text:
    (No. 6502
    Louise Mazurek, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

      Richard G. French and William H. Warvel, Attorneys for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll and George Mustis, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

Claimant, Louise Mazurek, seeks compensation for a broken leg suffered while a patient at Chicago Reed Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois, an institution operated by the respondent for treatment of the mentally distressed.

The facts are not in dispute. At about 2:00 a.m. on August 19, 1971, following a violent altercation in her home in which she threatened suicide, claimant was admitted to Chicago Reed Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois. Shortly after her admission, claimant was briefly placed in arm and leg restraints. The restraints were leather straps, locked with a key, and applied to both of claimant’s arms and legs.

At about noon on August 19, after having been released from the restraints, claimant was given a sedative and she fell asleep in a ward bed. Sometime during the afternoon of August 19, while still sedated, claimant was again placed in arm and leg restraints.

Norman Gastello, a ward attendant at Chicago Reed, found claimant in the restraints at about 6:45 the following morning. Gastello testified that when he removed the restraints, he noticed that claimant’s right leg was black and blue and swollen in the area where the right leg restraint had been applied.

Claimant complained of pain in the leg, and was taken to Marquette Hospital where X-rays revealed comminuted fractures of claimant’s right tibia and fibula. A full leg cast was applied, and claimant remained hospitalized for three weeks. She wore the cast for approximately four months, and for six to eight weeks thereafter, walked with the aid of crutches. Claimant was billed $465 by the State of Illinois Department of Mental Health for treatment of her broken leg.

The regulations of Reed Medical Center, which were introduced into evidence, provided that restraints may only be applied to a patient on the orders of a physician, and then only for two hours at a time. Gastello said he did not know who had applied the restraints to claimant, and he said he was unable to locate a physician’s order authorizing application of the restraints.

A state hospital is not an insurer of the well-being of its patients, but it does owe them a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in their treatment. See, Karulski v. Board of Trustees, 25 C.C.R. 295, at 299. To recover for her injury, therefore, claimant must prove that respondent breached this duty owed her; that she herself was free of contributory negligence; and that respondent’s breach was the proximate cause of her injury.

While the record does not explain precisely how claimant’s leg was broken, it appears that her leg was undamaged when she was sedated in the afternoon of August 19. When she awoke on the morning of August 20, the leg was broken. At all times the instrumentalities which caused the injury were under the exclusive control of respondent, and the injury is one which ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence. This is, therefore, a proper case for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which allows proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning the cause of an injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the respondent. Edgar County Bank and Trust Co. v. Paris Hospital, Inc., 57 Ill.2d 298, 312 N.E.2d 259.

In Metz v. Central Illinois Electric and Gas Co., 32 Ill.2d 446, 207 N.E.2d 305, the court said:

"Whether the doctrine applies in a given case is a question of law which must be decided by the court, but once this is answered in the affirmative, it is for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and determine whether the circumstantial evidence of negligence has been overcome by defendant’s proof.”

Respondent has presented no evidence to rebut the presumption of negligence raised by claimant, and in fact, respondent’s brief contests only the amount of damages which claimant should be awarded. We, therefore, find that claimant has established that respondent negligently breached the duty of reasonable care owed to her, and that the breach was the proximate cause of her injury. As claimant was apparently unconscious at the time of the injury, she was presumptively incapable of contributory negligence.

Claimant contends that she suffered permanent damage from the incident. She complains of numbness in her leg, and alleges that the confirmation of her right leg does not match that of her left leg. By agreement of the parties, claimant was examined by Dr. John F. Gleason to determine the extent of her injury; and his report was admitted into evidence by stipulation. The report states that while there was a slight limitation of motion in claimant’s right leg, the fractures had healed well. Dr. Gleason concluded that claimant could pursue her normal activities without further treatment.

Claimant is hereby awarded the sum of $3,000.00.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 74-CC-24
    Annie Delores Williams, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Legislative Committee on Minority Group Employment, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Kleiman, Cornfield & Feldman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-29
    Dorothy Pitchford, Bessie Gilbert Cooper, Mayme Keen, and Cecil Johnson, on behalf of and as the Widower and Sole Heir of Dorothy Johnson, deceased, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Kleiman, Cornfield & Feldman, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-672
    Starr Commonwealth for Boys, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Van Dellen and Tech, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-673
    Starr Commonwealth for Boys, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Cildren and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Van Dellen and Tech, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-726
    Darrell E. Johnson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Darrell E. Johnson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-893
    Lt. Stanford Sharp, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Kleiman, Cornfield, & Feldman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Perlin, C. J.

text:
    (No. 75-CC-168
    Dan Jensen, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Dan Jensen, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Perlin, C. J.

The purpose of the award is to make a salary correction to make adjustments for creditable service increases which were due Mr. Jensen, but not given, upon his return from leave of absence on April 1, 1972.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $792.04, plus employer contributions of $63.33, for a total employee benefit of .$855.37, which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois as follows:

$63.33 Employee’s contribution to Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois.
$ Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$63.33 State’s contribution to Teachers’ Retirement System of the State of Illinois. .
$ State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

The Court takes notice of the fact, that educators do not participate in the Social Security program, and are, therefore, not subject to the usual F.I.C.A. deductions.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 147.64 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 18.69 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the claimant:

$ 562.38 as claimant’s net salary, after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be, and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $855.37, to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-191
    Certanuim Alloys and Research Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Certainum Alloys and Research Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-245
    Sumter Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Sumter Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-266
    Flora Sakornsin, M.D., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Flora Sakornsin, M.D., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
    State Comptroller Act — replacement warrants. If the Comptroller refuses to draw and issue a replacement warrant; or if a warrant has not been paid after one year from date of issuance; persons who would be entitled under Ch. 15, Sec. 210.10, Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, to request a replacement warrant may file an action in the Court of Claims for payment.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-304
    Vulcan Signs and Stampings, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

      Vulcan Signs and Stamping, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-305
    Vulcan Signs and Stampings, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Vulcan Signs and Stampings, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-306
    Vulcan Signs and Stampings, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Vulcan Signs and Stampings, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-307
    Vulcan Signs and Stampings, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Vulcan Signs and Stampings, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-316
    Cyclops Welding Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Cyclops Welding Co., Claimant pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-342
    Peter J. Prosser, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Peter J. Prosser, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-344
    Shalco Chemical Corp., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Shalco Chemical Corp., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-423
    Western Materials Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Western Materials Co., pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-428
    Unistrut Service Company of St. Louis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Unistrut Service Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-429
    Puts Radio Sales, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Law Enforcement, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Puts Radio Sales, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-430
    Da Com Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Da Com Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-449
    Macmillian Arts & Crafts, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Macmillian Arts & Crafts, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-453
    Central Office Equipment Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Agriculture, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Robert H. Goldman, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-460
    Illinois Electric Works, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Illinois Electric Works, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-469
    Dixie Mills Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Dixie Mills Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-491
    Wayne F. Schwager, d/b/a Holiday Inn of Vandalia, Ill., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    George Huber, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-517
    Academic Press Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Academic Press Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-521
    Central Office Equipment Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Robert H. Goldman, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-527
    Reichle LP Gas Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Robert D. Reichle, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-549
    Utlaut Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-558
    Miller & Dilenbeck, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

      Kenneth Dilenbeck, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-559
    National Advertising Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    National Advertising Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-651
    Albert L. Pitts, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Commerce Commission, Respondent.

      Opinion filed January 14, 1975.

    Albert L. Pitts, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


author: Holderman, J.

text:
    (No. 6777
    Orr Construction Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Works and Buildings, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 3, 1975.

    Harry M. Brostoff, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler and Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorneys General, for Respondent.
   Holderman, J.

This claim is founded upon a contract entered into by the respondent with the claimant, a general contractor, for the construction of a particular section of Illinois Route 57 Highway in Fayette County.

The facts are not in dispute. The issues, under which claimant’s five-count complaint seeks damages in the sum of $572,408.12, arise out of a dispute in the interpretation of "Special Provisions” in-the contract entitled, "Removal and Replacement of Silty Topsoil Materials”.

This court is called upon to resolve the legal issues by making a judicial interpretation of the contract provision in dispute. Hence, without any objections from the respondent, we granted claimant’s motion to render a declaratory judgment in this cause pursuant to §57.1 of the Civil Practice Act. The parties concede that a declaration of their respective rights under the disputed provision of the contract which they request this court to construe may obviate the necessity for further litigation on the question of damages.

Both parties have informed the court that, if the legal question is decided in favor of the claimant, there is a possibility that the parties hereto in conference may reach a settlement on the amount of claimant’s damages making it unnecessary to go to trial on that factual issue. Conversely, if the ruling is favorable to the respondent, there would be no need for further proceedings in this cause.

As essential prologue to our interpretation of the disputed section of the contract, we restate the undisputed pertinent facts. On January 24,1969, the claimant submitted its sealed proposal for contract with the respondent under which claimant would construct the following: certain mainline grading and drainage for future pavement and ramps, as well as frontage roads, drainage structures, fencing, seeding, clearing and other work; a triple-barrel box culvert; and two steel bridges. This contract, as bid upon, was prepared and drafted solely by respondent. It consists of: (a) Plans, (b) Standard Speci fications for Road and Bridge Construction and (c) Special Provisions (which supplement the Standard Specifications.)

The Special Provisions (on page 3 of the contract) provide, in relevant part:

REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF SILTY TOPSOIL MATERIAL: Within the following station limits, and, as shown on the cross sections, the silty topsoil horizon is to be removed and replaced with suitable material.
This silty material shall be removed to a depth sufficient to provide a minimum thickness of 24 inches of suitable material between the bottom of the subbase and the remaining soil. The minimum depth of excavation shall be six (6) inches. The width of excavation shall extend beneath the pavement and the stabilized portions of the shoulders. The excavated material may be used in embankments greater than two feet in height and placed in alternate layers with suitable material. The height of embankment is to be measured from original ground to bottom of subbase. (Emphasis supplied to the keyword "may”.)
The silty material as well as material excavated from ditches or other excavations which has an A-4 classification (HRB classifications) and a silt content greater than 50% shall not be placed in embankments less than two (2) feet in height.
It is hereby understood and agreed that the final determination as to the materials to be removed and replaced will be made by the Engineer in the field and the plan quantity for Earth Excavation adjusted accordingly.
[Here the contract contains a table listing 21 areas in both the northbound and southbound pavement-, from station number to station numbers, in which the silty topsoil material was to be removed and replaced.]

Standard Specifications Section 202.03 (p. 31) in relevant part provides as follows:

"Unless otherwise provided in the plans or specifications, unstable and unsuitable material shall be disposed of by the contractor at his expense, outside the limits of the right of way.”

Claimant, in preparing its bid for the contract, understood the above quoted special provisions and standard specifications to mean: (1) that the silty topsoil material between the indicated stations was unsuitable material and was to be removed and replaced with suitable material; (2) that the unsuitable material was to be disposed of by the contractor at his expense; (3) that, at the contractor’s election, he could use the unsuitable material for fill in embankments greater than two feet in height, provided claimant placed it in alternate layers with suitable material; and (4) that, notwithstanding the quantity for such excavation shown on the plans, the determination of what was silty material to be removed and replaced would be made by the State’s Engineer and the plan quantity for excavation would be adjusted accordingly.

Claimant, relying on this understanding of the language of (3) above, determined that it could furnish a substantially lower bid by not using said unsuitable material in embankments over two feet high, but rather by disposing of it and providing and using suitable material in the embankments. Accordingly, claimant determined and submitted its bid on that basis; namely, on claimant’s election to dispose of the silty topsoil material and to use, instead, suitable borrow material in the embankments.

Thereafter, the claimant, having submitted the lowest bid, was awarded the job. Accordingly, on February 24, 1969, claimant entered into the aforesaid contract with the respondent. Except for the insertions of claimant’s bid prices, this contract is exactly the same as that drafted by respondent for submission to all contractors for bidding.

Claimant commenced work on the job. During the course of the work, respondent’s field engineer ordered claimant to use said excavated silty material in embankments of two feet or higher, contending that the election to use said materials rested with respondent. Claimant protested this interpretation of the Special Provisions; informed the respondent that the election to use said excavation in the embankments rested with the claimant; that his proposal had not been based on such re-use; and apprised respondent that its order would necessitate substantial additional expense not provided for in its bid. Respondent, nevertheless, ordered claimant to use this material. Claimant complied under protest.

The issue thus presented to the court is, whether the election to use the silty topsoil (unsuitable material) rests with the claimant contractor or with the State’s Engineer. The correct answer depends upon whether the grant of discretion by the word "may” in the following sentence from the "Special Provisions” supra, is addressed to the contractor to respondent’s field engineer:

"The excavated material may be used in embankments greater than two feet in height and placed in alternate layers with suitable material.”

The court takes notice that all of the other four sentences in the same paragraph from which the above sentence is lifted, are obviously all addressed to the contractor, and speak directly to him. They instruct him as to what he shall or may do, viz.

The silty material shall be removed to a depth................

The minimum depth of excavation shall be 6 inches.

The width of excavation shall extend beneath the pavement .....

[4] The excavated material may be used in embankments..........

[5] The height of embankments is to be measured from............

Respondent admits that the sentences we have numbered 1, 2, 3 and 5 from the paragraph in question speak to the contractor.

Respondent contends, however, that only one of the sentences in the paragraph [the sentence we numbered 4] speaks to the engineer, and grants him discretion whether to use the excavated material in embankments over two feet. The language of this paragraph plainly gives no support to respondent’s contention.

Nor does the language elsewhere in the contract. We find that, where the contract does give an election or judgment to respondent’s engineer, there is an explicit reference to him. For example, at page 4 of the contract, under "Filling Existing Wells”:

5. ... The material of this portion of the fill, its manner of placement and compaction is subject to the approval of the engineer . . .
8. The balance of the'hole is to be filled with sand, embankment material, or other soil approved by the engineer; it shall be placed in lifts and compacted as directed by the engineer. (Emphasis added.)

Again, following page 18 of the contract, at Special Provisions — "Steady Burning Barricade Lights”:

. . . The contractor shall replace all batteries on a group basis at 45 days or such other intervals as may be specified by the engineer. (Emphasis added.)

Unlike any of the foregoing provisions, the sentence in dispute ["The excavated material may be used in embankments greater than two feet . . .”] contains no such explicit reference to the engineer. It logically follows that no such reference was intended.

The disputed language, it seems to use, is plain and unambiguous. It tells the contractor he has the choice; that he "may” use the excavated material. Plainly, it does not tell him he "may” use the excavated material if the State so decides, an interpretation which would still place the election with the contractor. Equally plain, the language contains no explicit directions or reference to the engineer. We must disagree with respondent’s contention that none is needed. If the intention had been, as respondent contends, it would have said: the contractor shall use the excavated material if the engineer so decides.

"May” does not mean "shall” and it is not so construed in private contracts. Northwestern Traveling Men’s Association v. Crawford, 126, Ill. App. 468, 480 (1906) aff’d. 226 Ill. 57.

In support of its position, respondent points to ¶4 in the quoted section of the Special Provisions, which reads:

"It is hereby understood and agreed that the final determination as to the materials to be removed and replaced will be made by the Engineer in the field and the plan quantity for earth excavation adjusted accordingly." (Emphasis added.)

This paragraph relates to the first paragraph and merely places the final determination of what is to be removed with respondent’s engineer. It is apparent, that this authority was given to the engineer, to prevent the contractor from performing excessive excavation, with a resulting excessive cost to the State, inasmuch as the compensation to the contractor for excavation was on a cubic yard basis. Our interpretation as to the intent and purpose of the above ¶4 is further supported by the closing clause of that paragraph: "... and the plan quantity for earth excavation adjusted accordingly.” If there were any question as to the interpretation of this paragraph, the closing clause eliminates it. The closing clause makes it clear that the authority of the engineer in this paragraph is solely to determine and control, for the protection of the State, the quantity of unsuitable material to be excavated, and it informs the contractor that payment would be made on the basis of the actual quantity excavated, as determined by the engineer, and not based on the plan quantity of excavation (the quantity shown on the plans). To give this paragraph any other interpretation, we believe, would emasculate and give no'meaning to the words, "and the plan quantity for earth excavation adjusted accordingly’.

We do not see any inconsistency, as respondent suggests, in the language of the two paragraphs in question. The first one says that the contractor may use excavated material. The other says that the field engineer shall make the final determination as the quantity of materials to be removed and replaced.

Even if we could in good conscience find that there is more than one reasonable interpretation of the language in question, the doubt must be resolved against the respondent, since the respondent prepared the contract and chose the language. This venerable rule of contract construction, firmly established in Illinois, is restated in I.L.P. Contracts §221 as follows:

"Words which are ambiguous or of doubtful construction are to be construed most strongly against the party who prepared the contract, for the reason that he chose the language and is responsible for the ambiguities in his own expression.
"This rule obtains not only in grants, but extends in principle to all other engagements and undertakings; and in construing reservations or conditions inserted in a contract for the benefit of the party who makes them, where there are clauses which are doubtful or ambiguous, that construction will be adopted which is least favorable to the party making them.”

Repondent’s brief does not address itself to the "resolve-doubts-against-the draftsman” rule. Rather, it suggests that the intent of the disputed language in the contract is better understood by (1) reading the contract as a whole and (2) taking judicial notice of a "custom and usage” of which the claimant allegedly had or should have had prior knowledge, viz., "The State has for many years followed the custom of utilizing the silty material in embankments as much as possible for economic reasons.” [Departmental Report p. 4.]

Commenting on the last contention first, we believe that it would have been a simple matter for the respondent to have stated the aforesaid custom in its contract, which is so explicit on countless other matters of much less importance. If such a provision had been stated in the written contract, the claimant would not have been misled in submitting his bid, and this claim would not have arisen.

We have carefully examined the authority respondent cites in support of its claim that custom should override the clear and unambiguous language of a written contract. We believe it would be unconscionable for this court to announce such a rule in the case before us. Such a rule would permit other bidders in the future to be deceived by what purports to be a complete written contract in plain language on which both parties may rely. Here the specific language of the contract clearly distinguishes the case at bar from the rule on which respondent relies in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co., 46 Ill. 2d 522, 264 N.E. 2d 134 (1970).

We must reject respondent’s argument that "custom and usage” should control our interpretation of this contract, a contention that is contrary to the rules stated in I.L.P. Contracts, §211 "Custom and usage” and the authority of Mulliner v. Bronson, 14 Ill. App. 355 in which the court said:

"... the accustomed mode of dealing between parties in many prior transactions, can not be sustained, for such a private and special custom could not control the express words of the contract.”

Turning now to respondent’s argument that a different meaning of the contract may be gleaned from reading the contract as a "whole” to the end that we would hold with U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Jones, 414 Ill. 265, Ill. N.E. 2d 144 (1953), that

"In construing a written instrument, its letter should be controlled by its spirit and purpose, bearing in mind that the terms employed are servants and not masters of an intent, and are to be interpreted so as to subserve, and not to subvert, such intent.”

Respondent then states its conclusion that, "the intent of this contract is to give complete and final supervision to the State. Nowhere within the document does any contrary intent exist.” In pursuing respondent’s thesis, we started with the disputed provision in which we found that the word "may” clearly gives the election to the contractor and not the State’s engineer. We then examined the rest of the contract in a futile search for other language that might change our conclusion.

We have previously reported our analysis of the Special Provisions and concluded that 114 on page 3, the only part of these provisions on which respondent relies, merely places the determination of the quantity of that material which is to be removed and replaced, with the engineer in the field; and directs that the plan quantity for each excavation be adjusted accordingly. Thus, the only authority delegated to the engineer by said ¶4 is limited to the quantity of silty topsoil to be removed (and replaced). Accordingly, ¶4’s expressly circumscribed grant of authority to the engineer bears no relevant relationship to the use or non-use of the silty material. Our conclusion inescapably follows that the word "may” in ¶2 grants to the contractor the sole option to use the silty topsoil in embankments over two feet, or not to use it as claimant determines.

This close textual analysis necessitates our agreeing with claimant’s interpretation of the contract and is only confirmed by reading the provisions as an entirety.

Finally, we come to that part of the "whole” contract on which respondent further attempts to support its case, the Standard Specifications. In this regard, respondent refers to selected sections therein, some of which are skillfully paraphrased to imply what respondent no doubt wishes it had actually said. Others are irrelevant to the issue here. We find it significant that respondent fails to mention perhaps the most relevant and important provision of all, i.e., the opening sentence of the Special Provisions which declares:

The following Special Provisions supplement the "Standard Specifications . . and in case of conflict with any part or parts of said specifications, the said Special Provisions shall take precedence and shall govern.

This provision not only destroys any support for respondent’s contentions, but respondent has failed to show any significant conflict between the Special Provisions and the Standard Specifications. Moreover, if it be assumed arguendo that there is a conflict, the contract itself defines the manner of resolution. The Special Provisions take precedence. These we have held, as a matter of law, clearly support claimant’s interpretation of the contract, and we find no material or significant ambiguities that would require us to support our conclusion on the "resolve doubts against the draftsman” rule.

This court has held in a line of cases over many years that, when the State is responsible for such matters as delays, changes of plans, lack of coordination of prime contractors, or faulty plans, an award will be made for the increased costs incurred, as a result, by claimant contractors.

In Arcole Construction Company v. State of Illinois, 11 C.C.R. 423, (1941), the government-prepared plans and specifications, including a "typical cross-section” of underground conditions, contained a material misrepresentation which caused the contractor to be misled to his damage. The court held the contractor entitled to recover for these damages. The thrust of Arcole applies here. For, whether the focus be on physical condition or right to election, the State has misled the bidder equally.

In the case at bar, the contract clearly prescribed that the contractor "may use excavated material”. Nothing in the contract required the claimant to use excavated material. The engineer in the field had no right to compel the contractor to use excavated material in place of suitable material. Clearly, the field engineer only had final determination as the amount of unsuitable material to be removed and replaced, and not as to the re-use of the unsuitable material to be removed and replaced.

For all of the foregoing reasons, this court declares that the election to use or not to use the silty topsoil in embankments greater than two feet in height rested with the claimant, and that claimant is entitled to the damages which resulted from being ordered by the respondent, notwithstanding claimant’s protests, to use said material in embankments greater than two feet in height.

This declaration of rights is the only relief sought by the parties in this opinion. If the parties cannot agree and enter into a joint stipulation as to the actual amount of claimant’s damages, pursuant to this opinion, further litigation will be necessary on the questions of fact.

      The contract is described by the Department of Public Works and Buildings as FAI Route No. 57, Project 1-57-3 (73) 134, Section 26 (1A, IB-1, 2A, 2B-1 Fayette County. Job No. 97-133-68.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-575
    Guaranty Credit Corporation, Agents for Seven Drask Brothers, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Guaranty Credit Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-178
    Board of Regents, acting on behalf of NIU, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Jack M. Bleicher, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-268
    Martin Brothers Implement Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Martin Brothers Implement Company, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-315
    B & H Blueprint and Supply Co., B & H Industries, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Repsondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    B & H Blueprint and Supply Co., B & H Industries, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-338
    J. P. Rudlick Screw Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    J. P. Rudlick Screw, Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-347
    Arthur’s Sales Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Arthur’s Sales Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-364
    Tim Swain II, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Tim Swain II, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-369
    Rockford Anesthesiologists Association, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Child and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Rockford Anesthesiologists Assocation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-373
    Jerry’s Frame & Axle Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Jerry’s Frame and Axle Service, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-417
    Clark Oil and Refining Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Correction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Clark Oil and Refining Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-434
    The Flax Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    The Flax Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-440
    Storms Laundry Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Storms Laundry Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-464
    Elim Christian School, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Elim Christian School, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-492
    Colt Industries Fairbands Weighing Division, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Colt Industries, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-528
    Brink’s Security Service, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Brink’s Security Service, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-542
    Association for Educational Communications & Technology, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Association for Educational Communications & Technology, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-555
    Central Office Equipment Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Central Office Equipment Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-572
    Angelica Uniform Group, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Angelica Uniform Group, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-583
    Mine Safety Appliances Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Mine Safety Appliances Co., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-590
    Monitor Labs, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Monitor Labs, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-606
    Reis Equipment Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Reis Equipment Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-805
    Saunders & Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Office of the Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 4, 1975.

    Saunders & Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-681
    Gary Seebach, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1975.

    Barbara J. Hillman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-716
    Joseph E. Glass, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1975.

    Joseph E. Glass, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-717
    James R. Harris, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1975.

    James R. Harris, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-718
    Nelson Hesting, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1975.

    Nelson Hesting, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-719
    James C. Thomas, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1975.

    Jaimes C. Thomas, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-722
    Theodore Patton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1975.

    Theodore Patton, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saúl R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-886
    Earl Smith, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1975.

    Earl Smith, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-887
    Willie Smith, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1975.

    Willie Smith, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-888
    Kelly Truss, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1975.

    Kelly Truss, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-5
    Claude J. Flynn, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 5, 1975.

    Kleinman, Cornfield, & Feldman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-265
    Harold L. Davenport, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    Harold L. Davenport, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This case arises as a result of an hourly increase for day labor, extra help employed by the Department of Transportation. The increase in hourly pay scale was approved by the Department of Labor, but not reported to the Department of Transportation in time for the changes to be made in the effective payroll period. The period for which back pay is sought, is from May 1,1974, through June 30, 1974, and according to the Departmental Report, the amount due Mr. Davenport is $341.13.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $341.13, plus employer contributions of $17.97, for a total employee benefit of $359.10 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 23.96 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 0 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 17.97 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 0 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 85.28 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 8.49 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$223.40 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded the total employee benefit of $359.10 (Three Hundred Fifty-Nine Dollars And Ten Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-281
    Jerry M. Harris, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    Jerry Harris, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This case arises as a result of an hourly increase for day labor, extra help employed by the Department of Transportation. The increase in hourly pay scale was approved by the Department of Labor, but not reported to the Department of Transportation in time for the changes to be made in the payroll effective period. The period for which back pay is sought, is from May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974, and according to the Departmental Report, the amount due Mr. Harris is $307.35.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $307.35, plus employer contributions of $44.08, for a total employee benefit of $351.43 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 12.20 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 17.98 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 26.10 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 17.98 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 0 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$ 277.17 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $351.43 (Three Hundred Fifty-One Dollars And Forty-Three Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-339
    Jerome J. Eversgerd for Village of Germantown, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    Jerome J. Eversgerd for Village of German-town, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-399
    Forrest Neal Jones, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    Forrest Neal Jones, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This case arises as a result of an hourly increase for day labor, extra help employed by the Department of Transportation. The increase in hourly pay scale was approved by the Department of Labor but not reported to the Department of Transportation in time for the changes to be made in the payroll effective period. The period for which back pay is sought, is from May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974, and according to the departmental report, the amount due Mr. Jones is $367.95.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $367.95, plus employer contributions of $63.29, for a total employee benefit of $431.24 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 13.90 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 21.53 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 41.76 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 21.53 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 39.24 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 9.23 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$284.05 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $431.24, (Four Hundred Thirty-One Dollars And Twenty-Four Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-424
    Traffic Institute, Northwestern University, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    Traffic Institute, Northwestern University, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-526
    General Electric Supply Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    General Electric Supply Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-543
    Don Sullivan, City Treasurer of Metropolis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1976.

      Don Sullivan, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-566
    Charles H. Thoburn, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, State Fair Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    William K. Cavanagh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for plumbers from $7.96 to $8.96. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the State Fair Agency on September 25, 1974, thereby allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the payroll effective period. Back salary is sought for April 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The Departmental Report indicates that Mr. Thoburn is due $548.50.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $548.50, plus employer contributions of $63.83, for a total employee benefit of $612.33 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 19.84 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 32.08 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 31.74 State’s contribution to State Employees, Retirement System
$ 32.09 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 31.22 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 7.47 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$ 457.89 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $612.33, (Six Hundred Twelve Dollars And Thirty-Three Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with out above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-567
    Frank C. McCue, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, State Fair Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    William K. Cavanagh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for plumbers from $7.96 to $8.96. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the State Fair Agency on September 25, 1974, thereby allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the payroll effective period. Back salary is sought for April 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The Departmental Report indicates that Mr. McCue is due $480.00.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $480.00, plus employer contributions of $58.80, for a total employee benefit of $538.80 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 19.20 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 28.09 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 30.72 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 28.08 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 48.22 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 12.00 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$372.49 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $538.80, (Five Hundred Thirty-Eight Dollars and Eighty Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-571
    Donald E. Brewer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, State Fair Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    William K. Cavanagh, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for plumbers from $7.96 to $8.96. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the State Fair Agency on September 25, 1974, thereby allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the payroll effective period. Back salary is sought for April 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The Departmental Report indicates that Mr. Brewer is due $472.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $472.00, plus employer contributions of $57.82, for a total employee benefit of $529.82 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 18.88 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 27.62 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 30.21 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 27.61 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 0 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$425.50 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $529.82, (Five Hundred Twenty-Nine Dollars And Eighty-Two Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-761
    Warren Shufledt, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    Warren Shufeldt, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-776
    Gene Johns, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    Gene Johns, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-777
    Gene Johns, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 10, 1975.

    Gene Johns, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-111
    Charles L. Hester, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Charles L. Hester, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for trades tenders from $5.09 to $5.33%. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Mental Health on October 31, 1972, thereby allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for April 1,1972, through June 30, 1972. The Departmental Report indicates that Mr. Hester is due $208.80 in back salary.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $208.80, plus employer contributions of $22.43, for a total employee benefit of $231.23 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 8.35 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 10.86 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 11.57 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 10.86 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 18.44 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 2.06 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$169.09 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $231.23, (Two Hundred Thirty-One Dollars And Twenty-Three Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-618
    Curtis Woods and Edwina Woods, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Pubilc Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    M. T. Gruener, Attorney for Claimants.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-132
    Joann Piontkowski, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Renee C. Hanover, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-252
    Doris J. Stewart, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Doris J. Stewart, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   This claim arises as a result of an anniversary raise being overlooked by the payroll department of the Department of Mental Health. Ms. Stewart should have received a $25 increase in salary for the months of April, May and June, 1973. The error was not discovered until the lapse of the funds had occurred. The Departmental Report indicates that Ms. Stewart is due $75 in back pay.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $75.00, plus employer contributions of $8.89, for a total employee benefit of $83.89 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 3.00 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 4.39 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 4.50 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 4.39 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 2.94 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ .89 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$ 63.78 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $83.89, (Eighty-Three Dollars And Eighty-Nine Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-256
    Barry M. Scarlett, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Barry Scarlett, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for day labor, extra help of $1. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation on September 9, 1974, thereby allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Scarlett is due $54.06.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $54.06, plus employer contributions of $2.97, for a total employee benefit of $57.03 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows: .

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 3.96 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 0 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 2.97 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 0 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 0 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$50.10 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total of employee benefit of $57.03, (Fifty-Seven Dollars And Three Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-271
    Frederick William Mauzy, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Frederick Wm. Mauzy, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase in the prevailing rate for extra day labor help of $1. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation on September 9, 1974, allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Pursuant to Ch. 127, par. 145, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Mauzy is due $321.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $321.00, plus employer contributions of $31.61, for a total employee benefit of $351.61 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 12.84 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 18.77 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 12.84 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 18.77 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 5.54 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$283.85 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $352.61, (Three Hundred Fifty-Two Dollars And Sixty-One Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-274
    Edwin R. Walters, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Edwin R. Walters, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase of $1.00 for extra help hired in the Day Labor Unit of Transportation. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation on September 9, 1974, thereby allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The Departmental Report indicates that Mr. Walters is due $413.38.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $413.38, plus employer contributions of $40.30, for a total employee benefit of $453.68 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 15.54 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 24.76 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 15.54 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 24.76 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 5.30 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$ 367.78 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $453.68, (Four Hundred Fifty-Three Dollars And Sixty-Eight Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-275
    Ray Bogue Greer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Ray Bogue Greer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for extra day labor help of $1.00 per hour. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation on September 9, 1974, thereby allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, to June 30,1974. The Departmental Report indicates that Mr. Greer is due $368.28.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $368.28, plus employer contributions of $28.80, for a total employee benefit of $397.08 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 28.80 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 0 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 28.80 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 0 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 16.51 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ .67 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$ 322.30 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $397.08, (Three Hundred Ninety-Seven Dollars And Eight Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-291
    Ivan Lavern Ford, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Ivan Ford, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for extra day labor help of $1. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation on September 9, 1974, thereby allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Ford is due $362.74.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $362.74, plus employer contributions of $28.32, for a total employee benefit of $391.06 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 28.32 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 0 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 28.32 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 0 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 32.30 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 4.82 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$297.30 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $391.06 (Three Hundred Ninety-One Dollars And Six Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-308
    Lawrence Eugene Bayly, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Lawrence Bayly, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for extra day labor help amounting to $1.00. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Transportation on September 9, 1974, thereby allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period: Back salary is sought for May 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The Departmental Report indicates that Mr. Bayly is due $322.52.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $322.52, plus employer contributions of $25.36, for a total employee benefit of $347.88 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 25.36 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 0 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 25.36 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 0 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 32.27 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 6.05 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$258.84 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that the claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $347.88, (Three Hundred Forty-Seven Dollars And Eighty-Eight Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-333
    John H. Hilliard, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    John H. Hilliard, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for brickmasons from $7.90 to $8.96. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Mental Health on October 9, 1974, after the lapse of the funds appropriated for this expense. Therefore, the change could not be made for the effective period. Back salary is sought for April 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The Departmental Report indicates that Mr. Hilliard is due $391.50.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $391.50, plus employer contributions of $46.44, for a total employee benefit of $437.94 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 15.66 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 22.92 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 23.52 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 22.92 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 0 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.
$352.92 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $437.94 (Four Hundred Thirty-Seven Dollars And Ninety-Four Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-369
    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Atlantic Richfield Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-465
    Mary Ella Wilson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Sidney Z. Karasik, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-467
    George A. Davis, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Conservation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    George A. Davis, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-539
    Kalvar Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Secretary of State, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Kalvar Corporation, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-545
    Raymond H. Bacon, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Raymond Bacon, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for steamfitters from $7.96 to $8.96. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Mental Health on October, 9, 1974, allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for April 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Bacon is due $522.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $522.00, plus employer contributions of $61.86, for a total employee benefit of $583.86 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 20.88 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 30.54 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 31.32 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 30.54 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ .84 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to Claimant:

$469.74 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $583.86, (Five Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars And Eighty-Six Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-547
    Richard C. Perkins, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Richard C. Perkins, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for steamfitters from $7.96 to $8.96. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Mental Health on October 9, 1974, allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for April 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Perkins is due $522.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $522.00, plus employer contributions of $61.86, for a total employee benefit of $583.86 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 20.88 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 30.54 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 31.32 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 30.54 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 27.72 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$442.86 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $583.86, (Five Hundred Eighty-Three Dollars And Eighty-Six Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-548
    Cyril Murray, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Cyril Murray, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for plasterers from $7.96 to $8.65. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Mental Health on October 9, 1974, allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for April 1, 1974, through June 30, 1974. The departmental report indicates that Mr. Murray is due $360.18.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $360.18, plus employer contributions of $42.66, for a total employee benefit of $402.84 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 14.40 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 21.06 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 21.60 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 21.06 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 0 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$324.72 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be' and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $402.84 (Four Hundred Two Dollars And Eighty-Four Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-577
    Tri-City Electric Company, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Tri-City Electric Company, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-583
    Walter Dannenberger, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Walter Dannenberger, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for plumbers from $7.96 to $8.96. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Mental Health on October 9, 1974, thereby allowing insufficient time for changes to be made for the payroll effective period. Back salary is sought for April 1,1974, through June 30,1974. The Departmental Report indicates Mr. Dannenberger is due $530.25.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $530.25, plus employer contributions of $62.84, for a total employee benefit of $593.09 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 21.21 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 31.02 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 31.82 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 31.02 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 0 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division:

$ 0 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$478.02 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $593.09 (Five Hundred Ninety-Three Dollars And Nine Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-584
    Raymond C. Shafer, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Raymond C. Shafer, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises as a result of an hourly increase for plumbers from $7.96 to 8.96. This increase was approved by the Department of Labor and reported to the Department of Mental Health on October 9, 1974, after the lapse of the funds appropriated for this expense. Changes could not be made for the effective payroll period. Back salary is sought for April 1,1974, through June 30, 1974. The Departmental Report indicates that Mr. Shafer is due $524.25.

We find that claimant is entitled to back salary in the gross amount of $524.25, plus employer contributions of $62.13, for a total employee benefit of $586.38 which should be disbursed by the Comptroller and credited as follows:

To the State Employees’ Retirement System as follows:

$ 20.97 Employee’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$ 30.67 Employee’s contribution to F.I.C.A.
$ 31.46 State’s contribution to State Employees’ Retirement System
$30.67 State’s contribution to F.I.C.A.

To the Illinois State Treasurer to be remitted to the Internal Revenue Service:

$ 28.00 as claimant’s Federal Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

To the Illinois Department of Revenue, Income Tax Division

$ .60 as claimant’s Illinois Income Tax withholding for current taxable year.

Net to claimant:

$444.01 as claimant’s net salary after all of the above contributions and withholdings have been deducted from the above total employee benefit.

It Is, Therefore, Ordered that claimant be and is hereby awarded, the total employee benefit of $586.38 (Five Hundred Eighty-Six Dollars And Thirty-Eight Cents) to be disbursed and credited in accordance with our above finding.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-600
    Howard Thomas d/b/a Howard Thomas Gravel Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Howard Thomas d/b/a Howard Thomas Gravel Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-690
    Mildred A. Bury, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Revenue, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Mildred A. Bury, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-731
    Academic Press, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 13, 1975.

    Academic Press, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-720
    Carl Richardson, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 21, 1975.

    Carl Richardson, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-721
    E. C. Heath, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 21, 1975.

    E. C. Heath, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-579
    Clark Oil & Refining Corp. Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Local Government Affairs, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 23, 1975.

    Clark Oil & Refining Corp., Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-651
    Forest Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Children and Family Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1975.

    Forest Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-770
    Park Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of General Services, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1974.

    Park Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-199
    Richard Stratton, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1975.

    Kleinman, Cornfield & Feldman, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-299
    Kattie Parham, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Public Aid, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1975.

    Kattie Parham, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-458
    Bismarck Hotel, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1975.

    Bismark Hotel, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General; William J. Karaganis, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-484
    Pharmedent Credit, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1975.

    Pharmedent Credit, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-513
    William Adams Engineers, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1975.

    William Adams Engineers, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-532
    Rockford Memorial Hospital, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Mental Health, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1975.

    Rockford Memorial Hospital, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-587
    Edward Stauber Wholesale Hardware, Inc., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Capital Development Board, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 27, 1975.

    Edward Stauber Wholesale Hardware, Inc., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Martin A. Soll, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 74-CC-891
    Florence V. Von Bergen, Raymond A. Von Bergen, and Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Florence V. Von Bergen, Raymond A. Von BeR' gen and Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, Claimants, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Saul R. Wexler, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.


text:
    (No. 75-CC-299
    Cities Service Oil Co., Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Department of Transportation, Respondent.

      Opinion filed February 28, 1975.

    Cities Service Oil Co., Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; William E. Webber, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.