text:
    (No. 75-CV-44
    Raymond Kaepplinger, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 18, 1975.

    Raymond Kaepplinger, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred December 4,1973, at 5653 W. Fullerton Avenue, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Raymond Kaepplinger, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the court, the court finds:

1. That the claimant, Raymond Kaepplinger, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on December 4, 1973, the claimant was beaten by two unknown men in his photo studio at 5653 West Fullerton, in Chicago. Prior to the beating, the claimant was conducting his business at the studio.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any wrongful act or provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him by the two men in his photo studio.

4. That the claimant was transported to St. Anne’s Hospital, 4950 West Thomas, Chicago, where he was treated for his injuries by Dr. E. R. Felix. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. However, the assailants have not been identified at this time.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation for medical expenses and loss of earnings.

8. That the claimant was unable to work from December 4, 1973, to December 13, 1973, and, again, from December 24, 1973, to January 2, 1974, as a result of his injury, a total of 19 days.

9. That the claimant has proved to the court’s satisfaction that his loss of earnings compensable under the statute was $312.00.

10. That in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$1,294.65
2) Medical...................................... 725.00
$2,019.65

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the "Workmen’s Compensation Act’, or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”.

12. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $1,420.79. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in paragraphs 9 and 10, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $710.86. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $710.86, i.e.,

Net loss of earnings.................................$312.00
Net Hospital & Medical.........................’..... 598.86
910.86
Less $200 deductible............................... —200.00
$710.86

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $710.86 (Seven Hundred Ten Dollars and Eighty Six Cents) be awarded Raymond Kaepplinger, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


source: Caselaw Access Project

author: Per Curiam.

license: Public Domain

text:
    (No. 75-CV-49
    Derek Sean O’Neill, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 18, 1975.

    Derek Sean O’Neill, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on May 10, 1974, at 3954 North Keeler Street, Chicago, Illinois. Derek Sean O’Neill, a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat, 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the court, the court finds:

1. That the claimant, Derek Sean O’Neill, age 31, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2 (c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on May 10, 1974, claimant was severely beaten about the head and face by about ten unidentified assailants after leaving the Red Star Inn at 3954 North Keeler Street, in Chicago.

3. That statements taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of provocation by the victim for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from May 10, 1974 to May 24,1974, as a result of the beating of May 10, 1974. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. The police investigation is presently continuing.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of earnings as a result of his injuries.

8. That the victim was unable to work during the period of May 10,1974, to June 18,1974, as % result of his injuries; that the sustained loss of earnings during this period is in the amount of $1,967.66, based on his average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his injury. This amount is compensable pursuant to the following provision in §4 of the Act:

"Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

The amount of actual loss of earnings sustained by the claimant is greater than $500 per month. In accordance with §4 of the Act, the $500 per month limit is controlling, and, using this rate for 1 month and 8 days, the total compensable loss of earnings sustained by the claimant is $631.44.

9. That in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of all pecuniary losses as computed before deductions and set-offs is as follows:

1) Loss of earnings ...............................$ 631.44
2) Hospital ..................................... 1,915.49
3) Medical...................................... 1,064.00
$3,611.93

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act’, or from local government, State or Federal funds, or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefits of the applicant. . .)”.

11. That in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $2,891.42. Also deducted from the gross figure is the statutory deduction of $200.00. This leaves a total of $520.51 as the actual amount of loss sustained by the claimant. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $520.51.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $520.51 (Five Hundred Twenty Dollars and Fifty One Cents) be hereby awarded to the claimant, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-171
    Morris D. Speare, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 18, 1975.

    Morris D. Speare, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on August 3, 1974, at 1709 W. Juneway Terrace, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Morris D. Speare, victim of crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Morris D. Speare, age 60, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on August 3, 1974, claimant was beaten with an iron pipe while leaving a client at 1709 Juneway Terrace, Chicago. Prior to the beating, claimant was making an insurance collection for his job.

3. That statements, taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any wrongful act or provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him by the assailant.

4. That the victim was transported by private car to Bethesda Hospital, 2451 West Howard Street, Chicago, where he was treated for multiple lacerations of the scalp. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and his assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, that the assailants have been identified as Avell Wandick, Freddie Bates, and James Collins and that they have been indicted, tried and convicted.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for medical expenses and loss of earnings.

8. That the claimant was unable to work from August 3, 1974, to August 9,1974, and from August 19, 1974, to August 23, 1974, when he went back into the hospital. This is a total of 12 days.

9. That the claimant’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his injury were $997.00, but earnings of only $500.00 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of earnings, pursuant to the following provision in sec. 4 of the Act:

"Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

10. That based on a period of 12 days lost time and taking $500/month as his average earnings, his loss of earnings is computed to be $197.16.

11. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance, as follows:

1) Medical......................................$ 519.00
2) Hospital .................................... . 1,032.70
$1,551.70

12. That in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, sec. 7(d) of the Act states that this court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act’, or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”

13. That in this claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss as contemplated by sec. 7(d) of the Act were shown to be in the total sum of $675. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200 having been deducted from the gross amount of loss, as calculated in Paragraphs 10 and 11, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $873.86. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $873.86. i.e.,

Net loss of earnings ...............................$ 197.16
Net Hospital & Medical............................. 876.70
$1,073.86
Less $200 deductible............................... -200.00
$ 873.86

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $873.86 be awarded to the claimant as an innocent victim of a violent crime.


text:
    (Nos. 74-CV-9, 75-CV-126, Consolidated
    Laura L. Morris, and James H. Morris, Sr., on behalf of James H. Morris, Jr., Deceased, Claimants, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 20, 1975.

    Laura L. Morris, and James H. Morris, Sr., Claimants, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on January 24, 1974, at 21621 S. Main Street, Cook County, Matteson, Illinois. Laura L. Morris, wife of the victim and James H. Morris, Sr., father of the victim, seek compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq.) (hereafter referred to as the ”Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That James H. Morris, Jr., the husband of the claimant, Laura L. Morris, and the son of the claimant, James H. Morris, Sr., was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec.2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 9-1).

2. That on January 24, 1974, while visiting Christiana Mancino at 21621 South Main Street, Matteson, Illinois, the victim was shot and killed by a person or persons unknown. Also killed at the same time were Christiana Mancino and her stepfather, Walter Mancino.

3. That no evidence was presented that would indicate that the victim’s death was attributable to his wrongful act or the substantial provocation of his assailant.

4. That a further and more detailed report of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant or assailants have not been identified; however, it was recommended in the coroner’s verdict, that "the police continue to make a diligent search for the person or persons responsible for this act and when apprehended, they be held to the Grand Jury of Cook County on the charge of murder.”

6. That there was no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimants have fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the claimant, Laura L. Morris, seeks compensation under the Act for loss of support to herself and her minor child, Leigh Ann Morris, infant.

9. That the claimant, James H. Morris, Sr., seeks compensation under the Act for funeral and burial expenses.

10. That the claimant, Laura L. Morris, has proved to the court’s satisfaction that the loss of support that she suffered as a result of the victim’s death was in the amount of $332.57 per month.

11. That at the time of his death, James H. Morris, Jr., was 20 years old.

12. That based on the average life expectancy of a 20 year old male, and taking $332.57 per month as the victim’s average monthly earnings, the loss of support to his family resulting from the victim’s death is computed to be far in excess of the $10,000 maximum that can be awarded.

13. That the claimant, James H. Morris, Sr., father of the victim, incurred funeral and burial expenses as a result of his son’s death. The amount of pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

Funeral ........................................$2,191.60
Ambulance to move body ........................... 60.00
$2,251.60

14. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, sec 7(d) of the Act states that this court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act’, or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”.

We interpret the above provision to mean that the benefits received by the victim’s family as a result of his death, and a deduction of $200, shall be deducted from the total loss sustained and not from the $10,000 maximum amount payable under the Act. On this point, we are adopting a recent opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court on the same point arising under the provisions of an Act identical to ours in all material respects: Gurley v. Commonwealth (1973) 296 N.E. 2d 477.

15. That in the claim before us, no benefits other than social security, which is not deductible under the Act, have been received by either claimant from other sources. The statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the amount of loss calculated in Paragraphs 13 and 14, leaves an amount of loss sustained by both claimants far in excess of the $10,000 maximum amount that can be awarded under the Act for any loss resulting from a violent crime.

16. That, before an award is granted for loss of support, the claimant, James H. Morris, Sr., is entitled to an award to compensate him for the pecuniary loss suffered as a result of the funeral, $2,251.60. Hence, the claimant, James H. Morris, Sr., is entitled to an award of $2,251.60. This leaves an amount of $7,748.40 that can be awarded to the claimant, Laura L. Morris and her minor child.

This Court takes notice of the fact that the minor child of the deceased victim, who is named in §8 of this opinion, was dependent on James H. Morris, Jr., as was his surviving spouse, Laura Morris, the claimant and the mother of decedent’s said minor child.

Under these circumstances, the court is required to interpret and comply with the following language of the Act found in §8(b):

"If the Court of Claims finds, in the case of an application made by a person dependent for (her) support on a deceased victim, that persons other than the applicant were also dependent on that victim for their support, it (the Court) shall also (1) name those persons in its order; (2) state the percentage share of the total compensation award and the dollar amount to which each is entitled; and (3) order that those amounts be paid to those persons directly or, in the case of a minor or incompetent, to his (her) guardian or conservator, as the case may be.”

To comply strictly with the above legislative directive, it would seem appropriate and reasonable to order the distribution of the $7,748.40 award in accordance with the rule of distribution stated in §11(1) of the Probate Act. This rule would allow one-third ($2,582.80) to the victim’s surviving spouse, and the remaining two-thirds ($5,165.60) to the victim’s minor child.

However, to make distribution in this manner, we believe would impose an undue hardship on the mother. If the $7,748.40 award were paid to her in a lump sum, she would be holding $5,165.60 in trust for her minor child. Although she is guardian of her person, she would have no power to administer her estate, nor use her funds, unless she is duly appointed guardian of the minor’s estate as provided by law. Perry v. Carmichael (1880) 95 Ill. 519. After such appointment, she would be required to manage her child’s funds frugally under the direction of the appointing Court and present periodic accounts of her guardianship to such Court. She would also be responsible for Court costs and any legal expenses required in filing her petition for appointment, oath, surety bond, and accounts.

To obviate the necessity of the claimant, Laura L. Morris, being appointed guardian of her child’s estate, and considering all other facts in this case, the Court believes that the best interest of the victim’s family would be served by ordering that this award be disbursed to the claimant in periodic monthly payments as authorized in §8 (a) (4) of the Act. As the natural guardian of her minor child, the mother has a legal obligation to provide for her suitable support and education. In fulfilling this obligation, we believe she would necessarily be required to expend the proper amount from each monthly payment received hereunder for the care and nurture of her child as well as for her own necessities.

It Is Hereby Ordered As Follows:

1) The sum of $2,251.60 is awarded to the claimant, James H. Morris, Sr., the father of the victim of a violent crime, for funeral expenses this claimant paid for the victim.

2) The total sum of $7,748.40 be awarded to the other claimant and her minor child, collectively, as persons who were all dependent for their support on James H. Morris, Jr., the deceased victim of a violent crime.

3) That the aforesaid award in the previous paragraph be paid to the claimant, Laura L. Morris, in 16 monthly installments, the first 15 in equal amounts of $500 each, and the last installment in the amount of $248.40. The court directs that said monthly payments shall be made from the Court of Claims Fund insofar as it is legally possible to do so.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-44
    Mary Barth, on behalf of Richard J. Barth, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Carl F. G. Henninger, Attorney for Claimant.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Jerome Felsenthal, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of a criminal act of murder that occurred on March 18, 1974, in Downers Grove. Mary Barth, widow of Richard J. Barth, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the court, the court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased husband, Richard J. Barth, age 25, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act to wit:

"Murder”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 9-1).

2. That on March 18, 1974, the victim, Richard J. Barth, of 945 Burlington, Downers Grove, was employed as a police officer [badge #11] for the Village of Downers Grove Police Department. Officer Barth reported for duty on this day at the 7:45 a.m. roll call. He began his assignment at 8:00 a.m., which was motorized patrol of Beat 1, 2, 4 and 5. At 12:28 p.m. Officer Barth was directed by radio communication to respond to a "suspicious person” call at Northwest Park, located at Cornell and Chicago Avenues in Beat 4. At 12:33 p.m. victim Barth acknowledged that he was at the scene, and would continue communication by portable radio. At the same time one Officer Ralph Harrison also of the Downers Grove Police Department, was assigned to the scene as back-up to Officer Barth. Officer Harrison arrived at Northwest Park at 12:35 p.m. As Officer Harrison stepped away from his squad car, he heard four shots fired, then heard from Officer Barth, via his portable radio, that he had been shot. No further communication was heard and Officer Harrison proceeded into the wooded area searching for Officer Barth, and found him. He was alive but unable to speak.

3. That based on the police report and coroner’s report, the victim apparently was shot while struggling with his assailants. Subsequent to being shot the victim was able to release four rounds from his own revolver. The victim suffered two gun shot wounds from a .25 caliber pistol that punctured both lungs. He was dead upon arrival at Hinsdale Sanitarium.

4. That subsequent investigation resulted in the arrest of two individuals, both minors, and at this time they are being held at the DuPage County Youth Home. Claimant fully cooperated with law enforcement officers.

5. That there was no evidence to indicate that the victim’s injuries were attributable to the victim’s wrongful act or substantial provocation of his assailants. The victim was in the active performance of his duties as a law enforcement officer.

6. That there was no indication whatsoever that the victim was a relative of or ever shared the same household with his assailants.

7. That a timely notice was filed on April 25, 1974. Claimant’s application, Subrogation Agreement and Authorization for Records and Reports were filed with the Clerk of this court on May 20, 1974.

8. That the claimant, Mary A. Barth, is the widow of the deceased victim, Richard J. Barth, and was dependent on the victim for her support.

9. That the claimant apparently has received or is eligible to receive the following compensation or benefits from sources other than this Act as a result of the death of her husband:

Workmen’s Compensation...........................$26,900.00
United Benefit Life Insurance Company................ 25,000.00
Life Insurance Company of Illinois.................... 20,000.00
Downers Grove Group Insurance ..................... 10,000.00
State of Illinois (Law Enforcement and
Fireman’s Compensation)........................ 20,000.00
Federal Social Security Death Benefit.................. 255.00
Accrued Sick Days and Personal Days paid
by Village of Downers Grove ..................... 998.82
$103,153.82

In addition, claimant will receive from a Widow’s Pension the sum of $437.50 per month for the rest of her life or until she remarries.

10. That there is no claim for medical or hospital expenses since the victim was dead upon arrival at the hospital. That life insurance proceeds, after excluding the first $25,000, more than cover the funeral bill.

11. That the one phase of this claim which is cognizable under the Act is claimant’s loss of support as a dependent of the victim, and the court analyzes this claim as follows: The victim was employed by the Village of Downers Grove Police Department. His average monthly earnings [minus PICA, State and Federal withholding tax] for the 6-month period prior to his death were $643.58 per month. Since this income is more than $500 per month, we are required [by §4 of the Act] to use the amount of $500 per month in calculating the claimant’s loss of future support from her deceased husband. He was 25 years old when he died. Projecting an income of $500 per month over a period of the decedent’s normal life expectancy according to actuarial tables [or only to the early retirement age of police officers] we arrive at a sum which, after deducting all the death benefits to the claimant shown in 1Í9, far exceeds $10,000, the maximum amount that may be awarded under the Act [§7(c)].

Considering the fact that the claimant has received substantial death benefits in lump sum payments, we hold that the further compensation to be awarded to her under this Act [pursuant to §8 (a) (4)] should be in periodic monthly payments. Considering the further fact that the claimant receives a widow’s pension in the sum of $437.50 per month for the rest of her life or until she remarries, we find that periodic payments under this Act in the amount of $250 per month, to supplement her pension, would give the claimant a monthly income of slightly more than her husband’s net income at the time of his death. We will, therefore, order periodic payments to the claimant in the amount of $250 per month for a period of 40 months, but that such payments be terminated upon her remarriage, if that event occurs within the 40 months.

Parenthetically, the Court will comment on the fact that the claimant apparently will be entitled to a lump sum payment from the State in the sum of $20,000 pursuant to the Law Enforcement Officers and Firemen Compensation Act. The court has been advised by members of the General Assembly that the Legislature did not intend to provide death benefits to claimants under both the aforesaid Act and the Crime Victims Act. However, until such legislative intent is expressed in the statutes, the dependents of a police officer who is murdered while in the active performance of his duties, are eligible to apply for death benefits under both Acts.

It Is Hereby Ordered as follows:

1. That the claimant, Mary Barth, as the widow of the deceased victim of a violent crime, is hereby awarded periodic monthly payments for loss of her husband’s support in the sum of $250 per month for a period of 40 months or until her widowhood is terminated by her remarriage, if the later event occurs before the said 40 month period has expired and the maximum amount of $10,000 has been paid. The said periodic payments for support will also be terminated in the event of the death of the claimant.

2. That it is the duty of the claimant to inform this Court in writing if she remarries before this award is paid in full, and it is the duty of her personal representative to inform this Court in the event of claimant’s death.


text:
    (No. 75-CV-118
    Joseph J. Ozimek, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 24, 1975.

    Joseph J. Ozimek, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on July 30, 1974, at 8601 South Manistee, Chicago, Illinois. Joseph J. Ozimek, a victim of a violent crime, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act.” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits Submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Joseph J. Ozimek, age 47, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on July 30, 1974, the claimant was shot in the abdomen after he interrupted a robbery in progress at Ed’s Sport Club, at 8601 South Manistee Street, in Chicago.

3. That statements taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of provocation by the victim for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim was hospitalized from July 30, 1974, to August 12, 1974, as a result of the shooting of August. 12, 1974. A further and more detailed investigation considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. The police investigation is presently continuing.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation under the Act for loss of earnings as a result of his injuries.

8. That the victim was unable to work during the period of July 30,1974, to October 16,1974, as a result of his injuries; that the sustained loss of earnings during this period is in the amount of $1,819.93, based on his average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his injury. This amount is compensable pursuant to the following provision in §4 of the. Act:

"Loss of earnings, loss of future earnings and loss of support shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

The amount of actual loss of earnings sustained by the claimant is greater than $500 per month. In accordance with §4 of the Act, the $500 per month limit is controlling, and, using this rate for 2 months and 16 days, the total compensable loss of earnings sustained by the claimant is $1,263.16.

9. That in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of all pecuniary losses as computed before deductions and set-offs is as follows:

1) Loss of Earnings...............................$1,263.16
2) Hospital ..................................... 1,941.35
3) Medical...................................... 1,045.00
$4,249.55

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local government, State or Federal funds, or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .)”.

11. That in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be:

Gross losses ..................................$4,249.55
Less Insurance Benefits.............................-1,620.00
Less Public Aid benefits ............................— 249.00
Less Statutory deduction............................— 200.00
Net Compensable Claim......................... $2,170.55

It is to be noted that there was a deduction from the gross figure; this is the statutory deduction of $200. This leaves a total of $2,170.55 as the actual amount of loss sustained by the claimant. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $2,170.55.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $2,170.55 (Two Thousand One Hundred Seventy Dollars And Fifty-Five Cents) be awarded to the claimant, Joseph J. Ozimek, an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund to Joseph J. Ozimek, as a partial payment-on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $1,170.56 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for. its approval.


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    (No. 74-CV-47
    Carmen C. De Simone, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 27, 1975.

    Carmen C. De Simone, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on April 29, 1974, at 23rd & Wabash Streets, Chicago, Illinois. Carmen C. DeSimone seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat, 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the court, the court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Carmen C. DeSimone, age 60, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on April 29, 1974, at approximately 5:00 p.m., the claimant was walking to the Elevated Station near 23rd and Wabash, when he was attacked by three young men who demanded his wallet. When he refused, they pushed him to the ground.

3. That the claimant immediately called the police for assistance. The police took the claimant to Mercy Hospital for emergency treatment of facial laceration.

4. That the claimant then called his family who took him to MacNeal Memorial Hospital in Berwyn, Illinois, where he was treated for severe contusions of the head and a severe sprain of the right ankle.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That statements taken by the police shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

6. That the claimant and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

7. That, as the result of his injuries, the claimant was unable to work from April 29, 1974, until May 28, 1974, a total of 29 days. The claimant’s average monthly earnings was $600.00 per month which is greater than the statutory maximum. That in accordance with the Act, the maximum amount of compensation for loss of earnings that this Court can grant is $477.05.

8. That in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred hospital and medical expenses:

Hospital .........................................$ 63.60
Medical.......................................... 67.35
Loss of Earnings................................... 477.05
Total......................................... $608.00

9. That benefits in the amount of $63.60 were paid to the claimant by Blue Cross.

10. That in determining the amount of compensation to which a claimant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) . . shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source . . .”

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00, plus the insurance benefits of $63.60, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $344.40.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $344.40 (Three Hundred Forty-Four Dollars and Forty Cents) be awarded the claimant, Carmen C. DeSimone, the victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 74-CV-87
    Alice E. Regan, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 27, 1975.

    Alice E. Regan, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred May 17, 1974, on 55th Street near Richmond, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Alice E. Regan, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat, 1972, Ch. 70, §71, et. seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”.)

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Alice E. Regan, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill.Rev.Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on May 17,1974, the claimant was accosted by two youths as she was walking with a friend on 55th Street near Richmond. When claimant resisted, she was thrown to the ground and beaten.

3. That statements taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed present no evidence of any wrongful act or substantial provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her by the two youths.

4. Claimant was transported to Holy Cross Hospital by police car. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reférence.

5. That the victim and her assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. However, the assailants have not been identified at this time.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation for medical expenses.

8. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital $ 684.08
2) Medical 351.00
$1,035.08

9. That, in determing the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .)”.

10. That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $747.08. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 118, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $88.00. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $88.00, i.e.,

Net Hospital & Medical......................... 288.00
Less $200 deductible ........................... —200.00
$ 88.00

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $88.00 (Eighty Eight Dollars) be awarded Alice E. Regan, an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-33
    Judy L. Schwartz, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 27, 1975.

    Angelos & Angelos, Attorney for Claimant.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on December 6, 1973, at 2150 West Crescent, Park Ridge, Illinois. Judy L. Schwartz seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Judy L. Schwartz was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on the afternoon of December 6, 1973, the claimant had returned home from work and was opening her mail box when she was struck from behind with a large instrument. The claimant was dragged into the apartment of a neighbor, Stephen Talbett, of 2150 West Crescent, Park Ridge, Illinois. Mr. Talbett called the police.

3. That Stephen Talbett admitted to the police that he heard the claimant at her mailbox, that he came up behind her and struck her with a machete, that she began bleeding and he dragged her to his apartment, where he called the police. Talbett stated that he had heard that the claimant had turned in some of his friends on a narcotic arrest and that he wanted to get her for it. A machete with a dried red stain was found in Talbett’s apartment. Steve Talbet was charged with the aggravated battery of the claimant. He will appear before Judge Fitzgerald on March 31, 1975. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

4. That statements taken by the police shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

5. That the claimant and her assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the claimant was taken to Resurrection Hospital where she was treated for a depressed parietal skull fracture, multiple lacerations and cerebral concussion. The claimant incurred the following expenses:

Hospital.........................................$1,761.60
Doctors ..........................................901.00
$2,662.60

7. That as the result of her injuries the claimant was unable to work from December 6,1973, to February 15, 1974. The claimant’s average monthly earnings was $600.00 per month which is greater than the statutory maximum. That in accordance with the Act, the maximum amount of compensation for loss of earnings that this Court can grant is $1,158.00.

8. That benefits in the amount of $2,584.03 were paid to the claimant by the Seaboard Life Insurance Company.

9. That in determining the amount of compensation to which a claimant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this court—

"(d) . . . shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source . . .”

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00, plus the insurance benefits of $2,584.03, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $1,036.57.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,036.57 be awarded the claimant, Judy L. Schwartz, the victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninty-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund to Judy L. Schwartz, as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $36.58 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 75-CV-34
    Julia Dzierzawski, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 27, 1975.

    Julia Dzierzawski, Claimant, pro se.

      William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises, out of a criminal offense that occurred on May 23, 1974, at 3914 North Bernard, Chicago. Julia Dzierzawski seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, eh. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Julia Dzierzawski, age 49, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on May 23, 1974, at approximately 9:00 a.m., claimant left her home to go to work. As she was unlocking her car at 3914 North Bernard, she was attacked by two men wearing ski masks. The assailants stabbed her in the side three times with a knife.

That George Koste, Star #4436, an off-duty police officer, was standing in a doorway at 3905 North Bernard, talking with a friend when he observed the claimant being jostled by two men. When he noticed that the men were wearing ski masks, he ran to the claimant to assist her and the assailants jumped into a car and sped away at high speed. Officer Koste administered first aid to the claimant and called the police.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

4. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance by viewing suspect photos. That claimant made an identification of one of her assailants but that no arrests have been made in connection with this criminal offense.

5. That the claimant and her assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That claimant seeks compensation under the Act for medical expenses and lost wages.

7. That claimant was hospitalized at Swedish Covenant Hospital where she underwent emergency surgery for repair of a lacerated liver and adrenal gland.

That as the result of this medical treatment, the claimant incurred hospital and surgical expenses, as follows:

Hospital.........................................$2,969.15
Medical......................................... 996.00
$3,965.15

8. That claimant was unable to work from May 23, 1974, until September 24,1974, (4 months). That claimant was employed at the Lincoln Manufacturing Company in Chicago where she earned $800.00 per month before her injury. That claimant’s loss of earnings during her disability was $3,200, less disability benefits of $302.86. That in considering the loss of earnings, the court may not award more than $500 per month. Based upon this maximum, the claimant has sustained $2,000 in compensable lost earnings.

9. That based upon the calculations set forth in 1Í7 & 8, claimant’s pecuniary loss is:

Medical.........................................$3,965.15
Loss of Earnings ................................. 2,000.00
$5,965.15

10. That the claimant received insurance benefits from the Aetna Insurance Company in the amount of $3,342.96 and is not entitled to additional compensation therefrom.

That in determining the amount of compensation to which a claimant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) . . . shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source . . .”

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00, plus the insurance benefits of $3,342.96, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $2,422.19.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $2,422.19 be awarded the claimant, Julia Dzierzawski, the victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund to Julia Dzierzawski as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $1,422.20 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 75-CV-56
    Juan Arevalos, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed March 27, 1975.

    Juan Arevalos, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on March 30, 1974, at the vicinity of 300 South Racine Avenue, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Juan Arevalos, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Slat., 1973, Ch. 70, Sec. 71 et seq. (hereafter referred to as "the Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnishedby the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Juan Arevalos, age 51, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in Sec. 2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, Sec. 12-4).

2. That on March 30, 1974, claimant was beaten during a robbery attempt by two men while walking down the street near his home. Claimant had never seen these men before and has not seen them since.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries for which he was hospitalized and received surgery. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the two assailants have not been identified or apprehended. The case remains under investigation by the Chicago Police Department.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding his injury were $633.84 but darnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of earnings, pursuant to the following provision of Sec.-4 of the Act:

". . . loss of earnings shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

9. That the victim, as a result of his injuries was unable to work during the period of April 1, 1974, through July 15, 1974, a period of 3.5 months. In accordance with the statutory limit of compensation of $500 per month victim is entitled to $1,750.00.

10. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the precuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$ 946.50
2) Medical......................................$ 509.50
$1,456.00

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to 'which an applicant is entitled, Sec. 7(d) of the Act states' that this court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .)”.

That,.in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by Sec. 7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $1,968.00. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in Par. 9 and 10, leaves an amount of compensable loss sustained by the claimant of $1,238.00..

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,238.00 be awarded to the claimant, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety Nine Dollars and Ninety Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $238.01 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 74-CV-35
    Kathleen Fox, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 1, 1975.

    Kathleen Fox, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on January 5, 1974, at the Elevated Station at Roscoe and Southport Streets, in Chicago, Illinois. Kathleen Fox seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

The Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Kathleen Fox, age 26, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on January 5, 1973, at approximately 1:00 a.m., the claimant walked into the Elevated Station at Roscoe and Southport, Chicago, Illinois. There she was accosted by several males who beat and robbed her. The claimant was found lying unconscious in a pool of blood by Edwin Pennington, of 1332 West Eddy, an off-duty patrolman, who had just gotten off the northbound train and observed the claimant lying on the ground severely beaten. He immediately contacted the Chicago Police Department. Beat 1912, Officers L. Blair, Star No. 2991 and T. Kuroski, Star No. 15313 responded to the call. A police wagon transported the claimant to St. Joseph’s Hospital. Upon entering the hospital, the claimant was diagnosed to be in a comatose state with multiple facial lacerations and nasal fracture. She was placed in intensive care and remained in a critical condition for ten days.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

4. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance by viewing suspect photos. That claimant was unable to make an identification of her assailant and that no arrests have been made in connection with this criminal offense.

5. That the claimant and her assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That claimant seeks compensation under the Act for medical expenses and lost wages.

7. That claimant was unable to work from January 5,1974, until May 15,1974. That claimant was employed as a waitress at Pearson’s Restaurant in Chicago where she earned $540.00 per month before her injury.

That in considering the loss of earnings, the court may not award more than $500 per month. Based upon this maximum, the claimant has sustained $2,250 in compensable lost earnings.

8. That the claimant was hospitalized twice, January 5, to January 22,1974, and February 24, to February 25, 1974. That the Illinois Public Aid Department through its Aid to the Medically Indigent Program assumed all of the hospital expenses except $66.40.

9. That the claimant incurred medical expenses by surgeons and physicians in the amount of $1,780.

10. That in addition to loss of earnings and hospital and medical expenses, the claimant made four round trips from her home in Decatur to medical specialists in Chicago. In connection with these appointments, she incurred $173.50 of expenses which this Court considers to be appropriate medical expenses.

11. That based upon the calculations set forth in §7, 8, 9 and 10, claimant’s actual pecuniary loss is:

Hospital....................................66.40
Medical......................................... 1,780.00
Loss of Earnings................ 2,250.00
Miscellaneous .................................... 173.50
$4,269.90

12. That the claimant has received no benefits or reimbursements, directly or indirectly, from any other source, nor is she entitled to such benefits from any other source as the result of her injuries, with the exception of Public Aid benefits referred to in 18. These Public Aid benefits have been set off against the expenses that the claimant incurred. The calculation of pecuniary loss is based upon expenses that the claimant has incurred which are in excess of the Public Aid assistance.

13. That in determining the amount of compensation to which the applicant is entitled, the Act states that this Court shall deduct $200.

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $4,069.90.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $4,069.90 be awarded the claimant, Kathleen Fox, the victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund to Kathleen Fox, as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $3,069.91 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


text:
    (No. 74-CV-82
    Mary Payton, on behalf of Irene Dennis, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 1, 1975.

    Mary Payton, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General; Leonard Cahnmann, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred March 19, 1974, at 7339 South Coles, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Mary Payton, claimant, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (Hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnishedby the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Mary Payton, was the mother of the victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder”. (Ill. Rev. Stat, 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1.)

2. That on March 19, 1974, the victim’s body was found bound and gagged with a stab wound in the chest by the janitor in her building.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any wrongful act or provocation by the claimant for her death.

4. That the victim’s body was transported to South Shore Hospital in Chicago, where she was pronounced D.O.A. The remains were then transferred to the Cook County Morgue. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and her assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance. However, the assailants have not been identified at this time.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation for funeral and burial expenses.

8. That funeral and burial expenses were paid by the claimant in the amount of $1,703.00.

9. That life insurance benefits were paid by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to the victim’s brother, Melvin Payton, and sister, Carolyn Payton, in the amount of $10,000 each as a result of the victim’s death.

10. That both Carolyn Payton and Melvin Payton have waived all claims that they have pursuant to the Crime Victims Compensation Act as a result of the victim’s death.

11. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that wound inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .)”.

12. That, in this claim before us, the claimant has not received any benefits from other sources. The statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 1f8, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $1,503. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $1,503.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $1,503 be awarded to the claimant, the mother of an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund to Mary Payton, as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $503.01 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 75-CV-112
    Henry Hall, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 1, 1975.

    Henry Hall, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on February 8, 1974, at 6339 South Carpenter, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Henry Hall, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of' the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Courts finds:

1. That the claimant, Henry Hall, age 47, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on February 8, 1974, claimant was shot during a robbery attempt by a man in the hallway of an apartment building owned by claimant.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no substantial evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries for which he was hospitalized and received surgery. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailant, Raymond Elevens, was convicted of Aggravated Battery in the Cook County Criminal Court on March 24, 1975. (Indictment #74-3707.)

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailant were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully co- , operated with their requests for assistance.

8. That the victim’s loss of earnings during the period of his disability as a result of his injury is too speculative to calculate. In addition, since claimant has established medical expenses beyond the maximum award possible under the Act, such a calculation is unnecessary.

9. That the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were partially covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of the pecuniary loss for these items as computed before deductions and setoffs is as follows:

1) Hospital.....................................$17,959.75
2) Medical..................................... 3,100.00
$21,059.75

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant. . .).”

That, in the claim before us, the benefits received by the claimant from other sources which must be deducted from his loss, as contemplated by §7(d) of the Act, were shown to be in the total sum of $5,122.00. This amount, plus the statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 119, leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the claimant of $15,737.75.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $10,000, the maximum award allowable under the Act, be awarded to the claimant, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $9,000.01 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 75-CV-239
    William J. Berron, on behalf of Arlene C. Zandulab, Deceased, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 1, 1975.

    William J. Berron, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on August. 29, 1974, at 1444 West Winona, Chicago. William J. Berron, father of the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant’s deceased daughter, Arlene C. Zandulab, age 40, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Murder", (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §9-1.)

2. On August 29,1974, at 11:00 a.m., the discovery of a nude body of a woman lying on a garage floor at 1444 West Winona, was reported to police by an unidentified caller. The body was removed to the County Morgue, where an autopsy revealed the cause of death to be strangulation. A pair of panty hose found at the scene appeared to have been used in the murder. The body was later identified as Arlene C. Zandulab.

3. That at this time, the assailant or assailants have not been identified. That a further, and more detailed, summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

4. That the police investigation has presented no evidence of provocation by the decedent for the attack upon her.

5. That the victim and her assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation for funeral, interment and inquest fees in the amount of $1,627.60 that he incurred as the result of his daughter’s death.

8. That the claimant or his family has not received nor will be entitled to receive any benefits from any other source as the result of the victim’s death.

9. That the claimant has incurred a pecuniary loss in the amount of $1,627.60 from which $200 must be deducted pursuant to §7(d) of the Act.

10. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all the requirements of this Act, and the claim is therefore compensable thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $1,427.60 be awarded to William J. Berron, the father of an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred and Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $427.61 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 74-CV-30
    Louise K. George, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Louise K. George, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of a criminal aggravated assault and battery on October 13,1973, at 3:00 a.m. at 273 Longwood Drive, Kankakee, Illinois. Louise George seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 70, Par. 71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates the matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant was a victim of a violent crime covered under the Act to wit:

"Aggravated Assault, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973, Ch. 38, par. 12-2.”

2. A detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in an Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this claimant was severely injured by three gunshots wounds.

3. That said crime occurred at 3:00 a.m. at 273 Longwood Drive, Kankakee, Illinois, at which time claimant was severely injured by three gunshot wounds.

4. That said crime was reported to Kankakee City Police promptly and claimant at all times has cooperated with law enforcement officials.

5. That the alleged assailant has not been identified.

6. Claimant, as indicated by the report of the Attorney General, did not provoke the incident.

7. Claimant is not a relative of or a member of the same household of the assailant.

8. Claimant has suffered pecuniary loss in excess of $200 compensible by section 74 of the Act, to wit:

St. Mary’s Hospital
10-13-73 to 11-2-73...............................$3,361.95
Physician....................................... 391.00
Associated Radiologists of Joliet ..................... 193.50
$3,946.45

9. Claimant has not received nor is she entitled to any sums of money as a result of this injury which would be considered a set-off to any award.

10. Pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, Par. 71, this Court must deduct the first $200 in expenses.

11. That the proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of this Act and the claim is, therefore, compensible thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $3,746.45 (Three Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Six Dollars and Forty Five Cents) be awarded Louise K. George as a victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 75-CV-357
    Marie L. Virgo, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 11, 1975.

    Marie L. Virgo, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arose out of a criminal assault on November 10, 1974 at approximately 10:15 p.m. in the 700 block of North Church Street in Decatur, Illinois. Marie Virgo seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, Ill. Rev. Stats., 1973, Ch. 70, Par. 71, etseq. (Hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois, which substantiates the matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant was a victim of a violent crime covered under the Act to wit:

"Aggravated Assault, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1973, Ch. 38, Par. 12-2.”

2. A detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in an Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein’ are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That said crime occurred at 10:15 p.m. in the 700 block of North Church Street, Decatur, Illinois, at which time claimant was struck on the head and knocked to the ground.

4. That said crime was reported to Decatur City Police Department promptly and claimant at all times has cooperated with law enforcement officials.

5. That the assailants have not been apprehended.

6. Claimant, as indicated by the report of the Attorney General, did not provoke the incident.

7. Claimant is not a relative of or a member of the same household of the assailant.

8. Claimant has suffered pencuniary loss in excess of $200 compensible by section 74 of the Act, to wit:

Hospital .........................................$ 85.10
Ambulance ........................................ 34.80
Medication ........................................ 5.00
$124.90

9. Claimant has suffered a loss of wages in the amount of $96 based on pay vouchers submitted to the Attorney General.

10. Claimant has petitioned the Court for personal property stolen during the commission of this attack. In Section 74 of the Act, the Legislature has specifically stated that, personal property shall not be considered as pecuniary loss.

11. Claimant has not received nor is she entitled to any sums of money as a result of this injury which would be considered a set-off of any award.

12. Pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stats., 1973, ch. 70, par. 71, this Court must deduct the first $200 in expenses.

13. That proof submitted in support of this claim satisfies all of the requirements of this Act and the claim is, therefore, compensible thereunder.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $20.90 (Twenty Dollars and Ninety Cents) be awarded Marie L. Virgo as a victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 74-CV-10
    Ashour Badalpour, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 15, 1975.

    Ashour Badalpour, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on April 15, 1974, at 810 South Kilbourn, in Chicago. Ashour Badalpour seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Ashour Badalpour, age 22, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”, (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on February 21, 1974, at approximately 11:00 p.m., the claimant was driving in his car with two friends, Simon Pera and Ninus Ushana, in the area of Glenwood and Winnemac, when a 1969-70 brown Buick pulled up beside them, blocking their lane of traffic. The claimant recognized the occupants of the Buick on sight and believed them to be members of the TJO street gang. After some obscenities were exchanged, both drivers and passengers got out of their cars. The driver of the Buick went back to his car, grabbed a baseball bat and struck one of the claimant’s passengers, Ninus Ushana. A fist fight ensued among all occupants of both cars.

When the fight was over, the claimant went to the aid of one of his friends and the assailants jumped in their car and sped away as the police approached the scene in response to a call of a disturbance in the area. The claimant was able to drive himself and his two friends to the Edgewater Hospital.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials. That claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance, but has not been able to make a positive identification of his assailants.

5. That the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the claimant was hospitalized at Edge-water Hospital from February 22, 1974, to February 24, 1974, where he was treated for a severe contusion to the lumbar area.

7. That the claimant was unable to work as the result of his injury from February 21,1974, until March 3, 1974, a total of 10 days. That claimant’s average earnings immediately preceding his injury was $600 per month.

That the Court shall determine loss of earnings based on the victim’s average monthly earnings or $500 per month, whichever is less. The maximum rate per day based on $500 per month is $16.45. As the claimant was unable to work for 10 days, the maximum loss of earnings that this Court can award is $164.50.

8. That the claimant has incurred medical, hospital expenses and loss of earnings as follows:

1) Hospital.......................................$331.90
2) Doctor ........................................ 75.00
3) Loss of Earnings ................................ 164.50
$571.40

9. That the claimant has received no benefits or reimbursements, directly or indirectly, from any other source, nor is he entitled to any such benefits from any other source as the result of his injuries.

10. That in determining the amount of compensation to which the applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

"(d) shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workman’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source . .

That after the statutory deduction of $200.00, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $371.40.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $371.40 be awarded Ashour Badalpour, as an innocent victim of a violent crime.


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    (No. 74-CV-60
    Sarah Lee Cato, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 15, 1975.

    Sarah Lee Cato, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on November 17, 1973, at 7423 South Evans, Chicago. Sarah Lee Cato seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act,” Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds as follows:

1. That the claimant, Sarah Lee Cato, age 52, was a victim of a violent crime as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-3.)

2. That on November 17, 1973, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the claimant was entering her home when an unidentified man grabbed her from behind, pulled her down the porch stairs and fled with her purse. The claimant’s husband heard her scream for help, assisted her into the house and called the police.

A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the court’s file in this matter and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon her.

4. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials, and claimant has fully cooperated with their requests for assistance by viewing suspect photos. That claimant was unable to identify assailant and that no arrests have been made in connection with this criminal offense.

5. That the claimant and her assailant were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That, as the result of her injuries, the claimant was hospitalized at Jackson Park Hospital where she underwent surgery for the repair of a compound dislocation of the left 1st and 2nd tarsal metatarsal joints. All of the expenses that she incurred for this treatment have been or will be paid by claimant’s insurance companies, Aetna Casualty and Blue Cross/Blue Shield.

7. That the claimant was employed by the Board of Education as a lunchroom attendant at the rate of $413 per month. She was disabled as the result of this injury from November 17, 1973, to September 5, 1974. The claimant’s employment, however, would have ended with the close of school on June 15, 1974. Therefore, she was off of work a total of 7 months. At the rate of $413 per month, her loss of earnings was $2,891.00. She received disability benefits in the amount of $1,158.42. Her loss of earnings, less disability benefits, is $1,732.58 which is less than the statutory maximum.

8. That as all of the claimant’s medical expenses will be covered by private insurance, claimant is limited in her recovery to her loss of earnings less the disability benefits which she received. That claimant’s pecuniary loss is $1,732.58.

9. That pursuant to §7(d) of the Act, $200 must be deducted from claimant’s pecuniary loss. That after the statutory deduction of $200.00, the amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled is $1,532.58.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $1,532.58 be awarded the claimant, Sarah Lee Cato, the victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $532.59 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 75-CV-2
    Thomas A. Kelly, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 15, 1975.

    Thomas A. Kelly, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred December 29,1973, at 2200 North Lincoln, Cook County, Chicago, Illinois. Thomas Anthony Kelly, victim, seeks compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the court, the court finds:

1. That the claimant, Thomas Anthony Kelly, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery”. (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4.)

2. That on December 29, 1973, claimant was beaten and stabbed by three men in the area of 2200 North Lincoln Avenue in Chicago, Illinois. Prior to the stabbing, claimant and a friend were walking home from the Earl of Old Town, 1615 North Wells in Chicago.

3. That statements taken by police investigators shortly after the crime was committed, present no evidence of any wrongful act or provocation by the claimant for the stabbing and beating.

4. That claimant walked to Children’s Memorial Hospital, 2300 Children’s Plaza, where he was given emergency First Aid. He was then transported to Grant Hospital by police car, where he was treated for his injuries by Dr. Fedor F. Banuchi. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter and the facts reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the victim and his assailants were not related nor sharing the same household.

6. That the criminal offense was promptly reported to law enforcement officials and claimant has cooperated with their requests for assistance. However, the assailants have not been identified at this time.

7. That the claimant seeks compensation for medical expenses and loss of earnings.

8. That the claimant was unable to work from December 31, 1973, to January 8, 1974, a total of 8 days.

9. That the claimant has proved to the Court’s satisfaction that his loss of earnings compensable under the statute was $165.14.

10. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the amount of the pecuniary loss for these items is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$ 930.55
2) Medical...................................... 675.00
$1,605.55

11. That, in determing the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court—

(d) "shall deduct $200 plus the amount of benefits, payments or awards, payable under the 'Workmen’s Compensation Act,’ or from local governmental, State or Federal funds or from any other source, (except annuities, pension plans, Federal social security benefits and the net proceeds of the first ($25,000) Twenty-five Thousand Dollars of life insurance that would inure to the benefit of the applicant . . .)”.

12. That, in this claim before us, the claimant has not received any benefits from other sources. The statutory deduction of $200, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in 119 and 10, leaves a loss compensable under the Act of $1,570.69. Hence, the claimant is entitled to an award in the amount of $1,570.69.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the total sum of $1,570.69 be awarded to the claimant an innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund to Thomas A. Kelly, as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $570.70 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.


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    (No. 75-CV-36
    Edward J. Quiroz, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.

      Opinion filed April 15, 1975.

    Edward J. Quiroz, Claimant, pro se.
    William J. Scott, Attorney General, for Respondent.
   Per Curiam.

This claim arises out of a criminal offense that occurred on June 8, 1974, at the vicinity of Cicero and Cornelia, Chicago, Cook County, Illinois. Edward J. Quiroz, the victim, seeks payment of compensation pursuant to the provisions of the "Crime Victims Compensation Act”, Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 70, §71, et seq. (hereafter referred to as the "Act”).

This Court has carefully considered the application for benefits submitted on the form prescribed and furnished by the Court; and a report of the Attorney General of the State of Illinois which substantiates matters set forth in the application. Based upon these documents and other evidence submitted before the Court, the Court finds:

1. That the claimant, Edward J. Quiroz, age 24, was a victim of a violent crime, as defined in §2(c) of the Act, to wit:

"Aggravated Battery.” (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1973, Ch. 38, §12-4).

2. That on June 8, 1974, claimant was beaten severely by a group of men in the street near his home. Prior to the beating, claimant had been walking home peacefully after spending the evening at a neighborhood tavern.

3. That statements, taken by the police investigators after the crime was committed, present no substantial evidence of any provocation by the claimant for the attack upon him.

4. That the victim sustained numerous injuries for which he was hospitalized and received surgery. A further and more detailed summary of the facts and information considered by the Court is contained in the Investigatory Report prepared by the Attorney General. A copy of said report is retained in the Court’s file in this matter, and the facts as reported therein are incorporated in this opinion by reference.

5. That the assailants have not been identified. An investigation by the Chicago Police Department continues with claimant’s cooperation.

6. That there is no evidence that the victim and his assailants were related or sharing the same household.

7. That the victim’s average monthly earnings for the period immediately preceding the injury were $605.18, but earnings of only $500 per month can be considered as the basis for determining loss of support, pursuant to the following provision in §4 of the Act:

"Loss of earnings . . . shall be determined on the basis of the victim’s average monthly earnings for the 6 months immediately preceding the date of the injury or on $500 per month, whichever is less.”

8. That the claimant was out of work for 24 days and suffered a loss of earnings of $394.74. (This figure is determined by dividing the $500 monthly earnings by 30.4, the average days in a month and multiplying the total by 24, the number of days lost.)

9. That, in addition to loss of earnings, the claimant incurred medical and hospital expenses which were not covered by insurance benefits, and the gross amount of these expenses is as follows:

1) Hospital .....................................$1,186.50
2) Medical......................................$2,690.00

10. That, in determining the amount of compensation to which an applicant is entitled, §7(d) of the Act states that this Court "Shall deduct $200.” This amount, having been deducted from the gross amount of loss as calculated in ¶8 and 9, leaves an amount of compensable loss, sustained by the claimant of $4,071.24.

It Is Hereby Ordered that the sum of $4,071.24 be awarded to the claimant, as the innocent victim of a violent crime.

It Is Further Ordered that the sum of $999.99 (Nine Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents) be paid immediately from the Court of Claims Fund as a partial payment on the total amount of this award, and that the balance of the award due the claimant in the sum of $3,071.25 be referred forthwith to the General Assembly for its approval.