Beatrice Rodriguez, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (Daniel Brennan, Jr., Charles Davis, Jr., and Andrew Levine, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Burke, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that was discovered on March 31, 1989. The Claimant, Beatrice Rodriguez, mother of the minor, Ruben Rodriguez, Jr., seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on May 22, 1989 on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on March 31, 1989, it was discovered that one of the Claimants daughters had been sexually abused by the Claimant s husband. The incident occurred at their residence located at 3136 South Emerald, Chicago, Illinois. The offender has been apprehended, prosecuted, and convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. It has been determined that Ruben Rodriguez, Jr. was not sexually abused by the offender.

2. That in order for a Claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence that one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act occurred.

3. That it has been determined that the minor was not sexually abused by the offender. Therefore, the minor is not a victim of one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act, as no crime occurred.

4. That this claim does not meet a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

POCH, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that was claimed to have occurred on March 31,1989. The Claimant, Beatrice Rodriguez, mother of the minor, Ruben Rodriguez, Jr., seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

The Court had previously denied the claim after reviewing the application for benefits and the investigatory report of the Attorney General. The basis of the denial was that the minor was not sexually abused by his stepfather, Ruben Rodriguez and, therefore, the minor was not a victim of a violent crime as defined by section 72(c) of the Act which is a prerequisite for compensation.

The Claimant requested reconsideration of the denial of the claim and the mother was referred to a commissioner of the Court. The evidence showed that Ruben Rodriguez, Sr. had been charged with sexual abuse of Crystal Rodriguez, a sister of Ruben Rodriguez, Jr. At the request of the State s Attorneys Office, the Claimant had her daughters, Crystal and Lisa, and her son, Ruben Rodriguez, Jr., examined by a physician to determine if there was any objective evidence of sexual abuse. Examination of Ruben Rodriguez, Jr. showed no sign of sexual abuse and no charges were brought against Ruben Rodriguez, Sr. relating to Ruben Rodriguez, Jr.

The Claimant incurred bills of $150 for each child. The States Attorneys Office did not pay those medical bills even though the examinations were conducted at the request of that office.

In order for the Claimants child to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence that the child was a victim of a violent crime as set forth in section 72(c) of the Act. Since this minor child was not sexually abused by his stepfather, the minor is not a victim of a violent crime even if one of the other children of the Claimant was the victim of a violent crime.

The Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act. It is recommended that the Claimant submit the medical bills to the office of the Cook County State’s Attorney for payment through the victim witness program.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be and the same is hereby denied.

OPINION

Sommer, J.

The Claimant, Beatrice Rodriguez, brought this Crime Victims Compensation claim for medical bills incurred as a result of physical examinations and hospital tests that were done on her two children, Lisa and Ruben Rodriguez, Jr.

There is no dispute that Beatrice Rodriguez’ husband, Ruben Rodriguez, Sr., had been charged with the sexual abuse of one of their daughters, Crystal. When that abuse was brought to the attention of the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office, an assistant State’s Attorney told Ms. Rodriguez to have Lisa and Ruben evaluated by appropriate medical authorities to determine whether either of those children had been sexually abused. Evidently, the prosecution would have utilized that evidence in their criminal prosecution of the defendant, Ruben Rodriguez, Sr. Fortunately, as it turned out, neither of these two children showed any medical signs of sexual abuse and, therefore, there were no additional charges brought against Ruben Rodriguez, Sr.

Ms. Rodriguez incurred bills of $150 for each child as a result of these examinations which took place at the behest of the prosecution. There was no evidence presented to contradict the evidence of Ms. Rodriguez, and the scenario is perfectly logical in light of the nature of the criminal justice system. Eventually Mr. Rodriguez was convicted of a felony and sentenced. Ms. Rodriguez brought this matter after the State’s Attorney’s Office failed to pay for the examinations.

In order to recover under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, an applicant must have been injured or potentially injured as a result of a crime perpetrated against that person, or be the parent of a child so injured or potentially injured. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 72 2(d)7.) As no crime was perpetrated against the children in this claim, there can be no recovery. In other words, Lisa and Ruben Rodriguez, Jr., were not crime victims and their parent cannot recover under the Crime Victims Compensation Act.


author: Burke, J. Burke, J.

text:
    (No. 90-CV-0271

      In re Application of David Watt

      Order filed April 25, 1990.

      Opinion filed March 23, 1993.

    David Watt, pro se, and Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago (Devereux Bowly, of counsel), for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (James Maher III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Burke, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on January 15, 1989. David Watt, Claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on August 21, 1989, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the Claimant alleges that on January 15, 1989, he was leaving a friend s residence when two unknown offenders attacked him and threw him out a window. The alleged incident occurred in an apartment building at 5501 West Washington, Chicago, Illinois. However, according to a case report provided by the Chicago Police Department, there was no indication that a crime actually occurred. During an interview with the police in the emergency room at Loyola Medical Center, the Claimant repeatedly stated that he slipped and fell out a fourth floor window. For this reason, the Chicago Police Department classified the incident as an accidental injury and closed its investigation.

2. That in order for a claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence that one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act occurred.

3. That available evidence indicates that the Claimant informed investigating police officers that he slipped and fell from a fourth floor window. Therefore, there is no proof that one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act occurred.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby, denied.

OPINION

Burke, J.

On January 15, 1989, Claimant was en route to see a friend at the Washington Pine Hotel Apartments located at 5501 West Washington Street. As a former employee of the apartment building, the Claimant knew individuals in the building and was familiar with the physical plant of the building. Claimant walked up the stairwell to the fourth floor and was confronted on the landing by four men. A couple of men grabbed him, threw him into an apartment and beat him. Claimant was robbed and the force of a blow from a piece of wood sent him through a window and he fell to the ground. Claimant did not know any of the individuals involved in the beating and robbery. He was taken to the hospital by ambulance and was unconscious for a period of days.

The Claimant stated that he did not talk to any police officers during the eight-day period he was hospitalized, but it was conceivable that he had conversations he did not remember. Sgt. Dennis Porter of the Chicago Police Department who, at the time of the incident, was an Area 5 violent crimes investigator, stated that he did examine the scene of the incident and proceeded to Loyola Hospital where he and another officer interviewed the Claimant. The Chicago Police Department considered this a major incident because of the nature of the injuries. Sgt. Porter stated that Claimant was conscious, able to speak and made no inappropriate responses. Claimant told him that he had slipped and fallen out the window. Sgt. Porter told Claimant that he did not believe that statement, but the Claimant maintained that he had slipped and fallen out the window and he would not elaborate any further. Sgt. Porter also indicated that this particular building was a known hangout for narcotics dealers and was later raided by police authorities. After Claimants statement was taken, the matter was classified as an accident and no farther investigation was done.

In order to recover under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, the Claimant must prove that he was ready, willing and able to cooperate with the police in the investigation and prosecution of the crime. In the instant case, the Claimant failed to cooperate and his credibility is highly suspect. Immediately after the accident, he claimed to have fallen out the window and at the hearing he testified that some unknown assailants beat and threw him out the window after taking an unknown amount of money from his person. It is clear that Claimant failed to cooperate with the police in the investigation and prosecution of the crime.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the instant claim is denied.


author: Sommer, J. Sommer, J.

text:
    (No. 90-CV-0405

      In re Application of Roseaner Williams

      Order filed May 9, 1990.

      Opinion filed July 13, 1992.

    Roseaner Williams, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (James Maher III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Sommer, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 10, 1989. Roseaner Williams, mother of the deceased victim, Jimmy Martese Williams, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on September 21, 1989, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on March 10, 1989, the victim was shot by an offender who was known to him. The incident occurred in an apartment building at 4823 West Cortez, Chicago, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the victim began to play Russian Roulette with a loaded handgun in the apartment. When the victim put the gun down, the offender picked it up, not realizing that it was cocked. When the offender began to sit down, the weapon discharged, striking the victim in the head.

2. That section 80.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 80.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the victim was playing Russian Roulette with a loaded handgun. When the victim placed the gun down, the offender picked it up. The weapon then discharged, striking the victim in the head.

4. That the victims conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That in order for a claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence that one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(C) of the Act occurred.

6. That the shooting incident which resulted in the victim s death was an accident, not an intentional act.

7. That this claim does not meet required conditions precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Sommer, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 10, 1989. Roseaner Williams, mother of the deceased victim, Jimmy Martese Williams, seeks compensation pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

On May 9, 1990, this Court issued an order finding that the victim was playing Russian Roulette and denied the claim. This Court found that the shooting was an accident and that the deceased victims conduct contributed to his death to such an extent as to warrant a denial. The Claimant requested a review of the May 9 order.

Hearings were held on February 5, 1991, and September 20, 1991. The record was left open to enable the Claimant to document her claim.

No person testified who witnessed the incident. The Claimant testified that three persons were present when the shooting took place. The police report indicates that the offender gave two different versions of what occurred. One version suggested he and the victim were playing Russian Roulette and the second version alleged an unknown assailant. The Claimant was present at the criminal trial in the circuit court when the offender gave a third version, testifying that he was goofing off with a loaded gun and it discharged into the victims forehead. The Claimant produced a certified statement of conviction, stating that Marcus Jerome Sims, the offender, was convicted of the offense of reckless conduct. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 — 5.

Reckless conduct is a crime of violence as defined by the Act, thereby permitting this victim to seek compensation. The Crime Victims Compensation application states that the Claimant is not seeking compensation for medical expenses, but is only seeking funeral and burial expenses in the sum of $3,900. The Claimant was employed at the time of the incident and had medical insurance. Although there were medical expenses incurred in the approximate sum of $2,400, the Claimant did not submit the bills to her medical insurance carrier. The Claimant stated that she received $5,000 in life insurance proceeds.

On April 30, 1992, the Attorney General filed a funeral director report indicating that the Claimant paid $3,745 to A. A. Rayner & Sons, funeral director.

It is the finding of this Court that the death of the victim, having been caused by the criminal offense of reckless conduct, entitles the Claimant to compensation pursuant to the Act. The Claimant will not be awarded any sum for hospital expenses because she has not exhausted benefits reasonably available from secondary sources as required by section 10.1(g) of the Act. However, the Claimant will be awarded the maximum amount allowable under the Act for funeral and burial expenses, $3,000. It is therefore ordered that the order of May 9, 1990, is withdrawn and that the Claimant be paid $3,000 for funeral and burial expenses.


author: Patchett, J. Patchett, J.

text:
    (No. 90-CV-0977

      In re Application of Catherine M. Smith

      Order filed August 27, 1990.

      Order filed October 30, 1992.

    Catherine M. Smith, pro se, and Cooney & Conway, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (James Maher III, Charles A. Davis, Jr. and Andrew Levine, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Patchett, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on July 4, 1989. Catherine M. Smith, wife of the deceased victim, Thomas A. Smith, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on January 22, 1990, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on July 4, 1989, the victim was shot while waiting the commencement of a fireworks display. The incident occurred at Springfield Park, Bloomingdale, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that the victim and his family were sitting in the park, waiting to view the fireworks display. At a private residence a short distance away, the two alleged offenders were practicing shooting at a barrel with a handgun. One of the alleged offenders misfired, striking the victim. The alleged offenders have been apprehended and were charged with involuntary manslaughter by the Du Page County State s Attorney. The criminal proceedings against the two alleged offenders are still pending.

2. That in order for a claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence that one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act occurred.

3. That involuntary manslaughter is not one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act.

4. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

ORDER

Patchett, J.

On July 4, 1989, Thomas A. Smith, the Claimants husband, was attending a fireworks display at Springfield Park in Bloomingdale, Illinois. Mr. Smith was sitting in the park with his family waiting to view the fireworks. At a home a short distance from Springfield Park, two individuals were shooting a handgun at a barrel. Both were consuming alcohol near the time of the shooting. One of the individuals missed the barrel, and the bullet struck Mr. Smith. The bullet taken from Mr. Smiths chest confirmed beyond all doubt that it came from the same handgun these two individuals were firing.

One of the individuals, Carla Smith, pleaded guilty to the offense of involuntary manslaughter. Another individual, Bob Logsden, pleaded guilty to a crime as a result of the unlawful acts in question, but the record is unclear as to the specific crime of which the court convicted him.

To receive compensation under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, a person must be a victim of a “crime of violence.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 70, par. 72(a).) The General Assembly has itemized those crimes which are considered to be crimes of violence and which the Crime Victims Compensation Act may compensate. Both reckless conduct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 — 5), and reckless homicide (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3) are included, but on the day of the shooting, involuntary manslaughter was not included as a crime which could be compensated under the Crime Victims Compensation Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 70, par. 72(c).) Prior to 1991, the Act classified reckless homicide, but not involuntary manslaughter, as a “crime of violence.” Both were defined under the same section of the Illinois Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9 — 3).

The General Assembly subsequently amended the Crime Victims Compensation Act to include involuntary manslaughter. (1991 Ill. Legis. Serv. 2474, P.A. No. 87— 520 (West).) The State argues that because involuntary manslaughter and the unspecified crime for which the codefendant Logsden was convicted were not specifically listed in the Act at the time of the shooting, the Claimant cannot receive compensation. The State further argues that because the General Assembly did not amend the statute until after the date of the shooting, the Court may not apply the amended version to the instant case. This Court tends to agree with the State as to the issue of when the amended statute would be effective.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Village of Wilsonville v. S.C.A. Services, Inc. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824, states, ‘Without an express statutory provision stating an act is to have retroactive effect, it can only be applied prospectively.” Stigler v. City of Chicago (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 20, 268 N.E.2d 26; People ex rel. Schmidt v. Yeger (1961), 20 Ill. 2d 338, 172 N.E.2d 753.

Because Public Act 87 — 520 (1991) does not expressly provide for retroactive application, we find that the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act that apply to this claim are those in effect on the day of the shooting, July 4, 1989.

However, we do not agree that because involuntary manslaughter was not in the Act on the date of the shooting, the statute automatically bars compensation for the Claimant. There is nothing in the Crime Victims Compensation Act which requires an arrest or prosecution in order for the innocent victim of a crime to receive compensation.

We find that the conduct of the defendants in the instant case met the criteria for reckless conduct (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 12 — 5), which was a crime specifically included in the Crime Victims Compensation Act as of the date of the shooting. (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 72(c).) The fact that the defendants did not ultimately plead guilty to this crime does not bar the Claimant from receiving compensation. The acts of these individuals amounted to, or constituted, reckless conduct, regardless of the record of prosecution. A common element in this crime is the mental element of recklessness. A person acts recklessly when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk knowing that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 4 — 6.) The acts of Logsden and Smith clearly met this standard. Indeed, reckless conduct is a lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter by its very definition. Therefore, to prove involuntary manslaughter, the State was required to first prove reckless conduct.

Mr. Smiths income was approximately $3,640 per month. He was 64 years old at the time of his death. The funeral expenses totaled $7,192. Therefore, we award the Claimant the sum of $25,000; $3,000 as funeral expenses and the remainder as lost income.


author: Dillard, J. Sommer, J. Sommer, J. Sommer, J. Sommer, J.

text:
    (No. 90-CV-1007

      In re Application of Hester Reynolds, Samantha Ratcliff, Sandra Howard and Sheila Edwards

      Opinion filed August 27, 1990.

      Order filed March 8, 1991.

      Opinion filed May 16, 1991.

      Order filed July 6, 1992.

      Opinion filed December 18, 1992.

    Hester Reynolds, Samantha Ratcliff, Sandra Howard and Sheila Edwards, pro se, for Claimants.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (James Maher III and Charles A. Davis, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   OPINION

Dillard, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on November 4, 1989. Sandra Howard, mother of the victims minor child, Sanrena Howard, and Hester Reynolds, mother of the deceased victim, Julius T. Williams, respectively, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the applications for benefits submitted on January 29, 1990, and April 4, 1990, respectively, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Julius T. Williams, age 28, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit, first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1). The victim was shot on November 4, 1989, and expired from these injuries on November 11,1989.

2. That the crime occurred in Chicago, Illinois, and all of the eligibility requirements of section 76.1 of the Act have been met.

3. That the Claimant, Sandra Howard, seeks compensation for loss of support for the victim’s minor child, Sanrena Howard. The Claimant, Hester Reynolds, seeks compensation for funeral expenses.

4. That the Illinois Department of Public Aid has assumed responsibility for the funeral expenses incurred by the Claimant, Hester Reynolds, as a result of the incident.

5. The minor child, Sanrena Howard, bom July 10, 1980, was 9 years, 4 months, of age at the time of the incident. Sanrena Howard will attain the age of majority on July 10,1998, which is 104 months after the incident.

6. That section 72(h) of the Act states that loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victims average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $1,000 per month, whichever is less.

7. That the victim s average net monthly earnings were $73.34. Based on $73.34 per month, the projected loss of support for 104 months, the maximum period for loss of support for the victim s minor child, is $7,627.36.

8. That the Claimant Sandra Howard has received no reimbursements that can be counted as an applicable deduction under section 80.1(e) of the Act.

9. That section 80.1(a) of the Act states that a person may be compensated for his pecuniary loss.

10. That the Claimant, Hester Reynolds, has not suffered a compensable pecuniary loss under the Act.

11. That the Claimant, Sandra Howard, has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

12. That the interest of the Claimant, Sandra Howard, would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 81.1 of the Act.

It is therefore hereby ordered that the sum of $7,627.36 be and is hereby awarded to Sandra Howard, mother of Sanrena Howard, minor child of Julius T. Williams, an innocent victim of a violent crime, to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $4,027.36 to be paid to Sandra Howard in a lump sum for the use and benefit of Sanrena Howard;

(b) 48 equal payments of $75 to be paid to Sandra Howard for the use and benefit of Sanrena Howard;

(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimants child, it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.

It is further ordered that the claim of Hester Reynolds be, and is hereby denied.

ORDER

Sommer, J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the Court s own motion;

On August 27, 1990, an opinion was entered which made an award for loss of support to Sandra J. Howard for the use and benefit of Sanrena Howard and denied compensation for funeral expenses to Hester Reynolds. Shortly thereafter, the purported mother of another child of the victim contacted the Court and filed an application for benefits.

Payment of the previous award has not been made due to the possibility that one or more children may also be entitled to an award which, due to the limits on the amount of compensation which can be awarded, may cause a reduction of the award for Sanrena Howard.

It is hereby ordered that this matter is referred to the office of the Attorney General for further investigation and report and that payment of the award made on August 27, 1990, is withheld until further order of the Court.

OPINION

Sommer, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on November 4, 1989. Sandra Howard, mother of Sanrena Howard, minor child of the deceased victim, Hester Reynolds, mother of the deceased victim, Samantha Rat-cliff, mother of Julius T. Williams, Jr., minor child of the deceased victim, and Sheila Edwards, mother of Julian T. Williams, minor child of the victim, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the applications for benefits submitted on January 29, 1990, April 4, 1990, November 3,1990, and September 25,1990, respectively, on the forms prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the applications. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That Julius T. Williams, age 28, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit, first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9 — 1). The victim was shot on November 4, 1989, and expired from these injuries on November 11,1989.

2. That the crime occurred in Chicago, Illinois, and all of the eligibility requirements of section 76.1 of the Act have been met.

3. That the Claimant, Sandra Howard, seeks compensation for loss of support for the victim’s minor child, Sanrena Howard. The Claimant, Hester Reynolds, seeks compensation for funeral expenses. The Claimant, Samantha Ratcliff, seeks compensation for loss of support of the victims minor child, Julius T. Williams, Jr. The Claimant, Sheila Edwards, seeks compensation for the cost of a tombstone and for loss of support for the victim s minor child, Julian T. Williams.

4. That pursuant to section 80.1(c) of the Act, a person related to the victim is eligible for compensation for funeral expenses of the victim to the extent to which he has paid such expenses.

5. That section 72(f) of the Act defines “relative” as a spouse, parent, grandparent, stepfather, stepmother, child, grandchild, brother, brother-in-law, sister, sister-in-law, half-brother, half-sister, spouse s parent, nephew, niece, uncle or aunt.

6. That the Claimant, Sheila Edwards, is the mother of one of the victims children. However, the Claimant and the victim were never lawfully married. Therefore, Sheila Edwards is not a relative as defined in section 72(f) of the Act and is not eligible for compensation for the cost of the tombstone.

7. That the Illinois Department of Public Aid has assumed responsibility for the funeral expenses incurred by the Claimant, Hester Reynolds, as a result of the incident. Therefore, Hester Reynolds is not eligible for compensation for funeral expenses pursuant to section 80.1(c) of the Act.

8. That under No. 84-1901619 filed on June 13, 1984, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, Municipal Department, 1st District, the victim was found to be the father of Julius T. Williams, Jr. The victim was ordered to pay $75 per month to Samantha Ratcliff for child support of Julius T. Williams, Jr.

9. That the Claimant, Samantha Ratcliff, has not submitted evidence to substantiate that the victim was meeting his monthly child support obligation. Therefore, Samantha Ratcliff is not eligible for compensation for loss of support for Julius T. Williams, Jr.

10. That the Claimant, Sheila Edwards, has not submitted evidence to substantiate her allegation that Julian T. Williams was dependent upon the victim for support. Therefore, Sheila Edwards is not eligible for compensation for loss of support for Julian T. Williams.

11. That the Claimant, Sandra Howard, has submitted documentation to substantiate that Sanrena Howard was partially dependent upon the victim for support. During the six months immediately prior to his death, the victim contributed an average of $76.67 per month in support.

12. That the minor child, Sanrena Howard, born July 10,1980, was 9 years and 4 months of age at the time of the incident. Sanrena Howard will attain the age of majority on July 10, 1998, which is 104 months after the incident.

13. That based on support payments of $76.67 per month, the projected loss of support for 104 months, the maximum period for loss of support for Sanrena Howard, is $7,973.68.

14. That the Claimant, Sandra Howard, has received no reimbursements that can be counted as an applicable deduction under section 80.1(a) of the Act.

15. That section 80.1(a) of the Act states that a person may be compensated for his pecuniary loss.

16. That the Claimants, Hester Reynolds, Samantha Ratcliff and Sheila Howard, have not suffered a compensable pecuniary loss under the Act.

17. That thé Claimant, Sandra Howard, has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder.

18. That the interest of the Claimant, Sandra Howard, would be best served if the award hereunder would be paid pursuant to the installment provision of section 81.1 of the Act.

It is therefore, hereby ordered that the sum of $7,973.68 be and is hereby awarded to Sandra Howard, mother of Sanrena Howard, minor child of Julius T. Williams, an innocent victim of a violent crime, to be paid and disbursed to her as follows:

(a) $4,973.68 to be paid to Sandra Howard in a lump sum for the use and benefit of Sanrena Howard;

(b) 48 equal monthly payments of $75 to be paid to Sandra Howard for the use and benefit of Sanrena Howard;

(c) In the event of the death or marriage of the Claimant or the Claimants children it is the duty of the personal representative of the Claimant to inform this Court in writing of such death or marriage for the purpose of the possible modification of the award.

It is further ordered that the claims of Hester Reynolds, Samantha Ratcliff and Sheila Edwards be, and are, hereby denied.

ORDER

Sommer, J.

This cause coming to be heard upon Respondents motion to dismiss, due notice having been given, and the commissioner being fully advised in the premises, it is found that:

1. This claim was scheduled for hearing on November 22,1991, at 100 West Randolph Street, Room 10-400, Chicago, Illinois, 60601.

2. That only Samantha Ratcliff and Sheila Edwards appeared at the scheduled hearing.

3. That Sheila Edwards was prepared and ready to proceed.

4. That Samantha Ratcliff was given an additional period of 60 days to substantiate her claim with the Attorney Generals Office.

5. That on December 7, 1991, the Attorney Generals Office sent a certified letter to the Claimant Samantha Ratcliff, again requesting substantiation to which there has been no response.

6. That since November 22, 1991, Samantha Ratcliff has made no contact with the Attorney Generals Office.

7. That on December 14, 1991, the Attorney General’s Office sent a certified letter to Claimant, Hester Reynolds, which was received and to which there has been no response.

8. That this matter has been set for hearing on one previous occasion and that no progress has been made.

9. That Claimants received notice of this prior hearing and either failed to appear or were not prepared to proceed.

10. That Respondent was present and prepared to proceed on each occasion.

11. That Rule 26 of the Rules of the Court of Claims provides:

“A case may be dismissed for want of prosecution where the Court determines that the claimant has made no attempt in good faith to proceed.”

12. In light of the aforementioned facts, neither Hester Reynolds nor Samantha Ratcliff has made a good faith effort to proceed in this matter.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered the claims of Samantha Ratcliff and Hester Reynolds are hereby dismissed for want of prosecution.

OPINION

Sommer, J.

This claim arises from the murder of the victim, Julius T. Williams. Hester Reynolds (mother of the deceased victim), Sandra Howard (mother of Sanrena Howard, minor child of the deceased victim), Samantha Ratcliff (mother of Julius T. Williams, Jr., minor child of the deceased victim) and Sheila Edwards (mother of Julian T. Williams, minor child of the deceased victim) seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

On May 16, 1991, this Court rendered an opinion which awarded $7,973.68 to Claimant Sandra Howard for the benefit of Sanrena Howard, minor child of the deceased victim. That order denied the claims of Hester Reynolds, Samantha Ratcliff, and Sheila Edwards. These Claimants subsequently requested a hearing to contest the denial of their claims.

On November 22, 1991, a hearing was held before Commissioner Rochford of the Court of Claims. Claimants Samantha Ratcliff and Sheila Edwards appeared pro se, and Assistant Attorneys General James Maher III and Charles Davis, Jr., appeared on behalf of the Respondent, State of Illinois.

On April 26, 1992, the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for want of prosecution in regard to the claims of Hester Reynolds and Samantha Ratcliff. On July 6, 1992, the Court dismissed the claims of Samantha Ratcliff and Hester Reynolds. Therefore, this opinion addresses only the claim of Sheila Edwards.

In regard to Sheila Edwards’ claim, the undisputed facts are as follows:

Sheila Edwards is the mother of Julian T. Williams. Julian T. Williams is the son of the deceased victim Julius T. Williams. The Claimant, Sheila Edwards, and the victim, Julius T. Williams, were never lawfully married. The Claimant seeks loss of support for the victim’s minor child, Julian T. Williams.

The victim’s minor child, Julian T. Williams, was born on October 24, 1989. The victim was shot on November 4,1989, and died on November 21,1989.

There is no evidence that the victim was employed at the time of his death or in the six months prior to his death. Further, the Claimant was unable to substantiate any contributions made by the victim to the household in the six months prior to his death.

The issue is whether the Claimant’s minor child was dependent upon the deceased victim.

The Act defines “dependent” as a relative of a deceased victim who is wholly or partially dependent on the victim’s income at the time of his death. In determining the loss of support, the Act considers the victim’s average net income in the six months prior to the victim’s death.

This Court has held “that mere entitlement to support is not dependency under the Act.” In re Application of Smith (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 675, 679.

Where there is no evidence that a victim was actually contributing to a persons support, there can be no dependency under the Act. In looking at the Act as a whole, it is clear that the legislature intended to compensate those persons who experience out-of-pocket loss in defined circumstances.

One who is not actually receiving support at the time of the crime cannot be said to have had an out-of-pocket loss. An expectancy of support is not dependency under the Act. In re Application of Smith (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 675, 679.

In this case, there is no evidence that the victim was employed or receiving income in the six months prior to his death, and there is no evidence that the victim was contributing to the support of his minor child, Julian T. Williams, at the time of the victim’s death.

For purposes of the Act, Sheila Edwards’ minor child, Julian T. Williams, was not a dependent of the victim and, therefore, her request for compensation for loss of support for Julian T. Williams is denied.


text:
    (No. 91-CV-0021

      In re Application of Diana Raisanen

      Order filed October 31, 1990.

      Order filed July 13, 1992.

    Diana Raisanen, pro se, for Claimant.
    Neil F. Hartigan and Roland W. Burris, Attorneys General (James Maher III, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Patchett, J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on March 15, 1990. Diana Raisanen, mother of the deceased victim, Kimberly Sue Griebe, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 etseq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on July 3, 1990, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on March 15, 1990, the Claimants deceased daughter, Kimberly Sue Griebe, age 25, was the victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit, first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1).

2. That the crime occurred in Steger, Illinois.

3. That section 76.1(d) of the Act states that the Claimant is entitled to compensation if the victim and the assailant were not sharing the same household at the time the crime occurred.

4. That the Attorney Generals investigation shows that the victim and the assailant were sharing the same household at the time the crime occurred.

5. That the Claimant has not met a required condition precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby, denied.

ORDER

Patchett, J.

This claim arises as a result of the murder which took place on March 15, 1990. The victim was Kimberly Sue Griebe, who was murdered by her .boyfriend. Diana Raisanen, the mother of the deceased victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

The Attorney Generals Office, after conducting an investigation of this case, concluded that the victim and the assailant were sharing the same household at the time the incident occurred. Based on the results of that investigation, the Court entered an order on October 31, 1990, which denied the claim pursuant to section 76.1(d) of the Act, which at the relevant time of the order entered stated as follows:

o o jf t]le viC(;im is deceased and the victim and assailant were sharing the same, household at the time the crime occurred, no award shall be made.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 76.1(d).

On November 9, 1990, Claimant requested a review of the Courts findings. The matter was set for hearing before a commissioner of this Court. At that hearing, it was the position of the Claimant that the victim did not have a permanent full-time residence, but that she shared the Claimants residence at 2110 Winston, Crete, Illinois, until January 1990, at which time she had moved to her grandmothers house at 1481 Vincennes in Crete, Illinois. Claimant further testified that the majority of the victim’s personal belongings, including clothes and makeup, were at the Vincennes address at the time of the crime.

In support of her position, the Claimant produced the victims driver’s license which was issued on February 28, 1990, and which identified the victim’s address as 1481 Vincennes, Crete, Illinois. In addition, the victim’s 1989 W-2 tax form was received in January 1990 and bore the victim’s address as 2110 Winston, Crete, Illinois.

The Claimant did, however, acknowledge that the victim was having a relationship with the offender, and that she did stay at the assailant’s house. In fact, the Claimant’s letter to the Court of Claims dated November 7, 1990, in which she requested a review of the hearing, stated that the victim did live with the assailant. The Claimant testified that the victim only spent about one-third of her time at the assailant’s residence.

The issue is whether the statute prohibits a victim who lives with the assailant on a part-time basis from receiving an award pursuant to the Act.

This Court has consistently ruled that it was the intent of the legislature to deny compensation for injuries arising out of most domestic quarrels. The legislature did not intend that this Court enter into the morass of trying to determine provocation or causes of quarrels between relatives or other people who live together. This Court has reasoned that crimes among relatives constitute a large percentage of the total number of reported violent crimes, and the legislature did not intend for the State of Illinois to take on the financial burden of compensating victims of domestic quarrels. (In re Application of Gordon (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 707, 709.) Clearly the legislature intended to deny compensation in situations where the victim and assailant lived together, even if that was on a part-time basis. While we sympathize with the Claimant because of the enormous emotional pain and anguish caused by this crime, we must follow the intent of the legislature.

We therefore affirm our previous order of denial.


text:
    (No. 91-CV-0936

      In re Application of Ricky House

      Order filed May 21, 1992.

      Opinion filed March 4, 1993.

    Ricky House, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   ORDER

Sommer, J.

This cause comes on to be heard on the application of Ricky House for benefits under the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.), following the Attorney General s filing of the investigatory report, and the Court being advised, finds:

On May 16, 1990, Ricky House, age 32, was the victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit, aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 12 — 4). The crime occurred in Chicago, Illinois, and all of the eligibility requirements of section 76.1 of the Act have been met.

The applicant seeks compensation for medical/hospital expenses and for loss of earnings. He has complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualifies for compensation thereunder. As to the amount of compensation and its disbursal, the Attorney Generals investigatory report recommends the following.

1. Loss of Earnings — section 72(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or $1,000 per month, whichever is less. The applicants net monthly earnings for the six months prior to the incident were $756.73. He was disabled and unable to work for a period of three months and 12 working days. Rased on those figures, the maximum compensation for lost earnings is $2,682.99.

However, the report adds that the applicant has received $1,899.75 in sick pay benefits from his employer. This money is a deduction under section 80.1(e) of the Act.

The investigatory report concludes with the recommendation that the applicant be awarded $783.24 for loss of earnings.

2. Medical/Hospital Expenses — After considering insurance and other sources of recovery, the report concludes that the applicant has incurred compensable medical/hospital bills totalling $8,100.10 toward which he has paid nothing. The expenses break down as follows:

Loyola Medical Practice Plan . $5,131.20

Foster G. McGaw Hospital 2,114.90

Maywood Anesthesiologists 537.00

Superior Ground Ambulance Services, Inc. 317.00

Total $8,100.10

The report further stated that on July 18, 1991, Loyola Medical Practice Plan filed a lien with the Court of Claims concerning its bill. The report recommends paying this portion of the award directly to the provider based on the lien and awarding the balance of the expenses co-payable to the provider and the applicant pursuant to section 88 of the Act.

At the time the report was filed the Court did not have any record of having received a lien from Loyola Medical Practice Plan. If such a lien was filed with the office of the Attorney General only, the Court, which controls the awarding of the benefits, would not have been bound thereby. However, a lien was subsequently filed by Loyola Medical Practice Plan with the Court on March 20, 1992. The amount of the lien was $5,131.20 which is the amount of the award recommended by the office of the Attorney General.

A few weeks after the investigatory report was filed, eight separate notices of physicians liens for unstated amounts were filed. The report contained no recommendation to make awards based on services provided to any of those persons and businesses. Informal efforts by the Court administrator resulted in releases being filed for all but two of these liens. Notices of liens remain on file for Radha Sukhani, M.D., and Prabhakor Garla, M.D. These doctors did not respond to the Court administrators inquiry. Therefore it will be necessary to hold a hearing to adjudicate the rights of all the interested parties.

It is hereby ordered that the final decision in this matter is held in abeyance and that this claim is to be assigned to a commissioner for the purpose of conducting a hearing and filing a recommendation as to the amount and disbursal of funds to be awarded. The commissioner is to send notice to all interested parties that they may appear and participate at the hearing. The parties are hereby notified that if Doctors Sukhani and Garla fail to appear in person or by counsel, the Court will give no effect to their liens. The Court will enter and disburse an award in accordance with the recommendations of the office of the Attorney General set forth hereinabove if no evidence to the contrary is presented by any interested party.

OPINION

Sommer, J.

On May 16, 1990, Ricky House, age 32, was the victim of a violent crime as defined in section 72(c) of the Act, to wit, aggravated battery (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 12 — 4). The crime occurred in Chicago, Illinois, and all of the eligibility requirements have been met.

The applicant sought compensation for medical/hospital expenses and for loss of earnings. He complied with all pertinent provisions of the Act and qualified for compensation thereunder. As to the amount of compensation and its disbursal, the Attorney Generals investigatory report recommended the following.

1. Loss of Earnings — Section 72(h) of the Act states that loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average net monthly earnings for the six months immediately preceding the date of the injury or $1,000 per month, whichever is less. The applicants net monthly earnings for the six months prior to the incident were $756.73. He was disabled and unable to work for a period of three months and 12 working days. Based on those figures, the maximum compensation for lost earnings is $2,682.99.

However, the report adds that the applicant has received $1,899.75 in sick pay benefits from his employer. This money is a deduction under section 80.1(e) of the Act.

The investigatory report concludes with the recommendation that the applicant be awarded $783.24 for loss of earnings.

2. Medical/Hospital Expenses — After considering insurance and other sources of recovery, the report concludes that the applicant has incurred compensable medical/hospital bills totalling $8,100.10 toward which he has paid nothing. The expenses break down as follows:

Loyola Medical Practice Plan $5,131.20

Foster G. McGaw Hospital 2,114.90

Maywood Anesthesiologists 537.00

Superior Ground Ambulance Services, Inc. 317.00

Total $8,100.10

The report further states that on July 18, 1991, Loyola Medical Practice Plan filed a lien with the Court of Claims concerning its bill. The report recommends paying this portion of the award directly to the provider based on the lien and awarding the balance of the expenses co-payable to the provider and the applicant pursuant to section 88 of the Act.

At the time the report was filed, this Court did not have any record of having received a lien from Loyola Medical Practice Plan. If such a lien were filed with the office of the Attorney General only, this Court, which controls the awarding of the benefits, would not have been bound thereby. However, a lien was subsequently filed by Loyola Medical Practice Plan with this Court on March 20, 1992. The amount of the lien was $5,131.20, which is the amount of the award recommended by the office of the Attorney General.

A few weeks after the investigatoxy report was filed, eight separate notices of physicians’ liens for unstated amounts were filed. The report contained no recommendation to make awards to any of those persons and businesses. Informal efforts by the Court administrator resulted in releases being filed for all but two of these liens. Notices of liens remain on file for Prabhakar Garla, M.D., and Radha Sukhani, M.D. These doctors did not respond to the Court administrator’s inquiry. Therefore, it was necessary to hold a hearing to adjudicate the rights of all the interested parties.

On May 21, 1992, this Court ordered that the final decision in this matter be held in abeyance and that this claim be assigned to a commissioner for the purpose of conducting a hearing and filing a recommendation as to the amount and disbursal of funds to be awarded. The commissioner was ordered to send notice to all interested parties so that they may appear and participate at the hearing. Doctors Sukhani and Garla were notified that if they failed to appear in person or by counsel this Court would give no effect to their liens. This Court further ordered that it would enter and disburse an award in accordance with the recommendations of the office of the Attorney General set forth hereinabove if no evidence to the contrary was presented by any interested party.

The matter was assigned to Commissioner Rochford and the matter was set for hearing on October 22, 1992, at 2:00 p.m. Notices were sent to Radha Sukhani, M.D., and Prabhakar Garla, M.D. Doctors Sukhani and Garla failed to appear at the hearing. It is therefore ordered that any liens created by the notices of lien filed by Doctors Garla and Sukhani are extinguished and that awards are entered according to the recommendations of the Attorney General contained herein and that said awards shall be disbursed.


author: Montana, C.J. Frederick, J.

text:
    (No. 91-CV-0995

      In re Application of Wilma Steffel

      Order filed January 29, 1992.

      Opinion filed June 29, 1993.

    Wilma Steffel, pro se, for Claimant.
    Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Charles A. Davis, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.
   ORDER

Montana, C.J.

This claim arises out of an incident that occurred on December 17, 1989. The Claimant, Wilma Steffel, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, hereafter referred to as the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 71 et seq.

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on November 7, 1990, on the form prescribed by the Attorney General, and an investigatory report of the Attorney General of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted to the Court, the Court finds:

1. That on December 17,1989, the Claimant alleges that she was injured by her ex-husband, the alleged offender. The alleged incident occurred at 12500 South Austin, Palos Heights, Illinois. Police investigation revealed that prior to the incident, the Claimant initiated a domestic dispute with the alleged offender over the division of property as defined in their divorce decree. The alleged offender accuséd the Claimant of taking property that did not belong to her. The Claimant accused the alleged offender of threatening her with a knife and twisting her arm. Further investigation revealed that the alleged offender received a cut to his hand as he attempted to grab a steak knife from the Claimant. Attempts from the responding police officer to resolve this situation resulted in the Claimant becoming abusive to the alleged offender and being asked to leave the premises. The conclusion of the investigation determined that the Claimant was the aggressor in this incident. The Cook County State s Attorney Office declined to approve charges in this case indicating that the credibility of the combatants and witnesses was in question.

2. That section 80.1 of the Act indicates factors used to determine entitlement to compensation. Specifically, section 80.1(d) of the Act states that an award shall be reduced or denied according to the extent to which the victim s acts or conduct provoked or contributed to his injury or death, or to the extent to which any prior criminal conviction or conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death of the victim.

3. That it appears from the investigatory report and the police report that the Claimant initiated all the dispute which resulted in her alleged injuries.

4. That the Claimants conduct contributed to her injury to such an extent as to warrant that the Claimant be denied entitlement to compensation.

5. That in order for a claimant to be eligible for compensation under the Act, there must be evidence that one of the violent crimes specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act occurred.

6. That the actions of the offender did not constitute a violent crime specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act.

7. That this claim does not meet required conditions precedent for compensation under the Act.

It is hereby ordered that this claim be, and is hereby denied.

OPINION

Frederick, J.

On January 29, 1992, the Court entered an order denying the Claimants claim based on the investigatory report of the Attorney General. The Court found that the Claimants conduct contributed to her injury to such an extent as to warrant that the claim be denied. The Court further found the actions of the alleged offender did not constitute a crime specifically set forth under section 72(c) of the Act. The Claimant requested an evidentiary hearing on the claim and the cause was tried before Commissioner Stemik on March 2,1993.

Claimant testified that she believed her claim is based on an attempted murder situation carried out by her ex-husband. She claims her ex-husband denied her right to remove her personal effects from the home. Claimant testified there were numerous complaints filed by her against her former husband but they were conveniently erased. She also stated the police officer was paid to file a false report. When she finally received a copy of the police report from the purported incident, she found that a false claim had been filed with the State s Attorney. She testified the incident stated in the report did not take place. Claimant told the police the report was false.

Claimant indicated she would not stop at the Court of Claims but would take her case to the Governor. Claimant feels like she is being treated as a culprit rather than a victim in this case. She cannot understand the police report and wanted it explained to her. The reports admitted into evidence indicate the sheriffs office disposed of the criminal cases by stating,

“Situation does not warrant criminal proceedings; Order of Protection to be obtained by above Complainant. (Husband and Wife).”

The police report in the case indicates when the police arrived Mr. Steffel was bleeding and Mrs. Steffel was accusing him of twisting her arm. The police found it apparent that Claimant started the fight. No obvious injury was found to Claimant and Mr. Steffel was cut. Officer O’Neill noted that despite his attempts to resolve the argument, Claimant continued to curse Mr. Steffel. The reports also indicate that the State’s Attorney refused Claimant’s request for a criminal complaint against Mr. Steffel because Claimant was the offender in the incident. The officer indicated Claimant was uncooperative and abusive during the time he tried to resolve the matter.

The Law

The Crime Victims Compensation Act is a secondary source of recovery. (In re Application of Lavorini (1989), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 390.) The Act is intended to aid and assist crime victims under certain circumstances to receive compensation to help pay for the damage they sustained. The rules and procedures applicable to such claims must be followed before the Court of Claims can award benefits. (In re Application of Geraghty (1989), 42 Ill. Ct. Cl. 388.) For a claimant to be eligible for compensation, there must be evidence that the claimant was the victim of a violent crime as specifically set forth in section 22 of the Act. (In re Application of Lazarus (1986), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 312.) The Claimant has the burden of proving her claim by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Application of Sole (1976), 31 Ill. Ct. Cl. 713; In re Application of Hogan (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 395.

The Crime Victims Compensation Act also provides that the award of compensation shall be reduced to the extent which any criminal conduct of the victim may have directly or indirectly contributed to the injury of the victim. In re Application of Wintrol (1985), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 409.

We have carefully reviewed the entire record in this case. From a review of the record, we find that Claimant has not proven that she was the victim of a violent crime as defined in the Act by a preponderance of the evidence. Claimant requested a trial and a trial was held. The trial was the time to present evidence and not the time to make unsubstantiated claims that police and prosecutors were paid off, filed false reports, or were in cahoots with her ex-husband. As a Court, we can understand that Claimant was going through a difficult dissolution and post-dissolution time. However, we are bound by rules and burdens of proof. Claimant was given the opportunity to present evidence. That evidence did not fulfill her burden of proof. In re Application of Alexander (1991), 43 Ill. Ct. Cl. 459.

For the foregoing reasons, it is the order of this Court that Claimants claim pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act is hereby denied.